Crying Wolf in the Lab

Arya Gaduh, Peter McGee, Alexander Ugarov* February 27, 2023

Abstract

Keywords:

1 Introduction

A Tables

Table 1: List of Treatments

Gremlins composition						
Prop. of black balls (p)	Honest	Black-eyed	White-eyed	FP rate	FN rate	
0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.5	2	0	0	0	0	
0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.5	3	1	0	0.33	0	
0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.5	3	0	1	0	0.33	
0.1,0.2,0.3,0.5	3	1	1	0.33	0.33	
0.1,0.2,0.3,0.5	5	1	0	0.2	0	
0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.5	5	0	1	0	0.2	
0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.5	5	1	1	0.2	0.2	

Table 2: Demographic Characteristics of Subjects

	A	.11	$p \in \mathcal{A}$	$\{0.1, 0.3\}$	$p \in \mathcal{A}$	$\overline{\{0.2, 0.5\}}$
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Male	43	41	22	41	21	41
Age>23yrs old	14	13	6	11	8	16
Students	88	84	46	85	42	82
Had statistics classes	63	60	37	69	26	51
Total	105	100	54	100	51	100

Table 3: Risk Aversion Measurement

Switching Probability (π^*)	θ	N
Always protect	>2	1
0.1	2	10
0.15	1.216	13
0.2	0.573	29
0.25	0	16
0.3	-0.539	15
Never protect	<-0.539	14

Table 4: Informed protection response: logistical regression

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	
	All	S=White	S=Black	All	S=White	W=Black	S=White	W=
FP rate	.251**	.556***	136	.2*	1.19***	38	2.3**	
	(2.2)	(4.8)	(-0.8)	(1.8)	(3.7)	(-0.8)	(2.2)	(
FN rate	.342***	.615***	0304	.352***	1.26***	116	2.69***	J
	(3.2)	(4.6)	(-0.2)	(3.1)	(12.8)	(-0.3)	(4.1)	(
S=Black	.454***			.473***				
	(83.6)			(91.4)				•
plevel=200	.106***	.0914*	.12**	0	0	0	0	
	(2.8)	(1.9)	(2.2)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	ļ
FP rate x FN rate							-6.33**	
							(-2.4)	1
Subject FE	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ŀ
$P(FP \text{ rate} \neq FN \text{ rate})$.542	.766	.669	.309	.855	.705	.411	
N	624	312	312	582	117	105	117	ļ
Pseudo R-squared	.33	.159	.026	.519	.479	.0844	.56	
Log-likelihood	-290	-125	-152	-194	-41.2	-66.1	-34.8	

t statistics in parentheses

 ${\it Errors}$ are clustered by subject, average marginal treatment effects

^{*} p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table 5: Informed Protection Response: flexible control for posteriors and beliefs

-	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Posterior only	Posterior only	Both	Both
FP rate x (S=White)	.676***	.552**	.379*	.309
	(3.5)	(2.2)	(1.9)	(1.2)
FN rate x (S=White)	1.08**	1.57^{***}	.583	1.04**
	(2.3)	(3.3)	(1.2)	(2.1)
p=0.2	.404***	.363***	.357***	.316***
	(9.5)	(7.1)	(7.1)	(5.0)
S=Black	1.2**	2.13***	.706	1.56***
	(2.1)	(3.8)	(1.3)	(2.7)
FP rate x (S=Black)	887	-1.57^*	507	-1.05
	(-1.0)	(-1.9)	(-0.6)	(-1.4)
FN rate x (S=Black)	0383	372*	0542	372*
	(-0.3)	(-1.9)	(-0.3)	(-1.7)
FP rate x $(p=0.2)$		$.55^{*}$.405
		(1.7)		(1.2)
FN rate x $(p=0.2)$		$.518^*$		$.52^{*}$
		(1.8)		(1.8)
N	582	582	582	582
Pseudo R-squared	.575	.585	.609	.617
Log-likelihood	-172	-168	-158	-154

t statistics in parentheses

With flexible controls of posterior probability and beliefs

Subject FE, errors are clustered by subject, average marginal treatment effects

^{*} p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table 6: Informed Protection Response: flexible control for posteriors and beliefs, LPM

