Crying Wolf in the Lab

Arya Gaduh, Peter McGee, Alexander Ugarov*

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Abstract


Keywords:

1 Introduction

A Results

B IP and Beliefs

Figure 1: Average Blind Protection Response






Figure 2: Average Informed Protection Response

ALEX: Double check: Are these everyone or p \leq 0.2? YES

Table 1: Informed Protection Response: flexible control for posteriors and beliefs

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Posterior only	Posterior only	Both	Both
FP rate	.523***	.488**	.369*	.282
	(4.0)	(2.0)	(1.9)	(1.1)
FN rate	.724***	1.36***	.512	.833**
	(4.6)	(3.4)	(1.3)	(2.0)
p≥0.2	.119***	.351***	.35***	.299***
	(4.3)	(7.1)	(6.8)	(5.1)
S=Black	.321**	2.4^{***}	.731	1.8**
	(2.5)	(3.4)	(1.3)	(2.6)
FP rate x (S=Black)	119	-3.42***	-1.08	-2.5**
	(-0.4)	(-2.9)	(-1.1)	(-2.2)
FN rate x (S=Black)	721***	-1.64***	557	-1.14***
	(-3.6)	(-4.0)	(-1.4)	(-2.7)
FP rate x (p ≥ 0.2)		$.573^{*}$.409
		(1.7)		(1.2)
FN rate x (p ≥ 0.2)		.556**		.589**
		(2.3)		(2.1)
Observations	1224	582	582	582
Adjusted R^2				

t statistics in parentheses

With flexible controls of posterior probability and beliefs

Subject FE, errors are clustered by subject, average marginal treatment effects

ALEX:

• IP Table:

- We have Table 23 (new version) that controls for beliefs - $\dot{\iota}$ finds that beliefs explain biases except for s=white, FP.
- We want to tell the story of what happens (or the biases that remain) once we account for belief errors.

^{*} p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table 2: Belief Elicitation: When Mistakes Happen

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	All	S=White	S=Black
Simpletons	.28***	105***	.665***
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)
FN rate	.0528	.409***	304**
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)
Simpletons \times FN rate	177	0993	255
	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.3)
FP rate	.888***	.253***	1.52^{***}
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)
Simpletons \times FP rate	.277	.316	.238
	(0.2)	(0.3)	(0.4)
Constant	251***	.14***	641***
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)
Subject FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	624	312	312
Adjusted R^2	0.22	0.38	0.66

Dep. variable: reported belief - posterior probability

ALEX:

- BE Table:
 - Keep Cols 1-3 (Panel A)
 - *Drop for now

^{*} p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

C WTP

Table 3: WTP for Information (tobit)

				(/	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	All	p = 0.1	p = 0.2	All	All	All
model						
FN costs	577**	-1.24**	682***	791***	691***	69***
	(0.2)	(0.5)	(0.3)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.3)
FP costs	644***	647***	519**	595***	508***	494**
	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.3)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)
BP costs				.373***	.363***	.37***
				(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)
Belief change					.332	
					(0.3)	
Certainty						.688
						(0.8)
Constant	1.98***	1.79***	2.33***	.923***	.701*	.293
	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.3)	(0.4)	(0.8)
sigma						
Constant	1.8***	1.83***	1.7^{***}	1.77^{***}	1.76***	1.76***
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)
Observations	312	159	153	312	312	312
Adjusted \mathbb{R}^2						

Standard errors in parentheses

ALEX:

- Blind Protection costs: what you lose if you don't use signal.
- Belief change: Respondents' belief change due to the signal from white to black (how info structure changes the relative value of hint).
- Certainty: How close is your belief to 1 or 0. (Willingness to pay for certainty):
- Certainty= $P(S = W)(1 \mu(B|S = W)) + P(S = B)\mu(B|S = B)$, $\mu(B|S = Y)$ is the reported belief that the ball is black when the signal is Y, P(S = Y) is the actual prob of the ball being Y. This is an ad-hoc measure, I probably need to check literature to see if there is something more standard.
- Describe why better than OLS: because we truncate.

