


Dynamic Resource Allocation

Spectrum of Achievable Performances
& Algorithmic Design Principles



Akshit Kumar


Joint work with Omar Besbes and Yash Kanoria

Columbia Business School

Research Question

Research Question

A few (demand)
types are present



Theory


All (demand)
types are present



Theory


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Many (demand)
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Practice


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
Theory

Research Question

A few (demand)
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Many (demand)
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All (demand)
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
← Theory

Practice

Theory →


Entire spectrum of how to model (demand) types

Research Question



1. What is the interplay between the distribution of request types and achievable algorithmic performance?

Research Question



1. What is the interplay between the distribution of request types and achievable algorithmic performance?
2. Can we design a **unified, simple** and **near-optimal** algorithms which works for all type distributions?

Network
Revenue
Management

Repeated
Auctions with
Budgets



Order
Fulfillment

Dynamic
Matching

Network
Revenue
Management

Repeated
Auctions with
Budgets



Multi-
secretary



Order
Fulfillment


Dynamic
Matching

Multi-secretary Problem


The background of the slide features three intersecting lines. A blue line starts from the left edge and extends towards the top right. A green line starts from the left edge and extends towards the bottom right. A red line starts from the bottom left and extends towards the top right. These lines intersect to form a large, irregular shape in the center of the slide.

Multi-secretary Problem

A few types
are present




All types are
present




Multi-secretary Problem

A few types
are present
Bounded Regret




All types are
present
Logarithmic Regret



Regret is the additive gap b/w the value of hindsight opt. and value under some algorithm

Multi-secretary Problem

A few types
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Bounded Regret



All types are
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Logarithmic Regret




β -clustered distributions

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Multi-secretary Problem

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Logarithmic Regret



Entire spectrum of regret scalings is possible

β -clustered distributions


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Multi-secretary Problem


one algorithm to solve them all

Repeatedly Act using Multiple Simulations (RAMS)

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Network
Revenue
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Order
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Multi-
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Repeatedly Act using Multiple Simulations (RAMS)

Multi-secretary Problem



Online selection of top- B values

Online selection of top- B values

- Given a sequence of T values and budget B , the DM wants to select the top B values

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- Assumption: The values are drawn i.i.d from a known distribution F


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- Given a sequence of T values and budget B , the DM wants to select the top B values
- The values arrive in an online fashion
- The DM must make irrevocable **accept/reject** decisions
- Assumption: The values are drawn i.i.d from a known distribution F
- Performance Metric: Minimize **Regret**

$$\text{Regret}(\pi) = (\text{Expected Maximum Value in Hindsight}) - (\text{Expected Value under } \pi)$$

Multi-secretary Problem

A few types
are present
Bounded Regret



All types are
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Logarithmic Regret




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
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Complete Characterization of the Multi-secretary Problem


Complete Characterization of the Multi-secretary Problem




Complete Characterization of the Multi-secretary Problem




Complete Characterization of the Multi-secretary Problem




Complete Characterization of the Multi-secretary Problem



Complete Characterization of the Multi-secretary Problem




Complete Characterization of the Multi-secretary Problem




Distribution shape is a fundamental driver of performance

Complete Characterization of the Multi-secretary Problem



Distribution shape is a fundamental driver of performance


Complete Characterization of the Multi-secretary Problem



Distribution shape is a fundamental driver of performance

Dealing with gaps in an algorithmic challenge

Complete Characterization of the Multi-secretary Problem




Distribution shape is a fundamental driver of performance

Dealing with gaps in an algorithmic challenge

Conservativeness with respect to gaps (CwG) principle enables near-optimal performance

Complete Characterization of the Multi-secretary Problem



Distribution shape is a fundamental driver of performance

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
Use RAMS to operationalize CwG

Multi-secretary Problem


one algorithm to solve them all

Repeatedly Act using Multiple Simulations (RAMS)

A few types
are present
Bounded Regret



All types are
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Logarithmic Regret




Entire spectrum of regret scalings is possible

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Gaps pose an algorithmic
challenge

Gaps pose an algorithmic challenge



Gaps pose an algorithmic challenge



Certainty Equivalent Control computes the budget ratio


Gaps pose an algorithmic challenge



Certainty Equivalent Control computes the budget ratio

$$\text{br} = \text{Budget Ratio} = (\text{Remaining Budget}) / (\text{Remaining Time})$$

