

z/OS V2.5 IBM Education Assistant

Solution Name: Certificate failure diagnostics and extended master secret support

Solution Element(s): System SSL

July 2021



Agenda

- Trademarks
- Objectives
- Certificate failure diagnostics
 - Overview
 - Usage & Invocation
 - Interactions & Dependencies
 - Upgrade & Coexistence Considerations
 - Installation & Configuration
- Extended Master Secret (EMS)
 - Overview
 - Usage & Invocation
 - Interactions & Dependencies
 - Upgrade & Coexistence Considerations
 - Installation & Configuration
- Summary
- Appendix

Trademarks

- See url <http://www.ibm.com/legal/copytrade.shtml> for a list of trademarks.
- Additional Trademarks:
 - None

Objectives

- At the end of this presentation, you will understand the following enhancements from System SSL:
 - Certificate failure diagnostics
 - An overview of the new certificate diagnostics features
 - How to enable and collect certificate diagnostics
 - What sort of failures and errors can the certificate diagnostics capture
 - What data is collected and provided by the diagnostics
 - Extended master secret support provided by System SSL
 - An overview of extended master secret support
 - What benefits the extended master secret support provides
 - Understand how these enhancements affect installation, migration and coexistence

Certificate Failure Diagnostics

Overview

- Who (Audience)
 - System Programmers that want diagnostic aids that help identify and resolve certificate validation failures that occur within System SSL
- What (Solution)
 - Enhance the certificate validation and handshake processes to collect diagnostic information during execution
 - Implement mechanisms to provide this diagnostic information to exploiters
 - New callback routine
 - Update **gsk_validate_certificate_mode()** API with new optional output parameter
- Wow (Benefit / Value, Need Addressed)
 - Reduce the need for recreates and other time-consuming debugging activities by providing a first failure data capture during normal execution
 - New diagnostic information provides better insight to the cause of failure rather than just a return code
 - Collected diagnostics are provided directly to exploiting applications – allowing them to fold this information into their own diagnostic mechanisms

Usage & Invocation

- System SSL has enhanced the certificate validation and handshake processes to now collect diagnostic information during execution as a first failure data capture
- This diagnostic information is provided to exploiting applications that use one of the two new certificate diagnostic features
 - SSLV3/TLS applications can obtain certificate diagnostic information about the peer certificate by implementing the new **GSK_CERT_DIAGNOSTIC_CALLBACK** routine
 - This routine is provided the peer's certificate diagnostic information that was collected during the processing of the handshake CERTIFICATE message (**gsk_secure_socket_init()** API)
 - Applications that call the **gsk_validate_certificate_mode()** API directly can obtain this diagnostic information with a new optional parameter

Usage & Invocation – Diagnostic Callback

- SSLV3/TLS applications looking to exploit the **gsk_cert_diagnostic_callback** simply need to implement their own callback routine using the provided function prototype:

```
void * cert_diagnostic_callback (  
    gsk_handle          soc_handle,  
    gsk_diag_summary *  diag_summary,  
    char *              diag_string,  
    char *              user_data);
```

- Then set the **GSK_CERT_DIAGNOSTIC_CALLBACK** with *gsk_attribute_set_callback()* :

```
gsk_attribute_set_callback(handle,  
                           GSK_CERT_DIAGNOSTIC_CALLBACK,  
                           (void *)cert_diagnostic_callback);
```



Usage & Invocation – Diagnostic Callback

- The callback routine will automatically be called whenever a certificate validation occurs depending on the setting of the **GSK_CERT_DIAG_INFO** attribute
- **GSK_CERT_DIAG_INFO** can be one of the following values:
 - *GSK_CERT_DIAG_INFO_FAILURE_ONLY*
 - *GSK_CERT_DIAG_INFO_SUCCESS_ONLY*
 - *GSK_CERT_DIAG_INFO_SUCCESS_OR_FAILURE*
- By default, the callback routine is only called on validation failures
- The value for this attribute is set with either the **GSK_CERT_DIAG_INFO** environment variable or with the *gsk_attribute_set_enum()* routine