^{*} p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table 4: Average WTP discrepancy (WTP-Value) by Signal Type

False-positive	False-negative	Mean WTP discrepancy	P(=0)
No	No	-0.135	0.465
No	Yes	-0.209	0.152
Yes	No	0.465	0.005
Yes	Yes	0.437	0.001

Table 5: WTP minus Value of Information (OLS)

Table 5: WTF minus value of information (OLS)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
FP costs	.558***	.472***	.403	.506***	.437***
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.3)	(0.2)	(0.1)
FN costs	229*	.0337	495	.085	645***
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.5)	(0.1)	(0.2)
Risk-loving			0		
D. 1			(.)		
Risk-averse			0		
27			(.)		
No risk av. measure			0		
Dilli i DD			(.)		
Risk-loving \times FP costs			.12		
D. I. D. C.			(0.4)		
Risk-averse \times FP costs			.102		
N · l			(0.3)		
No risk av. measure \times FP costs			142		
D. I. I			(0.4)		
Risk-loving \times FN costs			.744		
D' 1			(0.5)		
Risk-averse \times FN costs			.549		
N 1 IN			(0.5)		
No risk av. measure \times FN costs			.492		
I			(0.5)	0776	
Inaccurate beliefs				.0776	
I				(0.2)	
Inaccurate beliefs \times FP costs				.631	
Incorporate heliefs v EN costs				(0.8)	
Inaccurate beliefs \times FN costs				00734	
ralerral 200				(0.3)	0
plevel=200					0
plevel= $200 \times FP \text{ costs}$					(.)
pievei—200 x I F COSts					.14
plevel= $200 \times FN \text{ costs}$					(0.2) $.84***$
pievei—200 × I'N COSts					
Constant	0921	141*	137	208	(0.2)111
Constant	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.1)
Observations	$\frac{(0.2)}{312}$	312	312	$\frac{(0.2)}{312}$	312
Adjusted R^2	0.05	0.59	0.58	$\frac{512}{0.58}$	0.60
Tujusteu It	0.00	0.08	0.00	0.00	0.00

^{*} p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

D Summary

Table 6: Comparing Findings across the Tasks

Design	Beliefs	IP	WTP
White, FN only	>	<>	<> *
Black, FN only	<	<>	<>
White, FP only	>	>	>
Black, FP only	>	<>	>
White, FN and FP	>>	>	>
Black, FN and FP	>	<>	>

^{*-}WTP estimates do not depend on signals.

E Classification: Honest vs. Bayesian

Table 7: Latent Class Multinomial Choice Model Estimates (FP and FN rates by hint)

	lc_results								
	Model	Class	Alt	Hint	FN0	FN1	FP0	FP1	Class share
r1	1	1	-2.86694	4.392251	4.834518	1919326	4.35168	8676941	1
r2	2	1	-2.91958	1.881626	7.980388	3599557	1.725487	6.632253	.2198715
r3	2	2	-2.91958	6.699559	3.838407	.4707898	5.285504	-8.229022	.7801285

Table 8: IP response by class

1 0						
	(1)	(2)				
	Honesty Seekers	Cautious Bayesians				
S=Black	.337***	.0245				
	(3.4)	(0.4)				
Prop. of lying gremlins	.664***	.277***				
	(4.6)	(4.3)				
Posterior prob.	198*	.788***				
	(-1.7)	(4.9)				
N	138	486				
Pseudo R-squared	.183	.541				
Log-likelihood	-67.2	-154				

t statistics in parentheses

Errors are clustered by subject, average marginal treatment effects

ALEX:

- Do this distinction between number of false gremlin vs. black/white gremlin for belief calculation (other columns)
- Alex: Let me know if you need it to join into one table, but it need manual work so we can reserve it for later.

ALEX:

- BE Table:
 - Keep Cols 4-6
 - We won't need this if we have the above version for belief.

