

- Public key encryption scheme proposed by **R.L. Rivest, A. Shamir, L.M. Adleman** in ***A Method for Obtaining Digital Signatures and Public-Key Cryptosystems*** (1978)
- Depends on the mathematical (computational) problem of **factorizing integers**.

If  $p$  is a prime number and  $z$  any number coprime to  $p$ ,  
i.e.  $\gcd(p, z) = 1$ , then

$$z^{p-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{p} \Leftrightarrow p \mid (z^{p-1} - 1)$$

$$\Leftrightarrow_{(p \nmid z)} \boxed{z^p \equiv z \pmod{p}}$$

## Proof:

■ Put:  $t = (1 \cdot 2 \cdot 3 \cdot \dots \cdot (p-1)) \bmod p \neq 0 \pmod{p}$

■ Multiplication with  $z$  defines a bijective mapping:

$$m_z: \mathbb{Z}_p \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p, m_z(x) = (x \cdot z) \bmod p$$

$$m_z: \mathbb{Z}_p^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$$

■ It follows that:

$$t \equiv 1 \cdot 2 \cdot 3 \cdot \dots \cdot (p-1) \equiv (1 \cdot z) \cdot (2 \cdot z) \cdot (3 \cdot z) \cdot \dots \cdot ((p-1) \cdot z) \equiv t \cdot z^{p-1} \pmod{p}$$

■ Division in  $\mathbb{Z}_p$  by  $t \neq 0$  gives the claimed identity.

$$\mathbb{Z}_p = \{0, 1, \dots, p-1\}$$

$$z \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$$

$$\text{ord}(z) \mid (p-1)$$

$$\text{by F3(i)}$$

$$p-1 = \text{ord}(z) \cdot b$$

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{Z}_p: \quad z^{p-1} &= z^{\text{ord}(z) \cdot b} \\ &= (z^{\text{ord}(z)})^b = 1^b = 1 \end{aligned}$$

[Proof F3(i)]

Let  $p, q$  be prime numbers ( $p \neq q$ ) and  $r \in \mathbb{Z}$  with:

$$r \equiv 1 \pmod{\text{lcm}(p-1, q-1)}$$

Then:

$$z^r \equiv z \pmod{p \cdot q} \quad \text{for all } z \in \mathbb{Z}$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \text{lcm}(p-1, q-1) \mid (r-1)$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \begin{cases} (p-1) \mid (r-1) & (*) \\ (q-1) \mid (r-1) \end{cases}$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \begin{cases} z^r \equiv z \pmod{p} \\ z^r \equiv z \pmod{q} \end{cases}$$

**Proof:**

- If  $z \equiv 0 \pmod{p}$ , then  $z^r \equiv 0 \pmod{p}$ .
- If  $p$  does not divide  $z$  and  $r = 1 + n(p-1)$ , then:

$$z^r = z \cdot \underbrace{(z^{p-1})^n}_{\substack{1 \text{ (Fermat's Lemma)}}} \equiv z \pmod{p}$$

- Similarly:

$$z^r \equiv z \pmod{q}$$

$$r-1 \stackrel{(*)}{=} n \cdot (p-1) \quad \text{for some } n \in \mathbb{N}$$

- Chose two random primes  $p$  and  $q$  ( $> 2^{1000}$ )

with  $e \nmid (p-1)$  and  $e \nmid (q-1)$

- Put  $n = pq$ ,  $v = \text{lcm}(p-1, q-1)$

- Define a public exponent  $e$  with:

$$\gcd(e, v) = 1$$

- Determine the private exponent  $d$  with:

$$ed \equiv 1 \pmod{v}$$

typically  $e = 2^{16} + 1 = 10 \dots 01$  a 4-th Fermat prime  
 $2^{2^n} + 1$   
(3, 5, 17, 65537, ...)  $e$

