1 Quick Computes

Simplify each expression using Fermat's Little Theorem.

- (a) $3^{33} \pmod{11}$
- (b) 10001¹⁰⁰⁰¹ (mod 17)
- (c) $10^{10} + 20^{20} + 30^{30} + 40^{40} \pmod{7}$

Solution:

```
(a) 3^{33} \pmod{11} \equiv 3^3 \cdot (3^{10})^3 \pmod{11} \equiv 27 \cdot 1^3 \pmod{11} \equiv 5 \pmod{11}
```

(b) $10001^{10001} \pmod{17} \equiv 10001^1 \cdot (10001^{16})^{625} \pmod{17} \equiv 10001 \pmod{17} \equiv 5 \pmod{17}$

(c)

$$10^{10} + 20^{20} + 30^{30} + 40^{40} \pmod{7} \equiv 10^4 \cdot 10^6 + 20^2 \cdot 20^{18}$$

$$+ 30^0 \cdot 30^{30} + 40^4 \cdot 40^{36} \pmod{7}$$

$$\equiv 10^4 + 20^2 + 30^0 + 40^4 \pmod{7}$$

$$\equiv 3^4 + 6^2 + 2^0 + 5^4 \pmod{7}$$

$$\equiv 3^4 + (-1)^2 + 2^0 + (-2)^4 \pmod{7}$$

$$\equiv 81 + 1 + 1 + 16 \pmod{7}$$

$$\equiv 4 + 1 + 1 + 2 \pmod{7} \equiv 1 \pmod{7}$$

2 RSA Practice

Bob would like to receive encrypted messages from Alice via RSA.

- (a) Bob chooses p = 7 and q = 11. His public key is (N, e). What is N?
- (b) What number is *e* relatively prime to?
- (c) *e* need not be prime itself, but what is the smallest prime number *e* can be? Use this value for *e* in all subsequent computations.

- (d) What is gcd(e, (p-1)(q-1))?
- (e) What is the decryption exponent d?
- (f) Now imagine that Alice wants to send Bob the message 30. She applies her encryption function *E* to 30. What is her encrypted message?
- (g) Bob receives the encrypted message, and applies his decryption function *D* to it. What is *D* applied to the received message?

Solution:

- (a) N = pq = 77.
- (b) *e* must be relatively prime to (p-1)(q-1) = 60.
- (c) We cannot take e = 2, 3, 5, so we take e = 7.
- (d) By design, gcd(e, (p-1)(q-1)) = 1 always.
- (e) The decryption exponent is $d = e^{-1} \pmod{60} = 43$, which could be found through Euclid's extended GCD algorithm.
- (f) The encrypted message is $E(30) = 30^7 \equiv 2 \pmod{77}$. We can obtain this answer via repeated squaring.

$$30^7 \equiv 30 \cdot 30^6 \equiv 30 \cdot (30^2 \mod 77)^3 \equiv 30 \cdot 53^3 \equiv (30 \cdot 53 \mod 77) \cdot (53^2 \mod 77) \equiv 50 \cdot 37 \equiv 2 \pmod{77}$$
.

(g) We have $D(2) = 2^{43} \equiv 30 \pmod{77}$. Again, we can use repeated squaring.

$$2^{43} \equiv 2 \cdot 2^{42} \equiv 2 \cdot (2^2 \mod 77)^{21} \equiv 2 \cdot 4^{21} \equiv (2 \cdot 4 \mod 77) \cdot 4^{20} \equiv 8 \cdot (4^2 \mod 77)^{10}$$
$$\equiv 8 \cdot 16^{10} \equiv 8 \cdot (16^2 \mod 77)^5 \equiv 8 \cdot 25^5 \equiv (8 \cdot 25 \mod 77) \cdot 25^4 \equiv 46 \cdot (25^2 \mod 77)^2$$
$$\equiv 46 \cdot (9^2 \mod 77) \equiv 46 \cdot 4 \equiv 30 \pmod{77}.$$

3 Squared RSA

- (a) Prove the identity $a^{p(p-1)} \equiv 1 \pmod{p^2}$, where a is coprime to p, and p is prime. (Hint: Try to mimic the proof of Fermat's Little Theorem from the notes.)
- (b) Now consider the RSA scheme: the public key is $(N = p^2q^2, e)$ for primes p and q, with e relatively prime to p(p-1)q(q-1). The private key is $d = e^{-1} \pmod{p(p-1)q(q-1)}$. Prove that the scheme is correct for x relatively prime to both p and q, i.e. $x^{ed} \equiv x \pmod{N}$.

