

Security Review

2025-06-05 by SECBIT Labs

At the request of the AladdinDAO team, we conducted a security review of recent modifications to the f(x) protocol's codebase.

This review covers the following change:

- <https://github.com/AladdinDAO/fx-protocol-contracts-internal/pull/1> f(x): refactor `TickMath`, commit `5580e5259232361867df51491aa2a2e1c7620192`

The following report introduces the background, analyzes contract functions, details the changes, presents the security review results, and discusses the current status of this modification.

PR#1 f(x): Refactor TickMath

Change Background

The AladdinDAO team has optimized and adjusted specific parameters and related computational logic within the `TickMath` contract to better align with application requirements.

Contract Functions Analysis

The `TickMath` library contract primarily implements two core functions:

(1). The `getRatioAtTick()` function calculates the `ratioX96` value corresponding to a given tick. This value can be derived in two ways, establishing a mapping between `tick` and the `debtsShares / collsShares` ratio. This assumes no bad debt in the system and that funding costs have not yet accrued (i.e., `rawDebts = debtsShares` and `rawColls = collsShares`).

$$\begin{aligned} ratioX96 &= 2^{96} \times 1.0015^{tick} \\ ratioX96 &= \frac{debts \times 2^{96}}{colls} \end{aligned} \tag{a}$$

(2). The `getTickAtRatio()` function performs the inverse operation, deriving the corresponding `tick` value from a given `ratioX96`. It is important to note that due to precision limitations, certain adjacent or closely-spaced `ratioX96` values may map to the same tick value.

Theoretically, the valid range for `tick` values in the `TickMath` library is $[-32767, 32767]$. Using the aforementioned functions and formulas, one can further derive the corresponding range of `ratioX96` values. Combined with the upper and lower bounds of the debt ratio defined in the protocol, this enables an estimation of the theoretical price range of collateral assets under ideal conditions.

In the f(x) protocol design, a minimum debt ratio is enforced for user positions. Based on the current parameter configuration, and assuming the absence of bad debt and funding costs (i.e., `rawDebts = debtsShares` and `rawColls = collsShares`), the minimum debt ratio must satisfy the following condition:

$$debtsRatio = \frac{debts \times 10^{18} \times 10^{18}}{colls \times collsPrice} \geq 0.091 \times 10^{18} \tag{1}$$

We can conclude that:

$$\frac{debt_s}{colls} \geq 0.091 \times collsPrice \times 10^{-18} \quad (b)$$

Assuming a position's `tick` reaches the minimum value defined in the `TickMath` contract (i.e., -32,767), the corresponding `ratioX96` would be `37,075,071`. (Note that an earlier version of the code returned `37,075,072`; the implications of this discrepancy will be discussed later). Based on this value, the theoretical lower bound for the debt-to-collateral ratio can be calculated. For simplicity, we again assume no bad debt in the system and no accrued funding costs, such that `rawDebts = debtsShares` and `rawColls = collsShares`:

$$RatioX96 = \frac{debt_s \times 2^{96}}{colls} = 37075071 \quad (c)$$

$$\frac{debt_s}{colls} = 4.6795 \times 10^{-22}$$

To meet the protocol's minimum collateral ratio requirement, the following inequality must hold:

$$\frac{debt_s}{colls} = 4.6795 \times 10^{-22} \leq 0.091 \times collsPrice \times 10^{-18} \quad (d)$$

$$collsPrice \geq 5.1423 \times 10^{-3} \quad (\text{where the precision of } collsPrice \text{ is } 10^{18})$$

This indicates that unless the price of the collateral asset falls below 5.1423×10^{-21} (essentially approaching 0), a user's position is unlikely to reach the minimum tick value of -32,767.

