Forensic Analysis Notes:

Case Information:

Case: Extract the registry hives and scheduled tasks.

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Id	File name	Hash(None)	Notes
1	Disk image	Zipped windows	Suspicious
		image	Windows files need
			to be investigated

Tools and Environment

Kali Linux v2025.2

```
(tempuser⊕ kali)-[~/Downloads]
$\$\sb_\text{release} -a \\
No LSB modules are available.\
\text{Distributor ID: Kali} \\
\text{Description: Kali GNU/Linux Rolling} \\
\text{Release: 2025.2} \\
\text{Codename: kali-rolling}
```

mount v2.41.1 to attach filesystem like(USB, partition, hard drive, and ISO image) to existing directory structure

```
/mnt/ewf/ewf1 on /mnt/ntfs type fuseblk (ro,relatime,user_id=0,group_id=0,allow_other,blksize=4096)

[root@kali]-[/home/kali/scheduled_task]
mount --version
mount from util-linux 2.41.1 (libmount 2.41.1: selinux, smack, btrfs, verity, namespaces, idmapping, fd-based-mount, statk, assert, debug)
```

Ewfmount: Mount expert witness format (ewf) as a raw disk for analysis

```
(root@kali)-[/home/kali/scheduled_task]
    ewfmount -V
    ewfmount 20140816

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warranty; not even for MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Report bugs to <joachim.metz@gmail.com>.
```

/mnt/hgfs/: created a shard folder to allow the virtual machine to access the folder on my external SanDisk driver

```
(root@ kali) - [/home/kali/scheduled_task]
### ls -lah /mnt/hgfs/
total 21K
dr-xr-xr-x 1 root root 4.1K Sep 27 23:09 .
drwxr-xr-x 5 root root 4.0K Sep 27 21:05 ..
drwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 Sep 27 19:17 BackUps
drwxrwxrwx 1 root root 12K Sep 27 19:20 certificates
```

```
(root@ kali)-[/home/kali/scheduled_task]
# mount | grep hgfs
vmhgfs-fuse on /mnt/hgfs type fuse.vmhgfs-fuse (rw,nosuid,nodev,relatime,user_id=0,group_id=0,allow_other)

—(root@ kali)-[/home/kali/scheduled_task]
```

Grep v3.11

```
(tempuser@ kali)-[~/Downloads]
$ grep -V
grep (GNU grep) 3.11
Copyright (C) 2023 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
License GPLv3+: GNU GPL version 3 or later <a href="https://gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html">https://gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html</a>
>.
```

Cat:

```
(root@ kali)-[/home/kali/scheduled_tasks]
    cat --version
cat (GNU coreutils) 9.7
Packaged by Debian (9.7-3)
Copyright (C) 2025 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
License GPLv3+: GNU GPL version 3 or later <a href="https://gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html">https://gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html</a>.
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
Written by Torbjörn Granlund and Richard M. Stallman.
```

cop v9.7 for copying files and directories

```
(root@ kali)-[/mnt/ntfs]

prop --version

cp (GNU coreutils) 9.7

Packaged by Debian (9.7-3)

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License GPLv3+: GNU GPL version 3 or later <a href="https://gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html">https://gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html</a>.


This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.

There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.

Written by Torbjörn Granlund, David MacKenzie, and Jim Meyering.
```

Reglookup command was used read and analyze data in windows registry hives

Step 1: Created a shared folder to allow the virtual machine (VM) to access the **backup** folder located at *D:\holders* on the external drive. This folder contains the disk image.



Step 2: Mount manually to allow vm to share the shared folder



Analysis Steps:

Step3: Created the directory where the image should be mounted and used the **ewfmount** command to mount the image

Command:



Result: Directory was created

Status: Worked

Step4: Mount the image to directory created

Command

```
(root@kali)-[/home/kali]

# ewfmount /mnt/hgfs/BackUps/CS436/CS436_Windows11_PWNED.E01 /mnt/ewf/
ewfmount 20140816
```

