

# **z/OS V2.5 IBM Education Assistant**

Solution Name: Data Privacy for Diagnostics (DPfD)

Solution Element(s): BCP SVA



# Agenda

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- Trademarks
- Objectives
- Overview
- Usage & Invocation
- Interactions & Dependencies
- Upgrade & Coexistence Considerations
- Installation & Configuration
- Summary
- Appendix

# Trademarks

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- See url <http://www.ibm.com/legal/copytrade.shtml> for a list of trademarks.
- Additional Trademarks:
  - Apache 2.0.

# Objectives

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- Things you will learn from this presentation
  - Functional content and benefit
  - How to use/ invoke the new function
  - Migration / Coexistence issues/ concerns
  - List of publications

# Overview

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- Problem Statement / Needs Addressed
  - z/OS dumps contain diagnostic data critical for problem analysis
    - There may be sensitive data in the storage being captured
- Clients share data dumps with IBM / vendors / 3<sup>rd</sup> parties
  - Risk sending sensitive private information accidentally
    - Fail to comply with Privacy Laws and Regulations (ex. GDPR)
      - Hefty fines and loss of credibility
  - Forced to choose between Regulatory Compliance and Serviceability
    - Non-negotiable for many of our clients

# Overview

- Impact of sharing sensitive data
  - Irreparable damages to money and reputation

\$3.9M

Global average cost of a data breach

The average total cost has increased by **10%** since 2014.

80%

Breaches that contained customer PII

Customer PII is the **most frequently** compromised type of record.

\$150

Customer PII average cost per record

Customer PII is also the **costliest** type of record compromised.

Biggest data breach fines in millions of USD

**Equifax (575M)**

**Home Depot( 200M)**

**Uber (148M)**

**Capital One (80M)**

- Lacks enabled by weak security, cover-ups or avoidable mistakes have cost these companies a total of nearly **\$1.3B** and counting.

Source: CSO, The biggest data breach fines, penalties and settlements so far, 2020 - [bit.ly/33Kt1rk](https://bit.ly/33Kt1rk)

# Overview

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- Our Solution
  - z/OS Data Privacy for Diagnostics (DPfD)
  - Implements a two-pronged approach to detect / tag sensitive data
    - Allow z/OS APIs to tag their 64-bit storage with Sensitivity attributes on z15
      - New keyword SENSITIVE=(YES|NO|UNKNOWN)
        - Supported on IARV64/ IARST64/ IARCP64 requests
  - Leverage the z/OS Diagnostics Analyzer
    - Complements the API tagging solution
    - Detects sensitive data in untagged pages
      - Pages tagged sensitive and non-sensitive are skipped
      - Includes a set of built-in identifiers
      - Allows customization to identify sensitive data in one's environment
      - Written in Java
        - Exploits zIIPs and multi-threading to boost performance

# Overview

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- Our Solution (continued)

- Capture storage as usual, along with sensitivity tags
  - Propagate the sensitivity attributes in the dump records
    - no additional impact to dump capture times
  - SVC and Stand-alone dumps (328868) – hbb77b0 to hbb77d0
  - SYSM and Transaction dumps (364824) - hbb77d0
  - Support keyword SENS on GTF parms (hbb77d0)
    - Options are YES|NO|UNK
    - Tag GTF records with Sensitivity Attributes
      - Dump records on GTFPCT are always marked not-sensitive

```
/IEFPROC EXEC PGM=AHLGTF,PARM='MODE=EXT,DEBUG=NO,TIME=YES,SENS=YES',  *  
//  TIME=1440,REGION=2880K  
-----  
s  gtf.VARAN1,,, (MODE=DEFER,SENS=NO,DEBUG=NO)
```



# Overview


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- Our Solution (continued)
  - z/OS Data Privacy for Diagnostics (DPfD)
    - Post-process the original dump to create a 2<sup>nd</sup> / redacted dump
      - Utilize the z/OS Diagnostics Analyzer to:
        - Scan, analyze and tag dump records with unknown sensitivity
          - Allows customized detection of sensitive data
        - Redact sensitive data in the dump records
          - Using built-in, custom and dependent identifiers
        - Provide redaction reports
          - List of redacted pages etc.
    - Send the redacted dump for diagnosing the problem

# Overview

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- Solution workflow



# Overview

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- Benefits / Value
  - System programmers can share diagnostics material
    - with sensitive data detected and redacted automatically
    - minimal impact to the problem resolution times
  - No need to choose between
    - Diagnostic Capability And Regulatory Compliance
  - Over-redaction is possible and preferred