Similarly, the `f(x)` protocol imposes an upper bound on the debt ratio for user positions. Under the current parameter configuration, this constraint is defined as:

$$debt_sRatio = \frac{debt_s \times 10^{18} \times 10^{18}}{colls \times collsPrice} \leq 0.865 \times 10^{18} \quad (2)$$

We can conclude that:

$$\frac{debt_s}{colls} \leq 0.865 \times 10^{-18} \times collsPrice \quad (e)$$

Assuming the tick reaches the maximum value of `32,767`, the corresponding `ratioX96` is `169307877264527972847801929085841449095838922544595`. From this, the debt-to-collateral ratio can be derived:

$$RatioX96 = \frac{debt_s \times 2^{96}}{colls} = 169307877264527972847801929085841449095838922544595 \quad (f)$$

$$\frac{debt_s}{colls} = 2.13697 \times 10^{21}$$

To satisfy the maximum collateral ratio constraint:

$$\frac{debt_s}{colls} = 2.13697 \times 10^{21} \geq 0.865 \times 10^{-18} \times collsPrice \quad (g)$$

$$collsPrice \leq 2.47 \times 10^{21} \times 10^{18} \text{ (where the precision of } collsPrice \text{ is } 10^{18})$$

This suggests that unless the price of the collateral asset exceeds 2.47×10^{21} —which is practically impossible under normal market conditions—a user's position is unlikely to exceed the maximum tick value of 32,767.

Given the current parameter settings and realistic price bounds, the tick range $[-32767, 32767]$ defined in the `TickMath` contract is sufficiently wide to cover all required price intervals for opening user positions in the `f(x)` protocol.

Change Details and Security Review Results

This round of code modifications primarily focuses on the following three aspects:

(1). Refinement of boundary conditions in the `getTickAtRatio()` function. The boundary values for each `if` branch in the original version were adjusted. These values can be derived and verified using the following Python script:

```
from mpmath import mp, power, fmul, fdiv
mp.dps = 150 # The data accuracy was set to 150-bits

s1 = 16384
for i in range(14, -1, -1):
    print(f"--- the tick is 2^{i}")
    s2 = fmul(power(2, 96), power(mp.mpf('1.0015'), s1))
    print("ratio x96 is:", s2)

    s3 = fdiv(fmul(s2, power(10, 26)), power(2, 96))
    print("the result is:", s3)

    s1 = s1 / 2
    print("-----")
```

The corresponding output is as follows:

```
--- the tick is 2^14
ratio x96 is:
3665252098134783297721995888537077351735.1284719652390629870640163216899947003949427706866
2614966776933218267406746416591868840311401026603502815886196
the result is:
4626198540796508716348404308345255985.0613196463948943465572122473375535210294460556400792
6903962305437157040531217424752453881914846942169968860765783
-----
--- the tick is 2^13
ratio x96 is:
17040868196391020479062776466509865.905345717930764040238504293001938778243843772012146441
6638648533719764997923707154904265506205372904943477401157101
```

```

the result is:
21508599537851153911767490449162.303764864215389837765550517284253876709086227307140502514
6883727157918853517181821714991147677869715801066755370502561
-----
--- the tick is 2^12
ratio x96 is:
36743933851015821532611831851150.421312006624608697168353298304159487170166419876695066461
8373069928727848057651357652640691943663866265130642879087283
the result is:
46377364670549310883002866648.977760764974262617364871694138592888132757426540714702810689
4090284579110206547586933330760858455959274551802151223053811
-----
--- the tick is 2^11
ratio x96 is:
1706210527034005899209104452335.3351926216335887478313856856646882343629207100907377134998
8411134639000987113562972079112192497809962259135289161441516
the result is:
2153540449365864845468344760.0635710848409604674330042031932255125325827802184291891362483
8343161518198021034401744637973543988484727643460557966386307
-----
--- the tick is 2^10
ratio x96 is:
367668226692760093024536487236.01162637994650403956578767260556394592632769576672165163747
2592778476585660882481925062666858673143611334118194345440381
the result is:
464062544207767844008185024.95058899055413626521290645448112788756766624944069547153624971
8544959732245130996295346791963771711845285893709191398299613
-----
--- the tick is 2^9
ratio x96 is:
170674186729409605620119663668.18215161119032883481922929201598657567178121638485212854114
216065532546041901408929833691081572861606707743124069296144
the result is:
215421109505955298802281577.03187960479213923225850817294756988572778794185872111775079408
696016521939762348481218941701580601220767061002725368890033
-----
--- the tick is 2^8
ratio x96 is:
116285004205991934861656513301.83343201843785026580645306832790487977804295299373374071491
2806629407727067671142322316189307646226913376435822983468216
the result is:
146772309890508740607270614.66765089965643887554150505806241094441063484543705495602180249
4916190787671921973286305280575274377236404667298852135212905
-----
--- the tick is 2^7
ratio x96 is:
95984619659632141743747099590.142410209931463701481178250384625613379654677075352202759466
8373323265383749991939009110274799153384211650585144812113006
the result is:
121149622323187099817270416.15724883774274176045679683577588715050983070459901777159580842
873156754607966615930322732290064545489673409643227799744388
-----