END TABLE

^{*} p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table 9: Belief Elicitation by Class

	(1)	(2)
	Simpletons	Cautious Bayesians
Posterior prob.	.357***	.479***
	(0.1)	(0.1)
S=Black	.123	.224***
	(0.1)	(0.0)
Prop. of lying gremlins	.171	.184***
	(0.1)	(0.0)
Constant	.112***	.0898***
	(0.0)	(0.0)
Observations	138	486
Adjusted R^2	0.31	0.60

Dep. variable: beliefs, errors clustered by subject

Table 10: Expected IP losses by strategy

		p=0.1,0.2			p>0.2	
	Mean loss	% of optimal	Loss prob.	Mean loss	% of optimal	Loss prob.
Baseline (all)	1.166304	156.7689	.0190281	2.11717	140.6088	.0508233
Honesty seekers	1.526998	205.2517	.0435806	3.095308	205.5705	.1163925
Bayesians	1.050706	141.2308	.0112388	1.806053	119.9464	.0300237
Optimal	.7439637	1	.0136432	1.505716	1	.0190598

^{*} p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table 11: Belief Elicitation: When Mistakes Happen

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	All	S=White	S=Black
Simpletons	.28***	105***	.665***
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)
FN rate	.0528	.409***	304**
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)
Simpletons \times FN rate	177	0993	255
	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.3)
FP rate	.888***	.253***	1.52***
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)
Simpletons \times FP rate	.277	.316	.238
	(0.2)	(0.3)	(0.4)
Constant	251***	.14***	641***
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)
Subject FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	624	312	312
Adjusted R^2	0.22	0.38	0.66

Dep. variable: reported belief - posterior probability

^{*} p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

F Tables

Table 12: List of Treatments

Gremlins composition						
Prop. of black balls (p)	Honest	Black-eyed	White-eyed	FP rate	FN rate	
0.1,0.2,0.3,0.5	2	0	0	0	0	
0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.5	3	1	0	0.333	0	
0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.5	3	0	1	0	0.333	
0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.5	3	1	1 0	0.333	0.333	
0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.5	5	1	0	0.2	0	
0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.5	5	0	1	0	0.2	
0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.5	5	1	1	0.2	0.2	

Table 13: Demographic Characteristics of Subjects

	All		$p \in \{0.1, 0.3\}$		$p \in \mathcal{A}$	$\{0.2, 0.5\}$
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Male	43	41	22	41	21	41
Age>23yrs old	14	13	6	11	8	16
Students	88	84	46	85	42	82
Had statistics classes	63	60	37	69	26	51
Total	105	100	54	100	51	100

Table 14: Risk Aversion Measurement

Switching Probability (π^*)	θ	N
Always protect	>2	1
0.1	2	10
0.15	1.216	13
0.2	0.573	29
0.25	0	16
0.3	-0.539	15
Never protect	<-0.539	14

Table 15: Informed protection response: logistical regression

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	
	All	S=White	S=Black	All	S=White	W=Black	S=White	W
FP rate	.251**	.556***	136	.2*	1.19***	38	2.3**	
	(2.2)	(4.8)	(-0.8)	(1.8)	(3.7)	(-0.8)	(2.2)	(
FN rate	.342***	.615***	0304	.352***	1.26***	116	2.69***	
	(3.2)	(4.6)	(-0.2)	(3.1)	(12.8)	(-0.3)	(4.1)	(
S=Black	.454***			.473***				
	(83.6)			(91.4)				
plevel=200	.106***	$.0914^{*}$.12**	0	0	0	0	
	(2.8)	(1.9)	(2.2)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	
FP rate x FN rate							-6.33**	
							(-2.4)	
Subject FE	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
$P(FP \text{ rate} \neq FN \text{ rate})$.542	.766	.669	.309	.855	.705	.411	
N	624	312	312	582	117	105	117	
Pseudo R-squared	.33	.159	.026	.519	.479	.0844	.56	
Log-likelihood	-290	-125	-152	-194	-41.2	-66.1	-34.8	

t statistics in parentheses

Errors are clustered by subject, average marginal treatment effects

^{*} p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table 16: Correlates of Strategies Used