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
FP rate x (S=White)	.541***	.366*	.317**	.202
rr rate x (b= winte)	(3.4)	(1.8)	(2.1)	(1.0)
FN rate x (S=White)	.624	1.04**	.142	.541
(12 11 11)	(1.3)	(2.0)	(0.3)	(1.1)
p=0.2	.326***	.279***	.454***	.41***
	(11.5)	(7.6)	(6.8)	(5.3)
S=Black	.827	1.76**	.461	1.3*
	(1.4)	(2.3)	(0.8)	(1.8)
FP rate x (S=Black)	674	-1.57	537	-1.24
	(-0.8)	(-1.6)	(-0.7)	(-1.4)
FN rate x (S=Black)	.0000692	309	.00247	284
	(0.0)	(-1.2)	(0.0)	(-1.1)
FP rate x $(p=0.2)$		$.542^{*}$.422
		(1.9)		(1.5)
FN rate x $(p=0.2)$.432		.425
		(1.4)		(1.5)
Subject FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Posterior	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Beliefs	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	624	624	624	624
Adjusted R^2	0.50	0.50	0.52	0.53

t statistics in parentheses

With flexible controls of posterior probability and beliefs

Subject FE, errors are clustered by subject, average marginal treatment effects

^{*} p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table 7: Latent Class Multinomial Choice Model Estimates (FP and FN rates by hint)

-	lc_results								
	Model	Class	Alt	Hint	FN0	FN1	FP0	FP1	Class share
r1	1	1	-2.86694	4.392251	4.834518	1919326	4.35168	8676941	1
r2	2	1	-2.91958	1.881626	7.980388	3599557	1.725487	6.632253	.2198715
r3	2	2	-2.91958	6.699559	3.838407	.4707898	5.285504	-8.229022	.7801285

Table 8: IP response by class

Ι.	- J	
(1)	(2)	(3)
All	Class 1	Class 2
.628***	.357***	.772***
(23.1)	(2.8)	(10.5)
.691***	1.49***	.352***
(4.3)	(3.5)	(3.3)
.622***	.49	.47***
(4.6)	(1.6)	(4.7)
0274	.0659	.0588
(-0.2)	(0.2)	(0.4)
124	1.15***	-1.25***
(-0.8)	(5.6)	(-4.8)
624	138	486
.347	.242	.543
-282	-62.3	-153
	(1) All .628*** (23.1) .691*** (4.3) .622*** (4.6)0274 (-0.2)124 (-0.8) 624 .347	All Class 1 .628*** .357*** (23.1) (2.8) .691*** 1.49*** (4.3) (3.5) .622*** .49 (4.6) (1.6) 0274 .0659 (-0.2) (0.2) 124 1.15*** (-0.8) (5.6) 624 138 .347 .242

t statistics in parentheses

Errors are clustered by subject, average marginal treatment effects

^{*} p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table 9: Correlates of Strategies Used

	(1)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Seek honest	.462***		
	(0.1)		
Other	.356***		
	(0.1)		
Female	(0.1)	.0782	
1 CIIIAIC		(0.1)	
Λ		` /	
Age		00845	
		(0.0)	
Stat. classes		0674	
		(0.1)	
Accur. beliefs			$.135^{*}$
			(0.1)
RA measure0			00705
			(0.0)
IP quiz			0635
1			(0.0)
Constant	.433***	.975***	1.03***
Constant			
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.2)
Observations	104	104	104
Adjusted \mathbb{R}^2	0.15	0.02	0.01

