# key derivation with easier measurable security

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hi — i propose *ciphart*, a sequential memory-hard key derivation function that has a security gain that's measurable more objectively and more conveniently than anything in class known to date.

to nail this goal, *ciphart*'s security gain is measured in the unit of *relative entropy bits*. relative to what? relative to the encryption algorithm that's used later on. therefore, this *relative entropy bits* measure is guaranteed to be true when the encryption algorithm that's used with *ciphart* is also the same one that's used to encrypt the data afterwards.

my reference implementation is available here<sup>1</sup>.

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## 1 ciphart

```
parameters:
```

M each task's size, at least 32 bytes. W total memory in multiples of 2M. number of rounds per task. B added security in relative entropy bits.

enc encryption function.

k initial key.

#### input:

```
T \leftarrow W/M

P \leftarrow \max(2, \lceil 2^B/(TR) \rceil)

x \leftarrow 0, a 16 bytes wide variable.

m_t for any task t \in \{1, 2, ..., T\}, m_t is M-
bytes memory for t^{th} task to work on.

m_t[0:16] means first 16 bytes. m_t[-16:]
means last 16 bytes.
```

nonce a variable with enough bytes to store nonces in.

hash a function to compress W bytes into desired key length.

### output:

 $\hat{k}$  better key, with B, or more, relative entropy bits. specifically, with  $\log_2(PTR) \ge B$  bits

### steps:

1

 $\mathbf{2}$ 

 $\mathbf{2}$ 

 $\mathbf{2}$ 

 $\mathbf{2}$ 

 $\mathbf{2}$ 

```
1: for p = 1, 2, ..., P do
        for t = 1, 3, ..., T - 1, in steps of 2 do
            i \leftarrow t
 3:
 4:
            j \leftarrow t + 1
            for r = 1, 2, ..., 2R do
 5:
               nonce \leftarrow (p, t, r)
 6:
               m_i \leftarrow \text{enc}(m_j, \text{nonce}, k)
 7:
               \hat{i} \leftarrow i
 8:
               i \leftarrow j
 9:
               j \leftarrow \hat{i}
10:
            end for
11:
12:
            x \leftarrow x \oplus m_i[-16:]
            x \leftarrow x \oplus m_i[-16:]
13:
        end for
14:
        for t = 1, 2, ..., T do
15:
            m_t[0:16] \leftarrow m_t[0:16] \oplus x
16:
        end for
17:
18: end for
19: return k \leftarrow \text{hash}(m_1, m_2, \dots, m_T)
```

 $<sup>^1</sup>$ https://github.com/Al-Caveman/ciphart

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