Result: The entire image was mounted in the /mnt/ewf/ directory

Status: worked

Step 5: List the characteristics of the mounted drive

```
)-[/home/kali]
     fdisk -l /mnt/ewf/ewf1
Disk/mnt/ewf/ewf1: 70 GiB, 75161927680 bytes, 146800640 sectors
Units: sectors of 1 * 512 = 512 bytes
Sector size (logical/physical): 512 bytes / 512 bytes
I/O size (minimum/optimal): 512 bytes / 512 bytes
Disklabel type: gpt
Disk identifier: 530B465D-65A0-41F3-9A2F-D76BBD90DE2C
                        Start
                                       End
                                              Sectors Size Type
                                 206847
/mnt/ewf/ewf1p1
                         2048
                                              204800 100M EFI System
/mnt/ewf/ewf1p2
                       206848
                                   239615
                                                32768
                                                          16M Microsoft reserved
                       239616 145481727 145242112 69.3G Microsoft basic data
/mnt/ewf/ewf1p3
/mnt/ewf/ewf1p4 145481728 146796543
                                                        642M Windows recovery environment
                                              1314816
```

Result: Partitions captured were listed, with the sector starting at 239616

Status: Worked

Step 5: Mount the NTFS partitions

Command:

Result: The disk image was mounted as read-only at /mnt/ntfs

Status: Worked

Step 6: listed all contents from the disk image mounted at /mnt/ntfs

```
ls -la
total 1757044
drwxrwxrwx 1 root root 4096 Jul 19 20:11
drwxr-xr-x 5 root root 4096 Sep 27 23:35
                                          2560 Jul 19 07:32 '$AttrDef'
0 Jul 19 07:32 '$BadClus'
-rwxrwxrwx 1 root root
 -rwxrwxrwx 1 root root
-rwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 Jul 19 07:32 '$BadClus'
-rwxrwxrwx 1 root root 2269408 Jul 19 07:32 '$Bitmap'
-rwxrwxrwx 1 root root 8192 Jul 19 07:32 '$Boot'
drwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 Jul 19 07:32 '$Extend'
-rwxrwxrwx 1 root root 67108864 Jul 19 07:32 '$LogFile
-rwxrwxrwx 1 root root 236453888 Jul 19 07:32 '$MFT'
-rwxrwxrwx 1 root root 4096 Jul 19 07:32
drwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 Jul 19 10:39
                                                                               '$MFTMirr'
                                              0 Jul 19 10:39 '$Recycle.Bin'
0 Jul 19 07:32 '$Secure'
-rwxrwxrwx 1 root root
-rwxrwxrwx 1 root root 131072 Jul 19 07:32 '$UpCase'
                                            0 Jul 19 07:32 '$Volume'
15 Jul 19 06:42 'Documents and Settings' → /mnt/ntfs/Users
-rwxrwxrwx 1 root root
lrwxrwxrwx 2 root root 15 Jul 19 06:42 'Documents ar -rwxrwxrwx 2 root root 12288 Jul 19 19:50 DumpStack.lo drwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 Jul 19 05:13 inetpub drwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 Jul 19 05:41 OneDriveTemp
                                                                                DumpStack.log.tmp
-rwxrwxrwx 1 root root 1476395008 Jul 19 19:50
                                                                                pagefile.sys
drwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 Apr 1 2024
                                                                                 PerfLogs
drwxrwxrwx 1 root root 4096 Jul 19 10:42 ProgramData
drwxrwxrwx 1 root root 4096 Jul 19 20:10 Program Files'
drwxrwxrwx 1 root root 4096 Jul 19 10:42 Program Files'
Program Files'
Program Files'
Program Files'
Program Files (x86)'
Recovery
-rwxrwxrwx 1 root root 16777216 Jul 19 19:50 Swapfile.sys
drwxrwxrwx 1 root root 4096 Jul 19 05:29 'System Volume Information' drwxrwxrwx 1 root root 4096 Jul 19 10:40 Users
drwxrwxrwx 1 root root
drwxrwxrwx 1 root root
drwxrwxrwx 1 root root
                                                                                 Windows
                                             16384 Jul 19 05:42
                                             0 Jul 19 07:38
                                                                                 Windows.old
```

Step 7: I made a directory to hold all registry artifacts

```
(root@kali)-[/mnt/ntfs]
# mkdir /home/kali/registry_artifacts
```

Step 8: All the hives were copied from the image to the new directory, one by one

```
root®kali)-[/mnt/ntfs]
cp -r /mnt/ntfs/Windows/System32/config/{SYSTEM,SOFTWARE,SAM,SECURITY,DEFAULT} /home/kali/registry_artifacts
```

Step 8: The NTUSER.DAT file that stores user-specific Windows registry settings was copied to the Cs436_NTUSER directory

Command:

```
cp -r /mnt/ntfs/Users/cs436/NTUSER.DAT /home/kali/registry_artifacts/cs436_NTUSER.DAT
```

Step 9: Read and analyze data about applications configured to run at Windows startup

Result: Under WindowsSecurityUpdate, there is a suspicious executable designed to run at Windows startup called scvhost.exe, instead of the usual Windows svchost.exe. This could be malware or another form of suspicious persistence activity.