Table 10: Expected IP losses by strategy

	p=0.1,0.2			p>0.2		
	Mean loss	% of optimal	Loss prob.	Mean loss	% of optimal	Loss prob.
Baseline (all)	1.166304	156.7689	.0190281	2.11717	140.6088	.0508233
Honesty seekers	1.526998	205.2517	.0435806	3.095308	205.5705	.1163925
Bayesians	1.050706	141.2308	.0112388	1.806053	119.9464	.0300237
Optimal	.7439637	1	.0136432	1.505716	1	.0190598

^{*} p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table 11: Latent Class Multinomial Choice Model Estimates

·	lc_results							
	Model	Class	Alt	Hint	$False_prob$	Posterior	Class share	BIC
$\overline{r1}$	1	1	-2.558866	5.518452	-2.179902	-5.647592	1	599.1649
r1	2	1	-2.535444	1.90032	3.500951	1.732533	.2750615	581.0222
r1	2	2	-2.535444	.1317798	2.727107	8.918563	.7249385	581.0222
r1	3	1	-2.738694	1.552418	4.89195	1.063685	.2025011	587.5337
r1	3	2	-2.738694	3.413443	8342289	6.007274	.4550624	587.5337
_r1	3	3	-2.738694	-3.203437	5.474852	16.56628	.3424365	587.5337

Table 12: IP response by class

	(1)	(2)
	Honesty Seekers	Cautious Bayesians
S=Black	.337***	.0245
	(3.4)	(0.4)
Prop. of lying gremlins	.664***	.277***
	(4.6)	(4.3)
Posterior prob.	198*	.788***
	(-1.7)	(4.9)
N	138	486
Pseudo R-squared	.183	.541
Log-likelihood	-67.2	-154

t statistics in parentheses

Errors are clustered by subject, average marginal treatment effects

Table 15: Average Protection by Signal Type

False-pos.	False-neg.	Signal	% protect	P(prot>0,<1)	Posterior	Optimal	P(=optimal)
No	No	White	0.038	0.022	0.000	0.000	0.045
No	No	Black	0.837	0.000	1.000	1.000	0.000
No	Yes	White	0.188	0.000	0.045	0.000	0.000
No	Yes	Black	0.783	0.000	1.000	1.000	0.000
Yes	No	White	0.145	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.001
Yes	No	Black	0.739	0.000	0.396	0.739	1.000
Yes	Yes	White	0.429	0.000	0.062	0.000	0.000
Yes	Yes	Black	0.829	0.000	0.328	0.743	0.182

^{*} p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table 13: Belief Elicitation by Class

	(1)	(2)					
	Simpletons	Cautious Bayesians					
Posterior prob.	.357***	.479***					
	(0.1)	(0.1)					
S=Black	.123	.224***					
	(0.1)	(0.0)					
Prop. of lying gremlins	.171	.184***					
	(0.1)	(0.0)					
Constant	.112***	.0898***					
	(0.0)	(0.0)					
Observations	138	486					
Adjusted R^2	0.31	0.60					

Dep. variable: beliefs, errors clustered by subject

Table 14: Belief Elicitation: When Mistakes Happen

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	All	S=White	S=Black
FN rate	.00702	.38***	366***
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)
FP rate	.948***	.318***	1.58***
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)
Constant	249***	.139***	636***
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)
Subject FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	624	312	312
Adjusted \mathbb{R}^2	0.22	0.37	0.66

Standard errors in parentheses

Dep. variable: reported belief - posterior probability

^{*} p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

^{*} p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table 16: Average Belief Error by Signal Type

False-pos.	False-neg.	Signal	Belief error	P(=0)
No	No	White	0.039	0.001
No	No	Black	-0.187	0.000
No	Yes	White	0.140	0.000
No	Yes	Black	-0.332	0.000
Yes	No	White	0.116	0.000
Yes	No	Black	0.177	0.000
Yes	Yes	White	0.245	0.000
Yes	Yes	Black	0.192	0.000

Table 17: Average WTP discrepancy (WTP-Value) by Signal Type

False-positive	False-negative	Mean WTP discrepancy	P(=0)
No	No	-0.135	0.465
No	Yes	-0.209	0.152
Yes	No	0.465	0.005
Yes	Yes	0.437	0.001

Table 18: Comparing Findings across the Tasks

Design	Beliefs	IP	WTP
White, FN only	>	<>	<> *
Black, FN only	<	<>	<>
White, FP only	>	>	>
Black, FP only	>	<>	>
White, FN and FP	>>	>	>
Black, FN and FP	>	<>	>

^{*-}WTP estimates do not depend on signals.

