
ciphart

key derivation with easier measurable security

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i propose *ciphart* — a memory-hard key derivation function with a security gain that’s measurable more objectively and more conveniently than anything in class known to date, while maintaining a memory-hardness identical to argon2d¹.

to nail this goal, *ciphart*’s security gain is measured in the unit of *relative entropy bits*. relative to what? relative to the encryption algorithm that’s used later on.

therefore, this measure is guaranteed to hold irrespective of adversary’s hardware, for as long as the encryption algorithm that’s used with *ciphart* is also the same one that’s used to encrypt the data afterwards.

my reference implementation is available here².

1 ciphart

1.1 parameters

M total memory in multiples of 2×64 bytes.
 T number of 64-byte tasks per lane segment.
 R number of rounds per task.
 B added security in *relative entropy bits*.
 L number of lanes for concurrency.
 S salt.
 K output key size in bytes.
 enc encryption function.
 p passphrase.

1.2 internal variables

$G \leftarrow M/64/T/L$; total number of segments.
 m_i 64 bytes memory for i^{th} task in M -bytes pad.
 $n_l \leftarrow lG$; nonce variable for l^{th} lane with at least 64 bits.
 $f \leftarrow \text{false}$; a flag indicating whether the M -byte pad is filled.

1.3 output

k K -bytes key with $\geq B$ *relative entropy bits*.

1.4 steps

shown in algorithm 1.

algorithm 1: ciphart version 6

```
1 while true do
2   for  $g = 0, 1, \dots, G - 1$  do
3     for  $l = 0, 1, \dots, L - 1$  do
4       for  $t = 0, 1, \dots, T - 1$  do
5         for  $r = 0, 1, \dots, R - 1$  do
6            $i \leftarrow gT + t$ ;
7           if  $t = 0$  then
8              $j \leftarrow i + T - 1$ ;
9           else if  $t = T - 1$  then
10             $j \leftarrow i + 1 - T$ ;
11          else
12             $j \leftarrow i + 1$ ;
13           $m_j \leftarrow \text{enc}(m_i, n_l, k)$ ;
14           $n_l \leftarrow n_l + 1$ ;
15           $k \leftarrow f(m_j, p, l, s, t)$ ;
16        if  $f = \text{true}$  and  $\log_2(n_l L) \geq B$  then
17          go to line 19;
18       $f \leftarrow \text{true}$ ;
19 while true do
20   for  $l = 1, 2, \dots, L$  do
21     if  $\text{len}(k) \geq K$  then return  $k[0 : K]$ ;
22      $n \leftarrow n + 1$ ;
23      $k \leftarrow k \parallel \text{enc}(m_{l,S,T}[1], n, k)$ ;
```

2 parallelism

3 memory-hardness

4 security interpretation

5 comparison

6 summary

¹<https://github.com/P-H-C/phc-winner-argon2>

²<https://github.com/Al-Caveman/ciphart>