# Usage & Invocation

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- On z15 machines
  - All SVC/ Stand-alone/ SYSM and Transaction dumps are redactable
- To post-process a redactable dump
  - File system setup is required (See SYS1.SAMPLIB(BLSDPJIN))
    - Create, initialize and mount the file system to the home directory
    - Shell script provided to create necessary sub-directories
    - **Knowledgebase** – stores ingested knowledge and user feedback
    - **Configuration** – stores configuration files
    - **Reports** – stores generated reports on DPfD functions
      - A subdirectory is created for each dump
        - A subdirectory with each run-number

# Usage & Invocation

- IPCS Post-process Panel

```
----- IPCS MVS DUMP BATCH JOB OPTION MENU -----
OPTION  ===>

  1  SADUMP      - Prepare stand alone dump for analysis
  2  SVCDUMP     - Prepare SVC dump for analysis
  3  SYSMDUMP    - Prepare SYSMDUMP for analysis
  4  SUPPLEMENT - Perform supplementary dump analysis
  5  EREP        - Process software data using EREP
  6  DPfD        - Data Privacy for Diagnostics

JOB STATEMENT INFORMATION:  (Verify before proceeding)

===> //DPFD JOB MSGCLASS=A,MSGLEVEL=(1,1),REGION=0M,
===> //      MEMLIMIT=NOLIMIT
===>
===>
===>
===>

Enter END to terminate batch job processing.
```

```
-----
*****
* USERID   - PURVIP
* DATE     - 19/09/24
* JULIAN   - 19.267
* TIME     - 01:39
* PREFIX   - PURVIP
* TERMINAL - 3278
* PF KEYS  - 24
*****
```

# Usage & Invocation

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- IPCS DPfD main panel

```
----- Data Privacy for Diagnostics Request -----  
COMMAND ==>  
Press ENTER to edit parameters, END to terminate without job submission.  
  
REQUESTED FUNCTION ==> ANALYZE    (ANALYZE, REPORT, FEEDBACK, INGEST, EXTRACT)  
  
    ANALYZE  - Analyze the input file using built-in and custom identifiers  
  
    REPORT   - Generate a user friendly report of ANALYZE operation  
  
    FEEDBACK - Provide feedback to fine-tune future DPFd analysis  
  
    INGEST   - Ingest the user provided data  
  
    EXTRACT  - Extract identifier information  
  
  
F1=HELP      F2=SPLIT    F3=END      F4=RETURN   F5=RFIND    F6=MORE  
F7=UP        F8=DOWN     F9=SWAP     F10=LEFT    F11=RIGHT   F12=CURSOR
```

# Usage & Invocation

- IPCS DPfD 'Analyze' panel

Press ENTER to submit the job, END to terminate without job submission.

DATA SET NAME ===> 'D83DUMP.DYNZOS24.S58.D190911.T221308.SV00006'

NEW DATA SET NAME ===> 'D83DUMP.DPFD.RED'

TEMP DATA SET/PAT ===> 'D83DUMP.DPFD.TEMP'

BYPASS DP ANALYSIS ===> N (Y or N)

REDACTION STRING ===> !!!!!!!!!!!!! (0-32 characters)

NUMBER OF THREADS ===> 8 (1-8)

ALLOW PAGE LEVEL ===> Y (Y or N)

SENSITIVE REPORT ===> Y (Y or N)

DPfD HOME DIR ===> /DPfD

JAVA HOME DIR ===> /usr/lpp/java/java800/current\_64

JAVA OPTIONS ===> -Xms256m -Xmx4g

JZOS LOAD MODULE ===> JVMLDM86 (JVMLDMxx, see JZOS Batch Launcher Toolkit)

MIGLIB DATASET ===> 'SYS1.MIGLIB'

TEMP ALLOC PARMS ===> storclas(sclarge) dataclas(compress)

EDIT CONFIG FILE? ===> Y

# Usage & Invocation

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- IPCS – DPfD ‘Analyze’ customize options
  - Number of threads (max 8)
  - Redaction level
    - Page (faster but may over-redact)
      - Token level for below-the-bar storage
    - Token (detailed but can take longer)
  - Redaction string
    - Makes it easier to spot redacted data in dump pages



# Usage & Invocation

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- New IPCS message at dump initialization
  - Redactable but not post-processed dump

```
IKJ56650I TIME-05:09:44 PM. CPU-00:00:04 SERVICE-394156 SESSION-02:29:07 JANUARY
15,2020
BLS18122I Initialization in progress for
DSNAME('MVSSVA.VARAN1.TWEAKSWO.NOREDACT.S00003')
BLS18124I TITLE=DPFD0011 WITH SUMLIST64
BLS18223I Dump written by z/OS 02.04.00-0 SVC dump - level same as IPCS level
BLS18558I This redactable dump has not been post-processed to protect sensitive data
BLS18222I z/Architecture mode system
BLS18255I Dump Init      Elapsed Time          CPU Time
          Input I/O      00:00:00.507451        00:00:00.010237
          DDIR           00:00:00.044555        00:00:00.021118
```