Table 19: WTP for Information (tobit)

	Table 19. Will for information (tobit)							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)		
	All	p = 0.1	p = 0.2	All	All	All		
model								
FN costs	577**	-1.24**	682***	791***	691***	69***		
	(0.2)	(0.5)	(0.3)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.3)		
FP costs	644***	647***	519**	595***	508***	494**		
	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.3)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)		
BP costs				.373***	.363***	.37***		
				(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)		
Belief change					.332			
					(0.3)			
Certainty						.688		
						(0.8)		
Constant	1.98***	1.79***	2.33****	.923***	.701*	.293		
	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.3)	(0.4)	(0.8)		
sigma								
Constant	1.8***	1.83***	1.7^{***}	1.77^{***}	1.76***	1.76***		
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)		
Observations	312	159	153	312	312	312		
Adjusted \mathbb{R}^2								

^{*} p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table 20: WTP minus Value of Information (OLS)

Table 20. W11 limits value of finormation (OLS)							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)		
FP costs	.558***	.472***	.403	.506***	.437***		
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.3)	(0.2)	(0.1)		
FN costs	229*	.0337	495	.085	645***		
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.5)	(0.1)	(0.2)		
Risk-loving \times FP costs	` ,	` ,	.12	, ,	` ,		
G			(0.4)				
Risk-averse \times FP costs			.102				
			(0.3)				
No risk av. measure \times FP costs			142				
1.0 11811 4.1 1110405410 7. 11 00500			(0.4)				
Risk-loving \times FN costs			.744				
This loving × 110 costs			(0.5)				
Risk-averse \times FN costs			.549				
Trisk-averse × 11v cosus			(0.5)				
No risk av. measure \times FN costs			.492				
No lisk av. measure × FN costs			(0.5)				
Inaccurate beliefs			(0.0)	.0776			
maccurate benefs				(0.2)			
Inaccurate beliefs \times FP costs				.631			
maccurate benefix x FF costs							
I I I C I IN				(0.8)			
Inaccurate beliefs \times FN costs				00734			
1 1 200 ED				(0.3)	1.4		
plevel= $200 \times FP \text{ costs}$.14		
1 1 200 FW					(0.2)		
plevel= $200 \times FN \text{ costs}$.84***		
					(0.2)		
Constant	0921	141*	137	208	111		
	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.1)		
Observations	312	312	312	312	312		
Adjusted R^2	0.05	0.59	0.58	0.58	0.60		

^{*} p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table 21: WTP for Information: heterogeneity by IP class

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	p < 0.3	p < 0.3	All	All
model				
FN costs	577**	699***	261***	386***
	(0.2)	(0.3)	(0.1)	(0.1)
FP costs	644***	73***	-1.04***	-1.15***
	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)
Simpletons		804**		87***
		(0.4)		(0.3)
Simpletons \times FN costs		.618		.63***
		(0.6)		(0.2)
Simpletons \times FP costs		.393		.573
		(0.5)		(0.4)
Constant	1.98***	2.17^{***}	2.39***	2.57***
	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.1)
sigma				
Constant	1.8***	1.79***	1.94***	1.92***
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)
Observations	312	312	624	624
Adjusted R^2				

^{*} p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table 22: WTP minus Value of Information, connection to self-reported protection strategy ${\bf v}$