```

[illegible]

In the previous code version, the boundary values for each `if` branch were strictly derived based on the results of the aforementioned Python script. In contrast, the latest implementation does not fully adopt the results computed by Python or [WolframAlpha](#). Instead, the boundary values were redefined based on the following process:

The `getRatioAtTick()` function in the `TickMath` contract is used to compute the `ratioX96` values for specific tick inputs (e.g., $2^0, 2^1, 2^2, \dots, 2^{14}$). These values are then normalized using the following formula in a Python script:

$$\text{getRatioAtTick}(\text{tick}) \times \frac{10^{26}}{79228162514264337593543950336} \quad (\text{h})$$

The discrepancies in results are likely due to inherent limitations in numerical precision when performing calculations in Solidity compared to Python or WolframAlpha. While it remains uncertain whether using `getRatioAtTick()` as a reference provides a more rigorous approach from a theoretical standpoint, we have conducted tests around several critical values near the `if` branch thresholds and have not observed any anomalies or errors. Overall, the revised implementation demonstrates stable and reliable behavior.

(2). In the updated `_getTick()` function, the AladdinDAO team revised the `ratioX96` value corresponding to the minimum tick value (-32,767).

```
// new version
/// The minimum value that can be returned from getRatioAtTick. Equivalent to
getRatioAtTick(MIN_TICK). ~ Equivalent to `(1 << 96) * (1.0015**(-32767))`
uint256 internal constant MIN_TICK_RATIO = 37075071;

// old version
/// The minimum value that can be returned from getRatioAtTick. Equivalent to
getRatioAtTick(MIN_TICK). ~ Equivalent to `(1 << 96) * (1.0015**(-32767))`
uint256 internal constant MIN_RATIOX96 = 37075072;
```

According to the code comments, `MIN_TICK_RATIO` is calculated using the following formula:

$$\text{MIN_RATIOX96} = 2^{96} \times 1.0015^{-32767} \quad (\text{i})$$

Using a Python script for derivation, the resulting value is approximately 37,075,071.974231223.

```
from mpmath import mp, power, fmul, fdiv
mp.dps = 150 # The data accuracy was set to 150-bits
# min ratio (tick = -32767)
s = fmul(power(2,96),power(mp.mpf('1.0015'),-32767))
print("min ratio is(tick=-32767): ", s)
```

```
# The output is:
min ratio is(tick=-32767):
37075071.97423122339058638485454196695350122999426011878673105226466334784121266256990459
13714630847674766084008424674157008690231021235300833981874847
```

In contrast to the previous approach, the new implementation adopts a floor operation, truncating the result to the integer value `37,075,071`. This value is then defined as the new `MIN_TICK_RATIO`. Under the current logic of the `_getTick()` function, when the input `ratio` equals `37,075,071`, the computed tick value is exactly -32,767, thereby satisfying the `TickMath` contract's boundary condition requirements.