Usage & Invocation – Diagnostic Callback

Attribute	Description	Values	Comments
GSK_CERT_DIAG_INFO (New)	Specifies the circumstances in which the <i>gsk_cert_diagnostic_callback</i> routine should be called.	Environment variable allowed settings: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• FAILURE – callback will only be called if the certificate validation fails for the peer• SUCCESS – callback will only be called if the certificate validation is successful for the peer• BOTH – callback will be called for both peer certificate validation successes and failures <i>gsk_attribute_[sg]et_enum()</i> allowed settings: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• GSK_CERT_DIAG_INFO_FAILURE_ONLY• GSK_CERT_DIAG_INFO_SUCCESS_ONLY• GSK_CERT_DIAG_INFO_SUCCESS_OR_FAILURE	Default: FAILURE

Usage & Invocation – Diagnostic Callback



Usage & Invocation – Diagnostic Callback


- When the diagnostic callback routine is called, it is provided the peer's certificate validation diagnostic information within the ***gsk_diag_summary***
- The ***gsk_diag_summary*** provides the following information:
 - CMS & SSL Return Codes
 - A brief description (text) of the failure encountered
 - List of the certificate sources used during validation
 - Certificate details of each certificate in the certificate chain
 - SubjectDN, IssuerDN, SerialNum, etc.
 - Source that the certificate was found (Handshake, kdb file, SAF keyring, etc.)
 - Index of the failing certificate (within the certificate chain)
- In addition to the ***gsk_diag_summary***, the routine is also provided an untranslated diagnostic string

Usage & Invocation – Diagnostic Callback Examples

- Diagnostic Callback Example Scenarios:
 - Expired Certificate
 - Missing Root CA
 - Revoked Certificate
 - Unsupported Elliptic Curve
- N.B. The following examples use output taken from internal applications. The output and formatting of the diagnostic data shown are a result of our implementation of a sample diagnostic callback routine in order to demonstrate the data provided by the diagnostics.

Usage & Invocation – Diagnostic Callback Example 1

Example: Server's End Certificate is Expired



Usage & Invocation – Diagnostic Callback Example 1


=====		
	Certificate Diagnostics	
	=====	
	Summary Overview	
	-----+	
	SSL Return Code	401
	CMS Return Code	0x03353022
	Descriptive Text	Certificate is expired
	-----+	
	Certificate Chain	
	-----+	
	Certificate Count	1
	Failing Cert Index	1
	-----+	
	Certificate Index	1
	SubjectDN	CN=End,OU=SSL,O=IBM,L=POK,ST=NY,C=US
	IssuerDN	CN=Int,OU=SSL,O=IBM,L=POK,ST=NY,C=US
	Serial Number	0d
	Cert Source	Handshake
	-----+	

Usage & Invocation – Diagnostic Callback Example 1

```
+-----+
|                               Diagnostic String                               |
+-----+
| SSLRetCode= 401 CMSRetCode= 0x03353022 Description= Certificate is expired S |
| ubjectDN= <CN=End,OU=SSL,O=IBM,L=POK,ST=NY,C=US> IssuerDN= <CN=Int,OU=SSL,O= |
| IBM,L=POK,ST=NY,C=US> SerialNumber= 0d CertificateSource= Handshake TrustedS | |
| ource= /home/certs/ex1.kdb |
=====
```


Usage & Invocation – Diagnostic Callback Example 2

Example: Client is Missing Server's Root Certificate



Usage & Invocation – Diagnostic Callback Example 2

=====		
Certificate Diagnostics		
=====		
Summary Overview		
+-----+-----+		
SSL Return Code	8	
CMS Return Code	0x0335302f	
Descriptive Text	Self-signed certificate not found in trusted key	
	source	
+-----+-----+		
Certificate Chain		
+-----+-----+		
Certificate Count	3	
Failing Cert Index	3	