J						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	All	p = 0.1	p = 0.2	All	All	All
Seek honest	.923***	1.17***		1.18**		1.4**
	(0.3)	(0.4)		(0.5)		(0.6)
Other	.317	.395		.324		.594
	(0.2)	(0.4)		(0.5)		(0.5)
FN costs	236	0324	-1.11***	563	558***	.602
	(0.2)	(0.5)	(0.4)	(1.0)	(0.2)	(0.6)
FP costs	.551***	.667*	424**	.578	415**	.631
	(0.1)	(0.4)	(0.2)	(0.4)	(0.2)	(0.6)
Seek honest \times FN costs		432		389		616
		(0.6)		(1.1)		(0.7)
Other \times FN costs		0759		.216		355
		(0.6)		(1.1)		(0.7)
Seek honest \times FP costs		179		222		155
		(0.4)		(0.5)		(0.7)
Other \times FP costs		103		144		.0513
		(0.4)		(0.5)		(0.7)
Constant	587**	717**	1.88***	123	2.28***	-1.56***
	(0.2)	(0.3)	(0.2)	(0.4)	(0.2)	(0.5)
Observations	312	312	159	159	153	153
Adjusted \mathbb{R}^2	0.09	0.09	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.08

^{*} p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

B Figures




Figure 1: Average Blind Protection Response






Figure 2: Average Informed Protection Response








Figure 4: Average Informed Protection Response (Smoothed)





Figure 5: Belief Updating By Priors



0 Posterior - Belief

Figure 6: Belief Updating

Figure 7: Theoretical vs actual WTP





Figure 8: WTP discrepancy






Figure 9: WTP discrepancy by prior and signal characteristics $\,$

C Appendix Tables

Table 23: Informed protection response: linear regression

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	All	S=White	S=Black	All	S=White	W=Black
FP rate	.251**	.641***	139	.203*	.555***	149
	(2.2)	(4.5)	(-0.8)	(1.7)	(3.6)	(-0.7)
FN rate	.341***	.714***	0312	.332***	.713***	0486
	(3.2)	(4.4)	(-0.2)	(2.9)	(3.7)	(-0.3)
plevel=200	.106***	$.0911^{*}$.12**	.333***	.667***	1.27e-14
	(2.8)	(1.9)	(2.2)	(1.4e+13)	(1.3e+14)	(1.1)
Constant	.37***	023	.762***	.442***	132***	1.02***
	(11.5)	(-0.7)	(14.4)	(23.9)	(-4.8)	(38.4)
Subject FE	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	624	312	312	624	312	312
Adjusted R^2	0.02	0.14	0.02	0.01	0.33	0.29

t statistics in parentheses

Errors are clustered by subject

^{*} p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table 24: Informed Protection Response: flexible control for posteriors and beliefs

				1	
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	FE			S=White	S=Black
.323**	.29	.29	.379*	.34***	.0312
(2.3)	(1.5)	(1.3)	(1.9)	(2.7)	(0.1)
.0616	.0446	0252	.583	0967	.0495
(0.5)	(0.3)	(-0.1)	(1.2)	(-0.3)	(0.3)
		.29***			
		(4.7)			
		.0154			
		(0.1)			
		.141			
		(0.7)			
			.706		
			(1.3)		
			887		
			(-1.2)		
			638		
			(-1.2)		
624	582	582	582	310	312
	.323** (2.3) .0616 (0.5)	(1) (2) FE .323** .29 (2.3) (1.5) .0616 .0446 (0.5) (0.3)	(1) (2) (3) FE .323** .29 .29 (2.3) (1.5) (1.3) .0616 .04460252 (0.5) (0.3) (-0.1) .29*** (4.7) .0154 (0.1) .141 (0.7)	(1) (2) (3) (4) FE .323** .29 .29 .379* (2.3) (1.5) (1.3) (1.9) .0616 .04460252 .583 (0.5) (0.3) (-0.1) (1.2) .29***	(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) S=White .323** .29 .29 .379* .34*** (2.3) (1.5) (1.3) (1.9) (2.7) .0616 .04460252 .5830967 (0.5) (0.3) (-0.1) (1.2) (-0.3) .29*** (4.7) .0154 (0.1) .141 (0.7) .706 (1.3)887 (-1.2)638 (-1.2)

t statistics in parentheses

With flexible controls of posterior probability and beliefs

Errors are clustered by subject, average marginal treatment effects

^{*} p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table 25: Informed protection response: semiparametric control for posteriors