Gaps pose an algorithmic challenge




Certainty Equivalent Control computes the budget ratio

$br = \text{Budget Ratio} = (\text{Remaining Budget}) / (\text{Remaining Time})$

Accept if the request type value is more than $F^{-1}(1 - br)$,
else reject the request

Gaps pose an algorithmic challenge




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


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
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
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$\text{Regret(CE)} = \Omega(\sqrt{T})$ (highly sub-optimal regret scaling)


CwG via multiple simulations




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
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
CwG via multiple simulations




CwG via multiple simulations




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
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
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
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
CwG via multiple simulations



CwG via multiple simulations




CwG via multiple simulations



Accept if the request type value is more than \overline{HS} , else reject the request


CwG via multiple simulations



Accept if the request type value is more than \overline{HS} , else reject the request

$$\text{Regret(RAMS)} = O(\log^2 T)$$

CwG via multiple simulations




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CwG via multiple simulations




Accept if the request type value is more than \overline{HS} , else reject the request

Conservativeness with respect to Gaps Principle

If the CE threshold $F^{-1}(1 - br)$ is close to a gap, use the gap as the threshold. Otherwise continue using the CE threshold.

CwG via multiple simulations



Accept if the request type value is more than \overline{HS} , else reject the request

Connections to "Dual Averaging"

The different HS thresholds are the shadow prices of the budget for different scenarios, the bid price is computed by averaging the HS thresholds

Network
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Multi-
secretary



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Repeatedly Act using Multiple Simulations (RAMS)


RAMS beyond multi-secretary

RAMS beyond multi-secretary

State (Budget) B_t and feasible set of actions A_t

RAMS beyond multi-secretary


State (Budget) B_t and feasible set of actions A_t



RAMS beyond multi-secretary

State (Budget) B_t and feasible set of actions A_t

Request $\theta_t = (r_t, c_t)$ arrives at time t




RAMS beyond multi-secretary

State (Budget) B_t and feasible set of actions A_t

Request $\theta_t = (r_t, c_t)$ arrives at time t

Simulate multiple request scenarios



RAMS beyond multi-secretary

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
Simulate multiple request scenarios

$\theta_t, \theta_{t+1}^{(1)}, \theta_{t+2}^{(1)}, \dots, \theta_T^{(1)}$ Scenario 1

$\theta_t, \theta_{t+1}^{(2)}, \theta_{t+2}^{(2)}, \dots, \theta_T^{(2)}$ Scenario 2

\vdots

$\theta_t, \theta_{t+1}^{(m)}, \theta_{t+2}^{(m)}, \dots, \theta_T^{(m)}$ Scenario m



Scenario 1

...



Scenario m

RAMS beyond multi-secretary

State (Budget) B_t and feasible set of actions A_t

Request $\theta_t = (r_t, c_t)$ arrives at time t

Simulate multiple request scenarios


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$\theta_t, \theta_{t+1}^{(2)}, \theta_{t+2}^{(2)}, \dots, \theta_T^{(2)}$ Scenario 2

\vdots

$\theta_t, \theta_{t+1}^{(m)}, \theta_{t+2}^{(m)}, \dots, \theta_T^{(m)}$ Scenario m

For each scenario k , compute the **compensation** for each action in A_t



Scenario 1

...



Scenario m

RAMS beyond multi-secretary

State (Budget) B_t and feasible set of actions A_t

Request $\theta_t = (r_t, c_t)$ arrives at time t

Simulate multiple request scenarios


$\theta_t, \theta_{t+1}^{(1)}, \theta_{t+2}^{(1)}, \dots, \theta_T^{(1)}$ Scenario 1

$\theta_t, \theta_{t+1}^{(2)}, \theta_{t+2}^{(2)}, \dots, \theta_T^{(2)}$ Scenario 2

\vdots

$\theta_t, \theta_{t+1}^{(m)}, \theta_{t+2}^{(m)}, \dots, \theta_T^{(m)}$ Scenario m

For each scenario k , compute the **compensation** for each action in A_t



Scenario 1

...