Status: worked

Step 10: Make a directory to handle scheduled tasks.

Command:

```
__(root@kali)-[/mnt/ntfs]
_____mkdir /home/kali/scheduled_tasks
```

Step 11: Copying all scheduled tasks stored in Windows/System32/Tasks

```
—(root@kali)-[/mnt/ntfs]
-# cp -r /mnt/ntfs/Windows/System32/Tasks/* /home/kali/scheduled_tasks
```

Step 12: Find an XML file that contains a command to be executed at Windows startup

```
)-[/home/kali/scheduled_tasks]
         WindowsUpdate
♦♦<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-16"?>
<Task version="1.2" xmlns="http://schemas
                     xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2004/02/mit/task">
  <RegistrationInfo>
    <Date>2025-07-19T16:12:52</Date>
    <Author>WORKGROUP\CS436_PWNED$</Author>
    <URI>\WindowsUpdate</URI>
  </RegistrationInfo>
  <Triggers>
    <TimeTrigger>
      <Repetition>
        <Interval>PT5M</Interval>
         <StopAtDurationEnd>false</StopAtDurationEnd>

⟨Repetition⟩

      <StartBoundary>2025-07-19T16:12:00</StartBoundary>
      <Enabled>true</Enabled>
    </TimeTrigger>
  ⟨/Triggers>
  <Settings>
    <MultipleInstancesPolicy>IgnoreNew</MultipleInstancesPolicy>
    <DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>true</DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>
    <StopIfGoingOnBatteries>true</StopIfGoingOnBatteries>
    <AllowHardTerminate>true</AllowHardTerminate>
    <StartWhenAvailable>false</StartWhenAvailable>
<RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>false</RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>
<IdleSettings>
      <Duration>PT10M</Duration>
      <WaitTimeout>PT1H</WaitTimeout>
      <StopOnIdleEnd>true</StopOnIdleEnd>
      <RestartOnIdle>false</RestartOnIdle>
    IdleSettings>
    <AllowStartOnDemand>true</AllowStartOnDemand>
    <Enabled>true</Enabled>
    <Hidden>false</Hidden>
    <RunOnlyIfIdle>false</RunOnlyIfIdle>
    <WakeToRun>false</wakeToRun>
    <ExecutionTimeLimit>PT72H</ExecutionTimeLimit>
    <Priority>7</Priority>
```

```
✓IdleSettings>
   <AllowStartOnDemand>true</AllowStartOnDemand>
   <Enabled>true</Enabled>
   <Hidden>false</Hidden>
   <RunOnlyIfIdle>false</RunOnlyIfIdle>
   <WakeToRun>false</WakeToRun>
   <ExecutionTimeLimit>PT72H/ExecutionTimeLimit>
   <Priority>7</Priority>
 </Settings>
 <Actions Context="Author">
     <Command>C:\\Users\\cs436\\Downloads\\xcvhost.exe</Command>
   </Exec>
 </Actions>
 <Principals>
   <Principal id="Author">
     <UserId>S-1-5-18</UserId>
     <RunLevel>LeastPrivilege</RunLevel>
   ⟨/Principal>
 ⟨Principals>
c/Task>
```

Result: Commands embedded in the XML files are set to run at Windows startup, which may indicate malware or suspicious persistence activity.

Findings:

The 'WindowsSecurityUpdate' key contained a misspelled executable, *scvhost.exe*, set to run at Windows startup. Additionally, an XML file named *windowsUpdate* was found, embedded with a command pointing to C:\Users\cs436\Downloads\xcvhost.exe, which is also configured to run at startup. This behavior appears suspicious and may indicate malware or a persistence mechanism.

Conclusion

The presence of a misspelled executable (scvhost.exe) configured to run at Windows startup via the WindowsSecurityUpdate registry key, along with an XML file (windowsUpdate) that contains a command to execute scvhost.exe from the user's Downloads folder. May suggests suspicious activity. With all these artifacts, they exhibit common characteristics of **malware or persistence mechanisms** often used to maintain unauthorized access to a system. A more detailed investigation and analysis of malware is recommended to confirm the existence and nature of these files.