Usage & Invocation – Diagnostic Callback Example 2


Certificate Index	1
SubjectDN	CN=End,OU=SSL,O=IBM,L=POK,ST=NY,C=US
IssuerDN	CN=Int,OU=SSL,O=IBM,L=POK,ST=NY,C=US
Serial Number	0d
Cert Source	Handshake
Certificate Index	2
SubjectDN	CN=Int,OU=SSL,O=IBM,L=POK,ST=NY,C=US
IssuerDN	CN=Root,OU=SSL,O=IBM,L=POK,ST=NY,C=US
Serial Number	0c
Cert Source	Handshake
Certificate Index	3
SubjectDN	CN=Root,OU=SSL,O=IBM,L=POK,ST=NY,C=US
IssuerDN	CN=Root,OU=SSL,O=IBM,L=POK,ST=NY,C=US
Serial Number	0b
Cert Source	Handshake

Usage & Invocation – Diagnostic Callback Example 2

```
+-----+
|                               Diagnostic String                               |
+-----+
| SSLRetCode= 8 CMSRetCode= 0x0335302f Description= Self-signed certificate no |
| t found in trusted key source SubjectDN= <CN=Root,OU=SSL,O=IBM,L=POK,ST=NY,C |
| =US> IssuerDN= <CN=Root,OU=SSL,O=IBM,L=POK,ST=NY,C=US> SerialNumber= 0b Cert |
| ificateSource= Handshake TrustedSource= /home/certs/ex2.kdb                |
=====
```

Usage & Invocation – Diagnostic Callback Example 3

Example: Client Using Revoked Certificate



Usage & Invocation – Diagnostic Callback Example 3

=====		
	Certificate Diagnostics	
	=====	
	Summary Overview	
	-----+-----+-----	
	SSL Return Code	431
	CMS Return Code	0x03353041
	Descriptive Text	Using CDP HTTP CRL, certificate is revoked
	-----+-----+-----	
	Certificate Chain	
	-----+-----+-----	
	Certificate Count	3
	Failing Cert Index	1
	-----+-----+-----	

Usage & Invocation – Diagnostic Callback Example 3


Certificate Index	1
SubjectDN	CN=End,OU=SSL,O=IBM,L=POK,ST=NY,C=US
IssuerDN	CN=Int,OU=SSL,O=IBM,L=POK,ST=NY,C=US
Serial Number	0d
Cert Source	Handshake
Certificate Index	2
SubjectDN	CN=Int,OU=SSL,O=IBM,L=POK,ST=NY,C=US
IssuerDN	CN=Root,OU=SSL,O=IBM,L=POK,ST=NY,C=US
Serial Number	0c
Cert Source	/home/certs/ex3.kdb
Certificate Index	3
SubjectDN	CN=Root,OU=SSL,O=IBM,L=POK,ST=NY,C=US
IssuerDN	CN=Root,OU=SSL,O=IBM,L=POK,ST=NY,C=US
Serial Number	0b
Cert Source	/home/certs/ex3.kdb

Usage & Invocation – Diagnostic Callback Example 3

```
+-----+
|                               Diagnostic String                               |
+-----+
| SSLRetCode= 431 CMSRetCode= 0x03353041 Description= Using CDP HTTP CRL, cert |
| ificate is revoked SubjectDN= <CN=End,OU=SSL,O=IBM,L=POK,ST=NY,C=US> IssuerD |
| N= <CN=Int,OU=SSL,O=IBM,L=POK,ST=NY,C=US> SerialNumber= 0d CertificateSource |
| = Handshake TrustedSource= /home/certs/ex3.kdb                               |
=====
```


