


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Preface

Note on translation. Translations of the contributions in French and German are based on those provided by Oxford University Press. Quotations in Greek and Latin in the original versions of the contributions have been edited and/or translated in square brackets where significant, as have quotations in modern languages other than English.

Acknowledgements. My thanks to the community of Xenophontic scholars, who have made this volume possible, and have made assembling it such a pleasure. The bibliography is largely the work of Simon Oswald, an alumnus of Auckland University, who also unicoded the Greek. Referencing is Harvard style. Abbreviations are according to the method of the original paper.

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Introduction

Vivienne J. Gray

XENOPHON'S WORKS AND CONTROVERSIES ABOUT HOW TO READ THEM

Xenophon is a major voice of the fourth century BC.¹ His works innovate within existing literary genres and they pioneer entirely new ones. *Anabasis* and *Hellenica* develop the tradition of historical writing, while *Memorabilia*, *Oeconomicus*, *Symposium*, and *Hiero* develop the literary dialogue. *Cyropaedia* is our first focused example of 'mirror of princes' literature, and *Agesilaus* sets a pattern for encomiastic biography. Xenophon left us our first example of *politeia* literature, which describes the laws and customs that made Sparta successful (*Respublica Lacedaemoniorum* (RL)), our earliest work on economic reform (*Poroi*), and our first technical handbooks, on horses and hunting with hounds (*de Re Equestri*, *Hipparchicus*, *Cynegeticus*). In short, his literary innovations were so many that it is difficult to do them justice in a single volume of *Oxford Readings*. He was so highly regarded that all of his writings were preserved, and one (*Respublica Atheniensium*) credited to him as an extra.²

¹ The works are translated with English titles in Loeb Classical Library, Penguin Classics, Oxford World Classics and in various editions and commentaries.

² *Ath.Pol.* is not directly covered in this volume; see Gray (2007a) 49–58 for introduction and commentary.

In detail, *Anabasis* describes Xenophon's own experiences with the Ten Thousand Greek mercenaries recruited by the Persian prince Cyrus the Younger for the war against his brother the King Artaxerxes in 401/400 BC; it is the first account in which an author is shown playing a large part in the events he describes, and it examines the problems of leadership through the narrator's self-representation, as well as the presentation of Cyrus and other leaders of the mercenaries; it is a rich source for our knowledge of the western Persian empire. *Hellenica* is our main source for Greek history from the closing years of the Peloponnesian War down to the battle of Mantinea in 362 BC; it continues Thucydides and makes an issue of the problem of praise and blame in historical writing.³ *Memorabilia* is a new literary vehicle for the presentation of Socrates; it combines a rhetorical defence against the charges of his trial (that he corrupted the young and harmed the polis by not worshipping in the prescribed manner) with a series of short self-contained conversations describing how he helped his fellow citizens to achieve virtue and manage their affairs as leaders of their households and of Athens; it offers an image of Socrates very different from Plato's. This is also the image found in his other Socratic works: *Oeconomicus*, which is our earliest account of the management of a farming estate, *Symposium*, an account of Socrates and his companions at play in a drinking party, and the *Defence of Socrates*, which justifies Socrates' refusal to deliver a proper defence at his trial.⁴ *Hiero* is a dialogue on whether the ruler has greater happiness than his subjects, being the only extant treatment of this popular topic and one of the few extant dialogues in which Socrates does not figure.⁵ *Agésilas* sets a pattern for encomiastic biography with its combination of a narrative of the career of the Spartan King Agesilaus followed by separate sections on each of his virtues.⁶ *RL* systematically praises the laws that were introduced by Lycurgus to produce the social and military practices that made Sparta successful.⁷ *Cyropaedia* reveals the secrets

³ See the section on historical writing in this volume for *Anabasis* and *Hellenica*.

⁴ See the section on Socrates in this volume.

⁵ For *Hiero*, which is not directly covered in this volume: Gray (2007a) 30–8 for introduction, with commentary and Appendix 1.

⁶ See Momigliano (1971) 8, 50–2 for *Agésilas*, not directly covered in this volume.

⁷ For *RL*, which is not directly covered in this volume, see Gray (2007a) 39–48 for introduction, with commentary and Appendix 3 on the epilogue.

of the successful leadership of Cyrus the Great, the Persian King, who ruled the largest empire known to Xenophon. It is an entirely novel combination of biography, history, and political utopia, containing one of the earliest accounts of the career of a great man from birth to death, and some of the earliest romantic love stories.⁸ The technical handbooks on managing horses and cavalry forces and hunting with dogs (*de Re Equestri*, *Hipparchicus*, *Cynegeticus*) and his advice on how to improve the Athenian economy (*Poroi*) are further, instructional novelties.⁹

This summary of his works also shows that they are a rich source of a wide range of information: about the events and personalities of his own and earlier times, about the laws of Sparta and the customs of Persia, about the management of horses and the practices of hunters, about the Athenian economy and cavalry, its estates and its social practices from the production of armour to the status of the courtesan. He provides primary evidence on matters as disparate as choral production,¹⁰ and private cults.¹¹

Their interest and significance make it all the more important to recognize the political and literary controversies about how to read Xenophon's works. They had a markedly positive reception in the ancient world,¹² but their reputation fell in the twentieth century and negative opinions are still strongly held about his intellect and political preferences and character. Diogenes Laertius counted him one of the three greatest pupils of Socrates.¹³ As a philosopher, Xenophon reveals an ethical interest throughout his works, directly philosophical or otherwise, in the Socratic search for the best life, with a particular focus on the virtues of leaders and on their relationships with their followers in the various social and political groups he describes, from families to empires.¹⁴ Yet his intellectual

⁸ See the section on *Cyropaedia* in this volume.

⁹ See Gauthier in this volume.

¹⁰ See frequent references to Xenophon in Wilson (2000).

¹¹ Xenophon's Scillus cult takes up almost a third part of Purvis (2003).

¹² See Münscher (1920). Cicero (*ad Q. f.* 1.1.23) admired *Cyropaedia* as a portrait of a ruler, Arrian imitated a range of Xenophon's works: Stadter (1980).

¹³ DL 2.47 puts him alongside Plato and Antisthenes.

¹⁴ On his theory of leadership: Wood (1964), Due (1989) 147–206, Gray (2007a) 1–14.

ability to appreciate Socrates' philosophy is a focus of modern debate.¹⁵ His desire to defend Socrates is thought to make his evidence unreliable of course in the Socratic works, but his inadequate intellectual grasp of philosophy is also said to have obliged him to assemble his image of Socrates out of passages borrowed from Antisthenes or Plato, sometimes badly misunderstood.¹⁶ And whereas antiquity admired his virtues, modern times have found vices. His *Anabasis* has been interpreted as vainglorious falsification of his part in the expedition.¹⁷ Following Schleiermacher, Robin found moral failings in his other attempts at self-praise too.¹⁸ He was accused of gross political opportunism in supporting democracy in *Poroi* (that was only in order to have his exile revoked, or as a show of gratitude to the democracy for revoking it), and of opportunism or incoherence in the changing views of Sparta and others that were detected within *Hellenica*,¹⁹ and between the main text and the epilogues to *Cyropaedia* and *RL*. These views are not much muted even in more modern times.²⁰

His images of political power too, particularly his apparent endorsement of one-man rule, have had mixed receptions. Cicero praised *Cyropaedia* as a worthy mirror for princes, and in a modern environment Luccioni criticized Xenophon's admiration of autocracy, implicating Socrates as an influence in this undemocratic preference.²¹ Yet at the same time as Luccioni was writing, Leo Strauss was publishing his highly influential articles and monographs that found sub-texts in Xenophon's works, and his followers read his images of rulers and followers as ironical rather than transparent.²² In monographs that dominate his recent bibliography²³ Xenophon

¹⁵ See Morrison and Patzer in this volume.

¹⁶ See Joël (1895, 1896) and Patzer in this volume; cf. Gray (1998), Dorion (2000).

¹⁷ See Erbse's challenge to that view in this volume.

¹⁸ Robin (1910). See Erbse in this volume for the influence of Schleiermacher.

¹⁹ Delebecque (1957) for example.

²⁰ Azoulay (2004b), for example, focuses on Xenophon's bribery and corruption as a commander in *Anabasis*. Xenophon is said to deploy 'many rhetorical strategies and smoke screens' to cover these because they are shameful when compared with ideal aristocratic exchange values.

²¹ Luccioni (1947) *passim*.

²² See Dorion in this volume on the influence of Strauss.

²³ Higgins (1977) 44–59; Tatum (1989), Nadon (2001). And see Carlier in this volume. Due (1989) has not had due influence.

emerged from this scrutiny as one who could condemn as well as endorse autocracy and wrote *Cyropaedia* in particular to reveal this; 'Xenophon is a subtle writer' became a regular description of this 'rehabilitation'.²⁴ *Hellenica* and *Hiero* were informed by such readings as well as the Socratic works, and, in another recent monograph, Xenophon is said to use irony throughout his works to endorse a theory of relations between leaders and followers in empire and army, and smaller social units, that is entirely exploitative and autocratic beneath its democratic appearance.²⁵

Xenophon's views on leadership are his major contribution to political thought, so that ironical readings of his images of power are important; they dictate how we understand that thought because they are credited to his own deliberate intention. It would be perfectly fine to read subversion into his texts in an exercise of reader reception 'just so long as we remember that it is we who are interested in irony and the history we construct reflects that interest, leaving open, for the present, the question of what relationship such a history has to the events of the time'.²⁶ But ironical readings of Xenophon's images of power tend to close down other interpretations. Modern circumstances of course influence our assessments, and ironic readings are no exception. Luccioni wrote in an age of dictators, ironical readings reflect the concerns of contemporary society with irony,²⁷ the Xenophon who deplores autocracy reflects the privileged status of democracy in our times, and the ruler who smiles and smiles but is a closet autocrat reflects our conviction that no ruler can be really good.

The reader may be assisted in forming an opinion on how to read Xenophon's politics by the contributions printed in this volume. There is some agreement, for instance, that Xenophon was not hostile to democracy within Athens, but tried to reconcile the

²⁴ E.g. Tuplin (2004a) 29: Xenophon is a sophisticated manipulator of the written word, a man with a straight face and a glint in the eye.

²⁵ Azoulay (2004a); cf. Gray's review in *CR* (2006). See also Azoulay (2004c).

²⁶ Witkin (1997).

²⁷ Witkin (1997): 'The importance of Irony in modern art and literature and, more latterly, in the intellectual sciences and in culture generally, can hardly be overestimated. For some writers, the cultivation of irony is the most essential qualification for any thought, any art or literature or social or political theory to be truly modern.'

needs of the wealthy to its aims (Gauthier, Johnston). Strauss read Socrates' support for democracy as ironic, on the grounds that the philosopher in a democracy must conceal his views behind a façade of democratic compliance because he never shares the views of the majority, but his support could genuinely reflect that reconciliation; Dorion in this volume challenges Strauss's reading of the Socratic works in any case. The contributions do not settle the question of *Cyropaedia*, which is read as both veiled criticism of autocracy (Carlier), and for its surface reading of praise (Stadter, Lefèvre), but Dorion and Huss point to a passage from *Memorabilia* (1.2.19–33) that suggests to them that the corruption described in the epilogue may reinforce the original praise of customs rather than questioning their validity. This also applies to the epilogue to *RL*.²⁸

THE INTERESTS REVEALED IN THE WORKS IN RELATION TO XENOPHON'S LIFE AND EXPERIENCE OF HISTORICAL EVENTS²⁹

There are two main sources for Xenophon's life. *Anabasis* gives autobiographical information and Diogenes Laertius includes Xenophon in his *Lives of the Philosophers*, giving us biographical detail along with a list of his works.³⁰ The works cannot be arranged in a definitive chronological sequence to provide a synchronism with his life. There is speculation that he completed some earlier,³¹ but

²⁸ See Gray (2007a) Appendix 3 for the epilogue to *RL*; cf. Humble (2004).

²⁹ The main introduction to Gray (2007a) 14–19 has a version of his life, where my purpose was to relate his experience to his political thought in *Hiero* and *RL*. This section contains much of the same material, but presented for a different effect.

³⁰ Anderson, (1974) gives a balanced and accessible account of the life. DL (third century AD) wrote an account of his life and works (2.48–59), drawing on writers such as Ephorus and Dinarchus (fourth to third centuries BC) and Diocles and Demetrius of Magnesia (first century BC); these supplement the information Xenophon gives about himself in *Anabasis*, especially 3.1, 5.3.

³¹ For example, Sordi (1980) believes *Hiero* uses the early fifth century Sicilian tyrant Hiero as a mirror into which the later Sicilian tyrants, the Dionysii, might gaze and recognize themselves. Specific events in their reigns then provide a date at which this mirror might be most plausibly offered to them. The epilogue to *RL*, which

Hellenica, *Cyropaedia*, *Agésilas*, and *Poroi* were not complete until 360–350 BC.³² The death of the author may make his experience theoretically irrelevant to the reception of his works,³³ but the works provide insights into his experience, and more evident than any moral or intellectual failing is the huge range of his experience of government.

Xenophon saw the operation of the Athenian democratic system in his youth, and the oligarchy imposed on Athens after the Peloponnesian War, describing these in *Hellenica* as well as in the Socratic works. He then experienced the command of Cyrus the Younger and the Greek generals over the Ten Thousand and he describes these in *Anabasis*. He goes on to describe his own command of those men, before it passed to Spartans. He served under Spartan commanders in their attempt to liberate Greek Asia and then marched with Agesilaus against Greece, describing these events also in *Hellenica*. His evaluations of leaders in *Hellenica* are marked by the intrusions into the narrative of his own voice, which historians usually reserve for matters of importance to them, and Agesilaus' leadership is the focus of the encomium he wrote for the King. He subsequently exercised leadership as master of his estate at Scillus and as patron of his adopted community in exile. All this allowed him to develop his theory of how to succeed in leadership, which he analyses in speeches, exemplifies in narratives, and teaches through Socrates and in works of more direct instruction like *Hipparchicus*. The Socratic works, especially *Memorabilia* and *Oeconomicus*, show that his concept of leadership extended beyond the army and the polis of these

criticizes Spartan hegemony, is likewise dated on the basis of the event that provoked the criticism: the seizure of the Cadmeia of Thebes, contrary to their treaties with their allies. Yet the rhetorical nature of the criticism in the epilogue to *RL* advises caution about precise timeframes, as does the timeless relevance of the message in *Hiero* for all kinds of audiences: Gray (2007a), 35 and Appendix 3.

³² *Poroi* 5.9 indicates a date of composition in 355/4 BC (D. S. 16.23 on the Sacred War); *Hell.* 6.4.37 was written after the accession to power of Tisiphonus in 357/6 BC (D. S. 16.14.1–2); *Agésilas* after Agesilaus' death, in 362/1 BC (D. S. 15.93.6 and Plut. *Ag.* 40.3); *Cyr.* 8.8.4 after the Satraps' Revolt c. 361 BC (D. S. 15.90–3). Huss and Patzer in this volume date the Socratic works to this period too, but on less strong evidence.

³³ Barthes (1977).

histories down to the management of personal relations in the household and even in the association of friendship, where, he thought, a kind of rotating leadership was always present. Xenophon's broad understanding of leadership indeed stretches our definition almost to breaking point, since it is not at all obvious in the modern world that friends and members of families take turns in 'leading' each other to common goals; but that is his view (*Mem.* 2.3–6). The strangeness of this thought encourages ironical readings precisely because the notion of individuals working for the benefit of their communities is not considered probable, but always implies, for us, a hidden degree of exploitation.

Xenophon's life c. 431–401 BC

Xenophon experienced the Peloponnesian War, presumably from within Athens. His description of himself as 'young' at the time of the *Anabasis* (401/400 BC) may mean that he was born in the early years of the War, since in other contexts 'young' means below thirty years of age.³⁴ Of his family we know nothing. He introduces himself in *Anabasis* 3.1.4 as 'Xenophon an Athenian' without giving his father's name, even though he mentions the dream in which his father's house caught fire (3.1.11). We go to his biographer Diogenes for the information that his father was Gryllus, and that this was the name Xenophon gave his elder son.³⁵

Of his education, we know that Socrates was philosophizing in Athens when Xenophon was of an age to benefit from his teaching.

³⁴ A birth-date no earlier than 430 BC can be deduced. Xenophon implies that he was too young for military command in 401 BC (*An.* 3.1.14, 25), and this probably means he was younger than thirty. It seems that those below thirty were called 'young' (*Mem.* 1.2.35). Proxenus was thirty years old at that time of his military command and it is significant that Xenophon does not call him too young (*An.* 2.6.20). He could even have been under twenty; his Alcibiades challenged the wisdom of Pericles at this early age, and his Glaucon tried (unwisely) to advise the Athenians about the management of their affairs (*Mem.* 1.2.40, 3.6.1). Proof that he lived at least until 355/4 BC is found in the reference he makes to the Sacred War (*Poroi* 5.9; cf. D. S. 16.23).

³⁵ See discussion of this name, but not Xenophon's, in Herchenroeder (2008).

He depicts himself in the starring role of Socrates' ignorant pupil, learning the dangers of erotic passion in *Memorabilia* 1.3.9–13. Plato was a fellow student, and others who were to be influential thinkers. Among the memories of these times is Xenophon's account of Socrates' version of Prodicus' lecture on Heracles' Choice between Virtue and Vice (*Mem.* 2.1.21–33), the only version we have of that famous performance.³⁶ Xenophon's Socrates used the dialectic method, involving questioning, definitions, classifications, and his general subject area was ethical virtue for those destined to be leaders of their communities (e.g. Euthydemus in *Mem.* 4.2–3, 5–6).³⁷ He gave guidance in the requirements of friendship (*Mem.* 2.2–10), and how to lead armies and cities (*Mem.* 3.1–7), as part of a programme of how to live a successful life. To this end *Memorabilia* 4.7 shows that he also encouraged as much of the sciences such as mathematics and astronomy as was needed to facilitate that life. It is Socrates' teaching for success that earns him his regular description as supremely 'helpful' to his associates (e.g. *Mem.* 4.1.1).³⁸ The educated man according to his definition is the *kaloskagathos*, one who is able to successfully manage relations with his friends and family, his comrades and his polis (*Mem.* 1.2.42). This model citizen needed a wide general knowledge as well as ethical training to make his service to his community effective. Xenophon's works show that he himself possessed this knowledge. When young Glaucon sought to play the politician and advise the polis, Socrates tested him on his knowledge of the Athenian economy and found him wanting (3.6). Xenophon commands this knowledge in *Poroi* and put it at the disposal of the democratic leaders of his polis, as his introductions shows. In *Oeconomicus* Socrates learns successful management of the household estate from Ischomachus and passes it on to Critoboulos. Xenophon shows from the farming detail in the work that he knew this art too. We assume that he twinned his intellectual with his physical development, dancing perhaps with Socrates, who has a basic understanding of physical fitness.³⁹ Socrates refers to medical writings

³⁶ Gray (2007b).

³⁷ See Morrison in this volume.

³⁸ This explains Longo's title (1959): *Aner ophelimos, the Helpful Man*.

³⁹ See Huss in this volume.

(*Mem.* 4.2.10), in which diet and exercise were central, and Xenophon shows this same interest among the Spartans (*RL* 5.8). Xenophon's literary education is proven by his works, which also show that he knew his Homer.⁴⁰

The information about horses and cavalry command in *Hipparchicus* and *de Re Equestri* suggest that his family was wealthy enough to keep horses, as well as maintain their son in Socratic idleness. His handbook on hunting with dogs, *Cynegeticus*, shows another interest typical of wealthier men; it fulminates against the sophists who teach words and not morality; hunting in contrast teaches you to be a good citizen through toil and teamwork (12–13). This wealthy background is no surprise. It would be exceptional to find any writer of humble origins in the ancient world. Perhaps it was because of this background that Xenophon is capable of the most enlightened views about ordinary people, about women, even slaves.⁴¹

Apart from his education, there was the War. He gives us an account of the final years of the Peloponnesian War at the beginning of *Hellenica* and there are references to it in *Memorabilia* (e.g. 3.5 on how to improve the hoplite forces, and the conversations with people who are in straightened circumstances because of the War: Aristarchus, 2.7, Eutherus, 2.8, and Charmides in *Symp.* 4.29–33). The inference from his equine interests that he served in the Athenian cavalry may be justified; he may have served during the democracy if he was old enough, and after the War possibly in the cavalry that supported the Thirty Tyrants, who ruled Athens at that time; but cavalrymen also served the democratic resistance to their tyranny (*Hell.* 2.4.25–7).

Xenophon's life c. 401–394 BC

Xenophon participated in the expedition led by the Persian prince Cyrus to overthrow his brother, the King of Persia, and he describes

⁴⁰ Homeric references: *Anabasis* 3.2.25, 5.1.2. In *Symp.*, Niceratus knows Homer by heart and quotes extensively from him (4.7–8). See also interpretation of Homer at *Mem.* 1.2, 56–8; 1.3, 7; 2.6.11, 14, 29, 33; 3.2; 4.6.15; *Symp.* 7.21.

⁴¹ See Baragwanath, Pomeroy, Goldhill in this volume.

his role in these events in his *Anabasis*. His reasons for going are to be guessed; but what he says of the motivation of most people may apply to himself: their desire to attach themselves to a prince who, if he became King, would repay them well for their service (6.4.8). Xenophon makes his friend Proxenus hope, through friendship with great men like Cyrus, to make his name and his fortune (2.6.17). *Anabasis* 1.7.6–7 has Cyrus promise to distribute satrapies to those who serve him well, and his obituary suggests that he would have kept his promises (1.9). Xenophon represents himself as a guest-friend of Cyrus, like the leaders of the military companies Cyrus collected;⁴² but it is important to notice his denial that he joined Cyrus in any military capacity (3.1.4)—he took on military leadership of the mercenaries only after the death of their generals. If he did not originally join in a military capacity, we can only assume that Cyrus took him on because of his reputation as a philosopher or as a young man of some other kind of promise. By Xenophon's own account at least, Cyrus was enthusiastic about his acquisition (*Anab.* 3.1.9). Cyrus may have seen Xenophon's potential as a writer and leadership theorist, if this was the direction his philosophical studies had taken. Cyrus could do with a good pressman for his Greek audience if he became king, and the praise of Cyrus in *Anabasis* 1 shows what a propagandist Xenophon would have been, had Cyrus lived. The role of the philosophical advisor and court historian to a king is not unattested. There was a tradition that Plato advised the tyrants of Syracuse about leadership. Philosophers including Callisthenes, Aristotle's nephew, followed Alexander the Great, advising him in moral and practical matters as well as writing accounts of his campaigns.⁴³ Philosophic networks engaged in writing and leadership theory certainly figure in Xenophon's account of his joining the expedition. Proxenus, who secured Xenophon's invitation to join Cyrus, was a pupil of Gorgias the rhetorician and writer of Leontini, who philosophized in Athens alongside Socrates. Proxenus led a regiment, but Xenophon says he was implementing what he had learned from Gorgias about leadership and friendship, just as

⁴² Herman (1987) 47, 97–101 on Cyrus' friendship as 'guest-friendship'.

⁴³ Plato, *Seventh Epistle*, Plutarch *Dion* and Diodorus Siculus 15.7.1 on Plato. Arrian 4.10–11 on how Anaxarchus the sophist offered Alexander consoling and flattering advice about his injustice as a king and how Callisthenes gave him another less welcome sort of advice.

Xenophon implemented the knowledge of command that he appears to have learned from Socrates (*Mem.* 3.1–5) when his time came. Xenophon also describes how he himself consulted Socrates about the expedition and was advised to consult Delphi, on the grounds that the Athenians would take against him if he went, because Cyrus had helped bring Athens to their knees in the recent Peloponnesian War (*Anab.* 3.1.5–8). Socrates admired Cyrus, if we can rely on what he is made to say in *Oeconomicus* 4.18–25, but obviously felt the association to be politically dangerous.⁴⁴ Xenophon's subsequent exile proved him right.

Whatever his motivation, Xenophon's interest in promoting images of leadership is on display not only in the narrative in the form of vignettes, such as the ones in which followers show their huge enthusiasm to serve Cyrus (1.5.8, 1.8.28–9), but also in the obituaries for the Greek generals (2.6) and for Cyrus himself (1.9), after he was killed in battle and beheaded by his brother. The obituary is a device he appears to have invented for the purpose of revealing the secrets of leadership, and they show his special interest in how the leader can win willing followers. He represents himself as another example of leadership, going so far in winning obedience from those he commanded himself that the Spartans were told he was too friendly to the ordinary soldier (7.6.4, 7.6.39). It is useful to consider whether his experience of Cyrus and his Persians on this expedition and the traditions he may have heard from them about Cyrus the Great, his namesake ancestor, developed his knowledge of Persia and awakened his interest in writing *Cyropaedia*, which is partly based on Persian sources which 'still' sing of Cyrus' excellence (*Cyrop.* 1.2.1). This was his longest work on leadership.

Xenophon is often said to be Laconophile because of the association with the Spartans that began at this time, and because of his praise for the laws of Lycurgus in *RL* and of Agesilaus in his encomium, but he reports initially uneasy relations with the Spartans in *Anabasis*. It could be said that he was caught between a rock and a hard place: the Athenians objecting to his alliance with Cyrus, the Spartans objecting to his Athenian provenance. When he was asked to take supreme command of the Ten Thousand, he was tempted, but refused it, on the grounds that the appointment of an Athenian

⁴⁴ See Erbse in this volume on this episode.

would alienate the Spartans, who claimed their right to be masters of all and who had stopped warring against Athenians only when this mastery was recognized (6.1.19–33). His experience of real Spartans increased the knowledge he had already acquired under Socrates about Spartan obedience to Lycurgus' laws (*Mem.* 4.4.15) and he displays this in his joking with the Spartan Cheirisophos in *Anabasis* 6.4.14–16 about their notorious habit of allowing their boys to steal.

Xenophon was exiled from Athens at some time after the end of the expedition. *Anabasis* 7.7.57 foreshadows it, and one view is that Socrates was right, that the Athenians blamed him for his association with Cyrus, their old enemy. This is the version given by Pausanias 5.11.5–6. Xenophon's reference suggests that the exile was soon to be passed, which makes it contemporary with Socrates' trial for impiety and corruption of the young, and this may have made things worse for him. The alternative reason given for his exile by Diogenes Laertius (2.51) is his friendship with the Spartans, but this puts the exile after 394 BC.⁴⁵ The Spartans recruited the Ten Thousand for their campaigns to liberate Greek Asia from the Persians (399–394 BC), but in 394 BC they marched under their King Agesilaus against the Athenians and their allies in the Corinthian War (394–387/6 BC). Xenophon does not refer to himself in the narrative of those campaigns but probably took part (*Hell.* 3.1–4, 4.1). The reason for his exile in this version was not just friendship with an old enemy, but with a continuing one.

His exile gives the question of Xenophon's attitude to the democracy special interest. Hostility might be expected, but goodwill is more apparent in his works. This is often considered self-seeking and false, but the point of resistance comes when it is hard to find any image of democracy in his works other than a positive one.⁴⁶ Perhaps Xenophon's political stance never did change, or perhaps the lapse of time between his exile and his works softened even the hardest heart. The support for democracy found in his Socratic works may be

⁴⁵ The exile continues to provoke interest: Rahn (1981); Badian (2004) believes Xenophon was by his own lights a loyal Athenian; Dreher in Tuplin (2004a) focuses on the legal process that led to Xenophon's exile from Athens and the circumstances of his return.

⁴⁶ See Gray (2004b) for his views on democracy.

dismissed as apologetic—but Socrates can still criticize the common man in order to encourage one who fears them to engage in politics (*Mem.* 3.7), and there is the possibility that Socrates did actually teach Xenophon that the wealthy should support and work with the democracy, which is the surface import of *Memorabilia* (e.g. 1.2.58–61). The tyranny led by Critias, which demolished the democracy at the end of the Peloponnesian War and persecuted Socrates for conversing with the young, is certainly condemned in *Memorabilia* (1.2.24–38) and *Hellenica* (2.3.11–56). In *Memorabilia*, this may be part of the defence against the charge that Socrates corrupted Critias, but no such motive drives *Hellenica*. *Hellenica* also presents Thrasybulus in a good light (esp. 2.4.40–2)—even though he led the administration that passed the sentence of exile. His apparent praise for ‘having a reputation as a good man’ at his death is explained as ironical (*Hell.* 4.8.30),⁴⁷ but Xenophon continues to show Athens under Thrasybulus as scrupulously, even foolishly observant of her reciprocal relations (a cornerstone of Xenophon’s ethical theory) when she repays Thebes with a greater favour than she ever received in joining her in war against the Spartans (3.5.16); and then she remembers the good she has had from Sparta rather than the bad in joining them in their war against Thebes (6.5.37–48, the speech of Procles). Her military record is patchy, but her cavalry goes out in a blaze of glory in the closing battle of *Hellenica* (7.5.16–17), in which, we hear from Diogenes, Xenophon’s son Gryllus died. *Poroi* gives useful advice to the democracy, reconciling the elite to that form of government (see Gautier in this volume).

Xenophon’s life c. 394–362 BC

Xenophon returned from Asia with Agesilaus and the remains of the Ten Thousand to wage war in Greece from 394 BC. It is unclear how much longer his military service to the Spartans lasted, but it was as a writer that he used his literary skills to praise the leadership of Agesilaus

⁴⁷ Luccioni (1947) reads the favourable representation of the democracy as a bid for favour. Tuplin (1993) 80–1 reads the apparent praise of Thrasybulus at *Hell.* 4.8.30 as a criticism of Athenian imperialism.

in the innovative encomium he wrote on the King's death in 361/360 BC. Plutarch (Ag. 20) tells an anecdote of relations between them as between a philosopher and a king rather than a soldier, and records also the education of Xenophon's sons in the Spartan system.

At some time after the march with Agesilaus, Xenophon was settled by the Spartans at Scillus near Olympia in the Peloponnese (*Anab.* 5.3.7). He subsequently purchased land in the vicinity for a sanctuary for Artemis that represented her tithe of the eastern plunder. He describes this as a game park of the style associated with the Persians (*Anab.* 5.3.8–13). The local community participated in the religious festival he established these in honour of the goddess.

As for military events, *Hellenica* 4.2–5.1 describes how the Spartans and their allies fought against the alliance of Thebes, Argos, Athens, and Corinth in the Corinthian War, which challenged the hegemony of Greece that they had secured after the Peloponnesian War. It goes on to describe how Persia ended the War by imposing the King's Peace of 387/6 BC, which gave Persia control of Greek affairs. Persian interest lay in securing tribute from the Asiatic Greeks, getting a regular supply of Greek mercenaries for her own wars, and preventing Greeks assisting rebels who challenged their authority in the west: Evagoras in Cyprus, various rulers in Egypt, and the satraps of the western provinces. Diodorus Siculus is the longer source for these eastern events, but Xenophon mentions Evagoras in *Hellenica* 4.8.24, and Agesilaus' campaign in Egypt in *Agesilaus* 2.26–33. The Spartans then took advantage of the clause in the King's Peace supporting autonomous governments in Greece in order to increase their power over the Peloponnese and Greece by breaking up federations of power (5.2–6.2). Athens meanwhile built up her Second Empire from the 390s BC in uneasy alliance with Persia, but this ended in the Social War of the 350s. It is in this period that Xenophon delivers his *Poroi*, advising them how to live off of their own resources rather than their empire. *Hellenica* also shows he is aware of their empire, but he does not make it a focus of this work, apparently because he wants to present Athens as a power chastened by their previous misfortune, not the fools who thought they could acquire power again: Callistratus the demagogue (6.3.10–17) claims she has learned from her errors not to oppress others, and so should Sparta. While these old partners waxed and waned, fought

and were reconciled, all against the background of Persian control, the Thebans had been increasing the power of their Boeotian confederacy and they defeated the Spartans at Leuctra in 371 bc. Stripping the Spartans of Messenia and her League, they began to manage the affairs of the Peloponnese, and of Greece to some extent, from that time (*Hell.* 6.4 ff.). The battle of Mantinea, in which Athens and Sparta fought as allies against Thebes, ended in stalemate (*Hell.* 7.5.26–7), and this is where Xenophon's record of Greek affairs ends. The power that was to rise without end was Macedon. Philip led them from the 360s bc, eventually to pass on to Alexander the conquest of Greece and the Persians. Xenophon does not mention him, though he charts the pattern of the rise of the northern power in his account of Jason of Thessaly, cut off from domination of the Greeks only by a lucky assassination (*Hell.* 6.1, 6.4.27–32).

Xenophon's life c. 362–354? bc

Xenophon may have been around seventy years old when Agesilaus died, both of them old campaigners. The 'myriad' tributes that came in on Xenophon's son's death at Mantinea attest to the fame of his father (DL 2.53–5)—written tributes from the philosophic and literary community to which he now belonged. Diogenes says that he relocated to Corinth in the troubles that followed the Spartan defeat at Leuctra, and that he died there in old age, but Pausanias 5.11.5–6 mentions a tombstone in Scillus. The Athenian perspective of *Poroi* suggests he returned to Athens. Wherever he was, the happy memory is of Xenophon in his final decade, setting himself a writing schedule for *Agesilaus*, *Cyropaedia*, *Hellenica*, and *Poroi*.

THE CONTRIBUTIONS AND THEIR BROAD CONTEXTS, INCLUDING NOTES ON MORE RECENT WORK

Oxford Readings print the best work of the past generation, but an equal challenge in my selection is to represent Xenophon's many

works, as well as the controversies about them, the methodologies used to interpret them and the continuity of the issues with them.

I have chosen the following topics because they cover his major works and represent what I think are interesting trends in the debate: 1. Status and gender; 2. Democracy; 3. Socrates; 4. *Cyropaedia*; 5. Historical writing.

The constraints of space demand special sacrifice of a writer who has so much to offer. *Poroi* is here, but the other shorter works are mentioned only in passing: *Hiero*, *Agesilaus*, *RL*, *de Re Equestri*, *Hipparchicus*. There are some significant modern authors missing.⁴⁸ Monographs proved impossible to break down into coherent smaller sections suitable for the series. One single paper harvests the wealth of the two recent volumes of essays edited by Lane Fox (2004a) and Tuplin (2004a)—but they are recent, and accessible. Many essays from these collections are mentioned in footnotes to supplement the *Readings* in areas such as his biography, his understanding of ancient military matters,⁴⁹ and his religious beliefs.⁵⁰ His language and style are not represented here because they are less suitable for a general series, but work has been done and remains to be done in this area. His use of rhetoric has been charted, he has been used to determine broader linguistic patterns, and he recently became the object of a study of the present tense.⁵¹ The stylistic variation between the

⁴⁸ For example: Christopher Tuplin, Stephen Hirsch, John Dillery.

⁴⁹ See for example in Lane Fox (2004a), Whitby, on the Greek leaders, particularly Xenophon, as highly innovative (see also Erbse in this volume); Hornblower, on the idea of the army as self-directing polis; Roy, on the phenomenon of the mercenary. In Tuplin (2004a) see Lee on the functions of the *lochos* in *Anabasis*, Manfredi on the itinerary of the Ten Thousand. Cf. Tritle in Tuplin (2004a) on Clearchus' difficulties as post-traumatic stress disorder with Thomas Braun in Lane Fox (2004a) on negative aspects in the characterization of Clearchus, and Cyrus.

⁵⁰ Parker in Lane Fox (2004a) explores Xenophon's personal religion, his optimism about the gods, their status as friends of mankind, their special gift of divination, his view that men need to do without their assistance however in matters that they can divine themselves. Bowden in Tuplin (2004a) investigates relations between gods and men, and questions the idea that Xenophon had any sweeping general principles.

⁵¹ The ancient critics exemplify his language mainly from *Anabasis* and *Cyropaedia*; Gauthier (1911) is the main modern work on Xenophon's language and style. See as a sample of recent work: Bakker (1997); Diggle (2002) 83–6; Buijs (2005).

parallel narratives of *Agesilaus* and *Hellenica* brings the stylistic demands of different genre into focus.⁵²

SECTION 1: STATUS AND GENDER

Sarah B. Pomeroy, 'Slavery in the Greek domestic economy in the light of Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*', *Index* 17 (1989) 11–18.

Emily Baragwanath, 'Xenophon's foreign wives', *Prudentia* 34 (2002) 125–58.

Clifford Hindley, 'Xenophon on male love', *CQ* 49 (1999) 74–99.

This section is on social issues: the household (slaves and women), powerful women, male love. Xenophon has a liberal view of slaves and women that credits them with the same instinct for co-operative human relations and leadership as his men. His evidence on male love is abundant and his views perhaps not straightforwardly Socratic. These themes are touched on in other contributions printed in this volume too.

Sarah Pomeroy finds in the *Oeconomicus* radical thought about women, slaves, and economics: it is the first work to draw attention to the economic importance of the *oikos*, it offers enlightened details on the role of women and slaves within that economy and the lesson that generous treatment of slaves is a contributing factor to success.⁵³

Emily Baragwanath treats Xenophon's foreign wives as a special category of women whose achievements Xenophon represents within patterned narratives about friendship and leadership. These women often initiate and mediate friendships between men of power: Panthea (*Cyropaedia*), Mania, the governor of Aeolis (*Hellenica*), Epyaxa, the Cilician Queen (*Anabasis*). Xenophon's representation is not the eastern stereotype of Herodotus, nor does it reflect Aristotle's view about any incapacity in women.

Clifford Hindley defines Xenophon's view on male love. Evidence from *Agesilaus*, *Hellenica*, *Anabasis*, and *Hiero*, as well as the Socratic works, suggests that Xenophon does not share the view of his Socra-

⁵² See Bringmann (1971).

⁵³ See also Pomeroy (2002) and (1994).

tes in *Symposium*. Socrates sees ideal male love as a friendship that inspires the partners to excellence in leadership and other worthy pursuits, and he recommends abstinence from its carnal expression, which he considers corrupting. Xenophon saw male love as an inspiration to excellence too, but he was not opposed to physical relationships, except where harmful to others or self.⁵⁴

SECTION 2: DEMOCRACY

Philippe Gauthier, 'Le programme de Xénophon dans les *Poroi*', *Revue de Philologie* 58 (1984) 181–99.

Steven Johnstone, 'Virtuous toil, vicious work: Xenophon on aristocratic style', *CP* 89 (1994) 219–40.

Simon Goldhill, 'The seductions of the gaze: Socrates and his girlfriends', in *Kosmos. Essays in Order, Conflict and Community in Classical Athens*, Paul Cartledge, Paul Millett, and Sitta von Reden (eds) (Cambridge 1998) 105–24.

Xenophon discusses the organization of the household in *Oeconomicus*, and of empire in *Cyropaedia*;⁵⁵ this section is on his view of democratic politics in Athens. Xenophon has been called undemocratic in more contexts than can be mentioned, but what emerges here is a Xenophon who reconciles elites with democratic ideals and practices.

Gauthier describes Xenophon's intentions in *Poroi*, and the political implications of his suggestions for the improvement of the Athenian democratic economy. Xenophon suggests that the Athenian democratic leaders should not exploit the empire but develop their own resources to maintain the *demos*, such as their agriculture, trade, and the silver mines. The work is packed with economic detail, but

⁵⁴ Hindley in Tuplin (2004a) again examines Xenophon's middle way in same sex relationships, between Socrates' celibacy and Critias' indulgence; see also Lane Fox (2004b).

⁵⁵ Investigations of his political thought in Tuplin (2004a) include Brock, who briefly examines Xenophon's political imagery; Dillery on the processions of Cyrus in *Cyropaedia*, as precursors of Hellenistic kingship practice; Sevieri on the possibility that Xenophon's *Hiero* accommodates the greatness of an individual within the community as epinician poets did.

the political interpretation is at issue, whether it is designed to strip the demos of political power, or to provide both rich and poor with a better economic foundation. Gauthier argues against opposing interpretations that Xenophon wishes to reconcile the needs of the aristocrats with those of the demos.

Johnstone agrees that Xenophon wished to preserve the elites within the democracy. From *Memorabilia*, *Oeconomicus*, *Cynegeticus*, he develops a paradigm in which the democracy harnessed the elites, and the elites responded by creating new codes of elite behaviour that did not harm the demos but were of assistance to it. Among them, Xenophon promotes a new interpretation of competitive *ponos*, 'valorized effort'. *Cynegeticus* reinvents hunting in a form that serves the democratic polis by training the elite in community warfare. *Oeconomicus* teaches principles of the new elite lifestyle as household management: the dangers of false appearances, the use of wealth, the nature of command, the meaning of being a free person, the importance of orderliness.

Goldhill believes that Xenophon is no fan of democracy, but he explores the democratic culture of viewing in Xenophon's account of the meeting between Socrates and Theodote the courtesan in *Memorabilia*, thus broadening the range of women mentioned in the first section as well as the notion of politics. Here the democratic citizen views a dangerously alluring spectacle. At the outset the spectacle is useful for the courtesan, who earns her living that way, but dangerous for the citizen, who may be corrupted. Yet Socrates is also a practitioner of desire and a struggle emerges between them, which explores different relations of exchange and reciprocity. Socrates gains the upper hand, avoiding corruption and becoming himself the spectacle of desire—for virtue in both men and women.

SECTION 3: SOCRATES

Donald R. Morrison, 'Xenophon's Socrates as Teacher', in Paul A. Vanderwaerd (ed.) *The Socratic Movement* (Cornell 1994) 181–208.

Andreas Patzer, 'Der Xenophontische Sokrates als Dialektiker', in Karl Pestalozzi (ed.) *Der fragende Sokrates* (Stuttgart 1999) 50–76.

Bernhard Huss, 'The dancing Sokrates and the laughing Xenophon, or the other *Symposium*', *AJPh* 120.3 (1999) 381–410.

Louis-André Dorion, 'L'exégèse strausienne de Xénophon: le cas paradigmatique de *Mémorables* IV 4', *Philosophie Antique* 1 (2001) 87–118.

The selections reveal the preoccupation of scholars with the historical Socrates. They deal with *Memorabilia*, *Oeconomicus*, *Symposium*, but not his *Defence of Socrates*.⁵⁶ Plato and Xenophon helped pioneer Socratic conversation in literary form and are our main sources for the historical Socrates. The resemblance of Xenophon's own views to those of Socrates make him look like a mere mouthpiece for Xenophon, but Plato also used Socrates as a mouthpiece for his own philosophy, so that neither can claim historical accuracy pure and simple. There is a tendency to privilege Plato's intellectual understanding and chronological priority, producing a Xenophon who just borrows from Plato and other more acute predecessors, for instance in his *Symposium*, and in *Memorabilia*.⁵⁷ On the other hand Xenophon's contribution is original in literary terms. *Memorabilia* is a literary innovation, as is *Oeconomicus*, which offers a complex of teaching and learning strategies about success in farming.⁵⁸

The first two papers serve as introduction to Xenophon's account of Socratic method (definitions, classification by categories, the hypothesis) and his conception of virtue. They reach different conclusions on the connexions between Xenophon and Plato. Andreas Patzer concludes from a study of Xenophon's references to Socrates' dialectic method that Xenophon should be dismissed as a source for the historical Socrates because he does not understand the intellectual complexity of his method; his view is that Xenophon borrows specific passages from Plato, and misunderstands them. However, Donald Morrison considers that Xenophon has captured the substance and method of Socrates' teaching within a broad appreciation

⁵⁶ See Gray (1989b) for a description of the *Defence*.

⁵⁷ See Patzer in this volume on *Memorabilia*. Thesleff (1978) concludes that Xenophon has two layers of composition in *Symposium*, the first before, the second after Plato.

⁵⁸ Gray (1998) builds on Erbse (1961) for *Memorabilia*. Gray (2004c) on *Oeconomicus*.

of philosophy. Morrison calls Xenophon's Socrates more true to life and more complete than Plato's because of the emphasis on the moral advice he gave and his substantive moral opinions. Xenophon thus provides a supplement and corrective to Plato.⁵⁹

Bernhard Huss addresses the aim of Xenophon's *Symposium*, taking it on its own terms rather than in comparison with Plato's *Symposium*. This aim is evident in the preface: to illustrate how 'gentlemen' such as Socrates are in serious pursuit of moral improvement even in their lighter moments, in this case at a drinking party.⁶⁰ He raises the question of Xenophon's humour, and the irony conducive to virtue. The focus is Socrates' playful claim to be a dancer, which is serious in its encouragement of physical development. Huss recognizes the dissonance between the positive way in which Xenophon presents some of his characters and the scandal of their later careers; but this is put down to the desire to present a Golden Age in which Socrates made his associates behave well, rather than an ironical sabotage of their characters.

Louis-André Dorion focuses directly on the influence of Leo Strauss as an interpreter of Xenophon and on his method of reading between the lines to find hidden meaning. Taking Strauss's interpretation of *Memorabilia* 4.4, where Socrates apparently defends the equation of what is lawful with what is just, Dorion unpacks and challenges Strauss's assumptions behind the impulse to irony: that the philosopher is always in conflict with the polis and always undermines the foundations of the polis, so that he must conceal his views to survive and must teach only those who are worthy enough to see through his dissimulation.

SECTION 4: CYROPAEDIA

Pierre Carlier, 'L'idée de monarchie imperiale dans la *Cyropédie* de Xénophon', *Ktema* 3 (1978) 133–63.

⁵⁹ Waterfield in Tuplin (2004a) also takes Xenophon seriously as a source for Socratic ideas. Wellman (1976) explored Xenophon's Socratic method, noting those times in Plato when Socrates' inquiry ends in positive statements as in Xenophon, and finding the doctrine of *anamnesis* in Xenophon.

⁶⁰ See also Huss's full commentary on *Symposium* (1999).

Philip A. Stadter, 'Fictional narrative in the *Cyropaideia*', *AJPh* 112 (1991) 461–91.

Eckard Lefèvre, 'Die Frage nach dem *ΒΙΟΣ ΕΥΔΑΙΜΩΝ*: Die Begegnung zwischen Kyros und Kroisos bei Xenophon', *Hermes* 99 (1971) 283–96.

Michael Reichel, 'Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* and the Hellenistic Novel', in Egbert Forsten (ed.) *Groningen Colloquium on the Novel*, Volume 6 (Groningen 1995) 1–18.

Heleen Sancisi-Weerdenburg, 'The death of Cyrus: Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* as a source for Iranian History', *Acta Iranica* 25 (1985) 459–71.

Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*, his longest work, has been the subject of several monographs (Due 1989, Tatum 1989, Nadon 2001). The title refers to the education in leadership of Cyrus the Great, who created the Persian Empire, and whose rise and fall Herodotus had described in the first book of his *Histories*. There is great interest in the epilogue, in which Xenophon condemns the Persians of his own time. This epilogue may confirm the apparent praise of Cyrus' practices in the creation of his empire, by indicating that the empire declined when people no longer followed his practices; or may make the praise ambivalent, by pointing to critical sub-texts behind the apparent praise.

Pierre Carlier sees this ironical method of reading as the only valid one and he names Strauss as the inspiration. Pursuing themes to be developed later by Tatum and Nadon, he reads *Cyropaedia* as a negative model of rulership on which Xenophon maps an investigation of whether a conquest of Asia was possible for the Greeks, and what consequences would come of it. Carlier suggests that the price Xenophon says they would pay for such conquest would be a centralized autocracy of the kind that Cyrus exercises in an empire which, the paper suggests, Xenophon paints between the lines as oppressive. The choice for the Greeks is between remaining poor under a democratic system of politics, or going to war and achieving wealth and subjection to autocracy. The epilogue shows that though the man of virtuous education may conquer Asia and rule it for a short time, inevitable decline will follow. The Greeks should try it at

their peril. This negative analysis has the benefit of the hindsight of the conquest and empire of Alexander the Great.

Philip Stadter reads *Cyropaedia* as a fictional mode of narrative that presents a fundamental truth, which is the nature of good leadership in an utopian community. He explores the literary features of the work: the nature of its fiction, which asserts the validity of the general truth over the historical referent; the didactic advantages of an extended narrative, with its long dialogues and embedded stories, such as Panthea's; as well as the manipulation of time and space and characters, always designed to present and confirm the paradigm of Cyrus' virtue—even the epilogue.⁶¹

Eckard Lefèvre explores Xenophon's adaptation of Herodotus in his account of the meeting between Croesus and Cyrus after the fall of Sardis, and finds likewise that the whole aim of the adaptation is praise of Cyrus, with Croesus as his foil.⁶² Michael Reichel pursues another literary line, finding that *Cyropaedia* reveals a greater variety of short stories than even Herodotus, and he examines the claim that Xenophon pioneered the Greek novel in stories such as that of Panthea. Reichel identifies the remarks Xenophon attributes to Aglaïtadas (*Cyrop.* 2.2) as early theory about fictional prose narrative.

Heleen Sancisi-Weerdenberg assesses the authenticity of Xenophon's evidence for Persian practices.⁶³ She shows how Herodotus, Ctesias, and Xenophon drew on Iranian oral traditions for their very different accounts of Cyrus' death. Xenophon's account of Cyrus' dying words to his sons represents Iranian traditions, the tone and

⁶¹ Due (1999 and 2002) also comments on the narrative technique; also Gray (2004c).

⁶² For Herodotus' influence even on *Hellenica*: Brown (1990).

⁶³ There has been widespread interest in Xenophon's evidence for Persia. Hirsch (1985a and 1985b) was an important inspiration. Tuplin in Lane Fox (2004a) assesses Xenophon's knowledge of the Achaemenid empire from *Anabasis*: his presentation of the King, his functionaries, who are interesting, eastern geography, paradeisoi, imperial tribute, religious practices, exploitation of resources, measures, roads, armies, the boundaries of Persian authority. Xenophon makes a controversial contribution also to the understanding of the administration of the Persian empire in *Oec.* 4 and *Cyrop.* 8.6: that there was a separation of civil and military powers in the provinces. Syme (1988) uses him as a source for the Cadusii. In Tuplin (2004a), Azoulay (2004c) looks at Xenophon's account of Cyrus' adoption of Median dress and ceremonial in *Cyropaedia*, how Cyrus balanced his dual Median and Persian heritage. In Tuplin (2004a) Petit examines vassalage in the Persian system, making

content of which is found in royal inscriptions. If Cyrus speaks like a Greek rather than a Persian, that is because it is in the nature of oral tradition to make such adaptations. The work is again taken at face value as a positive mirror for princes: Fürstenspiegel.

SECTION 5: HISTORICAL WRITING

H. D. Westlake, 'The sources for the Spartan debacle at Haliartus', *Phoenix* 39 (1985) 119–33.

Hartmut Erbse, 'Xenophons *Anabasis*', *Gymnasium* 73 (1966) 485–505.

John Ma, 'You can't go home again: Displacement and identity in Xenophon's *Anabasis*', in Robin Lane Fox (ed.), *The Long March: Xenophon and the Ten Thousand* (New Haven 2004) 330–45.

Patrick J. Bradley, 'Irony and the narrator in Xenophon's *Anabasis*', in *Essays in Honour of Gordon Williams*, E. I. Tylawsky and C. G. Weiss (eds) (New Haven 2001) 59–84.

Vivienne J. Gray, 'Interventions and citations in Xenophon's *Hellenica* and *Anabasis*', *CQ* 53 (2003) 111–23.

This section represents different approaches to Xenophon's historical writing. One issue of continuing interest is the accuracy of *Hellenica* and *Anabasis*,⁶⁴ and one method of checking accuracy is to compare Xenophon's accounts with others. The comparison of his account of the battle of Sardis in *Hellenica* 3.4 with Diodorus Siculus and the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* has become a case study, for instance.

H. D. Westlake uses Diodorus, Pausanias and Plutarch, and Xenophon as supplementary sources representing different traditions and

parallels with western medieval systems. He focuses on Cyrus' trial of Orontes in *Anabasis*. He examines the terms for vassals, then the procedures of *proskynesis*, the kiss, the oath, and the gift. Tuplin (1994) compares the Persian and Spartan education. Masaracchia (1996) finds resemblances between Iranian imperial documents and Xenophon, for instance in the willing obedience of the people in *Cyropaedia*.

⁶⁴ In Tuplin (2004a) Buckler argues for Xenophon's reliability in *Hellenica* about the events in central Greece that heralded the outbreak of the Corinthian War; Rung reconciles his account of the mission of Timocrates with the *HO*.

produces a modern reconstruction of the campaign that led to the siege of Haliartus (395 BC), where the Spartans failed to stop the rise of the Boeotian League. He diagnoses the weaknesses in ancient historians as bias, carelessness, forgetfulness, misunderstanding, omissions, and absence. Xenophon is not exempt: though he offers significant evidence, he was in Asia at the time of Haliartus and had trouble discovering the detail of what happened; his reluctance to offend the Spartans affects his viewpoint as well as his hatred of the Thebans; there is evidence of uncertainty in his anonymous references to what was 'said' about Theban morale, and in his unresolved alternative accounts of the motives of Lysander.

Hartmut Erbse investigates the reliability of Xenophon's *Anabasis*, with reference to nineteenth century interpretations that credited Xenophon with deliberate distortion for apologetic purpose and read his self-presentation negatively. Erbse finds the idea that Xenophon falsified major events in his own 'apologetic' interests too harsh and that his self-presentation is positive. Erbse addresses important issues that are still being debated, including Xenophon's exile, the account of the march by Diodorus Siculus,⁶⁵ his alleged pan-hellenic purpose,⁶⁶ and his use of the pseudonym: 'Themistogenes'.⁶⁷

John Ma reads *Anabasis* not for accuracy but as an essay in the identity of those who went on the expedition: the ex-slave who discovers on the march that he is in his original homeland, but whose identity is now entirely wrapped up in the Ten Thousand; the Spartan exiled for accidental homicide who continued in his country's harsh ways, and Xenophon himself, another exile. Displacement denies but also confirms identity. Against their loss of homeland the Ten Thousand develop an identity as a band of brothers, expressing this in athletic competition and dancing as well as war. Settlement in a new city is envisaged. And yet this new identity is frustrated by the

⁶⁵ Cawkwell in Lane Fox (2004a) argues that Xenophon produced *Anabasis* as a self-justifying reaction to the more accurate account of Diodorus Siculus, but Stylianou, again in Lane Fox (2004a) argues that Diodorus is in fact using Xenophon.

⁶⁶ Rood (2004a) in Lane Fox also denies that Xenophon wrote *Anabasis* to encourage a panhellenic attack on Persia. He sees apparent panhellenic references as mere clichés of a long literary tradition and notes that the speeches, which form the main evidence, are addressed to their audience, not to the reader.

⁶⁷ Sordi in Tuplin (2004a) asks why Xenophon adopted a Sicilian pseudonym as author of *Anabasis*.

desire for home and by fear. The theme of migration and identity looks forward to the Hellenistic world.

There is also the question of the structure of his narrative. None of the contributions directly address this, but the idea that *Hellenica* is incoherent because it was written in different sections at different times continues to be debated.⁶⁸ Structural oddities remain hard to explain. *Hellenica* 1.1.1–2.3.11, the ‘continuation of Thucydides’ that brings the Peloponnesian War to an end, displays narrative features such as its annual chronological framework, its scale and language, which are identified as Thucydidean and are said to distinguish it from the rest of the work, but the juncture back to Thucydides is uneven and this has provoked theories about a missing preface, and about interpolations.⁶⁹ Xenophon is certainly developing a notion of ‘continuous’ history; the end of the work invites a continuator to take up his pen as he apparently took up Thucydides. This may in some way explain the oddity.⁷⁰

New methods are also being applied to the reading of the historical works, and two of the contributions address this. Bradley goes over the same ground as Erbse, but in a narratological reading of *Anabasis* as a new genre of ‘novelesque’ autobiography.⁷¹ The lack of a preface in this work is said to give the narrator space to develop a new genre: Xenophon creates his authority from the narrative alone. The early references to anonymous sources give the impression of history, but disappear in later books, which morph from history to autobiography. Xenophon’s self-portrayal becomes the focus, and it is closely

⁶⁸ Henry (1967) demolished these theories for *Hellenica*, but Riedinger (1991) still found incoherence and no thematic unity in *Hellenica*. This depends on your definition of history and Riedinger’s was very narrow.

⁶⁹ See Gomme/Andrewes/Dover (1981) in their Appendix. Rood (2004b) in Tuplin (2004a) says that the Thucydidean allusions in Xenophon’s continuation enter into dialogue with Thucydides’ analysis. For example, his description of the reception of the news of Aegospotami, with its explicit reference to the Athenian massacre of the Melians, recalls Thucydides’ description of the news of Syracuse as well as the Melian massacre itself. The effect is to enhance the similarities and the differences, which Rood argues are all important in the historical analysis.

⁷⁰ See Gray (1991) for some possibilities.

⁷¹ Marincola (1997) 175–216 also discusses the problem of self-praise and the strategies devised to address it; 186 on *Anabasis*, with reference to Plutarch *de Gloria Atheniensium*, *Moralia* 345E; cf. Gray (2004c) 129–32.

involved with the expectation of homecoming. The irony is that the Xenophon narrator knows he did not return, but the Xenophon character is still in ignorance.

Hellenica has been considered problematic rather than innovative as historical writing,⁷² but this too develops existing historiographical traditions, and shares them with *Anabasis*. I examine first-person narrator interventions and references to anonymous sources. The former bring out the agenda of praise and blame of leaders and followers and offer strategies to protect his praise and blame. Xenophon is redefining the 'greatness' that historical writing regularly addressed, but in terms of leadership.⁷³ His use of sources, especially anonymous indications of what 'was/is said', develops the role of source citation in historical writing and appears in many cases to confirm the veracity of details that might otherwise be thought incredible, and give them magnitude.⁷⁴

⁷² Rahn (1971), Grayson (1975).

⁷³ See Marincola (1997) 158–74 on the problems posed by the praise and blame of others and the strategies used to convey impartiality.

⁷⁴ On Xenophon's historical writing, now see relevant sections in Marincola (2 vols. 2007).

I

Status and Gender

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Slavery in the Greek Domestic Economy in the Light of Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*

Sarah B. Pomeroy

The *Oeconomicus* makes a major contribution to our understanding of the economy of ancient Greece, for it is the only extant Greek didactic work to draw attention to the importance of the *oikos* ['household'] as an economic entity.¹ The earliest written evidence from the Greek world indicates that the *oikos* was the basis of the Greek economy: it was the most common unit of production and consumption. In Athens and elsewhere, public legislation and private custom conspired to perpetuate the *oikoi*; thus the *oikoi* remained in continuous operation, enduring longer than the lifespan of any individual member, and continuing to bear economic burdens imposed by the state. Therefore, a discussion of the participation of slaves in the Greek economy, must include an examination of their role in the *oikos*.

That the *oikos* was fundamental to the ancient economy would seem to be obvious. Yet, for the most part, neither Marxism nor classical economic theory takes the entire household into account. Economic historians of the Greek world tend to ignore the domestic economy (except its agrarian aspect), and prefer to discuss industries, banking, and trade-routes. Thus, for example, Glotz (1920) presents a brief discussion of the family economy only in his opening

¹ A more detailed discussion of the role and function of the *oikos* will appear in my social and economic commentary on the *Oeconomicus* (1994). Abbreviations of journal titles follow the forms in *L'Année Philologique*. All references beginning with an upper case Roman numeral are to the *Oeconomicus*.

chapters on the Homeric period. Neither Rostovtzeff (1941) nor Michell (1957) treat domestic labour and its products.

The late M. I. Finley has asserted that the Greeks were ignorant of economic theory² and—following J. A. Schumpeter³—that the *Oeconomicus* is not about economics.⁴ Finley criticizes Xenophon for being ‘interested in specialization of crafts rather than in division of labour’.⁵ Finley refers to the same passage in *Cyropaedia* 8.2.5 as Karl Marx did when he observed that Xenophon displayed a characteristic bourgeois instinct in his discussion of division of labour in the workshop.⁶ However, Georges Sorel comments that Xenophon’s observations show an understanding of the importance of production—an understanding which Plato lacks.⁷ Marx, Sorel, and Finley all fail to realize that in the *Oeconomicus*, Xenophon discusses the sexual division of labour which is fundamental to human society.⁸ Finley’s negative assessment also results from an anachronistic view of economic theory which excludes, by definition, much of what the Greeks themselves regarded as the economy, and argues that ‘what we call the economy was exclusively the business of outsiders’.⁹ Thus, Finley fails to give full recognition to the private sphere and the contribution of women, both slave and free, to the economy. Beyond admitting that bakers and textile workers were productive, Finley pays little attention to female domestics, although it is likely that they were numerous, perhaps, as Gomme suggested, even outnumbering male slaves, within the city of Athens.¹⁰ This blindness about women mars Finley’s analysis of ancient slavery, since his distinction between slave and free, that ‘no slave held public office or sat on the deliberative and judicial bodies’¹¹ can not be used to differentiate women’s

² Finley (1970) 13 n. 44. See the rebuttal by Meikle (1979) 57–73.