# Usage & Invocation

- New IPCS message at dump initialization
  - Redactable and Post-processed dump

```
IKJ56650I TIME-10:21:06 AM. CPU-00:00:01 SERVICE-154397 SESSION-01:15:51 JANUARY 15,2020
BLS18122I Initialization in progress for DSNAME('MVSSVA.SECURDMP.SADMP.DPA.AFTERE35')
BLS18124I TITLE=SADMP DPF0001
BLS18223I Dump written by z/OS 02.04.00-0 SADUMP - level same as IPCS level
BLS18557I This redactable dump has been post-processed to protect sensitive data
BLS18222I z/Architecture mode system
BLS18125I CPU(1) STATUS available
BLS18125I CPU(2) STATUS available
BLS18310I Stand alone dump required 00:03 to record to MVSSVA.SECURDMP.SADMP
BLS18255I Dump Init      Elapsed Time      CPU Time
           Input I/O    00:00:01.408455      00:00:00.023984
           DDIR         00:00:00.242923      00:00:00.124712
```

# Usage & Invocation

---

- New message during post-processing
  - Attempt to redact an unsupported dump
    - non-z15 dump

```
" 2021-02-19 13:11:58 INFO PageData:365 - Dump supported : false : 00"  
" 2021-02-19 13:11:58 INFO FileProcessor:267 - Header Status : false"  
" 2021-02-19 13:11:58 INFO DumpReaderZfile:142 - Going to close : //'D83DUMP.SYSZOS25.ZD00FJH6.SV02922'"  
" 2021-02-19 13:11:58 ERROR FileProcessor:103 - The dump version is not supported."  
" 2021-02-19 13:11:58 ERROR EntryPoint:257 - Error during processing : "  
" com.ibm.irl.data.sdi.SdiException: The dump version is not supported."
```

- a post-processed dump and Analysis was bypassed

```
16.09.01 JOB08341 $HASP373 E35POSTP STARTED - WLM INIT - SRVCLASS WLMLONG - SYS AQTS  
16.09.01 JOB08341 IEF403I E35POSTP - STARTED - TIME=16.09.01  
16.09.01 JOB08341 +BLS18556I The input data is not eligible for DPfD post processing  
16.09.01 JOB08341 -
```


# Usage & Invocation

---

- New IPCS component record BLSREDCT
  - Lists pages tagged sensitive by an API or Analyzer
  - SVC Dump
    - BLSREDCT for API tagged pages is created at the dump write time
    - BLSREDCT for Analyzer tagged pages is created during post-processing
  - Stand-alone dump
    - BLSREDCT is created during post-processing for API and Analyzer tagged pages


# Usage & Invocation

- New IPCS component record BLSREDCT



# Usage & Invocation

- New IPCS component record BLSREDCT (continued)



# Usage & Invocation

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- New IPCS REXX exec
  - BLSXREDR – REXX that reads COMPDATA(BLSREDCT)
    - Lists ranges tagged sensitive
    - Can be invoked from IPCS or TSO
    - Input – dump name, ASID (optional)

# Usage & Invocation

- BLSXREDR sample output
  - In TSO: %BLSXREDR 'MVSSVA.DPFD.TESTDUMP'

```
Dump being analyzed: 'MVSSVA.DPFD.TESTDUMP'
.
00000000_7EBB0000 : 00000000_7EBB0FFF, Redacted by Data Privacy Analysis, partial page(s)
00000000_7EBBA000 : 00000000_7EBBAFFF, Redacted by Data Privacy Analysis, partial page(s)
.
Records for ASID 0007
00000050_0020A000 : 00000050_0020AFFF, Redacted by Data Privacy Analysis, whole page(s)
00000050_00212000 : 00000050_00213FFF, Redacted by Data Privacy Analysis, whole page(s)
00000050_00688000 : 00000050_00688FFF, Redacted by Data Privacy Analysis, whole page(s)
00000050_00878000 : 00000050_00878FFF, Redacted by Data Privacy Analysis, whole page(s)
.
Records for ASID 0006, DSPNAME=IXCDSMEM.
00000000_00900000 : 00000000_00901FFF, Redacted by Data Privacy Analysis, partial page(s)
00000000_01200000 : 00000000_01200FFF, Redacted by Data Privacy Analysis, partial page(s)
00000000_01D00000 : 00000000_01D00FFF, Redacted by Data Privacy Analysis, partial page(s)
00000000_02400000 : 00000000_02400FFF, Redacted by Data Privacy Analysis, partial page(s)
.
Records for COMPDATA='IARHVSHR'.
0000040C_FEFB9000 : 0000040C_FEFB9FFF, Redacted by Data Privacy Analysis, whole page(s)
0000040C_FF015000 : 0000040C_FF015FFF, Redacted by Data Privacy Analysis, whole page(s)
0000040C_FF01F000 : 0000040C_FF01FFFF, Redacted by Data Privacy Analysis, whole page(s)
0000040C_FF068000 : 0000040C_FF068FFF, Redacted by Data Privacy Analysis, whole page(s)
0000040C_FF087000 : 0000040C_FF087FFF, Redacted by Data Privacy Analysis, whole page(s)
```