Usage & Invocation – Diagnostic Callback Example 4

Example: Server Using Elliptic Curve not Supported by GSK_CLIENT_ECURVE_LIST



Usage & Invocation – Diagnostic Callback Example 4

Note: The CMS
return code
indicates a
perfectly valid
certificate

=====	
Certificate Diagnostics	
=====	
Summary Overview	
+-----+	
SSL Return Code	405
CMS Return Code	0x00000000
Descriptive Text	Elliptic curve type (secp192r1) is not supported by the local GSK_CLIENT_ECURVE_LIST
+-----+	
Certificate Chain	
+-----+	
Certificate Count	3
Failing Cert Index	1

Usage & Invocation – Diagnostic Callback Example 4

Certificate Index	1
SubjectDN	CN=End,OU=SSL,O=IBM,L=POK,ST=NY,C=US
IssuerDN	CN=Int,OU=SSL,O=IBM,L=POK,ST=NY,C=US
Serial Number	0d
Cert Source	Handshake
Certificate Index	2
SubjectDN	CN=Int,OU=SSL,O=IBM,L=POK,ST=NY,C=US
IssuerDN	CN=Root,OU=SSL,O=IBM,L=POK,ST=NY,C=US
Serial Number	0c
Cert Source	Handshake
Certificate Index	3
SubjectDN	CN=Root,OU=SSL,O=IBM,L=POK,ST=NY,C=US
IssuerDN	CN=Root,OU=SSL,O=IBM,L=POK,ST=NY,C=US
Serial Number	0b
Cert Source	/home/certs/ex4.kdb

Usage & Invocation – Diagnostic Callback Example 4


```
+-----+
|                                     |
|                               Diagnostic String                               |
|-----+
| SSLRetCode= 405 CMSRetCode= 0x00000000 Description= Elliptic curve type (sec |
| p192r1) is not supported by the local GSK_CLIENT_ECURVE_LIST SubjectDN= <CN= |
| End,OU=SSL,O=IBM,L=POK,ST=NY,C=US> IssuerDN= <CN=Int,OU=SSL,O=IBM,L=POK,ST=N |
| Y,C=US> SerialNumber= 0d CertificateSource= Handshake TrustedSource= /home/c |
| erts/ex4.kdb |
|=====
```

Usage & Invocation – gsk_validate_certificate_mode() API

- Certificate diagnostics are also available to callers of the ***gsk_validate_certificate_mode()*** API through a new optional parameter

```
gsk_status gsk_validate_certificate_mode (  
    gskdb_data_sources *      data_sources,  
    x509_certificate *        subject_certificate,  
    gsk_boolean               accept_root,  
    gsk_int32 *               issuer_record_id,  
    GSKCMS_CERT_VALIDATION_MODE validation_mode,  
    gsk_uint32                arg_count  
    [, GSKCMS_CERT_VALIDATE_KEYRING_ROOT validate_root]  
    [, GSKCMS_REVOCATION_SECURITY_LEVEL security_level]  
    [, gsk_int32               max_source_rev_ext_loc_values]  
    [, gsk_int32               max_validation_rev_ext_loc_values]  
    [, x509_diag_summary *      diag_summary]  
    ...)
```

Usage & Invocation – gsk_validate_certificate_mode() API



Usage & Invocation – gsk_validate_certificate_mode() API

- System SSL will collect and return certificate diagnostics if a non-NULL value is provided for the ***diag_summary*** optional parameter.
- Diagnostics are always collected and returned using this method. (Not determined by **GSK_CERT_DIAG_INFO** attribute)
- The diagnostics returned consist of:
 - CMS return code
 - A brief description (text) of the failure encountered
 - Copy of each certificate in the chain
 - Index of the failing certificate (within the certificate chain)
 - Index and type of each certificate source
 - Failing revocation source index

Interactions & Dependencies

- Software Dependencies
 - None
- Hardware Dependencies
 - None
- Exploiters
 - AT-TLS (Application Transparent –TLS)
 - IPSec