³ Schumpeter (1959) 54.

⁴ Finley (1985) 19.

⁵ Finley (1970) cit. 4.

⁶ Marx (1867, repr. 1969).

⁷ Sorel (1936) 366 n. 2.

⁸ On the division of labour as the principal incentive for human marriage see Lévi-Strauss (1969) 40, and (1971) 346.

⁹ Finley (1970) cit. 25.

¹⁰ According to Gomme (1933) 21 n. 3, female domestics might have outnumbered males.

¹¹ Finley (1960) 55.

statuses. In this paper, I will concentrate particularly on the aspects of the domestic economy which have been overlooked by previous historians.

Although the estate attributed to Ischomachus would have been exceptional in classical Athens, and, particularly in some aspects of the position of the wife and in the importance accorded to education, more an idealistic vision than a description of reality, it is nevertheless possible to glean some information about the economic structure of the normal *oikos* from the *Oeconomicus*. Most *oikoi*, however, would not have been so large or wealthy as that of Ischomachus, for the character in the text is probably based on an Ischomachus who was a member of the liturgical class in the second half of the fifth century.¹² His *oikos* was clearly so large that his family alone could not supply the requisite labour, nor the necessary supervision. Ischomachus' wealth is apparent in that he owned an unspecified number of both male and female slaves.

According to the *Oeconomicus*, profit is the chief goal of estate management. In classical Greece, the domestic economy is linked to the political structure. The family farm not only provides an opportunity for citizens to practice their military skills. In order for an *oikos* to assume its proper share of civic responsibility a surplus of wealth must be created. Thus, it is not sufficient to merely earn money (I 4 *misthophorein*) by estate management. A great deal of money and a profit are the goals (I 4 *polun misthon... periousian... auxein*). The emphasis throughout is on increasing the estate (I 4, 15, 16; II 1 *auxein*). *Oikonomia* is a dynamic science by which people can cause estates to increase (VI 4 *auxein oikous*).

To be wealth, what is produced must be used or sold. The sources of on-going income for an *oikos* based on an agricultural economy are numerous. Horses sheep, cash, and other items are potential sources of income (II 11, III 9). Slaves are profitable for what they produce (VII 41, XVI 1, and see below, pp. 37–8); Ischomachus does not buy or sell them. Furthermore, the land itself is the principal source of income (or loss) and the one most deserving of the estate

¹² Davies (1984) 33, estimates that only 400 men belonged to the liturgical class at any given time in the fifth century. On the identity of Ischomachus see Davies (1971) 248, 265–8.

manager's concern (III 5, V 1, VI 11, XV 1, XXI 10). From the enthusiasm of Ischomachus, it appears that there might be a considerable profit in improving land and selling it (XX 26). Even scholars who deny that slaves were generally employed for agricultural labour in Attica agree that they were used on large estates of non-contiguous parcels of land such as the property ascribed to Ischomachus.¹³

All the human members of an *oikos* can contribute to its successful operation, or can incur losses. However, Xenophon pays particular attention to those in authority, both female and male as well as slave and free. The husband and the wife (III 10, VII 13–14) as well as the housekeeper (IX 12) and the bailiff can produce a profit (XV 1, XXI 10 *periousian*). Even ordinary female slaves, can increase the worth of the estate by doubling their own value when they learn to spin (VII 41).

Textile manufacture was women's sole productive activity that was traditionally recognized by the Greeks as making an economic contribution; but modern historians have not given this activity the attention it deserves. Among skilled workers listed on linear B tablets from Cnossus and Pylos are large numbers of female and male textile

¹³ The extent to which slaves were employed in Athenian agriculture has engendered much debate. Jameson (1977) 122–45, has stated that the use of slaves in agriculture was widespread. de Ste. Croix (1981) argues that the employment of hired labour in Greek agriculture was rare. Nevertheless, although most agricultural production was performed by 'small peasants' the propertied classes must have used slaves. In contrast to Ste. Croix, Finley (1984) 4–11, and (1973, repr. 1985) 70, believes that agricultural slavery was limited to large holdings and that even owners of large holdings employed seasonal free workers in addition to slaves. Wood (1983) 1–47, esp. 36, n. 32, points out some inconsistencies in Ste. Croix's statements and argues that most families worked their own farms, and that even owners of large holdings leased small parcels to individuals who exploited them with free labour. The solution to the debate over the extent of agricultural slavery may lie in a chronological and regional approach to the problem. As H. Bolkestein (1923, rev. 1958), 81–2 argued, the use of slaves may have been more common in Attica than in the interior of the mainland. Bolkestein's statement is corroborated by a footnote (64) listing literary sources ranging from the fifth century BC to some as late as Lucian and Pollux. Surely, the use of slaves or free workers must have varied in response to factors such as supply and profitability. There is no doubt that in the early fourth century men with large holdings used slaves to work them. However, it may be wrong to generalize from Xenophon's work as does Grace (1970) 49–66, and to draw the conclusion that 'the farm worker at that time was typically a slave'. Ischomachus certainly used slaves and some of them were sent to work out of doors (VII 33). If he had also hired temporary free labour in agriculture it seems likely that Xenophon would have mentioned this fact, for this would have been an essential element of estate management.

workers.¹⁴ The females are more than twice as numerous as the males. That these women received the same food rations as the men seems to indicate that their work was considered both equally laborious and equal in value. The picture painted by the Homeric epics is consistent with the evidence of the tablets. In the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, female slaves were valued for their handiwork.¹⁵ Their products comprised a significant commodity in the gift-exchange system. For example, the ransom of Hector included a dozen each of robes, mantles, blankets, cloaks, and tunics (*Il.* 24.229–31), and Odysseus tells Laertes that he was once given a dozen each of cloaks, blankets, robes, and tunics (*Od.* 24.273–9). The Phaeacians gave Odysseus thirteen robes and thirteen tunics (*Od.* 8.390–3). When we consider the amount of labour that must have been necessary to produce these textiles, we must revise Finley's view that slavery is not important in Homer, but begins to be prominent only in the classical period. Finley was looking only at the men.

Even after the introduction of a moneyed economy, textiles continued to function as liquid wealth, for they were readily converted to cash. In Xenophon's *Memorabilia* (2.7.7) upper-class women who are suddenly thrown on their kinsman's charity as a result of the Peloponnesian War are able to support themselves by weaving. In manumission inscriptions from classical Athens *talasiourgoi* ('spinners') constitute the largest group by far of manumitted workers whose special job is recorded. It should be assumed that they purchased their freedom and were able to pay the 100 drachmas required for the dedication of a phiale as a result of their work.¹⁶ That female slaves were considered as productive as males is suggested by the fact that the average price of females and males listed in the Attic *stelai* was the same.¹⁷ In the *Oeconomicus* (VII 33, 34, 38), the estate is compared to a beehive. Though Greek entomologists were uncertain about the sex of the leader of the bees, there was general agreement that the

¹⁴ For detailed discussion see Killen (1964) 1–15, and (1984) 49–63.

¹⁵ E.g. Agamemnon's expectation that Chryseis will both weave and serve as a sexual partner *Il.* 1.31.

¹⁶ IG. ii² 1553–8 in Lewis (1959) 208–38, and (1968) 368–80. Davies (1984) 48, focuses on the few male industrial slaves in this document as a source of wealth, and ignores the numerous female woolworkers.

¹⁷ Pritchett (1956) 276.

workers were female. Ischomachus displays the stores of textiles belonging to his *oikos*: some are valuable enough to be locked in the inner room *thalamos* (IX 3, 6). This hoard is a portion of the wealth of the *oikos*. An anthropological study of Sicily supplies information about how such textiles might have functioned as wealth in many spheres of exchange.¹⁸ Until the middle of the twentieth century, brides brought to marriages substantial quantities of textiles, which they had made and embroidered. A portion of such a trousseau was not designated for personal use: rather it was regarded as capital, to be exchanged for food or cash in hard times.

Some critics of Greek slavery assert that slavery was hostile to the accumulation of capital, because of the slaves' lack of energy and lack of interest in the creation and preservation of capital. But, Ischomachus seeks to avoid such a problem by a system of rewards. Slaves such as the *tamia* and *epitropos* who work in a supervisory capacity are given a share in the profits (IX 11–13, XII 9, 15). Good slaves are to be distinguished from bad by the clothing allocated to them (XIII 10). Since, as the Old Oligarch ([Ps. Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 1.10) complains, it was impossible to distinguish slaves from free people by their appearance, what the allocation of clothing according to merit implies is that good slaves may be rewarded by very fine clothing indeed. The Pseudo-Aristotelian *Oeconomica* (1.5.3), which was written perhaps fifty years after Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*, states that the lot of slaves consists of work, punishments, and food. In contrast, while Xenophon mentions the possibility of bad slaves, he usually speaks of rewarding the good ones, rather than punishing the bad ones. Furthermore, the Pseudo-Aristotelian text advocates allowing slaves to reproduce, so that the children would serve as hostages for the good behaviour of their parents (1.5.1344b). For Xenophon, children are a reward for slaves who have demonstrated their virtues, rather than a potential means of disciplining the parents (IX 5).

Slaves born at home are the only acceptable source of slaves for Ischomachus, although from remarks in the dialogue (III 10, XII 3), it is clear that less fastidious land owners purchased slaves and trained them as agricultural labourers or purchased men already trained as bailiffs.

¹⁸ Schneider (1980, reprinted 1985) 81–119.

One of the jobs of the wife of Ischomachus (who is compared to a queen bee) is to supervise the rearing of the young workers. When the young are fit for work, she is to send them out to found a colony (VII 34). Perhaps this metaphor implies that they are to live elsewhere on the family's estates, since Ischomachus neither buys nor sells slaves. In any case, the slaves evidently do more than reproduce their numbers, if their offspring must be sent away. Slaves born at home constituted a substantial source of slaves, certainly for someone like Ischomachus who disdains the slave market. As Professors I. Biežuńska-Malowist and Marian Malowist have pointed out,¹⁹ slaves born at home constituted a substantial source of slaves and Henri Wallon²⁰ misinterpreted the passage in the *Oeconomicus* IX 5 about rewarding good slaves with the opportunity to produce children as meaning that slave reproduction at home was discouraged in general. The attitude toward slave reproduction must have varied according to need and to the external supply of slaves available through capture, exposure of infants, and the market. Hesiod had advised farmers to purchase a slave woman without children, for a slave with a child to nurse is troublesome (*Works and Days*, 602–3). However, in the fourth century, when the Athenians were no longer engaged in the wars of expansion in which they might enslave their enemies, and when large estates like that of Ischomachus employed substantial numbers of slaves, reproduction at home probably increased in importance, though no source was ever so prolific as to totally exclude the others.²¹

Nevertheless the reproduction of slaves in Greece was not breeding in the sense that slave owners interfered with the sexual lives of their slaves in an attempt to exceed the natural rate of increase. An examination of the first thousand names listed by Linda Reilly (1978) indicates that 12 per cent of the slaves were born at home (*oikogenes*, or more rarely *endogenes*). Most of the slaves listed by Reilly were Hellenistic. Moreover, owing to sentiment, or to the fact that their masters were often their biological fathers, slaves born at

¹⁹ Biežuńska-Malowist and Malowist (1966) 275–80.

²⁰ Wallon (1900) 5–6.

²¹ For the sources of Roman slaves see the judicious discussion by Bradley (1987) 42–64.

home might have been manumitted at a higher rate than purchased slaves; therefore the actual percentage of slaves born at home among the slave population in Greece may have been somewhat less than 12 per cent. Of course, some infants born to slaves may have been exposed or neglected so that they failed to survive to be counted. Historians of new world slavery have pointed out that malnourishment and excessively hard labour on the part of mothers meant that the mortality rate of slave children was high.²² But Ischomachus and his wife avoid such a waste of human capital by permitting only virtuous slaves to reproduce, with the explicit intention of allowing them to rear a family. In fact, in the *Oeconomicus*, since only the selected slaves are permitted to reproduce, while the troublesome ones must remain childless, and some of the male slaves are homosexual, the result would have been a lower than natural rate of increase.

It is interesting to note that the slaves are not motivated by passion, but rather by the wish to have offspring. Ischomachus also makes lack of interest in sex a criterion for the choice of the housekeeper, *tamia* and bailiff, *epitropos* (IX 11, XII 13–14). In this sexually-segregated society, Ischomachus is concerned only about the potential distractions of erotic liaisons between the men whom he selected to serve as overseers and boys (XII 13–14).

That the wife of Ischomachus is to share control of sexual access to slaves indicates that she is a partner in the patriarchal powers usually exercised by the man of the house. However, we must assume that the double standard continued to operate, so that the wife herself does not have the same right as her husband does, to have sexual relations with slaves. Ischomachus tells her that she should look after the slaves when they are ill (VII 37). Since she would be required to enter the men's dormitory to minister to male slaves, Ischomachus must consider them as property whose value warrants the mistress's personal attention, rather than as strange men whose bodies ought to be taboo to a respectable woman. In contrast, the master of the house—even one with a young wife—enjoyed sexual access to his slaves.

²² E.g. Jones (1985) 35, 123.

Ischomachus himself mentions the option of sexual intercourse with slaves (X 12–13), and is explicit about the attractions of slave women and their sexual availability to the master.²³ But he acknowledges that slave women are less desirable as sexual partners, for they come to the master's bed by compulsion. Although tragic poets had portrayed the degradation of captive women who were compelled to sleep with victors who had destroyed their cities and families, Xenophon is the first to state, as a general principle, that slave women were reluctant to have intercourse with their masters, and to note that some men might prefer not to rape such women.

Finally, Xenophon's views on slaves are consistent with his ideas about women and non-Greeks. In the *Oeconomicus*, there is no natural hierarchy among human beings according to gender, race, or class. Men and women have the same mental capabilities. Both are teachable and both have an equal potential to exercise memory, diligence, moderation, and discretion (e.g. VII 15, X 1). In fact, if the wife of Ischomachus demonstrates that she is superior to her husband, he will gladly become her servant (VII 42). Like women, slaves are teachable, and can learn to exercise the kingly skill of command. Furthermore, the work performed by slaves was not *ipso facto* demeaning. Although some kinds of employment are rejected as banausic, Ischomachus and his wife, like the female relatives of Aristarchus in the *Memorabilia*, often do the very same agricultural and domestic work as slaves. Like most Athenian slaves, the slaves of Ischomachus and his wife were probably not of Greek origin. However, there is no natural mental or physical difference between owners and slaves. The slaves who are given positions of authority possess the same moral qualities as their master and mistress. They do not manifest the psychic inferiority which Aristotle (*Pol.* 1252a31–4, 1254b17–19, 1260a12–13, 1280a33–4) imputes to the natural slave. The fact that Ischomachus expects his slaves to understand that it is in their interest to obey, indicates that he believes they will be guided by their own rationality (XIII 9–10). The bailiff is taught to be able to

²³ Kolendo (1981) 288–97, discusses the various permutations of liaisons between masters and mistresses and their slaves, for which there is evidence in the Roman period. For classical Athens, the evidence is limited to liaisons between masters and slaves.

take his master's place (XIII 4). Both the bailiff and the housekeeper, like Ischomachus and his wife, are to be temperate in their appetites, loyal, and enthusiastic about increasing the family's property (VII 30). The master rewards his housekeeper for meritorious behaviour by granting her greater wealth and freedom (IX 13) and his bailiff by honouring him (XII 16) and treating him as a free man and a gentleman (*hōsper eleutherois* and *kalos te kagathos* XIV 9). In contrast, some wealthy people of the highest lineage are deemed to be slaves by their own volition (I 17, X 10). In short, although Xenophon, like his contemporaries, took slavery for granted, he did not have a theory of natural slavery.

Xenophon's Foreign Wives¹

Emily Baragwanath

Stories become shaped over time into patterns that make them more memorable. Explicit literary patterning of historical narrative leads historians to tread carefully, to assume that the record of what 'actually happened' must have been compromised. But this patterning may convey additional meaning: it may express a community's 'most basic mythic thought patterns',² and also reveal the mentality of the individual who sets a story's final form. The Greek mind seems to have moulded historical events rather quickly into familiar patterns, even while 'real' knowledge still circulated.³ Elements of stories were suppressed and others elaborated upon, within or against the grain of existing story-patterns. This phenomenon helps to explain how fictional and non-fictional material alike sometimes fell into similar patterns.

¹ I wish to express my gratitude to Christopher Pelling and *Prudentia's* anonymous referees for their extremely helpful suggestions, and to the University of Auckland Classics Department for all their support. My debt in particular to Vivienne Gray, an inspirational supervisor, will be apparent. Translations are adapted from those of the Loeb Classical Library.

² Gray (1989), 72.

³ See Gray (1989), 71–2. Xenophon's narrative of Alexander's death, for example, written only a decade after the events it describes, is already shaped by the tradition of Xenophon himself into a clear pattern (that of a woman who takes revenge on her husband, using male agents to murder the man and usurp his position), behind which lies 'a pattern of thought that looked to women as the cause of dynastic troubles' (71). The phenomenon suggests that the 'storytelling style of history' was a valid alternative to more literal accounts (72).

Some of the narrative patterning evident in Xenophon's works will have been present in his source material, but much seems to have occurred at his own hands, arising from his particular interests and emphases, often of a moral and philosophic nature. The great extent to which his reflections upon ideal leadership inform all his works, resulting for example in the remarkably similar character sketches of many of his positively portrayed figures (the Cyruses, Agesilaus, Jason of Pherae, Socrates, Xenophon the soldier, and so on), is well known.⁴ In Xenophon's view, any manifestation of ideal rule involved the creation and maintenance of a bond of *φιλία* (friendship) between ruler and subject.⁵ Successful leaders proved very good friends of those who served them. They knew how to define and effect a common good, beneficial both to ruler and subject. Thus the ideal ruler–subject relationship is characterized by reciprocity and mutual benefit: the leader, being *philanthropos* as well as *philotimos*, ['loving men as well as honour'] outdoes those who serve him in his generous bestowing of gifts in return, and is honoured and loved by those who think he can benefit them. Charismatic, often beautiful too,⁶ he attracts his subjects' gazes and inspires them to virtue. He is self ruled, his salient quality *ἐγκράτεια* (self-control), so that physical cravings never hinder him from fulfilling the requirements of the ideal friend. In all, he demonstrates that he is the leader because he is the most morally fit to rule.

This article will analyse the particular narrative patterns that envelop Xenophon's depictions of women through the filter of his wider leadership pattern, with the aim of reaching a deeper understanding of how he envisaged women fitting into his theory of

⁴ See especially Due (1989), 147–206, for a description of the phenomenon in the context of the *Cyropaedia*, and then a comparison of Xenophon's portrayal of Cyrus the Great with that of others of his major ideal leaders. Due notes that many other less illustrious parallels could be found throughout Xenophon's works (198). Wood (1964), 33–66, at pp. 51–60 offers a good summary of the qualities of an ideal leader; cf. Luccioni (1948), 54–9. Breitenbach (1950) and Krafft (1967), 103–50 who examine the theory in regard to the *Hellenica*; cf. Giraud (2001) 39–68. See further Tatum (1989); Pomeroy (1994), 38–9; Wilms (1995); Anderson (1974), 120–33 for Xenophon's own leadership.

⁵ Gray (2000), 142–54, at pp. 146–51, offers the most recent general discussion of the leadership theory and emphasizes its very broad application and its resemblance to friendship. Cf. Wood (n. 3), 52, 59, 66.

⁶ E.g. Cyrus the Great, *Cyrop.* 1.2.1; or he at least seems beautiful because of the fact that he rules (*Hiero* 8.5).

human relations, and of how he used narrative patterning. I will focus for brevity's sake on one striking category of his women, the high-ranked foreign wives—whose relative historical prominence perhaps made them more susceptible than their Greek equivalents to the application of his philosophy of leadership.⁷ And yet in some ways his narrative works to collapse the conceptual distance between these women and their closer-to-home Greek wife or courtesan counterparts. Xenophon deals with the foreign wives in the context of their relationships with men, usually their husbands or the narrative's male protagonist. Epyaxa, wife of Syennesis, appears in the *Anabasis*; Panthea wife of Abradatas in the *Cyropaedia*; and both the wife of Alexander of Phraeae, and Mania wife of the deceased Zenis, in the *Hellenica*.⁸ Their role is distinctly 'in-between':

⁷ Gray, (1989), 147 writes that 'Xenophon believed women to be as useful as men and as capable of rule and friendship', and illustrates the point with examples from his *Oec.*, *Mem.*, and *Cyrop.* Pomeroy (1994), esp. 278–9 and 302, discusses the leadership of Ischomachus' wife (but see n. 64 below). On the whole, however, despite the fact that Xenophon the philosopher showed an unparalleled interest in the women's sphere in writing his *Oeconomicus*, his depictions of women have been considered with minimal reference to his broader notions of human relations. His works, particularly the *Oeconomicus*, are often mined for information on the lives of women in fourth-century Athens, or for generally-held attitudes towards those women. The judgement of Oost (1977) 236 remains *communis opinio*: 'the general ideas of Xenophon on women, when he is not writing under the influence of Socrates, or possibly of his own marriage, seem to be probably a fair representative selection of the prejudices of Athenians of his education and upper-class status'. Whereas the Socratic works are more favourable, and Ischomachus/Xenophon even 'envision[s] the possibility that, in her own sphere of course, woman may be or become the superior of man', in the non-Socratic works 'women are ordinarily inferior to men, are regarded as male possessions to be bandied about without reference to their own wishes'. Exceptions like Mania 'make no impression on male smugness concerning the "second sex"' (ibid., 235). Cartledge (1993) 5–14 deals with Xenophon's literary constructions of women as illuminating (and to some extent challenging) the stereotypical male–female polarity of Greek thought. That polarity was natural to the Greek mind and certainly finds reflection in Xenophon's thought, but in my view the leadership theory too informs Xenophon's representation of women, as it does his representation of men, and in doing so strengthens the challenge Cartledge detects.

⁸ These women are 'foreign' on account of their residing outside the physical, or in Alexander's wife's case conceptual, bounds of Greece (Thessaly with its reputation for barbarism may be deemed an honorary foreign place), and 'wives' because Xenophon's narrative situates them in relation to their (in Mania's case former) husband. Only Panthea is straightforwardly fictional, but the patterns that pervade the representation of even those women who are historical figures suggest that all have been moulded into literary shape by Xenophon or his source.

Xenophon focuses on the role they play as intermediaries between the man of rank who is (or was) their husband and another man who is more powerful (or potentially so), while also representing them in some ways as ideal leader figures in their own right.

INTERMEDIARIES

Epyaxa, Mania, and Panthea each enter the narrative in a vulnerable and potentially disadvantageous situation *vis-à-vis* the powerful outsider, and then transform their relationship with him into one characterized by *philia*. Epyaxa's domain Cilicia, over which her husband Syennesis rules, is threatened by the plundering of Cyrus and his men. Pharnabazus intends to grant the sub-satrapy of Aeolis (which Mania's husband had ruled while he lived) to someone else rather than to Mania. Panthea, in the lowliest position of all, has been captured by Cyrus' men and faces the prospect of slavery. The fact that these women are conducting the negotiations signals the particularly hopeless nature of the situation: Epyaxa and not her husband does so because he will not deal with anyone in whose power he is already (*Anabasis* 1.2.26), whereas Panthea's husband was away when she was captured with the camp. But only in Panthea's case is the wife's lowly initial situation elaborated at length. It serves to emphasize, as well as Cyrus' generosity, her own remarkable transformation in his eyes from a mere war-won concubine into a useful friend.

Panthea first appears as the spoils are divided after Cyrus' victory, when 'the most beautiful tent and the woman of Susa, said to be the most beautiful woman in Asia', are to be taken to Cyrus (*Cyropaedia* 4.6.11). Panthea is booty like this tent with which she is first paired. She is described with the same adjective as it is, and identified simply by her provenance as war-won concubines generally were (4.6.11). The extravagance of her description evokes the story-telling tradition, though the wording here: ['the woman of Susa, who is said to be the most beautiful woman in Asia'] is reminiscent of *Hellenica* 3.3.8, when Cinadon is instructed to bring back the woman of

Aulis⁹—an early hint that this woman may likewise play a part in the tale and exercise some sort of influence? Her description is evocative of such legendary womanly paragons as Helen of Troy, and of the lovely females selected, some of them captives, for the harem of the Great King. Such fine loot represents an honourable prize, and in its eastern context, Homeric models are brought to mind: we recall Agamemnon's reluctance to give up Chryses' daughter, then his demand for Briseis. The verbal pairing of lady and tent¹⁰ recalls the similar pairings in Homer and Herodotus of 'Helen (or 'the woman') and the treasure'.¹¹ Proteus in Herodotus' version takes it upon himself to guard the woman and treasure for Menelaus (2.115), as Araspas is to guard the woman and tent for Cyrus (5.1.2): both are Cyrus' possessions, just as Helen and the treasure belong to Menelaus.¹² Cyrus, like Paris, has seized woman and tent, but Panthea (though like Helen, the wife of another) is rightfully his, not stolen.

At her next appearance the woman is identified further as Abradatas' wife (5.1.3), and a first description opens with her guard's question to Cyrus: 'Have you seen (ἐώρακας) the woman whom you bid me guard?' The men could not at first tell Panthea apart from the maids around her; 'but when we gazed around at them all, wishing to know which was the mistress (δέσποινα), at once her superiority to all the rest was evident, even though she sat veiled, looking to the ground.' When she stood up she was conspicuous 'both for her stature and for her nobility and grace' (5.1.4–5). Learning that she would now belong to Cyrus she ripped her outer *peplos* from top to toe and wept aloud—'At which point,' Araspas exclaims, 'we had vision of most of her face and vision of her neck and arms; and let me tell you, Cyrus, that it seemed to me and to all the rest who saw her that there never was so beautiful a woman of mortal birth in Asia' (5.1.7). He then urges Cyrus to see the woman for himself.

⁹ '... the woman who was said to be the most beautiful there (ἡ καλλίστη μὲν αὐτόθι ἐλέγετο εἶναι), and was thought to be corrupting the Lacedaimonians who came, older and younger ones alike'.

¹⁰ Cf. 5.1.2.

¹¹ e.g. 'Helen and all her treasure', *Iliad* 3.70, 72, 91, 282, 285 etc.; 'this woman and the treasure', *Histories* 2.115; cf. 2.114; 'both Helen and the treasure', *Histories* 2.115, 118 (2 occurrences), 119.

¹² A *skene*—the opulent, Persian, treasure-filled variety of tent—like *chremata*, is an indication of wealth.

The situation recalls the story of the arrival of the free-born concubine Aspasia of Phocaea to serve in Cyrus' harem.¹³ Having been led in to Cyrus, Aspasia's companions sat down and accepted readily his advances, whereas she stood in silence, and at being called to him swore, 'Whosoever lays his hands upon me shall rue the day!'¹⁴ The King recognized her as the only one who was free and uncorrupted and from this time on 'was ruled by her and loved her above all other women, calling her "the Wise" (26.5). Panthea, too, is easily distinguished from the women around her by her noble bearing and ruler quality, and the value she places on freedom is evident in her lament at its loss. The comparison invites the implication that Cyrus will recognize the same quality in Panthea as he had in Aspasia, and choose to treat her with similar respect. Cyrus' subsequent advice that Araspas 'guard the woman well, for she may perhaps be of very great service to us when the time comes' (5.1.17) does suggest he already sees in Panthea the makings of a valuable friend, and anticipates her usefulness in that role. When she later refrains from informing Cyrus of Araspas' threats, 'hesitating to cause trouble between friends' (6.1.32), until she risks being violated, Panthea demonstrates again the store she sets on *philia*.

Araspas' emphasis on the notion of vision and gazing as he extols Panthea's beauty, continuing on from the emphatically positioned *ἑώρακας* of his opening question, invites comparison with the way in which the courtesan Theodote is discussed in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, and also with Candaules' enthusiastic description of his wife to his underling Gyges. That tale, preserved in the Herodotean *logos* but presumably borrowed from the wider oral tradition,¹⁵ tells how the Lydian empire was doomed to fall at the hands of the same Cyrus who is the protagonist of the *Cyropaedia*. Araspas and Candaules are both besotted by the woman when the account begins and consider her to be of unrivalled quality. Stunned by such beauty, both enthuse

¹³ Xenophon mentions this Aspasia at *Anabasis* 1.10.2. He and some of his audience were surely familiar with this story, having heard it themselves or via Ctesias, and perhaps with variants of it as well.

¹⁴ Plutarch *Artaxerxes* 26.4.

¹⁵ Xenophon was certainly familiar with the *Histories* (Keller, 1911) and could assume the same of many of his readers, although various other versions of this sort of story were probably floating about in the wider oral tradition. See Gray (1989), 71–2.

about it to another man, and then—dissatisfied at the adequacy of their description—urge the other to look for himself.¹⁶ For, Candaules insists (using a proverb that will turn out to be true in a way quite different from what he expects¹⁷), ‘eyes are more trustworthy than ears’ (*Histories* 1.8.2). *Memorabilia* 3.11 begins similarly with a rumour of Theodote’s beauty, which is ‘beyond words’, able to be expressed only by artists—and so Socrates urges that the men go and see *her* for themselves.

Candaules and Araspas each claim that no harm could come from the other man seeing the beautiful woman, oblivious to the potential ramifications; but Gyges and Cyrus are aware of the dangers involved and so reluctant. Gyges’ concern is with the impropriety of seeing his mistress naked; he recalls the wise moral ‘to look at one’s own’, (1.8). Cyrus, who (in Greek terms, and as the comparison serves to underline) has every right to treat this woman as he will, wishes rather to avoid being compelled to remain watching her indefinitely (*Cyrop.* 5.1.8). In similar fashion men who have seen Theodote desire to touch what they have seen, and yearn for her when they are gone, with the result that they are transformed into her servants (*Mem.* 3.11.3).¹⁸ Thus the gazing upon Panthea as upon Theodote is not simply proprietorial, as in the Herodotean story: the danger is not the execution of a violent punishment, but far more insidious; for the men, as Cyrus and Socrates both recognize, may be rendered willing slaves to desire (*eros*). The disturbing way in which gazing so naturally leads on to more surfaces again as a theme in Herodotus’ *Histories* with the tale of the Persians’ visit to the Macedonian court: the men’s gazing upon the royal women—‘torments to their eyes’—engenders their desire to touch them too, which in turn precipitates their destruction at Alexander’s hands (5.18–20).¹⁹ But Araspas

¹⁶ *θέεσαι*, *Cyrop.* 5.1.7; *θεήσσαι*, *Histories* 1.8.

¹⁷ The queen’s eyes will indeed be crucial as she glimpses Gyges: see Christopher Pelling, ‘Herodotus and Croesus’ (forthcoming) on this, and on the unexpected applications of the other proverbs in the scene as well. Cf. Shapiro (2000), 98.

¹⁸ Goldhill (1998), 105–24, esp. 113–24, illuminates the issues of power, exchange, and desire that are involved in viewing Theodote.

¹⁹ Cf. Plutarch’s story that Alexander the Great believed that the beauty of the Persian royal women (who likewise seemed ‘torments to the eyes’) was a test of his kingly *sophrosune*, since gazing at it could so easily lead to more (Plutarch *Alexander* 21.10–11).

cannot compel Cyrus to gaze upon Panthea, whereas Candaules can and does coerce his subject Gyges to gaze upon his wife—and that will inevitably lead further.²⁰ Both men's concerns are validated by the events that follow in which *eros* precipitates transgressions of acceptable behaviour. Thus Xenophon shows us again the powerful effect of Panthea, whom Cyrus afterwards describes as an 'irresistible creature' (*Cyropaedia* 6.1.36), upon the men about her. Her later comment that Cyrus has treated her as one would a brother's wife (6.4.7) enriches further the matrix of associations, in its veiled allusion to Xerxes' less than fraternal treatment of his brother Masistes' wife in Herodotus' *Histories*.²¹ The horrendous (and also politically hazardous) events precipitated by Xerxes' illicit love underline again Cyrus' wisdom in refraining from seeing the woman, and in allowing Araspas to play out that part instead.

The naming of Panthea by Cyrus (6.1.41) marks the point at which she becomes the counterpart of Mania and Epyaxa. Threatened by Araspas, she has sent word to the great man as a preventative measure, and upon hearing of Araspas' departure she begins actively to arrange an alliance between Cyrus and her husband. All three women approach the powerful outsider with a view to establishing a reciprocal relationship based upon *philia*. They take far more constructive action than merely to weep and plead in conventional style (as did the Herodotean intermediary Intaphrenes' wife, who relied on the pity of the powerful outsider Darius: *Histories* 3.119). Epyaxa and Mania set forth to visit the man, accompanied by an impressive retinue, determined to influence his policy: the Cilician desires to secure (for her husband) positive diplomatic relations with Cyrus so that their territory might not be plundered when his army passes through, whereas Mania desires that Pharnabazus leave her ruler of her deceased husband's satrapy. Panthea hopes to secure decent treatment for herself and to be reunited with her spouse. The widow Mania, like Panthea, clearly acts of her own accord. The singular verb describing the Cilician's action leaves the impression that she, too, is acting independently: only later is her husband's involvement in the

²⁰ And the queen knows it: as Christopher Pelling pointed out to me, there is a sense here that she too regards the next step as a natural consequence, and thus as one she can insist on in the paradoxical way she does.

²¹ 9.108–14; cf. Cartledge (1993), 13.

expedition made clear. Another woman who appears in a similar role is the Armenian's wife, who approaches Cyrus before he departs from Armenia (*Cyrop.* 3.3.2), but she is explicitly an intermediary, bringing gifts from her husband to the powerful Persian, and acts out of gratitude for peace rather than to secure further favour.

Mania and Epyaxa each gain a personal audience with the great man, bringing their feminine appeal to bear in winning his friendship, while Panthea—already the man's captive—does not approach him in person, but sends a message. Xenophon sets down in direct discourse the words with which she and Mania address the powerful man. Both enter into the discourse of Xenophontic ideal relations, speaking in terms of reciprocity and *philia*, while also offering tangible rewards. The manner of each is deferential and unassuming as well as psychologically perceptive: each flatters the ego of the powerful male. In her speech, Mania speaks both of simple friendship, and of the practical material benefits that Pharnabazus has already enjoyed from her husband: 'Pharnabazus, my husband was both a friend to you in all other ways, and he also paid over the tributes which were your due, so that you praised and honoured him' (*Hell.* 3.1.11). Her manner then becomes understated when she asks: 'Therefore, if I serve you no less faithfully (*μηδὲν χείρον*) than he, why should you appoint another as satrap?' (*Hell.* 3.1.11). The modesty of the turn of phrase *μηδὲν χείρον ἐκείνου* ('no worse than he') is matched with a subjunctive that leaves her proposition conditional, suggesting humble uncertainty of her ability to carry it out. And her final statement—'and if I should fail to please you in any respect, surely it will be in your power to deprive me of the office and give it to another'—provides him with a psychologically reassuring escape clause. Her appeal to his power as a reason to be confident in granting her the position, at least temporarily, is flattering. The speech conveys Mania's own view of her (and previously her husband's) relationship with Pharnabazus. She specifies friendship, praise, and honour in return for the payment of tribute owed, service for appointment, and the giving of pleasure (3.1.11): all the marks of a reciprocal *philia* relationship. Her speech immediately has its desired effect. Without disputing a single point and clearly recognizing in the woman the signs of a good friend, Pharnabazus enters into the *philia* relationship, offering Mania the job (12).

Panthea, upon learning of Araspas' departure apparently to join the enemy, is equally eloquent in the message she sends to Cyrus. She advises him not to be distressed,

for if you will allow me to send to my husband, I promise you that a much more faithful friend (πολὺ...πιστότερον φίλον) than Araspas will come to you. And I know that he will come to you with as many forces as he can bring; for whereas the father of the present king was his friend, the one who is king now once even tried to separate my husband and me from one another. Inasmuch, then, as he considers him an insolent man, I am sure that he would willingly transfer his allegiance to such a man as you (πρὸς ἄνδρα οἶος σύ). (*Cyrop.* 6.1.45)

With this offer of a valuable alliance, Panthea—up to this point booty that Cyrus has elected to treat well—transforms her relationship with the King into one of some mutuality, from which he might reap concrete benefit. Her reference to the Assyrian king's hubristic nature and impropriety towards her suggests a comparison between him and Cyrus:²² the Assyrian King's unacceptable actions are contrasted with those of (and to be expected of) 'such a man as you', flattery that might indeed encourage Cyrus to continue his gentlemanly behaviour.²³ And as Mania's offer is twin-pronged, functioning both on the level of ideal relations with the reference to the 'friend' that her husband had been to Pharnabazus, and on a more concrete level with the mention of his prompt payment of tribute, so Panthea refers first to the 'more faithful friend' her husband would be for Cyrus, and then to the many troops—solid military assistance—he would provide. Both women thus appeal to the Persian's sense of honour, entering into the discourse of ideal friendship, while also displaying worldly appreciation of accompanying material benefits. Panthea's words prove as effective as Mania's, for Cyrus straight away bids her to send for her husband, who proceeds to join him with a thousand horse (46). Xenophon does not record the direct discourse of the Cilician queen, but the concrete financial assistance that she

²² And perhaps an intertextual comparison too, with Herodotus' Xerxes: for Panthea's mention of the Assyrian's attempt to divide the couple recalls Xerxes' similar attempt with regard to Masistes and his wife (*Histories* 9.111).

²³ Panthea's technique here is exactly Socrates' towards Callias at *Symposium* 8.7–11, as Hermogenes recognizes (8.12).

provides is evidence of prudent diplomacy. She, like Panthea, does eventually secure an alliance between Cyrus and her husband.

As Panthea proves correct in her estimation of her husband, so Mania lives up to the role in which she envisaged herself as her husband's successor. Her initial statement to Pharnabazus that her husband 'paid over the tributes due' (τοὺς φόρους ἀπεδίδου) finds reflection in the statement in the following paragraph that she 'paid over the tributes due no less faithfully than her husband had' (τοὺς τε φόρους οὐδὲν ἥττον τὰνδρὸς ἀπεδίδου, 3.1.12). But following this comparison is an extensive list of her excellent services, which gives a strong impression that in her achievements on Pharnabazus' behalf she has easily surpassed even her husband. The list culminates with the remark that 'whomever she praised she would give plentiful gifts, with the result that she equipped her mercenary force most splendidly' (3.1.13)²⁴—and thus, along with her personable style, she is shown to provide Pharnabazus with the most crucial of aids, by being herself an ideal military ruler on his behalf. As a woman she is perhaps better placed than the men to aspire to match her superior in leadership ability, while still not presenting a threat to his rule.²⁵

These women secure what they desire through tact and diplomacy, but also, in the case of Epyaxa and Mania, through giving generous gifts. In the tale of Mania the word 'gifts' recurs, when she twice bestows them on Pharnabazus (at 3.1.10, 12) and then on favoured mercenaries (3.1.13), and related verbs with the 'given' root are also several, used of her or by her.²⁶ Setting forth to visit the satrap to make her request, she takes with her 'gifts, both to give to Pharnabazus himself, and to use for winning the favour of his courtesans and of the most powerful men at his court' (*Hell.* 3.1.10). She sees the value of forging a network of relationships that stretches beyond the king himself to encompass others who may have influence with him²⁷ (and that presumably is also Panthea's purpose in developing

²⁴ See Due, *Cyropaedia* (1989), 182–3, for the ideal leader's principle of granting rewards for effort to encourage those who serve him.

²⁵ Cf. Herodotus' tale of Aryandes, who 'made himself equal to Darius' and so was killed (*Histories* 4.166).

²⁶ δοῦναι: 3.1.10, 11; ἀπεδίδου: 3.1.11, 12; ἐδίδου: 3.1.13.

²⁷ The real historical influence of the *pallakai* of the Persian royal and satrapal courts is difficult to assess (Brosius, 1996, 31–4, 191–2), but they 'clearly enjoyed a good status' (*ibid.*, 89 n. 14).

a friendship with Cyrus' man Araspas, 5.1.18). The Cilician also bears valuable gifts when she arrives to visit Cyrus at the city of Caystrupedion. Xenophon has just recorded Cyrus' inability to pay his troops, who, being owed 'more than three months' wages' (μισθὸς πλέον ἢ τριῶν μηνῶν), 'went again and again to his headquarters and demanded what was due to them. And he continued to express hopes, and was clearly troubled' (*Anab.* 1.2.11). The queen's arrival at precisely this moment solves the problem, and reads as an answer to the hopes just mentioned: μισθὸν τεττάρων μηνῶν (four months' wages) is a clear response to Cyrus' owing his troops 'more than three months'. In choosing to spend the money on his troops, Cyrus displays the mark of an ideal ruler who prioritizes his men before himself, though the groundswell of discontent must also compel him towards that decision. Thus the Cilician grants the powerful man a most significant favour, in bringing the cash that makes feasible the continuation of his expedition, and in a sense becoming a paymaster before whom the troops later stage a terrifying military display. The favour places him under an obligation to the queen. The Armenian woman brings the elder Cyrus both 'other gifts' and money (τὸ χρυσίον, 'gold' which Cyrus directly describes as 'money' χρήματα), which he returns exclaiming 'You shall not make me go about doing good for pay!' He advises her not to give it to the king again to bury, but rather to spend it on her family and son (*Cyrop.* 3.3.2–3). Under less dire circumstances the younger Cyrus might have preferred to respond likewise to Epyaxa. Rather like Xenophon at Seuthes' dinner party (*Anabasis* 7.3.29–32), Panthea is in no position to offer Cyrus material gifts: but as Xenophon, in want of a gift, pledges his men's friendship, so Panthea, having nothing else (respectable!) to offer, pledges her husband's friendship.

The three women continue to please and delight the powerful men. Xenophon depicts in each case a developing relationship characterized by mutual *philia* and reciprocal benefits. Mania's loyalty, attentiveness, and deferential manner to Pharnabazus win his ongoing friendship. Once in office, Xenophon notes that 'whenever (ὅποτε) she went to Pharnabazus' court she always gave him gifts, and whenever (ὅποτε) he came down to her province she received him with far more magnificence and courtesy than any of his other governors' (*Hell.* 3.1.12). The repetition ὅποτε... ὅποτε suggests the

generous extent of her willing helpfulness, but also serves to associate the two clauses, linking Mania's gift-giving with her ability to give the satrap pleasure. The narrative hints at reciprocity in the balance of their actions (ὁπότε ἀφικνοῖτο—ὁπότε... καταβαίνοι). Mania is the ideal servant and friend, unassuming and reliable: she *always* plies Pharnabazus with gifts *whenever* she visits him, and offers him far lovelier receptions than do the other sub-satraps; it is 'for Pharnabazus' that she keeps secure not only the cities she received from her husband, but also three more; she accompanies Pharnabazus in the field (3.1.13). The many superlatives and eulogies that pepper the narrative emphasize the outstanding quality of her service. Xenophon concludes the section with the remark that 'in return for these services Pharnabazus paid her magnificent honours, and sometimes asked her to aid him as a counsellor' (3.1.13),²⁸ thus illuminating the reciprocal nature of the relationship. The evocation here of splendid gifts and spectacular receptions, along with the earlier allusion to concubines and influential courtiers, hints at the luxury and debauchery Greek minds associated with an eastern court. But this background of associations, which brings to the fore the possibility that the relationship was erotic²⁹ (and perhaps conveys the coarse assumption of uncouth observers that that must have been the case), serves as a foil to the fact that in Xenophon's analysis it consists simply in *philia*. Their mutual *philia* is such that Pharnabazus declares after Mania's murder that he would prefer not to live than fail to avenge her (3.1.15).

Xenophon's narrative hints that the Cilician, too, has developed a friendship with Cyrus. She demonstrates diplomacy comparable to that of the other women, though the little that is suggested of the developing relationship is reported indirectly and remains rather obscure. We hear only briefly of her initial encounter with Cyrus: 'and it was said that Cyrus had (intimate) relations with the Cilician'

²⁸ The allusion here to the Herodotean Artemisia's famous counsellor, *symbolos* aspect underlines again the fact that Mania is not simply a tragic Warner whose words are destined not to be heeded by the king (Artemisia fits both the categories in Lattimore (1939), 24–35), but rather a figure who enters into a far more reciprocal friendship with her superior.

²⁹ Cf. the later story of Cleopatra's magnificent visit to Antony, bearing gifts and money, then reception of him at a surpassingly brilliant and elegant dinner (Plutarch *Antony* 25.4–27.1).

(ἐλέγετο δὲ καὶ συγγενέσθαι Κῦρον τῇ Κιλίσσῃ, *Anab.* 1.2.12). At this point the soldiers focalize the narrative, and their views as to the nature of the relationship are conveyed in Xenophon's choice of verb—for συγγίγνομαι where a woman is involved does imply sexual relations. And yet the wider narrative pattern indicates a different interpretative emphasis, upon the trust Epyaxa here offers for the sake of developing ties of *philia*.³⁰ The single fairly detailed account of her interaction with Cyrus is the occasion when 'the Cilician woman, as the report ran, asked Cyrus to exhibit his army to her (λέγεται δεηθῆναι); such an exhibition was what he desired to make (βουλόμενος οὖν ἐπιδείξαι), and accordingly he held a review of the Greeks and the foreigners on the plain' (1.2.14). This rather manly gesture on Epyaxa's part, redolent of barbarian otherness (reminiscent perhaps of Pheretime's request for an army in Herodotus' *Histories* (4.162), or of Artaynte's refusal to accept that same gift, 9.109)), is nevertheless an intelligent and appropriate signal of friendly diplomacy, particularly as Cyrus has spent the money she gave him on these very troops. With λέγεται Xenophon seems to present the view of those who knew the queen and Cyrus, as witnesses of their perfect friendship: βουλόμενος, along with the repetition of ἐπιδείξαι, expresses the exact harmony of her wish with his desire to fulfil it. The Cilician accompanies Cyrus in her carriage as he inspects the Greek soldiers from his chariot (16). Xenophon next describes the parading phalanx breaking into a run towards the camp (17), frightening the barbarians and causing the queen to flee, then roaring with laughter at the fright caused. The laughter casts an unfavourable light on the incident, which (even if intended to impress) seems inappropriate at the expense of this dignified woman. Again later, with the plundering of the woman's territory and destruction of her palace (though Cyrus is absolved somewhat from blame, for it is specifically Menon's unruly troops³¹ that are responsible), there seems some disjunction between the woman's irreproachable behaviour and the Persian leader's failure to respond wholly in kind. But despite her discomfort the queen's reaction is ever courteous:

³⁰ See below.

³¹ Cf. *Anabasis* 1.5.12; Lendle (1995), sv 1.2.26.

Now the Cilician was filled with admiration at seeing the brilliance and the order of the army (ἡ δὲ Κίλισσα ἰδοῦσα τὴν λαμπρότητα καὶ τὴν τάξιν τοῦ στρατεύματος ἐθαύμασε); and Cyrus was pleased to see the fear with which the Greeks inspired the foreigners (Κῦρος δὲ ἤσθη τὸν ἐκ τῶν Ἑλλήνων εἰς τοὺς βαρβάρους φόβον ἰδών). (*Anab.* 1.2.18)

The balance of the sentences—ἡ δὲ Κίλισσα ἰδοῦσα / Κῦρος δὲ... ἰδών—situates the two subjects in parallel and their responses in accord, expressing the pleasing rapport with Cyrus that the queen has achieved through her efforts thus far. The symmetry serves also to link the two sentences, associating the queen with the powerful man's pleasure (ἤσθη)—but in a less erotic way than the earlier phrase has led one to expect.

These women show themselves to be more sensitive than the men to the requirements of *philia*. When Abradatas arrives, Panthea tells him of the piety, self-restraint, and compassion that Cyrus has shown the pair. He asks what he might do to repay such a debt of *charis* (gratitude), and she advises: 'What else, pray, than to try to be to him what he has been to you?' (6.1.47). Abradatas afterwards approaches Cyrus to offer himself as his 'friend, servant and ally' (6.1.48), and pledges to co-operate with the king in whatever enterprise he might engage in. Thus it is Panthea who guides her husband into appropriate action. Later, just before the battle, she urges her husband to fight gallantly, for

to Cyrus I think we owe a great debt of gratitude, because when I was a prisoner and allotted to him, he did not think fit to treat me as a slave or as a freewoman under a dishonourable name, but took me and kept me for you as one would a brother's wife. (6.4.7)

Her words sum up the situation succinctly. Cyrus had every right to make her his slave or concubine. In choosing instead to treat her with respect he has shown her husband *philia* of the strongest variety,³² and he is therefore obligated to do all he can in return. Panthea next tells Abradatas of the promise she made to Cyrus,³³ and so articulates

³² Cf. *Hiero* 3.7.

³³ Her use of much the same vocabulary here as she used in making her original promise to Cyrus (6.1.45) suggests the seriousness with which that promise was made.

for him the expectations he must strive to live up to. Touched (we are told) by these words, he lays his hand on her head and prays that he might show himself 'a husband worthy of Panthea, and a friend worthy of Cyrus, who has shown us honour' (6.4.9). The gesture suggests that he draws strength from his wife, who will help him to be true to his oath. Panthea declares that she would rather die than face the dishonour of failing to repay the debt of gratitude she owes Cyrus (*Cyrop.* 6.4.6). Likewise it is Epyaxa, not her husband, who establishes a bond of *philia* with Cyrus; and Mania shows herself more rigorous than her male sub-satrapal counterparts or her husband before her in fulfilling the requirements of friendship with Pharnabazus.

Mania's amenable manner is made strikingly evident through the implicit contrast that underlies the subsequent account between her usurper son-in-law's style and her own. Having murdered Mania, Meidias copies her practice in sending gifts to Pharnabazus (*Hell.* 3.1.15), a parallel gesture that illuminates the shockingly different context: Mania legitimately sought to become ruler in the place of her deceased husband, by virtue of her partnership with him in marriage, whereas Meidias, having slain the legitimate ruler, intends nevertheless to take over himself by virtue of kinship with her. Mania goes in person to Pharnabazus to speak with him and present him with the gifts, and she persuades him gently to give her a trial as satrap; whereas Meidias, with an abruptness conveyed by the aorist tense and the brevity of the sentence, merely 'sent gifts' to Pharnabazus and 'claimed the right' (*ἡξίουν*) to rule the province just as Mania had (3.1.15). Mania's manner of gift-giving is less presumptuous (for she does not take for granted any right to rule the satrapy), and is farther-reaching, extended also to the others at court. Naturally Pharnabazus rejects Meidias' gifts, and states his intention to avenge his wronged friend.

All the foreign wives grant concrete military assistance. Epyaxa provides money that is used to pay Cyrus' troops. Mania introduces prizes that improve the standard of the mercenaries campaigning in Pharnabazus' interest, and campaigns with him against the Mysians and Pisidians (3.2.13). It is under Panthea's guidance that Abradatas pledges to co-operate in Cyrus' every enterprise (6.3.48–9), and then proceeds not only to contribute a hundred chariots to Cyrus' force

(50) but also to take the most vulnerable battle position. Panthea says that she would prefer that he die a gallant soldier than live disgraced (6.4.6), and he pays heed: Xenophon devotes four chapters (7.1.29–32) to a dramatic account of Abradatas' courageous and effective action, which culminates in his death as a man of valour (7.1.32). The Cilician, like Panthea, secures for Cyrus her husband's support, although (in keeping with the fact that the pair are not indebted to Cyrus like the couple of Susa) this support is of a more passive variety and without such tragic consequences.³⁴ Pledges are exchanged to ensure that the territory of Cilicia is not devastated further, and the Cilicians provide more money for Cyrus' troops (1.2.27). Hellas, wife of Gongylus the Eretrian, fits much the same pattern too (*Anabasis* 7.8.8). It is she who entertains Xenophon in Mysia (no mention is made of her husband or his whereabouts, though we imagine she must be acting on his behalf), and she provides tremendous practical assistance: for she advises Xenophon in precise military detail (7.8.9) as to a final action on the *Anabasis* before Thibron takes over the leadership. In this way she is responsible for the Greeks' seizure of considerable booty that finally places Xenophon in a position to again 'benefit another' (καὶ ἄλλον ἥδη εὖ ποιεῖν, 7.8.23)—and so be a good friend.

The expertise of the wives in establishing and preserving bonds of *philia* is revealed in the context of their relations not only with the powerful outsider, but also with their own husbands. Panthea's devotion to Abradatas is central to Xenophon's account. She repulsed Araspas' advances, we are told, 'and was true to her husband, although he was far away, for she loved him devotedly' (6.1.32). The impression of the couple's mutual *philia* is reinforced in the subsequent account through the selection of snap-shots of emotive

³⁴ However plundering of their territory still occurs: Xenophon also explores the issues surrounding divided loyalties, and the compromises that the women, especially Epyaxa and Panthea, endure for their efforts. Panthea, for example, shows the *philotimia* characteristic of an ideal leader in being extremely conscious of the favour she owes Cyrus. She wishes to be seen by others to act honourably in this regard. But after her husband's death, she berates herself (7.3.10), regretting profoundly to have had to choose between the debt of *philia* owed to the ideal leader, and that owed to her husband.

scenes.³⁵ Although Xenophon makes no explicit statement regarding the Cilician couple, the structure of his account and the symmetry of their roles likewise leaves an impression of partnership. The first record of Syennesis' actual words (rather than merely his rumoured actions) marks the point at which he replaces his wife (who is not mentioned again) as the key negotiator with Cyrus. With the lines, 'for he said that he had never yet put himself into the hands of anyone who was more powerful than he was, and would not now go to Cyrus until his wife had won him over and he had received pledges' (1.2.26), Xenophon binds together the two portions of the account. The queen dominates the earlier stages of the story with Syennesis barely mentioned, while her husband dominates the later stages played out in his territory—yet here the two halves are joined with the suggestion that they are working together as a freedom-loving, barbarian pair. Symmetry in their roles is suggested in the way the account opens with the wife giving Cyrus 'abundant cash' *χρήματα πολλά*, apparently for his army (1.2.12), and closes with her husband giving *χρήματα πολλά*, explicitly 'for his army' (1.2.27).³⁶ The contrast with the Herodotean wife of Intaphrenes (3.119), who chooses that Darius spare the life not of her husband but of her brother, is stark.

While Syennesis and Abradatas are represented as loyal partners of their wives, working in concert with them in negotiating with the powerful outsider, Alexander of Pherae (*Hellenica* 6.4.34–7) presents

³⁵ The joyful embrace of husband and wife when they are first reunited (6.1.47); Panthea's bedecking of Abradatas in golden armour made from her own jewellery (6.4.2); her kissing of his chariot-box as he departs for battle (6.4.9); her holding her dead husband's head in her lap (7.3.5); and finally her death with her head resting upon his chest (7.3.14), and the covering of the two bodies with a single cloak, as Panthea had directed (7.3.15).

³⁶ A referee suggests it may be significant that Syennesis receives gifts from Cyrus at the end, whereas Epyaxa does not, and so perhaps we could view his condescending to have sex with her as a gift. I feel rather that the culminating gifts to her husband are also her own (she has been acting on behalf of both of them, after all), just as Abradatas is brought under obligation by Cyrus' favour to Panthea. If we may compare Epyaxa's situation with Panthea's (as the narrative patterns appear to encourage us to do) then refraining from sex with her would be the greater gift. See also n. 53 below. Cf. the tale reported in Plutarch's *Alexander*, according to which 'the finest and most princely favour' that Alexander paid Darius' female relatives was his respect of their chastity (21.5).

an absolute contrast. When he fails to be a loyal or supportive partner his wife turns to her brothers for help. Xenophon notes the dire effect of Alexander's rule on the people of Thessaly, but the focus of his account is personal, on the man's tyrannical behaviour within his household. Alexander's wife's part in his assassination is spelt out only once his death has been established as desirable, and so she is introduced not as a partner in tyranny (like Herodotean queens such as Amestris) but as the deviser of the deed and enactor of justice. She is vindicated further with the sketch of his arrival home drunk (6.4.36: information that is ominous in view of his generally menacing character), and with the record of two alleged reasons for her hatred of him, both of which suggest again his beastly nature. The first depicts a man who cuts the throat of his beautiful favourite *because* his wife pleads that the boy be released, flouting the moral code that one should listen to the entreaties of suppliants; the second, a man who undermines conjugal loyalty. In this second allegation—of those who say 'that inasmuch as no children were being born to him of this woman, Alexander was sending to Thebes and trying to win as his wife (*ἐμνήστευε*) the widow of Jason' (37)—there seems a hint even at bigamy, unacceptable and barbaric behaviour to the Greeks: for a man might divorce an infertile wife without censure to remarry, but there is no suggestion here that the marriage be dissolved. *Μνηστεύω* is related to *μνηστήρ*, used often in the *Odyssey* of the suitors of Penelope, and thus lustful and debauched behaviour is evoked.

The dreadfulness of the couple's relationship is illuminated further through the comparison it invites with the tale of Candaules' murder by his wife,³⁷ which in certain key differences reveals a considerable contrast between the characters of the two queens. In the strange detail Xenophon provides of Alexander's wife clutching the door-knocker as she waits for Alexander to die is a vivid suggestion of a desperate psychological condition: this woman has tolerated much before being driven to this extreme. While Candaules' flaw was to

³⁷ The motifs preserved in the Herodotean tale were perhaps part of a wider common tradition, but the similarity in detail suggests that Xenophon may well have had this specific version in mind. See Gray (1989), 71–2 for the main points of comparison.

love his wife too much (it was this that provoked him to display her naked), Alexander treated his wife not merely with callous neglect, if he wooed another woman, but also vindictively. It is he who allegedly killed an innocent underling, as Candaules' wife might have done had Gyges chosen differently. Furthermore, the implied brutality recalls the cruelty suffered by Masistes' virtuous wife (in Herodotus' *Histories*) at the hands of another powerful outsider, Xerxes.³⁸ Unlike Candaules' dominant barbarian queen, Alexander's wife is motivated not by a rationalistic desire for justice, but by a very human desperation. Moreover she works through her kin, using her brothers to carry out the deed,³⁹ whereas Candaules' wife overturns the social order by coercing a subject into killing his master and stealing the kingship. And while Gyges' line is cursed as a result—an indication that his action is not divinely sanctioned—Xenophon's narrative leaves the woman's brother in secure possession of the throne at the end of the story, which serves tacitly to validate his rule. We are left with a vivid impression of a tyrant who undermined the partnerships both of husband and wife and of ruler and subject, and so deserved his fate. The Herodotean tale of Masistes and his wife is likewise a reverse story, telling of natural (in this case fraternal) ties of *philia* that are dissolved rather than forged, and of Xerxes' transformation from caring kin to cruel outsider⁴⁰—however he, unlike Alexander, remains in control at the end.

As with Xenophon's other foreign wives, Alexander's is represented in relation to two different categories of man, but she is in partnership with her brothers *against* her husband: it is he who is initially situated in the role of powerful outsider (a role that is negated when he is assassinated and her brother becomes king). Where Panthea and Epyaxa negotiate with a powerful man to secure the good treatment of their husbands as well as themselves, Alexander's wife negotiates with her brothers to secure her husband's assassination. The husbands of

³⁸ 9.112. Xerxes was aware of what would ensue if he handed this woman over to Amestris: 9.111.

³⁹ A Greek woman did have the right of recourse to her natal family if her marriage failed.

⁴⁰ Immediately prior to the story of Xerxes' love for Masistes' wife, Herodotus tells of the king's gratitude to the man who saved his brother's life (9.107). The juxtaposition underlines the king's fickleness.

Panthea and Epyaxa are supportive partners, and work together with their wives for their mutual benefit in securing good treatment from a powerful outsider; Alexander's wife must turn to her brothers for support where her husband gives none. Rather than helping her to secure an alliance (which is not an option) they seek to get rid of the tyrannical man altogether and to win the sovereignty themselves. The brothers of Alexander's wife are her agents. They commit the murder itself and take power in Alexander's place, but she determines that this action must be taken and coerces them to execute it (6.4.36). Thus like Panthea and Epyaxa she exerts significant pressure on her male relations.