It is important to note that `MIN_TICK_RATIO` and `MAX_TICK_RATIO` merely represent the theoretical bounds of the tick values supported by the `TickMath` contract. As previously analyzed in the context of extreme tick values, these boundary conditions are unlikely to be encountered in practice under normal market conditions when calculating user positions.

```
function _getTick(uint256 colls, uint256 debts) internal pure returns (int256 tick) {
    // @audit assume that the ratio is 37075071
    uint256 ratio = (debts * TickMath.ZERO_TICK_SCALED_RATIO) / colls;
```

```

// @audit corresponding tick is -32768
(tick, ) = TickMath.getTickAtRatio(ratio);
// @audit the tick will reset to -32767
if (tick < TickMath.MIN_TICK) {
    tick = TickMath.MIN_TICK;
}

// @audit the corresponding ratio of 37075071 was calculated for tick= -32767
uint256 ratioAtTick = TickMath.getRatioAtTick(tick);
unchecked {
    // @audit the if condition is not met, and the final tick value is -32767
    if (ratioAtTick < ratio) tick++;
}
if (tick > TickMath.MAX_TICK) {
    tick = TickMath.MAX_TICK;
}
}

```

(3). Corresponding adjustments have also been made to the implementation logic of the `_getTick()` function.

Since the new version of the code will be deployed as an upgrade to the existing contract, ensuring compatibility is critical. In particular, special attention must be paid to whether the same `ratioX96` value maps to different tick values under the old and new implementations.

Using the test input `ratioX96 = 637677893254828711268793574671080`, we compared the return values of the `_getTick()` function under both the old and new logic:

In the previous code version, the function returns a tick value of 6,000 for this input ratio.

```

// @audit old version
function _getTick(uint256 colls, uint256 debts) internal pure returns (int256 tick) {
    // @audit ratio = 637677893254828711268793574671080
    uint256 ratio = (debts * TickMath.ZERO_TICK_SCALED_RATIO) / colls;
    uint256 ratioAtTick;
    // @audit tick = 5999
    // ratioAtTick = 636722809041266811052215258151081
    (tick, ratioAtTick) = TickMath.getTickAtRatio(ratio);
    // @audit if condition is met
    if (ratio != ratioAtTick) {
        // @audit tick = 6000
        tick++;
        ratio = (ratioAtTick * 10015) / 10000;
    }
}

```

Under the updated logic, when `ratioX96` is set to `637677893254828711268793574671080`, the function returns a tick value of 6,001.

```

function _getTick(uint256 colls, uint256 debts) internal pure returns (int256 tick) {
    // @audit ratio = 637677893254828711268793574671080

```

```

uint256 ratio = (debts * TickMath.ZERO_TICK_SCALED_RATIO) / colls;
// @audit tick = 6000
(tick, ) = TickMath.getTickAtRatio(ratio);
// @audit skipped
if (tick < TickMath.MIN_TICK) {
    tick = TickMath.MIN_TICK;
}

// @audit tick = 6000, ratioAtTick = 637677893254828711268793574670086
uint256 ratioAtTick = TickMath.getRatioAtTick(tick);
unchecked {
    // @audit if condition is met, tick is updated to 6001
    if (ratioAtTick < ratio) tick++;
}
if (tick > TickMath.MAX_TICK) {
    tick = TickMath.MAX_TICK;
}
}

```

This observation reveals that the tick value calculated by the updated implementation may be greater, under certain conditions, than that returned by the previous version. It is worth noting that during `rebalance()` or `liquidate()` operations, the contract first shifts the affected position to the new tick and synchronizes the `topTick` value accordingly. As such, even if the liquidation process temporarily results in a larger `topTick` value, it does not adversely affect the protocol's normal logic. Users can continue to liquidate positions starting from the updated tick value, confirming that the code modification behaves as expected.

Status

A detailed analysis of the modified code indicates that the recent updates to the `TickMath` contract and its associated logic do not affect the normal functionality of the `f(x)` protocol and do not introduce new security risks.