- Key pair  $(k_{\text{pub}}, k_{\text{priv}})$ :

$$k_{\text{pub}} = (n, e)$$


modul public exponent

$$k_{\text{priv}} = (n, d)$$

private exponent


- **Encryption** of a message  $m$  ( $< n$ ):

$$c = E(m) = m^e \bmod n$$



- **Decryption** of  $c$ :

$$D(c) = c^d \bmod n$$



- $D(c) = m$  follows from  $e \cdot d \equiv 1 \pmod{\varphi}$  and Fermat's lemma:


$$D(c) = c^d \bmod n = (m^e)^d \bmod n = m^{ed} \bmod n = m \bmod n = m$$

*conseq. of*

*" (m^e mod n)^d mod n "*


- [FIPS PUB 186-4: Digital Signature Standard \(DSS\)](#)
  - Chapter 4: The Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA)
  - Chapter 5: The RSA Digital Signature Algorithm
  - Chapter 6: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)


- Signing a message






- Verifying a signature







## ■ DSA Domain Parameters

- $p$  : prime number of bit length  $L$

- $q$  : a prime divisor of  $p-1$  of bit length  $N$   $p-1 = q \cdot b$

- $g$  : element of  $\mathbf{GF}(p)^*$  with  $\mathbf{o}(g) = q$

$\mathbb{Z}_p^*$ , let  $h \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$  with  $\mathbf{o}(h) = p-1 = q \cdot b \Rightarrow g := h^b, \mathbf{o}(g) = q$

- Selection of Parameter Sizes and **Hash** Functions for DSA:

- $L = 1024, N = 160$   $\text{SHA-1}$

- $L = 2048, N = 224$   $\text{SHA-224}$

- $L = 2048, N = 256$   $\text{SHA-256}$

- $L = 3072, N = 256$  — " —

- **DSA Domain Parameters**

- $p$  : prime number of bit length  $L$
- $q$  : a prime divisor of  $p-1$  of bit length  $N$
- $g$  : element of  $\mathbf{GF}(p)^*$  with  $\mathbf{o}(g) = q$

$$\mathbf{GF}(p)^* \supseteq \langle g \rangle = \{g, g^2, g^3, \dots, g^q = 1\}$$

- **DSA Key Pairs**

- $x$  : private key with  $0 < x < q$
- $y$  : public key  $y = g^x \bmod p$

- Domain Parameters:  $p, q, g$
- Key Pair:  $x, y$
- Signature Generation for message  $M$ 
  - $k$  : per message newly generated secret random number,  $0 < k < q$
  - $r := (g^k \bmod p) \bmod q$
  - $z$  : Hash( $M$ ) (leftmost  $N$  bits)
  - $s := (k^{-1}(z + xr)) \bmod q$
- $\text{Sig}_x(M) := (r, s)$

- Domain Parameters:  $p, q, g$
- Key Pair:  $x, y = g^x \bmod p$
- Signature for  $M$ :  $\text{Sig}_x(M) = (r, s)$ ,  $r = \underline{(g^k \bmod p) \bmod q}$ ,  $s = \underline{(k^{-1}(z + xr)) \bmod q}$
- Signature Verification (given  $M$ ,  $\text{Sig}_x(M) = (r, s)$ ,  $y$ )
  - $w := s^{-1} \bmod q$  in  $\mathbb{Z}_q$ :  $w = s^{-1} = k \cdot (z + xr)^{-1} \bmod q$
  - $z : \text{Hash}(M)$  (leftmost  $N$  bits)
  - $u_1 := (zw) \bmod q$
  - $u_2 := (rw) \bmod q$
  - $v := \underline{((g^{u_1} y^{u_2}) \bmod p) \bmod q}$
  - $\text{Sig}_x(M)$  **ok** iff  $v = r$

$$\begin{aligned} (g^{z \cdot w} \cdot g^{x \cdot r \cdot w}) \bmod p &= g^{w(z + xr)} \bmod p \\ &= g^{k(z + xr)^{-1}(z + xr)} \bmod p \\ &= g^k \bmod p \end{aligned}$$