Xenophon himself—in his role as the gift-carrying, *philia*-seeking intermediary between the Greek mercenaries and the powerful outsider Seuthes in the *Anabasis*⁴¹—serves as a helpful touchstone in assessing further the features that are unique to the pattern involving the wives. In his speech to Seuthes, Xenophon, like the women, enters directly into the discourse of ideal relations, offering himself and his men as faithful friends to the king, noting that the soldiers desire that even more fervently than he, and indeed that they 'are asking you for nothing more, but rather giving themselves over to you and willing to labour and brave the first danger on your behalf' (*Anabasis* 7.3.30–1). Again, the offer of friendship is matched with prospects of material gains: territory, horses, men, and beautiful women. But the dynamic here is quite different. The backdrop of this spontaneous response on the part of a tipsy Xenophon to an unexpected dinner party custom is awkward rather than life-threatening: the Greeks are in a position of power *vis-à-vis* Seuthes, for they can offer the king the support he needs to regain his father's territory, and failing that have other options open to them. In fact, the idealism of Xenophon's speech sits quite jarringly alongside the practical reality of material advantage that has been the theme up till now.⁴² Events that follow reveal the futility of what seem to have been empty words: so far from its wanting nothing else from Seuthes, negotiations break down entirely when the army fails to receive sufficient monetary reward. The women, by contrast, understand Aspasia's wisdom on the subject of

⁴¹ I thank one of the anonymous referees for this interesting comparison.

⁴² At 7.2.35, for example, Xenophon demanded a detailed account of what Seuthes could offer each different section of the army.

matchmakers (*Mem.* 2.6.36): that above all else what they say must be true. The women conduct the discourse of ideal relations on a more ideal plane, retaining distance from what is nevertheless an underlying reality of utility. Their initial powerlessness obliges them to rely wholly on their personal skill at conducting human relations, and perhaps even assists in that diplomacy by ensuring that the men perceive in them no threat. Xenophon the commander fails in his objective: no genuine *philia* develops between him or his soldiers and Seuthes. He instead alienates both camps and finds himself (at *Anab.* 7.6.10) in risk of his life.

IDEAL RULERS

Xenophon's foreign women prove to be ideal friends not only in their relationships with powerful outsiders and their husbands: their capacity for *philia* is underlined also through their characterization in certain respects as ruling figures. For Xenophon the connection was natural: the best leaders of men were those most skilled at building relationships. This is how the techniques that come naturally to Theodote in pleasing her suitors—or to Panthea in relating to Araspas, or Mania to Pharnabazus—turn out to be much the same as those exercised by Xenophon's Cyruses, for example, or his Jason of Pherae. These are the methods of the *philanthropos* leader, who shows appreciation of friends through simple kindnesses and thoughtfulness (visiting them in illness, for example, and gift-giving),⁴³ and thus secures loyal friendship in return. In other ways too the women are characterized as skilled leaders in their own right.⁴⁴ Along with

⁴³ See Due (1989), 163–70 for the ideal leader's *philanthropia*.

⁴⁴ All are portrayed, for example, surrounded by followers and loyal servants: Panthea's maids encircle her in the opening scene, wailing in sympathy; her nurse is loyal to the end, dismayed by her mistress's instructions but nevertheless carrying them out exactly; and her eunuchs slay themselves at her death, much as Cyrus the Younger's eunuch does (*Anab.* 1.8.29; cf. Gera (1993), 244). Mania is a fine military ruler who commands her men's loyalty, improves their standard by giving rewards for achievement, and presides in person from her carriage over their successful seizure of several cities. In similar fashion the Cilician shows a personal interest in Cyrus' soldiers, watching them from her carriage.

the support provided by their husbands, their further practical resources (which are those of any successful ruler: willing attendants, command of soldiers, considerable wealth,⁴⁵ and so on) must culminate in real power, and specifically—as the tyrant’s advantages as enumerated by Simonides do likewise in the *Hiero*, 2.2—in a superb ability to reward friends.⁴⁶ This capability renders Epyaxa ‘useful’ to Cyrus and Mania to Pharnabazus, and goes part way towards explaining why these women are well-treated by the respective powerful males: but their real achievement is to enshroud that reality in a form that brings out in the men the best behaviour in return. It is likewise his ‘usefulness’ (ὠφέλεια) to his subjects that keeps Xenophon’s ideal ruler in power—and that same quality is most commonly ascribed by Xenophon to the man who is perhaps the prototype of his ideal-ruler model, Socrates himself.⁴⁷

Mania alone of the women exercises actual rule, and in her case the narrative works specifically to evoke conventional tyrant story patterns.⁴⁸ By thus accentuating her role as tyrant rather than woman or wife, it implies that she holds power in her own right, not merely by derivation of the authority invested in a man. In the second phase of her story (*Hell.* 3.1.14), she is no longer represented as a mere subordinate ruling on behalf of a superior, or wife on behalf of a husband (there is no mention at all of Pharnabazus or Zenis), but rather as an autonomous ruling figure. The opening (‘now when she was more than forty years old’) suggests chronological separation

⁴⁵ This is evoked with the mention of the two cities that housed most of Mania’s treasure (*Hellenica* 3.1.15), and implied in Epyaxa’s gift to Cyrus of so large a sum of money that it enabled him to back-pay his troops several months’ wages (*Anabasis* 1.2.12). Panthea has significant riches of her own which she puts to use without her husband’s knowledge (6.4.2) when she has golden armour made for him.

⁴⁶ It is specifically the power to reward friends (and harm enemies) that caps the achievements of the Cyruses, too, e.g. *Anab.* 1.9.11; *Cyrop.* 8.7.7, 28.

⁴⁷ See esp. *Mem.* 4.1.1; also, e.g. 3.8.1, 10.1, etc. The question of whether Xenophon’s model of the ideal ruler (of which many of his positive figures are variants) was fashioned after his perception of Socrates, or whether Xenophon’s representation of the philosopher was crafted in line with his own moralistic outlook, is interesting and perhaps unanswerable: see Gera (1993), 26 (and 27–131).

⁴⁸ Xenophon could envisage a good tyrant: see, e.g. Gelenczey-Mihalcz (2000), 113–21. The *Hiero*, in which Simonides presents the tyrant of Syracuse with a vision of the ideal ruler he could become, provides a useful concentration of tyrant narrative patterning.

from the preceding account, and perhaps also a parallel conceptual distance from her earlier portrayal: we are given the impression that Mania has been a successful ruler for a number of years. The focus of the narrative shifts from her relationship with Pharnabazus to her relationship with her son-in-law Meidias, who enters the tale for the first time at this point. Meidias, we are told, 'was disturbed by certain people saying that it was a disgraceful thing for a woman to be the ruler, while he was in private station' (γυναικα μὲν ἄρχειν, αὐτὸν δ' ἰδιώτην εἶναι)—information forewarning of his motivation for the terrible deed that is to follow. In making explicit this motivation, Xenophon foregrounds the ruler–subject dynamic that to Meidias characterizes his relationship with Mania. In his conception of himself as ἰδιώτης (private citizen) in contrast to ruler, the *idiotes*, *tyrannos* dichotomy (that forms the skeletal framework of the *Hiero*, and which Xenophon there explores at great length) seems specifically to be recalled.

We then hear of Mania 'guarding herself carefully, as is proper in a tyranny' (14), but trusting Meidias because he is kin. A μέν - δέ construction (τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους μάλα φυλαττομένης αὐτῆς . . . ἐκείνῳ δὲ πιστευσούσης καὶ ἀσπαζομένης) spells out the contrast between prudent guarding against others and trust of the particular individual who is let through the guard. The motif of the tyrant's guard recurs in the *Hiero*, and is associated in life and literature with the conventional tyrant.⁴⁹ So too is the phenomenon of trusted individuals who may pass through a bodyguard—especially in the context of the betrayal of that trust in assassination attempts.⁵⁰ Together these motifs foreground a ruler's very real dilemma in balancing the need to conduct relationships with the need for personal protection. Mania trusts Meidias and lets him past her guard, and so does indeed die the archetypal tyrant's death: for she is assassinated, and by a trusted kinsman, presumably in a private room—we are told merely that Meidias 'went in and strangled her'.

⁴⁹ E.g. in the *Hiero*: 2.8, 4.9, 5.3, 6.10–11, 10.4. Cf. Herod. 1.59; Thuc. 6.58; Plato *Rep.* 567e; Livy 1.49.2; and so on.

⁵⁰ *Hiero* 1.38. Cf. Darius' words at *Histories* 3.72 (proved correct at 3.77, when he and the fellow conspirators are let through the royal guards).

This bodyguard/trusted individual motif is present in the narratives of all the wives. To Mania's letting down her literal bodyguard to her son-in-law we may add her initial journey to Pharnabazus in the protection of her *stolos* but subsequent rendering herself vulnerable in an apparently private meeting. The guarded (in a different sense) Panthea lets down her metaphorical guard when she opens up emotionally to Araspas, in showing herself grateful for his care and attentive to him in sickness or need.⁵¹ Meidias' abuse of Mania's trust and undermining of a natural bond of *philia* towards kin is made a focus of that account, much as Araspas' flouting of his bond of care is foregrounded by Artabazus' condemnatory speech (6.1.35: she is his 'entrusted deposit' (παρακαταθήκη), entrusted to his care). Thus Xenophon's emphasis in both narratives is on the dreadfulness of such abuse of the woman's openness, which (the pattern implies) is an act of *megaloprepeia*⁵² that deserves a response in kind. The pattern underlines the fact of the woman's trust, which she offers for the sake of (developing) a *philia* relationship, and the fact too that she makes these decisions on her own. The same pattern appears to be present in Epyaxa's case, for she likewise has a bodyguard, and juxtaposed with the bodyguard is the rumour of her close communication with Cyrus: 'the Cilician woman had a guard about her of Cilicians and Aspendians; and it was said that Cyrus had relations with her'. In coming to Cyrus with gifts and letting him past her bodyguard, though she is a lone married woman and he an unknown man, she shows that she trusts him. That trust becomes clearer in the ensuing narrative. The similar narrative pattern suggests that her trusting openness may also be read as *megaloprepeia* (a reading lent poignancy by the fact that her generosity will not be altogether reciprocated⁵³) rather than as sexual forwardness⁵⁴—in which case the sensational rumour among

⁵¹ A variation on the pattern is perhaps to be seen in the way Abradatas, trusted on account of his being Panthea's husband, is allowed to pass through Cyrus' sentries and then his wife's personal guard (Araspas having left), *Cyrop.* 6.1.46.

⁵² 'magnificence', but in this context, 'trust of friends without fear of deceit': Gray (1989), C.3. The quality is characteristic, in fact, of good leaders; cf. *Ag.* 11.4. See Dover (1974), 194.

⁵³ Cf. n. 33 above.

⁵⁴ Indeed, when the verb is next used it records Cyrus' negotiations with her husband (1.2.27; the reader is aware that Xenophon's meeting with the king, too, involved that same word), and seems a further way in which the king and queen's roles are made to mirror one another.

Xenophon's fellow soldiers on the *Anabasis* of the Cilician woman's visit to Cyrus and their subsequent relationship is transformed into a tale of developing *philia*. We can see how Xenophon has fleshed out the bare bones of the circumstances—of married woman serving as envoy to powerful unrelated male—in line with his philosophical interests: the woman becomes a bearer of gifts and of friendship (in her own right, and on behalf of her husband). Whatever the truth-status of the soldiers' rumours, Xenophon chooses to emphasize the *philia* she offers, much as he does even in the case of the courtesan Theodote, whose services are styled 'gifts' (*Mem.* 3.11.14) and whose intellectual and emotional companionship are the focus of that account.

Xenophon's narrative technique does regularly work in this way to bring into question or undermine simplistic and conventional views of the women, and of male–female polarity generally. The frequent focalization of the portraits through male onlookers expresses explicitly male views of female power, and so brings into play obvious gender stereotyping, and yet equally conveys for the reader the power of the women's charisma, in that it re-enacts the effect of their presence upon men. Araspas' description of Panthea's effect upon him and his companions when they first catch sight of her, and then the way all eyes are drawn to her when Abradatas leaves for war, bring to mind Simonides' vision of the ideal ruler whose divine-seeming aura⁵⁵ and beautiful appearance draw the gazes of all. There is a hint of the supernatural about Panthea, too, in Araspas' and the others' conviction that such a woman 'has never before been born a mortal, nor even come from mortal parents' (5.1.7), and then in the way that his assertion that *human* beauty (*κάλλος ἀνθρώπου*) could not overwhelm him (5.1.9) is followed by his falling in love. The impression is heightened with the first mention of the woman's name, for 'Panthea' means 'altogether divine', and bears an odd resemblance to the names both of the archetypal Pandora, 'gift of all (the gods)', and Theodote, 'a gift of god'. The sexual appeal of Panthea and Theodote invites a reading in terms of the leader's alluring quality, for although often contrasted with *philia*, *eros* can also be its ultimate form, as Simonides' words imply: the poet tells Hiero that if he will transform himself

⁵⁵ Xenophon believed that the ability to rule willing subjects is virtually divine (e.g. *Oec.* 21.12).

into an enlightened ruler, 'you will not only be loved, but adored by mankind', *Hiero* 11.11). Theodote, like Cyrus,⁵⁶ is a figure of Eros, and she, like him, renders those she deals with her willing subjects (much as Araspas comes to attend on Panthea, 5.1.18): captivated by her beauty and so enslaved by desire, the men ironically serve *her*. The tale plays explicitly with this question of power relations. Both Theodote and Socrates have a sort of magical power over others that draws others to them.⁵⁷ She at the beginning attracts artists and onlookers, and he at the end a trail of followers; and at its close each claims the right to use Socrates' magical wheel to draw the other. Indeed, Theodote emerges as a parallel to the philosopher, an expert in *philia* like he is, and doing a task much like his.

However, although 'Panthea' recalls two women who embody the dangers of *eros*, the name serves ultimately to emphasize the fact that this woman, unlike those, does *not* exploit her sexuality (for her marital fidelity extends to when her husband is far away and may never be seen again, much as Mania's extends beyond the grave). She instead offers a genuine gift of friendship, and quickly proves to the king that she may be better use to him as a friend than merely as a beautiful concubine. Indeed, Xenophon's foreign queens, so unlike their several scandalously lustful and sexually potent counterparts in Herodotus' *Histories*,⁵⁸ remain paragons of *sophrosune*.

In a similar fashion in the tale of Mania, Xenophon recalls motifs and story-patterns characteristic of famous eastern ruling widows, but then transforms them in a way that illuminates her distinctiveness. Most earlier widow narratives capitalize, for example, on the sensational and paradoxical aspect of manly female rule (a direction alluded to in Pharnabazus' decision 'that the woman must be

⁵⁶ Tatum (1989), 178–9, reads the *Cyropaedia* in these terms: 'In this love story, each person has fallen into his or her place around Cyrus, the ruler as [beloved,] *eromenos*. . . . In the most practical sense, the only Eros in the *Cyropaedia* is Cyrus himself'

⁵⁷ Cf. Cyrus the Elder's belief that rulers should 'enchant' their subjects, *Cyrop.* 8.1.40.

⁵⁸ We need only to recall Artaynte's affair with Xerxes (9.108–12), Atossa's bedroom persuasion of Darius (3.133–4), or the ominous dreams about Mandane's excessive fertility (1.107). The royal wife of Masistes, who remains lovingly united with her husband in opposition to Xerxes (9.111–13), is a conspicuous exception. Candaules' wife is of course also a model of *sophrosune*, horrified to have been seen naked—but that concern leads to her exchanging her husband for another!

satrap'). However by the time Meidias enters this story, with his conventional notions of proper gender roles, Xenophon has already had Mania show just how ill-founded they are: how much *better* she is, even in traditional male endeavours, than both her husband before her and the other satraps, while still retaining her womanly *sophrosune*. The conclusion of the tale, with Dercylidas' quip to Meidias (the point of which being that he has no right to rule over others, but only over the small piece of property that was his father's, 3.1.28), reiterates the notion central to Xenophon's thinking on leadership, that authority to rule derives from ability not from emblems of rule.⁵⁹

Cartledge's description of reader response to Xenophon's narrative in terms of two successive takes, the second of which reveals his 'subtext and intertext', is helpful.⁶⁰ At first sight the surface of his narrative perhaps mollifies the insecurities of a traditional Greek audience concerning independent women, in that it names the women in accordance with Greek forensic convention,⁶¹ characterizes them as intermediaries (thus framed within a context of male control), even portrays them sympathetically as having distinctly Greek womanly *sophrosune*. However the deeper narrative structure and content is more radical. It is the woman each time who is represented as the initiator of action: the power she secures derives not from her husband's authority, but from her personal initiative, most dramatically in the case of Alexander's wife. The 'tyrant aspects' of the women, especially Mania, contextualize and politicize their portrayal as ideal rulers by underlining the political and military realities of the role they play, whether as actual ruler or as diplomatic envoy. It depicts them also as solo actors in their own right, influential through their own doing.

⁵⁹ *Mem.* 3.9.10; cf. *Oec.* 21.11–12.

⁶⁰ E.g. on Mania: 'At first sight . . . Xenophon's Mania is a latterday Artemisia . . . At second sight, however—and this was surely Xenophon's subtext and intertext—his Mania was not all equivalent to Herodotus' infinitely more subversive and transgressive Artemisia' (1993), 8–9. (See also the disjunction between the connotations of Mania's name and her 'wholly positive' portrayal, *ibid.*, 8.)

⁶¹ I.e. as 'the wife of x'. Cf. Schaps (1977), 323–30: in oratory, respectable married women were ideally identified in this manner. (In other genres they were named more freely: Schnurr-Redford (1996), 127–8.) As a widow Mania's position is different, yet she too is nevertheless first introduced as Zenis' wife.

Thus these women are characterized in an interwoven manner as intermediaries, friends, and ideal rulers: they are relationship-builders *par excellence*. They are differentiated from others of Xenophon's women by the very real-worldly context of their negotiations and of the influence they win. The ruler representation may be explained partly as issuing from historical reality: women of the East had in Xenophon's time the possibility of exercising a significant degree of rule, whether in a satrapy or even in the empire (witness Parysatis), and whether through their influence with a ruler husband or son,⁶² or themselves ruling, like Mania, in their husband's stead after his death. Persian royal women undertook travels, in a private or an official capacity, independently of their husbands.⁶³ They accompanied the men on military campaigns.⁶⁴ Mania undoubtedly did have a bodyguard and a murderous son-in-law; and Xenophon perhaps saw the Cilician when she reviewed the Greek army, and heard the rumours about her relationship with Cyrus. However the combination of intermediary and tyrant-ruler patterning, which fits so well with Xenophon's *philia*-based philosophy of leadership and seems intended to further the portrayal of the women as ideal rulers, suggests that he has moulded his material considerably. Others of Xenophon's women emerge as natural leaders in certain respects: Ischomachus' wife has striking real-world leadership analogies applied to her, and like her housekeeper exercises rule within the *oikos* (even if that picture is complicated by the extratextual knowledge Xenophon's audience had of the unruly woman she went on to become⁶⁵). But what seems unique here is the characterization of

⁶² As in Parysatis' case. While the extent of female dominance over the Persian king is undoubtedly exaggerated in the Greek authors, these women do seem to have had a considerable degree of influence behind the throne on all sorts of matters, and also significant economic independence through their personal wealth: see Brosius (1996). Parysatis backed Cyrus' attempt on the throne, allowing his troops to encamp in her villages (*Anabasis* 1.4.9). Royal (and probably noble: Brosius, *ibid.*, 200) Achaemenid women might have their own centres of manufacture and control large workforces (*ibid.*, 123–82).

⁶³ Brosius (1996), 91–3.

⁶⁴ Brosius (1996), 87–91.

⁶⁵ For the real-life Chrysilla's future career, and its bearing on an interpretation of the *Oeconomicus*, see Pelling (2000), 244–5 and Goldhill (1995), 139–41. This extratextual dimension makes all the more convincing Pelling's argument (*ibid.*, 239–45)

the women as independent actors (in an economic and more general sense), and the association of that independence with the status of wife.⁶⁶ For as we have seen, the narratives emphasize much more distinctly their status as wife than their foreignness—a consequence, perhaps, of the actual Greek ethnicity of some of the wives, which along with the geographical proximity to Athens of Alexander's, challenges readers to draw comparisons also with their more thoroughly Greek counterparts. Hellas' name underscores most emphatically that Greek connection.

We have seen that the patterns that envelop the foreign wives span three works of different genres and compositional periods, though all are 'worked up' to different literary ends,⁶⁷ tempting readers to draw connections between them. In this they support a view of Xenophon's literary production as being characterized by unity.⁶⁸ We may imagine Xenophon gathering stories from all sorts of sources (Spartan, Athenian, even Iranian) throughout his life, and then recording what the tradition, and his own memory, had by then made of them, infusing those patterns with details exploring his philosophical interest in ideal leadership. The basic foreign-woman-as-intermediary pattern perhaps already structured the material as it reached Xenophon: it appears to reflect the historical role of women in Greek society (as link between male households, bringers of dowries in marriage, and so on), shaped to a foreign context. Alternatively the bare bones of the pattern perhaps arose simply from the historical visit of a woman such as Epyaxa to Cyrus. The pattern then struck Xenophon as an attractive vehicle for his own concerns and so was

that many of the work's apparently enlightened views on the wife's potential may be read as 'illuminating Ischomachus' rhetorical strategy as much as Xenophon's convictions' (240), and the *Oeconomicus* as a whole as 'investigating not only household management but also the rhetoric of masculine control, exploring the strategies whereby a male can induce an impressionable wife to acquiesce in her role' (241).

⁶⁶ Theodote is clearly economically independent—richly dressed, with matching mother and maids at her side, living in a lavishly furnished house (*Mem.* 3.11.4)—but that for a courtesan was not astonishing.

⁶⁷ The accounts of Mania and Panthea are both prominently worked up pieces of their respective larger narratives, but even the account of Epyaxa, with its brevity and obscurity, is likewise carefully tailored to the stretch of the *Anabasis* in which it appears.

⁶⁸ Cf. Cartledge (1993), 14: Xenophon's literary manner remained largely the same in *Hell.*, *Cyrop.*, and *Oec.*; Higgins (1977); Due (1989), 185.

used and developed by him. Perhaps Xenophon found women to be particularly well-suited to the application of his theory. To judge from these portraits, their manner may have seemed to him to be more attentive, deferential, diplomatic, and appealing than that of men. The Greek mind does appear to have conceived of women as natural gift-givers—bringing a dowry in marriage, associated in literature with treasure, and coming themselves as gifts⁶⁹ in the marital alliances forged between patrilineages. They were prominently involved in the religious life of the *polis*, perhaps more so than men, as gift-givers to the gods. Women, the gift-givers, were also intermediaries: they forged bonds of goodwill between families, or between mankind and the gods. They may well have intrigued Xenophon as natural experts in the requirements of the *philia* relationship.

⁶⁹ In Homeric marriage the girl herself was at times considered the counter-gift (in which case no dowry accompanied her): Finley (1955 reprinted 1981), 241; cf. Lacey (1968), 41; and in the Achaemenid context, still in Xenophon's time, a royal daughter might be offered as part of a gift in return for services to the king: Brosius (1996), 76; cf. 190.

Xenophon on Male Love

Clifford Hindley

In a previous article I attempted to trace the way in which, for Xenophon, homosexual liaisons might or might not affect the discipline of military life, and the emphasis which he placed upon the virtue of 'self-control' (ἐγκράτεια) in dealing with desires of this kind.¹ The present paper seeks to broaden the enquiry into a study of Xenophon's attitude to male same-sex affairs in general.

Following the recognition that Plato's discussions of pederasty are quite unrepresentative of Athenian society as a whole, recent scholarship has concentrated on vase paintings and on the orators who, as Sir Kenneth Dover has taught us, embody in their speeches the values which would appeal to an Athenian jury. Xenophon meanwhile has to some extent fallen between two stools. Relegated to the second rank as a writer and thinker behind Thoukudides and Plato, he nevertheless fails to be representative of the common man. On questions of male love, his writings have been excavated for citations to supplement general views on the Greek outlook, but the distinction between Sokrates and Xenophon has often been disregarded, or perhaps thought incapable of definition.² Other scholars have regarded Xenophon's writings as a source for the 'historical Sokrates', while showing little interest in the views of Xenophon himself. More

¹ Hindley (1994).

² Both Dover and Foucault, from their different viewpoints, handle the material in this way. See Dover (1978); Foucault 2 (1986). The relationship of Sokrates to the tradition about him over many areas of interest has been much illuminated by the essays edited by Vander Waerdt (1994).

recently, there has been a tendency to regard Xenophon as opposed to pederasty (or at least its physical expression) outright.³

The time may therefore be ripe for a fresh attempt to discover just what Xenophon believed on this subject. He belongs to an important group in Athenian society, the upper-class gentry who, while not aspiring to the heights of Platonic philosophy, might be prepared to think about their relationships with boys. Moreover, his very position in the second rank as a man of letters embodies a positive virtue for the social historian who is seeking to map the views of Greek society at large. I do not claim in any simplistic sense that Xenophon can be held to embody those views, but he provides an interesting specimen for dissection. Granted the limitations of his class background, his experience of life was wide-ranging—from military service in Asia Minor and Thrace to the pursuits of a retired country gentleman at Skillous. He knew the life of Athens and Sparta, and, to some extent, that of the Persian empire and of Thrace. In his retreat at Skillous he developed a variety of interests, which are reflected in his multifarious treatises. He shows himself aware of the different traditions within Greece regarding pederasty,⁴ and his narratives include glancing references to a number of other Hellenic societies. Moreover, in addition to the set-piece discussions of love in the *Memorabilia* and the *Symposium*, many of his references to manifestations of *ἔρως* ['desire'] are in the nature of parenthetical narratives or *obiter dicta*, seemingly uncoloured by the rhetorical or metaphysical purposes of an Aiskhines or a Plato. Elsewhere Xenophon provides annotations which, however jejune they may be, at least allow inferences to be drawn about the author's own ethical stance.

I propose therefore to examine the few passages in which Xenophon speaks in *propria persona*, his editorial comments, the implications of his narratives, and the extent to which he seems to identify with, or stand aside from, the various more formal discussions of pederasty attributed to others in his writings. It is to be hoped that what emerges is a reasonably rounded picture of the views held by an

³ Cantarella (1992), 63–4. Thornton (1997), 103, 202–3.

⁴ *Lac. Pol.* 2.12–13. The omission of Athens here is intriguing and hard to explain, though it is to some extent (and in a very different context) repaired in Sokrates' discourse at *Symp.* 8.32–4. Unless otherwise specified, the title *Symposium* in this article refers to Xenophon's work of that name.

experienced observer of male same-sex relationships in the world of his time, and a contribution to understanding that ποικιλία ['variety'] which, following Plato's Pausanias, recent observers have emphasized as characteristic of the Athenian scene.

Several passages make clear Xenophon's recognition of the power of sexual desire. Notably, in the fifth chapter of *Agésilaios* the king is said to have shown almost superhuman self-control in resisting Megabates, though his love for the youth was of the kind displayed by a 'most passionate nature' (σφοδροτάτη φύσις) for the loveliest of boys. Indeed, concludes Xenophon, 'It seems to me that many more men are able to gain the mastery over their enemies than over such passions.' This is a matter of 'nature', which, as commonly used, refers to a person's settled character.⁵ The term may extend to human nature at large, as when Hieron (and behind him I think we can hear Xenophon) is made to say that his love for Dailokhos is perhaps driven by a natural compulsion.⁶ Elsewhere, children, wives, or παιδικά ['boy-loves'] are grouped together as objects of a similar 'natural compulsion' to love.⁷ The passages so far mentioned carry no implication that a person may be more inclined to homosexual than to heterosexual relations (or vice versa), but Xenophon seems elsewhere to come near to what we mean by 'sexual orientation' in speaking of Episthenes as a παιδεραστής ['lover of boys'], whose τρόπος ['orientation'] can be explained to Seuthes by reference to his cohort of beautiful youths.⁸ Dover points out that the compulsion

⁵ *Ages.* 5.4 and 6. See also *Symp.* 8.8, where Sokrates admires Kallias' character. The reason for Agesilaos' restraint was, I believe, not a moral objection to pederasty, but the risk of diplomatic entanglement with an ambitious Persian family (see Hindley (1994), 361–5). On the wider literary background for the power of Aphrodite/Eros, see Davidson (1997), 159 ff.

⁶ *Hiero* 1.33. Cf. Dover (n. 2), pp. 61–2. Also, for the meaning of 'nature', see Dover, (1994), 88–95. For Hieron as mouthpiece of Xenophon, see below p. 96.

⁷ *Cyrop.* 7.5.60: the term for 'love' here is φιλεῖν, but surely in the case of wives and παιδικά it does not exclude ἐρᾶν. (Cf. Dover (n. 2), pp. 49–50, on the overlap between φιλία and ἔρως.) At *Mem.* 2.6.21 friendship or hostility toward others are matters of 'nature'.

⁸ *Anab.* 7.4.7–8. Cf. Dover (1978), 51, 62. Xenophon's text is grammatically ambiguous as to who raised the cohort of 'beautiful boys'. To my mind the more likely candidate, on balance, is Episthenes. But cf. Ogden, (1996), 126. For τρόπος as an individual's character, cf. *Cyrop.* 8.3.49, and as a national characteristic, *Cyrop.* 2.2.28.

of love is described in the same terms as same-sex desire in the heterosexual story of the Persian Araspas.⁹ Interestingly, however, as soon as the discussion here turns to the power of love in general (§12), the genders of lover and beloved both become masculine. This grammatical shift may not necessarily indicate all-male relationships, but it surely includes them.¹⁰ The language of the paragraph as a whole (with its repeated references to ἐρώμενοι ['objects of desire']) is strongly reminiscent of male same-sex contexts, where the compulsions of love are felt as strongly as in the heterosexual arena.

Xenophon makes an important distinction between sex with and sex without ἔργως. The latter is treated as a mere bodily appetite, on a par with other bodily appetites, such as hunger and thirst. This catalogue is mentioned with numbing regularity by Xenophon's Sokrates, and at *Mem.* 2.1.1 Xenophon himself implicitly acknowledges its validity.¹¹ The sexual appetite may be satisfied quite casually—without any thought of procreation—and, Sokrates observes, the streets are full of those who are willing to oblige.¹² The gender of the object of desire is immaterial. Thus, the philosopher Antisthenes, when his body craves relief, is satisfied with whoever (or perhaps (the

⁹ *Cyrop.* 5.1. 8–18. The passage provides another example of Xenophon speaking through his characters: for while at *Cyrop.* 2.2.28 Kuros is depicted as deriding a courtier for appearing to have a παιδικά in the Greek fashion, he speaks in *Cyrop.* 5.1.12 as though homosexual relationships were entirely on a par with heterosexual ones.

¹⁰ On the ambivalence of the masculine grammatical gender, see Kühner and Gerth, 1 (1955), §371.1, p. 82.

¹¹ *Mem.* 2.1.1: 'He seemed in saying this to turn his companions to the exercise of control in respect of their desires for food and drink and sex and sleep.' This alignment between sex and other bodily appetites is well analysed in Foucault (1985). It is given great prominence by Davidson (1997) in relation to Athenian society as a whole. By the phrase 'Xenophon's Sokrates' I mean the teachings attributed by Xenophon to Sokrates, whether or not the historical Sokrates actually held them. For convenience the name 'Sokrates' is used with this meaning (unless indicated otherwise) throughout this article.

¹² *Mem.* 2.2.4–5. Cf. *Mem.* 2.1.5, where would-be adulterers are counselled (in the interest of avoiding awkward entanglements) to resort to a prostitute 'since there are many giving release from the desires for sex'. In both passages the participle 'giving' may include women, but prostitutes were readily available: see Halperin, 'The democratic body: prostitution and citizenship in Classical Athens', in Halperin (1990), 88–112. For resort to boys on the part of a frustrated married man, cf. also Euripides, *Medea* 249 (Dover (1978), 171, n. 2).

neuter) ‘whatever’—τὸ παρόν) is available, including women whom no one else will visit.¹³

Beyond (but including) this bodily appetite lies ἔρως, which Dover defines as ‘the obsessive focussing of desire upon one person’.¹⁴ Xenophon makes Hieron speak of the much greater pleasure to be obtained from τὰ μετ’ ἔρωτος ἀφροδίσια [‘sex with desire’],¹⁵ and is clearly happy to romanticize relationships based on ἔρως. When Episthenes (the ‘lover of boys’ whom he encountered in Thrace) was on the point of offering his own life in exchange for that of a beautiful youth, Xenophon readily came to his aid, and praised the valour he had shown alongside his company of young men.

He also takes obvious pleasure in recounting the παιδικὸς λόγος [‘story about boys’] of the Median nobleman who steals a kiss from the young and handsome Kuros, and for whom a mere blink which deprives him of the sight of Kuros seems an eternity.¹⁶ Most notably, he provides a lyrical description of the effect of Autolukos’ beauty on Kallias and the assembled company at the opening of his *Symposium*, himself making the comment that ‘those who are inspired by a “temperate love” (σώφρων ἔρως) have a kindlier look, a gentler voice, and show a more unconstrained bearing’. A modern moralist might conclude from this idealistic eulogy that physical sex is out of the question between Kallias and Autolukos. But the opposite implication is clearly made later in the dialogue. For when Sokrates praises Kallias’ love as Ouranian and directed to the ‘soul’ (ψυχή), Hermogenes astutely interrupts to praise Sokrates’ skill in admonishing Kallias while seeming to praise him. If, in Hermogenes’ submission, Sokrates has to instruct Kallias as to ‘the character he must have’, it follows that hitherto his conduct has not met Sokrates’ standard. One naturally concludes that the ‘temperate love’ attributed to Kallias (by Xenophon) included physical intimacy in some form.¹⁷

¹³ *Symp.* 4.38.

¹⁴ Dover (1978), 63.

¹⁵ *Hiero* 1.29.

¹⁶ *Cyrop.* 1.4.27–8.

¹⁷ See *Symp.* 1.10, and Hermogenes’ interjection at *Symp.* 8.12. The phrase ‘temperate love’ σώφρων ἔρως is paralleled in the ‘just love’ δίκαιος ἔρως of Aiskhines 1.136, and a number of other expressions and relationships noted at n. 88 below. Also, see the analysis of ‘reverence’ in Kritoboulos’ speech, pp. 93–6 below.

At the same time, Xenophon is aware of the potential of physical desire, particularly in its homosexual form, for undermining the right ordering of military and political affairs. This much emerges from the contrast between his portrayal of the Spartan Thibron, a general who (as I believe the text implies) was destroyed by his uncontrolled desire for bodily pleasure, and that of Agesilaos, who amazingly resisted such desires. Another Spartan commander, Alketas, could betray his post for an attractive boy, while the tyrannical Iason of Pherae could be praised as 'most controlled in the pleasures of the body'.¹⁸

Awareness of the potentially anarchic power of sex is a major factor in Xenophon's admiration for the virtue of *ἐγκράτεια*. It is for him 'a fine and noble possession for a man'. These words introduce a chapter in which, at the climax of a paean to self-control in every department of life, he makes Sokrates call self-control 'the foundation of virtue'. This thought is reinforced, in the concluding paragraph, with Xenophon's own commendation: 'in saying this, Sokrates showed himself even more controlled (*ἐγκρατέστερον*) in his actions than his words'. Moreover, this perception of Sokrates forms the centrepiece of Xenophon's rebuttal of the charge that the philosopher corrupted the young.¹⁹

In Book 4 of the *Memorabilia*, the analysis is carried further to show that such self-control is also true freedom, because it enables a man to do what is right, rather than be enslaved to his passions,²⁰ a view endorsed by Xenophon as Sokrates' way of making his companions 'better fitted for action'. Conversely, Sokrates can claim that many have been destroyed through passions aroused by physical attraction,²¹ an observation Xenophon himself had made earlier,

¹⁸ See Hindley (1994) for a more detailed examination of these examples. The main references are: *Hell.* 4.8.18–19, *Ages.* 5, *Hell.* 5.4.56–7, 6.1.16. The description of Iason is found in the speech of the admittedly partial Poludamas of Pharsalos, possibly Xenophon's informant on Thessalian affairs (cf. Cawkwell, 1979, p. 26). The important point here is the probability (based on Xenophon's laudatory introduction—*Hell.* 6.1.2–3) that the historian would have endorsed Poludamas' judgement. He himself makes a similar comment about Diphridas, Thibron's successor in Asia (*Hell.* 4.8.22). For a survey of homosexuality in Greek armies generally, see Ogden (1996).

¹⁹ *Mem.* 1.5.1, 1.5.4, 1.5.6. For the general argument, compare Foucault (n. 2), esp. Part 1.3. On the potential danger of wasting money on *παιδικά*, see *Mem.* 1.2.21–3. For corruption of the young, see *Mem.* 1.2.1.

²⁰ *Mem.* 4.5.1–3. Cf. *Mem.* 2.1.3.

²¹ *Mem.* 4.2.35.

with some emphasis, 'I too bear witness to it' (*Mem.* 1.2.21–3). In regard to love, such men are described (by Xenophon) as οἱ εἰς ἔρωτας ἐγκυλισθέντες, ['those who wallow in with love affairs']²² and Sokrates' way of dealing with them is illustrated in the incident of Kritias and Euthudemos. Sokrates, it will be remembered, rebuked Kritias for approaching his παιδικά, Euthudemos, like a piglet scratching itself against a stone.²³ A number of factors however, in addition to Kritias' desire to enjoy physical intimacy with Euthudemos, may be thought to have contributed to a sharpening of Sokrates' criticism. In the first place, as paragraph 30 makes clear, the incident took place in public, though a degree of privacy for sex was usually thought desirable.²⁴ Equally open to criticism in Sokrates' view was Kritias' behaviour in abasing himself before his παιδικά, which displayed a slavish attitude not befitting a free man. Finally, the narrative implies that Kritias' purpose was confined to sex. Though he is said to 'love' (ἐρᾶν) Euthudemos, his passion seems to be limited to that of one who was 'attempting' (πειρῶντα) to use the boy physically [like those who harvest sex from bodies].²⁵ These factors would also explain why Xenophon (who, as we shall see, does not share Sokrates' outright rejection of all homosexual copulation) also condemned Kritias' action. For such condemnation seems clearly implied in Xenophon's introduction to the incident, where the word 'misbehaving' is naturally taken as reflecting Xenophon's own as well as his mentor's judgement.²⁶

One reason for reporting the Kritias incident at this point is to demonstrate how in Xenophon's view Kritias (and also Alkibiades) were restrained by Sokrates and deteriorated when they parted company with him.²⁷ This is not simply a matter of private morality, but

²² *Mem.* 1.2.22. For the language, compare Sokrates' words (during the discussion of military pederasty) about Pausanias, as 'τῶν ἀκρασίᾳ ἐγκαλινδουμένων [defending those who are wallowing in lack of control]' (*Symp.* 8.32).

²³ *Mem.* 1.2.29–31. For the imagery, cf. Plato, *Gorgias* 494c–e, on which see Winkler (1990a), 53.

²⁴ For privacy and sex, see Halperin (1990), 91 and 182, n. 28.

²⁵ For πειράω (attempting) sexual seduction, compare Hipparkhos' attempts on Harmodios' honour, Thuc. 6.54.3 and 4 (two separate occasions). Cf. also Xen. *Hiero* 11.11.

²⁶ *Mem.* 1.2.29: 'But even if he had not himself done anything bad, if he praised them when he saw them misbehaving, he would be rightly blamed.'

²⁷ *Mem.* 1.2.24.

reveals ἐγκράτεια as crucial for political leadership. Xenophon not only claims that Sokrates' public humiliation of Kritias explains the latter's hostility to the philosopher when he came to power as one of the Thirty Tyrants: but we are also, I think, invited to infer that Kritias's ἀκρασία ['lack of control'] in sexual matters (aggravated, no doubt by the bad company he had kept in Thessaly) was symptomatic of one who, when deprived of Sokrates' restraining influence, could perpetrate the atrocities of the Thirty.²⁸

At the beginning of Book 2 of the *Memorabilia*, Sokrates, in conversation with the philosopher Aristippos (an apolitical hedonist), raises the question, what kind of young man is fit to be entrusted with government?²⁹ The argument ranges widely, but insofar as it concerns the control of sexual appetite, it proceeds from assumptions very different from those we are accustomed to make. There is no discussion of the 'morality' or otherwise of sexual acts in whatever context. Instead, Sokrates concentrates on the duty to participate in public life and rebuts Aristippos' suggestion that a man may honourably decline to play this role. From this perspective, the control of sexual desire is advocated simply with a view to ensuring that a man is deflected from doing his public duty.³⁰ The dialogue with Aristippos prepares the way for the discussion of virtue embodied in the fable of Herakles' Choice, attributed to Prodikos, which Xenophon now reproduces, and which develops further the theme of self-discipline as a requirement for proper participation in public life.³¹

²⁸ Davidson (1997), ch. 9 has recently analysed the link between physical self-indulgence in matters of food and sex and the practice of tyranny in politics.

²⁹ *Mem.* 2.1.1–20. The nature of the elder Aristippos' teaching is obscure: cf. Guthrie (1971), 170–1. It would be interesting, however, if he had, as Diogenes Laertius avers, formulated the principle, 'it is best to conquer and not be defeated by the desires, not to avoid them'. In formal terms, at least, this is close to what I believe Xenophon's position to have been. (DL 2.75: cf. Foucault (1985), 70.) The discussion here touches on the broader philosophical question of hedonism. Tarrant (1994) 124 has recently suggested that the formula 'mastery not abstention' reflects the moderating influence of Sokrates' teaching on Aristippos, who may originally have advocated a more extreme hedonism: See also Tarrant's discussion of 'moderate hedonism' in Xenophon's presentation of Sokrates (121 ff.).

For the importance of political involvement in the discussion with Aristippos, and the role of self-control in this sphere, cf. O'Connor (1994) 159–63: 'Aristippos' indifference to politics rather than his hedonism is Sokrates' primary target' (p. 160).

³⁰ *Mem.* 2.1.3. Love for a woman can be equally distracting—*Cyrop.* 5.1.8.

³¹ *Mem.* 2.1.21–34.

Xenophon himself, in his introductory sentence to the second book of the *Memorabilia*, presents the Sokratic teaching which follows, first in dialogue with Aristippos and then in the fable of Prodikos, as an ideal to be followed. It is thus that (according to Xenophon) Sokrates encouraged his associates to practice self-discipline in respect of all bodily appetites. It is all with a view to achieving great things in public affairs, an argument which reaches its most eloquent expression in the final discourse in the *Symposium*. Kallias is exhorted to practise virtue in the city's service, and there can be little doubt that for Sokrates this requires keeping his relationship with Autolukos on a purely non-physical plane.

The question of total abstinence, however, has hardly been raised in the passages so far reviewed. In the case of food and drink it would be a recipe for suicide, as the down-to-earth Aristippos points out.³² The test here, therefore, is whether at any given time bodily needs demand reasonable satisfaction, and one recalls the words of Virtue in the fable of Herakles' Choice, where she berates Vice for artificially stimulating appetites (for food, sex, and sleep) when there is no need.³³ A similar test can be applied to sexual indulgence, but it is obviously too simple to transfer the regimen appropriate to food and drink to sex without more ado. Life can survive celibacy, and there are a number of passages where Xenophon represents Sokrates as advocating total abstinence from sexual relations with boys. The simplest and clearest statement is at *Mem.* 1.3.8: 'he recommended energetic avoidance of sex with beautiful boys (τῶν καλῶν).'³⁴

³² *Mem.* 2.1.1.

³³ *Mem.* 2.1.30. The strictures against male love here are, I believe, restricted to anal intercourse between adult males, cf. Hindley (1994), 349. Cf. also *Mem.* 1.3.5–6.

³⁴ Καλῶν ('beautiful' i.e. boys) here must surely be masculine. Not only is it picked up by τοιούτων in the following line, but the whole ensuing discussion revolves around boys, and its conclusion (§13) generalizes the message in explicitly masculine terms 'whenever one sees a beautiful boy'. Given the context, one must also allow for the influence of the καλός-inscriptions on vases: of Robinson and Fluck (1934) for their list of 283 'love-names' (give or take one or two of doubtful gender) only about 34 (12 per cent) are female.

For the sentiment, cf. *Mem.* 2.6.32, 4.2.35, *Symp.* 4.54. The 'appeasing appetite' argument is applied heterosexually to Antisthenes (*Symp.* 4.38), but Sokrates nowhere, I think, contemplates celibacy as total abstinence from women. Indeed, as a married man and a father he could hardly do so. But heterosexual intercourse may be justified more for its role in the procreation of children and the raising of a family than for its pleasure (*Mem.* 2.2.4).

Sokrates' own practice is summarized later in the same chapter: ['he himself had clearly prepared himself in this so as to more easily avoid the fairest and most lovely than others avoid the ugliest and most unlovely'].³⁵ It is also to be noted that in Virtue's speech in the Fable of Herakles, at the place where one might expect a positive appraisal of honourable boy-love, one in fact finds Virtue claiming to be 'an excellent partner in friendship'.³⁶ It is of course given to Sokrates to narrate the fable, and the sentiment here is a succinct summary of the thrust of Sokrates' speech in the *Symposium*, exhorting Kallias to develop a wholly non-physical love towards Autolukos. This is the same Sokrates that we find in the famous anecdote of Alkibiades' unsuccessful attempt at seduction, and there can, I imagine, be little dissent from Sir Kenneth Dover's conclusion that the Sokrates of both Xenophon and Plato condemns homosexual copulation.³⁷

Did, then, Xenophon himself, with all his veneration for Sokrates, accept this ban on physical intimacy between homosexual lovers? Key passages are the discussions with and about Kritoboulos in the *Memorabilia* and the *Symposium*. But by way of background it is worth recalling aspects of Xenophon's own experience and knowledge which must have helped form his judgement.

Xenophon's emergence as a general after the battle of Cunaxa and the death of Klearkhos indicates considerable powers of leadership in a perilous situation, and it is natural to assume that this experience helped shape his concern with leadership in his later historical writing. Certainly there are examples in the *Anabasis* of his exhibiting the virtues of physical self-discipline which he was later to advocate.³⁸ Did he also discern, in some of his contemporaries, a growth of indiscipline in personal attitudes which he thought required to be challenged by the succession of sermons in the *Memorabilia*? He certainly allows Perikles, son of the great statesman, to reflect pessimistically on the decline of Athens,³⁹ and it is the quest for the

³⁵ *Mem.* 1.3.14. Cf. also *Mem.* 4.1.2.

³⁶ *Mem.* 2.1.32.

³⁷ Plato, *Symposium* 217–19. Dover (1978), p. 160. Cf. Guthrie (1971), 70–8.

³⁸ *Anab.* 3.4.46–9, 4.4.12–13.

³⁹ *Mem.* 3.5.15. Cf. Cantarella (1992), 64. But the evidence suggests to me that Xenophon's attitude to boy-love was far more complex than Cantarella allows.

qualities needed for political and military leadership (with a heavy emphasis on self-control) which informs much of the *Memorabilia*.⁴⁰

However, while the perils of uncontrolled desire on the part of a military commander were apparent, *ἔρως* could also inspire loyalty, devotion, and heroism. One recalls the *παιδικά* of the Spartan general Anaxibios, who stood by his *ἐραστής* as he fought to the death;⁴¹ or the devotion of the Greek soldier, Pleisthenes, to the captive (and effectively orphaned) son of the Armenian village headman whom he took home with him as his lover, and 'treated him as the most faithful' of companions;⁴² or the valour displayed by Episthenes, to whom reference has already been made, in association with his band of beautiful youths.

The most notable and extended of Xenophon's pederastic narratives is that of the affair between Arkhidamos, son of King Agesilaos of Sparta, and Kleonumos, son of Sphodrias. The sentiment that inspired it lasted for at least seven years, from Sphodrias' luckless raid on Attica (378 BC) to the death of Kleonumos defending his king on the field of Leuktra in 371 BC. The liaison between two such eminent families must have been a very public affair. According to Xenophon, it gave rise to a disreputable deal arranged by Arkhidamos with his father, on behalf of Sphodrias, his *παιδικά*'s father, whereby Sphodrias was acquitted (quite wrongfully in Xenophon's view) of treason. But the relationship between the two young men seems to have been an honourable one. Xenophon says of Kleonumos that he declared that he would never besmirch Arkhidamos' honour, and that 'while he lived, all his actions were those of a good and noble Spartan. His death caused Arkhidamos terrible pain; but he had kept his promise; he had brought him honour and not shame.'⁴³

We can only guess at what complexities lie behind the brief narrative of Agesilaos' relationship with the son of the Persian satrap

⁴⁰ See above pp. 77–8 and n. 18.

⁴¹ *Hell.* 4.8.38–9.

⁴² *Anab.* 4.6.1–3.

⁴³ *Hell.* 5.4.25–33 and 6.4.13–14. The translation cited is that of Warner. The liaison can be considered independently of the role it may have played in securing Sphodrias' acquittal. The exact age of the lovers is not known. Xenophon describes Kleonumos as just out of puberty at the time of the Sphodrias affair (378 BC). Cartledge, in his *Chronological Table* (1987), suggests that Arkhidamos may already have been born when Agesilaos ascended the throne in 400 BC.

Pharnabazos and Parapita. 'Guest-friendship' was established between them, and Agesilaos seems to have followed the young man's career. Later, the king used his influence to get the Persian's Athenian *παιδικά* admitted to the boy's race at Olympia.⁴⁴ The friendship pact may have had political significance, but the pendent anecdote of the Athenian *παιδικά* seems to owe its place to the favourable light which, in Xenophon's view, it sheds on Agesilaos' loyalty to his friends.

The evidence so far shows a number of love relationships between men which seem to meet with Xenophon's approval. The historian is no tabloid reporter, hot in the pursuit of titillating details, but it would be surprising if these relationships had not found physical expression. Such liaisons (short of anal penetration, which is implicitly condemned at *Mem.* 2.1.30⁴⁵) do not attract condemnation on Xenophon's part unless they involve actual or risked betrayals of trust. Indeed, there is some slight evidence to support the speculation that (as might be expected of an Athenian of his background) Xenophon himself had found a male lover during his campaigning in Asia Minor. Xenophon's response to Kritoboulos' kiss (discussed below) as well as his obvious interest in retailing love-stories about *παιδικά* suggest that he had an eye for a handsome youth, and a passage in the *Anabasis* shows that soldiers might be expected to take their boys or women along with them. For when it was decided that the baggage train must be reduced by leaving behind recently taken prisoners of war, a blind eye might be turned if a soldier was in love with a good-looking boy or woman. At a later point, in defending his exercise of authority, Xenophon includes the claim that he never quarrelled with a soldier over his *παιδικά*.⁴⁶ While the sentence does not assert that Xenophon had a *παιδικά*, it clearly implies that it would have caused no surprise had there been such a boy for whom he might have been expected to fight. It may also be noted (though the point is not so relevant to the discussion in Greek eyes as in ours) that Xenophon was probably not yet married at the time, and might

⁴⁴ *Hell.* 4.1.39. Cf. Herman (1987), 58 f. On the diplomatic overtones of this story, cf. Cartledge (1987), 193.

⁴⁵ Cf. Hindley (1994), 349.

⁴⁶ *Anab.* 4.1.12–14, 5.8.4.

well be expected to have sought the comfort of a male lover as did some of his companions on the Long March.⁴⁷

It is against this background that we must question the role of the 'boy' (*παῖς*) whom Xenophon brought with him to the court of Seuthes.⁴⁸ The existence of this young man is known because of Xenophon's embarrassment at having no suitable gift for Seuthes, his host. He had, he records, brought nothing with him from Parion except his 'boy' and a few provisions. Unfortunately the ambiguity of the term here can hardly be resolved. When later in the banquet another guest presents a '*παῖς*', the meaning seems to be 'slave'. But Xenophon does not make a present of his 'boy' to Seuthes, and at *Lac. Pol.* 2.12–13, as at *Anab.* 4.1.14, he clearly treats *παῖς* as equivalent to *παιδικά*. Perhaps on active service the roles of slave, batman, lover, coalesced. The traces of pederastic interest in this record are too slight to yield a firm conclusion, but it is at least possible, and even likely, given the *mores* of the time, that Xenophon, in common with many of his men, had found a young male companion to share the rigours of campaigning.⁴⁹

However, the *Memorabilia* provides clearer evidence of Xenophon's acceptance of love relationships between men, and his divergence from Sokrates' views on their means of expression. I refer to the episode of Kritoboulos' kiss.⁵⁰ Sokrates, it will be remembered, came to know that Kritoboulos had kissed Alkibiades' handsome son. The discovery prompts the philosopher to utter an unpromising warning (though cast in humorous vein) about the dangers of such conduct. It is worse, he says, than the bite of a poisonous spider, rendering the victim a slave to his passions, and even driving him to madness. The humour is characteristic of Xenophon's (and, often, Sokrates') relaxed and informal style in dealing with serious

⁴⁷ The circumstances of Xenophon's marriage are obscure. Delebecque (1957), 124 dates it to 399 or 398; Anderson (1974), 162 places it some time after 399 BC.

⁴⁸ *Anab.* 7.3.20.

⁴⁹ In the light of this conclusion we may look with fresh eyes on the incident of the trumpeter Silanos (*Anab.* 7.4.16). Doubtless he struck fear into the enemy with his trumpeting. But why is this minor figure given such prominence—even to the mention of his age, when, at eighteen, he was pre-eminently 'lovely'? Is this another young man who caught Xenophon's eye?

⁵⁰ *Mem.* 1.3.8–15.

matters.⁵¹ But the thought is in line with Sokrates' utterances on self-control, and his ban on homosexual copulation,⁵² to which (it is implied) the first kiss will inevitably lead. Much more interesting is Xenophon's own contribution to the discussion.

This conversation is the only occasion in the *Memorabilia* at which Xenophon claims to have been present not merely as a reporter but as a participant. It is introduced by reference to Sokrates' teaching (already noted) that one should resolutely abstain from sex with beautiful youths.⁵³ But the effect of Xenophon's contribution is to dissociate him from Sokrates' rigorist views. For when Sokrates suggests that Kritoboulos, by his rash act, has belied his character as a sober and prudent man and become instead 'foolish and reckless', Xenophon replies that he might well take a similar risk himself. The historian, it seems, shares with his male contemporaries that susceptibility to ephebic beauty, which Sokrates warns against.⁵⁴ In the face of Sokrates' comparison with the fateful spiders' bite, he protests the innocuous character of the lovers' kiss. Indeed, his attitude is not so very far from Kritoboulos' light-hearted approach to kissing in a subsequent exchange with Sokrates.⁵⁵ It also accords with the evidence already assembled for Xenophon's positive attitude to male love.

Against this background, how are we to interpret the conclusion to the episode? Following Sokrates' advice to Kritoboulos to go away for a year, Xenophon continues with a summary of Sokrates' teaching on sexual matters which departs significantly from the advocacy of total abstinence found in *Mem.* 1.3.8:

⁵¹ Gray (1989) 76–7 draws attention to this characteristic of Xenophon's style, both in his historical writing and his more philosophical works. Cf. O. Gigon (1953) 110. Further examples of Xenophon's sense of humour are collected in Bassett (1917), 565–74.

⁵² See pp. 80–1 above and n. 37.

⁵³ *Mem.* 1.3.8. Cf. above p. 80 and n. 34.

⁵⁴ Cf. *Symp.* 4.25 where (of a kiss) Sokrates says, 'there is no fiercer fuel than desire'. The incident of Sokrates nudging Kritoboulos, reported by Kharmides at *Symp.* 4.27, suggests that Sokrates shares the susceptibility, but still he warns against it: the encounter with Kritoboulos, he says, was like a wild beast's bite and gave him a sore shoulder for a week.

⁵⁵ *Mem.* 2.6.32.

οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἀφροδισιάζειν τοὺς μὴ ἀσφαλῶς ἔχοντας πρὸς ἀφροδίσεια ᾧετο
 χρῆναι τοιαῦτα, οἷα μὴ πάνυ μὲν δεομένου τοῦ σώματος οὐκ ἂν προσδέξαιτο ἡ
 ψυχὴ, δεομένου δὲ οὐκ ἂν πράγματα παρέχοι.⁵⁶

In essentials following Marchant's text, I would translate:

In this way, then, he thought that those who find their sexual impulses difficult to control should engage sexually [only] in such activities as the mind would not condone unless an urgent bodily need arose, and such as, once the need was there, would not cause trouble.

The phrase, 'unless an urgent bodily need arose', seems to conflate two thoughts: a definition of the *kind* of activity (that which arises from the body's need) and the *timing* (when that need becomes urgent for actions which otherwise the mind would not condone).

The passage (whose grammatical construction is tortuous) seems intended to allow a concession to human weakness similar to that developed in regard to the dangers of overindulgence in food and drink (*Mem.* 1.3.6). Sokrates is represented as teaching that those who have difficulty in controlling their sexual drive may indulge when two conditions are fulfilled: (a) when the bodily urge is overpowering;⁵⁷ (b) when to indulge 'would cause no trouble'. To illuminate the latter phrase 'would cause no trouble' Gigon refers to the avoidance of the risks of adultery recognized elsewhere in the *Memorabilia* (2.1.5), and finds parallels to the abstinence from sexual indulgence among anecdotes told of the philosophers by Diogenes Laertius and others.⁵⁸ They all concern the charms of women, and Gigon accordingly argues that §14 is concerned with heterosexual relationships. If so, the transition is abrupt, and it seems more likely that the section either continues the homosexual theme or covers both homosexual and heterosexual ἔρως, following the Greek tendency to minimize the difference between the two where sex is concerned.⁵⁹ In either case, the phrase 'not causing trouble' could readily be interpreted by reference to *Memorabilia* 2.6.22, where

⁵⁶ *Mem.* 1.3.14. The text is that of Marchant's second edition (OCT, 1921), omitting πρὸς before τοιαῦτα.

⁵⁷ For δέομαι with reference to the sexual urge, cf. *Mem.* 2.1.30, *Symp.* 4.38, 4.15, *Hiero* 1.33.

⁵⁸ Gigon (1953), 117.

⁵⁹ Cf. Dover (1978), 63–5.

self-control in sexual matters is urged in order to avoid hurting those who should not be hurt (see below, pp. 89–90).

But whether the section continues the homosexual theme of the conversation about Kritoboulos or moves to heterosexual (and presumably extra-marital) relationships, it is difficult to understand the link with its context seemingly conveyed by the words ‘in this way’ οὕτω δῆ. Οὕτω commonly refers to what precedes, and must surely do so here. If δῆ is then taken as emphatic,⁶⁰ it serves only to emphasize the disjunction with what has gone before. ‘In this way’ is precisely what the following words fail to show; for they allow occasional indulgence which Sokrates has just warned against. Only by a perversely excessive reliance on irony could one argue that ‘in this way’ means ‘as urged upon Xenophon’—i.e. not at all. More probably, οὕτω δῆ is connective.⁶¹ But even on this view, the point of comparison between the warning to Xenophon and the advice to those who ‘find their sexual impulses difficult to control’⁶² remains obscure. It may base itself on the distinction between desire which is inflamed by the flirtatious kiss (to be avoided) and bodily need, which arises without such encouragement. Only in the latter case, when the desire becomes irresistible, may the ‘mind’ (or ‘soul’) (ψυχή) condone its physical expression. But such a view, intelligible in itself, is difficult to reconcile with the fact that in *Memorabilia* 1.3.8, and even more forcibly in the long exhortation to Kallias in *Symposium* 8, Sokrates unconditionally rules out any form of bodily love in relations with boys.

This discrepancy (coupled with the absence of any evidence for dislocation in the transmission of the text) suggests the hypothesis that Xenophon has here grafted in a statement by Sokrates from another (possibly heterosexual) context, in order to support the caveat that he had himself entered in condoning Kritoboulos’

⁶⁰ Denniston (1950; repr. Bristol, 1996), p. 209, § (x).

⁶¹ Under this heading, Denniston alludes to the commonness of such openings to sentences as οὕτω δῆ, ἐνταῦθα δῆ (1950) 236.

⁶² One might also ask whether this phrase implies that there is another class of men (and the whole discussion is carried on from a male perspective)—those who are safe in respect of sex? If so, are they totally abstinent (at least outside marriage), or are they men who, in the phrase attributed to Aristippos, are able to master pleasures without abstaining from them? (See n. 29 above.)

kiss.⁶³ Of course, the limited character of the concession allowed in *Memorabilia* 1.3.14 falls short of the positive view of homosexual ἔρως which Xenophon puts into the mouth of Kritoboulos in the *Symposium*. But it goes some way to soften the stark contrast between Sokrates' teaching on celibacy and (if the argument of this essay so far is correct) Xenophon's own attitude to pederasty.