# Usage & Invocation

- BLSXREDR sample output
  - In TSO: %BLSXREDR 'MVSSVA.DPFD.TESTDUMP' A A5

```
Dump being analyzed: 'MVSSVA.DPFD.TESTDUMP'
Records for ASID 00A5
 00000000_00DB7000 : 00000000_00DB8FFF, Redacted by Data Privacy Analysis, partial page(s)
 00000000_00DC0000 : 00000000_00DC0FFF, Redacted by Data Privacy Analysis, partial page(s)
 00000000_00DC4000 : 00000000_00DC4FFF, Redacted by Data Privacy Analysis, partial page(s)
 00000000_00DC6000 : 00000000_00DC8FFF, Redacted by Data Privacy Analysis, partial page(s)
 00000000_7F266000 : 00000000_7F266FFF, Redacted by Data Privacy Analysis, partial page(s)
 00000000_7F295000 : 00000000_7F295FFF, Redacted by Data Privacy Analysis, partial page(s)
 00000000_7F2A6000 : 00000000_7F2A6FFF, Redacted by Data Privacy Analysis, partial page(s)
..
 00000010_008FF000 : 00000010_008FFFFFFF, Redacted by Data Privacy Analysis, whole page(s)
 00000010_00AFC000 : 00000010_00AFCFFF, Redacted by Data Privacy Analysis, whole page(s)
 0000005C_80007000 : 0000005C_80007FFF, Redacted by Data Privacy Analysis, whole page(s)
Records for COMPDATA='IARHVSHR'.
 00000321_00006000 : 00000321_00006FFF, Redacted by Data Privacy Analysis, whole page(s)
 00000321_F8A79000 : 00000321_F8A79FFF, Redacted by Data Privacy Analysis, whole page(s)
 00000321_F8C10000 : 00000321_F8C10FFF, Redacted by Data Privacy Analysis, whole page(s)
```

# Usage & Invocation

- IP LIST sample output before and after page-level redaction
  - sensitive ranges in the original dump

```
>> ip list 50_00800000.asid(x'41') len(4096)

LIST 50_00800000. ASID(X'0041') LENGTH(X'1000') AREA
_0800000 LENGTH(X'03B0')==>All bytes contain X'00'
_08003B0. 00D3E8C4 C9C14040 40404040 4040D2C5 |.LYDIA          KE|
_08003C0. D3D3E840 40404040 40404040 4040D74B |LLY            P.|
_08003D0. D64B40C2 D6E740F1 F5F96B40 F3F6F9F4 |O. BOX 159, 3694|
_08003E0. 40D4C1E4 D9C9E240 E2E34B40 40404040 | MAURIS ST.    |
_08003F0. 40404040 4040E2C1 D540D1D6 C1D8E4C3 |          SAN JOAQUIC|
_0800400. 60D54040 40404040 40404040 40404040 |-N             |
_0800410. 40404040 4040F0F8 F4F8F340 40404040 |          08483   |
_0800420. 4040F5F1 F5F6F1F8 40F4F6F1 F7F3F640 | 515618 461736 |
_0800430. F7F4F3F1 40F2F1F9 00000000 00000000 |7431 219.....|
_0800440 LENGTH(X'0BC0')==>All bytes contain X'00'
```

- sensitive ranges in the post-processed dump

```
>> ip list 50_00800000.asid(x'41') len(200)

LIST 0050_00800000. ASID(X'0041') LENGTH(X'C8') AREA
_0800000. D9C5C4C1 C3E3C5C4 40C4C1E3 C1000000 |REDACTED DATA.....|
_0800010. 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 |.....|
_6B00020 LENGTH(X'A0')==>All bytes contain X'00'
_6B000C0. 00000000 00000000          |.....|
```