Interactions & Dependencies

- Certificate Diagnostics: AT-TLS support
- AT-TLS implements the new GSK_CERT_DIAGNOSTIC_CALLBACK callback function
- Whenever System SSL returns an error regarding a certificate received from a remote communication partner:
 - If the AT-TLS trace level includes 2 (Error) for the relevant AT-TLS rule, a certificate diagnostic message will be written to the AT-TLS log via syslogd:

```
EZD2052I TTLS Certificate Diagnostics GRPID:00000004 ENVID: 00000004 CONNID: 00000039 SSLRetCode= 8  
CMSRetCode= 0x0335302f Description= Self-signed certificate not found in trusted key source SubjectDN=  
<CN=TEST Server,OU=MYDEPT,O=MYCOMPANY,L=Raleigh,ST=NC,C=US> IssuerDN= <CN=TEST INTERMEDIARY  
CA,OU=MYDEPT,O=MYCOMPANY,L=Raleigh,ST=NC,C=US> SerialNumber= 67 CertificateSource= Handshake TrustedSource=  
CLIENTRING
```

- If the AT-TLS trace level includes 8 (Event) for the relevant AT-TLS rule, the certificate chain will also be written to syslogd:

```
EZD2053I TTLS Certificate Diagnostics Details GRPID:00000004 ENVID: 00000004 CONNID: 00000039 Certificate=  
1 of 3 FailingCert= NO SubjectDN= <CN=TEST Server,OU=MYDEPT,O=MYCOMPANY,L=Raleigh,ST=NC,C=US> IssuerDN=  
<CN=TEST INTERMEDIARY CA,OU=MYDEPT,O=MYCOMPANY,L=Raleigh,ST=NC,C=US> SerialNumber= 67 CertificateSource=  
Handshake  
EZD2053I TTLS Certificate Diagnostics Details GRPID:00000004 ENVID: 00000004 CONNID: 00000039 Certificate=  
2 of 3 FailingCert= NO SubjectDN= <CN=TEST INTERMEDIARY CA,OU=MYDEPT,O=MYCOMPANY,L=Raleigh,ST=NC,C=US>  
IssuerDN= <CN=TEST ROOT CA,OU=MYDEPT,O=MYCOMPANY,L=Raleigh,ST=NC,C=US> SerialNumber= 23 CertificateSource=  
Handshake  
EZD2053I TTLS Certificate Diagnostics Details GRPID:00000004 ENVID: 00000004 CONNID: 00000039 Certificate=  
3 of 3 FailingCert= YES SubjectDN= <CN=TEST ROOT CA,OU=MYDEPT,O=MYCOMPANY,L=Raleigh,ST=NC,C=US> IssuerDN=  
<CN=TEST ROOT CA,OU=MYDEPT,O=MYCOMPANY,L=Raleigh,ST=NC,C=US> SerialNumber= 11 CertificateSource= Handshake  
EZD2054I TTLS Certificate Diagnostics Data Sources GRPID:00000004 ENVID: 00000004 CONNID: 00000039 Count= 2  
CLIENTRING , Handshake
```

Upgrade & Coexistence Considerations

- To exploit this solution, all systems in the Sysplex must be at the new z/OS level
 - No
- Migration/Toleration/Coexistence
 - None

Installation & Configuration

- None

Extended Master Secret

Overview

- Who (Audience)
 - Applications performing TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1 and TLS 1.2 handshakes
- What (Solution)
 - Implement the extended master secret (EMS) support as specified by RFC 7627
- Wow (Benefit / Value, Need Addressed)
 - Uses an improved and more secure calculation for the master secret during TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1, and TLS 1.2 handshakes

Usage & Invocation

- System SSL has added EMS support in z/OS 2.5
- EMS support will be available in the future for z/OS 2.3 and 2.4 with new function APAR OA60105
- By default, System SSL will enable EMS support on the client and server with addition of two new environment variables/attributes
 - This results in the negotiation of EMS with the client and server by default
- EMS is only negotiated during TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1, and TLS 1.2 handshakes
 - It does not apply to TLS 1.3 as an EMS-styled calculation is already done within this protocol