One other point to arise from this passage is the role given to ψυχή, which Tredennick and Waterfield here and elsewhere translate as 'mind'. In this text, as in an earlier discussion of dietary self-discipline,⁶⁴ the decision on what is allowable or not rests with the ψυχή. There is also the recurrent contrast between love of body and love of ψυχή. The latter term had already by the time of Xenophon developed a complex history, and its significance in relation to Socratic thought is discussed by Guthrie.⁶⁵ Of Xenophon's usage, one may say that, while the notion of the 'invisible part of man' is not excluded,⁶⁶ the ψυχή is thought of largely in functional terms: it is the seat of intelligence, judgement, thought, that which 'rules in us, the organ of virtue or vice'.⁶⁷ When Sokrates is said to 'love the soul', what he loves are not insubstantial wraiths, but 'people whose minds dispose them to virtue'.⁶⁸ The ψυχή is that which orders a person's life as a whole, and it may cover both the directing mind and the personality which results. It is for the ψυχή to judge (amongst other things) how far bodily desire for boys may be accepted. While for Sokrates the answer may be 'never', the analysis allows others such as Xenophon to respect a ψυχή which judges otherwise.⁶⁹ In the latter case the contrast between love of body and love of soul may well consist, not in a simple dichotomy between a physical and a non-physical love, but

⁶³ One may compare the concession to overmastering desire acknowledged in Plato, *Phaedrus* 256.

⁶⁴ *Mem.* 1.2.4.

⁶⁵ Guthrie (1971), 147–64.

⁶⁶ *Mem.* 1.4.9, 3.10.3, 4.3.14, 1.2.53; *Cyrop.* 8.7.17.

⁶⁷ *Mem.* 1.2.53, 1.4.13, 1.4.17 (in this section, 'intellect' νοῦς and ψυχή are equivalent), 4.3.14, 3.11.10. For ψυχή as the seat of virtue, see *Mem.* 1.2.19, 1.2.23, 2.6.30, 4.1.2, 4.8.1.

⁶⁸ *Mem.* 4.1.2. Conversely, it is possible to be 'wretched in mind/soul': cf. *Oec.* 6.16.

⁶⁹ This is essentially the principle of self-regulation which Foucault develops under the heading 'Chrésis' (n. 2, part 1, ch. 2), though it was no doubt exercised within an overall understanding of 'custom and law'.

between a desire which is exclusively physical, and a love directed by the mind (*ψυχῇ*) which embraces both friendship and its physical expression.

To sum up, the passage (*Mem.* 1.3.8–15) as a whole shows that

- (a) Xenophon acknowledges homosexual desire in himself (a not surprising fact, but a not unimportant one either).
- (b) He challenges Sokrates' rigorist view on grounds of common sense.
- (c) He acknowledges circumstances (though circumscribed) in which the physical expression of sex with boys may be accepted by the mind without harmful consequences. It is for the individual 'mind' to regulate these matters.
- (d) While Sokrates' practice of abstinence is to be admired, it may be questioned whether this rule is to be made universal, since even the master allowed some relaxation.

The division over sexual ethics between Sokrates and Xenophon which we see emerging is dramatized here and elsewhere around the character of Kritoboulos. He is presented, not as the porcine (and potentially tyrannical) Kritias, but as one who is (to the average observer) 'sensible and cautious'.⁷⁰ Despite Sokrates' rebuke over his delight in kissing a charming ephebe, he can later in the *Memorabilia* engage in a serious discussion with the philosopher about civic virtue and friendship. He is also Sokrates' interlocutor for the first six chapters of the *Oeconomicus*, where he responsibly explores with the philosopher questions of business and estate management. In both dialogues Kritoboulos shows himself for the most part a willing pupil of Sokrates. The one point at which he seems to resist Sokrates' teaching is over his associations with young men. In *Memorabilia* 2.6.32 the jovial banter about kissing beautiful ephebes is repeated, with no sign of recantation on Kritoboulos' part, despite Sokrates' attempts to move him away from assuming that one can catch the physically beautiful and the morally virtuous in the same net of friendship. And in the *Oeconomicus* (where Kritoboulos is depicted as already married) Sokrates chides him as one who 'παιδικοῖς

⁷⁰ *Mem* 1.3.9.

πράγμασι [gives his attention to boyish matters].⁷¹ It should, however, be noted that for Sokrates the ground of criticism is the waste of time and money involved in pederasty, rather than, in our sense, the ‘immorality’ of such activities. As for Kritoboulos himself, he claims, after listening to Sokrates’ advocacy of ἐγκράτεια, to have attained reasonable success in applying this teaching to his personal life.⁷²

The general picture of Kritoboulos as a lover of young men seems to justify us in taking the masculine genders in the Kritoboulos texts mentioned as referring to beautiful men rather than beautiful people in general. More doubt attaches to one remaining passage, where the following words, attributed to Sokrates, are embedded in a discussion between Sokrates and Kritoboulos, and relate to the καλοὶ καγαθοί [‘good and true gentlemen’] who develop friendship to put a brake on their mutual animosities and conflicting ambitions:

[On account of their virtue they choose to have moderate measures without trouble rather than be masters of everything through fighting, and they have the power to share food and drink without pain though they hunger and thirst and, though taking delight in the love of the fair, to endure so that they do not harm those they should not harm]. *Mem.* 2.6.22

The surrounding conversation ranges across the field of friendship and how to conduct one’s affairs decently, in a way which might seem to be consistent with an advocacy of sexual abstinence (outside marriage). But the reference to sex arises out of a variant of that overworked theme, control over bodily appetites, where the phrase ‘taking delight in the love’ indicates actual participation in sexual pleasure.⁷³ The point is, once again, self-restraint, not

⁷¹ *Oec.* 2.7. Given the character of Kritoboulos as revealed elsewhere, παιδικὰ πράγματα must surely refer to the objects of desire: ‘minions’ (Marchant) rather than ‘childish pursuits’ (Waterfield). For Kritoboulos’ marriage, see *Oec.* 3.13 and *Symp.* 2.3.

⁷² *Oec.* 2.1 ‘I seem to find on self-examination that I am reasonably in control of such things’.

⁷³ The wider context concerns the antidote to ‘taking advantage’—what one can properly take for oneself. The reference to sex parallels the immediately preceding comment on moderate participation in food and drink, with κοινωνεῖν meaning ‘take a share of’ (LSJ), rather than ‘give a share of’ (as Marchant and Tredennick/Waterfield). The latter, as part of a more general ‘mutual assistance’ (ἐπαρκεῖν ἀλλήλοις) only arises in §23, while §22 concerns the familiar theme of moderation in food and drink, and self-control in matters of sex. Cf. *Mem.* 1.3.14.

abstinence.⁷⁴ The immediate context is concerned with what the individual can fairly take (whether of food, drink, or sex) and what is 'fair' in regard to sexual pleasure is defined in the qualification 'so that they do not harm those they should not harm'. The passage would then mean 'exercise self-control in taking sexual pleasure with people in the bloom of youth, so as not to harm those whom one should not harm'. What is not clear, however, in this isolated mention of sexual relations, is the gender of the objects of desire. Does the good man avoid adultery (which would harm a husband's—and fellow citizen's—rights) and go for female prostitution instead (with equal concern, we would hope, for the woman involved)? Or does he cultivate his παιδικά with what would be regarded as an honourable love, which would bring no harm to the beloved? Perhaps both forms of sexual engagement are envisaged, though here again the occurrence of the phrases in a 'Kritoboulos context' suggests a preference for the male interpretation. Either way, the passage advocates a form of moderation and respect for others in indulging sexual desire that is akin to *Mem.* 1.3.14.⁷⁵

Insofar as they include pederasty within their purview, it is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile either *Mem.* 1.3.14 or *Mem.* 2.6.22 as teachings of Sokrates, with the exhortation to abstain from pederastic sex attributed to him elsewhere. I have suggested that *Mem.* 1.3.14 may represent an attempt by Xenophon to moderate the teaching. On the other hand, when, in *Mem.* 2.6.22, the reference to sex appears as tangential to the discussion of rivalry among the καλοὶ καγαθοί, we may understand Sokrates here to be reporting on observed social *mores* rather than formulating his own teaching.

As far as Kritoboulos is concerned, the consistent picture to emerge from the various passages so far discussed is that of a young man who combines a continuing, but (according to his own

⁷⁴ καρτερεῖν ['to endure'] flows from ἐγκράτεια, but does not require the renunciation of pleasure. Cf. the collocation of ἐγκράτεια-καρτερεῖν-ἡδεσθαι at *Mem.* 4.5.9.

⁷⁵ The theme of self-discipline over bodily appetites is set at the head of the whole chapter (*Mem.* 2.6.1). Gigon (1956), 146–7 finds it alien to the subject of contention between good men: but current views on the risk of pederasty infringing citizen status throw new light on this contention. In regard to pederasty, at least, the moderation advocated in this text may have an important bearing on the mutual adjustments between good men in society.

estimation) reasonably self-disciplined, love of pleasure, with a serious interest in philosophy and public affairs. He had, however, so far as we know, no public persona, nor any reputation as a philosopher. He might therefore be deemed to be merely a representative of views widely accepted in his social circle. But when the only personal intervention by Xenophon in the *Memorabilia* (over Kritoboulos' kiss) so clearly aligns the historian with the latter, it is not unreasonable to assume that on questions of pederasty, Xenophon is closer to Kritoboulos than to Sokrates. It would follow that in seeking Xenophon's views we should give more attention than has been customary to Kritoboulos' speech in the *Symposium*, a speech which occupies a position in Xenophon's dialogue somewhat similar to that of Pausanias in the *Symposium* of Plato.⁷⁶

It will be recalled that the topic for discussion, introduced by Kallias, is the quality upon which each speaker particularly prides himself. For Kritoboulos, this is his beauty. With a bantering irony to match that of the other speakers, he claims that it is through this quality that he can get what he requires from others without lifting a finger. Kritoboulos infers this conclusion from the assumption that other people's attitudes to him, as a handsome man (and putative 'beloved' ἐρώμενος) will mirror his own reaction to the beauty of his παιδικά, Kleinias. Following a passionate opening declaration of his love for Kleinias, the central portion of Kritoboulos' speech consists of a sequence of three-pointed sections on the blessings which accrue from beauty:

1. For the παιδικά it gives more reason for boasting than strength/bravery/wisdom.
2. It provides him with money/personal (even menial and laborious) service/protection from danger.
3. The ἐραστής is 'inspired' with corresponding virtues: to be liberal with money/to endure toil/to court glory through danger.

⁷⁶ Xenophon, *Symp.* 4.10–18. Cf. Plato, *Symp* 180c ff. One cannot go quite so far as to say that Kritoboulos is simply Xenophon's mouthpiece, if only because the former's pleasure in spending money on his παιδικά would clearly attract Xenophon's censure (*Mem.* 1.2.22).

Thus far section 3 balances section 2, the virtues inspired in the *ἐραστής* corresponding to the services he performs for the *ἐρώμενος*. Moreover, the thought so far can be illustrated from elsewhere: lavish expenditure on the *παιδικά* is reported in other authors;⁷⁷ the lover's 'enslavement' to the beloved and love's power to inspire the lover to heroism on the battlefield are found in Plato's *Symposium*, in the speeches of Pausanias⁷⁸ and Phaidros⁷⁹ respectively. We need not decide whether here (and in *Symposium* 8.32) Xenophon was echoing or misquoting Plato, or whether, possibly, both were drawing on a more widely current discourse of love.⁸⁰ But for an analysis of Xenophon's own views, it is significant that the list of qualities in section 3 is extended ['moreover'—*καὶ μὴν*⁸¹] to less commonplace ideas. *Ἐρώμενοι*, says Kritoboulos, also inspire their *ἐρασταί* to be ['more modest (*αἰδημονεστέρους*), more self-controlled (*ἐγκρσεστέρους*) because they feel reverence for (*αἰσχύνονται*) what they most desire'].

With this conclusion, the somewhat light-hearted tone of the first part of Kritoboulos' contribution has been dispelled, the point of transition being marked by Kritoboulos' claim that he is better able than Kritias to inspire every kind of virtue. In particular, the introduction of quite new elements, including a reference to the important virtue of *ἐγκράτεια*, requires to be taken seriously. *αἰδήμων* the word used of disciplined Spartan boys at *Lac. Pol.* 2.10 and of the young Kuros in his respect for the elders (*Anab.* 1.9.5), seems at odds with Kritoboulos' flamboyant spending as criticized by Sokrates in *Oec.* 2.5–7. *ἐγκρατής*, referring to the virtue which Xenophon seems sometimes to set above all others, is only

⁷⁷ Cf. Plato, *Symp.* 184a, 185a; Aristophanes, *Wealth* 153–9; Xenophon, *Mem.* 1.2.22; *Anab.* 2.6.6. Cf. Dover (n. 2), pp. 92 f., 107. Such expenditure is criticized by Xenophon, but for Aristotle a proper degree of liberality with money is a virtue (*Nic. Eth.* 4.1, 1119b24 ff.).

⁷⁸ Plato, *Symp.* 183a, 184b. *φιλοπονώτερος* ('more fond of toil') corresponds to the more explicit 'serving as Kleinia's slave' in §14. Enslavement to the *παιδικά* is condemned by Sokrates while it is condoned, if not praised, by Plato's Pausanias.

⁷⁹ Plato, *Symp.* 178d–179b. The principle that the lover may be inspired to valour by the presence of his beloved is accepted by Xenophon at *Cyn.* 12.20, though rejected by Sokrates at *Symp.* 8.32 ff.

⁸⁰ On the complex problems surrounding the relationship between the two dialogues on this subject, see Dover (1965, reprinted 1988).

⁸¹ *καὶ μὴν* as 'progressive', introducing a new point: see Denniston (1950), 351–2.

doubtfully to be applied to the Kritoboulos of the dialogues. But of course the question at issue is not the nature of an historical character, but the ethical conclusion that Xenophon wishes to reach. It is embodied above all in the last three virtues, and, in particular, in the concluding statement on αἰσχύνη. The beauty of the ἐρώμενος will make the ἐραστής modest and self-controlled and the latter will show αἰσχύνη towards those things he most needs. The circumlocution shows a characteristic reticence in mentioning sex when it is the subject of approval rather than condemnation.⁸² But, in the context of a discourse on love, the concept of 'need' is surely to be aligned with *Hiero* 1.33, *Mem.* 1.3.14, and similar passages—the body's need for sex.

But does the ἐραστής show 'shame'—and so not seek bodily consummation of his love, or 'reverence'—approaching sex with the respect accorded to one he loves? Von Erffa has shown how in the course of development from Homer onwards, αἰσχύνομαι came, in some instances, to shed its association with shame, and how (particularly in Thoukudides) it may mean to 'show honour or respect'.⁸³ In Xenophon, αἰσχύνομαι generally refers to shame. In some instances it is ambiguous. But there are clear instances where it means 'show respect for' or 'diffidence towards'. Closest to the context of Kritoboulos' speech is the Median gentleman, who hesitates to approach Kuros for a kiss out of respect for the young prince. There is the general, Proxenos, who shows more deference to his troops than they do to him, and the Thracian, Medosades, who shows no proper respect to the gods or to his ally. Kuros' arrangements for quartering his troops were designed to develop mutual respect among them, and later in the *Cyropaedia* αἰσχυντέον refers to troops who have borne the heat of battle.⁸⁴ These instances lend substantial support to the Tredennick/Waterfield translation of

⁸² Cf. the avoidance of the term 'sexual parts' τὰ αἰδοῖα at *Hiero* 1.4–5, and, for general usage, Dover (1978), 53–4. Also, on this passage, see Foucault (1985), 223: 'the "thing" is designated by the very impossibility of naming it'.

⁸³ von Erffa (1937).

⁸⁴ *Cyrop.* 1.4.27; *Anab.* 2.6.19 (cf. Kharmides' diffidence before the 'lower orders' of the *ekklesia*—*Mem.* 3.7.6); *Anab.* 7.7.9 (cf. *Anab.* 2.5.39); *Cyrop.* 2.1.25, 4.2.40. Cf. also Aiskhines 1.180.

Symposium 4.15: 'because they (the lovers) feel reverence for what they most desire'.

The decisive point is the structure of the argument: it is difficult to believe, in the light not only of this speech but of the pervasive divergence between Kritoboulos and Sokrates over sexual *mores*, that the younger man's eulogy of *ἔρως* should reach its climax in a recommendation of abstinence. But it would be natural for Xenophon, in constructing Kritoboulos' speech, to move from what the scanty evidence suggests may have been a recognized discourse of love to thoughts more distinctively his own about self-control and respect. And it is consonant with all we have so far gleaned about Xenophon's attitudes (and his self-acknowledged sympathy for Kritoboulos) that he might use the speech to express a view midway between Sokrates' advocacy of celibacy (so far as boys are concerned) and the profligacy of those who (like Kritias) are devoted to nothing but their own physical pleasure. For Xenophon, with his emphasis on *ἐγκράτεια*, would condemn the latter as much as would Sokrates. Instead, he advocates a temperate course, in which the self-disciplined man can nonetheless enjoy a positive *ἔρως*, and in which physical consummation is tempered with respect for the beloved, soul and body.⁸⁵

This blend of the physical and the ethical may also provide an underlying logic for the transition to the conclusion of the speech proper: it justifies the well-known principle that the presence of a lover can inspire men to deeds of honour (and so it is foolish, says Kritoboulos, to ignore this factor in appointing generals). A similar conjunction of the dimensions of physical and personal relationships allows society to recognize different forms of 'beauty' as a man grows from childhood to old age.⁸⁶

Reticence over these matters, as Dover has emphasized, inhibits explicit statements of what such physical relationships involve,

⁸⁵ It may well be that adherence to such a view (and the observations that led him to it) underlie Xenophon's sympathy with reported scepticism about the Spartans' observance of the 'law' of Lukourgos which enjoined celibacy in regard to boys—*Lac. Pol.* 2.14.

⁸⁶ Cf. Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1.5.11 (1361b), and the same author's recognition of the transition, which may (though not invariably) occur with the passing of time, from *ἔρως* to *φιλία* in a relationship, *NE* 8.4.1–2 (1157a).

though Aiskhulos comes close to it when he makes Akhilles speak of his reverence for the thighs of Patroklos.⁸⁷ But the concept of honourable love which includes the physical and to which the climax of Kritoboulos' speech points, finds support in the phraseology used by other writers: the 'just desire' *δίκαιος ἔρως* or 'the undamaging desire' *τὸ ἀδιαφθόρως ἐρᾶσθαι* of Aiskhines; the love of Ouranian Aphrodite advocated by Plato's Pausanias, which is 'without insolence' and which is to be practised 'with orderliness and lawfully'; the decency with which the speaker in *Lusias* 3 claims to have treated the youth Theodotos. From Xenophon himself we may recall the description of Kallias' love for Autolukos as 'temperate love' or Pleisthenes' treatment of his Armenian *παιδικά*. In dealing with a culture so different from our own it is difficult to be confident about how far allowance must be made for things obscure to us which the Greeks would have taken for granted. But closer analysis supports the view that a physical relationship is implicit in all these examples.⁸⁸

The fullest exposition of the combination of respect for the beloved with physical love-making is that attributed by Xenophon to Hieron, tyrant of Syracuse. I have already suggested that Kritoboulos may to some extent be regarded as reflecting Xenophon's views. With even more confidence can this be said of Hieron, who was tyrant of Syracuse before Xenophon was born. What Xenophon gives us is an imaginary dialogue, and it is likely that one reason, at least, for the choice of Hieron and Simonides (rather than Sokrates) as protagonists is the fact that the views expressed were not those of the philosopher. That is particularly true in relation to the subject of this article. Moreover, while (as Professor Gray has argued) Simonides is cast in the role of 'Wise Man', in the first part of the dialogue, the author's sympathies are clearly with Hieron, who wins the first exchanges.⁸⁹

⁸⁷ Aiskhulos, frs. 135, 136 (*TrGF*). Cf. Dover (1978), 197–8.

⁸⁸ Aiskhines 1.136–7; Plato, *Symposium* 181c, 182a5 (cf. 184d4); *Lusias* 3.5; Xenophon, *Symp.* 1.10, *Anab.* 4.6.1–3. Dover (n. 2, pp. 42 ff.) takes Aiskhines' 'just love' *δίκαιος ἔρως* as the text for his analysis of the degree of physical intimacy permitted. See also Dover (1980), 95 f. (Pausanias); Hindley (1991), 172 (Pausanias and *Lusias* 3); above, pp. 76–7 (Autolukos). Also cf. Winkler (1990a) n. 23, 53–4 on the distinction between approved pederasty and the life of the *κύναιδος*, the pathic.

⁸⁹ Cf. Gray (1986), 115–23 at 117. Aalders (1953), 213–14. Pederasty is the subject of *Hiero* 1.29–38.

One could wish that the relative dating of Xenophon's works was more firmly established, but it is widely thought that the *Hiero* is a comparatively late work, and the probability is that it was written after the *Symposium*.⁹⁰ If so, one could well argue that its brief discussion of pederasty represents a development of aspects of the Xenophontic thought earlier expressed in the Kritoboulos speech. This relative dating also seems (as I argue below) to provide a plausible explanation for the relationship between the theories of *ἔρως* attributed respectively to Sokrates and to Hieron.

The brief discussion in the *Hiero* begins by placing sex alongside the other bodily appetites, and Simonides asserts that the prospect of enjoying sex may well be what motivates a man to seek absolute power. After an analysis of this thought in respect of marriage, the discussion moves to sex with boys. But Hieron makes it immediately clear that he is not interested in 'mere' sex, which is no more than the satisfaction of physical appetite. He wants 'sex with desire' which (as 'everyone knows') yields immeasurably greater pleasure. The need for *ἔρως* (in the sense of passionate desire for another) is a variant of the general argument that sensual pleasure is keenest where it is stimulated by desire (such as hunger or thirst) for something not immediately available. This psychological perception creates special difficulty for the tyrant, who need never be in want. He has the power to force his will upon an unwilling boy, but in so doing he will inhibit the pleasure he most desires. For while his body 'needs' what Dai-lochos can give him, he also wants it to be 'freely given [with friendship from one who is willing]'—*μετὰ φιλίας καὶ παρὰ βουλομένου*. The reference to 'need' (*ὧν δέονται*) links this passage with the Kritoboulos speech,⁹¹ as does the attitude which Hieron recognizes he must adopt. He will not seek pleasure by force (a kind

⁹⁰ According to Dover (1965, reprinted 1988), Xenophon's *Symp.* was written after the formation of the Sacred Band at Thebes in 378, and Plato's work of the same title, before that date. There also seems some force in the argument that the reference to Spartan leadership (Xenophon, *Symp.* 8.39) implies a date before Leuktra (371): see reference to Dornseif at Dover (1965 reprinted 1988), 97, n. 41. The arguments linking *Hiero* with political developments in Syracuse and political assassinations in the ruling house at Pherae seem persuasive, yielding, according to Hatzfeld (1946), 54–70, a date of 360–355 BC; see also Delebecque (1957) who dates *Hiero* to 358–357 BC.

⁹¹ *Symp.* 4.15.

of robbery), but will seek only such favours as the παιδικά freely wills to give. This is to exercise that respect for his lover that Kritoboulos commends. It manifests the attitude previously noted in the *Memorabilia*, where the self-controlled lover will avoid hurting (or grieving) the beloved.⁹² More generally, as Sokrates elsewhere argues in regard to the senses, self-control and not lack of control actually brings the greater pleasure.⁹³

It is along these lines that Xenophon reconciles the need for self-control and the desire for sexual gratification. And the pleasure associated with the latter is suggested by the words ἡδύς, ἡδομαι. Of course these words are used very widely, often in a quite weak sense, 'pleasant'. But in some instances the context clearly requires at least an awareness that the gratification has a sexual basis.⁹⁴ So here, when Hieron speaks of ἔρωσ being required for τὰ ἡδίστα ἀφροδίσια ['the sweetest pleasures'], the repeated use of ἡδιστος subsequently to describe the παιδικάς' response by word and gesture⁹⁵ indicates the erotic content of such flirtatious behaviour.

But if my interpretations of the *Hiero* and the Kritoboulos passages are correct, it becomes clear that broadly three approaches to the love of boys appear in Xenophon's writings. First is the more or less amoral concentration on physical gratification whether enthusiastically pursued (as in the case of Kritias) or regarded as an irritant to be relieved as expeditiously as possible (as with Antisthenes or the concessionary indulgence recognized at *Memorabilia* 1.3.14). This is the sphere of sex pure and simple. Then there is the 'way of moderation' (implicit in the attitudes of Kritoboulos and Hieron) which combines the love of body with affection and respect for the mind or personality. Finally, there is

⁹² *Mem.* 2.6.22. This is important evidence for the Greek recognition of a distinction between hubristic and hubris-free sexual relations (though the word ὕβρις is not used). On ὕβρις in the sphere of sexual activity generally, see Fisher (1992).

⁹³ *Mem.* 4.5.9.

⁹⁴ Cf. *Mem.* 2.6.22. One also recalls the Theban polemarchs entrapped by Phillidas with the expectation of a night with the most beautiful courtesans (*Hell.* 5.4.5); or the comment in *Oecon.* 10.7 that the gods have ordained sexual attraction between members of the same species. Cf. also Aristoph., *Clouds* 1069, with Henderson (1991), 158–9. ἡδύς appears as the description of lovers in erotic inscriptions of the fourth century on Thasos (*LSJ*, Revised Supplement, Oxford, 1996).

⁹⁵ *Hiero* 1.30 and 34–5. Cf. Kritoboulos' repeated use of ἡδίων to show how he places devotion to Kleinias above everything else (*Symp.* 4.14–15).

the 'Sokratic' view, the 'way of celibacy', which concentrates on the love of the mind/personality and its development to the exclusion of genital activity, and which reaches its fullest expression (in Xenophon's writings) in chapter 8 of the *Symposium*. In the closing part of this paper I propose to explore the complex web of linguistic cross-references between crucial sections in the *Symposium* and the *Hiero*, which suggests that Xenophon is aware of arguing (perhaps with himself as well as with his readers) the comparative merits of the latter two lifestyles. The passages concerned are *Symposium* 8.12–18 and *Hiero* 1.29–38.

In the *Symposium* Sokrates, while alluding to the Ouranian and Pandemian Aphrodite expounded by Plato's Pausanias,⁹⁶ sets up a far sharper distinction between love of body and love of mind/soul than is to be found in the latter. Basing himself on this distinction, Xenophon's Sokrates devotes paragraphs 12–18 to a eulogy of the love of mind, which expresses itself in 'friendship'. He has no time for the physical expression of same-sex love, which for him (§§19–22) is a 'shameful association', leading to 'many unholy acts'. The distinction and relative merits of the two loves are further expounded in what follows, but paragraphs 12–18 are sufficiently self-contained to provide a basis for comparison with Hieron's philosophy on the question whether or not to admit a physical relationship.

It is true that Xenophon's Sokrates, briefly and in passing, recognizes the possibility of combining love for mind with love for body,⁹⁷ but he immediately dismisses it in order to concentrate on the love which excludes the physical. The result is a gap in Sokrates' exposition where one might expect to find something like 'love' in our modern sense—a relationship which combines physical and ethical elements. We shall not, on the other hand, be surprised to find Hieron implicitly challenging the dichotomy propounded by Sokrates, following the declaration that in matters of good and evil, we sometimes experience pleasure and pain through the mind alone, and sometimes jointly through mind and body.⁹⁸ Following this clue,

⁹⁶ Plato, *Symp.* 180–1. On the chronological precedence of Plato's work, see above, n. 90.

⁹⁷ *Symp.* 8.14: 'if they delight in both'...

⁹⁸ *Hiero* 1.5 (following Marchant's text, 1925 (Loeb)). The point is made by Simonides, but immediately accepted by Hieron.

one might well argue that the allusions to pederasty at various points in the *Hiero* seem precisely to fill the void apparent in the Sokratic treatment. For where 'Sokrates' argues for an exclusive attention to mind, Hieron presupposes a combination of mind and body.

Both discussions announce that they are concerned to promote 'enjoyment' (εὐφραίνεισθαι) whether through ethical relationships ('desire for the mind') or through physical ones.⁹⁹ For Sokrates, love of mind leads to φιλία ['friendship'], without which there can be no relationship worthy of the name: 'because without friendship we all know there is no worthy relationship' (*Symp.* 8.13).¹⁰⁰ For Hieron it is sex based on desire, which brings enjoyment: 'because we all know that love with desire gives a far greater enjoyment' (*Hiero* 1.29).

To take these two sentences in isolation, however (despite the significant degree of symmetry between them), would be to oversimplify the situation. Sokrates argues exclusively for φιλία. While it is true that for him φιλία stems from a form of ἔρως ('love of mind', §12), he seems uncomfortable with the latter term, which at §15 he replaces with 'the φιλία of the mind'. Hieron, on the other hand, having begun by contrasting τὰ μετ' ἔρωτος ἀφροδίσια with sexual gratification without love, goes on to posit a relationship of φιλία with the object of his desire. Indeed, his major aim in chapter 1 is to repudiate the idea that simple appeasement of the 'need' for sex is sufficient. He is inclusive (sex–desire–friendship) where Sokrates is exclusive (friendship only).

Both types of relationship are a form of 'compulsion' (ἀνάγκη). For Sokrates, where love (φιλεῖν) is inspired by the beloved's character, it is a 'pleasant and willing compulsion', ἀνάγκη ἡδέα καὶ ἐθελουσία. For Hieron it is seemingly a compulsion of nature. For Sokrates this latter is to be resisted and replaced by the compulsion of φιλία. By contrast, Hieron's ideal is to combine an acceptance of the compulsion of sexual desire (and its attendant pleasures) with the values of friendship. These two foci of love are elegantly combined in Hieron's description of his relationship with Dailochos.¹⁰¹

⁹⁹ *Symp.* 8.12, *Hiero* 1.29. On hedonism, see n. 29.

¹⁰⁰ συνουσία can mean sexual congress, but hardly in this context!

¹⁰¹ *Symp.* 8.13. *Hiero* 1.33. Cf. p. 76 and n. 6 above.

Both forms of relationship express *φιλία* and look for affection in return (*ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι*) and both are celebrated in the exchange of glances and conversation.¹⁰² On the well-worn theme of appetite and satiety, Sokrates naturally argues that dependence on physical beauty (like the desire for food) is soon glutted and loses its appeal, whereas the love of the mind is 'less liable to be satiated' (§§14, 15). But he neither admits that *ἔρως* (as desire for the unpossessed) may intensify pleasure, nor does he (in Xenophon's text) recognize the metaphysical dimension to this emotion which provides the starting point for Plato's philosophy of beauty. Hieron, on the other hand, accepting the comparison with the appetite for food and drink, finds an analogue in sexual matters in awaiting the free response of his *παιδικά*, which even a tyrant cannot command, but which is essential for his fulfilment—['from willing boys, I think, sweetest are the pleasures']. The key word 'beautiful' (*καλός*) is also brought into the discussion. Sokrates uses it in its moral sense to describe the *ἐρώμενος* as *καλός τε καὶ ἀγαθός*, and for him, the aim of the *ἐραστής* is not so much to enjoy the boy's beauty but to 'seek the boy's well-being' rather than pursue his own pleasure, (*Symp.* 8.17). In the *Hiero*, however, the conventional use of 'beautiful' in erotic contexts is observed: Dailochos is 'most beautiful' as the object of desire, and Hieron seeks what is needed 'from the beautiful' (*Hiero* 1.31, 33).

If one takes in the Kritoboulos speech as part of the 'Xenophonic' view of *ἔρως*, two further linguistic parallels are notable. At *Symposium* 8.14, Sokrates refers to the common theme of the withering of youth's bloom. Rather surprisingly (and surely polemically) he draws the conclusion that it entails the withering, not merely of *ἔρως* but of *φιλία*, and the choice of the word *φιλία* here suggests that nothing of permanent value can come out of bodily love.¹⁰³ Kritoboulos, as spokesman for 'the way of moderation', has already anticipated this objection with his recognition that each stage of life has its own beauty (*Symp.* 4.17). Kritoboulos also anticipates Sokrates by claim-

¹⁰² *Symp.* 8.18, *Hiero* 1.35.

¹⁰³ A more balanced view is found in Aristotle, *NE* 1157a6–12. But see also the recognition in *Symp.* 8.27 that the *ἐραστής* may convert his *παιδικά* into 'a good friend' (*φίλον ἀγαθὸν ποιήσασθαι*: the infinitive is seemingly a metaphorical use of *ποιεῖν* = 'beget').

ing the description 'more respectful' for his type of lover (*Symp.* 4.15, cf. 8.16).

Throughout these discussions Xenophon shows an awareness that the key words in a discourse of love can point in different directions, towards or away from an acceptance of the physical. But perhaps the most interesting link between the discussions in *Symposium* 8 and *Hiero* 1 is the word *ἐπαφρόδιτος*. At the simplest level, this provides just another verbal link between the two passages. But the meaning of the word presents a teasing problem. If it had originally had any connection with the sexual side of Aphrodite's domain, it had lost it by the time of the Byzantine lexicographers: the *Suda* gives 'charming' (*ἐπίχαρις, ἡδύς*). Photius applies it to the grace of literary style or as a translation of Sulla's agnomen, 'Felix'. A search of the *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae* reveals (if we include one instance of the negative, *ἀνεπαφρόδιτος*) only nine occurrences in the fifth and fourth centuries, of which four are found in the Xenophon passages we are considering. Of the rest, Isokrates uses it to characterize the charm of Homer's style; Aiskhines recalls that Ktesiphon employed it in a fawning description of Philip; and the New Comedy poet, Philemon, incorporated it in a eulogy on the blessings of peace.¹⁰⁴ In all these cases something like 'charming' would seem an appropriate translation. There remain Herodotos, who twice uses the word in his story of the high-class courtesan, Rhodopis, and the four Xenophon instances.¹⁰⁵ In none of these latter passages would the translation 'charming' be impossible—but is it wholly satisfactory? When the adjective occurs in a sexual context, can we exclude the influence of the cognates *τὰ ἀφροδίσια* and *ἀφροδισιάζειν*, or the substantial tradition of the appellative use of the name Aphrodite to mean sexual love?¹⁰⁶ Herodotos describes how Rhodopis, who had lived as a slave in the same household on Samos as Aisopos, was brought to Egypt

¹⁰⁴ Isokrates, *Helen* 65.6; Aiskhines, *Fals. Leg.* 42.6 (also 52, where the description is glossed as 'good-looking'); Philemon, *Frag.* 71. One should perhaps add a possible tenth instance which may be from the fourth century—the apparently undatable Lunkeus as cited in Athenaios, 6.242c, where the noun *ἐπαφροδίσια* refers to literary elegance. I am most grateful to Mrs Sue Willetts of the Library of the Institute of Classical Studies (London University) for technical guidance with TLG.

¹⁰⁵ Herodotos 2.135.2 and 135.5. Xen., *Symp.* 8.15 (bis), 18; *Hiero* 1.35.

¹⁰⁶ From Homer, *Od.* 22.444, onwards.

‘in the course of her trade’ by one of her wealthy admirers, where according to Herodotos, ‘she prospered greatly [by being exceedingly ἐπαφρόδιτος]’. She clearly amassed her fortune by providing sexual services, and (as Sokrates’ dialogue with Theodote shows¹⁰⁷) a Greek would have had no embarrassment in recognizing this. Even if the word ἐπαφρόδιτος is (like the English plural ‘charms’) something of a euphemism, it surely refers here to Rhodopis’ sexual attractiveness. And no doubt it is with the same meaning that, in the following section, the ‘courtesans’ of Naukratis are described as ἐπαφρόδιτοι.

On the strength of the Herodotos passages one may explore the possibility that in Xenophon’s discussions of male love likewise, ἐπαφρόδιτος means ‘sexually attractive’. At the outset, it is relevant to note that it is Xenophon who provides us with two of the clearest examples of the appellative use of the goddess’s name to refer to sexual desire or sexual intercourse.¹⁰⁸ In turning to the occurrences of ἐπαφρόδιτος, I take the clearer context first. In *Hiero* 1.29–38 the overall subject matter is sexual pleasure with boys, which in Hieron’s view is most (possibly only) worth pursuing when accompanied by a loving response. The responses mentioned in §35 illustrate the theme, and the argument is cumulative—from glances to questions and answers and, best of all, ‘struggles and quarrellings’. All these exchanges are ‘sweet’ (ῥηδεῖαι), a word which, as I have argued, takes on sexual overtones from its context. But the concluding items are characterized yet more strongly as ῥηδισται δὲ καὶ ἐπαφροδιτόταται. For the rhetoric to work, the concluding superlative must go beyond ῥηδισται, and the obvious direction is towards a more emphatic reference to sexual pleasure—the ‘struggles and quarrellings’ are ‘most sexually stimulating’. I presume this is the intention of Marchant’s translation, ‘very ravishing’. Waterfield translates the word as ‘erotic’.¹⁰⁹

I would suggest that we need a play on the same meaning to make sense of *Symposium* 8.15: [‘the love of the mind because it is holy less is liable to satiety but not as one would think less attractive (καὶ

¹⁰⁷ Xen., *Mem.* 3.11.

¹⁰⁸ *Symp.* 3.1, 8.21.

¹⁰⁹ Waterfield (1997), 12.

ἀνεπαφροδιτοτέρα) for that, but clearly the prayer is answered in which we ask the goddess to make our words and deeds ἐπαφρόδιτα’].

The anonymous ‘one’ presumably supposes that a ‘holy’ love would be ἀνεπαφρόδιτος in the sense of lacking sexual pleasure. He frames the response of the ordinary man to Sokrates’ advocacy of abstinence. In reply, Sokrates resorts to an argument of the kind he has already deployed around the word καλός in his conversation with Kritoboulos in chapter 5: ‘I am καλός, but not in the sense you mean.’ So the ‘friendship’ analysed in chapter 8 will, according to Sokrates, be no less erotic, no less replete with the charms of Aphrodite (ἐπαφρόδιτος) than its physically sexual counterpart: but the true meaning of the adjective (according to him) is that found in the prayer commonly addressed to Aphrodite—a petition for words and deeds of grace and charm. Thus love of the mind/personality is ‘erotic’, but only in the sense that Sokrates claims that he himself has always been in love. The same logical ploy underlies Sokrates’ summary at *Symposium* 8.18, where the question is both a challenge and an equivocation: are not all these things ἐπαφρόδιτα?¹¹⁰

Admittedly, an interpretation based on a handful of instances of ἐπαφρόδιτος can hardly be conclusive when compared with the multitudinous occurrences of ‘beautiful’. But the logic is the same as that in other Socratic arguments, and the interpretation gives point to the importation of a distinctly rare word. This analysis of ‘the charms of Aphrodite’, I would suggest, confirms the argument that in *Symposium* 8 and *Hiero* 1 Xenophon was deliberately setting alongside one another two types of love: the Socratic doctrine of celibate friendship as the true fulfilment of ἔρως, and the view found in discourses associated with Kritoboulos and Hieron and elsewhere in Xenophon’s writings that an honourable ἔρως may include physical satisfaction within the broader pattern of φιλία, provided it is subject to self-control (ἐγκράτεια).

One may nevertheless feel a certain lack in Hieron’s discourse of that concern for the beloved ‘in sickness and in health’ which pervades Sokrates’ view in *Symposium* 8.18. In reply, it may be said that the short discourse in *Hiero* 1 is concerned with the narrow point:

¹¹⁰ A similar oscillation has already been noted in the two speeches (of Hieron and Sokrates) over the word καλός (above, p. 101). A further example of the same logical ploy is found around the word ᾗδεσθαι at *Mem.* 1.3.15.

whether, given the nature of tyranny, a tyrant can experience the reward of true ἔρως for something he does not possess and cannot command. But, more importantly, the chapter describes the relationship between the lovers as embracing both φιλία and ἔρως. One may, therefore, expand the analysis with reference to the positive discussion of φιλία in *Hiero* 3. While this chapter makes no explicit mention of pederasty (unless such a relationship is implicit in the ‘comrades to comrades’ of §7), it speaks of the mutual caring of friends in language distinctly reminiscent of *Symposium* 8. It may thus be called upon to supplement the description of flirtatious love-making in the first chapter.

Nevertheless, the passages in *Hiero* 1 and 3 so far discussed share a fundamental weakness. They speak of ideal relationships, which are unattainable by one who occupies the position of tyrant as Hieron understands it. Thus at the outset Hieron declares that in respect of boy-love even more than in heterosexual relationships, ‘the tyrant has fewer pleasures’ (1.29). He wants to attain his goal with the beloved, in a friendship freely given: but (as he thinks) force is inescapably in the background for all a tyrant’s activities. He can therefore never be sure that the love seemingly offered to him is genuine and not hypocritical, arising from fear or self-interest.

This problem besets the tyrant in every department of life. The answer, which Simonides reveals, is that a tyrant’s rule need not be oppressive. He can devote himself to the service of his people and so achieve Xenophon’s ideal of ‘tyranny over willing and loving subjects, which is a heaven’.¹¹¹ The ideal ruler here does everything required to ensure ‘the love of his subjects’ (τὸ φιλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων, 11.8). He will, in consequence, be surrounded by admirers and well-wishers, and be the object not only of φιλία but of ἔρως. In Waterfield’s translation:

What people will feel for you, then, is passionate love rather than mere liking. You won’t have to make advances to good-looking men, but to bear with their advances.¹¹²

The immediate context recalls the opening of the dialogue which surveys the organs of sensual pleasure, beginning with the eyes

¹¹¹ Gray (1986), p. 117.

¹¹² *Hiero* 11.11.

(gratified by great tourist spectacles) and ending with the genitalia. Hieron claims that his status as tyrant prevents him gratifying any of these desires. In the recapitulation at 11.11 the discussion is compressed to the first and last points: the reformed Hieron can now follow his tourist instincts wherever he wishes, without risk; as for sex, he will be surrounded with would-be lovers. But the change that makes this possible is not in his eudaimonistic goals, but in his mode of government. As Gray summarizes the main thrust of the dialogue, 'Simonides eventually shows him how he can turn his tyranny into the sort of rule that will attract love, and then he will be able to enjoy those pleasures if he wants (8–11).'¹¹³ The 'reformed' tyrant will act in a beneficent manner *vis-à-vis* his subjects, and the pleasures will then accrue to him unimpeded by his status.¹¹⁴

But if the possibility of enjoying true love is included in the tyrant's reformation, why is the approach of lovers described as something that 'he must *endure*'? The answer must, I think, lie in Xenophon's fondness for ironic witticism, an example of which can in fact be found earlier in this dialogue, where Xenophon refers to the wild delight of the citizenry following a military victory in which they claim to have killed a greater number of the enemy than actually fell on the battlefield!¹¹⁵ The light touch at 11.11 may indicate a certain delicacy and reticence in dealing with sexual matters, but it is essentially jocular, suggesting that so far from being unable to attain a sexual liaison of the kind he wants, Hieron will have to put up with plenty of unsolicited offers. This hints at opportunities for discriminating choice, rather than promiscuity, but does not imply abstention from sex altogether.¹¹⁶ Indeed, the

¹¹³ Gray (1986), p. 116.

¹¹⁴ *Hiero* 8.1, cf. 3.5.

¹¹⁵ *Hiero* 2.16. For Xenophon's humour, cf. n. 51. Also (for the ironic twist), cf. Hindley (1994), 355–6 and nn. 38, 39. An element of humour also creeps into the Alkibiades seduction narrative, when Alkibiades complains that Sokrates' rejection had 'insulted' him (*ὑβρίσεν*—usually a strong and serious term): Plato, *Symp.* 219c.

¹¹⁶ An alternative view is hinted at in the note to Waterfield's translation (1997) n. 3, p. 189, which suggests a possible parallel with Alkibiades' attempt to seduce Sokrates. Sokrates puts up with this, but clearly does not welcome it, and eschews any physical response. A similar attitude, it might be argued, is implicit in the moral connotation of 'endure' in the present passage. But to follow this route for the interpretation of *Hiero* 11.11 is to entertain a dismissive attitude to sexual pleasure, which does not appear elsewhere in the dialogue and is at variance with Xenophon's view of moderate physicality (as argued for in the present article).

possibility of more than one lover is probably implied in the reference to the plural *παῖδας* in 11.14 (see below).

The tyrant's services so far mentioned in chapter 11 are in the public domain, but a more personal concern for friends and lovers is urged at the ensuing §14, which enjoins him to treat his *παῖδας* as his own life. Once again, we encounter ambiguity in the word *παῖς*. There is certainly rhetorical force in adding 'sons' to 'friends', but one may wonder why an exhortation to care for sons is needed when the father-son relationship has just been held up as exemplary.¹¹⁷ A paragraph or two earlier the promise of male lovers has been held out to the good tyrant. As we have seen, Xenophon uses *παῖς* equivalent to *παιδικά* more commonly than has been generally recognized, and this seems certainly a possible, and on balance the more likely, meaning here. When, at the close of the dialogue, Xenophon comes to depict the character of the good tyrant, his male lovers are included within the scope of his beneficence.

Taken as a whole, the various references in the *Hiero* present what may be regarded as an idealized view of homosexual love. They depict a way of moderation and regard for the beloved, a combination of the physical and the ethical, which we have now seen to run through Xenophon's writings, and which, it may be claimed, was Xenophon's own view of the matter. It may be unattainable by the unreconstructed tyrant, but remains as an ideal for the ruler (and, presumably for any of his subjects) who is willing to show concern for his fellow men.

The purpose of this paper has been to explore so far as possible Xenophon's own understanding of male love. It is no accident that I have largely avoided the longest single treatment of the subject in Xenophon's writings—Sokrates' speech in *Symposium* 8. This speech has provided a foil for the way of moderation expounded by Hieron. But neither in the passage I have selected for detailed study (*Symposium* 8.12–18) nor elsewhere in the speech is there any overt endorsement by Xenophon himself of the views attributed to Sokrates.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁷ This argument also rules out the possibility that the words might be a warning against family murders of the kind mentioned in *Hiero* 3.8.

¹¹⁸ The nearest approach is Lukon's concluding appraisal of Sokrates (*Symp.* 9.1). On the other hand, traces of the 'moderate' view can be discerned (albeit dimly) in Sokrates' speech itself: *Symp.* 8.14 (love of both body and soul) and 8.27 (growth out of pederasty into friendship).

Not only so, but (as we have seen) the evidence elsewhere suggests that Xenophon, in accepting the way of moderation, disagreed with the philosopher over the degree to which physical relationships between ἐραστής and ἐρώμενος might be acceptable. Moreover, other discrepancies are apparent between *Symposium* 8 and Xenophon's treatment of pederasty elsewhere. The swift move to concentrate on prostitution in the discussion of bodily love (*Symp.* 8.21–2) disregards the examples of honourable love we have noted elsewhere. The discussion in *Symposium* 8 also overlooks the distinction between lack of control and self-control, which admits (and indeed enhances) sexual pleasure, put into the mouth of Sokrates at *Memorabilia* 4.5.9. In the *Cynegeticus* Xenophon himself accepts the principle of inspiration to deeds of honour provided by the ἐρώμενος, which Sokrates rejects.¹¹⁹

There are then several grounds on which one might doubt the initially appealing hypothesis that Sokrates' speech in *Symposium* 8 represents a summation of Xenophon's own views. But if my thesis of Xenophon's espousal of the 'way of moderation' is to be entertained, it must face the question: why did he devote so elevated a place to a speech which uncompromisingly advocates pederastic celibacy?

The first point to be made is that, whatever the thrust of Sokrates' exhortation to Kallias, it cannot eliminate, and should not be allowed to obscure, the evidence in favour of a moderate physicality found elsewhere in Xenophon's works. The 'way of moderation' is close to that expounded by Plato's Pausanias, and must clearly be included in any account of views current in fourth-century Athens. The fact and manner of its occurrence in Xenophon's writings suggest that it was accepted by the writer himself. At the same time, Xenophon admired Sokrates greatly, and it is to the biographical purpose of the *Symposium*¹²⁰ that we must turn for some explanation of the space given to Sokrates' non-physical view of male love.

Xenophon clearly intends to present Sokrates as the centre of the dialogue. In nearly all respects he regards Sokrates' teaching as exemplary, and important points of convergence between Xenophon's views and the teaching of Sokrates in *Symposium* 8 can be

¹¹⁹ *Cyn.* 12.20; contrast *Symp.* 8.34.

¹²⁰ *Symp.* 1.1.

attested from elsewhere in Xenophon's writings. Xenophon valued highly the pedagogic element in pederasty exemplified in the relationship between Cheiron, Phoenix, and Achilles. Such 'education' presupposes a loving relationship of mutual respect, whether physically consummated (Xenophon) or not (Sokrates).¹²¹

Moreover, Xenophon's comments in the *Memorabilia* support the high value placed upon ideals of public service in the latter part of Sokrates' speech in the *Symposium*. Xenophon would also, as we have seen, have agreed with Sokrates' teaching on the love of boys insofar as it counselled self-discipline (falling short of total celibacy). It would be wrong, therefore, to exaggerate the divergence between the Sokratic speech in the *Symposium* and what I have argued to be Xenophon's own view.

But self-control is not to be identified with celibacy, and Xenophon could not, without sacrificing historical fidelity, have suppressed the fact that Sokrates sought to divert *ἔρως* wholly away from the body and to focus it exclusively upon 'mind'. Xenophon

¹²¹ *Symp.* 8.23. Cf. *Mem.* 4.1.1–5, esp. §5; *Lac. Pol.* 2.12. Xenophon's conception of Sokratic 'education' would require a separate essay, but reference may be made to two recent studies of 'education through love' in the Sokratic tradition: Kahn and O'Connor in Vander Waerdt (1994).

Kahn traces the literary history of the theme to Aiskhines of Sphettos, whose dialogues *Alcibiades* and *Aspasia* seem to have regarded not only pederastic (probably celibate) love, but also heterosexual (and presumably consummated) love, as the locus for such training. If Kahn's reconstruction of Aiskhines' fragmentary remains is correct, a striking parallel in thought structure can be discerned in comparing the latter's *Alcibiades* with Xenophon's *Mem.* 4.1.1–5. Both sequences move from love and companionship, through the rebuke of pride (in ability and possessions), to the need for training in virtue. One may even add to Kahn's identification of possible literary influences of Aiskhines upon Xenophon (p. 89, n. 7) the thought that the former's reference to training in horsemanship (*ibid.*, p. 90 and n. 14) may well have prompted the latter's comparison with the breaking-in of horses (*Mem.* 4.1.3). Xenophon, it seems, was appropriating from the tradition as well as from his own memory an aspect of Sokrates' teaching, which he wished to commend. (On Xenophon's claims to memory, cf. Clay in Vander Waerdt (1994), 42, n. 43.)

A much more extended study of a sophisticated (but seemingly non-physical) *eros* as the basis for education is to be found in O'Connor's essay. But O'Connor does not ask (nor, I think, is it relevant to his thesis to ask) whether Xenophon may not have maintained his own, more physical (but still morally structured) view of *eros* alongside the philosophical exchanges with Sokrates which he presents and the authentic interpretation of the philosopher's (paradoxically complex) virtue which he seeks to evoke.

also had a more particular reason for retaining this aspect of Sokrates' teaching in his literary creation. One of his major aims was to defend Sokrates against the charge of 'corrupting the young'—and for Xenophon 'corruption' clearly included the encouragement of unrestrained sexual indulgence.¹²² To have introduced qualifications into the 'set piece' in *Symposium* 8 would have gravely weakened the defence. Xenophon accordingly contented himself with indirect indications of his dissent elsewhere in his writings. One might go further. For if indeed *Hiero* was written after the *Symposium*, we could justifiably read it as a recantation of those elements in the Socratic speech which so vehemently reject the physical content of homosexual ἔργα.

It must be acknowledged that part of Xenophon's weakness as a philosopher (but part of his amiability as a man) is his failure always to achieve self-consistency in his writings. What I hope I have demonstrated, however, is an interest on his part in right sexual relationships between older and younger men and boys, and the articulation of a viewpoint, if not a theory, on this subject which stands in tension (and, by the time of the *Hiero* self-conscious tension) with Sokrates' absolutist rejection of all genital relations between males. It may be termed a way of moderation. It embraces love of body and love of mind, in which the older respects the younger partner and what he offers. It maintains self-discipline over physical expression without denying the latter its place, and finds pleasure in a freely given (sexual) love as an ingredient in friendship. It inspires the lover to the endurance of toil and the pursuit of honour. Finally it integrates such personal ethics into an overriding (and typically Greek) philosophy of public achievement in the service of the polis.

¹²² Cf. *Mem.* 1.2.1–2. The exact significance of the charges against Sokrates has, of course, been much debated. It is enough here to say that one element in this paragraph's description of the charges to be rebutted is making young men uncontrolled in sex. In this passage, as in Xenophon's *Apologia*, the defence lies in an appeal to Sokrates' self-disciplined character (*Apol. Soc* 16).

II

Democracy

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Xenophon's Programme in the *Poroi*

Philippe Gauthier

Xenophon's short work 'On revenues', composed between 355 and 354, for a long time drew disregard from modern writers. In the last sixty years, the situation has changed gradually: today the revival of interest is clear, especially since the appearance of three easily accessible works. In 1970, Bodei Giglioni produced a new edition and translation, with an extensive introduction in which the author offers—through a very modern lens—an economic and social interpretation of Xenophon's programme.¹ In 1976 I myself published a commentary on the *Poroi* whose main aim was to clarify Xenophon's comments in the light of the institutions of his times—and vice-versa.² Now there is the work by Schütrumpf, in which the text is re-edited, translated, and annotated.³ In a detailed introduction, the author attempts to define and explain Xenophon's programme, especially from the angle of *Staatsdenken*—for which his previous works prepared him; particularly his interesting study of the Aristotelian analysis of the *polis*.⁴

Since all these authors vigorously criticize their predecessors' ideas, and because the reader will see a new discussion emerge in this paper, there is reason to fear that the debate is sterile and one will turn away from a study that is futile. So it is necessary first of all to

¹ Bodei Giglioni, 1970.

² Gauthier, 1976.

³ Schütrumpf, 1982.

⁴ Schütrumpf, 1980. I have reviewed this work in the *Rev. Ét. Anc.*

reduce this unfortunate impression by recalling the scope of the controversy. On many points, in no way of minor interest (for example the attribution of the work to Xenophon, its date of composition, the primacy of the fiscal point of view), agreement exists or is gradually being reached by commentators. Moreover, in comparison with works prior to 1922—the year in which Thiel's excellent annotated edition appeared⁵—the establishment and interpretation of the text of the *Poroi* have certainly progressed.⁶ What remain as an object of discussion—and will no doubt remain as one for a long while—are the intentions, the goals, the relations between the means and the goal, the worth of the proposed means: in brief Xenophon's programme.

Our uncertainties come from the absence of any indications in the treatise itself of the practical details of the distributions of monies envisaged or the political and economical implications of the programme planned. If these things were in fact plain to the eyes of ancient readers (which is not certain), then the difficulties that we have in filling Xenophon's silences would simply illustrate our own imperfect understanding of the organization of Greek democracies and of the mentality of the ancient Athenians. As it is, interpreters are driven to extend Xenophon's observations, credit him with certain attitudes of mind or political ulterior motives, bring in comparisons with other authors; in a word interpret his proposals in the manner that appears to them appropriate.

Thence the divergent opinions of moderns, whose criticism appears the more lively for generally calling into question the fundamental assumptions of previous arguments. Is it productive, given this situation, to feed the controversy? Will each not hold his own position? Even though on one major point I have not convinced Schütrumpf, nor has he been able to convince me, I propose once again to take up my pen, as I consider his study stimulating and his criticism to be in some senses justified. In taking this opportunity to

⁵ Thiel, 1922. Little read, this translation (the introduction and notes in Latin) will never exert the influence that it should have had.

⁶ Schütrumpf, 1982, 121–9 notes and tries to resolve the principal difficulties; I here abandon the examination of points of detail (adoption of some readings, translation of some words) on which we have differing opinions.

correct and clarify the hypotheses that I previously adopted, I hope, despite everything, to make the debate progress.

Schütrumpf begins by summarizing Xenophon's position (pp. 1–15). We must remember that Xenophon composed his work at a time when the disastrous Social War was coming to an end. Several cities allied with Athens had defected and saw their independence recognized. Founded in 377, the Second Athenian Confederacy was still going in 354, but in diminished form. Xenophon justifies his subject in this way:

Since certain Athenian leaders (*prostatai*) said that they recognized what is just no less well than other men, but that the poverty of the masses (*τὴν τοῦ πλῆθους πενίαν*) forced them—they said—to be more unjust to the cities (allies), I tried to determine whether the citizens could somehow ensure their maintenance by depending on their own city—an altogether just procedure. I think that if this happened, they would be protected from poverty and from the suspicion of the Greeks. (I, 1)

Xenophon was not unaware of the problem that faced and continued to face the Athenian *prostatai*, but he objected to the means that had been used up to that time to solve it, namely, to imperialism. On this point all the commentators seem to be in agreement: like others (for example Isocrates), Xenophon condemns the politics of the preceding decades and is going to propose an alternative. It remains to be explained—which was not Xenophon's purpose, but is the obligation of the commentator, and we will come back to it below—how yesterday's imperialism allowed the 'poverty of the masses' to be remedied.

Whatever the case, the measures proposed in the *Poroi* aimed to increase public revenues. As the climate, resources and geography of Attica favour trade, it will be necessary to facilitate the settlement of more metics, and the movement of more traders, which will increase the taxes raised by the city (*metoikion*, taxes on imports and exports, taxes on sales). On the other hand, thanks to a peacetime *eisphora* ['a contribution from the wealthy'], which will provide the necessary investment (*aphorme*), the city will undertake construction in the Piraeus and above all purchase a great quantity of slaves, to lease out to the Laurion mine owners at the rate of an obol per day per man.

Thanks to the revenue produced by the 1,200 slaves initially acquired (by means of the *eisphora*), the city will buy new slaves and so on 'until there are three for each Athenian' (IV, 17). As a result, in time, each citizen will receive, thanks to the revenues of public slaves, three obols a day, that is, 180 drachmas per year; even for the wealthy, who will have greatly contributed to the payment of the initial *eisphora*, this will be a good revenue. Though Xenophon does not say so, it must be remembered that the number of Athenian citizens was between 20 and 30,000, and that the complete realization of his project would have therefore required the settlement of between 60 and 90,000 public slaves in Laurion.

How should these propositions made in terms of domestic politics be evaluated (pp. 15–20)? Schütrumpf highlights two points that seem to him to be complementary and in conformity with Xenophon's temperament. In the first place, he emphasizes, the system is advantageous to the wealthy nobles. Effectively, if the city renounces imperialism, the rich would be released from the burden of the trierarchies and the *eisphorai*. At the same time, thanks to the growth of public revenues and the remittance of the daily triobol, 'the rich could be certain that their goods would no longer be constantly called on to ensure the provisioning of the people' (p. 16). The 'upkeep' of the poor would be ensured without the rich being put under pressure.

The second point is more original. Given to each citizen on a daily basis, the triobol promised by Xenophon for the *τροφή* of the *demos* ['maintenance of the people'] would have been, according to Schütrumpf, entirely distinct from payment for political office (civic *misthoi*). 'Xenophon', he writes, 'does not mean that payments be linked to a service given in exchange by the citizens; they are not given as compensation for some political activity or another. Besides, the regular compensation for participation in the assemblies, certainly those in which the greatest number of the population participated—the Popular Assembly and jury service—did not provide everyday income' (p. 19). And later: 'the payment envisaged by Xenophon of three obols per day cannot be regarded as the regular compensation in the democracy for the time spent in sessions of the Popular Assembly or of the tribunals' (p. 21). On the contrary, the daily triobol would be a substitute, in the Athens of tomorrow,

for the democratic *misthoi*. Thus would we uncover the political drift of the *Poroi*. Henceforth, poor citizens, supported by the state, would have been much less tempted to sit in non-remunerated assemblies and tribunals: renouncing public affairs, the people would have left the first place in the governance of the city to the aristocrats. Xenophon's project would have had the effect of reforming the existing democracy and of more or less returning it to the ancestral constitution (*patrios politeia*), which a number of distinguished Athenians were dreaming of, each in his own way.

Of these two points, only the first is explicit (see VI, 1) and was therefore taken up by all the commentators.⁷ According to Schütrumpf, the second could easily be deduced from the proposed measures, but Xenophon would not have wished to say so outright: 'on the one hand, these changes, aiming to replace salaries paid for attendance at popular assemblies and tribunals with a regular subsidy, substantially modified the character of Athenian democracy, and we cannot blame Xenophon for his caution in not making the consequences too clear to the people' (p. 24). Here we are reduced, as often, to offering exegesis of Xenophon's silences. Let us agree with our commentator that this hypothesis accords best with the political attitude that is often attributed to the author of the *Hipparchicus*: 'If my interpretation is right, we must also place Xenophon, given the *Poroi*, among men who, in the middle of the fourth century, wished to limit the dominating influence of the *demos*. Xenophon's proposals are not at all radically democratic—a description frequently made, but one that can be reconciled so poorly with Xenophon's political attitude' (p. 25).