# Usage & Invocation

- IP LIST sample output before and after token-level redaction
  - sensitive ranges in the original dump

```
LIST 0B1A0320. ASID(X'0038') LENGTH(X'64') AREA
0B1A0320. 00000000 00000000 0000C194 81A88140 |.....Amaya |
0B1A0330. 40404040 404040E2 A3859788 8595A296 |      Stephenso|
0B1A0340. 95404040 404040F2 F0F760F4 F9F9F540 |n      207-4995 |
0B1A0350. C58785A2 A381A240 E2A39985 85A34040 |Egestas Street |
0B1A0360. 40404040 40404040 40404040 404040C4 |              D|
0B1A0370. 85A39996 89A34040 40404040 40404040 |etroit        |
0B1A0380. 40404040                |              |
```

- sensitive ranges in the post-processed dump

```
LIST 0B1A0320. ASID(X'0038') LENGTH(X'64') AREA
0B1A0320. 00000000 00000000 00005A5A 5A5A5A5A |.....!!!!!!|
0B1A0330 LENGTH(X'40')==>All bytes contain X'5A', EBCDIC C'!'
0B1A0370. 5A5A5A5A 5A5A4040 40404040 40404040 |!!!!!!      |
0B1A0380. 40404040                |              |
```

# Interactions & Dependencies

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- Software Dependencies
  - No
- Hardware Dependencies
  - z15
- Exploiters
  - Db2, IMS, VSAM, various DFSMS components
  - ZFS (z/OS V2.5 only)

# Upgrade & Coexistence Considerations

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- To exploit this solution, all systems in the Sysplex must be at the new z/OS level:  
No
- Fix Category: IBM.Function.DataPrivacyForDiagnostics
- List of toleration/coexistence APARs/PTFs.
  - Storage Manager (API-1) OA57633 (UJ00688, UJ00699)
  - Storage Manager (API-2) OA58289 ( UJ03895, UJ03896)
  - Storage Manager (API-2 PE) OA60373 (UJ04600, UJ04601)
  - Service Aids Support OA57570 (UJ00714, UJ00715)
  - Service Aids Support OA58114 (UJ04756, UJ04586)
  - Basic Access Methods OA58712 (UJ01664, UJ01665)
  - Object Access Method OA58431 (UJ01359, UJ01360)
  - Db2 PH15940 (UJ65280)
  - IMS PH14059 (UJ65556)
  - VSAM OA58730 (UJ04647,UJ04649)

# Upgrade & Coexistence Considerations

---

- List anything that doesn't work the same anymore
  - No change. Original dumps before DPfD post-processing are same as before, except that the dump records contain sensitivity attributes of the storage captured.
- Coexistence applies to lower-level systems which coexist (share resources) with latest z/OS systems.
  - Function available on v2r3 and above.

# Installation & Configuration

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- Are any APARs or PTFs needed for enablement? Yes, see the slide on PTFs
- What jobs need to be run? See slides on Post-processing
- What hardware configuration is required? z15
- What PARMLIB statements or members are needed? None
- Are any other system programmer procedures required? N/A
- Are there any planning considerations? N/A
- Are any special web deliverables needed? N/A
- Does installation change any system defaults? no

# Summary

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- z/OS Data privacy for Diagnostics
  - Available on z15 machines
  - Designed and developed to help clients comply with Privacy policies / regulations
    - Without sacrificing diagnostic capabilities
  - Creates a second, redacted dump by post-processing the original dump
    - By removing/redacting sensitive data
  - Allows APIs to tag their known 64-bit storage with Sensitivity attributes
    - 31-bit storage is subjected to token-level redaction by the z/OS Diagnostics Analyzer
      - Except various system areas (NUC, LPA, system trace buffers which are considered not-sensitive)
  - Optional post-processing to secure sensitive data
    - Ingests the sensitive data/ data patterns
    - Exploits parallelism
    - Scans, detects and tags sensitive data in untagged dump records
      - Using Built-in / Custom / dependent identifiers
    - Allows to fine-tune redaction through the Feedback function
  - Over-redaction is possible and preferred
  - Only redactable and unredacted dumps can be post-processed.



# Appendix

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- Publications:
  - z/OS MVS IPCS Commands (SA23138200)
  - z/OS MVS IPCS Customization (SA23138300)
  - z/OS MVS IPCS Messages (SA2275900)
  - z/OS MVS IPCS User's Guide (SA23138400)
  - z/OS Version 2 Release 5 of MVS System Commands (SA38066600)
  - z/OS MVS Diagnosis: Tools and Service Aids (GA32090500)