	(1)	(0)	(0)	(4)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
FP rate	.546***	.442**	.527***	$.357^{*}$
	(3.5)	(2.2)	(3.3)	(1.8)
FN rate	189	203	631	000611
	(-1.0)	(-0.9)	(-1.6)	(-0.0)
p=0.2	, ,	.0385	, ,	, ,
•		(0.8)		
FP rate x (p ≥ 0.2)		.218		
11 1886 II (P = 0. 2)		(0.9)		
FN rate x (p ≥ 0.2)		.0514		
The rate x (p ≥ 0.2)				
C DI I		(0.2)	F 01	
S=Black			-5.81	
(0.51.1)			(-0.5)	
FP rate x (S=Black)			.0175	
			(0.0)	
FN rate x (S=Black)			.498	
			(1.2)	
Stat. class				0205
				(-0.4)
FP rate x Stat. class				.333
				(1.5)
FN rate x Stat. class				303
21. 1000 11 5000. 01000				(-1.4)
Observations	624	624	624	624
Adjusted R^2	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02

t statistics in parentheses

^{*} p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table 26: WTP - Value of Information, by prior with order effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	` '	` '	` '	(4)	(5)	(6)
	p=0.1,0.2	p=0.3,0.5	p=0.1,0.2			
FP rate	2.23***	249	2.12^{***}	1.21^{*}	249	325
	(0.5)	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.8)
FN rate	254	2.64***	-1.22**	.169	2.64***	1.33***
	(0.4)	(0.5)	(0.5)	(0.5)	(0.5)	(0.5)
Starts with p=0.2		, ,	-1.13***	.256	, ,	, ,
-			(0.3)	(0.3)		
Starts with p= $0.2 \times FP$ rate			.215	444		.157
•			(1.0)	(1.0)		(0.7)
Starts with p=0.2 \times FN rate			1.99***	2.11***		2.71***
•			(0.7)	(0.8)		(0.6)
First prior			,	()	.0367	.0367
•					(0.2)	(0.2)
First prior \times FP rate					2.48***	2.48***
					(0.7)	(0.7)
First prior \times FN rate					-2.9***	-2.9***
This prior × TV rate					(0.3)	(0.3)
Constant	135	172	.412*	278	172	172
Constant						
01	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)
Observations	315	315	315	630	630	630
Adjusted R^2	0.04	0.04	0.12	0.04	0.04	0.06

Table 27: WTP - Value of Information, by prior

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	All	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.5
FP rate	.822*	1.96***	2.3***	121	865
	(0.5)	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.9)	(0.9)
FN rate	1.2^{***}	-1.24***	.783	1.57^{***}	3.79***
	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.5)	(0.6)	(0.7)
Constant	134	.435***	713***	921***	.677***
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.2)
Observations	630	162	153	162	153
Adjusted R^2	0.36	0.64	0.49	0.42	0.48

^{*} p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

^{*} p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table 28: Belief Elicitation: Discrepancy