But let us follow Schütrumpf's developments on the maintenance (*τροφή*) of the *demos* (pp. 30–45). Given the measures that Xenophon proposed aimed to augment the *public* revenues (see notably II,

⁷ In my view, I expressed myself clearly enough (1976, 3: 'the choices made by Xenophon and the care he shows about rich Athenians...'; 1976, 44: 'in the *Poroi* Xenophon wishes to put an end to the poverty of the citizens thanks to the payment of cash indemnities, all while preserving the security and wealth of the land-owners'; 1976, 216: 'for the rich... Xenophon's project offers less a way to receive the *τροφή*, for them derisory, than a way of being finally unburdened of *eisphorai* and of trierarchies'). Schütrumpf's remark (1982, 17 and n. 79) rests upon a confusion: in the passage that he invokes, I was criticizing one of Thiel's hypotheses, not doubting the fact that the system proposed by Xenophon was advantageous to the rich.

1 and 7; III, 6, 13–14; IV, 1 and 49; VI, 1), how would the problem of the 'poverty of the masses' be resolved? The daily triobol barely covers the vital minimum, and perhaps even represents much less than is necessary if the beneficiary has a wife and child. To give Xenophon's project a satisfying economic interpretation today, we must assign him aims other than this form of public assistance. So Schütrumpf writes: 'only the strict interpretation of the triobol as a subsistence grant, without service in exchange, makes it possible that, according to Xenophon, the Athenians of the future had daily to devote themselves to a lucrative activity' (p. 31). In other words, the triobol would help the most downtrodden, but since it could not on its own assure the well being of the civic community, it would be no invitation to an idle life.

The payment proposed by Xenophon of three obols per day is not pocket money to be added to a sufficient revenue which the citizens regularly enjoyed, from wherever it came; instead, it was an indispensable subsidy to their upkeep. The proposals of *Poroï* are Xenophon's response to the distress that was being felt especially at the end of the Social War. Xenophon's efforts to pay citizens three obols per day are not comprehensible if most Athenians already had sufficient income from their work. But this does not authorize the conclusion that the Athenians in general did not work, and, from the measures proposed by Xenophon, we have no right to deduce that the Athenians of the future would not have had to pursue productive activities. (p. 32)

When he declares that if his project was put into action, 'the people will have an abundance of τροφή' (VI, 1), Xenophon is thinking—according to Schütrumpf—of the addition of the public subsidies to the fruits of one's labour, both assuming the increased exploitation of the resources of the land and the mines of Laurion in particular.

The question that arises is then this: why does Xenophon only address the question of public revenues and subsidies, that is to say the enrichment of the city and the allowances given to citizens, and pass over the essential activities and revenues of the Athenians *qua* individuals? Schütrumpf's answer is as follows:

It was not economic motives that prevented Xenophon from recommending to the Athenian citizens that they procure the basics of life with work, because he wanted to attract metics to the country who would have had

enough from their work to live on and pay taxes. What Xenophon was trying to do by not recommending individual work for citizens, was to separate their condition from that of the metics; he thus provided for them a privileged status that was uncontested and, so he established for them alone, without supplementary work, a form of protection designed to assure them the basics. (pp. 34–5)

In fact, Xenophon no more mentions the economic activity of the metics than of the citizens. He merely considers the metics as a source of public revenue, and the citizens as the beneficiaries of these same revenues. Be that as it may, by insisting on the distinction of status, Schütrumpf re-founds the *Staatsdenken*. Instead of ensuring their maintenance by subjugating the Greek cities—unjust politics—the Athenians would exploit, at home, the metics and the slaves. ‘This simple inversion from exterior towards interior is the main idea of the *Poroi*’ (p. 39). And to compare some pages of the *Politics*: ‘in Aristotelian terms, Xenophon’s method could be described thus: he challenges the form of power, in which the citizens of the Greek cities, the allies of the Athenians, fall into slavery. He replaces it with a just form of power, by which slaves, that is to say those who merit being commanded despotically, assure the Athenians their necessary maintenance’ (p. 40).

Such an analysis, in terms of ‘status’ and of ‘power’ is interesting; but it appears a little forced (what applies to slaves applies much less well to metics and travelling traders) and does not, in my opinion, exactly translate Xenophon’s intentions, who wanted the citizens to provide their maintenance (from their own city)—ἐκ τῆς ἐαυτῶν (πόλεως)—meaning from the resources of Attica (chap. 1) as much as from the producers of revenues, strangers or slave.

The last section (pp. 45–65) focuses on the examination of ‘other proposals to check the misery of the *demos* in the 4thc.’ First Aristotle, *Politics*, VI, 5. To restore social peace, and encourage a good democracy (the point of view is not humanitarian), the Stagirite proposed that if the state has revenues, it should not squander them with repeated distributions, as do the ‘demagogues’, but establish a fund and use it to give the downtrodden citizens (*aporoï*) means to buy land, or, if not this, an investment in commerce or agriculture. Schütrumpf then analyses Isocrates’ *Areopagiticus*, a work roughly contemporary with the *Poroi*. There the author defends an ancient and largely mythical regime. Thanks to the role that the

Areopagus played, he said, rich and poor once stood together. The former gave the latter means of survival; the poor were not jealous of the rich. The people limited themselves to electing magistrates and judging disputes; richer citizens administrated public affairs 'like servants'. Social concord, work, and the well being of all went hand in hand with moderate democracy, in which the highest citizens, enjoying leisure and appropriate education, held the top places. In giving the Areopagus back its old influence, and in promoting the return to old education, the city would be transformed. Rich and poor would change their way of thinking and lend each other mutual support instead of fighting.

Without mistaking the differences that separate them, Schütrumpf believes that his projects have a common point of departure with those of other, fourth century, thinkers: 'the question of knowing what can be done for the *demos* to receive what they need for living' (p. 64). By different means, Xenophon, Isocrates, and Aristotle would have wanted to eradicate social tensions born of the poverty of the people, and thereby encourage a moderate democratic regime in which the rich enjoyed the tranquil possession of their goods and took charge of affairs, while the poor, given the necessities of life but deprived of leisure, could only now and then participate in the administration of public affairs.

I am not sure that these connections, interesting in themselves, can contribute to understanding the *Poroi*. In the *Areopagiticus*, the 'imitation of ancestors' is a theme of political thought where rhetoric, moralism, and historical fabrications mingle. So can we speak of a reform project? Practical proposals shine by their absence. As for the measure envisaged by Aristotle, it seems to me fundamentally different from Xenophon's because it expressly concerns the very poor and not, as in the *Poroi*, 'the citizens' or 'all the Athenians'. The philosopher imagines a limited and isolated action that would be a kind of partial re-founding of the city on a sounder economic basis, whereas Xenophon envisages regular distributions of public subsidies which pick up the methods of the 'demagogues' of whom Aristotle disapproved.

On the nature of the distribution of funds, Schütrumpf's hypotheses differ from those I have upheld, which he criticizes in an appendix

(pp. 65–72). According to him, as we have seen above, the subsidies distributed to the people thanks to the growth of public revenues would have been subsistence allocations, distinct from the civic *misthoi*. Was the ‘poverty of the people’ not a hard daily reality in 355/4, affecting most of the civic population (including women and children)? The triobol promised by Xenophon would have assured the most downtrodden a minimum upkeep (τροφή). I have myself proposed, following R. Herzog and A. Wilhelm, that at least in a first period, the surpluses would have permitted more regular and more frequent payments of the civic *misthoi* and that thus the τροφή of the people was, in Xenophon’s eyes, the maintenance of the ‘political animal’.

Our disagreement is explained in the first place (but not solely) by our different approaches. Schütrumpf is interested in political thought and therefore analyses Xenophon’s project as a whole, realizable in a short timeframe, and he immediately unrolls all its logical consequences. Having adopted a more empirical approach, if not more historical, I tried to understand how the implementation of Xenophon’s concept would have affected the institutions of the democratic city, before examining whether its complete realization would not have ruined them. So, for the convenience of the analysis, I distinguished Xenophon’s *goal* from his *ideal* and sought to define the first prior to, and the second after detailed commentary.

The terms used (‘goal’ and ‘ideal’) are contestable, at least ambiguous, but the distinction between the short and the long term seems to me still not only to be valuable, but essential for the analysis of the τροφή. In fact, the great project of the *Poroi*, whose demonstration occupies half the work, is the acquisition of 60–90,000 public slaves, whose lease will provide the payment of three obols per day to each Athenian. Xenophon proposes that the city buys first, as the result of an *eisphora*, 1,200 slaves (IV, 23), and then uses the revenue produced for new purchases and thereby ‘in five or six years’ comes to possess more than 6,000 slaves. Then, from the rent received by the city, a third, i.e. 20 talents, will be allocated to the purchase of new slaves (a few less than 700). And so on. It would be necessary, then, if all went well, that several decades pass before the total required would be reached. The daily triobol is not a solution for tomorrow. Nevertheless, Xenophon wants the task to be put into action quickly

(VI, 1) and proposes other measures that are not costly (concerning the metics and traders) that—according to him—will permit improvement of the public finances in the short term, but only as a partial solution. In other words, if it is immediately decided to institute the programme of the *Poroi*, from the next year the city will have slightly increased revenues, and these revenues will annually increase thanks to the leasing of public slaves. Against the background of growing public revenue, which will be progressive, the ‘public’ ἀπὸ κοινοῦ distribution of τροφή (IV, 33) will be also progressively greater. The reader must therefore adopt an interpretation of the τροφή that suits both the short term (when the public revenues are still limited) and the long term (when the payment of the daily triobol becomes possible).

It still seems to me to be necessary to analyse the effects of Xenophon's plan in the long term, but I do recognize that I was mistaken to use the beginning of chapter VI to define the short term goal. When Xenophon writes, ‘if it is true that none of my proposals is unrealizable or even difficult to realize and that thanks to their implementation . . . the people would have abundant τροφή, while the rich would be unburdened of the expenditures of war, and that, thanks to abundant surpluses (of revenues) we would celebrate festivals more elaborately than we can today, restore sanctuaries, repair walls and docks, and pay the priests, the Council, the magistrates and the horsemen their “ancestral dues” (τὰ πάτρια), how could we not think it good to implement them as quickly as possible?’—this results, as Schütrumpf rightly emphasized (pp. 66–7), from the situation resulting from the complete application of Xenophon's programme.

If we do not take account of timeframes and practical details, do we not seem to be more theoretical than Xenophon? According to Schütrumpf, it would be enough to give the usual meaning (‘food’ or ‘upkeep’) to τροφή and to consider the twin result of Xenophon's programme: on one side, the state, having become richer, would regularly distribute subsidies to the people; on the other, the influx of metics, traders, and mining slaves would provoke growth in economic activity, which would profit individuals.

The second point is only implicit in the *Poroi*, and the first would demand refinement. Certainly if we imagine only the final situation

and take seriously the hypothesis about the daily triobol, we must concede that an allocation as regular as that would have had nothing in common with civic allowances—at least such as were actually distributed and received in the democratic city.⁸ But since the author himself envisages or suggests long delays and only a partial application of his plan (IV, 34–40), the commentator must ask himself about the initial results: on which occasions, by what methods, and in which form would the sums that were progressively available over the following years be distributed to the citizens? As Xenophon has not made this clear, the simplest hypothesis seems to me to still be the one that I adopted following R. Herzog and A. Wilhelm: the growth of public revenues would have first allowed a more regular and larger payment of the civic *misthoi*. We know well that the two most important to the majority of citizens—the Heliaea and the Assembly—were then paid in the form of the triobol.⁹ Pure coincidence we might say. Maybe. But the hypothesis fits the nature of the *τροφή* that Xenophon envisages (and to which I will shortly return) and fits our meagre information on the functioning of these institutions. The tribunals in fact did not meet when, due to unforeseen expenditures and short-comings in the treasury, the triobol could not be paid to jurors.¹⁰ Assembly payment, at least in the beginning of the fourth century, was not ordinarily given to *all* the citizens who were present. In line with the available sums, a pre-determined number of ballots were distributed to the first to arrive, who then received the triobol; the others left with empty hands.¹¹ Thus, before becoming (at the end of how many years?) a daily allocation and thus acquiring a new significance, the triobol mentioned

⁸ So, I considered, in relation to the final outcome, the idea of subsistence allocation (1976, 242–3, and also 20–2); but, at present, I would analyse the situation in the long term in a way much simpler than before, cf. *infra* pp. 132 f.

⁹ See 1976, 29 and n. 14, *infra*, n. 11.

¹⁰ Cf. Haussouiller, 1917, 97–102.

¹¹ Cf. Busolt-Swoboda, II, 1926, 994 and n. 2. The cited passages from Aristophanes' *Assembly of Women* are revealing (add 186–8, 282–4). The information is valid for the difficult years from the beginning of the fourth century and we may suppose that the sums reserved for the payment of the *misthos* of the assembly perceptibly varied from one epoch to another; but, when the *Poroi* was written, the financial situation was not good (on the other hand, the elevated amount of the *misthoi* received by the Assembly, as indicated by Aristotle in the *Ath. Pol.* 62, 2, was perhaps a new thing, due to the financial prosperity of Athens under Lycurgus' administration).

in the *Poroi* could have been distributed more frequently to citizens within the structure of democratic institutions: perhaps, as already happened, but not without difficulty or limits, in the Assembly and Heliaea, or for the benefit of new stake-holders, or in particular circumstances, for example to ephebic patrols, as Xenophon suggests (IV, 52), or citizens attending the City Dionysia, in the manner of the later *theorikon* managed by Euboulus.

Schütrumpf believes this hypothesis to be incompatible with the beginning of the last chapter of the *Poroi* that I translated above. Everything happens, he explains, as if Xenophon was distinguishing between two series of results. On the one hand, the realization of his programme would permit the *demos* to have an abundance of *τροφή*, and the rich to be relieved of their heaviest expenditures. On the other hand, thanks to surplus, the Athenians would fund some expenses more generously (festivals, buildings, equipment) and would pay their dues (*ta patria*) to priests, Council, magistrates, and cavalry. From this exposition in two parts, Schütrumpf draws two complementary conclusions: 1) 'on its own the sequence of ideas pleads against the equivalence between *τροφή* and the *misthoi* cited by Xenophon' (p. 22, n. 101, and p. 67). 2) Xenophon's silence on the salaries paid to the Assembly and the tribunals would imply that the future of the triobol, in his eyes, must be as a substitute for these *misthoi*; on the other hand, the maintenance or re-establishment of the payments for councillors and magistrates reveals Xenophon's aristocratic tendencies (compare the measures adopted by the oligarchs in 411, pp. 26–8).

Though these points lead me to correct my commentary on this passage, Schütrumpf's reasoning does not convince me. I was wrong to see in the statement 'the people will have abundant *τροφή*' an allusion only to the *misthoi* received by the Assembly and the Heliaea, as opposed to the advantages granted to the magistrates and the Council, which follow.¹² The proposition has a more general meaning and probably covers all forms of subsidies that, thanks to Xenophon's project, would be paid to citizens in the more or less distant future (including the daily triobol). Moreover, I am tempted to flag

¹² For another point of view, see the critique by Hansen, 1979, 20–1, n. 23 (but some of his arguments are debatable).

the meaning of the expression *ta patria* more emphatically than before. I do not think that Xenophon avoided using the term *misthos* here, as Schütrumpf says (pp. 23–4), ‘because this would have only given a reason (*sc.* to the reader) to question the payment of the most important *misthoi*, those of the Assembly and the tribunals’ (whose suppression Xenophon would have envisaged in the future). Rather than ‘salaries’, is the author not thinking of various advantages, fees or honours, to which priests and magistrates (some of them at least), councillors and cavalrymen had an ancient right, particularly during festivals, which Xenophon expressly wished to stage more magnificently?¹³

Whatever the case may be, the sequence of ideas does not invalidate the hypothesis according to which the *τροφή* of the *demos*, at least in part or at an early stage, would have consisted of civic payments. As opposed to the wealthy, *plousioi*, who, like their fellow-citizens, will get public subsidies but will welcome Xenophon’s plan because of the reduction of their burdens, the *demos* here covers poor and humble citizens, for whom the public payments (and, in the long term, the daily triobol) will be essential. In then mentioning the re-establishment of the advantages that benefit priests, magistrates, councillors, and cavalrymen, Xenophon treats restricted categories, with whom most citizens, at the Assembly, in the courts or at festivals, plainly do not merge.

This controversy would only have a limited interest if it did not lead one to question the meaning and direction of the whole work. Where Schütrumpf sees a programme with a political intention directed at reform (to return to a moderate democracy) and having an economic dimension (because it would be about ending the poverty of the masses, not only thanks to public subsidies, but also and especially to the happy consequences for each individual of increased exploitation of the land), I see a project that aimed to restore public finances without returning to imperialism, and to permit the functioning of a democracy, in which the ‘haves’ would no longer be harassed. In my understanding, the *τροφή* that concerns Xenophon is political and this is why the link with the civic payments is logical and

¹³ See Hansen, 1979/1980, 105–25.

necessary. Finally, Xenophon's project appears to me, more now than in the past, to conform to images of democracy (favourable or not) created by his contemporaries, of its advantages and constraints. In the following pages, I attempt to present the steps of my reasoning more clearly than in my *Commentary*, while at the same time responding to some of Schütrumpf's objections.

1) I observe that in the eyes of Xenophon—and of the *prostatai*—of whom he speaks in I, 1—the problem of the 'poverty of the masses' is not new. Already in the past, influential orators 'declared' or 'affirmed' (Xenophon uses imperfects, *ἔλεγον*, *ἔφασαν*, which convey repetition of effort) that they resigned themselves to imperialism, though known to be unjust, 'because of the poverty of the masses'. It was therefore not the consequence of a recent crisis.¹⁴ Certainly, the political-military defeats of 357–354 and the decline, already felt or just predictable, of profits linked to imperialism would again bring the difficulties of the Athenian people into plain view—from which came the reflections and the proposals of his contemporaries. But, to repeat, 'the poverty of the masses' was not the product of an unfavourable situation, but constituted a fundamental problem for the Athenian democracy. In the fifth century and from 377–357, imperialism contributed to the resolution of the problem.

2) How? Xenophon does not indicate how (this is not his topic) and Schütrumpf does not ask the question. Given our sources, we can imagine two means of enrichment. On the one hand, since the fifth century, the 'Empire' permitted the appropriation, public and certainly private, of lands belonging to the allies, and more generally, of goods or money extorted by threats or intrigue, not to mention the profits that the Athenians could realize through the development of trade. All of this, which converged to increase the resources of *individuals*, is mentioned, not without distortions, in the *Athenaion*

¹⁴ I note my disagreement with Schütrumpf, who suggests that the *Poroi* is Xenophon's answer to the impoverishment of the Athenians in the years before the Social War (see, esp., 1982, 32 and n. 143). This hypothesis is logical (and even necessary) once we interpret the 'poverty' of the citizens and the *τροφή* of the *demos* from an economic point of view. In my opinion, this perspective is not the correct one and the texts that are mentioned (Isocr. VII, 83; Xen., *Oec.* XI, 10) could not furnish information on a specifically dated social situation (see *infra* about the second of these passages).

Politeia of the *Old Oligarch* (I, 14–19). On the other hand, the tributes and taxes paid by the allies increased the public treasury and permitted the distribution of salaries to hoplites, rowers, and garrisons, but also to jurors, councillors, and some magistrates. The issue here is payments to *citizens* who perform public functions and represent the city. As I have emphasized, this is Aristotle's point of view in his *Ath. Pol.* (24): for him, the 'τροφή of the *demos*' that Aristides guaranteed to citizens who agreed to 'take the hegemony in hand and to leave their country homes to reside in the city' after 480, that τροφή was at that time guaranteed by the *misthoi* paid to all the servants of the hegemonic state.¹⁵ This is Aristophanes' view in the *Wasps* (655–64). Bdelycleon counts only the incoming revenues, won for the city by the Empire (tributes and taxes), and tells Philocleon that the salary distributed to the jurors in one year is less than one tenth of the total.

Given that Xenophon's work is entirely focused on the 'means of wealth' (*poroi*), and that the assets of Attica, the influx of metics and merchants, and the resumption of mining activity were not considered under the rubric of supplementary income that they could bring the population, but under the rubric of revenues (*prosodoi*) that the city would get from them, I conclude that in writing these pages, Xenophon sought and proposed a substitute for the revenues that the public Treasury drew previously from imperialism, and transferred to the citizens in the form of salaries and reimbursements.

3) 'Poverty' and 'wealth' were envisaged by Athenian authors of the fourth century, particularly Xenophon, from two different points of view: socio-economic and political. In the first case, it means purely

¹⁵ Speaking of a τροφή 'guaranteed by the *misthoi*', I express myself better than in my *Commentary* and take into account Schütrumpf's criticism (1982, 68–9). Having come to the conclusion (that seems to me still well founded) that the civic τροφή means the payment of the *misthoi*, I unduly pursued the equation τροφή = *misthos*. In reality, as Schütrumpf emphasizes, the comparison between the 'abundance of τροφή' of *Ath. Pol.* 24, 3 and the 'abundance of *misthoi*' of *Pol.* VI, 2, 1317 b 31 on its own hardly establishes equivalence between the two. The term τροφή, being very general, leaves it up to the commentator to show, case by case, whether it refers to food or to an indemnity for food, and, if the latter, whether it is legitimate to establish a link with the *misthoi* (compare for example, on invalids, Aesch. I, 104 and Aristot., *Ath. Pol.* 49, 4).

and simply assessing the material resources of individuals; and, when there is some detail (as in the speeches of Lysias or Isaeus), the setting is naturally the household (*oikos*). Poverty and wealth were family matters. In matrimonial alliances, the succession and size of families (division of heritage), good or poor management of goods, windfalls or setbacks, some were impoverished while others were made rich. The poor were defined as 'those who do not have the means to meet necessary expenditures' or simply 'what they need' (*Mem.* IV, 2, 37). The rich had more than what was necessary.

More sensitive to the influence of moral virtues than of social inequalities, Xenophon suggests that wealth, or at least ease with money, is first a matter of personal merit. Carelessness and excessive expenditure by individuals causes the ruin of the *oikos*, commitment to work and the good management of others were responsible for prosperous *oikoi* (*Oec.* I, 16–23; XX, 21). Even though they inherited equal amounts or accomplished identical tasks, some were lacking in everything, while others had a surplus (*Symp.* IV, 35; *Oec.* II, 17; III, 5 and 8). By making them work according to Socrates' advice, Aristarchos was able to easily maintain the fourteen free persons who lived under his roof (*Mem.* II, 7). Socrates advised Eutheros, who had to work with his hands to survive, to become steward for a rich man and to arm himself in this way against poverty in his later years (*Mem.* II, 8). In the *Oeconomicus* (XI, 9–10), Ischomachus explains that his means permitted him to honour the gods grandly, to come to the aid of his friends, if they needed some service, and to contribute to the embellishment of the city. 'Good pursuits for a rich man!' Socrates exclaims, and adds, 'there are many people who are never able to live without asking the help of someone else, many more who consider themselves lucky to be able just to get the bare necessities'. A commonplace, in my opinion, and valid in general terms. Ischomachus belonged to the minority of rich men; by not neglecting the interests of his *oikos*, he has a surplus. Among the others classified as poor, some just meet their needs (they have no excess); the most downtrodden have to resort to gifts, advances, or loans from friends.¹⁶

¹⁶ Or to the generosity of the rich, as the Lakiads with Cimon, who 'fed a number of his demesmen' (Arist., *Ath. Pol.* 27, 3). Socrates' remark is so general and could be illustrated with so many examples that it seems to me to be illusory to see specific evidence of the social situation of the 360s in it (cf. *supra* n. 14).

Thus, like his contemporaries, Xenophon makes a place, beside personal merit, for mutual aid between neighbours or friends (in the anecdote about Aristarchos, noted above, the interested party needed an advance of funds to properly manage his enterprise).

As a general rule, the city does not intervene in the affairs of individuals or of their *oikoi*—except to make the laws respected; the city tolerates inequalities of fortune and even makes the best of them. It is only when the disequilibrium of resources and social tensions became intolerable and threatened the cohesion of the community that the city resorts to drastic measures (abolition of debts, redistribution of lands, colonization)—to avoid civil war (*stasis*).

In the other case, poverty and wealth are considered from the point of view of the democratic city. The subjects are no longer the *oikoi*, but only the citizens (*politai*), political animals. In this frame, the rich are defined as those who make payments to the city, in the form of liturgies, *eisphorai* or voluntary contributions: Aristotle mentions ‘the category of those who contribute from their possessions to public services, whom we call the rich’.¹⁷ The poor are those who not only do not pay such contributions, but who receive money from the city. In effect, as a political entity that demanded the participation of the greatest number in communal affairs (political deliberations, justice, defence, sacred affairs), the democratic city has the obligation to ‘feed’ the citizen—but not the head of the family. It is in this context that Charmides’ joke in Xenophon’s *Symposium* (IV, 29–33) must be interpreted: ‘once (i.e. when I was rich), it was I who paid the tribute to the people, now (that I have become poor), it is the city that pays me tribute and maintains me (*νῦν δὲ ἡ πόλις τέλος φέρουσα τρέφει με*)’. Comparing the burdens weighing on rich citizens with the advantages that the poor citizens received, Charmides’ speech repeats the criticism of the *Old Oligarch*, *Ath. Pol.* I, 13.

The political definition of wealth and of poverty lent itself to ambiguities which our sources—generally reflecting the point of view of the rich—have contributed to maintaining. In principle,

¹⁷ *Pol.* IV, 4, 1291 a 33–44. This definition, we know, was retained by Davies, 1971, esp. XX–XXIV (with numerous references).

the *τροφή* that the democratic city gave in the form of indemnities or payments involved all citizens. The rich and the poor who were in session at the Heliaea or who had come to the Assembly had the right to the same 'salaries'. But only poor citizens needed to be compensated for participating in public activities; and the most downtrodden could acquire a useful bonus to their insufficient means of existence thanks to the *τροφή* of the city: like the rowers of the fleet. The rich citizens cared nothing about *misthoi*. It was therefore inevitable that in the eyes of the rich the contrast between the payments of the rich and the profits of the others completely eclipsed the egalitarian character of the *τροφή*. Taking on the burden of the liturgies (notably the trierarchy) and of the *eisphorai*, the rich citizens formed the opinion and spread the idea that they were feeding the mass of the 'poor', who, paying nothing, received the *τροφή*.

On the other hand, the maintenance of the citizens by the city remained not only very modest, but also and especially uncertain, because it was linked to public functions and to war: a man was on Council or a magistrate for a year only, he did not sit on the Heliaea every day, and even citizens serving as rowers or garrison troops did not always receive pay during twelve months of the year, or even each year. From the point of view of people's daily needs, the *τροφή* of the citizens was a stopgap; it did not guarantee a regular revenue. The contrary assumption qualifies either as outrageous polemic or as a utopic ideal. This is why Charmides, in the passage cited from the *Symposium*, playfully celebrates his new position as 'poor', but lets Callias understand that he will joyfully recover, once the war ends and the territory is back under cultivation, his previous revenues from land.

4) Poverty and wealth are considered from a political point of view in the *Poroi*, as they are in passages of the *Old Oligarch* (I, 13) (cf. *supra*) as well as in Xenophon, Demosthenes, and Aristotle. This is why the author is preoccupied with the maintenance of the *citizens* (I, 1), not of men and their *oikoi*. This is also why the improvement of land did not interest him for the supplementary resources that the population could get from it (in particular the poorest, in the economic sense), but because of the growing revenues that the city would tap from it

and then redistribute equally to *all* citizens—but to citizens *alone*.¹⁸ This is the reason why, in the end, ‘the poverty of the mass’, once cancelled out by the Empire’s revenues and the payments that came from that, could again be suppressed in the future, thanks to the extra revenues proposed by Xenophon, which would be a source of abundant public subsidies. Only a political interpretation of ‘poverty’ permits all this meaning to be given to Xenophon’s work: it illuminates its title and content. The economic interpretation obliges the commentator to suppose that the implicit is fundamental, and the explicit is secondary.

From Xenophon’s perspective, the ‘poverty of the masses’ is therefore the absence of means that, at one stroke, prevents a large number of citizens from participating in public affairs, let alone receiving compensation, and renders the most downtrodden among them hungry to receive the civic *τροφή*. Therefore, the ‘*τροφή* of the *demos*’ is the maintenance of the political animal. The decisive passage is IV, 33: once the city is organized in conformity with the author’s wishes: ‘There would be for all Athenians, from the common stock, a sufficient *τροφή*.’¹⁹ ‘The maintenance of the people’ depends uniquely on the public Treasury and has nothing to do with the revenues of individuals. As I indicated above, the necessarily gradual introduction or, possibly, the (only) partial realization of Xenophon’s plan, along with the fact that the *τροφή* (up to the far-off daily *triobol*) is destined for all citizens, fits the hypothesis of a more regular distribution of civic *misthoi*. Moreover, some of the author’s own comments (II, 1; IV, 34 and 52) can be explained only in terms of this hypothesis.²⁰

¹⁸ I admit of course that the measures proposed by Xenophon implied the effort of all Athenians: farmers, traders, artisans, and mine owners, and that they were supposed to (or should have been supposed to) promote the enrichment of individuals. But, if we must properly study the economic and social consequences of Xenophon’s plan, the commentator must first note that the author does not say a word about it, simply because his goal was not the economic development of Attica, nor the extinction of poverty.

¹⁹ For an analogous expression, but in a different context, cf. *Anab.* V, 1, 12.

²⁰ I refer to my commentary on these different passages, the essence of which I think is still of value. On the other hand, with respect to the payment (*μισθοφοροῦτο*) of III, 5, I would be more reserved today, without being able to find the least attraction in the old hypothesis (taken up by Schütrumpf) according to which the verb refers to the lease of public buildings.

It is interesting to compare Xenophon's project with the image, historically false but still instructive, that Aristotle offers of the imperialist democracy of the fifth century (*Ath. Pol.* 24 and 25, 1). According to Aristotle, the 'τροφή' was assured to the *demos* thanks to the salaries that the citizens received by performing some public activity. The account does not emphasize the transfer of revenues, but the transfer of activities, once private (in the country) but now public (in the city or near it). The function of the *τροφή* is to permit the civic mass to 'take the hegemony in hand', that is to say to accomplish public tasks imposed by the new arrangement. Though it is not negligible for the needy, the *τροφή* was not meant to remedy the material poverty of *individuals*, who lived more or less well on their land, or in the villages of the territory, but to recompense the *citizens*, who, if deprived of surplus, were removed from public activities.

5) An objection here presents itself that can be formulated in two ways and that Schütrumpf considers decisive. On the one hand, because Xenophon envisages an eventual daily allocation (the triobol), and the occasions to receive the *misthoi* were neither regular nor, even less, daily, how can we not believe that the triobol was distinct from civic *misthoi*? On the other hand, if the triobol had to be paid daily to 'full-time citizens', they would have been incapable of doing the productive activities that the realization of Xenophon's plan suppose—and then they would have barely survived. Is it not then more logical to see in the triobol an allocation for subsistence, essential for the needy, but only secondary to the rest of the citizens, hard at work driving the economic machine and therefore less attracted by the sessions of the Assembly and tribunals?

I was not unfamiliar with these difficulties. But I was mistaken in analysing them too narrowly and abstractly, and to thus emphasize the contradictions that the modern reader thinks he sees in the *Poroi*.²¹ In reality, it is the ambiguities of the political definition of poverty (cf. *supra*) that lead us astray. That is why today I limit myself

²¹ So, Schütrumpf had good cause to consider 'debatable' (1982, 72) an analysis (the one I proposed as Xenophon's ideal) that is founded on the contradictions in which the author would be trapped. The remarks that follow help, I think, to show their consistency with Xenophon's propositions and ambitions.

to comparing the proposals of the *Poroi* with the opinions expressed by classical authors.

With respect to the first point, the fact is that the *Old Oligarch*, Aristophanes, Isocrates, and Aristotle see the civic *misthoi* as regular and daily salaries, where we see more irregular and occasional payments. Aristotle says (*Ath. Pol.* 24, 3) that in the fifth century 'more than twenty thousand Athenians' were maintained by the Empire's revenues; he cites in a quick list the 6,000 jurors, 500 bouletes, the magistrates, the archers, the garrison troops, and the cavalry. M. I. Finley comments: 'The arithmetic is preposterous; not all the categories comprised Athenian citizens or even free men; the navy is surprisingly omitted; hoplites more often than not found themselves out of pocket; not all 6000 empanelled jurymen were in session every day... Except for the navy no regular income was involved: most public offices were annual and not renewable, and jury service was unpredictable.'²² The commentator is evidently right, but the ancient author saw things differently.

Similarly, the *Old Oligarch* declared that by obliging the allies to come to plead in Athens, 'the Athenian people... receive a salary (sc. in the Heliaea) all year long' (I, 16). 'A great exaggeration' we justly say now.²³ Aristophanes calculates the *misthos* of the heliasts in the *Wasps* (vv. 660–4) on the basis of 6,000 jurors sitting 300 days a year—which corresponds no more so to the reality. Similarly, when Isocrates mentions the citizens who, constrained by poverty 'live off the courts and the Assemblies' (VIII, 130), he seems to consider that the *misthoi* would pay a modest salary, though a regular one.

Compared to these texts, Xenophon's proposals seem regular and the first objection loses its force. The author of the *Poroi* seems to think that the civic *τροφή* can or could become a source of regular payments, even daily ones. From there, either we limit ourselves to emphasizing the difference between discourse and (democratic) reality, or we take Xenophon at his word and try to imagine what, without an Empire, a full-time democracy would have been—which ends in absurdities, which I (too complacently) developed in my *Commentary* and to which Xenophon would not have subscribed.

²² Finley, 1975b, 231. Translation from English edition.

²³ Kalinka, 1913, 160 (cited and approved by Schütrumpf, 1982, 21, n. 96).

To resolve the second point, it suffices perhaps to build upon the preceding remarks. Even though it was marked for 'all Athenians', is the abundant *τροφή* described by Xenophon not designed to give the most downtrodden citizens some relief, without pressuring the rich? Indispensable to the good functioning of the democracy, the prospect of a large and regular stream of civic payments would not prevent, in the eyes of Xenophon and his readers, the majority devoting themselves to their affairs and increasing their private revenue, thanks to the fortunate results of his programme.

Let us consider again the picture that Aristotle offers of the situation of the years from 480–430. To believe him, the Athenians listened to Aristides and left their countryside, because 'more than twenty thousand' among them would have been supported by public salaries. In fact, we know that this did not happen. In relation to the year 431, Thucydides emphasizes the size and the difficulties of the exodus of the rural population; most of the Athenians, he explained, were still living on the land with their families and 'it was nothing less than his city that each abandoned' (II, 14, 2; 16, 1–2). After the war ended around 400, about five sixths of citizens lived as land-owners (after the reforms of Phormisius); most of them had only modest means and came to the city only occasionally. Among the 5,000 non-proprietors, not all were poor.

It is useless to add to these observations. Aristotle had read Thucydides and knew the social situation in Athens of the fourth century better than we do. In mentioning the huge crowd of paid members of the city (in the fifth century), he illustrates the completion and the ideal of the democratic system in Athens, which is capable of 'feeding' all the *citizens*. He is not unaware that *men* have other concerns, activities, and incomes. In a comparable manner, Xenophon could hold out the prospect to his readers of a situation where the democratic *τροφή* would be abundant 'for all Athenians', it being understood that the majority among them would continue to attend to their own habitual occupations.²⁴

²⁴ Provided that they renounce the economic interpretation (Schütrumpf) as well as a utopia of 'full-time' democracy (myself), the commentators could perhaps find common territory, based on the preceding observations.

6) It remains to assess the proposals of the *Poroi vis-à-vis* Xenophon's personality and opinions. Philolaconian, linked to the circle of *aristoi*, keen on aristocratic activities—those of the horseman, hunter, and gentleman-farmer, like Ischomachus—must Xenophon have undergone 'a conversion' to create a plan that aimed, in my view, at increasing the civic *τροφή*, thus to permit a better functioning of the democracy? Taking account of the details recorded above, it seems to me the response must be negative.²⁵

After his return to Athens,²⁶ Xenophon composed two works directly concerning the affairs of the city: the *Hipparchicus* (about 360?) and the *Poroi*. In neither of the two is it possible to discover, in my opinion, the least judgement nor the least allusion in favour of the democracy of his time. On the other hand, in both, Xenophon tries to reconcile his patriotism with his sympathy for the 'best'. The reorganization of the Athenian cavalry would have increased the power and the security of the *polis* while giving back to the 'best' some part of the prestige of old times. Similarly, the growth of public revenues would have permitted the stabilization of the political and social situation, even while sparing the rich—a considerable innovation.

Belonging to a community where democracy has set down firm roots and could not be questioned by the majority, Xenophon shows himself to be more realistic than Isocrates. He knows that the setback of the Social War and the decline of external revenues risk exacerbating the discontent of the most downtrodden and increasing the obligations of the rich. In renouncing imperialism completely, Xenophon affirms that the Athenians will increase their prestige and security (I, 1; V; VI, 1); and the rich will be relieved of heavy expenditures. But, if they have to see themselves skinned alive to

²⁵ In his review of my commentary, Cawkwell, 1979, 17–19, justly doubted such a 'conversion' to 'full-time democracy' that I had imagined in developing the extreme consequences of Xenophon's project—a theme that I will not take up again today (cf. *supra*).

²⁶ We do not know when Xenophon returned to his homeland, but it is certain that he was living there when he composed the *Hipparchicus* (cf. esp. III, 2–7 and IX, 6), then the *Poroi* (see among others IV, 13 and 25). The author of the *Poroi* generally uses the first person plural (IV, 11, 13; VI, 1), rarely the second person plural; in this last case, he pretends to dialogue with his reader to better exhort the timid ones (IV, 32) or to convince the sceptics (IV, 2 and 40).

have the indispensable civic *τροφή* assured, will these rich people not fall from Charybdis into Scylla? So Xenophon wants the public coffers to be filled by the revenues from metics, traders, and mining slaves. Thus, the prosperity of the democracy will go hand in hand with social harmony.

In spite of their bad reputation among moderns, the fact is that Euboulos and his party contributed to the proper functioning of the democracy without empire (more exactly, with a restricted empire) from 354 BC. By making the public revenues grow, by ensuring an abundant civic *τροφή*, and by not neglecting public facilities or the 'finery' of the city, these men took, by different tracks, the path that Xenophon had shown them. Today, these 'demagogues' pale in comparison with 'democrats' like Demosthenes. Like the great who rallied to his cause, Euboulos had no doubt made a virtue of necessity; and one might think that in these troubled years Xenophon's attitude was similar to that of his political friends (or those supposed to be such). The *theorikon*, associated with Euboulos' name was quite rightly considered to be the 'glue of democracy'; could one not say the same thing about Xenophon's 'daily' triobol, if it had seen the light of day?

Virtuous Toil, Vicious Work: Xenophon on Aristocratic Style

Steven Johnstone

The man who would rule must be trained to resist hunger and thirst, to forestall sleep, to put off sex, to endure heat and cold, to undertake toil. ‘If we classify those who have self-control (τοὺς ἐγκρατεῖς) over all these things as those who are fit to govern, won’t we place those who can’t do them with those who have no claim to rule?’¹ Although scholars have construed these sentiments, which Xenophon attributes to Socrates in a conversation with the philosopher Aristippus (*Mem.* 2.1.1–7), as part of a moral doctrine or as part of a regimen of self formation, it is also useful to view them as pertaining not to individuals in general but to a particular class. They represent Xenophon’s interests in constructing a style of living, which would justify and enhance the power of elites.

The works of several modern thinkers have been especially useful in formulating the problem this essay explores. Rather than draw attention away from the Athenian evidence—which is the sole basis on which to judge my argument—and encumber the text with more notes, I want to acknowledge in a general way those works I found suggestive: Bourdieu (1984, 1977); de Certeau (1984); Foucault (1985); and Giddens (1979).

I would also like to thank those who were generous enough to read and comment on earlier drafts: Jennifer Dellner, Wally Englert, Jon Goldberg-Hiller, Jerry Shurman, William Diebold, Peter Hunt, Nancy Sultan, Mark Edwards, Andrea Nightingale, the students in my Athenian Social History class at Reed College in the spring of 1992, and the patient anonymous readers for *Classical Philology*.

¹ *Mem.* 2.1.7.

The lifestyle of elites was a central and abiding concern of Xenophon. As this passage in the *Memorabilia* indicates, he thought that especially elites, those in positions of power, needed to cultivate 'self control'. The problem of how to live was not (or not only) a moral or personal problem, it was essentially political; and it recurs throughout Xenophon's writings. In two of his treatises, which concern everyday life, *Cynegeticus*, a pamphlet on hunting, and *Oeconomicus*, a dialogue concerning household management, Xenophon attempted to construct and defend an elite lifestyle. By positing *ponos*, 'toil'—a stylized labour both practical and virtuous—as the hallmark of this reformed lifestyle, he hoped to secure and legitimate the position of elites within the polis.

THE MEANING OF *PONOS*

Xenophon's use of *ponos* to define the activities of an aristocrat depended on both the general senses of the word and on a specifically philosophical debate surrounding it. Generally, Nicole Loraux has explored the contrasting meanings of *ponos* as both suffering and valorized effort.² It is this second sense, which Loraux suggests did not exist until the classical period, which is most germane to Xenophon's use of the term. *Ponos* in this sense—a sense which was strongly moral—served to mark a series of social hierarchies: noble over common, warrior over artisan, man over woman, Greek over barbarian, and master over slave.³ In each case the superior party undertook *ponoi*, and their toil (marked as morally valuable) demonstrated their superiority.

Although Loraux's account ranges broadly, she terminates it with Socrates, who, she claims, appropriated the hierarchical notion of *ponos* to endorse a specific philosophic doctrine.⁴ His successors, while agreeing that the individual must exercise self-control in pleasure, disagreed as to whether toil was necessary to achieve this.

² Loraux (1982) 171–92.

³ Loraux (1982) 172–6.

⁴ Loraux (1982) 178. For Socrates, consult North (1966) 117–18.

Aristippus thought that self-mastery in pleasures should be achieved through their prudent use.⁵ He saw no need for abstinence and toil: 'He enjoyed the pleasures which were present and did not hunt with *ponos* (πόνος) the enjoyment of those which were absent.'⁶ Antisthenes disagreed: 'For him what mattered about Socrates was that he was indifferent to worldly possessions and pleasures.'⁷ But this indifference could only be achieved through training in denial, through *ponoi*: 'Antisthenes said that *ponoi* are like dogs: they bite those who are unfamiliar.'⁸ Although these philosophers disputed whether training ought to be in the use or in the denial of pleasures, they agreed that this training should aim at temperance, *sophrosyne*, and self-mastery, *enkrateia*.⁹ The argument, moreover, was frequently carried out through discussions of ideal figures, notably Heracles and Cyrus, the founding king of the Persian empire.¹⁰

⁵ When reproached for his relationship with the courtesan Laïs, he is reported to have said: 'I have her, she does not have me. It is best to master pleasures and not be subdued by them, not to refuse to experience them at all' (Aristippus fr. 57a Mannebach). Guthrie (1969) 490–9, summarizes the small amount we know of Aristippus' beliefs. Mannebach (1961), has collected the few fragments of his writings. Xenophon gives a vivid picture of Aristippus in recounting two conversations with Socrates (*Mem.* 2.1.1–34; 3.8.1–7). It is clear from the first of these conversations, which concerns the proper relationship to pleasures, that Xenophon (and hence Xenophon's Socrates) disagreed with Aristippus. It ends with Socrates' lecture on *ponos* and his invocation of Prodicus.

⁶ fr. 54b (Mannebach). Given the importance of the hunt, to Xenophon at least, as one of the *ponoi* which should be submitted to before pleasure, it is possible that the pun is intended.

⁷ Guthrie (1969) 304–11, discusses Antisthenes. Caizzi (1966), has gathered the fragments. These are a bit fuller than for Aristippus and include two complete specimens of display oratory. (Antisthenes was also said to be a student of Gorgias.) The difficulty in assessing Antisthenes' beliefs arises because the later Cynic tradition attempted to make him into the direct teacher of Diogenes the Cynic and imputed back to him Cynic doctrines which were not his own. Though Antisthenes may have influenced the Cynics somewhat, he was not one of them. (Sayre (1948) 84–96.) Xenophon has left a portrait of Antisthenes as well in his *Symposium* (esp. 3.8; 4.34–44, 62–4).

⁸ fr. 96 (Caizzi).

⁹ North (1966) 123–32, shows how closely related these two terms were.

¹⁰ Diogenes Laertius reports that Antisthenes showed that *ponos* was good through the examples of Heracles and Cyrus (*Vit.* 6.2). Höistad (1948) 33–7, discusses what little we know about Antisthenes' treatment of Heracles. See pp. 73–94 for Cyrus. Höistad also discusses the use of Heracles, Cyrus, and *ponoi* in later Cynic tradition.

Much of Xenophon's work engaged with this philosophical discussion, especially his *Memorabilia*, a vindication of and reminiscence about Socrates, and his *Cyropaideia*, a political utopia in the form of a romanticized, mythologized biography of Cyrus.¹¹ In the *Memorabilia*, *enkrateia* is the most significant virtue;¹² indeed, it is the basis of Xenophon's defence of Socrates:

It also seems amazing to me that some people believed that Socrates corrupted the youth. Besides what I said before, of all men he was most in control (ἐγκρατέστατος) of his sexual desires and his appetites. He was the most able to endure the cold and heat and all other toils (πόνους). Additionally, he was so schooled toward moderate needs that, even though he had very little, he easily had enough to satisfy him. How could a man who was like this make others impious, unlawful, greedy, lascivious, or lazy? (*Mem.* 1.2.1–2)

This self-control, with Socrates as with others, was the result of continual training (*Mem.* 1.2.19–24).

Throughout Xenophon's works virtue is closely associated with an ascetic life, with the need for control of the appetites, and with training, especially training in deprivation and in *ponoi*.¹³ Xenophon elaborates the pattern in considerable detail in the *Cyropaideia* where *enkrateia* 'means self-control and the ability to endure trials of the body', according to Bodil Due. 'The theme shows the high value placed by Cyrus on physical strength and it is often connected with themes of hunting, drill, sweating, and so forth, disciplines which are pursued in order to make and keep the body fit.'¹⁴ Although at the beginning of the *Cyropaideia* Xenophon represents the twin themes of *enkrateia* and *ponos* as military ideas, part of the necessary training for war, after Cyrus and the Persians have gained an empire he transforms them: they then become moral principles which justify the rulers' power.¹⁵ At that point they confer 'virtue'

¹¹ Due (1989) 147–84, gives an account of his other ideal (and idealized) leaders.

¹² Due (1989) 199–200; see generally, pp. 198–203. Foucault (1985) 63–77, discusses *enkrateia* generally.

¹³ Xenophon's idealized description of Sparta, for example, resonates with this same link: there (so he says) just at the age when boys develop the most acute desire for pleasures, they are compelled to submit to the most *ponoi* (*Lak. Pol.* 3.2).

¹⁴ Due (1989) 179; see generally pp. 170–81.

¹⁵ Cyrus' speech to the Persians after they have conquered and settled in Babylon dwells on this theme: *Cyr.* 7.5.72–85.

(*aretē*)—and legitimacy.¹⁶ As this example suggests, it would be wrong to interpret Xenophon's concerns as purely philosophical; rather, he has adapted a philosophical discussion for political ends.

Modern scholars have recognized the political implications of Xenophon's ideas. Jean-Pierre Vernant takes Xenophon's recommendation of toil as a valorization of agriculture over mechanical and artistic trades.¹⁷ Admitting this, Loraux believes that for Xenophon *ponos* fundamentally distinguishes the citizen.¹⁸ Although both of these scholars correctly recognize that Xenophon makes *ponos* a social as much as a philosophical concept (and one that is also highly overdetermined), I would argue that Xenophon's interests lie less in distinguishing farmers, citizens, or free men than in defining and legitimating a particular class within the polis, elites.

THE DYNAMICS OF CLASS IN FOURTH CENTURY ATHENS

Xenophon's programme must be understood in the context of the social tensions in fourth century Athens, both between elites and others and among elites themselves. The distinction between elites and the populace was the most potent division within the citizen body.¹⁹ Athenian elites (who numbered two thousand or less in Xenophon's day, out of an estimated population of adult male citizens of perhaps 30,000) had been distinguished traditionally by

¹⁶ Due (1989) 226–7; 179.

¹⁷ Vernant (1983) 252.

¹⁸ Loraux (1982) 177.

¹⁹ Of the considerable modern scholarship defending the analysis of class in Athens, consult Vernant (1980) 11–27; Austin and Vidal-Naquet (1977) 23–5; de Ste. Croix (1981) 71–4; Finley (1983) 1–12; Markle (1985) 267–71; Sinclair (1988) 121–3; Ober (1989) 194–6 and (1991) 112–35. I use the terms 'elites' and 'aristocrats' interchangeably to refer to those wealthy enough to be freed from the necessity of labour. I do not mean to imply by 'aristocracy' either a meritocracy or a closed hereditary nobility with inheritable titles, offices, and privileges (as in Europe). No such nobility existed in Athens.

birth, wealth, and leisure.²⁰ Certainly wealth in its most direct form conferred power and some position,²¹ but *leisure*, the freedom from the necessity of work, allowed for the development of a distinctive style of life.²² As a result, the power of wealth was mediated through specific socialized practices; class was figured as culture.

Even in the archaic period, elites had pursued strategies of cultural distinction. The aristocracy in archaic Greece took part in several exclusive pursuits: symposiums, horse breeding, pederasty, and hunting.²³ Leslie Kurke has recently shown how, in response to the rise of newly wealthy men, some traditional aristocrats further elaborated their style of life with 'ostentatious luxury' (*habrosynē*): long, expensive garments, long, elaborate hair, gold ornaments, wine, song, and sensuality.²⁴ Such strategies, however, were not uncontested, and by the end of the fifth century a strong backlash had stigmatized *habrosynē*, in Athens at least.²⁵

In Athens, in fact, the desire for distinction was constantly running up against the levelling impulses of the democracy; Xenophon's project must be understood as an attempt to navigate through these countervailing forces. In the first place, sometime in the sixth century the city had intervened to undercut private benefactions that might have formed patronage relationships by institutionalizing many gifts in the form of liturgies. Specific tasks assigned to the rich, liturgies ranged from feasting a group of citizens, to sponsoring

²⁰ Scholars usually identify those the Athenians would have called 'the rich' with those in the liturgical class, some 1,000 to 1,200 individuals. Those who paid the *eisphora* probably numbered 2,000. Men in this property class probably had enough wealth to be freed from the necessity of labour, and so enjoyed leisure. Consult generally Sinclair (1988) 119–23. Rhodes (1982) 1–19, argues for the number of liturgists. Hansen (1985), estimates the population.

²¹ Davies (1981) discusses the ways in which wealth could be deployed; Gallant (1991), shows how wealthy farmers could choose among more risk-buffering strategies and how in times of shortage and crisis the rich grew richer while ordinary farmers lost ground.

²² On leisure, see Finley (Berkeley, 1973) 41; Markle (1985) 271; and Sinclair (1988) 120–2.

²³ Symposiums: Murray (1990); Slater (1991). Hunting: Schmitt and Schnapp (1982) 57–74; Durand and Schnapp (1989) 53–70; and Schnapp (1989) 71–87. Xenia: Hermann (1987).

²⁴ Kurke (1992) 96.

²⁵ Kurke (1992) 104–6.

a chorus in a festival, to equipping and manning a trireme.²⁶ Such contributions were mandatory and were made not to individuals but to the city collectively, thereby diffusing the sense of obligatory reciprocity that might otherwise accompany gifts. Moreover, beginning in the middle of the fifth century, the city began to pay for public service (as on the juries or in the fleet). As Paul Millett has argued, this was a form of income redistribution, which mitigated the economic necessity that might otherwise have fostered patronage relationships.²⁷ Simultaneously, civic ideology came to value such public expenditures over private luxury, so that excessive expenditure on showy consumption might be a matter of reproach.²⁸ Claims of inherited excellence were also viewed with rising suspicion; ancestry alone ceased to offer sufficient justification of social and political leadership.²⁹ During Xenophon's life the pressures to conform to this democratic ideology—which simultaneously stressed the political equality of all citizens and the claims of the city as a whole on the resources of the wealthiest—became even more acute due to the expulsion of the Thirty and their avowedly oligarchic government in 403 BCE.³⁰

In response to these pressures, elites tried to justify their virtues as practical. 'By the later part of the [fifth] century,' Walter Donlan has noted, 'the claims of mental and moral superiority were central elements in the nobility's defense of its primacy, and aristocratic self-justification increasingly and explicitly asserted that those who were not members of their class were incapable of high ethical behaviour or refinement of thought and feeling.'³¹ Xenophon's programme followed such a strategy, borrowing the language of newly developing fields of technical knowledge. Thomas Cole has shown that the word *techne* at first referred to how-to manuals and in the fourth century was extended by philosophers to encompass theoretical reflections on practice.³² The *Cynegeticus* is much more like the

²⁶ Sinclair (1988) 188–90; Roberts (1986) 355–69.

²⁷ Millett (1989) 15–47.

²⁸ Kurke (1992) 104–6.

²⁹ Donlan (1980) 131–6; Rose (1992) 273–8, 340–1, 352–3.

³⁰ Donlan (1980) 175.

³¹ Donlan (1980) 143.

³² Cole (1991) 81–2.

former while the *Oeconomicus* (insofar as it articulates not just practice but a language about practice) is more like the latter. Both, however, make a practical manual's claims of usefulness while also aiming at inculcating virtue, which was a theme of philosophic reflections. In marrying virtue to practice and adopting the language of both, Xenophon was able to elide the subject of class. By insisting on acquired capacities as the basis of the elite position, Xenophon reintroduced birth and wealth in a mediated form: although the socialized morality and learned abilities which constituted the elite lifestyle could be represented as ideally open to all, in actual practice it was almost entirely elites who had access to education.³³

Xenophon was responding not only to the tensions between aristocrats and the populace, but among aristocrats themselves. He sought to develop a lifestyle of distinction while simultaneously mitigating the competition that the rivalry for distinction might engender. Ancient Greece was a highly competitive culture; this agonistic impulse, however, could be quite divisive.³⁴ As Alvin Gouldner has noted, competition could create a structural disjunction between an individual's interests and those of the larger group. Moreover, since the total amount of rewards was thought to be fixed, one primary way to regulate the intensity of competition was to moderate the competitive urge itself, by making people want less.³⁵ Indeed, the attempt to restrain the effects of competition is a recurring theme in Greek history.³⁶

However much such competition threatened the harmony of citizens, it presented a clear danger to the unity of an elite class. The problem for elites was that for any particular aristocrat it was to his own personal advantage to throw over his class and appeal to the

³³ Plato pursues a similar strategy in his *Republic*: see Rose (1992) ch. 6.

³⁴ As some Greeks themselves saw: e.g. Thuc. 2.65.

³⁵ Gouldner (1965) 41–60 (see esp. pp. 52–5). Gouldner applies this analysis to competition among citizens, but the same tensions result from competition among elites.

³⁶ Leslie Kurke's work on Pindar, for example, reveals that one of the poet's tasks was to smooth over the envy and resentment stirred up by the athlete's victory, jealousies which threatened the social order. The victor had to be reintegrated into his city and his class and the resentment of other aristocrats diffused. Redfield (1977/78) 146–61, suggests that the Spartan social system attempted to suppress economic and cultural competition among citizens.

populace. At Athens this dislocation of interests was particularly powerful; the democracy harnessed the competitive urges of aristocrats in the service of the interests of the populace.³⁷ David Whitehead has shown how the 'ambition' (*philotimia*), which drove so many elites, was in fact encouraged so that they would compete in serving the city.³⁸ It is therefore less surprising that the Athenian democracy was led by elites: it was not so much a question of who the leaders were as of whose interests they served.³⁹ As Josiah Ober has remarked:

The ideological hegemony of the masses effectively channeled the fierce competitiveness of elites, a legacy of the aristocratic code, into patterns of behavior that were in the public interest... [T]he abilities, wealth, and birthright of the elite politician (and to a lesser degree of all elites) were only valorized when he received public recognition by the demos. Thus, the continuing strength of the aristocratic code of competition and *philotimia* served the interests of the democracy.⁴⁰

Elite competitiveness was, in some ways, the dynamo that drove the democracy.

Xenophon was critically concerned to redirect and repress intra-elite competition.⁴¹ One passage in the *Memorabilia* highlights this concern (*Mem.* 2.6.19–26). Critobulus remarks to Socrates about the difficulty in forming friendships, adding that even those who practise virtue engage in political battles for preeminence in their cities. Socrates replies that though some forces pull men apart, especially the competition for noble and pleasant things, friendship unites (that is to say, it ought to

³⁷ Ober (1989) 84–5, 242–3, 250. Arnheim (1977).

³⁸ Whitehead (1983) 55–74. Note, too, Demosthenes' remarks about Meidias, who had struck him during Demosthenes' tenure as liturgist: he says that Meidias ought to have lawfully indulged his ambition by sponsoring a rival chorus and defeating Demosthenes, thereby both causing Demosthenes trouble and honouring the populace (*Dem.* 21.67–9).

³⁹ The analysis of Athenian democratic leadership, that is to say, should be structural not personal.

⁴⁰ Ober (1989) 333.

⁴¹ There had often been tensions within the elite class between those of inherited and achieved status (particularly those who owed their position to the acquisition of wealth, to a lesser extent those who rose through education). Xenophon seems much less concerned with friction between these specific fractions of the elite class than with the structural disjunctions caused by competition. He seems to have seen these distinct sources of power generating conflicting interests largely because of the agonistic ethos.

unite) aristocrats (καλούς τε καὶ καλοὺς). They should be able to share, resist greed, put aside strife and jealousy, and make up. ‘Isn’t it likely, then,’ Socrates asks, ‘that aristocrats will be partners even in public honours, not only without harming each other but in fact to their mutual benefit?’ So, he concludes, ‘isn’t it profitable for someone who has acquired the noblest friends to take part in government, treating them as partners and collaborators in affairs rather than as rivals?’ Xenophon sought to mitigate elite competitiveness both by restricting the desire that drove competition (by insisting on self-control) and by shifting competition to a purely cultural field. Neither the *Cynegeticus* nor the *Oeconomicus* were so much manuals of practical activity (as they have sometimes been construed) as of aristocratic style.⁴²

XENOPHON’S *CYNEGETICUS*

Although somewhat unusual in its form, Xenophon’s *Cynegeticus* exhibits a unity in construction and purpose. It begins with a lengthy

⁴² Although the date of neither treatise can be fixed securely, they both seem directed to Athenian audiences and their concerns. The *Oeconomicus*, with its Athenian setting and characters and its concern with particularly Athenian problems (e.g. the management of slaves or the abuse of the legal system (sycophancy) and the need to practise speaking to combat this (11.21–5), neither of which would have been significant concerns at Sparta) has usually been construed by scholars with little comment to refer to Athens. The *Cynegeticus* does not provide the same obvious clues, but its pointed references to sophists and philosophers (13.1, 13.9) suggest Athens much more than Sparta, as do its recommendations for the education of young men after they’ve learned to hunt (2.1), advice which clearly conflicts with the model of the Spartan system (*Lak. Pol.* 2.1 ff.). Xenophon, born around 430 BCE, spent much of his adult life living away from Athens. There is nothing concrete by which to establish the date of the *Cynegeticus*. Marchant, in the introduction to the Loeb edition (1925), xl, suggests 401 and Luccioni (1947) 23 avers a similar date, but Delebecque (1970) 33–5, puts it somewhere around 390. The *Oeconomicus* is usually thought to be later. Delebecque (1951) 21–58, places it between 365 and 355. Despite his absence from his native city and his pervasive admiration of Sparta, Xenophon retained an intimacy with and concern for Athens. The *Hipparchikos*, a work probably written relatively late in his life, offers suggestions for improving the Athenian cavalry. The *Poroi*, probably his final work and securely dated to 355, is a detailed argument for improving the public finances of Athens. Other scholars have generally taken Xenophon to be understood in a persistently Athenian context: e.g. Higgins (1977), or Luccioni (1947).

preface invoking mythical students of the hunt and the benefits they gained from it (chapter 1). The body of the work (chapters 2–11) has been described as a technical manual of hunting: the bulk of this section concerns hunting hares on foot with dogs (chapters 2–8), although the remainder covers hunting deer, boars, and more exotic animals (chapters 9–11). The advice offered the hunter of hares includes descriptions of equipment (chapter 2), of dogs (chapters 3 and 4), and of the behaviour of hares (chapter 5), and instruction in exercise and training as well as the actual hunt (chapters 6–8).⁴³ The lengthy epilogue both extols the benefits of hunting (chapter 12) and blames the sophists as providing an inferior education to that offered by the hunt (chapter 13).