Usage & Invocation

Attribute	Description	Values	Comments
GSK_CLIENT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET (New)	Specifies if the TLS client sends the extended master secret extension to the server. This option is only applicable for TLS V1.0, TLS V1.1, or TLS V1.2 handshakes.	<p>Environment variable allowed settings:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• 0, OFF, or DISABLED – Does not send the extended master secret extension to the server• 1, ON, or ENABLED – Sends the extended master secret extension to the server but does not require the server to support the extension• REQUIRED – Sends the extended master secret extension to the server and requires the server to support the extension. If the server does not send the extension, the handshake fails. <p>gsk_attribute_[sg]et_enum() allowed settings (connection or environment):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• GSK_CLIENT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_ON• GSK_CLIENT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_OFF• GSK_CLIENT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_REQUIRED	Default: ON

Usage & Invocation

Attribute	Description	Values	Comments
GSK_SERVER_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET (New)	Specifies if the TLS server supports negotiating the extended master secret extension from clients. This option is only applicable for TLS V1.0, TLS V1.1, or TLS V1.2 handshakes.	<p>Environment variable allowed settings:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">0, OFF, or DISABLED – Does not support negotiating the extended master secret extension from clients1, ON, or ENABLED – Supports negotiating the extended master secret extension from clients but does not require the extensionREQUIRED – Requires the EMS extension from the client. If a client does not send the extension, the handshake fails. <p>gsk_attribute_[sg]et_enum() allowed settings (connection or environment):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">GSK_SERVER_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_ONGSK_SERVER_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_OFFGSK_SERVER_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_REQUIRED	Default: ON

Usage & Invocation

- `gsk_attribute_get_enum()` – Updated to support a new attribute which can be queried to see if the EMS extension has been negotiated on a connection
 - New attribute type: `GSK_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_USED`
 - `GSK_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_USED_ON` – Indicates that EMS has been negotiated on the connection
 - `GSK_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_USED_OFF` – Indicates EMS has not been negotiated on the connection

Interactions & Dependencies

- Software Dependencies
 - None
- Hardware Dependencies
 - None
- Exploiters
 - AT-TLS (Application Transparent – Transport Layer Security)

Upgrade & Coexistence Considerations

- To exploit this solution, all systems in the Sysplex must be at the new z/OS level:
Yes (for now)
 - APAR OA60105 provides full EMS negotiation for LPARs running 2.3 and 2.4
 - When the PTFs for OA60105 are applied, then all systems will have the capability to negotiate EMS (full and cached TLS handshakes)
 - 2.3 PTFs (UJ05345, UJ05349, and UJ05361) and 2.4 PTFs (UJ05348, UJ05368, and UJ05370)
- Toleration/coexistence APAR OA60691
 - Allows for cached TLS handshakes to occur on back-level LPARs that negotiate EMS on 2.5
 - Only comes into play when the System SSL server application is enabled for sysplex caching (GSK_SYSPLEX_SIDCACHE=ON)
 - Before IPLing z/OS 2.5, all LPARs in the sysplex must apply the PTFs for coexistence APAR OA60691 to all back-level releases (2.3 and 2.4)
 - If the PTFs are not applied, additional full TLS handshakes may occur which may impact performance
 - Coexistence APAR OA60691 will be marked as IBM.Coexistence.z/OS.V2R5
 - 2.3 PTFs (UJ05161 and UJ05173) and 2.4 PTFs (UJ05162 and UJ05195)

Upgrade & Coexistence Considerations

- Updates in z/OS 2.5
 - Server will now optionally negotiate EMS if the client has sent the extension
 - Client will now send and optionally negotiate EMS if the server supports it
 - Can set GSK_CLIENT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET and GSK_SERVER_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET to OFF to turn off negotiating EMS

Installation & Configuration

- None

Summary

- You should now be able to understand the following enhancements from System SSL:
 - Certificate failure diagnostics
 - Extended master secret support
 - Understand how these enhancements affect installation, migration and coexistence

Appendix

- z/OS Cryptographic Services System SSL Programming