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Seek honest	.462***		
	(0.1)		
Other	.356***		
	(0.1)		
Female		.0782	
		(0.1)	
Age		00845	
		(0.0)	
Stat. classes		0674	
		(0.1)	
Accur. beliefs		, ,	.135*
			(0.1)
RA measure0			00705
			(0.0)
IP quiz			0635
-			(0.0)
Constant	.433***	.975***	1.03***
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.2)
Observations	104	104	104
Adjusted \mathbb{R}^2	0.15	0.02	0.01

^{*} p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table 17: Latent Class Multinomial Choice Model Estimates

-	lc_results							
	Model	Class	Alt	Hint	$False_prob$	Posterior	Class share	BIC
$\overline{r1}$	1	1	-2.558866	5.518452	-2.179902	-5.647592	1	599.1649
r1	2	1	-2.535444	1.90032	3.500951	1.732533	.2750615	581.0222
r1	2	2	-2.535444	.1317798	2.727107	8.918563	.7249385	581.0222
r1	3	1	-2.738694	1.552418	4.89195	1.063685	.2025011	587.5337
r1	3	2	-2.738694	3.413443	8342289	6.007274	.4550624	587.5337
r1	3	3	-2.738694	-3.203437	5.474852	16.56628	.3424365	587.5337

Table 18: WTP for Information: heterogeneity by IP class

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	p < 0.3	p < 0.3	All	All
model				
FN costs	577**	699***	261***	386***
	(0.2)	(0.3)	(0.1)	(0.1)
FP costs	644***	73***	-1.04***	-1.15***
	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)
Simpletons		804**		87***
		(0.4)		(0.3)
Simpletons \times FN costs		.618		.63***
_		(0.6)		(0.2)
Simpletons \times FP costs		.393		.573
_		(0.5)		(0.4)
Constant	1.98***	2.17***	2.39***	2.57***
	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.1)
sigma				
Constant	1.8***	1.79***	1.94***	1.92***
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)
Observations	312	312	624	624
Adjusted R^2				

^{*} p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table 19: WTP minus Value of Information, connection to self-reported protection strategy $\,$

J						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	All	p = 0.1	p = 0.2	All	All	All
Seek honest	.923***	1.17***		1.18**		1.4**
	(0.3)	(0.4)		(0.5)		(0.6)
Other	.317	.395		.324		.594
	(0.2)	(0.4)		(0.5)		(0.5)
FN costs	236	0324	-1.11***	563	558***	.602
	(0.2)	(0.5)	(0.4)	(1.0)	(0.2)	(0.6)
FP costs	.551***	.667*	424**	.578	415**	.631
	(0.1)	(0.4)	(0.2)	(0.4)	(0.2)	(0.6)
Seek honest \times FN costs		432		389		616
		(0.6)		(1.1)		(0.7)
Other \times FN costs		0759		.216		355
		(0.6)		(1.1)		(0.7)
Seek honest \times FP costs		179		222		155
		(0.4)		(0.5)		(0.7)
Other \times FP costs		103		144		.0513
		(0.4)		(0.5)		(0.7)
Constant	587**	717**	1.88***	123	2.28***	-1.56***
	(0.2)	(0.3)	(0.2)	(0.4)	(0.2)	(0.5)
Observations	312	312	159	159	153	153
Adjusted \mathbb{R}^2	0.09	0.09	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.08