Some have questioned the authenticity of part or all of the treatise because of the seeming incompatibility of the preface, body, and epilogue, but V. J. Gray has recently offered a reasoned defence of its unity.⁴⁴ She notes that if it is seen as merely a technical manual, then the beginning and end do seem incongruous. But Xenophon, she argues, was writing a *parainesis*, a work of exhortation and advice including a programme of ‘what activities to pursue, what to avoid, what company to keep, how to live’.⁴⁵ She compares it both to Hesiod’s *Works and Days* and to two of Isocrates’ tracts, all of which must be seen as a common genre.⁴⁶ There are important implications for the way we read the pamphlet in these conclusions, for they suggest that the *Cynegeticus* is not (or not primarily) a practical manual of hunting, but that it aims, rather, to inculcate a moral sense. As Alain Schnapp has noted, Xenophon’s treatise is less a practical manual and more an ideological apology, or, even, a manual of etiquette.⁴⁷

The hunt, for Xenophon, was still a form of elite display. Xenophon’s insistence that the hunt be beautiful (*kalos*) firmly situates it in this aristocratic tradition: the hunt was meant to be both beautiful,

⁴³ Anderson (1985), chs. 2–3, and Hull (1964), both give modern accounts of the techniques of Greek hunting, as described by Xenophon.

⁴⁴ Gray (1985) 156–72. Gray includes citations of those who doubt the work’s authenticity, to whom she is responding. She also argues that there is no need to discard the traditional ascription of the work to Xenophon (pp. 162–72).

⁴⁵ Gray (1985) 159.

⁴⁶ Gray (1985) 159–61.

⁴⁷ Schnapp (1973) 317.

that is, an elite spectacle to be seen, and ennobling, that is, morally good in a class specific way.⁴⁸ So, in describing the physical defects which make dogs incapable of hunting well, Xenophon disqualifies the unsightly dogs as 'ugly' (*aischra*) to the eye, a word which as the opposite of beautiful could mean either ugly or morally bad.⁴⁹ In enumerating the advantages that accrue to a hunter, Xenophon notes that unlike the 'ugly' (*aischran*) language of those who engage in politics for their own gain, the hunter's diction is 'eloquent' (*Cyn.* 13. 16). In his advice to the man knocked to the ground and trampled by a boar, Xenophon recommends that one of his companions distract the boar so that he can jump up quickly, remembering, of course, to grab hold of his spear: 'For safety is not beautiful (*kalē*) except to one who conquers' (*Cyn.* 10. 15). The effect of the whole hunt should be one of exquisite and overwhelming beauty: 'So charming is the spectacle that if anyone saw a hare tracked, found, chased, and caught he would forget whatever else he loved.'⁵⁰

Although the hunt had long been reckoned as one of the distinguishing practices of the upper classes and was especially associated with the socialization of the young,⁵¹ nevertheless Xenophon attempted to reinvigorate it and reinvest it with new legitimacy by situating it in a discourse of utility. In Xenophon's reflection on the art, status derives from the display not of wealth but of virtue, virtue which is not only a socially specific aesthetic sensibility, but also, as he claims, practical as well. In the first place, although the *Cynegeticus* concerns the proper style of life, it takes the form of a practical manual: it describes in detail the nets and stakes employed, the behaviours of hares when being chased, and the training of dogs (*Cyn.* 2. 5–9; 5. 15–21; 7. 6–12). The hunt, however, as Xenophon constructs it, was not primarily a productive activity. Nowhere does he mention meat. In fact, attention to the production of food could distract from the real purpose of hunting. He warns: 'Do not be

⁴⁸ This corresponds to Xenophon's attitude toward horses which, as Vilatte has shown, were meant to show the master's excellence by presenting a beautiful spectacle: Vilatte (1986) 274.

⁴⁹ *Cyn.* 3. 3. Notice too that the colour of the dogs must be right: 4. 7–8.

⁵⁰ *Cyn.* 5. 33. Xenophon elsewhere describes the hunter's relationship to hunting as 'loving', *ēpān*: *Cyn.* 12. 10, 14; 13. 18.

⁵¹ See above, n. 23.

excessive in tracking the hare. Using every means to make the capture quickly is diligent ('toil-loving' *φιλόπονον*), but it is not hunting.⁵² It was not essential that animals were killed. Hunting might even interfere with the efficient production of food: Xenophon praises the customs of previous times which both had prohibited hunting by night near the city 'so that those who practise that art might not deprive the young men [who hunt by day] of their game' and also had allowed hunting over cultivated fields 'despite the scarcity of grain'.⁵³

Xenophon claims that the hunt is useful in two ways: it trains a man for war and it inculcates virtue.⁵⁴ Men will be better soldiers, he maintains, if they have gotten used to carrying weapons over rough country, sleeping on the ground, following orders while fighting, and moving through difficult terrain (*Cyn.* 12. 2–5). The emphasis on utility, however, is as much ideological as real: hunting as he describes it, although as useful as any other kind of general physical training, taught none of the specific skills needed for hoplites or other soldiers.⁵⁵ More importantly, from Xenophon's perspective, the young hunters become better soldiers and generals because the hunt trained them in virtue (*Cyn.* 12. 8–9). Hunting, writes Xenophon, 'makes [young men] self-controlled and just, because they are schooled in the truth' (*Cyn.* 12. 7). Xenophon insists that the young men will discover the meaning and content of 'virtue' through the toil associated with the hunt (*Cyn.* 12. 18, 22).

Xenophon contrasts hunting as a form of education with the instruction of the sophists, who and whose students seek only their own advantage (*Cyn.* 13. 10). He wants to legitimate the traditional aristocratic practice of hunting in the practical terms of sophistry itself: it makes citizens who are better able to serve the state. But he also wants to show that it is superior to sophistry in this regard:

Because they are busy making off with the property both of ordinary people and of the city, [selfish politicians under the influence of the sophists] are

⁵² *Cyn.* 6. 8. Even in hunting, Xenophon worried about the competitive urge.

⁵³ *Cyn.* 12. 6–7. Night seems to have been the time when those who earned their livelihood at hunting did it (Anderson (1985) 159 n. 3).

⁵⁴ Largely in chapter 12.

⁵⁵ Vidal-Naquet (1986) 120 makes this point. Hunting was apparently not a part of the training of Athenian ephebes (Pleket (1969) 292–4).

less useful for the security of the state than private people are; and because they are incapable of toil (*πονεῖν*), their bodies are the worst and most shameful (*κάκιστα καὶ αἰσχίστα*) for war. Hunters, on the contrary, supply both their bodies and their fortunes in good condition (*καλῶς*) to the state for the citizens.⁵⁶

Xenophon would like to argue that it is not so much a skill (excepting, of course, skill in war) as a moral sense which is the product of each kind of education, and the sophists, despite their claims, lead the young only to the opposite of virtue (*Cyn.* 13. 1).

Hunting, as a form of elite education, held one other significant advantage for Xenophon. In hunting, the agonistic impulse which drove elite competition and weakened elite solidarity was directed away from rivalry with other aristocrats and against the animals which were the object of the hunt. In the concluding paragraphs of the treatise (13.10–18), Xenophon starkly contrasts ‘those who rashly seek their own advantage’ (13. 10) by attacking their ‘friends’ (13.12 (twice), 13.15) with hunters who attack animals that threaten everyone. ‘So those who want to gain an advantage at the expense of the city practise to gain victory over their friends, but hunters do this over common enemies’ (13.15). The pupils of the sophists advance their own interests against their friends’, whereas those socialized in the hunt do not undermine the interests of their class in cut-throat competition.

Xenophon’s instructions did not make for a more efficient hunt as much as for a nobler man. Although it may have supplied meat for the table, hunting was in the first place an exclusively aristocratic education, which developed a sense of beauty and of virtue. Certainly, as Xenophon describes it, the practice was reserved for elites—as were its benefits. It was (as Xenophon notes) a pursuit not all could afford to follow (*Cyn.* 2. 1)⁵⁷: Good dogs were rare, and must have been expensive (*Cyn.* 3. 2). The hunt took most of the day and

⁵⁶ *Cyn.* 13. 11. The subject of the first sentence is carried over from the previous one: ‘those who rashly seek their own advantage’. I have expanded this somewhat because it is clear from the context that these men’s conduct has been formed by their association with the sophists.

⁵⁷ Compare this to Xenophon’s idealized system of Persian education which, while in theory open to all children, is in fact (as he notes) restricted to those whose fathers can afford to keep them free from work (*Cyr.* 1.2.15).

the dogs were meant to be taken out every other day (*Cyn.* 6. 25; 6. 3–4). Even Xenophon was aware that to do it right would take a great deal of time (*Cyn.* 12. 10 ff.). Xenophon sought to transform the leisure time afforded by wealth into a distinctive style of life, so that the pursuit of ordinary activities (here, hunting) would be carried on in such a way as to both mark their practitioners as elite and reserve their advantages (civic virtue) for the few.

XENOPHON'S *OECONOMICUS*

Xenophon's treatise on household management, the *Oeconomicus*, like his *Cynegeticus*, constitutes not so much a practical manual of conduct as a guide to the style of an aristocratic life.⁵⁸ It addresses less the conduct of farmers in general than that of the richest among them.⁵⁹ In substance the work concerns the proper management of an estate (*oikos*). Formally, the treatise takes the form of a narrator recounting a dialogue he once heard between Socrates and Critobulus. In the course of this dialogue Socrates relates a conversation he once had with the wealthy Athenian landowner Ischomachus. During their conversation, Ischomachus tells of talks he had had with his wife.

Even more than the *Cynegeticus*, the *Oeconomicus* shows how elites stylized mundane, productive activities by making them the object of selfconscious reflection. Xenophon begins by defining the art of household management as similar to other arts, such as carpentry or medicine, which aim at utilitarian ends (*Oec.* 1. 1–4). Like his *Cynegeticus*, though, agricultural production is not its central

⁵⁸ The work is not by any means a straightforward description of an Athenian household. It is, as Murnaghan (1988) 9–10, notes, philosophical, and therefore highly stylized and idealized.

⁵⁹ Note, for example, that Socrates praises farming as giving the most leisure for 'attending to' (*συνεπιμελείσθαι*) one's friends and city (*Oec.* 6. 9; cf. 4.3). In comparing this to Aristotle's belief (*Pol.* 1318b10–17, 1329a1–3) that most farmers haven't the leisure to get involved in civic life (or to cultivate *arete*), it is clear that Xenophon was concerned with only the richest farmers who, like Ischomachus, did not themselves have to labour.

concern;⁶⁰ the bulk of the treatise rather describes the style with which an aristocratic household should be run. Sylvie Vilatte has shown how the parts of a man's household—the animals, the slaves, the wife, the property, too—were thought of as emblems of his virtue.⁶¹ More than displaying these static signs, however, the aristocrat transformed his or her practices, doing what many did in a way that few could. The essence of creating a *technē* of household management was thus more stylistic than practical. It was not so much Xenophon's specific recommendations that were important (most of which must have been obvious), as the selfconscious principles from which they were derived. In the *Oeconomicus* Xenophon sought to convey four such principles as the basis of an elite lifestyle: the dangers of false appearances, the nature of command, the meaning of being a free person, and the importance of orderliness.

Although the position of elites depended upon wealth, by a curious inversion Xenophon considered the blunt display of wealth as the mere mirage of status, whereas its manifestation through virtuous—that is to say, stylized—activity denoted true superiority. Thus Ischomachus deplores wealth displayed directly rather than mediated through a style of living. When his wife appears before him one day covered in cosmetics, he reproves her (*Oec.* 10. 2–13; cf. *Mem.* 2. 1. 22). She must not, he tells her, merely seem to be beautiful, but must be really so: to do that she must take command of the household, imposing order by the art of ruling. True beauty, in short, is to be found in the style of the life of an aristocrat. 'Beautiful and noble things (τὰ καλά τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ) are increased for humans not by youthful appearances but by virtues in their way of living' (*Oec.* 7. 43).

The aristocrat asserted his status through the art of commanding. Ischomachus suggests that the need for command was common to all

⁶⁰ As Robin Osborne (1987a) 18, notes: 'The practical value of this discussion [between Socrates and Ischomachus] is almost nil.'

⁶¹ Vilatte (1986) 271–94. Attitudes toward rape and seduction show that a husband's honour was reflected not only in a wife's body, but her behaviour. Penalties for rape were more lenient than for seduction because the latter crime implied the corruption of the wife's character (*Lys.* 1.33).

forms of business.⁶² Xenophon's treatise concludes with Ischomachus' claim that to win willing obedience was a power somewhat divine (*Oec.* 21. 12). The aristocrat must know how to command his wife, his bailiff, his slaves (*Oec.* 10. 1; 13. 6–12). So fundamental was the idea of command that when Ischomachus seeks parallels to ordering a household, he conjures up the typical positions of command a member of his class might have undertaken for the polis as liturgies: a chorus, an army, a trireme.⁶³ Admittedly in at least the first and last of these the man who had undertaken the liturgy commanded through another man, a technical expert, the trainer of the chorus in the first case, the steersman in the second. But command was not so much a mastery of technical details (as of how to sing, or row, or plant) as of how to conduct oneself while having others—whether slaves or other citizens—execute these for you (cf. *Arist. Pol.* 1255b31–7). There can be no doubt that in each case it was the sponsor who thought himself in command: the prize for the chorus was won by the sponsor, and the liturgist was always the captain of his ship.⁶⁴ So, too, the man (or, in one case, woman) who won the prize for chariot racing in the games was not the driver but the backer. These other practices correspond closely to Ischomachus' model of agriculture. For here too he commands through a bailiff.⁶⁵ Moreover, it is not that commanding a household is like commanding an army or chorus: it is the same thing. The *technē* is generalizable, universal, and transferable. The art of household management for Ischomachus depends upon a generalizable skill of

⁶² *Oec.* 21. 2. Foucault (1985) 152–65, sees the art of command as central to Xenophon's text. Foucault's concern, however, is how command of the household intersects with command of the self. Here I am concerned not with how this practice is directed inward, but outward: how the proper governance of a household created a style, a virtue, which asserted superiority over other citizens.

⁶³ *Oec.* 8. 1–9; 8. 19–20. Murnaghan (1988) 16, believes that these comparisons are meant to assimilate the household to 'the impersonal, egalitarian, and collective character of Athenian civic life'. Ischomachus, however, is attempting to show that these institutions will not function until order has been imposed. That order creates equality among the members of the common enterprise, but it is imposed from above by an aristocrat like himself.

⁶⁴ Note that men who had hired another to actually carry out their trierarchy still claimed the prize for preparedness themselves (*Dem.* 51.7).

⁶⁵ To gauge the importance of such overseers, consider the report that Nicias paid the huge sum of one talent for a slave to manage his mining contracts (*Mem.* 2. 5. 2).

commanding, an art which is equally valid for the farm, the army, or the ship. Thus proper farming trains a man to be a commander of soldiers.⁶⁶

A parallel passage in another of Xenophon's Socratic works, the *Memorabilia*, confirms the picture of the art of commanding as a universalized art.⁶⁷ Here Nicomachides complains to Socrates that despite his military experience he has not been chosen general, but that Antisthenes, who has none, was elected. Socrates points out that Antisthenes is eager for victory and that when he undertook to sponsor a chorus, his choir always won. Although Nicomachides sees no similarity between handling a chorus and an army, Socrates notes that just as he found the best experts to train his chorus, so he will find others capable of managing for him. 'Whatever someone is in charge of,' says Socrates, 'if he knows what's necessary and can get it, he will be a good ruler, whether he's in charge of a chorus, a household, a city, or an army' (*Mem.* 3. 4. 6). Socrates then points out that the arts of ruling are the same in both cases, concluding:

For the oversight (*ἐπιμέλεια*) of private affairs differs from that of public ones only in magnitude. In other respects they are about the same, especially in that neither can happen without people and that both private and public business is conducted through the same people. For those who manage public business use the same men as when they oversee the affairs of their households. Those who are capable of using them for both private and public affairs are successful, but those who are incapable of it bungle both. (*Mem.* 3. 4. 12)

Household management, like other forms of commanding, is doubly implicated as the aristocrat's exclusive and distinctive possession. Insofar as it consists of commanding inferiors to manage the practical

⁶⁶ *Oec.* 5. 14–17. Cf. *Mem.* 3. 6. 14 where Socrates advises Glaucon to practise managing an estate before trying to manage the city.

⁶⁷ *Mem.* 3. 4. 1–12. This chapter should not be read in isolation from those around it (chs. 1–5). In each Xenophon explores a particular quality required of a military commander by having Socrates confront someone who lacks this specific quality. In chapter 4 Xenophon does not argue that the technical details of the command of an army should be left to hired help, but that the universalized art of command is separable from these details. The surrounding chapters develop ideas of specific kinds of military knowledge; this one, however, confirms that for Xenophon an important element of being a general is the generalizable art of ruling.

details, it merely asserts, in certain stylized and recognized forms, social superiority. So Socrates points out to Nicomachides that a ruler in any field will make his subjects willing and obedient, punish the bad and reward the good, win the goodwill of his underlings, etc. (*Mem.* 3. 4. 7–10). But Xenophon has also created (through Socrates) a selfconscious art based on certain principles. It is not that the masses cannot run a farm—indeed, it is they who will have the technical knowledge the aristocrat relies upon—but that they cannot understand and talk about household management in a properly scientific way. The knowledge of this art marks the aristocrat's status.

The art of household management was meant to reveal its practitioner as a truly free person. Socrates is made to say that 'even the most blessed men cannot shun farming. For it seems likely that the practice (*ἐπιμέλεια*) of agriculture is at the same time a kind of luxury as well as a way to increase your household and to train your body in those things a free man ought to be able to do' (*Oec.* 5. 1; cf. 5. 11). Xenophon's conception of freedom parallels closely the oligarchic notion of freedom explored by Kurt Raaflaub.⁶⁸ Raaflaub notes that oligarchs did not distinguish the legally free person from the slave, but the 'truly free' person (that is, the aristocrat) from the populace. In doing so oligarchic ideology rejected the democratic idea of freedom, which was grounded in the political sphere, and substituted a social definition which emphasized both character (the personal qualities required for leadership) and freedom from labour (i.e. leisure). Xenophon's treatise applies to the few for whom, because it was chosen and not an economic necessity, agriculture was allied with leisure (*Oec.* 6. 9). For Xenophon, too, freedom was defined socially: the free person was the one who commanded, that is, who was distinguished not so much from slaves as from the mass of others who were ruled like slaves. Moreover, freedom, and therefore the ability to command, was equated with a form of aristocratic virtue, self-control. Those who are slaves to vice, Socrates says, will never make good farmers (*Oec.* 1. 19–23). So seriously did Xenophon take this notion of freedom as control of the self that he makes Socrates say (paradoxically if not just shockingly) that it might be better to be

⁶⁸ Raaflaub (1983) 517–44.

actually enslaved to an aristocrat, who by chastisement might compel a person to be better, than to live as a 'slave' of gluttony, lechery, or some other vice (*Oec.* 1. 22–3). The freedom associated with agriculture was expressed not in the drudgery of work, but through the command of oneself and of others.

An aristocrat's end in commanding was to impress orderliness. Although this order was represented as practical, it was essentially aesthetic. Ischomachus tells his wife that 'there is nothing so useful or so beautiful (*kalon*) for humans as order' (*Oec.* 8. 3). A fascination with order possesses Ischomachus, who speaks with reverence of the organization the Persian kings imposed on agriculture, and especially the way the prince Cyrus had laid out trees in straight rows, and of the 'most lovely and precise ordering' of tackle and equipment on a Phoenician ship (*Oec.* 8. 11–16; 4. 12–25). When Ischomachus' wife was unable to produce from storage an object he asked for, he instructed her to put each thing in its own place (*Oec.* 8. 10). It should not be supposed that this order was primarily instrumental; it was *καλόν*, morally good and beautiful. Rather than manifesting his wealth in unusual objects (he tells us that his possessions are not extravagant (*Oec.* 9. 2)), Ischomachus marked himself as an aristocrat by the style with which he ordered them. Once again, the end was aesthetic ('beautiful' translates the repeated *καλόν*):

I have said how it is good to order the stock of utensils and how easy to find a place to put each of them in the house, a place suitable for each. And how beautiful it appears when the sandals are laid out in rows, and how beautiful to see clothes of all sorts kept separate. And it is beautiful when it's bedspreads, and beautiful when it's pots, and beautiful when it's tableware. Even if the unserious man who always mocks everything does not, the elegant man does find it beautiful that the pots laid out regularly appear (as I say) well proportioned.⁶⁹

Ischomachus divides the rooms of the house by function, categorizes all their possessions by use, and suggests that in default of this system a promiscuous chaos would prevail (*Oec.* 9. 2–10; cf. 3. 2–3). As an example of disorder he imagines a farmer who stores his barley,

⁶⁹ *Oec.* 8. 18–19. This is Socrates speaking, relating what Ischomachus told him that he said to his wife.

wheat, and pulse in the same bin, so that he must separate it out grain by grain when he needs it (*Oec.* 8. 9). For even the dullest farmer, this was an unlikely blunder. Rather, Ischomachus has made into an art one of the skills of everyday existence. He has transformed a particularly mundane and unselfconscious practice (that of putting things away) into the art of orderliness. This selfconscious reflection on the activity may have improved its efficiency somewhat. But the essential point is that it has created a new kind of knowledge: beyond the practical knowledge of how to put things away, Ischomachus has the ability to talk about this, invoking a system of orderliness which transcends particular spheres and applies universally—to a home, a ship, an orchard, an army, a chorus.

The same concerns pertain to the aristocratic woman. Ischomachus must educate his young wife into the superior style of an aristocrat. One might question the veracity of his assertion that when he married his wife she knew nothing of household duties, even though she was just fifteen years old.⁷⁰ One may also wonder whether, as he claims, he himself trained her in these duties. But the point is not that she came without practical skills of any kind, which he then taught her, but that she too must come to have the self-conscious knowledge of the arts of command and orderliness.

I told my wife that none of these [measures regarding a housekeeper] would be useful unless she herself took charge (*ἐπιμελήσεται*) that order remained in effect in every instance. I told her that in cities with good laws it does not seem sufficient to the citizens that they pass good (*καλοῦς*) laws, but they additionally choose guardians of the laws who oversee and commend those who act lawfully and punish anyone who breaks the law. Therefore I urged my wife to adopt the practice and be guardian of the laws in the household. I urged her to scrutinize our property whenever it seemed appropriate, just as a commander of a fortress inspects the guards; and to examine whether everything was in good order (*καλῶς*), just as the Boule makes a trial of the cavalry men and horses; and, like a queen, to praise and reward the worthy to the extent of her powers, and to blame and punish those who needed it. (*Oec.* 9. 14–15)

⁷⁰ *Oec.* 7. 5. Murnaghan (1988) 12–13, notes the improbability of this, and assigns its cause to the fact that Xenophon's philosophical dialogue requires the wife to be educated into being like a man.

Ischomachus' wife, too, must not just oversee the household, but understand that she does so by virtue of a universal, systematic art.

Xenophon's strategy of grounding the aristocrat's higher status in a discursive knowledge of practical activities derived from contemporary philosophical rationalization. One of the achievements of philosophy in the fourth century was to develop languages to talk about activities; Plato and Isocrates (Xenophon's contemporaries) were the first to develop rhetoric in the sense of an analytical language to talk about language.⁷¹ Thus the philosopher, as distinguished from common practitioners, possessed a peculiar kind of knowledge—not ability but science. That this knowledge of an art aimed less at improving technique than at conferring on its possessor a unique ability to talk about the practice is shown by Xenophon in a passage of the *Memorabilia* where Socrates talks to artisans about their occupations (*Mem.* 3. 10. 1–15). He converses in turn to a painter, a sculptor, and a shieldmaker, getting each of them to agree, through his step by step questioning, to his theory of their art. It is clear that Socrates possesses knowledge of how to talk about these arts that their practitioners lack. When he confronts Cleiton, the sculptor, the man is initially confused by Socrates' question:

'Cleiton, I see and know that the runners, wrestlers, boxers, and pancratists you make are beautiful, but how do you produce in your statues that thing which most allures the onlooker, the illusion of life?' Since Cleiton was perplexed and didn't answer at once, Socrates asked: 'Is it by modelling your work on the form of living beings that you make the statues seem most lifelike?' (*Mem.* 3. 10. 6–7)

Socrates, leading him through the reasoning and allowing him to agree to each statement, finally announces the answer to his own question: 'Therefore it is necessary that the sculptor make his representations of the soul correspond to its nature' (*Mem.* 3. 10. 8).

Socrates' questioning did not enable the artisans to do something they could not do before; rather, it converted their practical knowledge of their craft into discursive knowledge, the object of self-conscious philosophical reflection. Whether or not this benefited the artisans, they were clearly bewildered by the questions—but no less

⁷¹ Cole (1991) 127.

skilled artisans for that. For the philosopher it was not the knowledge of how to act that counted, however expert and skilled that knowledge might have been, but the knowledge of how to talk about acting. The ability to systematically reflect on experience marked the superiority of its possessor.

TOIL: THE VIRTUE OF STYLIZED LABOUR

Xenophon repeatedly emphasizes that in the practice of his life the aristocrat must undergo *ponos*.⁷² The gentleman's toil, however, should not be confused with the merely productive labour of a slave, artisan, or common farmer. It was, rather, a unique and stylized form of labour, which distinguished the aristocrat from these people. It aimed at the production of virtue. 'For Xenophon ...,' Vernant notes, 'agriculture is first and foremost what makes it possible to exercise a type of ἀρετή.'⁷³

Xenophon marks the distinction between productive work and stylized toil clearly in his vocabulary: the one is ἔργον, the other πόνος.⁷⁴ (To retain the distinction, I translate ἔργον and ἐργάζεσθαι as 'work' and πόνος and πονεῖν as 'toil'.) 'Work' aims at production and supplies a livelihood; as Xenophon remarks bluntly, one must either

⁷² Dover (1974) 163, claims that 'what makes... *ponoi* ("exertions", "labours", "toils", "sufferings") virtuous is that they involve neglect of one's own pleasure and comfort for the sake of others'. This does not accurately characterize Xenophon's use of the word. Certainly *ponoi* involved the neglect of pleasures, although the welfare of others did not seem to enter into the calculation very often. Rather, they were virtuous because they were stylized labours, as the concept of virtue itself marked a style of life.

⁷³ Vernant (1983) 252.

⁷⁴ Vernant (1983) 252 in his discussion of work in Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*, suggests that he contrasts labour on the farm with the activities of artisan, identifying the former with other virile activities like war. (It is, in fact, a common claim (e.g. Mossé (1969) 26–7) that agricultural labouring did not incur contempt.) But I believe the contrast between the aristocrat's labour on the farm and the ordinary worker's is marked even more clearly, and that, in the course of making this contrast, Xenophon identifies the common farm worker's tasks with those of the artisan. What Vernant says is true, but only of the aristocratic farmer. A consideration of class improves his analysis.

work or be fed by those who must (*Hipp.* 8. 8). In the *Cyropaedia*, Pheraulas, a character who has risen to a great position from poverty, describes his boyhood: his father, who supported himself by the labour of his hands, was barely able to give him a boy's education by working, but when he got a little older, his father could no longer support his idleness, so he brought him back to the farm and put him to work, where the son supported the father by digging and sowing himself (*Cyr.* 8. 3. 37–8). Conversely, Eutherus, an Athenian who lost his foreign property after the end of the Peloponnesian war, was compelled to work with his body to support himself (*Mem.* 2. 8. 1–2). 'Work' describes the labour of underlings in the fields: 'In [farm] work there is a great difference in effectiveness between those who do what they've been ordered to and those who do not but instead devise excuses for not working.'⁷⁵ Slaves are said to 'work', often under compulsion.⁷⁶ It is also the word that Xenophon uses to describe the labour of slaves in the mines at Laurium (*Poroi* 4. 3; 4. 32), as well as the work of artisans (*Oec.* 4. 2; *Cyr.* 8. 2. 5; *Mem.* 1. 1. 7; *Symp.* 4. 40).

The labour of an aristocrat was altogether different, described with a different constellation of words: especially *πονείν*, 'to toil' and

Although I am concerned with Xenophon's usage alone, this distinction was generally maintained, as a glance at *LSJ* shows. For the most part, *ἔργον* and *ἐργάζεσθαι* could be—and frequently were—predicated of specific kinds of work: manual labour and trade. *πόνος* and *πονείν*, however, were often used of labour in the abstract. When the type of toil was specified, although it often involved real bodily exertion, it pertained to activities like athletics or the military which were morally valued. Xenophon's contemporary Isocrates also generally upheld the distinction: he called productive labouring *ἐργάζεσθαι* (e.g. 7.24; 11.20; 2.21, 6.79) whereas the labour of battle was *πόνος* (e.g. 12.83; 6.57; 10.52), a kind of labour which was morally virtuous (e.g. 12.128; 1.7; 10.24). This does not exhaust the description of the meanings of these words: *ἔργον* had other meanings as well—for example 'function' or 'deed' (as at *Mem.* 2. 1. 20)—but these should not be confused with 'work' nor be taken to undermine the identification.

⁷⁵ *Oec.* 20. 19. Xenophon frequently describes working the land as *ἔργον*: *Oec.* 1. 8; 1. 16; 12. 4; 20. 16. Though especially appropriate to the labourers, it can also pertain to the farmer generally.

⁷⁶ *Mem.* 2. 7. 6; *Oec.* 3. 4. Elsewhere, on the model of slavery, Xenophon calls an individual's passions masters who enslave him and keep the profits of his work until he gets too old to work, when they abandon him: *Oec.* 1. 22.

ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, 'to take care', but μοχθεῖν, 'to labour hard' (*Cyn.* 12. 15; *Mem.* 2. 1. 17–18; *Symp.* 2. 4; 8. 40; *Age.* 5. 3), and ταλαιπωρεῖν, 'to suffer hard labour' (*Mem.* 2. 1. 18, 25) are also occasionally used in the sense of *πονεῖν*.⁷⁷ The aristocrat's labour, while often demanding on his body, was not 'work'.⁷⁸ Essentially, it was not directly productive; or, rather, what it produced was aristocratic style.

In so far as aristocratic labour was involved with productive activities, it involved oversight or management (ἐπιμέλεια), which, like Ischomachus' labour on his farms, asserted social superiority both by its refusal to work (ἐργάζεσθαι) and by its control over

⁷⁷ Loraux (1982) 178 n. 34 and 185 n. 70, shows that μοχθεῖν is equivalent to *πονεῖν*.

⁷⁸ Although generally true, the distinction is not absolute. Xenophon does sometimes say that gentlemen work on the farm, but the sense is indefinite. For example, he has Socrates say that agriculture 'seems to be the easiest to learn and the most pleasant to work at (ἐργάζεσθαι), and to produce the most beautiful and strongest body and allow souls the most leisure for taking care of (συνεπιμελεῖσθαι) friends and the city' (*Oec.* 6. 9). This work which makes for leisure did not consist in specific and degrading tasks. Cf. *Oec.* 7. 22, 31.

On the other hand, Xenophon occasionally uses *πονεῖν* of the labour of those lower in status than aristocrats. Twice in the *Oeconomicus*, in speaking of training a bailiff, Ischomachus refers to rewarding slaves who gladly undertake *ponoi* (13. 11; 14. 10). Vilatte (1986) 277 suggests that this anomalous treatment of some slaves is due to the fact that they—like the aristocrat's dogs, horses, and wife—were visible signs of the master's status. There was clearly some ideological tension at this point: the bailiff, who was a slave, must take charge in the master's absence and represent his authority (Ischomachus says '[taking care in place of myself], ἀντ' ἐμοῦ ἐπιμελούμενος', *Oec.* 12. 4), that is to say, hold the same relationship to the other workers as the master himself. (Notice, too, that Ischomachus dismisses the technical skills of agriculture in a sentence, but spends considerable time in spelling out how to teach the bailiff to rule the other slaves (*Oec.* 13. 1–12; cf. 21. 9).) The same problem arose with the head housekeeper, a female slave into whom, to ensure her loyalty to the *oikos*, the virtues of the free wife were instilled (*Oec.* 9. 11–13). Still, this was not an issue with most slaves. In four other cases where Xenophon attributes *ponoi* to slaves, it is in explicit comparison to free men, meant either to suggest a minimum standard for the free (*Mem.* 3. 13. 6; *Cyr.* 7. 5. 78) or predicated of a free individual if he were to become a slave (*Mem.* 2. 1. 15; *Symp.* 4. 14). He also specifies that the netkeeper (a slave) who accompanies the hunter should be able to overcome *ponoi* (*Cyn.* 2. 3). When he allows that rowers and pirates *πονεῖν* (*Oec.* 21. 3; *Hipparchikos* 8. 8) it is because their labour is being thought of as just like that of soldiers. In general, however, Xenophon's usage follows that which he attributes to Cyrus: 'Those whom he was preparing to be servants (δουλεύειν) he in no way encouraged to practice the *ponoi* of free men' (*Cyr.* 8. 1. 43).

others.⁷⁹ So Xenophon notes that there are many, both Athenians and foreigners, ‘who cannot or choose not to work (ἐργάζεσθαι) with their bodies, but would gladly make a living by managing (ἐπιμελούμενοι) with their minds’.⁸⁰ Xenophon clearly distinguishes oversight from execution in the advice he gives the cavalry commander:

the most important of all my hints, it seems to me, is taking care (ἐπιμελεῖσθαι) that whatever he knows to be best is carried out. Things which have been decided well do not bring profit—neither in agriculture, nor shipping, nor in positions of command—unless someone takes care (ἐπιμελῆται) that these things are accomplished with the help of the gods.⁸¹

At one point, in fact, Xenophon’s Socrates distinguishes men who work the land themselves (τοὺς αὐτουργοὺς) from those who farm through oversight (τοὺς τῇ ἐπιμελείᾳ γεωργοῦντας, *Oec.* 5. 4; cf. 5. 14–16). Ischomachus, not surprisingly, viewed his job as one of management (*Oec.* 7. 30). Throughout, Xenophon does not extol agriculture in general as opposed to crafts (as, for example, Vernant claims⁸²), but a particular relationship to agriculture which was reserved for a very few.⁸³

Because aristocratic Athenian women did not engage in exhausting training, their status was not marked in the same way as men’s.⁸⁴ As

⁷⁹ ‘Taking care’ (ἐπιμελεῖσθαι) might mean not only ‘managing’ but ‘practising’. In this sense of ‘practice’, ἐπιμέλεια very often involved considerable physical exertion—practising horsemanship, hunting, or in the gymnasium (*Hipparchikos* 8. 16; *Cyn.* 1. 12; *Poroi* 4. 52)—but like πόνος, this labour was stylized and not primarily productive. Whether it suggests oversight or a more direct engagement, ἐπιμέλεια seems to describe the aristocrat’s relationship to certain practices, even when these took the form of common, practical activities. It is just this word, ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, which Xenophon has Socrates use to describe the Persian prince Cyrus’ ‘practice’ of agriculture (*Oec.* 4. 4 ff.).

⁸⁰ *Poroi* 4. 22, here referring to managing slaves working in the mines.

⁸¹ *Hipparchikos* 9. 2. The passive and middle voices of the verbs of execution (‘is carried out; are accomplished’) show that the one taking care was not the one carrying out orders. Cf. *Mem.* 20. 10, below.

⁸² Vernant (1983) 252.

⁸³ Compare this to Aristotle’s remark that farmers do not have the leisure for *arete* (*Pol.* 1329a1–3).

⁸⁴ Xenophon tells us that Spartan women, however, in contrast to women in all other Greek states, did undergo a regimen of physical exercise (*Lak. Pol.* 1. 3–4).

Loraux has noted, the fact that men engaged in *ponoi* distinguished them from women.⁸⁵ Barred from *ponoi*, aristocratic women might still express their social position in their conduct of 'oversight' (*epimeleia*). This is the word that Ischomachus repeatedly uses to describe his wife's activities in the household⁸⁶: she oversees their possessions, their children, their servants (*Oec.* 9. 18; 9. 19; 7. 37, 41). Plans, Ischomachus tells his wife, are useless unless she takes care that they are scrupulously executed (*Oec.* 9. 14). He explains her position of superiority by analogies both political (the council, a queen, the guardians of the laws, a garrison commander) and natural (the queen bee) (*Oec.* 9. 14–15; 7. 33–4). Moreover, although not as vigorous as men's *ponos*, walking around to supervise the household was thought to constitute a form of exercise.⁸⁷ When Ischomachus recommends mixing flour, kneading bread, and folding clothes as excellent exercise (*γυμνάσιον*), his wife's labour is not conceived of principally as productive. In fact, she undertakes these tasks precisely to differentiate herself from a slave (*Oec.* 10. 11). Thus, in the household, her duties too consist of asserting her social superiority in certain stylized forms of labour.

The toil of an aristocrat differed from the work of a common person in that it was voluntary, had its own special field, and created that watermark of aristocratic style, virtue.

It was important that the elite chose to toil while the labourer was compelled to work.⁸⁸ In the *Memorabilia*, Aristippus objects to Socrates that if the happy man must endure hunger, thirst, cold, sleeplessness, and other tortures, he is no better than a slave. Socrates responds that it is the voluntary nature of the suffering which makes it different: it may be ended at will (*Mem.* 2. 1. 17–18). 'The man who voluntarily undergoes hard labour (ὁ μὲν ἐκουσίως ταλαιπωρῶν) is happy as he toils because of a favourable prospect, as hunters gladly toil (ἡδέως μοχθοῦσι) with the hope of capturing the animals.'⁸⁹

⁸⁵ Loraux (1982) 174–5. She notes that this sexual difference by *ponoi* is especially true in Xenophon. *Ponos* was used, however, to name the labour of childbirth (as at *Mem.* 2. 2. 5).

⁸⁶ Her duties are described generally as ἐπιμέλειαι at *Oec.* 7. 7, 22; 9. 14; 10. 10.

⁸⁷ *Oec.* 10. 10: ['these things seemed to me to be both ἐπιμέλεια and περίπατος'].

⁸⁸ ἐργάζεσθαι is explicitly linked to 'compulsion': *Oec.* 4. 2; *Mem.* 2. 7. 6; 2. 8. 1–2; cf. *Hipparchikos* 8. 8.

⁸⁹ *Mem.* 2. 1. 18.

Much greater than this, he says, are the rewards that come from toiling to win friends, subdue enemies, manage estates well, or benefit your city. 'Taking care (ἐπιμέλειαι) through patient endurance makes it possible to achieve beautiful and noble deeds, as good men say' (*Mem.* 2. 1. 20).

Toil was appropriate to the aristocrat in those activities through which he defined his elite status: the practices of war, hunting, athletics, and agriculture. The deprivations and physical hardships of soldiers were *ponoi* (*Oec.* 6. 7; 21. 4–5; *Cyn.* 12. 2; *Ag.* 2. 8; 5. 3; *Hipp.* 8. 2; *Hiero* 10. 6). Hunting, which Xenophon considered the best form of education for the youth, required the endurance of *ponoi* for its success and so taught love of toil.⁹⁰ There is no doubt that the training of an athlete might involve extreme exertion; consistent with its aristocratic nature, Xenophon uses the language of toil to describe this training (*Symp.* 8. 37; cf. *Poroi* 4. 52). Finally, a farmer toiled in agriculture (*Oec.* 15. 3). Ischomachus says that it was through love of toil that his father was able to improve the estates he bought (*Oec.* 20. 25). It would be wrong, however, to imagine this as manual labour; the aristocrat's toils involved oversight (*epimeleia*) and were not compelled but chosen. Ischomachus claims that it is not that good farmers know more than bad ones, but that they take more care, especially in their oversight of the workers (*Oec.* 20. 16 ff.). 'Everyone says that manure is the best thing in farming and they see that it is produced naturally. But although they understand how it's produced and that it's easy to get enough of it, only some take care (ἐπιμελοῦνται) to have it collected while others are entirely negligent.'⁹¹

Toil did not aim so much at production, as at controlling the appetite for pleasure (cf. *Lak. Pol.* 3. 2; *Ag.* 9. 3). Whatever its economic benefits, its intended product was virtue, a style of life which, Xenophon argued, was profitable to the city. Xenophon begins his account of mythical figures who benefited from hunting

⁹⁰ *Cyn.* 13. 12–13. Meilanion and Menestheus, two of the mythical figures in the introduction to the *Cynegeticus*, are specifically said to have learned 'love of toil' (*φιλοπονία*) from hunting (*Cyn.* 1. 7, 12).

⁹¹ *Oec.* 20. 10. As the middle voice of the verb indicates, Ischomachus 'has the manure collected for him' by others. His hands remain clean.

by saying that they were all admired for their virtue (*Cyn.* 1. 5; 12. 18) and the pamphlet concludes with an attack on the sophists precisely because they do not lead young men to virtue in the way that hunting does (*Cyn.* 13. 1–3). In his advertisement of the advantages of an education in hunting as opposed to sophistry, Xenophon writes that ‘those whose *ponoi* remove whatever is shameful and arrogant from the soul and body and increase the desire for *arete* are the best (*ἄριστοι*) because they would not overlook an injustice committed against their own city nor a wrong suffered by their land’ (*Cyn.* 12. 9). Those who refuse to learn because it involves toil are altogether base, he claims; ‘for they do not discover through toil what kind of man a good man ought to be, so that they are incapable of being either pious or wise’ (*Cyn.* 12. 16).

Xenophon’s clearest and longest exposition of the nature of toil and its relation to virtue comes in the *Memorabilia* at the end of the conversation between Socrates and Aristippus which begins on the subject of self-mastery (*ἐγκράτεια*) (*Mem.* 2. 1. 1 ff.). After Aristippus questions whether a life of voluntary endurance of deprivations is worthwhile—just that life which Xenophon presents as self-mastered—Socrates defends the choice of toil over indolence at length. First he invokes the authority of Epicharmus, for whom ‘the gods sell us all good things for the price of toil’ (*Mem.* 2. 1. 20), and then he recounts the story of Heracles choosing between the paths of Vice and Virtue (*Kakia* and *Arete*), a story he attributes to Prodicus the sophist.⁹² Vice offers him an easy road to great rewards with little effort: he will not have to exert himself; food, drink, sex, and soft beds will be his, all supplied at the expense of others’ work (*Mem.* 2. 1. 24–5). Virtue, on the other hand, demands discipline: ‘The gods give to humans nothing that is good or beautiful (*ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν*) without toil and care (*ἀνευ πόνου καὶ ἐπιμελείας*)’ (*Mem.* 2. 1. 28). Every reward, she tells him, will come only as the result of effort. Virtue castigates Vice for encumbering life with excessive pleasures:

⁹² *Mem.* 2. 1. 21–34. The extent to which it represents Prodicus’ own sentiments or words is not important for my point: It is, after all, Xenophon who has chosen to insert and endorse it. It is also consonant with the much briefer accounts of virtue in *Cyn.* 12. 17–22 and *Cyn.* 2. 2. 24–5.

‘You long for sleep not because you have toiled (διὰ τὸ πονεῖν), but because you have nothing to do’ (*Mem.* 2. 1. 30).

Xenophon sought to define the aristocrat by his toils. Far from being opposed to toil, leisure (as Loraux observed) made toil possible.⁹³ Toil was the stylized, even ostentatious, version of aristocratic leisure, aesthetically and morally superior to the compulsory work of the ordinary person. The labour of the aristocrat was καλός, noble, beautiful, and it won for him virtue. These virtuous practices were concerned not just with the formation of the self (as Foucault has suggested), but essentially with the self as a member of a superior class.⁹⁴ Through practices which denied pleasure and asserted self-control, elites would not only distinguish themselves from the populace, but (so Xenophon hoped) moderate their own desires so as to control their competitive urges. Xenophon sought to guarantee the superiority of elites by reforming their culture.

⁹³ Loraux (1982) 176.

⁹⁴ Foucault (1985) focuses almost exclusively on the formation of the self as an ethical subject; he considers status and class only intermittently (pp. 59–62, 72–9). I believe his analysis is enriched considerably when it is recognized that these strategies of the self were also strategies of a specific class.

6

The Seductions of the Gaze: Socrates and his Girlfriends

Simon Goldhill

This chapter will find its focus in a little read but highly instructive passage of that much maligned writer ('no philosopher', 'inadequate historian', 'great influence on the novel'), Xenophon. My broadest interest here is in the cultural politics of viewing within the classical polis—a subject given particular emphasis in current debate, partly because of the heated contemporary discussion of pornography and the politics of representation.¹ As will become evident, a concern with the scene of viewing will necessarily engage with the ideals of a citizen's self-control, with the threats and lures of erotic vision, and with the complexities of social exchange between citizens and non-citizens, males and females—and all the dynamics of power and manipulation involved in such negotiated self-positioning. Indeed, Xenophon will prove a fascinating and subtle guide to the questions of personal relations in the polis which motivate this volume.

I will begin, however, with some rather general remarks by way of introduction to the topic. It all, always, begins with Homer. In Homer, the hero's visible distinction is a key mark of being a hero. When Helen and Priam look from the walls of Troy in the *teichoscopia*, the princes of the Greek force are instantly to be seen as outstanding figures, and described as such. 'Stature' is a visible, social

¹ A debate fuelled most recently in classics by Richlin (1992) which relies very—heavily on Kappeler (1986); see also Higgins & Silver (1991); Tomaselli & Porter (1986); Armstrong & Tennenhouse (1989); Itzin (1992).

quality. When Achilles is faced by Lycaon he says (*Il.* 21. 108–9): ‘Look at me. Do you not see how big and beautiful I am’—for the best of the Achaeans is inevitably the most beautiful. When Hector, the best of the Trojans, is finally killed, the Greeks gather round and ‘marvel at the sight of his beautiful body’ (*Il.* 22. 370–1)—and then stab it repeatedly. The most shameful of the Achaeans, by the same economy, is ‘bandy-legged, with a club foot, both shoulders humped together, curving over a caved-in chest, and bobbing above them, his skull warped to a point, sprouting clumps of scraggly, woolly hair’ (*Il.* 2. 217–19)—and he rails violently at the social positioning that condemns him to baseness (before being physically whipped into place by Odysseus). In the *Odyssey*, Odysseus, the tricky one, can return in disguise as a beggar, but even then his massive thighs show through the rags, and it is with a ‘body like the gods’ (*Od.* 23. 163) that he finally strides into his *oikos*. In the *Odyssey*, the gap between appearance and reality is opened in order to be closed in the triumphant epiphany of the hero. Odysseus is ‘beautified’—returned to his proper glorious physical appearance—before each crucial moment of return: it is as a hero that he stands revealed to his wife, his son. The suitors, who ‘look like kings, but do not behave in a noble way’, Iris, the flabby and weak ‘beggar king’, the monstrous distortion of the Cyclops’ body, construct a pattern of distorted ‘body language’ against which the hero is (to be) viewed. The modality of the visual ineluctably frames the hero.

Athenian society was always enough of a performance culture to validate this Homeric sense of a hero’s construction in the eyes of others—fighting for the limelight was good Athenian and Greek practice—but the Kleisthenic reforms and the growth of democracy created new and specifically democratic civic spaces for competitive performance, and, above all, a new sense of the act of being in an audience, being a *theates*. In the democratic polis, the scene of viewing has a new political constitution and it is this new sense of the public, civic gaze that will be important for the following discussion. Both the law-court and the Assembly required a massed citizen audience, public debate and a collective vote to reach a decision. Democracy made the shared duties of participatory citizenship central elements of political practice, and thus to be in an audience is not just a thread in the city’s social fabric, it is a fundamental *political* act.

It is to play the role of the judging *polites*, the mainstay of democratic decision making. When Thucydides' Cleon sneeringly calls the Athenians *theatai tōn logōn*, 'spectators of speeches', he is in part attacking their inability to come up with the *erga*, 'acts'—but he is also attacking what in Athenian political ideology was proudly highlighted as a commitment to putting things *es meson*, 'into the public domain to be contested'. In trying to denigrate the role of the *theates*, Cleon is challenging the very principle of democratic participatory citizenship.

This is nowhere clearer than in the institution of the *theatron*, the space for viewing. The audience—which I have discussed elsewhere²—mapped the city, its socio-political divisions; and the event of the Great Dionysia—which I have also discussed elsewhere³—took the occasion of the largest gathering of *politai* in the calendar to project and promote a particular image of the polis and the citizens' duties and obligations. This vast audience of citizens and the rituals of civic display create a remarkably charged space for the contests of status in the city. The bitter row between Demosthenes and Aeschines is ostensibly on the subject of a presentation of a crown to Demosthenes in the theatre at this time. Demosthenes' speech against Meidias is predicated on the fact that Meidias punched Demosthenes in the theatre—a physical abuse that becomes highly significant because of its setting. Demosthenes' account of Meidias' appearance at the Dionysia shows well the sense of status at stake before the gaze of the citizens: 'Those of you who were spectators (*theōmenoi*) at the Dionysia hissed and booed him as he entered the theatre, and you did everything that showed loathing of him' (Dem. 21. 226). Peter Wilson has tellingly demonstrated how the orator's description of the scene is full of theatrical language, as the social drama of Meidias in the theatre becomes the subject of further debate on the stage of the People's Court.⁴ The theatre was a space in which all the citizens were actors—as the city itself and its leading citizens were put on display. Spectacular viewing.

² Goldhill (1997); see also Goldhill (1994).

³ Goldhill (1990).

⁴ Wilson (1991).

This democratic formulation of the socio-political spaces for viewing and the corollary formulation of the citizen's role as participating in—or as the object of—collective, judgmental viewing are an important context for understanding the city's imperial, architectural programme (led by Pericles and the Parthenon). The Parthenon frieze, if Robin Osborne is correct, is the first example of temple architecture to represent the civic body.⁵ As the citizen processes around the temple to its entrance, his viewing of the Parthenon frieze's representation of a procession implicates him as spectator in a particular engagement with an idealized aristocratic image of the democratic citizenry performing its religious practice. It binds the viewer in a reciprocal process of self-definition. If, as Joan Connelly has contended,⁶ the frieze represents the heroes of the state, the processing citizen is engaged in a different process of negotiation of and through the idealized image of male figures, processing. Like the *topoi* of the funeral oration, with their links between the heroes of the past and the soldier-citizens of the present, the topography promotes and projects the ideologically charged role of the citizen. The theatre's dynamic of spectacular viewing, the construction of the citizen gaze as the frame in which status is marked, finds an analogy in the construction of an image representing (representatives of) the whole city, on the city's primary symbolic structure, that binds the viewer in a reciprocal process of (self-)definition.

So too the Stoa Poikile, which runs along the Agora, offers the citizen an important, state-funded self-image. The paintings which give the Stoa its name, set in juxtaposition Athenian victories over Sparta with scenes from the sack of Troy—affiliating past and present glories in a military message.⁷ This was buttressed not only by captured armour dedicated in the Stoa, but also—at least by the time of Pausanias—by a statue of Solon, whose role in democracy as a founding father helps connect—as ever—the political and military injunctions of the state.⁸ The famous Marathon epigram, inscribed as

⁵ Osborne (1987b).

⁶ Connelly (1996).

⁷ See Castriota (1992) for discussion and bibliography.

⁸ The sculpture is attested only in Pausanias (1.16)—and thus difficult to date with certainty, though it is plausible that it is contemporaneous with the classical reinvention of the figure of Solon as a democratic hero. See Mossé (1979).

part of the same schema, further links the different elements of the paintings, since this Athenian-led defeat of the barbarian forces of the East plays a founding role in the rhetorical self-projection of the Athenian state, so well analysed by Nicole Loraux.⁹ Again, a novel architectural experiment seems designed to face the citizen spectator with a pattern of normative imagery, to engage the viewer in the recognition of the military and political obligations of citizenship.

This sense of viewing and judging was encapsulated also in an extraordinary competition in the Panathenaea. For among the other internationally attended artistic and athletic competitions of this festival was a competition in *euandria*. This contest was limited to Athenian citizens, and was organized on a tribal basis. Although details of the prizes and the form of competition are problematic,¹⁰ the *euandria* was probably 'a beauty contest . . . in which the criteria were size and strength'.¹¹ Since the contest involved strength, continues Crowther, 'more than mere posing was involved. The competitors had to perform. The *euandria*, therefore, as far as can be ascertained, was a team event which incorporated elements of beauty, size and strength.'¹² As the modern 'beauty show' with its display of a particular image of the female (and the discussion of that display) is hard not to see as an event that embodies a wider discourse of viewing and gender in contemporary Western culture, so the *euan-dria* may stand as an iconic event for Athenian culture. That the most important festival of Athens should include a tribally organized, team competition which judged citizens as physical specimens, seems exemplary of the way Athenian democracy creates and promotes a particular culture of viewing.

I have offered what must be in the space of this chapter a deliberately impressionistic account of some aspects of the classical city to make a first and central point in my argument. The democratic city of Athens—its institutions and practices—constituted a particular culture of viewing, in which the roles, statuses, and positions of the democratic actors were constantly being structured in and through

⁹ Loraux (1986).

¹⁰ The Aristotelian *Ath. Pol.* (60.3) mentions shields as prizes; a fourth-century prize inscription (*IG* 11² 2311), however, specifies an ox and one hundred drachmas.

¹¹ See Crowther (1985). The quotation is from page 288.

¹² Crowther (1985) 288.

the gaze of the citizens. This collective, participatory audience is a fundamental element of the democratic polis—a fundamental aspect of what constitutes public life.

This point is important to have made because it is often forgotten that the discussions of optics begun by Democritus and others,¹³ or the articulation of the paradoxes of sight and knowledge in the *Oedipus Tyrannus*,¹⁴ or the challenge to the primacy of perception undertaken by the sophists, or indeed Plato's theories of *mimesis*, epistemology and vision, have this highly relevant cultural and political context. Indeed, this extensive fifth- and fourth-century discussion of different aspects of the modality of the visual forms in this sense a self-reflexive commentary on a major principle of democratic practice, much as the extensive discussion of the use of language—its deceptions, truths, and powers—continually reflects on the central place of the public exchange of words in the working of democracy. Scrutinizing viewing is part of a self-reflexive democratic discourse.

This brief introduction—which no doubt could be extended in a variety of ways—is sufficient, I hope, to frame a remarkable passage of Xenophon which has scarcely been commented on by scholars,¹⁵ but which seems to offer a striking set of insights into the classical culture of viewing. It is a passage which has not yet entered either the canon of art historical exegesis (which focuses rather too narrowly on the trope of ecphrasis and the rhetorical tradition that privileges ecphrasis), or the discussions of gender studies. Yet it traces in a fascinating way many of art history's and gender study's most prominent contemporary concerns: the logic of the gaze; the gaze and desire; the politics of looking and being looked at.¹⁶ Xenophon, of course, is not an evident supporter of democracy as a political

¹³ For an interesting discussion of the science of optics as 'une analytique du regard', see Simon (1988).

¹⁴ For a discussion of this in its intellectual context, with further bibliography, see Goldhill (1986) 199–221.

¹⁵ It is particularly surprising to see no mention of it in two recent studies of the *Memorabilia*, Morrison (1994) 198–203 ('Socrates as master of erotics') and O'Connor (1994) ('The erotic self-sufficiency of Socrates'). There is a brief discussion of whether Theodote is a figure for Aspasia in Henry (1995) 48–50. (Davidson 1997 appeared when this book was in proof.)

¹⁶ See in particular Rose (1986); Betterton (1987); Penley (1988).

system;¹⁷ yet even his writing, as we will see, is crucially informed by his contemporary culture of viewing, and the contemporary sense of personal relations implicated by it.

The passage in question is *Memorabilia* 3. 11, but the passage itself receives an important introduction in the previous brief dialogue (3. 10), which I shall look briefly at first. Here, Socrates visits a painter (Parrhasios), a sculptor (Cleiton) and an armourer (Pistias). The discussion is significantly introduced as evidence of how Socrates was ‘useful’ (ὠφέλιμος) to those who practised arts and workmanship. (The demonstration of Socrates’ ‘usefulness’ is a central plank of Xenophon’s apologetics.¹⁸) With Parrhasios he begins by asking if painting is ‘the representation of what is seen’ (εἰκασία τῶν ὁρωμένων) since ‘you represent and copy (ἀπεικάζοντες ἐκμιμείσθε) through colours’ bodies of various types. This standard account of representation as the reproduction of visual form—with its associated ideas of accuracy, verisimilitude and a vision of the real—is first agreed by Parrhasios. ‘And yet’, continues Socrates, since it is not easy for one person to possess a completely blameless form, does the artist not ‘combine the most beautiful aspects’ from a variety of forms to make an image, ‘in forming the likenesses of beautiful forms at least’ Parrhasios agrees that indeed in this way visual reproduction is also informed by a certain idealism. So, Socrates continues, is ‘the character of the soul’ (τῆς ψυχῆς ἡθος) a ‘subject of copying’ (μιμητόν)? Parrhasios replies: ‘How could something that has neither colour nor any of the [physical] qualities you have just mentioned, and which is not visible at all be imitated?’ As is noted by Agnes Rouveret, whose fine study of art and the imaginary begins from this very passage of Xenophon, this dialogue ‘expresses for the first time a debate which will continue throughout antiquity, namely, how to render the invisible visible’.¹⁹ Here Socrates searches how to express ‘the character of the soul’, and this too will become the specific search of Hellenistic painting and writing about painting in particular, where

¹⁷ On Xenophon’s political stance see Pangle (1994) (strongly indebted to Leo Strauss); Tatum (1989); Farber (1979); Higgins (1977).

¹⁸ See Morrison (1994), and Stevens (1994). The whole of Book 3 is introduced as stories of how Socrates ‘was useful (ὠφέλει) to those who were striving towards noble ends’.

¹⁹ (1989) 133.

the discrimination of *ethos* in the external behaviour and visual signs of figures is a constantly addressed theme.²⁰

Socrates proceeds to ask Parrhasios if aspects of social evaluation that are normally applied to internal qualities are to be found in external signs of expression or pose or gesture: is it not the case that 'dignity and freedom, meanness and slavishness, discipline and discretion, insolence and vulgarity, all show themselves in the face and gestures of still and moving subjects'? So says the famously ugly Socrates. (Plato's Alcibiades in the *Symposium*, by contrasting Socrates' external ugliness to an internal, spiritual beauty, paradigmatically articulates the turn away from a Homeric visual regime, a turn which becomes central to Western evaluation of the non-corporeal over the physical.²¹) Demosthenes reveals the political, evaluative side of this physiognomics when, for example, he accuses Stephanos of falsely imitating the pose and gestures of a good citizen, of 'pretending to walk with heavy and serious expression, something a person would reasonably judge to be the signs of self-control and sense (*sophrosunē*)' (45. 69); so Apollodorus can enjoin the jurors 'Look at the appearance of this woman, and consider whether she—Neaira!—did these deeds' (59. 115). When Parrhasios agrees to this painterly physiognomics, he is open to the final moral of Socrates—that it is better to represent the good, the noble, and admirable character (*ἡθος*) than the base, the shameful, and odious. The move away from representation as reproduction of the visible is thus marked as specifically ethical—the categories of the moral and the artistic, as ever in the fifth century and not only with Socrates, overlap. The 'usefulness' of Socrates to the artist is to be found in the recognition of the place of the ethical in representation—that is, its use(fulness) in the order of the polis.

The second example of Socrates' usefulness to artists is with a statue maker (3.10 6–9). Socrates wonders at the beautiful statues of athletes and asks him to explain 'the quality of lifelikeness' (*τὸ ζωτικὸν φαίνεσθαι*), which, he says, particularly 'seduces men through their faculty of vision', *ὃ δὲ μάλιστα ψυχαγωγεῖ διὰ τῆς*

²⁰ A vast bibliography could be given here. On *ethos* in art, see e.g. Pollitt (1974) 184–9. On Plato, art and *ethos*, see Keuls (1978) 99–109; on Aristotle and *ethos*, see Halliwell (1986) 138–67. More generally, see Gill (1984).

²¹ See e.g. Jay (1993).

ὁψεως τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. The danger of artistic manipulation and distraction that is so evident in Plato (and in the sophistic challenge to the security of perception) finds an echo here particularly in the verb *psychagogein*, ‘distract’, ‘manipulate psychologically’ (which term Plato, following Gorgias, privileges as a sign of distraction from truth towards the fallacies of appearance).²² When the statue maker cannot answer—*aporia* comes early in Xenophon—Socrates suggests that lifelikeness comes from ‘taking an image from the form of live models’. This leads to a similar argument to that of the previous encounter with Parrhasios. Should feelings (τὰ πάθη) be included with the other schemata that are persuasive and true to life? Agreement with this prompts the conclusion that a statue maker should ‘assimilate the works of the soul in his image’ (τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἔργα τῷ εἶδει προσεικάζειν). The verb *proseikazein*, which I translated as ‘assimilate’, also recalls the process of copying an image, *apeikazein*. Here too with the statue-maker, Socrates’ conclusion is designed to introduce the ethical—the qualities of a good citizen—into the process of visual representation.