- [FIPS PUB 186-4, Ch. 6](#)
  - relates strongly to ANS X9.62, Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Standard (ECDSA)
  - FIPS PUB 186-4, Appendix D: Recommended Elliptic Curves for Federal Government Use
- Certicom Research: Standards for Efficient Cryptography
  - [SEC 1: Elliptic Curve Cryptography](#)
  - [SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters](#)



- **ECDSA Domain Parameters**

- **$E$**  : elliptic curve over  $F = GF(p)$  or  $F = GF(2^m)$
- **$q$**  : a large prime divisor of  $|E| = qh$  (with cofactor  **$h$** )
- **$G$**  : point of  **$E$**  with  $o(G) = q$

$$o(G) = q : q \cdot G = \mathcal{O}$$

$$\begin{array}{ccc} x \cdot G & & g^x \\ (\bar{E}, +) & \longleftarrow & (\mathbb{Z}_p^*, \cdot) \end{array} \quad o(G) = q$$

- **ECDSA Domain Parameters**

- $E$  : elliptic curve over  $F = GF(p)$  or  $F = GF(2^m)$
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- $G$  : point of  $E$  with  $o(G) = q$

- **ECDSA Key Pair**

- $x$  : private key with  $0 < x < q$
- $Y$  : public key  $Y = x \cdot G$

- Domain Parameters:  $E, q, G$
- Key Pair:  $x, Y$
- Signature Generation for message  $M$ 
  - $k$ : per message newly generated secret random number,  $0 < k < q$
  - $R := k \cdot G = (R_x, R_y), \quad r := R_x \bmod q$
  - $z$ : Hash( $M$ ) (leftmost  $N$  bits)
  - $s := (k^{-1}(z + xr)) \bmod q$
- $\text{Sig}_x(M) := (r, s)$

- Domain Parameters:  $E, q, G$
- Key Pair:  $x, Y = x \cdot G$
- Signature for  $M$ :  $\text{Sig}_x(M) = (r, s)$ ,  $r = (k \cdot G)_x \bmod q$ ,  $s = (k^{-1}(z + xr)) \bmod q$
- Signature Verification (given  $M, \text{Sig}_x(M) = (r, s), Y$ )
  - $w := s^{-1} \bmod q$
  - $z : \text{Hash}(M)$  (leftmost  $N$  bits)
  - $u_1 := (zw) \bmod q$
  - $u_2 := (rw) \bmod q$
  - $V := u_1 \cdot G + u_2 \cdot Y, v := V_x \bmod q$
  - $\text{Sig}_x(M)$  **ok** iff  $v = r$

$$\begin{aligned} V &= z \cdot u \cdot G + r \cdot u \cdot x \cdot G = (z \cdot u + r \cdot u x) \cdot G \\ &= (u \cdot (z + rx)) \cdot G = k \cdot G \end{aligned}$$

initial a    initial b

	<u>A=132</u>	<u>B=156</u>		q
initialization	1	0	132 <sup>a</sup>	
	0	1	156 <sup>b</sup>	0
	1	0	132 <sup>b</sup>	1 ←
	-1	1	24 <sup>b</sup>	5 ←
	6	-5	12 <sup>b</sup>	2 ←
		0		
			STOP	

$gcd(132, 156) = 12$

$a > b$

$gcd(a, b) = gcd(b, a \bmod b)$  ,  $a \bmod b = a - q \cdot b$   
with  $q = \frac{a}{b}$

$x \cdot A + y \cdot B = b$

$6 \cdot 132 - 5 \cdot 156 = 12 = gcd(132, 156)$

$$p = 107$$

$$x = 42$$

$$\gcd(p, x) = 1$$

$$\rightarrow$$

107	42		q
1	0	107	
0	1	42	2
1	-2	23	1
-1	3	19	1
2	-5	4	4
-9	23	3	1
11	-28	1	3
	$\uparrow$	0	

$$11 \cdot 107 - 28 \cdot 42 = 1$$

in  $\mathbb{Z}_p$

$$\cancel{11 \cdot 0} + 79 \cdot 42 = 1$$

$$42^{-1} = 79 \quad \text{in } \mathbb{Z}_{107}$$