^{*} p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

G Figures


Protection Response

Protection Response

A Blind Informed

Figure 3: Average Informed Protection Response








Figure 5: Belief Updating

Theoretical vs actual WTP


Theoretical vs actual WTP

percent
38.077

Figure 6: Theoretical vs actual WTP



Theoretical WTP






Figure 8: WTP discrepancy by prior and signal characteristics $\,$

H Appendix Tables

Table 20: Informed protection response: linear regression

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	All	S=White	S=Black	All	S=White	W=Black
FP rate	.251**	.641***	139	.203*	.555***	149
	(2.2)	(4.5)	(-0.8)	(1.7)	(3.6)	(-0.7)
FN rate	.341***	.714***	0312	.332***	.713***	0486
	(3.2)	(4.4)	(-0.2)	(2.9)	(3.7)	(-0.3)
plevel=200	.106***	$.0911^{*}$.12**	.333***	.667***	1.27e-14
	(2.8)	(1.9)	(2.2)	(1.4e+13)	(1.3e+14)	(1.1)
Constant	.37***	023	.762***	.442***	132***	1.02***
	(11.5)	(-0.7)	(14.4)	(23.9)	(-4.8)	(38.4)
Subject FE	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	624	312	312	624	312	312
Adjusted \mathbb{R}^2	0.02	0.14	0.02	0.01	0.33	0.29

t statistics in parentheses

Errors are clustered by subject

^{*} p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table 21: Informed Protection Response: flexible control for posteriors and beliefs

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
		FE			S=White	S=Black
FP rate	.325**	.291	.312	.369*	.34***	0715
	(2.3)	(1.5)	(1.4)	(1.9)	(2.7)	(-0.1)
FN rate	.00994	000178	0956	.512	0967	.0767
	(0.1)	(-0.0)	(-0.5)	(1.3)	(-0.3)	(0.4)
p≥0.2			.279***			
			(4.6)			
FP rate x (p ≥ 0.2)			0236			
			(-0.1)			
FN rate x (p ≥ 0.2)			.186			
			(0.9)			
S=Black				.731		
				(1.3)		
FP rate x (S=Black)				-1.08		
				(-1.1)		
FN rate x (S=Black)				557		
				(-1.4)		
Observations	624	582	582	582	310	312
Adjusted R^2						

t statistics in parentheses

With flexible controls of posterior probability and beliefs

Errors are clustered by subject, average marginal treatment effects

^{*} p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table 22: Informed protection response: semiparametric control for posteriors

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	(1)	(-)	(0)	(1)
FP rate	.546***	.442**	.527***	.357*
	(3.5)		(3.3)	(1.8)
FN rate	189	203	` ′	000611
	(-1.0)		(-1.6)	
p≥0.2	(-)	.0385	(-)	()
r = -		(0.8)		
FP rate x (p ≥ 0.2)		.218		
(1 = /		(0.9)		
FN rate x (p ≥ 0.2)		.0514		
(I = /		(0.2)		
S=Black		()	-5.81	
			(-0.5)	
FP rate x (S=Black)			.0175	
,			(0.0)	
FN rate x (S=Black)			.498	
,			(1.2)	
Stat. class			,	0205
				(-0.4)
FP rate x Stat. class				.333
				(1.5)
FN rate x Stat. class				303
				(-1.4)
Observations	624	624	624	624
Adjusted \mathbb{R}^2	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02

t statistics in parentheses

^{*} p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table 23: WTP - Value of Information, by prior with order effects

		(2)	(2)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	(1)	` '	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	p=0.1,0.2	p=0.3,0.5	p=0.1,0.2			
FP rate	2.23***	249	2.12^{***}	1.21^{*}	249	325
	(0.5)	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.8)
FN rate	254	2.64^{***}	-1.22**	.169	2.64***	1.33***
	(0.4)	(0.5)	(0.5)	(0.5)	(0.5)	(0.5)
Starts with p=0.2	, ,		-1.13***	.256	, ,	, ,
-			(0.3)	(0.3)		
Starts with p= $0.2 \times FP$ rate			$.21\overset{\circ}{5}$	444		.157
•			(1.0)	(1.0)		(0.7)
Starts with p=0.2 \times FN rate			1.99***	2.11***		2.71***
•			(0.7)	(0.8)		(0.6)
First prior			,	()	.0367	.0367
•					(0.2)	(0.2)
First prior \times FP rate					2.48***	2.48***
					(0.7)	(0.7)
First prior \times FN rate					-2.9***	-2.9***
The prof × TV rate					(0.3)	(0.3)
Constant	135	172	.412*	278	172	172
Constant						
01	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)
Observations	315	315	315	630	630	630
Adjusted R^2	0.04	0.04	0.12	0.04	0.04	0.06