(c) Prove that this scheme is at least as hard to break as normal RSA; that is, prove that if this scheme can be broken, normal RSA can be as well. We consider RSA to be broken if knowing pq allows you to deduce (p-1)(q-1). We consider squared RSA to be broken if knowing p^2q^2 allows you to deduce p(p-1)q(q-1).

Solution:

(a) We mimic the proof of Fermat's Little Theorem from the notes. Let S be the set of all numbers between 1 and $p^2 - 1$ (inclusive) which are relatively prime to p. We can write

$$S = \{1, 2, \dots, p-1, p+1, \dots, p^2-1\}$$

Define the set

$$T = \{a, 2a, \dots, (p-1)a, (p+1)a, \dots, (p^2-1)a\}$$

We'll show that $S \subseteq T$ and $T \subseteq S$, allowing us to conclude S = T:

- $S \subseteq T$: Let $x \in S$. Since gcd(a, p) = 1, the inverse of a exists $(\text{mod } p^2)$. For ease of notation, we use a^{-1} to denote the quantity $a^{-1} \pmod{p^2}$. We know $gcd(a^{-1}, p) = 1$, because a^{-1} has an inverse $(\text{mod } p^2)$ too. Combining this with the fact that gcd(x, p) = 1, we have $gcd(a^{-1}x, p) = 1$. This tells us $a^{-1}x \in S$, so $a(a^{-1}x) = x \in T$.
- $T \subseteq S$: Let $ax \in T$, where $x \in S$. We know gcd(x, p) = 1 because $x \in S$. Since gcd(a, p) = 1 as well, we know the product xs cannot share any prime factors with p as well, i.e. gcd(xs, p) = 1. This means $xs \in S$ as well, which proves the containment.

We now follow the proof of Fermat's Little Theorem. Since S = T, we have:

$$\prod_{s_i \in S} s_i \equiv \prod_{t_i \in T} t_i \pmod{p^2}$$

However, since we defined $T = \{a, 2a, ..., (p-1)a, (p+1)a, ..., (p^2-1)a\}$:

$$\prod_{t_i \in T} t_i \equiv \prod_{s_i \in S} as_i \equiv a^{|S|} \prod_{s_i \in S} s_i \pmod{p^2}$$

We can now conclude $(\prod_{s_i \in S} s_i) \equiv a^{|S|}(\prod_{s_i \in S} s_i) \pmod{p^2}$.

Each $s_i \in S$ is coprime to p, so their product $\prod_{s_i \in S} s_i$ is as well. Then, we can multiply both sides of our equivalence with the inverse of $\prod_{s_i \in S} s_i$ to obtain $a^{|S|} \equiv 1 \pmod{p^2}$. Using HW4, 4(b), we know |S| = p(p-1), which gives the desired result.

Alternate Solution: We can use Fermat's Little Theorem, combined with the Binomial Theorem, to get the result. Since gcd(a, p) = 1 and p is prime, $a^{p-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$, so we can write $a^{p-1} = \ell p + 1$ for some integer ℓ . Then,

$$(a^{p-1})^p = (\ell p + 1)^p = \sum_{i=0}^p \binom{n}{i} (\ell p)^i = 1 + p \cdot (\ell p) + \binom{p}{2} (\ell p)^2 + \dots + (\ell p)^p,$$

and since all of the terms other than the first term are divisible by p^2 , $a^{p(p-1)} \equiv 1 \pmod{p^2}$.

(b) By the definition of d above, ed = 1 + kp(p-1)q(q-1) for some k. Look at the equation $x^{ed} \equiv x \pmod{N}$ modulo p^2 first:

$$x^{ed} \equiv x^{1+kp(p-1)q(q-1)} \equiv x \cdot (x^{p(p-1)})^{kq(q-1)} \equiv x \pmod{p^2}$$

where we used the identity above. If we look at the equation modulo q^2 , we obtain the same result. Hence, $x^{ed} \equiv x \pmod{p^2q^2}$.

(c) We consider the scheme to be broken if knowing p^2q^2 allows you to deduce p(p-1)q(q-1). (Observe that knowing p(p-1)q(q-1) is enough, because we can compute the private key with this information.) Suppose that the scheme can be broken; we will show how to break ordinary RSA. For an ordinary RSA public key (N=pq,e), square N to get $N^2=p^2q^2$. By our assumption that the squared RSA scheme can be broken, knowing p^2q^2 allows us to find p(p-1)q(q-1). We can divide this by N=pq to obtain (p-1)(q-1), which breaks the ordinary RSA scheme. This proves that our scheme is at least as difficult as ordinary RSA.

Remark: The first part of the question mirrors the proof of Fermat's Little Theorem. The second and third parts of the question mirror the proof of correctness of RSA.