The third and longest visit is to the armourer, Pistias (3.10 9–15). Here the useful argument is about use itself. For the attraction of beauty itself is explicitly made secondary to ‘proportion’ (ῥυθμός) without which the breastplate has no ‘use’ (ὄφελος). The qualities of comfort and fit outweigh not merely beauty but also simple, accurate reproduction of bodily form. Since bodies can change shape, and move in different ways, the crucial characteristic of a breastplate, it is agreed, is ‘not to hurt the wearer when he uses it’. If the painter and the sculptor are encouraged expressly to consider the representation of the ethical in their work, the armourer’s simpler category of what is useful underlines that the category of the ethical is to be evaluated within the frame of the *polis*. It is the recognition of the use of the ethical in art as a force in the life of the *polis* that makes Socrates’ dialogue with artists useful. For the figure of Socrates, the politics of looking requires that the role of ethics in artistic representation is recognized and controlled—as what is useful to the city in making better citizens. This is not a point, I take it, that would have been lost on the designers of Athens’ programme of imperialist civic

²² See Plato *Phaedrus* 261 Aff, following from Gorgias *Encomium to Helen* 10.

decoration. (Or on the Socrates of Plato's *Republic*.) Art and viewing art are part of a politics of control. In the (democratic) *polis*, there is a new political culture of viewing.

Rouveret concludes that this dialogue represents a crucial moment in the history of art theory and perception: 'one can ask', she writes, 'whether Xenophon's dialogue does not constitute precious evidence of a moment when painting, conceived as an image resembling the visible world, imposes on aesthetic thought new figurative problems and new criteria of appreciation which lead it to play a pioneering role in the exploration of sensible appearance'.²³ While I agree that this passage is certainly testimony to the self-aware discussion of viewing and the role of the object and subject of viewing in *la cité des images*, I would emphasize not only the contribution to a narrowly conceived history of aesthetic perception, but also the wider political point: that in the democratic *polis* with the citizen as *theates*, and the new spaces for viewing thus created, there is a new culture of viewing that changes the relations between the object and subject of art. Although it would be very hard to claim that there is any specific democratic (as opposed to, say, oligarchic) political agenda in these artistic encounters of Xenophon's Socrates, the civic thrust of the dialogue shows how the gaze of the citizens in the *polis* constitutes the condition of possibility for the debate. For although statue making for victorious athletes may seem to evoke the aristocratic milieu typical of Xenophon's writing, the role—the use—of the arts has been significantly reformulated by Socrates' questioning. The statue maker does not discuss monumental memorialization of fame (for all the talk of victory), in contrast with the way that Pindar, say, compares his poetry for aristocratic patrons to statue-making.²⁴ The painter, for all the talk of what is *kalon*, 'beautiful', does not consider the glorification of the *kalos kagathos* as hero. The armourer does not reflect on how armour may be 'stored as a treasure for a king, both an ornament for his horse and a glory for the rider', as Homer puts it (*Il.* 3. 144–5), but agrees that to value armour for its beauty is misguided, even dangerous. Value is located in the object's use, a use defined by its position in the visual regime of the *polis*.

²³ Rouveret (1989) 15.

²⁴ For an excellent account of the (cultural) politics of Pindar, see Kurke (1991).

What should be represented, what should be viewed, how should the plastic arts be used, to make citizens better? These questions, which arise from Xenophon's attempt to defend Socrates' role in and for the city, are informed by the normative values of the polis, its sense of how the visual field is (to be) organized.²⁵

It is, however, quite remarkable that Rouveret does not see this discussion of art to be in a significant relationship with the following dialogue of Book 3, which gives an equally fascinating insight into the role of viewing in the polis, and the Socratic enquiry into it. (Neither Rouveret nor Zeitlin,²⁶ who follows Rouveret, mentions the passage.) It is this further visit of Socrates to the artist's studio that will take up the remainder of this chapter.

The opening paragraph introduces several key aspects, and makes a strong thematic connection with the previous dialogue. It deserves to be quoted in full.

At one time, there was a beautiful woman in the city, whose name was Theodote. She was the sort of woman who consorted with anyone who persuaded her (*οἷας συνεῖναι τῷ πείθοντι*). One of Socrates' companions mentioned her and said that the beauty of the woman was beyond expression. He also said that painters went to her to paint her (*ζωγράφους φήσαντος εἰσεῖναι πρὸς αὐτὴν ἀπεικασομένους*), and that she showed them as much of herself as was proper (*ἐπιδεικνύειν ἑαυτῆς ὅσα καλῶς ἔχου*). 'We should go', said Socrates, 'to look at her (*θεασομένους*)'. For it is not possible to know fully merely by hearsay what is beyond expression (*τὸ λόγου κρείττον*).²⁷

The beautiful woman (*Θεοδότη* 'God's Gift') in the *polis* is classed as someone who consorts with anyone who persuades her. *συνεῖναι* 'consort with' is a general term for the range of companionship a *hetaira* or consort or concubine provides, but *τῷ πείθοντι* 'anyone who persuaded her' enters her into a particular realm of exchange.

²⁵ It is tempting to speculate that the brief 'chapters' of the *Memorabilia*, a strikingly particular form of writing, were read aloud at *symposia*. Surrounded by the imagery of sympotic ware, with its accompaniment of heroic narratives and aristocratic expectation, the rehearsal of this dialogue's question of what's in an image would have a wider political point for the male group of symposiasts than Rouveret allows. This representation of Socrates as a good citizen is good (useful) for Xenophon's audience to think with, *bon à penser*.

²⁶ Zeitlin (1994) 192–4.

Peitho implies ‘seduction’ as much as ‘persuasion’—it is a central term linking erotics and rhetoric in the *polis*,²⁷ and it positions Theodote precisely. She is not a citizen wife or daughter who should not be a figure of ‘seduction’, but rather of ‘obedience’ [*peithesthai*]. Theodote is (thus) named without any defining male *kurios*.²⁸ Nor is she a *pornē*, a figure on display who can be bought by anyone with the money. She is not for sale by a pimp or madame. Rather, she is a *hetaira*, who needs to be persuaded for an appointment. If, as Foucault suggests, the classical Athenian texts are concerned deeply with the position of power and control—self-control—of the male subject, then the *hetaira* is a particularly difficult figure for the dynamics of male authority. Beautiful and desirable—but who’s in charge? Not biddable nor buyable—but perhaps persuadable. Male self-determination—self-sufficiency—is set at risk by the figure of the *hetaira*. As we will see, this dialogue is fundamentally involved with the overlapping categories of eros, economics, and persuasion—and precisely with controlling the figure of the *hetaira* as the locus of desire and expenditure.

Painters visit this Theodote to paint her picture. Both the terms *ζωγραφος* and *ἀπεικάζειν* help forge an explicit link with the previous dialogue, as the painters’ (and Socrates’) visits rehearse and reverse the previous scene’s trip to the artists’ studios to discuss beauty. She displays of herself what it is fine and proper (*kalōs*) to display. This *epideixis* of beauty must be understood within the gender terms of the period. As much as a man’s body is displayed in the gymnasium and Assembly—or in the *euandria*—and his status formed in the gaze of the citizens, a woman is not visible in the same way. Within the idealized (male) discourse of propriety, a woman who is properly controlled—in all senses—is not open to the gaze of men, except under carefully regulated circumstances, particularly within the limited sphere of religious performance. (It is not by chance that ‘love at first sight’ and ‘the glimpse of the woman at a festival/funeral’ are *topoi* of New Comedy and other genres of writing.) The prostitute is distinctive because she is open to the gaze of men. To be seen is to be available for further exchange. Herodotos’ celebrated tale of Can-

²⁷ The standard study remains Buxton (1982).

²⁸ See on women’s names, Schaps (1977).

daules and Gyges—told of Lydians but to Athenians (and other Greeks)—demonstrates the dangers of transgressing the conventions of *aidos* and visibility. To see the naked queen is to enter into the violent exchanges of dynastic succession. For the queen to be seen not only is humiliating for her, but also leads to disaster for the man who displays her in such hazardous circumstances. The Gorgonic dangers of looking at the female form are seen from Hesiod onwards: the figure of Pandora—the ‘lovely evil’—fabricated to deceive by appearance, is rewritten in Greek male writings’ often vitriolic horror of female make-up—cosmetics and false *schemata*.²⁹ So for Xenophon to describe Theodote as showing ὅσα καλῶς ἔχουσι, is to mark the fine line of propriety. How much is it proper to see of the woman? What is the acceptable limit of the gaze? The acceptable limit of display of the female body? Where is propriety to be located in looking at a beautiful *hetaira*? Theodote, as we will see, is not naked—but is dressed to attract; even, like the spider, dressed to kill: and how she fits into the dynamics of exchange will soon become the question.

Socrates ends the opening paragraph by agreeing to ‘go and view’ (*θεασομένους*) the woman, since what is greater than *logos* cannot be learnt by mere hearsay. As Socrates with ironic literalism points out the implications of the companion’s phrase—how can what is greater than *logos* be described adequately?—Xenophon encapsulates the classic problem of ecphrasis and beauty ‘Beauty (unlike ugliness) cannot really be explained... Every direct predicate is denied it; the only feasible predicates are either tautology (*a perfectly oval face*) or simile (*lovely as a Raphael Madonna*)’;³⁰... or, as here, it may be subjected to hyperbolic aposiopesis (*Beauty beyond Belief*). Beauty can only be troped, not accounted for. In this remark, however, Socrates also utilizes the standard Greek criterion of the primacy of vision and presence—the eye-witness—as the only adequate basis of knowledge. Since the dialogue will go on to question the simplicity of such terminology, this remark too must be seen as part of a Socratic irony.

²⁹ On Hesiod see e.g. Loraux (1993 [1984]) 72–110. I have discussed what Achilles Tatius calls the ἐπίπλαστα σχήματα of women, and other late accounts of the horrors of make-up in Goldhill (1995) 82–3, 90–1.

³⁰ Barthes (1975) 33.

They find Theodote posing for a painting and they too view her (ἐθεάσαντο)—as the philosopher and his companions double the (professional) gaze of the artist. When the painter has finished, however, Socrates asks a quite remarkable question which goes to the heart of the public construction of status: 'Ought we to be more grateful (χάριω ἔχειν) to Theodote for displaying her beauty to us, or she to us for viewing her?'

Charis, whose range of meanings stretches from 'gratitude' and 'thanks', to 'grace', 'beauty', will be an important term in the exchanges of this dialogue. It is, of course, a central expression in the dynamics of *philia*—political, as much as sexual, philosophical as much as economic, theological as much as familial³¹—throughout the fifth and fourth centuries. *Charis* always invokes the ideals of reciprocity. Here the process of looking is opened to discussion as a *reciprocal engagement*, and placed immediately under a rubric of a word expressive of reciprocal obligation. The gaze, for Xenophon's Socrates, even—especially—when directed by a man at a beautiful woman, is not a unilinear process of objectification.³²

Socrates immediately specifies what he means by his question in a way that again links this debate to the previous discussion: 'If the display has been more *useful* to her (ταύτῃ ὠφελιμωτέρα), she ought to feel gratitude to us; if the sight has been more *useful* to us, we ought to be grateful to her.' It is the category of the useful that determines the value of gazing and being gazed at. As art is to be useful to the *polis* by virtue of its representation of the ethical, so it is right to ask if it is more useful for a person to view or to be on display. The answer Socrates proposes to his question is formulated wholly within the fifth-century frame of the necessarily public construction of status. In Theodote's case, he begins, 'she already profits (κερδαίνει) by our praise (ἔπαινος), and when we spread the report to more people, she will find it more useful still'. Since praise, the aim

³¹ For *charis* discussed as a familial virtue in the *Memorabilia* see 2.2; for *philia* in general see 2.4–2.10. On *charis*, see Herman (1987) especially 41–8, 108, 129, 135; Ober (1989) 226–32; Millett (1991) 123–6, with bibliography; MacLachlan (1993); and most recently in the broadest context, von Reden (1995a) s.v. *charis*.

³² Since this paper was originally written the fine work of Frontisi-Ducroux (1995) has appeared which gives extensive demonstration of the reciprocity of vision in Greek culture, (p. 20): '[everything to do with vision in Greek is subject to a principle of reversibility; seeing is not separate from being seen.]'

of competitive striving for status, is won on the lips of others, and they have been praising her, Theodote's stock can be said to have risen; so too their future accounts of the event will be of benefit, of use, to her: the more people who hear of her fame, the more she will have 'profited'. This accounting—or even commodification—of female status in praise is a view that stands against the grand public version of female 'report' famously expressed by the Thucydidean Pericles (unless one reads here with a very strong sense of Socratic irony, not borne out by the remainder of the discussion of viewing). But it is fundamental to this dialogue that Theodote is not a citizen wife, the class addressed by Pericles. The named entering of public discourse here by a female is overdetermined by her status. For a *hetaira*, publicity—being in the public eye—is a central negotiation of status. It is because Theodote is a *hetaira* that Socrates can raise the question of a benefit in being viewed, and why, as we will see, outside the normal proprieties of *oikos* life, she can also be a threat to the self-sufficient male viewer.

This striking position on the viewed female body is completed by Socrates' version of the act of viewing itself: 'We on the other hand now desire to touch what we have viewed, and we will go away titillated, and when we have gone, we will feel an unsatisfied longing'. The effect of viewing on the men is to produce desire, specifically a physical desire to touch what has been viewed. This desire titillates, itches the men, who will go away and still feel a longing that is not satisfied. If self-control and control over the passions are the aim of citizen's *askesis*, 'practice', viewing is a stimulus to loss of control, to an uncontrolled desire. The *psuchagogia*, seduction, of men through *opsis*, vision, that was the concern with the statue maker, is here too the philosopher's worry. Thus, concludes Socrates, 'it is natural (*eikos*) to infer that we are performing a benefit (*θεραπεύειν*) and she is receiving a benefit (*θεραπεύεσθαι*)'. *Therapeuein* indeed implies not merely a 'benefit' or 'service' but also specifically the service a lover offers his beloved, the care and attention of a suitor. Looking at a beautiful woman is useful, even beneficial for her, but it is unsatisfying and even dangerous for the (male) viewer.

At this point, however, Theodote herself enters the conversation to agree with Socrates that hers should be the gratitude in this scene of viewing (if Socrates is right about praise and desire). Unlike the

(art-)objects of 3.10, Theodote is also a subject who speaks (though, as we will see, her lines will be carefully directed by Socrates). As we enter the erotics of exchange, and gender becomes a crucial marker, the distanced argumentation of Socrates with his male artists takes on a different and more problematically engaged form. Unlike the breast-plate or statue, Theodote talks back—and thus needs to be carefully . . . watched. This opening remark of Theodote—as often in Xenophon—seems to confirm the ‘success’ of a Socratic elenchus from the mouth of his interlocutor, but it also opens the way for a discussion between Socrates and Theodote that takes the dialogue in a new direction (though one that has already been signalled). For Socrates—now—notices (*ὁρῶν*) that Theodote is expensively dressed and well attended, and that her house is lavishly appointed, and he begins to question her position in the economics of exchange. We move thus in a carefully articulated way from the opening discussion of the usefulness of art, via the benefits of looking at a beautiful woman, to how this beautiful woman benefits from or uses her beauty.

Socrates learns that she does not have a house or a farm or a factory that produces income; rather that ‘if someone becomes a friend (*philos*) to me and wants to treat me well (*εὖ ποιεῖν*), that is how I get a livelihood’. The standard Greek ethos of ‘doing good to a *philos*’ here seems euphemistically or ironically to imply a range of possible negotiations between Theodote and her admirers. Socrates returns the verbal veil with a pun on how this alters the normal economic means of production: ‘it’s a much better possession to possess,’ he says, ‘a flock of friends than a flock of sheep’.³³ As desire loves to be veiled in language, so talk of the social positioning of Theodote as object of desire is disseminated into puns and euphemisms.

Indeed, Socrates continues by wondering if she attracts friends by chance or by some device (*μηχανή*), a device which would be even more suitable for her than for a spider, who also ‘hunts for a living’ and ‘weaves subtle webs’:³⁴ ‘For you know how they hunt a livelihood:

³³ On the value of possessing friends—with the same vocabulary of *ktēmata*—see *Mem.* 2.4, and, in general, Stevens (1994).

³⁴ For a Xenophonic Socrates’ association of the maddening bite of a spider and the lover’s kiss, see *Mem.* 1.3.12.

they weave what you might call intricate webs (ἀράχνια γὰρ δῆπου λεπτὰ ὑφηνάμεναι).’ The language of hunting is common in erotic contexts (as is the behaviour of presenting game to prospective lovers);³⁵ so too the ‘intricate’, ‘fine’ weaving recalls the archetypal female work in the proper economic order of the household—as in Socrates’ famous advice to Aristarchus who is heading to destitution because he has so many female refugee relations staying with him (*Mem.* 2.7): he persuades Aristarchus to set them all to weaving and thus with propriety saves the *oikos* from starvation and ruin. But weaving also recalls the archetypally tricky nature of female behaviour. Since the *Odyssey* at least, female weaving is a potentially duplicitous practice.³⁶ Here the double use of the language of subtlety (λεπτὰ) and weaving is underscored by the classic mark of Socratic irony δῆπου.

This imagery of hunting is extended over many lines as the dialogue continues. This most worthy form of hunting—the hunting of friends—requires ‘skill’ (*technē*), says Socrates. So even when hunting for hares—the lowest form of game—*technē* is needed for the different types of pursuit. Special ‘night dogs’ are sometimes used, since the hares feed at night. (The significance of night hunting here is not so much to do with the ‘chasseur noir’ of ephebic lore as with an innuendo aimed at Theodote’s pursuits.) Similarly, other day-dogs are used to pursue the hares that retreat ‘to their beds’. The hares that run fast in the open require fast dogs and nets. Theodote continues the conceit: ‘Which approach should I use to hunt friends (*philoî*)?’ Socrates: ‘Not a dog, but someone who will track and find men of taste [*philokaloi*—those who are (to be) *philoî* of her *kallos* is one implication of ‘good taste’ here] and wealth; and when he has found them he will devise a way to drive them into your nets’. Theodote does not try to find out what sort of a person this human tracker of men of wealth might be; from the perspective of comedy it is difficult not to think of the *leno* as the figure hinted at; but she does ask what her nets might be. Socrates replies: ἐν μὲν δῆπου... καὶ μάλα εὖ περιπλεκόμενον, τὸ σῶμα, ‘one for sure... and that’s rather close folding, your body’. περιπλεκόμενον, which

³⁵ See e.g. Schnapp (1989).

³⁶ See e.g. Bergren (1979); Snyder (1981); and especially Jenkins (1985).

I translated somewhat awkwardly as ‘close folding’, could be used of a net to imply simply a carefully made—well braided—twine; but it also strongly suggests something that is intricate, devious, and binding. It can also be used for a physical embrace, to ‘entwine’ oneself round an object or person. (So in the passive form always in Homer.³⁷) What is more, it is used to connote the weaving of a euphemistic veil of words—to hesitate to speak directly.³⁸ Thus self-reflexively as Socrates plays with the displaced language of desire, the carefully chosen image—marked again with *δήπου* to indicate the requirement of careful reading—suggests in its range of interwoven senses the idea of veiled sense itself.

This is, however, Socrates. The punning reference to the nets of the body leads straightaway to talk of the soul: ‘and in the body, a soul, with which...’. The soul teaches Theodote *ὥς ἂν ἐμβλέπουσα χαρίζοιο*, ‘to look in such a way as to gratify’ a friend. Now as Socrates turns to the ethics of behaviour and to the soul (a familiar move from the previous encounters with the artists), the argument is turned so that Theodote is ‘looking’ (*ἐμβλέπουσα*) and, indeed, not so much feeling gratitude as gratifying or gracing her man. (The *charis* one is to show a *philos* is here reformulated within the (com)modification of exchange her position seems to require.) Thus after running through some of the kindnesses she can show a friend, Socrates sums up that for a friend who treats her well she should *ὅλην τῇ ψυχῇ κεχαρίσθαι*, ‘gratify him with her total soul’. For ‘when your friends are pleasing’, he concludes, ‘I know that you persuade [*anapeitheis*] them not by words but by deeds’. The opening description of Theodote had been of a woman who consorted with *τῷ πείθοντι*; now Theodote is said by Socrates to persuade (*ἀναπείθεις*) her friends of her feelings by deeds and not by words. The opening question of the dialogue had been to discover where the *charis* in looking at Theodote was; now it is tracing in a different way the *charis* she

³⁷ See e.g. *Od.* 23.33.

³⁸ See e.g. Aeschines 1.52: ‘by Dionysos, I don’t know that I can keep glossing (*περιπλέκειν*) the thing all day’. The ‘thing’ that is being glossed is, of course, precisely the use of Timarchos’ body in prostitution. For the equivalent use of the noun *περιπλόκαι*, see the useful note of Mastronarde (1994) ad 494–6.

shows her friends. Socrates' line of questioning is inverting the language of exchange in which the dialogue has been set up.

At this point, Theodote denies knowledge of any such hunting devices or traps—Socrates, note, has had to put into Theodote's mouth the standard negative portrayal of a woman as tricky seductress, full of devices, as he continues to set her up for his put down—and the dialogue takes its third tack. For Socrates agrees that with friends you are not likely to win them or keep them by force (*βία*—the standard opposition to *peithō*); but one should use good deeds and pleasure. This commonplace of ethics leads to a strong statement of the values of reciprocity in the same language that the dialogue has already mobilized: *δεῖ... πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς φροντίζοντάς σου τοιαῦτα ἀξιοῦν, οἷα ποιῶσιν αὐτοῖς μικρότατα μελήσει, ἔπειτα δὲ αὐτὴν ἀμείβεσθαι χαριζομένην τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον*, 'when people care for you, you should make only such demands as they can satisfy with a minimal outlay. Then you should pay back your thanks in the same way.' *Charis* is now to be constructed on an equal (minimal) and reciprocal basis. *ἀμείβεσθαι*, with its sense of requital and payment, significantly qualifies the values of *charis*, with its more general sense of reciprocal gratitude, as the minimal request for the assistance of friends receives a similar immediate return. In this way, *philo*i remain longest (a common source of worry and concern in Greek writing about *philia*), claims Socrates; for 'you are likely to gratify (*χαρίζοιο ἄν*) them most if you give what you have to give when they ask'. The economics of gratification appear here to aim at a stable state, where need and satisfaction coincide. As when good food is offered to a sated man, or inferior food to one who is starving, the pursuit of pleasure depends on observing the *kairos*, 'limit', of desire and satisfaction. Thus, concludes Socrates (after the discussion of desire has typically found its exemplary case in food³⁹), it is best to satisfy the strongly felt desire of an admirer, and to avoid any indication of imminent gratification (*χαρίζεσθαι*) when the admirers are satiated.

³⁹ 'to practise self-control towards desire for food, drink, sex...' (2.1.1.) is the opening description of Socrates' aims in the second book of the *Memorabilia*.

This conclusion appears to be constructed as useful advice to Theodote in the pursuit of her livelihood, a sort of ironic version of the advice of Socrates to Aristarchus and his female relations—as if he were advising the *hetaira* in the way he advised the artists and armourer. But his advising also turns out to have had a performative function, as the dialogue takes a fourth and crucial turn. For Theodote is now made to ask Socrates ‘why don’t you become a fellow-hunter (*συνθηρατής*) of friends?’ Theodote appears to be asking Socrates to play the role of hunter of *philoî* that he outlined earlier. His talk of desire and hunting and the dynamics of satisfaction have led her to desire him (the persuader) to stay with her (*συνεῖναι τῷ πείθοντι*). Thus Socrates: *ἐάν γε νῆ Δί, ἔφη, πείθῃς με σύ*, ‘Yes, by god’, he said, ‘if you can persuade me.’ Now it is Socrates who is offering himself as object of persuasion, object of seduction. His speech about hunting friends has led her to want to hunt him. We are watching the personal relations of client and *hetaira* at work, seeing how the dynamics of *peithō* function with this very particular client—as the ugly but attractive Socrates is now being courted by the beautiful *hetaira*.

Theodote asks how she can persuade (*πείθειν*) him. He replies: ‘You will yourself look and you will find a device (*μηχανήσει*), if you want something from me.’ Theodote must seek to find a way, she must ask—try to seduce—the master. ‘Wanting’, ‘asking’, is a common expression for a specifically sexual request, as ‘giving’ is the normal term for the ‘granting of sexual favours’, that is, compliance. Theodote (‘God’s gift’), the *hetaira*, will have to ask... So, ‘Come and visit often’, she encourages. And Socrates, mocking his own lack of political activity (*ἀπραγμοσύνην*), said ‘Theodote, it is not at all easy for me to find the time. For many private and public matters of business take away my leisure. Also I have many girlfriends, who will not let me go out day or night, because they are learning potions and charms from me.’

The flirtatious exchange between two different practitioners of the wiles of desire turns to explicitly labelled self-mockery, mockery now as Socrates places himself within the civic frame that has structured his remarks on viewing, usefulness, and ethics. The picture offered of Socrates’ positioning in the political world is highly complex, however (and not only because it is a gesture of self-mockery in a society where self-promotion is the normal trope of self-representation—or

rather because this self-promotion is of a figure of self-mockery). It depicts a man highly visible in the public eye⁴⁰ but not formally engaged in public institutions; a person whose *apragmosune* is so well known (and yet whose behaviour in the city leads to public trial and execution);⁴¹ a citizen who has no leisure to visit a 'female friend', because he has a set of 'girlfriends' (*philai*) who will not let him out 'day or night'—to continue the innuendo of the hare-hunting conceit. These girl-friends to whom he is subjected, however, are learning 'potions and charms' from him, the master, as if he were the aphrodisiac-mongering old woman of erotic discourse (rather than a Platonic 'midwife'). The next paragraph names Apollodoros, Antisthenes, Cebes, and Simmias as Socrates' companions at home, constantly with him because of his spells and lures. Are these his 'girlfriends', then, with whom he has to stay in?⁴² Or are they the Johns to his madam?⁴³ What educational transaction is being represented here, then? 'The Girls' keep him at home, while or because they are learning in turn spells from him—spells which have also bound them to him. In what ways does Socrates use (his pupils as) *philai*? What analogies are being drawn between Socrates' and Theodote's pursuit of *philo*? As Socrates is performing his seductive, educational ploys on or with Theodote, his talk is of the seductive, educational ploys he uses. And for the reader of the dialogue...? Where is the *charis* in this exchange?

Socrates' manipulation of the position of the desiring subject and the object of desire is fully played out in the last exchange of the dialogue. Theodote, impressed by Socrates' talk of his 'devices', asks him to give her his 'magic wheel', so that 'I may spin it for you'. Socrates, however, declines: 'I don't want to be drawn to you, I want you to come to me.' The question is, who is to be master (of desire)? Who to pursue (visit), who to be pursued (as Sappho puts it)? Socrates explicitly—and thus with what deviousness?—expresses

⁴⁰ So Xenophon in his opening description of Socrates writes (1.1.10): 'he was always in the public eye'.

⁴¹ On Socrates' unique form of *apragmosune*, see Carter (1986) 184–6.

⁴² So it is taken in most modern translations.

⁴³ So the Loeb—and Chris Faraone (per litt.). Who the *philai* are becomes harder to understand on this reading—as is the final reference to *philotera* (see below).

his wish to be sought as an object of desire; not to pursue Theodote, subjected to desire. Since this is Xenophon's dialogue, Theodote immediately agrees to this reorganization of the visiting arrangements enacted in the opening scene of the dialogue: ἀλλὰ πορεύσομαι, ἔφη· μόνον ὑποδέχου, "I will come", she said, "only mind you let me in". And with a final twist of the politesse of erotic reception that closes the dialogue, Socrates responds: ἀλλ' ὑποδέξομαί σε, ἔφη, ἂν μή τις φιλωτέρα σου ἔνδον ᾖ, "I will let you in", he said, "unless there is someone [female] more of a friend to me inside"—some better girlfriend! Theodote will have to take her place in the queue of *philai*, Socrates' girlfriends, striving for Socrates' acceptance. If the self-control of the male is threatened by his subjection to desire that is stimulated by viewing the alluring female form, Socrates' mastery (over desire) makes all his pupils his female friends—who have to visit him, ask him for grace and favour. Socrates paradoxically inverts the standards of the male discourse of desire, as in his demonstration of his mastery over the subjections of desire he himself becomes the object of desire. ('Is it more useful to view or be viewed?', 'To desire or be desired?') As Socrates has outlined the economics of desire and satisfaction, and as he has manoeuvred his way through the logic of gratification, now once more he stimulates—performs—the titillation and challenge of desire that he had deprecated in answer to his opening question. Theodote's desire to be received will have to wait on Socrates' receptivity, his *philia*. As in Plato's *Symposium*, it is Socrates who is to emerge as the strange object of desire by demonstrating his mastery over the position of the desiring subject. Socrates wins control in the erotic game by becoming—and manipulating his position as—the object of desire for a desirable beauty.

We began by looking at how Socrates located art in a public, political, ethical context, and we have moved via the discussion of looking at the beautiful woman through the discussion of winning friends to this point of erotic flirtation, apparently far from the concerns of art and mimesis, citizenship and power. One significant connection between looking at art and making friends, however, is in the scrutiny of the process of viewing—or more precisely in the empowerment that the male subject qua citizen/*theates* experiences, discusses, and needs to practise in viewing. If 3.10 was about the construction of the good citizen by the producing and viewing of art,

3.11 is about the construction of the good—the self-controlled—citizen with regard to the erotic gaze, and the reciprocities of erotics in a social setting: in short, *philia*. The viewing subject is what is at stake, as the dialogue *enacts* or *performs* Socrates' ironic control over the *hetaira's* beauty as a disruptive force in the dynamics of male control.

This dialogue begins, then, by stipulating a reciprocal relation between the viewed (female) and the viewer (male)—of praise and status on the one hand, and unsatisfied desire on the other. When Theodote's standing in the exchanges of eros and livelihood is further explored, however, a more complex positioning emerges which on the one hand analyses the established relations of exchanges in the pursuit of *philoï*—the logic of *charis*—and on the other *performs* or demonstrates the shifting dynamics of desire and power, as Socrates' seductive discussion of pursuit turns himself into the object of Theodote's desire—a condition he stimulates and flirts with inconclusively, though the last word is most definitely Socrates'. Socrates' opening account of the viewer as 'titillated and unsatisfied' is finally turned against the beautiful woman, as he inverts the power relations of the scene. (In the field of eros above all, the gaze necessarily invokes the categories of power and gender.) In this way, the dialogue which is written in celebration of Socrates, may also help uncover something of the *threat* of Socrates, the *corruption* he brings to the city. For as much as the self of the citizen is constructed in the gaze of the collective audience and articulated in the reciprocities of citizenship, so here Socrates explores and destabilizes those reciprocities, the logic of that gaze. For despite Socrates' exemplary triumph over the threat to self-control that a beautiful woman presents to the male gaze, it is achieved by a persuasive irony and punning that destabilizes the secure and direct exchange of language; an erotics of teaching that turns his pupils into girlfriends, learning charms and spells, and Socrates into a master visited and pursued (like an object of beauty, seducing as much as persuading). What is more, the previous dialogue's discussion of artistic form with its disjunction between ethical representation of the soul and the reproduction of the image of the body here develops into a shifting dynamic of viewing and being viewed (as well as the disjunction between Theodote's beautiful body

(and its effects) and her soul (and its devices)). (The next dialogue will discuss the physical condition of one of Socrates' companions.) This analysis of the practice of viewing—the recognition of the manipulation of the uses of viewing—offers a challenge to the presentation and recognition of the citizen in the glare of the public view—a challenge marked also by Socrates' own self-mocking presentation of himself as engaged in the business of citizenship. Socrates confuses the modes of exchange—words, teaching, gratitude, desire, vision—by which a citizen is placed. Socrates' triumph over the *hetaira* is won at the cost of the bizarre representation of him with his girlfriends.

If the gaze is to be conceptualized as a process of objectification by which male subjectivity is constructed, as Kappeler, followed by Richlin and others, have argued—the world in his imaging—here at least are to be traced the ruses and ironies, reciprocities and seductions, by which the subject is represented as being at risk and being maintained—and the paradoxes to which such strategies of self-determination lead.⁴⁴ Similarly, this dialogue shows how the model of the *askesis* of the self developed so influentially by Foucault for the classical *polis* needs to be supplemented by a more nuanced account of the negotiations and engagements of the subject, especially in the erotic sphere. Indeed, the models of power offered by Kappeler and by Foucault will require a more complex articulation if they are to account adequately for the twists and turns of Xenophon's dialogic writing.

Xenophon has an oblique relation to the democratic system and has his apologetic agenda. None the less, his dialogues give a fascinating insight into a self-reflexive discussion of viewing as a constitutive factor in the socio-political condition of being a citizen. The passages I have discussed demonstrate that it is insufficient for art historical enquiry to limit itself to the few well-known discussions of painting, ecphrasis or Platonic censorship of the arts: the system of different discursive sites of the *polis* is fundamental to understanding its culture of viewing. Socrates' encounter with the *hetaira* traces

⁴⁴ See Kappeler (1986); Richlin (1992); the cinematic model followed by Kappeler has been challenged most recently from a Lacanian perspective by Copjec (1994) 15–38.

the subject's concern with erotic viewing and desire, and explores different relations of exchange and reciprocity, as it represents the performance of a complex exchange, the scene of *peithō* between Socrates and Theodote. Personal relations in the polis are formulated within these overlapping discourses of art, politics, prostitution, eros, philosophy: it is this intricate network of languages, the λεπτὰ ἀράχνια constitutive of personal relations in the polis, that Xenophon lets us see.⁴⁵

⁴⁵ This paper was first delivered in Cambridge, and subsequently in California and Princeton. Thanks to all who contributed to some rather lively discussions, especially Froma Zeitlin, and thanks to Tony Boyle and Froma Zeitlin for the invitations to speak in America.

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III

Socrates

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Xenophon's Socrates as Teacher

Donald R. Morrison

Plato and Xenophon, along with many of their contemporaries, were intensely interested in the moral character of Socrates. Insofar as Socrates has served, and continues to serve, in our tradition as providing a certain paradigm for a human life, we too must be interested in these questions: What kind of man was Socrates? Was he praiseworthy or not? Should he be emulated? Was he justly or unjustly condemned? These questions are not abstract enough to be, strictly speaking, philosophical questions. But, as Plato and Xenophon each surely believed, the example of Socrates can be an important test case for moral theory.

Xenophon's goal in the *Memorabilia* is to defend Socrates against the charges levelled against him at the trial.¹ In particular, Xenophon defends Socrates against the charge of corrupting the young by means of a thoroughgoing defense of his moral character generally. By showing that Socrates was beneficial to those around him, not just in one respect but in many ways, Xenophon aims to convince the reader that Socrates was beneficial to his young associates, hence that he did not corrupt them and was therefore unjustly condemned.

Both Plato's and Xenophon's testimony make it clear that the most important test cases for the charge of Socrates' corruption of the young were Alcibiades and Critias.² These extremely gifted and

¹ *Mem.* 1.1–2 directly treats the trial. The apologetic purpose of the rest of the work is signalled at 1.3.1 and 1.4.1.

² Although Critias and Alcibiades are not mentioned in either Plato's or Xenophon's *Apology*, Xenophon indicates that they were cited by Polycrates in his speech against Socrates (*Mem.* 1.2.12). (They may be alluded to in Plato's *Apology*

ambitious men were for a time associates of Socrates yet later went on to commit what Athenian society saw as serious evil deeds.³ No one supposed that Socrates himself was in favour of such deeds, or exerted evil influence on these men by instilling in them the values of ambition and greed from which their later behaviour sprang. Rather, the thought was either that Socrates' probing, critical spirit had a kind of nihilistic influence on the young, relaxing the hold that traditional values might have on them and thus allowing the baser human impulses to take over, or that quite apart from the question of moral influence, Socrates gave his young associates a mental training that amounted to a powerful tool or weapon that they could then use for the good or ill of the society around them. If Socrates were to hand out this weapon indiscriminately, that is without regard to the character of the recipient, Socrates himself would be a danger to society. Giving such mental training to Alcibiades would be tantamount to putting a sword in the hands of a madman.

Xenophon defends Socrates against both parts of this charge. He argues that Socrates not only encouraged positive moral values in his young associates, but also took care that they learned prudence *before* learning the mechanics of rhetoric and affairs (*Mem.* 4.3.1). He also argues that Socrates was choosy about the moral character as well as the intellectual gifts of his young companions. His explicit discussion

at 33a4–5.) I will not comment here on the complicated matter of how the details of Polycrates' arguments might be influencing Xenophon's defense. For a survey of this question, see Chroust (1957).

³ Given their early intellectual curiosity and interest in the sophists, it is reasonable to suppose that both Alcibiades and Critias began to associate with Socrates while still in their teens. Their association with Socrates continued well into adulthood, however. Since Critias was only ten to fifteen years younger than Socrates, and much older than Plato and Xenophon, both authors naturally tend to treat him more as a contemporary of Socrates than as a student. (See, for example, *Mem.* 1.2.29, where Critias is criticized for trying to seduce a young member of the Socratic circle, Euthydemus.) Of course, the basic moral issue is whether Socrates' influence on his companions is beneficial or harmful, regardless of their age. His effect on his *young* associates gets special attention from Xenophon for two reasons. First, they are more impressionable, and consequently Socrates specially seeks them out. Second, the charge at the trial is that he corrupts the *young*. The word for 'young' in the charge is *véoi*, which is broad enough in meaning that it can be used (or, at least, allowably stretched—see *Mem.* 1.2.35) to cover men as old as thirty. Perhaps this word was chosen deliberately by the accusers to leave no doubt that Critias and Alcibiades and Charmides are included.

of the Alcibiades case comes in *Memorabilia* 1. But the most detailed account we possess of how Socrates conducted himself in selecting—and also intellectually seducing—his young associates is given to us in *Memorabilia* 4.2.1 ff., the story of Euthydemus. The subtle and complex structure of this account puts the lie to anyone who would claim that Xenophon was too dull to understand Socrates.⁴

THE STAGES OF SOCRATIC EDUCATION

Why did Xenophon choose Euthydemus as his example of how Socrates selected and educated his associates step-by-step? The answer to this question affects our view of how widely we can generalize from his example, for Xenophon tells us that Socrates adopted different strategies, depending on the soul of the interlocutor (*Mem.* 4.1.3). Important evidence that will help us to answer this question is given in the first chapter of Book 4, in which Xenophon sets the stage for the story of Euthydemus which follows.

In the opening line of the book, Xenophon asserts that nothing was more beneficial (*ὠφέλιμον*) than to be with Socrates and spend time with him, no matter what the circumstances or where. But Socrates, Xenophon implies, did not desire to spend time with just anyone. He would often say: I love so-and-so, but the people he desired were not the ones with beautiful bodies, but rather those with souls well disposed toward virtue. He used three traits as signs of such souls: (1) the ability to learn quickly; (2) the ability to remember what has been learned; and (3) a desire for every kind of knowledge by which they could manage the household and the city, and could deal comfortably with men and their affairs. Notice that the first two traits differ from the third in being less amenable to education. Although the abilities to learn and to remember can be developed, they are basically a natural gift. Determining whether a young person has either of these traits will therefore be relatively easy. The desire for knowledge, however, is something that can be awakened in a person who originally lacks it. Here, too, the person's

⁴ See Breitenbach (1967), col. 1825; Gigon (1946a), 10.

nature matters: even after education, the strength and durability of the desire for knowledge varies from soul to soul; and some sluggish souls will resist every effort to arouse in them a desire for knowledge.

Xenophon goes on to tell us that Socrates did not approach everybody in the same way. He illustrates this by describing Socrates' different approach to each of three types: (1) those who thought that nature had made them good, and therefore scorned his teaching;⁵ (2) those who considered that wealth would make them good; and (3) those who believed that they had the finest education and were conceited because of their wisdom. Socrates approaches Euthydemus as an illustration of the third type.

The relationship between these personality types and the marks of lovability is important. Presumably, all the young men whom Socrates approached were ones he was interested in—else why approach them? Thus we may assume that Socrates believed that the young men had at least the potential to be objects of his love. This implies that he had reason to think that these young men had the two easily discoverable marks of lovability: the ability to learn quickly and the ability to retain what has been learned. If Socrates were to discover that a young man lacked these abilities, he would lose interest and leave off his approach. What about the third mark—a desire for every kind of knowledge useful for the conduct of life? Neither of the first two personality types has that trait! Neither those who think that they are by nature good, nor those who think that wealth is sufficient, desire knowledge. Socrates' approach to these two types is designed to provoke in them a desire for knowledge. His strategy is to show them, via argument, that neither native talent (in the first case) nor wealth (in the second) is sufficient for a successful life. Depending on whether these arguments succeed in awakening a durable desire for knowledge in the person or not, Socrates will either come to love the person, or else lose interest.

By contrast, those of the third type already have the desire for every kind of knowledge when Socrates meets them. (The problem with this group is not that they do not desire knowledge, but that they mistakenly think that they already have the knowledge they desire!)

⁵ Xenophon's remarks at *Mem.* 1.2.24 suggest that he would put Alcibiades in the first group.

This group has a special attraction for Socrates. Members of the other two groups might become lovable if a desire for knowledge can be awakened in them; but Socrates will find members of the third group lovable from the start. Euthydemus belongs to this third group. Perhaps the reason Xenophon chose Euthydemus to illustrate Socrates' approach is that Socrates found Euthydemus especially lovable, and therefore an especially promising prospect.⁶

Given that Euthydemus is introduced as representing only one of three personality types, how widely can we generalize from his example? To answer this question I must anticipate a little. According to the interpretation that follows, the process by which Euthydemus becomes a close associate of Socrates has seven stages. Stages 1–3 constitute the initial approach, stage 4 is the crucial elenchus, stages 5 and 6 are further testing, and at stage 7 Euthydemus is accepted as a close associate of Socrates. When Xenophon presents Socrates' approach to the first two personality types (*Mem.* 4.1.3–5), what he provides corresponds to stage 4. We may assume that for these people, too, there would be preliminary stages analogous to stages 1–3 in the Euthydemus story. Since individual personalities differ, the content of these stages is likely to differ considerably from person to person. Stages 5 and 6 in the Euthydemus story are evidence that Socrates cares about the strength and durability of the desire for knowledge, and not merely its minimal presence. Since his reasons for caring about these traits apply equally to everyone, we are entitled to infer that he would put everyone through the testing stages (5 and 6). Furthermore, although the duration may vary, the basic character of these stages will be the same for all.

THE TESTING OF EUTHYDEMUS

Socrates hears that Euthydemus the 'beautiful', although very young, has acquired a large collection of the writings of the poets and the wise. He prides himself on being wiser than others of his age, and he

⁶ On the attractiveness of Euthydemus and on Socrates' effort to protect him from unwholesome suitors, see *Mem.* 1.2.29–30.

is ambitious. Now such a young man is just the sort to interest Socrates:⁷ beautiful, intelligent, ambitious, and with a demonstrated serious interest in acquiring wisdom. One may suppose that this same description at one time applied to Alcibiades.⁸

Socrates seeks the young man out. With some other young companions he goes to a leatherworker's shop that Euthydemus is known to frequent. But Socrates' approach is subtle. He does not address Euthydemus directly, but instead addresses to another young man words intended to move Euthydemus. What he says—to this other young man—is that since teachers are needed for the lesser arts, surely skill in the greatest of the arts, that of governing a city, does not come automatically to men. This initial 'softening up' is stage 1.

Stage 2 of the process by which Euthydemus becomes a closer associate of Socrates happens sometime later. Euthydemus is present, but hangs back from the group and is careful not to give the appearance that he is impressed with Socrates' wisdom. This time Socrates mentions Euthydemus by name, though he still does not address him directly. I suppose, he says, that when Euthydemus is grown and offers advice to the assembly, he will begin his speech by bragging that he has never learned anything from anyone. He has never had a teacher, has in fact completely avoided learning anything from anyone; yet he will give the assembly whatever advice happens to fall into his head. At this, everyone present laughs. Euthydemus has been made fun of—he has been

⁷ Strauss (1972), 94, 100 claims that Euthydemus is not a 'good nature' on the grounds that Euthydemus thought he knew it all and that his earlier desire for learning had been 'perverse'. Against this, I would argue that Euthydemus' mistaken opinions are typical of what a young, untutored 'good nature' might naturally fall into on his own, prior to encountering Socrates.

⁸ Parallels between Socrates' discussion with Euthydemus in *Mem.* 4.2 and his discussion with Alcibiades in Aeschines' *Alcibiades* are detailed in Dittmar (1912), 125–8. However, Dittmar's claim that these parallels prove that Xenophon borrowed much of this material from Aeschines is exaggerated. For example, Dittmar notes that the level of emotional excitement in the *Alcibiades* continues to rise, whereas in Xenophon it levels off and stays even. 'This proves', says Dittmar, 'that Xenophon inherited his motif rather than invented it.' It proves no such thing: as Dittmar himself notes, the difference in the development of the two tales results from the difference in the character of the interlocutors.

The report in Diogenes Laertius 2.48 of Xenophon's first encounter with Socrates suggests that Xenophon may have modelled the Euthydemus story, at least in part, on his own youthful experience. (Alternatively, of course, it may be Diogenes or his source who models his account on the Euthydemus story.)

'stung'—from now on, Xenophon tells us, Socrates has Euthydemus' attention. But note Socrates' timing. If he had made fun of Euthydemus in this way on their first meeting, quite likely the boy would have been put off and would have avoided Socrates from then on.

Socrates now has Euthydemus' attention. But Euthydemus will not answer Socrates. He remains reluctant to say anything, thinking that he will appear more prudent by keeping silent. Further public teasing might drive the boy away. So at stage 3 Socrates reverts to his previous technique, making general comments about how it is important for aspiring politicians to find eminent teachers and to study long and hard. But at this stage it will be clear to Euthydemus that Socrates' remarks are meant to apply to him. Xenophon implies that this stage continued for some time, though how long he does not say.

When Socrates notices that Euthydemus is more inclined to endure his conversation, and more eager to listen, he moves on to stage 4. Socrates has it in mind to refute the young man for the first time: to bring him, by means of elenchus, face-to-face with his own ignorance. But Euthydemus is proud, and his sensibilities are tender. To save him public embarrassment, and thus make the refutation easier for him to accept, Socrates goes along to the leatherworker's shop and talks with Euthydemus privately. At first he flatters Euthydemus by praising his collection of books and his evident desire for wisdom. Xenophon says: 'And Euthydemus was pleased to hear this, for he thought that Socrates believed he was heading in the right direction toward wisdom. Socrates, well aware that Euthydemus was pleased with this praise' (*Mem.* 4.2.9), then begins his elenchus.

The elenchus is of the classic type familiar from Plato. Socrates establishes that Euthydemus seeks the noblest and greatest art, the art of ruling, and that one who has the art of ruling necessarily also has the virtue of justice. Euthydemus claims to be as just as any man. But justice has its product, just like any other craft. It is characteristic of craftsmen that they can discriminate the objects of their craft from other things. (Here the refutation is logically more powerful than those we are familiar with from Plato, because it depends on a weaker assumption. It is not claimed that craftsmen can explain their craft (*Ap.* 22b–d; cf. *Grg.* 465a, 501a)—a doubtful requirement—but merely that they can discriminate products of their craft from other things, which is surely an appropriate minimal condition of

craftsmanship.) Socrates makes two columns, one for the just and the other for the unjust acts, and proceeds to demonstrate that Euthydemus does not know under which column various kinds of act should be classed. Lying, enslaving, doing mischief—all of these seem to Euthydemus to be unjust, but Socrates leads him to acknowledge that under certain circumstances they are also just.

Socrates brings the refutation home in language also familiar from Plato:⁹ 'Now then, if someone wants to tell the truth but never says the same things about the same things; if when he shows you the road, he tells you first that it runs east, then that it runs west, and when he makes a single calculation produces first a larger result and then a smaller one; what would you think of such a person?' Euthydemus: 'Clearly, by god, that he does not know what he thought he knew' (*Mem.* 4.2.21). Euthydemus admits that such ignorance is slavish, and that one must make every effort to avoid being a slave.

But Euthydemus is in *aporia*: 'Socrates, how discouraged do you think I am, knowing that in spite of my pains I am not able to answer a question about the things it is most necessary to know, and have no other way through which I might improve?' (4.2.23). We have reached stage 5, which is the turning point. Euthydemus recognizes his ignorance and the inadequacy of his previous method of searching for wisdom. But he is helpless; he has no other method. To break out of this state of blockage and discouragement, he is dependent on Socrates' help and guidance. Socrates responds to Euthydemus' plea with a speech in praise of the Delphic maxim 'Know thyself.' That is *not* what Euthydemus needs.¹⁰ 'Have no doubt, Socrates,' he says, 'that I value self-knowledge very highly. But where should one begin the process of examining oneself? This is what I look to you for, if you are willing to tell me' (4.2.30).

⁹ Cf. *Euthphr.* 15b; *Lysis* 222d; *Chrm.* 174b; *Prt.* 361b.

¹⁰ Dittmar (1912), 125, gives the speech a more positive function: 'This passage is a resting place for Euthydemus, gives him something positive, restores him [*baut auf*].' Dittmar's interpretation and mine are compatible, in a way that enhances the subtlety of Socrates' approach. The speech both encourages Euthydemus, through a constructive protreptic, and frustrates him, by refusing to give him what he asked for. Dittmar errs only in calling the speech a resting place. By frustrating Euthydemus, Socrates intentionally keeps up the pressure.

Socrates responds to Euthydemus' plea for guidance with another elenchus, demonstrating that Euthydemus does not know what things are good and bad (4.2.31–6), and that he doesn't know what democracy is (4.2.36–9). That is, Socrates refuses to give Euthydemus the guidance he asks for. The process until now has been one of Socrates seducing Euthydemus, which has required careful handling and some kindness. At this stage, however, Socrates wishes to test Euthydemus, and that requires toughness. No guidance, no encouragement, just refutation and aporia.

Stages 4 and 5 show that Xenophon considers subjecting people to the elenchus to be an essential part of the Socratic method. In this he agrees with Plato, even if he does not put as much literary emphasis on it as Plato does. In Xenophon, the function of the elenchus is twofold: (1) to awaken a desire for wisdom, for every kind of knowledge relevant to the conduct of life; and (2) to test the strength and durability of this desire, by seeing if it withstands the frustration of repeated and unmitigated elenchus. Here, too, Xenophon's view is compatible with Plato's.

Now that Socrates has refuted him again and again, Euthydemus leaves completely discouraged, despising himself and thinking that he truly is a slave (4.2.39). Xenophon's next words indicate that what Euthydemus is going through is nothing unusual, but is part of Socrates' regular procedure: 'Many of those put into this condition by Socrates never came near him again, and he thought these people to be blockheads.'

But Euthydemus understood—without being expressly told!—that he would not become worthy of repute (*ἀξιόλογος*) unless he spent as much time with Socrates as possible. This is stage 6. Euthydemus hangs out with Socrates as much as he can, and even begins to imitate some of Socrates' practices—that is, his life-style, habits, and character.

Presumably this stage lasted a good while. Here, as elsewhere in the *Memorabilia*, Xenophon compresses time for the sake of economy of presentation. When Socrates eventually recognizes that Euthydemus really does have the right sort of character, Socrates changes his behaviour once more. No more savagery, no more throwing him into the sea of aporia without a lifeline. Here at stage 7, Euthydemus is a confirmed and close associate of Socrates.

In stages 1 through 6 Xenophon describes a process, not only of seduction, but of rigorous selection. The rigor of the process is important to Xenophon as a means of defending Socrates against the charge of handing out intellectual tools indiscriminately to those who will misuse them. Xenophon wishes to show that Socrates was careful to admit into his inner circle only those whose habits and moral values—including but not limited to a commitment to the examined life and the search for wisdom—are similar to his own. One question that arises, but Xenophon does not address in Book 4, is, How successful was Socrates' procedure in ensuring him the right sort of companions? This question may be divided into two others: (1) How successful is the procedure in weeding out pretenders—those who seem to have the right values but do not? (2) How successful is the procedure in weeding out unstable characters—those who, having reached stage 7, might later fall out of sympathy with Socrates and go on to commit evil deeds?

These questions bring us back to the cases of Critias and Alcibiades. These men were well known to have consorted with Socrates, yet they turned out bad. Xenophon has three alternatives for explaining these cases. He could claim either (1) that Critias and Alcibiades never progressed beyond stage 6, which involved spending a lot of time with Socrates, but without intimacy, or (2) that Critias and Alcibiades reached stage 7 through subterfuge, pretending to be in sympathy with Socrates when they were not, or (3) that Critias and Alcibiades reached stage 7 fairly and were admitted to intimacy with Socrates, but their characters were unstable, so that they fell away again. For Xenophon's apologetic purpose, the most satisfactory explanation of Critias and Alcibiades would be the first, that they never really *belonged* to Socrates' circle at all. However, Xenophon does not go that route.¹¹ In *Memorabilia* 1.2.12–24 he admits that Socrates included Critias and Alcibiades among his companions. Xenophon's explanation is the third, that Critias and Alcibiades met Socrates' standards for admission to stage 7, but that their characters were unstable, so they fell away again.

According to Xenophon's portrayal, when Critias and Alcibiades first meet Socrates they are like Euthydemus in two ways, being

¹¹ Pace Chroust (1957), 179.

talented and ambitious. But whereas Euthydemus wants the whole of wisdom, the ambitions of Critias and Alcibiades are narrower: they want honour, power, and prominence. Euthydemus mistakenly thinks he has the wisdom he wants; by contrast, Critias and Alcibiades recognize that Socrates has something they lack but believe they need: namely, debating skills. Thus, whereas shy Euthydemus needed seducing, Critias and Alcibiades—clearly more forceful characters—probably did not. Xenophon stresses that Critias' and Alcibiades' values were at the outset hostile to Socrates. Their attitude was: rather than live the simple independent life of Socrates, I would prefer to die (*Mem.* 1.2.16). But under Socrates' influence, their attitudes and behaviour changed. Xenophon claims that so long as Critias and Alcibiades were with Socrates, they acted temperately, not because they were afraid of being penalized or beaten by Socrates, but because, at the time, they thought that this sort of conduct was best (1.2.18). In *Memorabilia* 1.2 this is stated as an isolated fact; but from the Euthydemus story we can infer its significance. Before Critias and Alcibiades could become regular companions of Socrates, their attitudes and behaviour would have to have changed. Stages 5 and 6 of the process are designed to ensure just that.

On the other hand, according to Xenophon the Socratic transformation of Critias' and Alcibiades' characters was not complete. Underneath their virtuous actions and beliefs, their political ambitions and base desires remained. So long as Critias and Alcibiades stayed with Socrates, they were able, with his help, to master these desires (1.2.24). But when they left him, they fell into bad company, and the baser side of their natures reemerged.¹²

What are the lessons of this story? Xenophon's express purpose in this section of the *Memorabilia* is to argue that Socrates did not corrupt

¹² Xenophon was no intellectualist. His explanation requires that Alcibiades could believe that temperance is best, while having contrary (though repressed) desires. Thus Xenophon, unlike the Socrates of Plato's early dialogues, believes that beliefs and desires can conflict. Although Xenophon does not make the connection explicit, presumably he can use this belief to explain how, in cases like those of Critias and Alcibiades, virtuous habits can be lost. Under changed circumstances, the suppressed part emerges to cause trouble. As explained by Xenophon, Alcibiades' case resembles that of an adolescent guardian in Plato's *Republic* who wanders off while on patrol, meets up with some barbarians, and is seduced by the glory and excitement of their way of life into staying with them forever (compare *Rep.* 538–9 and *Th.* 150e).

Critias and Alcibiades, but on the contrary was a good influence so long as they were with him. Moreover, putting this story together with the story of Euthydemus, we can see that Socrates exercised due diligence, taking on as companions only those who came to share his values and life-style. But the story of Critias and Alcibiades supplements the Euthydemus story by showing that this process, however diligent, is fallible. Critias and Alcibiades came to Socrates, met his tests, and learned reasoning and dialectical skills from him, as well as temperance. Later when they parted from Socrates their temperance left them; but the reasoning and dialectical skills they learned from him presumably remained, to be put to evil ends (cf. *Mem.* 4.3.1).

Once Euthydemus reached stage 7, Xenophon says that Socrates 'avoided disturbing or confusing him but rather explained most simply and clearly the things he thought it most necessary to know and best to practice' (4.2.40). With these words those inclined to think that Xenophon is a bore, and that he passed on this quality to his character Socrates, might think their suspicions confirmed. Xenophon's Socrates reveals a certain roughness and irony in relation to those who are not his close companions—such as the professional sophists and young men whom he wants to impress—but to his close companions he reveals his true self, namely a fatuous giver of conventional moral advice. However, this reaction would be a mistake. Clearly Xenophon's Socrates does give advice. But it is not entirely, or even mainly, conventional moral advice. What Xenophon's Socrates gives, in passage after passage throughout the *Memorabilia* and elsewhere, is Socratic moral advice: with all the emphasis on care of the soul and disdain for material well-being that one has learned to expect from Plato's Socrates. Moreover, Xenophon's Socrates is quite willing to back up earnest, avuncular advice with biting cross-examination, as in his discussion between Xenophon and Critoboulus at *Memorabilia* 1.3.8–13.

SOCRATIC MORAL ADVICE

Furthermore, Plato's Socrates must also give moral advice to his students. (By 'giving moral advice' I mean 'asserting to someone

that they ought to do [or not do or aim for or avoid] something.')

Notice that I do not say: Plato also shows Socrates giving moral advice to his students. Plato does not show Socrates giving moral advice to his students. This has given some scholars the impression that Plato's Socrates is not the sort of person to give moral advice.¹³ But that is a wrong conclusion, because—as we'll see in a moment—the character of Plato's Socrates will lead him to give moral advice, in certain situations. Why did Plato choose not to depict these situations in his dialogues? Maybe because he thought that Socrates' advice giving was not a very important aspect of his character. If so, Plato was wrong about this, and Xenophon right. More likely is the hypothesis that Plato wished deliberately to downplay this side of Socrates' character. One reasonable motive Plato might have had for suppressing scenes of Socratic advice giving is that they might leave the (in Plato's eyes, mistaken) impression that Socrates was a teacher. In any case, Xenophon's Socrates is, on this point, both more true to life than Plato's and more complete.

To see that Plato's Socrates is the sort of person to give moral advice, consider the *Crito*. In the *Crito*, Socrates does not give moral advice, but he does give philosophical argument resolutely in favour of a particular practical decision. The only reason that his activity is not a case of giving practical advice is that the actor in question is not one of his associates, but himself.¹⁴ Now suppose the practical situation were reversed: the person condemned and considering whether to break out of jail is Plato or Phaedo or Crito, and Socrates is party to the discussion. Would he not take hold of the discussion and lead it similarly to the way he does in the *Crito*? I cannot think of any plausible reason to deny that he would.¹⁵ And conducting a discussion in this

¹³ See most recently Nehamas (1985).

¹⁴ Objection: another reason is that in *Crito* Socrates is not deliberating about what to do, but rather justifying to others a decision already—firmly—made. Reply: Socrates' commitment to following where the argument leads invalidates, in the case of actions not yet taken, the distinction between deliberation and justification. If Crito had managed to marshal conclusive arguments in favour of escape, then (despite the rhetoric of *Crito* 54d), Socrates would have changed his mind and fled.