Table 20. Benef Effection. Discrepancy							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
FN rate	.021	.021	014	014	0562	0554	
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	
FP rate	.917***	.917***	1.07***	1.07***	1.05***	1.05***	
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	
Good quiz	` ,	,	.0467	.0688	, ,	, ,	
			(0.0)	(0.0)			
Good quiz \times FN rate			.0571	.0571			
_			(0.1)	(0.1)			
Good quiz \times FP rate			289*	288*			
•			(0.2)	(0.2)			
Stat. class			,	, ,	00248	0127	
					(0.0)	(0.0)	
Stat. class \times FN rate					.138	.137	
					(0.1)	(0.1)	
Stat. class \times FP rate					232	229	
					(0.2)	(0.2)	
Constant	0762***	0654***	101***	102***	0751***	0563	
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	
Prior prob dummies	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	
Observations	624	624	624	624	624	624	
Adjusted \mathbb{R}^2	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	

^{*} p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table 29: WTP minus Value of Information: demographic determinants

Constant	Table 29. W11 limits value of information, demographic determinants									
FN costs		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
FN costs										
FN costs	FP costs	.558***	.602***	.548***	.475**	.416**	.54***	.485***	.66***	.591***
Male (0.1) (0.2)		(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.2)
Male 195 197 197 197 197 198 198 198 198 158 158 158 158 158 158 158 158 158 158 158 161 179	FN costs	229*	317*	0684	242		295*	0336	037	.223
Male 195 197 197 197 197 197 198 198 198 158 158 158 158 158 158 158 158 161 179 183 125 183 125 183 125 183 125 183 125 183 125 183 125 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 183		(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.2)
Male × FP costs 138 155 Male × FN costs (0.2) (0.2) Stat. class 225 .249 (0.3) (0.2) Stat. class 161 177 Stat. class × FP costs (0.4) (0.4) Stat. class × FN costs (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) Stat. class × FN costs 0.192 .199 .	Male		195	197	, ,	, ,	, ,	, ,		
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$			(0.4)	(0.4)						
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	$Male \times FP costs$		138	155						
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$			(0.2)	(0.2)						
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	$Male \times FN costs$		` '	, ,						
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$			(0.3)	(0.2)						
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Stat. class		` ,	, ,	161	179				
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$					(0.4)	(0.4)				
Stat. class × FN costs .0192	Stat. class \times FP costs				.138					
Second quiz × FP costs Second quiz × FP co					(0.2)	(0.2)				
>23 yrs 827*** 785***	Stat. class \times FN costs				.0192	` ′				
>23 yrs 827*** 785***					(0.3)	(0.2)				
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	>23 yrs				,	,	827**	785**		
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	v							(0.3)		
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	$>23 \text{ yrs} \times \text{FP costs}$.193	.159		
Good quiz Good quiz × FP costs Good quiz × FN costs Figure 9 Constant Good quiz × FN costs Good quiz × FN costs Figure 9 Constant Figu	v						(0.3)	(0.3)		
Good quiz Good quiz × FP costs Good quiz × FN costs Figure 9 Constant Good quiz × FN costs Good quiz × FN costs Figure 9 Constant Figu	$>23 \text{ yrs} \times \text{FN costs}$						` /	.389		
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	v						(0.2)	(0.3)		
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Good quiz						()	()	.347	.413
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	•								(0.4)	
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Good quiz \times FP costs								194	` /
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	1								(0.2)	
Constant09210115 .356 .00585 .387 .0142 .363279 .0568 (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.3) (0.3) (0.4) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.3) Prior dummies No No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes	Good quiz \times FN costs								,	
Constant 0921 0115 .356 .00585 .387 .0142 .363 279 .0568 (0.2) (0.2) (0.3) (0.3) (0.4) (0.2) (0.2) (0.3) (0.3) Prior dummies No No Yes No Yes No Yes	1									
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Constant	0921	0115	.356	.00585	.387	.0142	.363	` ,	` '
Prior dummies No No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes										
	Prior dummies	` ′	` ′	, ,	, ,	` ′	` ′	` ′	, ,	` ,
	Observations	312	312		312		312		312	
Adjusted R^2 0.05 0.04 0.12 0.04 0.12 0.06 0.13 0.04 0.12	Adjusted \mathbb{R}^2	0.05	0.04		0.04			0.13	0.04	

^{*} p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01