Table 24: WTP - Value of Information, by prior

				, J	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	All	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.5
FP rate	.822*	1.96***	2.3***	121	865
	(0.5)	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.9)	(0.9)
FN rate	1.2^{***}	-1.24***	.783	1.57^{***}	3.79***
	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.5)	(0.6)	(0.7)
Constant	134	.435***	713***	921***	.677***
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.2)
Observations	630	162	153	162	153
Adjusted \mathbb{R}^2	0.36	0.64	0.49	0.42	0.48

^{*} p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

^{*} p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table 25: Belief Elicitation: Discrepancy

Table 26. Benef Energation. Discrepancy											
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)					
FN rate	.021	.021	014	014	0562	0554					
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)					
FP rate	.917***	.917***	1.07***	1.07***	1.05***	1.05***					
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)					
Good quiz	` ,	, ,	.0467	.0688	, ,	, ,					
			(0.0)	(0.0)							
Good quiz \times FN rate			.0571	.0571							
_			(0.1)	(0.1)							
Good quiz \times FP rate			289*	288*							
•			(0.2)	(0.2)							
Stat. class			,	, ,	00248	0127					
					(0.0)	(0.0)					
Stat. class \times FN rate					.138	.137					
					(0.1)	(0.1)					
Stat. class \times FP rate					232	229					
					(0.2)	(0.2)					
Constant	0762***	0654***	101***	102***	0751***	0563					
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)					
Prior prob dummies	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes					
Observations	624	624	624	624	624	624					
Adjusted \mathbb{R}^2	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17					

^{*} p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table 26: WTP minus Value of Information: demographic determinants

Table 20. W11 initial value of information, demographic determinants												
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)			
FP costs	.558***	.602***	.548***	.475**	.416**	.54***	.485***	.66***	.591***			
	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.2)			
FN costs	229*	317*	0684	242	0701	295*	0336	037	.223			
	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.2)			
Male	, ,	195	197	, ,		, ,						
		(0.4)	(0.4)									
$Male \times FP costs$		138	155									
		(0.2)	(0.2)									
$Male \times FN costs$		$.22 extstyle{5}$.249									
		(0.3)	(0.2)									
Stat. class		, ,	,	161	179							
				(0.4)	(0.4)							
Stat. class \times FP costs				.138	.125							
				(0.2)	(0.2)							
Stat. class \times FN costs				.0192	.199							
				(0.3)	(0.2)							
>23 yrs				()	()	827**	785**					
v						(0.4)	(0.3)					
$>23~{ m yrs} \times { m FP~costs}$.193	.159					
						(0.3)	(0.3)					
$>23 \text{ yrs} \times \text{FN costs}$.465**	.389					
, I j						(0.2)	(0.3)					
Good quiz						(-)	()	.347	.413			
1								(0.4)	(0.4)			
Good quiz \times FP costs								194	178			
1								(0.2)	(0.2)			
Good quiz \times FN costs								355	354			
								(0.3)	(0.2)			
Constant	0921	0115	.356	.00585	.387	.0142	.363	279	.0568			
COLLOCALIO	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.4)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.3)	(0.3)			
Prior dummies	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes			
Observations	312	312	312	312	312	312	312	312	312			
Adjusted R^2	0.05	0.04	0.12	0.04	0.12	0.06	0.13	0.04	0.12			
	5.00	- · · · ·	v ·	J. U.	~ ·	5.00	J. 1 J	J. U.	~ ·			

^{*} p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01