Scenario m

Compensation(scenario k , a) =
(Max total reward in scenario k) –
(Max total reward in scenario k if
action a is taken at time t)

RAMS beyond multi-secretary

State (Budget) B_t and feasible set of actions A_t

Request $\theta_t = (r_t, c_t)$ arrives at time t

Simulate multiple request scenarios

$\theta_t, \theta_{t+1}^{(1)}, \theta_{t+2}^{(1)}, \dots, \theta_T^{(1)}$ Scenario 1


$\theta_t, \theta_{t+1}^{(2)}, \theta_{t+2}^{(2)}, \dots, \theta_T^{(2)}$ Scenario 2

\vdots

$\theta_t, \theta_{t+1}^{(m)}, \theta_{t+2}^{(m)}, \dots, \theta_T^{(m)}$ Scenario m

For each scenario k , compute the **compensation** for each action in A_t

Take the **action** with the **minimum compensation** averaged over m scenarios



Scenario 1

...



Scenario m

Compensation(scenario k , a) =
(Max total reward in scenario k) –
(Max total reward in scenario k if
action a is taken at time t)

RAMS beyond multi-secretary

State (Budget) B_t and feasible set of actions A_t

Request $\theta_t = (r_t, c_t)$ arrives at time t

Simulate multiple request scenarios

$\theta_t, \theta_{t+1}^{(1)}, \theta_{t+2}^{(1)}, \dots, \theta_T^{(1)}$ Scenario 1

$\theta_t, \theta_{t+1}^{(2)}, \theta_{t+2}^{(2)}, \dots, \theta_T^{(2)}$ Scenario 2


\vdots

$\theta_t, \theta_{t+1}^{(m)}, \theta_{t+2}^{(m)}, \dots, \theta_T^{(m)}$ Scenario m

For each scenario k , compute the **compensation** for each action in A_t

Take the **action** with the **minimum compensation** averaged over m scenarios

Repeat the process



Scenario 1

...



Scenario m

Compensation(scenario k , a) =
(Max total reward in scenario k) –
(Max total reward in scenario k if
action a is taken at time t)

RAMS minimizes hindsight-based
regret

RAMS minimizes hindsight-based regret

Informal Meta Theorem [RAMS inherits guarantees of near-optimal algos].

Given a dynamic resource allocation setting, if there exists an algorithm **ALG** satisfying certain technical conditions, then

$$\text{Regret}(\text{RAMS}) \leq \text{Regret Upper Bound of } \mathbf{ALG} + \text{Sampling Error}$$

RAMS minimizes hindsight-based regret

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Proof of the Informal Meta Theorem.

$$\text{Regret}(\text{RAMS}) = \sum_{t=1}^T \mathbb{E}[\text{Comp}_t(a_t^{\text{RAMS}})] \leq \sum_{t=1}^T \mathbb{E}[\text{Comp}_t(a_t^{\text{ALG}})]$$

Compensated Coupling or
Performance Diff. Lemma

RAMS chooses the action with
the minimum compensation

RAMS is on-par with SOTA

RAMS is on-par with SOTA

Corollary of the Meta Theorem.

Polynomial regret for multi-secretary problem under different type distributions [**this work**]

Bounded regret for Network Revenue Management and Online Matching for a **few types** [Vera and Banerjee '21]

Logarithmic regret for Network Revenue Management with many types and non-degeneracy assumps. [Bray '23]

Log-Squared regret for Network Revenue Management with many types and w/o non-degeneracy assumps. [Jiang et. al '22]

RAMS is on-par with SOTA

Corollary of the Meta Theorem.


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
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Network Revenue Management problem with a few types



What is the interplay between the distribution of request types and achievable algorithmic performance?



Can we design a **unified, simple** and **near-optimal** algorithms which works for all type distributions?


one policy to solve them all

Repeatedly Act using Multiple Simulations (RAMS)

A few types
are present

Bounded Regret

Multi-secretary Problem



All types are
present

Logarithmic Regret



Entire spectrum of regret scalings are possible

β -clustered distributions

Network
Revenue
Management

Repeated
Auctions with
Budgets



Multi-
secretary



Order
Fulfillment

Dynamic
Pricing

Repeatedly Act using Multiple Simulations (RAMS)

Network
Revenue
Management



Repeated
Auctions with
Budgets



So long and **Thanks** for all the fish



Order
Fulfillment
Repeatedly Act using Multiple Simulations (RAMS)

Dynamic
Pricing
(Pricing)