¹⁵ One reason that has been suggested to me is this: perhaps Socrates believes that giving advice is the wrong way to help, that what is needed is for his associates to find out the needful thing for themselves. But this is implausible. Socrates probably did think that merely giving people advice on what to do, without the reasons that

way, announcing: 'I think Phaedo ought not to escape [or ought to, depending on the nature of the case] and here are the reasons why. Let us cross-examine them and see if they are sound' is just to give Socratic moral advice. The density of philosophical argument in the *Crito* should not mislead us. Philosophical argument is an equally essential part of the moral advice given by Xenophon's Socrates. In both Plato and Xenophon, the way that Socrates explains to his students that such-and-such a course of action is right, or that so-and-so is the correct goal to have, is by showing that this course of action or goal has the strongest arguments in its favour.¹⁶ True, Plato's Socrates has more brilliant arguments. But his emphasis on the brilliance of the arguments should not blind us to a fact that Xenophon rightly stresses, and the evidence in Plato supports, namely that Socrates and his students constituted a community set off from the rest of the society by distinctive values. It is wholly unrealistic to suppose that such a community would have been brought into being by a Socrates whose sole dialectical activity was the fruitless search for definitions. No, despite Socrates' lack of success in searching for definitions, he thought he had convincing arguments in favour of a certain set of values. Positive moral arguments such as we find in the *Apology*,¹⁷ *Crito*, *Phaedo*, and *Memorabilia* must have been part of Socrates' daily activity, and they are crucial to our evaluation of him as a philosopher and as a moral being.

explain why the advice is good advice, is cheap and does not do lasting good to the advisee. But Socratic advice is different: it is accompanied by argument and reasons. The *Crito* shows Socrates guiding his associates to the conclusion that Socrates should not escape. So he cannot think that his associates must be left to figure out everything by themselves. And if one of these young men were about to commit a grievous wrong, in the false belief that the action is right, would not Socrates come to his young friend's aid by convincing him of its wrongness? Remember, Socrates loves his young friends. If he is faced with a choice between seeing his young friend commit a great wrong and convincing him beforehand of its wrongness, surely Socrates' benevolence would lead him to choose the latter course.

¹⁶ Even when Xenophon's Socrates gives straight advice, without accompanying argument, the assumption is that his advice is reasoned advice and that he has arguments to give should they be called for. For example, Socrates' famous advice to Xenophon to consult the oracle (*An.* 3.1.5) is supported by the arguments on when to consult the gods at *Mem.* 1.4.1–18 and 4.6.10.

¹⁷ See esp. *Ap.* 30a–b, d; 36c; and 41a.

Against this it might be objected that even if Socrates did give advice, this activity was not very important to him. According to Plato, Socrates saw it as his mission to deflate people who thought they knew so that they would be ripe for undertaking enquiry; his mission was not to advise those who were aware that they did not know. If that is so, the advice giving was probably a very marginal Socratic activity. Given his mission, it seems probable that he talked most often with, and sought out, people who would prefer to give advice rather than receive it.¹⁸

In view of the meager evidence, no one can say with confidence how much time Socrates spent on which activity. But the objection seems to me psychologically improbable. Socrates had a circle of friends and admirers. He *loved* these people. How could he not desire to spend time with them, and to give them what help he was able—including advice?

The moral importance of Socrates' advice giving is part of a larger point. There is an 'intellectualizing' current of Socrates interpretation which holds that what is morally important about Socrates is his *intellectual* activity, that is, dialectic. The persistently *negative* results of Socratic dialectic lead some intellectualizing interpreters to the view that Socrates' beneficial influence on those around him consists in his dialectical refutations of their views, and their consequent recognition of ignorance. The intellectualizing interpretation of Socrates is suggested by some things Plato says, and surely Plato places greater emphasis on this aspect of Socrates than Xenophon does. But it should be clear that the intellectualizing interpretation of Socrates is not Plato's own.

Plato recognizes the importance of Socrates' moral example, and of the influence his approval and disapproval has on his young associates. The evidence for this is scattered throughout the dialogues,

¹⁸ Advice giving was the role of Socrates' *daimonion*. This might tempt someone to suggest that Socrates' *daimonion* 'took over' the advice-giving role, so that Socrates himself never gave advice, either to himself or to others, but always 'projected' that role onto the *daimonion*. This suggestion, however, gives the *daimonion* far too great a scope. Socrates' *daimonion* is a difficult and mysterious topic; but surely the *daimonion* intervened only in matters beyond human foresight, and only (or usually) negatively. The scope of appropriate advice giving in normal human affairs is much wider than this.

but Alcibiades—famously—puts it best: 'Socrates is the only man in the world who can make me feel ashamed' (*Symp.* 216b). Both silently, by his example, and verbally, through both ridicule *and* refutation, Socrates makes people feel ashamed.

In both Plato's and Xenophon's portrayals, Socrates induces this sense of shame not only, or even primarily, by intellectual means. Instead, as Alcibiades knew, he induced shame in his companions by means of his mastery of erotics: his ability to make himself so attractive to the young people around him that they yearned to follow his example and to earn his approval and became despondent and ashamed of themselves when they failed. His mastery of erotics is obviously an essential feature of Socrates the teacher. To this theme I shall return.

SOCRATES AS MORAL EDUCATOR

The portraits that Plato and Xenophon paint of Socrates are less incompatible than they might seem. Even though Plato does not actually show Socrates doing it, he does give testimony that Socrates gave a certain kind of practical advice, namely, advice about what to study and with whom. Xenophon's Socrates also showed concern with (*Mem.* 4.7) and claimed expertise in (*Ap.* 20–1) these educational matters.

At the beginning of the *Laches*, Laches praises Socrates' abilities as an adviser for the education of the young, since 'he is always spending his time wherever there is a fine field of study or occupation for the young of the sort that you [Lysimachus and Milesias] are looking for' (180c). Then Nicias adds his support: Socrates has recently introduced to him a music teacher for his son, a man who not only is a skilled musician, but who 'in every other respect you might wish is a worthy companion for young men of that age.' In this dialogue, of course, Socrates declines to give such practical advice. It suits Plato's purpose to have him direct the discussion toward more abstract topics. But the words of Laches and Nicias testify that Socrates was regarded as a good adviser about the education of the young quite

generally—not just about philosophy in the narrow sense—and that he did give such advice.

Similarly, in the *Theages* Demodocus comes to Socrates for advice about placing his son with a sophist (122a). Socrates puts him off a little, saying: ‘This is a most divine matter’; and he expresses wonder that Demodocus would have thought Socrates better than Demodocus himself at advising the son. But even so, and whether or not the *Theages* is actually by Plato, it does give evidence that Socrates was regarded as the sort of man one goes to for advice about the education of the young.

The beginning of the *Protagoras* reinforces this impression. The advice Socrates gives to young Hippocrates about the dangers of spending time with a sophist could come only from a man who has thought long and carefully about education. That Hippocrates would come to Socrates for an introduction to Protagoras at all suggests that Socrates not infrequently took on the middleman’s role.¹⁹

Socratic advice about what to study and whom to study with is *practical* advice about what to *do*, not *theoretical* advice about, for instance, which moral principles to *believe in*. The two kinds of advice are importantly different. But Plato and Xenophon present Socrates as a kind of moral expert. The model of expertise for Socratic advice about moral principles is something like ‘older colleague’ or ‘more advanced student’. If you are one of his intimates, he will state plainly what principles he believes in, and commend them to you.²⁰ But the commendation is based on his assumption—rooted in extensive dialectical experience—that if you investigated the question with him for a while, you would come to see the truth of this principle for yourself. And in both Plato and Xenophon, Socrates

¹⁹ A further example in the Socratic literature occurs in Aeschines’ *Aspasia*, where Callicles asks Socrates to recommend a teacher for his son, and Socrates recommends Aspasia (fr. 17 Dittmar). In Xenophon’s *Oec.* 3.6, Socrates recommends that Critoboulus study with Aspasia. Since Critoboulus is a middle-aged aristocrat, this incident proves what one would anyway have guessed: that Socratic advice giving, like his elenchus, is in principle available to everyone, regardless of age or social status.

²⁰ Socrates can also be frank about his principles to non-intimates, as, for example, in his confrontation with Callicles in the *Gorgias* and to the Athenian crowd during his defence speech. But Socrates will be *consistently* frank with intimates in a way he is not with strangers, to whom he is often ironical, evasive, and negatively dialectical instead.

does not want his associates to believe the principles merely on his say-so. He wants them to go through the arguments with him, proofing them at every step, so that their belief will be based on understanding, and in hopes that he might learn something new.

Some practical decisions in life hinge mainly on a question of moral principle. Thus Socrates' decision about whether or not to escape from jail hinges mainly (though not entirely) on the question of whether such an action would be just or not. Therefore, it is appropriate for Socrates in the *Crito* to direct the conversation toward a discussion of moral principles. However, not all practical decisions are of this sort. In particular, decisions concerning what to study and whom to study with are not like that. To know what a particular young person ought to study, and with whom, one needs to be, as Socrates says in the *Laches*, 'an expert in the care of souls' (185d). To possess this expertise in its complete form presumably requires knowledge of important and difficult moral principles—such as what the best life is for a human being, if there is such a thing. But it also requires an understanding of particulars—above all, of particular souls. The expert in the care of souls must be able to judge accurately what the condition of a particular soul is, what its strengths and weaknesses are, and where its potentialities lie. Moreover, an understanding of how various influences affect various souls is also required. In regard to the question—With whom should this young person study?—this understanding also involves the ability to judge accurately the characters of the prospective teachers.

When Socrates gives positive educational advice to young boys, he often cannot hope to bring them to see for themselves its correctness through his usual elenctic demonstration. (The negative task of showing the boy that his own ideas about his education are ill founded is, by contrast, ideally suited for elenchus.) In the first place, for psychological reasons that have become notorious since Freud, people have special difficulties obtaining an accurate view of their own characters. In the second place, the boys simply lack the experience that would enable them to understand (a point much stressed by Aristotle). Socrates' ability to give educational advice is a moral expertise, but its model is not that of 'older colleague' or 'more advanced student'. Of the standard models of expertise in Athenian culture, the best one for this purpose is, I believe, the 'trainer'.

A trainer's judgements about what to eat, how and when to practise, and, for example, which other trainers to seek out to learn specific skills are based on long experience as well as an understanding of certain basic principles. Because of the experiential element, the trainer cannot always justify his judgements. Sometimes he just *tells* the trainee what it would be best for him or her to do, and the trainee must just accept it. The trainee's acceptance need not rest on blind faith. It may be based on a *general* confidence in the trainer's expertise, which in turn is based on the extent of the trainer's experience, the reputation of the trainer's own teachers, and the trainer's own past record of success—both in practising the art itself, perhaps, and in training others.²¹ Socrates acts directly as a 'trainer' in influencing the characters of his young associates.²² In his role as educational expert, Socrates is a kind of 'master trainer': he is the trainer one goes to for advice concerning which trainers to choose. In that role, Socrates must give advice that he cannot fully justify to the recipient.²³

The difference between Xenophon's Socrates and Plato's is also mitigated by the fact that Plato's Socrates is not always as savage as he is with Gorgias, Polus, Thrasymachus, Euthyphro, and the Athenian crowd. Indeed, careful analysis will reveal significant differences in Socrates' attitude and conduct toward these people. But more important for us are the gross differences between Socrates' relative hostility toward these people—persons outside his moral community, who, he is confident, will remain outside it regardless of how the conversation goes—and his kind, gentle, and appreciative attitude toward his own associates—Glaucon and Adeimantus in the *Republic*, Crito in the *Crito*, Simmias and Cebes in the *Phaedo*. Plato and

²¹ For Socrates' own list of criteria, see *Lach.* 185b–186c.

²² For Socrates as trainer, see Foucault 2 (1985), p. 1, ch. 3, pp. 72–3. Foucault wisely rejects intellectualizing interpretations of Socrates, calling the recognition that '*mathesis* alone is not sufficient; it has to be backed up by a training, an *askesis*,... 'one of the great Socratic lessons' (p. 72).

²³ Thus Nehamas (1986), 302–3 is wrong to argue that moral experts are worthy of obedience only if we can understand and approve of their reasons. Justified belief that certain people are moral experts can be gotten simply from observing their track record. And if these people can give us convincing reasons that they are in a position to know or adequately appreciate reasons that we ourselves are not able to know or appreciate, we may reasonably conclude that, in the areas governed by these reasons, we ought to accept their authority.

Xenophon agree in showing Socrates displaying a vastly different manner to those inside his circle, and to those firmly outside of it. Neither of these groups, however, is the most interesting for us. The group into which Euthydemus falls at the beginning of the discussion in *Memorabilia* 4 is a third, very important group: those who are *potential* intimates of Socrates. By my count, Plato shows Socrates in discussion with only four 'potential intimates': Cleinias, Lysis, Menexenus, and Charmides.²⁴ From these four portraits we learn a little about Socrates' approach to this group, but not much. In the *Euthydemus* Socrates employs open protreptic, praising philosophy to the young Cleinias. Perhaps one reason why Plato lets him do this is that the sophists Euthydemus and Dionysidorus had already accomplished the task of elenchus.²⁵ Neither the *Lysis* nor the *Charmides* gives us even that much data. In the *Lysis*, Menexenus, the older and more experienced boy, gives up rather quickly in the face of refutation, and Lysis, the new boy, takes over. But Lysis undergoes no character development in the dialogue, and Socrates does not vary his approach. We learn something more about Menexenus in the dialogue named after him, when Socrates supposes that Menexenus is going in for politics, having finished with education and philosophy. Menexenus says that he will seek office 'if Socrates allows and advises it'. This is a curious remark, since it implies that Menexenus still considers himself one of Socrates' circle, and that Socrates' followers expected, and presumably received, such advice. But Socrates' supposition, and his sarcasm later in the dialogue, reveal that Menexenus is not now, if he ever was, regarded by Socrates as one of his associates. Finally, in the dialogue named after him, Charmides shows himself to be a charming and intrinsically promising boy, whose later turn to tyranny is implicitly explained by the strong influence of his intemperate guardian Cleinias. All in all, there is

²⁴ Hippocrates in the *Protagoras* might be added as a fifth (see esp. *Prt.* 311b–314c). Note that the bystanders in Socratic dialogues often include 'potential intimates'. A full exploration of this problem would have to analyse, case by case through the dialogues, Socrates' 'indirect communication'—the intended effect of his words (and of the entire discussion that he steers) upon those who are present but to whom he is not directly talking.

²⁵ Whether Cleinias is really a beginner is cast into doubt later in the dialogue (290c–291a), when Socrates, the narrator, admits that Cleinias had been represented as giving answers to Socrates' questions that no neophyte would be likely to give.

not much in Plato to compare with Xenophon's account of Socrates' conquest of Euthydemus.

SOCRATES AS MASTER OF EROTICS

The grand theme of Socrates as the master of erotics, common to Plato and Xenophon, is the most important (if also very difficult) piece of evidence that Socrates took an interest in all aspects of the education of the young. The theme is significant, because unless Socrates has knowledge of erotics, his avid pursuit of talented young people is unjustified and wrong.

In Plato's *Symposium* Socrates says that erotics is the one thing he knows (177d); in the *Lysis* (211e) and in the *Theages* (128b) fundamentally the same claim recurs.²⁶ In Xenophon's *Symposium* Socrates presents a version of this claim that connects it directly with education.²⁷ Socrates says that he prides himself most on being a 'procurer' at 3.10, where the word used has sexual connotation. Later, at 4.57, Socrates explains what he means. The procurer is one who can make a person attractive to his or her associates. Thus, the best procurer is one who can make a person attractive to the whole city (4.60). (Notice that Socrates the procurer, condemned to death by a popular court, was thus a failure as a procurer, namely at applying his art to himself. To suppose that this consequence was not noticed by Xenophon would be to make a serious error. Sometimes Xenophon's irony is even stronger than Plato's, because it is carried out more quietly.)

In what follows, Socrates ascribes to Antisthenes the trade not only of procurer, but also of go-between, a trade which he says 'follows on' procuring. Being a go-between follows on procuring in the sense of perfecting it. The go-between not only makes people attractive to each other, makes them desire each other, but also is able to recognize those who are useful to each other—and, by implication, those who

²⁶ See also the dialogue with Critoboulus on friendship, where Socrates is giving advice on the choice of friends (which includes the choice of teachers), and explicitly erotic imagery is used (*Mem.* 2.6.28–9). See also *Cyr.* 8.4.17–19 and *Mem.* 4.1.2.

²⁷ For Socrates' claim to educational expertise, see *Xen. Ap.* 20–1.

are not (4.64). Now procuring alone is no virtue—whether being made attractive to a particular person is a good thing or not depends on whether that person's company is beneficial. But the trade of go-between is a virtue in the strict Socratic sense. With it, as Socrates says, a person can arrange valuable friendships, not only among individuals but also between states. Moreover, the role of educational expert, the ability to know with whom a particular young person should study and associate, is but one branch of the art of the go-between.

The art of the go-between is especially useful because it can be applied reflexively: if a person has mastered the art of the go-between, he or she can recognize those whose company will be beneficial to them, and those to whom their company will be beneficial; and he or she can make themselves attractive to such people. If Socrates were to possess this art, he would know which young people are suited to his company, and he would be able to attract them.

Socrates ascribes to Antisthenes the art of the go-between. Although I think he chose Antisthenes for a reason,²⁸ I also think that his choice was a humorous and well-bred way of describing the art upon which he prides himself.²⁹ Let me put it this way: unless Socrates does possess the art of the go-between, at least in educational matters, he has no business seducing the young as energetically and as selectively as he does. For if Socrates does not possess this art, then he cannot know whether or not he is harming these youngsters: some by his associating with them, others, perhaps, by driving them away. That is, unless Socrates possesses the art of the go-between, he cannot know whether he is guilty of corrupting the young. And if he does not know that, then he has no business taking the risk.

This risk should not be underestimated. In fact, the moral dangerousness of Socrates' situation in cultivating the company of bright, impressionable young men is parallel to Euthyphro's in the Platonic dialogue. Euthyphro's action in prosecuting his father is morally controversial, and its potential consequences are grave. In the dialogue, Socrates makes clear his attitude that under such circumstances one had better know what one is doing (*Euthyphr.* 4e).

²⁸ See also *Mem.* 3.4–4.

²⁹ See also *Oec.* 3.14–16.

Anyone who would run such risks had better be sure of their expertise. Similarly, if Socrates does not know whether he is corrupting the young, he had better not run the risk of associating with them.

In the *Laches* Plato shows Socrates to be extremely aware of the moral gravity of decisions concerning education. Melesias and Lysimachus are looking for a teacher for a young man, and Socrates says to them: 'Or do you think it a slight matter that you and Lysimachus have now at stake, and not that which is really your greatest possession? For I take it that according as the sons turn out well or the opposite will the whole like of their father's house be affected, depending for better or worse on their character' (185a; see also 186b). But, unfortunately, in the *Laches* Plato has Socrates disclaim the very skill that he must have if he is to defend his practice of seeking out and selecting young associates. The skill required is the art of caring for souls (185c). This enables one to know what particular things a particular young person needs to learn (*Lach.* 185e–186e). This art Socrates explicitly disclaims: 'Now I, Lysimachus and Melesias, am the first to avow that I have had no teacher in this respect, ... and to this moment I remain powerless to discover the art myself' (185c).³⁰

Socrates, an intensely charismatic man who is fully aware of his charisma, actively cultivates the company of talented young men. If he is as ignorant of the 'art of caring for souls' as he admits in the *Laches*, then he does not know whether associating with him is good for these young men or bad for them. The Socrates of the *Laches* does not know whether he is guilty of corrupting the young. And if Socrates does not know that, then he—like Euthyphro—has no business taking the risk.³¹

In the *Theaetetus*, however, Socrates claims a related ability. In the famous 'midwife' passage, Socrates says about those unfortunate young men whose minds are not pregnant that 'with the best will

³⁰ To be precise, Socrates does not need the whole of this art in order to defend himself, but only enough of it to be able to make correct decisions concerning his own case. However, neither here nor elsewhere does Plato defend the view that Socrates has even this much of the art.

³¹ In the *Apology*, Socrates defends himself against Meletus' charge by claiming that he does not *intentionally* corrupt the young. While this is an effective defence

in the world I undertake the business of matchmaking; and I think I am good enough at guessing (πάνν ἱκανῶς τοπάζω)—God willing—with whom they might profitably keep company. Many of them I have given away to Prodicus; and a great number also to other wise and inspired persons' (151b).

This passage confirms the other testimony from Plato and Xenophon that Socrates gave young people advice about what and with whom to study. Here Socrates does claim reliable judgement in what Xenophon's *Symposium* calls 'the trade of the go-between'.³² But Socrates stops short of claiming either *knowledge* of what is best for these young men or the *art* (τέχνη) of caring for souls. What he claims is, in the language of the *Gorgias*, a certain knack: he is *good at guessing* what is good for them, God willing.³³ This raises several questions. Is guessing correctly good enough? (Compare the discussion of true belief later in the *Theaetetus*.) What are Socrates' grounds for believing that his guesses are correct? The advice Socrates gives

against Meletus, it does not help him here. If Socrates does not know whether he is corrupting the young or not, he is running an awful risk, and he ought to stop. (Of course, if Socrates is right about the ignorance of his compatriots, then they are in no better position than he is.)

³² Objection: the final sentence of this passage drips with irony. Socrates does not think that Prodicus will benefit young people, nor that these 'other persons' are truly wise and inspired. Since the people Socrates is sending the young people to will not benefit them, and Socrates knows this, the claim that he engages in matchmaking is not meant straight, but only ironically. Reply: Socrates did think that learning to make distinctions, which Prodicus taught, was useful, even if Prodicus carried it to extremes. Further, the objector must decide how much to take ironically: Socrates' claim to send young people to others or only his claim that those he sends them to benefit them. If only the second claim is meant ironically, then Socrates is knowingly sending young people to those who will not benefit them, and so he is pandering, not matchmaking. Taking the first claim ironically runs afoul of all the other testimony that Socrates gave educational advice. This text and the others I cite confirm each other on this point.

For a reading of the passage as ironical, see Burnyeat (1977), 7–13. Burnyeat's reading works best if the verb *δινύμι* at 151b5 is taken to mean 'please' rather than 'benefit'. But if Socrates sends young people to those who merely please them, he is a panderer. Those who are tempted to find Vlastovian 'complex irony' at work in this passage might consult Morrison (1987), 11–14.

³³ Just how good does Socrates think his ability is? It is hard to tell precisely: *πάνν ἱκανῶς* is a rare phrase in fourth-century Greek prose. Presumably it means 'well enough for one's purposes, but not infallibly'. Socrates' awareness of the importance of acting as a go-between is shown by the phrase 'God willing' (*σύν θεῷ εἰπεῖν*), which is a conventional expression used to ward off the penalties for hubris.

has a decisive impact on these young men's lives. Therefore, it is morally crucial that Socrates' confidence in his judgements be well grounded. But in the *Theaetetus*, Socrates' confidence concerning this matter is left unexplained and undefended. One suspects that the Socrates of the *Laches* would claim that the only person who is justified in being confident of his judgements about educational matters is the person who possesses the art of caring for souls.³⁴

In his judgements about infertile souls, Socrates can only 'guess'. By contrast, for dealing with intellectually pregnant young men, Socrates claims to possess a *technē*—the art of midwifery. The 'highest power' of this art of his is the ability to test whether a young man's ideas are false or fertile (150c). In this passage Socrates assumes that undergoing his midwifery is beneficial to the young people who undergo it. This assumption is implied by his calling it midwifery, the true art, rather than pandering. But of course, this assumption is controversial and needs defence. The thesis, put in terms of Plato's metaphor, that Socrates' activity is midwifery rather than pandering, is precisely the point denied in more ordinary language by Socrates' accusers in their charge that he corrupts the young. In the *Theaetetus* Plato creates a rich and lovely image that rhetorically suggests Socrates' innocence: Socrates is a midwife, and how could midwifery *not* be beneficial? But in the *Theaetetus*, Plato uses this image to avoid, rather than address, that issue.

Recently C. D. C. Reeve has faced up to the problem of whether Socrates' elenctic activity could be shown not to corrupt the young, and he has admitted that he cannot find a solution.³⁵ He notes the remarkable fact that the question of whether the elenchus tended to corrupt the young is not much discussed by recent writers. Sensibly, he then observes that one would have to know quite a bit about the psychological effects of the elenchus in order to settle the question with authority.

Thomas Brickhouse and Nicholas Smith, on the other hand, offer a solution to the problem. They propose that Socrates can claim to

³⁴ Clearly, this passage in the *Theaetetus* raises—but does not help resolve—the notorious problem in Socratic epistemology of how one is justified in relying on particular judgements if one lacks knowledge of the matter at hand.

³⁵ Reeve (1989), 166–9.

know that he is not corrupting the young, on the basis of two other facts: he has been commanded by the gods to associate with the young in the way he does (Pl. *Ap.* 33c); and the god is wise, and hence infallibly beneficent.³⁶

This is a good argument: if Socrates did know the premises, he would be entitled to know the conclusion that he does not corrupt the young. But does Socrates know the premises? Xenophon's Socrates provides arguments for the second premise at *Memorabilia* 1.4; while Plato's Socrates, as Brickhouse and Smith acknowledge, merely assumes it.³⁷ Xenophon's account lacks the story of Socrates' divine mission that Plato gives,³⁸ so his Socrates does not know the first premise. The Socrates of Plato's *Apology* seems utterly convinced of his divine mission. But does he know the first premise? Surely not; for, first, if all he knows is his ignorance (and he does not know anything 'fine'), then he does not know that he is carrying out the will of the god. Second, and perhaps more important, interpreting the Delphic oracle is a notoriously risky business. In order to know that his activities are approved by the god, Socrates must know not only that the oracle is the accurate expression of the god's judgement but also that he has interpreted the oracle correctly, and that he is carrying out the instructions competently and accurately. In all fairness, the interpretation of the oracle and the execution of the instructions are complicated and inherently controversial matters, which Plato's Socrates is not in a position to claim to know.³⁹

Our earlier discussion has shown that the performance of the god's instructions is a more complicated matter than interpreters of Plato's Socrates have tended to realize. If we set aside the implausible view that elenchus is beneficial always and everywhere and however conducted, then Plato's Socrates faces the questions about his execution of the divine

³⁶ Brickhouse and Smith (1989), 199–200. This conception of Socrates' divine mission is shared by G. Vlastos (1991), 176: 'Piety is doing god's work to benefit human beings.'

³⁷ They call it an 'article of faith': Brickhouse and Smith (1989), 120.

³⁸ See Vander Waerdt (1993), 1–48.

³⁹ One might claim that Socrates can justify his claim properly to perform the god's instructions by appeal to the god's foresight: if Apollo had foreseen that Socrates would foul it up, he would have had the prudence not to have given him the mission in the first place. But the Delphic oracle typically gives its recipients plenty of room to go wrong.

mission to which Xenophon responds with the story of Euthydemus. Is Socrates choosing the right people to refute? The right moment? Is he effectively mixing in other approaches—flattery, encouragement, sarcasm, indirect communication—so that the elenchus, when it comes, will be maximally effective? For Plato's Socrates to know that he is correctly carrying out the god's mission (and therefore benefiting his compatriots) he would need to know the answers to these questions. This is more than his profession of ignorance will allow him to claim.

WAS SOCRATES A TEACHER OF VIRTUE?

Socrates' relation to Euthydemus and to the other young men around him raises the famous question of whether Socrates was a teacher of virtue. Socrates himself denied that he was a teacher of virtue—on this point both Plato and Xenophon agree.⁴⁰ But in both Plato and Xenophon, Socrates does claim to be beneficial to his compatriots.⁴¹ And this means claiming that he can make them better persons, that is, more virtuous. How, then, can Socrates disclaim being a teacher of virtue?

Plato and Xenophon offer different answers to this question. Plato's Socrates denies that he is a teacher of virtue on the grounds that he is not a teacher (*Ap.* 19e, 20c). Xenophon's Socrates, by contrast, does claim to teach, but not virtue. Xenophon's Socrates disclaims the title of teacher of virtue, because he has not mastered the art. There are two reasons for this. First, a master craftsman can promise his customer a high-quality product of his craft. But Socrates cannot promise to make someone virtuous (*Mem.* 1.2.3). For one thing, only a few people are suited to become his students. Of course, every craftsman requires good materials. A more distinctive difficulty for the craft of moral education is that it requires the active cooperation of the 'raw materials'. Becoming virtuous requires continual effort and cooperation on the part of the learner.⁴² Socrates can make

⁴⁰ *Xen. Mem.* 1.2.3, 1.2.8; but cf. *Mem.* 1.6.13, 14. See also *Mem.* 4.4.5; *Pl. Ap.* 19e, 20c.

⁴¹ See esp. *Pl. Ap.* 31b, 36c; *Xen. Ap.* 32; *Mem.* 1.2.8; 1.4.1; 1.6.13, 14.

⁴² See the emphasis on Socrates' companions' efforts at self-improvement at *Memorabilia* 1.2.3.

the sort of careful tests that we see in the Euthydemus story, but he cannot guarantee the young man's stamina, or that other, less beneficial influences will not seduce him away.

Second, Socrates does not know everything there is to know about virtue. There is much he has not figured out yet. Xenophon's Socrates knows some things about virtue, and he is willing to teach his companions whatever good he can (*Mem.* 1.6.13–14; 4.7.1). But this falls short of the complete art of virtue.⁴³

Plato's Socrates gives a different reason. Plato's Socrates denies that he is a teacher of virtue on the grounds that he does not teach at all (*Ap.* 19e, 20c). Does Xenophon's Socrates deny that he is a teacher? Answering this question turns out to be a little complicated. Xenophon claims at *Memorabilia* 4.7.1 that 'everything it is fitting for a good man (καλὸς καγαθὸς ἀνὴρ) to know, Socrates eagerly taught (ἐδίδασκεν), so far as he himself knew it'. Strictly speaking, Xenophon's claim is compatible with Socrates' teaching nothing, if there is nothing that he knows. But rhetorically and in the context, it is clear that Xenophon means to imply that Socrates knows quite a few things that the good man needs to know, and that he taught them.

Xenophon makes this claim about Socrates. Does he show Socrates making this claim about himself? Yes, but indirectly. Socrates tells Antiphon that 'we think that whoever makes a friend of one whom he recognizes as having a good nature, and teaches him what good he can, does what a good man and citizen ought' (*Mem.* 1.6.13). Since Socrates aimed at being a good man, we may safely suppose that he would apply this principle to himself. By claiming that the good man teaches his good-natured friends what good he can, Socrates is implicitly acknowledging that he himself will 'teach his friends what good he can'.

Xenophon's Socrates thinks that his claim to benefit those around him is based primarily on the influence of his moral example,⁴⁴

⁴³ In his *Alcibiades* Aeschines gives a third reason why Socrates is not a teacher of virtue, one that would prevent Socrates from being a teacher of virtue in the ordinary sense; namely, that he was able to help Alcibiades only due to a 'divine dispensation' (θεῖα μοῖρα), that is, 'because of love' (frs. 11a–c Dittmar). If Socrates really depended on something as uncertain as a divine dispensation to guarantee the suitability of his young associates to benefit from his company, then he was a dangerously reckless man.

⁴⁴ *Mem.* 1.2.3; 4.4.10.

secondarily on the truth of the moral beliefs for which he argues in discussion with his students,⁴⁵ and (implicitly—this is never said in so many words) only thirdly on the training in philosophy and dialectic that he gives them. Which, if any, of these activities count as ‘teaching’?

In the *Memorabilia*, Xenophon’s Socrates does not make explicit whether providing a moral example counts as teaching. He certainly thinks that being influenced by a moral example counts as learning: he twice quotes with approval Theognis’ line ‘From the good you shall learn good things.’⁴⁶ But it does not follow from this that providing the example counts as teaching.

The context of the claims that Socrates ‘teaches what good he can’ makes clear that Xenophon and Xenophon’s Socrates count his dialectical activity as teaching and consider the many propositions of which he convinces his interlocutors to be ‘knowledge taught’. Scholars have recently argued that Plato’s Socrates does not ‘teach’, in part because his elenchus is based upon beliefs that the interlocutor already has, and because one cannot teach a person what they already (‘in a sense’) know.⁴⁷

Xenophon was aware of this line of argument. His *Oeconomicus* resembles Plato’s *Parmenides* in that another character, in this case the gentleman Ischomachus, takes over the ‘Socratic’ role of leading the discussion, and Socrates himself has the lesser role of interlocutor. Ischomachus claims to teach (*didaskein*), not the whole of virtue, but a certain type of justice;⁴⁸ and he claims to be a teacher, with Socrates his pupil (*Oec.* 17.6). Yet Ischomachus uses the question-and-answer method, and he repeatedly draws attention to its reliance on the interlocutor’s antecedent knowledge. He says to Socrates: ‘I

⁴⁵ *Mem.* 1.2.8; 1.2.3; 4.7.1.

⁴⁶ *Mem.* 1.2.20; *Symp.* 2.5.

⁴⁷ Nehamas (1985). See also Reeve (1989), 160–8. Reeve claims that Socrates’ disclaimer of teaching applies only to the elenchus, and that Socrates denies that ‘*elengchein* is *didaskein*’ (p. 163). But Socrates’ disclaimer of teaching applies to more than the elenchus, since he claims that he never teaches the young, and his activity in their presence includes more than refutation. Among other things, it includes setting a moral example, and it includes giving advice. (Pace Reeve, the lesson to learn from Plato *Apology* 21b1–2 is simply that Socrates contradicts himself.)

⁴⁸ Note the verb of promising (*ὑποδύειν*), and contrast this with the denial of *ὑπάρχειν* at *Mem.* 1.2.3.

believe that you know a great deal about [farming] yourself, without being aware of the fact' (*Oec.* 15.10). Moreover, Ischomachus implies that Socrates knows beforehand as much as he, the teacher, does, about each of the subjects discussed (18.1, 3, 5). Ischomachus even suggests that Socrates' readily elicited antecedent knowledge extends so far that he is capable of teaching the subject himself!⁴⁹ Socrates responds with a revealing comment: 'I really wasn't aware that I understood these things; and so I have been thinking for some time whether my knowledge extends to smelting gold, playing the flute, and painting pictures. For I have never been taught these things any more than I have been taught farming; but I have watched men working at these arts, just as I have watched them farming' (*Oec.* 18.9).

In the *Meno* and the *Phaedo* the antecedent knowledge that enables one to respond correctly to certain dialectical questions was obtained in a prior, disembodied existence. In the *Oeconomicus* Xenophon points out that Plato's picture is, at best, incomplete: we acquire our implicit knowledge of many arts from ordinary experience. In some cases, we do not even need to practise the art itself: having watched skilled craftsmen at work is sufficient.

As regards farming and painting pictures, Plato's Socrates and Xenophon's Socrates may not disagree. But Xenophon's Socrates applies this analysis to the art of living, or virtue, in a way that diverges from Plato. Just as having observed skilled farmers at their work is a necessary condition for being able to correctly answer dialectical questions about farming, so correctly answering dialectical questions about virtue requires exposure to virtuous people. Plato's Socrates gives the impression that all of the knowledge required for a successful dialectical examination of virtue is innate. Xenophon's Socrates recognizes that this is not so, and that Euthydemus when he first meets Socrates is less able to answer dialectical questions about virtue than he will be after long association with Socrates, in part for other reasons, but in part because he will learn a great deal about virtue from observing Socrates.

In the quotation above, Socrates says that 'no one taught him' farming. This implies that providing a model for observation does

⁴⁹ *Oec.* 18.9; cf. 15.10.

not count as teaching. Socrates' own activity of self-consciously providing a model of virtue for his young associates does not count, for him, as 'teaching' them anything. (But it does count as beneficence, and as helping them to learn.) Ischomachus implies at *Oeconomicus* 17.6 that his activity of dialectically examining Socrates about farming is 'teaching'.⁵⁰ Though the inference from what Ischomachus says to what Socrates would say is not uniformly valid, in this case it seems safe to say that Xenophon's Socrates, who, unlike Plato's, does claim to teach, would follow Ischomachus in claiming to teach through dialectic.

But in teaching through dialectic, what exactly is it that one teaches? The obvious answer is that one teaches the propositions that survive dialectical examination. But if the learner already knew these propositions, there is an equally obvious problem: How can you teach someone something that he or she already knows? Xenophon's Socrates says about the art of sowing: 'I know it, but I had forgotten that I know it' (*Oec.* 18.10). What the dialectical teacher does is teach the pupil various propositions about the subject by reminding him of what he knows, by removing forgetfulness (*λήθη*). Plato's Socrates, with his theory of recollection, has a similar description of the process but declines to call it 'teaching'.

Is the disagreement between Plato's Socrates and Xenophon's Socrates on whether dialectic constitutes 'teaching' therefore merely verbal? I do not think so. By calling dialectic teaching, Xenophon's Socrates acknowledges his superior position. Socrates is the one who is aware of what the learner has forgotten he knows; and Socrates leads the discussion. By denying that dialectic is teaching, Plato's Socrates emphasizes that the origin of the views arrived at is within the interlocutor himself; and he deflects responsibility for the outcome from himself onto the pupil. This deflection of responsibility is useful for escaping the corruption charge; but it is disingenuous. Socrates was a sufficiently skilled dialectician that he would have been able, had he wanted, to draw on other, perhaps mistaken, beliefs of his interlocutors in order to generate false and even vicious conclusions. By accepting the designation 'teacher', Xenophon's

⁵⁰ Note the participle *didaskonti*.

Socrates—quite properly—accepts responsibility for the moral consequences of his dialectical conversations.⁵¹

Socrates is the patron saint of philosophy; and scholarly writing about Socrates often bears an uncomfortable resemblance to hagiography. Scholars do disagree about Socrates' life and character. But that he was a saint; that he was a hero; and that he was innocent of corrupting the young is unquestioned or treated as unquestionable. Plato and Xenophon thought that Socrates was a hero, and that he was the best man of his time. But I believe that both Plato and Xenophon had a much sharper sense of the moral dangerousness of Socrates' activity than most modern writers do. Although they thought that Socrates was innocent of the charge of corrupting the young, they did not believe that he was *obviously* innocent. Various recent scholars have written as if it were obvious that the effect of Socratic elenchus is always beneficial. But Plato and Xenophon knew better. After all, the free philosophizing of Plato's Socrates is forbidden under the rules of Plato's *Republic* (537e–539e). In the Euthydemus story, Xenophon shows Socrates being very careful about what he says, and to whom, so as to minimize the clear danger of corruption.

Xenophon stresses more than Plato does the importance of Socrates' moral character and its influence for our overall evaluation of the man. Here Xenophon's portrayal provides an important supplement and corrective to Plato's account. Historically, what is most important about Socrates is his contribution to philosophy in the narrow sense—to the awakening of wonder, to philosophical method, and to the development of certain philosophical problems. But the historical importance of a person is for the most part independent of his moral worth. What makes Socrates morally admirable are his remarkable character and the substantive moral opinions that he held. Plato and Xenophon agree that central to Socrates' moral being is a certain kind of intellectuality: his commitment to the examined life and to the reasoned search for wisdom.

⁵¹ Behind this disagreement there may also be a political motivation. When Plato denies that Socrates was a teacher at all, he differentiates Socrates sharply from the sophists. By allowing that Socrates was a teacher, Xenophon softens the contrast but does not eliminate it.

But this commitment by itself is not enough. If Socrates had been just as clever a philosopher, and just as convinced of his own ignorance, but greedy, lecherous, and power-hungry, neither Xenophon nor Plato would have thought him a good man.⁵²

⁵² Thanks are due to David Calhoun, Michael Frede, Cynthia Freeland, Paul Vander Waerdt, Gregory Vlastos, Roslyn Weiss, Stephen White, Paul Woodruff, and Harvey Yunis for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. The Alexander von Humboldt Foundation generously supported my initial work on this essay, and a Summer Seminar on Socrates sponsored by the National Endowment for the Humanities gave me both leisure and a remarkably collegial environment in which to expand and revise it.

Xenophon's Socrates as Dialectician

Andreas Patzer

For Johannes

And if one believes Xenophon . . . then one does not understand how Socrates did not empty out the market and the workshops, the streets and the gymnasia over so many years through fear of encountering him, or how the boredom of the interlocutor does not stand out in the naïve lowlands manner of Xenophon even more strongly than it actually does here and there.

Schleiermacher

THE SOCRATIC XENOPHON

As controversially as Socrates has been judged in antiquity and the modern era, the fact that Socrates' philosophizing proceeded *conversationally* by Socrates asking an interlocutor a question and using the subsequent answer as the basis of further questioning, so that an independent thought process developed in the exchange of question and answer; on this point there is no disagreement. This style of conversation, which can be termed *dialectic*, inasmuch as the term *dialectic* in the true sense of the word means nothing more than *the art of conversation* (διαλεκτικὴ τέχνη), was in its time something completely new—a *discovery of Socrates*. The Sophists did indeed already proclaim themselves prepared to answer any question put to them. However this readiness has nothing in common with

Socratic *dialectic*, as is evident from the very fact that it is the Sophist who *answers*, but in every case Socrates acts the role of the *questioner*. This important difference refers to the fact that the Sophistic conversation with the public is nothing but *one* possible way to demonstrate their claim to knowledge. The Sophist can also articulate this knowledge if required, and on demand, in the form of a lecture, i.e. epideictically (*locus classicus*: Plat. *Prot.* p. 329b = VS 80 A 7). Socratic dialectic founded itself in opposition to this—nor is this a matter of debate—on the awareness of its own ignorance. It is not the claim to knowledge, but the lack of knowledge that instigates communication with others, which as an expression of spiritual, or even existential need thus becomes a necessary form of philosophizing, irreplaceable by anything else.

In this way Socrates gained a *social* dimension for thought; and it is therefore no surprise that it is not just the methods of Socratic dialectic that are founded in the social sphere, but also its subject; for the subject of Socratic dialectic—and nor should this be a matter of debate—is essentially the *good*; only from recognition of this can correct action follow for men, a recognition that since Aristotle has been customarily referred to by the philosophical term *ethical* (ἠθική).

The Socratic *discovery of ethics* was already seen as an epochal event in the history of Greek philosophy in antiquity—and rightly so—and it found suitable expression in the oft-quoted words of Cicero (*Tusc. disp.* 5. 4. 10) that Socrates summoned philosophy from Heaven and brought it down to Earth. And even modern philosophical historiography still recognizes Socrates' epochal significance when they—disputably—call the early Greek philosophers *Presocratics*, as though natural and theoretical philosophy before Socrates was nothing more than a prelude to the ethical philosophy that Socrates discovered and founded.

Inasmuch as the Socratic method of philosophizing essentially occurs as dialectic in the form of living conversation through the medium of question and answer, it is essentially *oral*. Orality is not permanent, but passes in the moment it occurs. So that we would not know anything about Socrates as a philosopher if others had not passed down their accounts of him to us, amongst which, or rather above all, are the close companions and friends of Socrates, who were

already called *Socratics* (Σωκρατικοί) in ancient histories of philosophy (earliest instance: Phainias fr. 30 ff. Wehrli).

The Socratics' accounts of Socrates have their own special character. They mainly occur in a medium created by the Socratics that Aristotle (*Poet.* 1447 a 28–b 13; fr. 72 Rose; cf *Rhet.* 1417 a 18–21) calls *Socratic prose* (λόγος Σωκρατικός) or *Socratic dialogue* (διάλογος Σωκρατικός), thus naming a new literary prose genre in which Socrates' dialectical conversations—dialogues—were depicted. Aristotle classes this prose genre as *poetry* since, as in the mimes of Sophron and Xenarchus, the representation comes about *by means of imitation* (διὰ μιμήσεως). But that means, to bring Aristotle into the discussion again (*Poet.* 1451 a 36–b 7): in their dialogues the Socratics do not represent what Socrates actually did or said (τὰ γενόμενα), but what he might have done or said (οἷα ἂν γένοιτο). In modern terminology this simply means that Aristotle considers the Socratic dialogues a genre of *fictional prose literature*.

Had modern researchers taken what Aristotle says about the fictional character of the Socratic dialogues seriously, they would have been able to save themselves a great deal of effort, for the endless dispute as to which Socratic in which dialogue or dialogues portrays the real, the *historical* Socrates proves to be mistaken and pointless in the light of Aristotle's literary-historical statement, inasmuch as *none* of the Socratics even intended to try to portray the historical Socrates in a dialogue. And this, the fact that the historical Socrates is only ever visible through the Socratics' fictional lens, is the *crux* and the dilemma of Socratic research, which is obliged, by means of historical criticism, to establish the historical substrate which has formed the basis for the fictional interpretations of Socrates from the beginning—a task which is as hermeneutically laborious as it is difficult, demanding methodical prudence as well as critical audacity.

The accuracy of Aristotle's perception of the Socratic dialogues' fictionality is confirmed by Plato with a literary signal: he himself never speaks in his own name, but—in the so-called diegetic dialogues—he has another person appear as narrator (often, though not always, Socrates) or else—in the dramatic dialogues—fails to name a source at all. An author cannot show any more emphatically or clearly that what he is depicting is not meant to be taken as an historical account, but as a literary creation. It is not the historical

but a fictional or an ideal (which amounts to the same thing) Socrates who appears and speaks in the Platonic dialogues. Apart from that there is every indication that the Socratics whose dialogues have only been transmitted fragmentarily also proceeded in the same way as Plato. Of Aischines we know that Socrates acted as narrator in all his dialogues (Taylor 1934 [1994 in original] 3–8); for Antisthenes, Eukleides and Phaidon it is at least likely that they also withdrew themselves entirely from their own dialogues.

Xenophon is quite different. He employs a different narrative technique, which differs markedly from Plato and also from the fragmentary Socratics. Xenophon abandons the literary distance between author and work that signals the fictionality of the representation in the other Socratics, and expressly professes himself to be the authority for what he as the author says about Socrates. And so the Xenophontic *Socratica* gain the appearance of *personal memoirs*. Xenophon's main work advertises this idiosyncratic form of transmission in its very title: *Ἀπομνημονεύματα*—*Memoirs* (henceforth *Memorabilia*). But the other *Socratica* of Xenophon, the *Symposium*, *Oeconomicus*, and the so-called *Apology of Socrates* (the authenticity of which is still debated), are also, as far as form is concerned, conceived as memoirs, since at the outset in each case Xenophon explicitly assures us that he personally heard or personally found out from other people that Socrates spoke the way that he speaks in what follows.

It is perfectly understandable that the guarantees of authenticity that Xenophon includes in his *Socratica* have long been given credence. The view of antiquity was already that Xenophon was the first to secretly note down what Socrates said and publish it under the title *Ἀπομνημονεύματα* as memoirs (*Diog. Laert.* 2.48). For a long time, modern Socratic research had a similarly high view of the authenticity value of the Xenophontic *Socratica* (e.g. Hegel 1833; Labriola 1871; Boutroux 1883; Döring 1895; von Arnim 1923; Schmid 1940). In the memoirs of the historian Xenophon, Socrates speaks authentically in plain verisimilitude, more authentically especially than Plato, who unmistakably idealizes Socrates in poetical and philosophical terms.

Historical criticism has thoroughly cleared away this conception and provided a good example that what is plausible can also be

mistaken (e.g. Joel 1893/1901 and 1895/96; Robin 1910; Gigon 1946b and 1947). The *locus classicus* for this line of argument has always been the introductory scene in Xenophon's *Symposium* (1.1): Xenophon gives as the occasion for the conversation, which he claims personally to have attended, Autolykos the younger's victory in the pankration. The chronological impossibility of this had already been demonstrated by the Pergamene scholar Herodikos of Babylon (Düring p. 20), who quite correctly concluded from documentary material that when Autolykos won his victory in the pankration (422 BCE) Xenophon probably had not even been born, or was at most a small child (cf. Breitenbach 1966, 1571 f.). Xenophon, rightly, does not name himself amongst the participants, nor does he take a turn speaking at any point: and so if we are to take Xenophon at his word we must conclude he experienced the whole event as a mute secretary taking the minutes as a child and after the event wrote it all down from memory. The obvious absurdity of this idea is clear, and we can have no doubt that we cannot, and should not, take Xenophon's guarantees of authenticity at face value. This simply means that the guarantee of authenticity cannot for its part be taken as an historical reminiscence, but is to be seen as the expression of *literary fiction*. What applies to the *Symposium* must self-evidently also hold for *Oeconomicus* and *Memorabilia*—not to mention the suspect *Apology*: Xenophon's guarantees of authenticity prove to be literary fiction here as well. Similarly Xenophon is also present in the *Oeconomicus* only as a stony-faced guest and, though explicitly named as present (1.1), does not speak a single word. And as for the knowledge of housekeeping and farming the Xenophontic Socrates exhibits in the *Oeconomicus* (3–6) as well as of the military and economic circumstances of the Persian Empire (including the detailed description of the imperial park in Sardis), all that fits the historical Socrates as little as the conversations that the Xenophontic Socrates has in the *Memorabilia* (3.1–4) about military strategy, the duties and characteristics of a general, and the correct way to lead cavalry. These topics fit in with the image of the historical Socrates as poorly as they clearly articulate Xenophon's spirit and interests, who in the *Anabasis* tellingly presents himself as pro-Persian, a large land-owner, and above all a soldier. No doubt: Xenophon has everywhere here put his own knowledge and views into Socrates' mouth—with the justification

not of the historical reporter, but the licence of a story-teller. And with the licence of the story-teller Xenophon reproduces a wide-ranging conversation in the *Memorabilia* (3.5) between Socrates and the younger Pericles that presupposes exactly those political circumstances that arose in Greece after the defeat of the Spartans at Leuctra in 371 BCE. It follows from this that the *Memorabilia* were composed (and the same will be true for the other Xenophontic *Socratica*) in the 360s BC, when Xenophon, having been exiled for the second time, was living in Corinth (Marschall 1926).

From all this we can conclude that Xenophon was by no means the first Socratic, as ancient scholarship would have believed, but instead the *last*, who already had laid out before him a widely ramified Socratic literature which had already been established for thirty years. Xenophon unselfconsciously refers to this fictional Socrates literature now and then (*Mem.* 1.4.1, 4.3.2; *Apol.* 1), where he notes that some have written this or that about Socrates, and he works it as a latecomer into a new form of expression: he invented the *Socrates Memoir*—a completely new and original *genus* of Socrates literature which further enhances the fictionality that is fundamentally suited to the Socratic dialogue by employing the guarantee of authenticity as a mode of fictional narrative—a literary device not without wit and originality. Those who fail to spot the device are doing Xenophon an injustice as a Socratic and as a man of letters: and a greater injustice still to the historical Socrates who is least of all present in this late and hyper-fictional narrative perspective.

The memoir form seems otherwise to have also been the only original idea Xenophon had when writing his *Socratica*. Apart from that he shows an astonishingly unoriginal mind. What he imputes to Socrates with the licence of a fictional narrator of his own knowledge and experience—strategic, economic, and things about Persia—is still very good, because he is here speaking from experience. It is different regarding philosophy, where he has only a little to say, and the little he does say is clearly second hand. He owes the ethics mainly to the Socratic *Antisthenes*, whose radical theory of autarchy, derived from the biography of Socrates, he moderated into respectability, insisting on the ideal of the exemplary wise man, who displays self-sufficiency, prudence, and generally respectable civic behaviour and disposition. Xenophon owes his dialectic on the other hand, insofar

as he is aware of it as a coherent method at all, to no less a figure than Plato. Let us then see how the intellectual masterpiece of Platonic dialectic looks through the lens of the Xenophontic Socrates.

THE CONCEPT OF DIALECTIC IN THE MEMORABILIA

On the subject of Socratic dialectic Xenophon comments expressly only in the *Memorabilia*: once at the beginning of the first book (*Mem.* 1.1.16), then twice at the end of the fourth (*Mem.* 4.5.11 ff.; 4.6). At these three points three different aspects of dialectic are considered, which can be named as follows: *Definition* (*Mem.* 1.1.16; 4.6.1–12), *hypothesis* (*Mem.* 4.6.13–15), and *Dihairesis* (*Mem.* 4.5.11 ff.). The following analysis will focus on these three main concepts, which do not just by chance have more to do with Plato than Xenophon.

Definition

In the first chapter of the first book of the *Memorabilia* Xenophon comes to Socrates' defence against the accusations on the charge of impiety. Not a single word of it is true, he says, Socrates was not at all involved in natural philosophy, which so offends the religious; in fact he apparently considered speculations in natural philosophy madness, and a pointless waste of time to boot. After these negative defences Xenophon now positively formulates what the core substance of Socrates' philosophy was meant to be (1.1.16): αὐτὸς (sc. Socrates) δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων αἰεὶ διελέγετο σκοπῶν τί εὖσεβές, τί ἀσεβές, τί καλόν, τί αἰσχρόν, τί δίκαιον, τί ἄδικον, τί σωφροσύνη, τί μανία, τί ἀνδρεία, τί δειλία, τί πόλις, τί πολιτικός, τί ἀρχὴ ἀνθρώπων, τί ἀρχικὸς ἀνθρώπων, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἃ τοὺς μὲν εἰδότες ἡγείτο καλοὺς καγαθοὺς εἶναι, τοὺς δ' ἀγνοοῦντας ἀνδραποδώδεις ἂν δικαίως κεκλήσθαι. [The translation will emerge in the following discussion].

It is beyond doubt that Xenophon put great effort here into showing how we are to interpret Socratic dialectic, which is expressly referred to by the predicate ['he discussed'] διελέγετο at the begin-

ning of the sentence: the subject of Socratic dialectic is not nature, but 'human affairs' (τὰ ἀνθρώπεια); Socrates 'inquires' into these affairs (σκοπῶν) by asking 'what they are' (τί ἐστίν); for only one who knows that is an ethically worthwhile character; the ignorant can be rightly called slavish in soul.

This is, by and large, a clear account, and it was doubtless for clarity's sake that Xenophon then also gave a list of such what-is-questions as Socrates asked in dialectic debate. The fact that this list is just a selection, is something Xenophon makes clear by stressing at the end of the list that Socrates also spoke 'about the other—human—affairs (περὶ τῶν ἄλλων)'. In spite of this, or in fact precisely because of this, we can take the selection of questions that Xenophon came up with as typical and exemplary-classical paradigms of Socratic dialectic so to speak and as such well worth closer examination.

But if one looks more closely at the list of paradigms, the clarity of the account vanishes and the picture becomes murky. Xenophon lists in total fourteen individual questions that he arranges in seven pairs. The strict formal order can however not disguise the fact that he has put together highly heterogeneous material.

He begins by having the first five question pairs constructed with their elements *in opposition* to each other: Pious—impious; beautiful—ugly; just—unjust; sense—madness; bravery—cowardice. The last two question pairs are quite different. They are constructed so that the *field* is mentioned first and then the *agent*: Polis—politician; leadership of men—leaders of men. Thus while the question pairs in the first half of the list complement each other in each case, the last two pairs are each in a hierarchical relationship of subordination—a most remarkable difference which indicates in form that in thought too a paradigm change has occurred: that is to say the first five question pairs are *ethical* problems, the following two pairs *political* issues.

The conceptual inconsistency of this list, which stands out all the more for the consistency of its construction in pairs, also continues within the two thematically distinct halves of the list. Just as the elements of the political pairs are in a hierarchical relationship with each other, the pairs themselves are also in a hierarchical relationship *with each other*, insofar as the first pair, by asking about the polis and politicians, merely articulates a special case of the following pair of paradigms, which asks about leadership and leaders of men. But

there are also peculiarities in the first half of the list, which deals with the set of ethical problems: the first three pairs of paradigms formulate the objects of their questions *as adjectives* (pious—impious; beautiful—ugly; just—unjust); in contrast the following two pairs express their interrogative objects *as nouns* (sense—madness; bravery—cowardice). This obvious shift in the manner of expression is not simply serving as stylistic *uariatio*, but it marks a conceptual shift in paradigm. For it makes a big difference conceptually whether you formulate a what-is question substantively or adjectivally. If you are asking for a noun, then you are asking for *one* object and you expect *one* suitable identification of an entity as your answer; if you ask the same question adjectivally, then you are asking for *all* the objects that fit this *one* adjectival identification, so that strictly speaking instead of one, an *infinite* number of answers are possible. Or to put it differently: the substantively formulated what-is question requires the *definition* of the object in question; the adjectival formulation of the question requires as its answer the *inductive listing* of all objects which meet the criteria in question.

Therefore, the list of Socratic question paradigms that Xenophon provides in the first book of the *Memorabilia* proves, on closer examination, to be a surprisingly inconsistent and incoherent conceptual picture, harbouring a variety of conflicting notions and ideas which cannot be hidden by the superficially smooth and uniform manner of expression, if indeed they are meant to be hidden—assuming that the author was aware of the conceptual heterogeneity he has here composed into stylistic uniformity.

How can we explain this unsettling discovery? We may exclude the possibility that Xenophon has here provided an historically credible portrayal of Socratic dialectic. The effect of Socratic dialectic on the history of philosophy, which is for its part an indisputable historical fact, can not possibly have grown out of such inconsistency of thought as Xenophon offers. Nor is it likely that Xenophon arrived at such a representation of Socratic dialectic on his own. The stylistic complexity presented here is too great for that, as is the heterogeneity of thought that is tolerated. Considering this, the most likely thing is that Xenophon, as so often, consulted *other Socratic literature* and adapted it in his own hand. In fact it can be *proved* that Xenophon compiled the paradigms of Socratic dialectic he presents in the first

book of the *Memorabilia* by recourse to Plato's early aporetic definition dialogues.

The aporetic definition dialogues comprise the majority of Plato's early work. Here we see throughout the way in which Socrates strives, and always fails, in the conversation to come up with an abstract definition of Virtue, or of a virtue (Robinson 1941; H. Patzer 1965; Erbse 1968; Allen 1970; Erler 1987). If this group of dialogues is considered individually the following picture emerges. In the beginning there is the *Protagoras*, which, taking the question whether Virtue can be taught as its starting point, discusses the relationship between Virtue in general and the various individual virtues, and finally from the failure of this discussion the conclusion is drawn that whether Virtue can be taught or not and what is the relationship between its components can only be answered when the nature of Virtue has been established in advance. In this cause the Platonic Socrates now endeavours firstly to find a definition of the nature of the individual virtues. Thus the dialogue *Laches* asks about the *nature of bravery* (τί ἐστιν ἡ ἀνδρεία), and the *Charmides* asks about the *nature of sense* (τί ἐστιν ἡ σωφροσύνη). And then there is the first book of *Republic*, which itself is conceived in the form of an aporetic definition dialogue and so differs in content, structure, and diction from the rest of the work, that there is every indication that this book, which Plato (*Resp.* 2 357a) after all refers to explicitly as a *preface* (προοίμιον), was originally intended to function as a separate dialogue under the title *Thrasymachus* (Dümmler 1895; von Arnim 1914, 76–87). Here Socrates initially asks about the *nature of justice* (τί ἐστιν ἡ δικαιοσύνη); however as soon as Thrasymachus joins the conversation (*Resp.* 1 336bd) this question is reformulated, in that the question is no longer about the nature of justice, but about the *nature of the just* (τί ἐστι τὸ δίκαιον), and this formulation of the concept of justice using the adjective-as-noun prevails throughout the rest of the entire dialogue. What is more, the subsequent definition dialogues formulate the subjects of their questions without exception with adjectives used as nouns. Thus the dialogue *Lysis* asks about the *nature of love* (τί ἐστι τὸ φίλον), the *Hippias major* asks about the *nature of the beautiful* (τί ἐστι τὸ καλόν) and the *Euthyphro* asks about the *nature of the pious* (τί ἐστι τὸ εὐσεβές). Finally the *Meno* concluding the sequence of definition dialogues,

resumes the inquiry into the nature of Virtue as a whole and whether it can be taught; with the introduction of the concept of anamnesis it clearly indicates that the answer to this question can be found only through the theory of Forms.

As the analysis shows us, Plato formulated the questions regarding the individual virtues in two ways. Either the subject appears as a *noun* or as an *adjective-as-noun*. Bravery and sense appear as nouns *ἀνδρεία* and *σωφροσύνη*; love, beauty, and piety are in contrast expressed by adjectives as nouns: the dear—*τὸ φίλον*—the beautiful—*τὸ καλόν*—and the pious—*τὸ εὐσεβές*. The first book of *Republic* takes a central position, or rather a connecting position, in that it asks about justice initially as the noun *δικαιοσύνη* which is soon replaced by the adjective as noun *τὸ δίκαιον*, so that at the end we are no longer talking about justice, but about the just—a finding that again conclusively proves that the first book of *Republic* was actually originally conceived as a stand-alone definition dialogue: in *Republic* proper Plato has long resolved the issues that are expressed in the shift in formulation.

In fact the shift in the formulation of the definition (ontological) question within the definition dialogue is of the utmost conceptual importance. That is to say the noun characterizes a specified thing as a unity; the adjective as noun on the other hand, that magic wand of Greek philosophy, characterizes a specified unity in its greatest conceivable generality—a *conceptual advance* of great significance. The new formulation of the ontological question using the adjective as noun reveals for the first time some of that secret that lies at the heart of all the definition dialogues. That the ontological question can be answered only on the basis of a generality with regard to which the individual examples can be defined: the *fundamental form* (*ἰδέα* or *εἶδος*) which imparts being and essence to the individual examples.

If that is so, the *relative chronology* of the definition dialogues can be more accurately determined. *Laches* and *Charmides* were conceived of earlier than the so-called *Thrasymachus*, with *Lysis*, *Hippias major* and *Euthyphro* appearing later. And since the *Laches* introduces Socrates as a member of the Athenian nobility, of which Plato was also a member, it explains the beginning of Platonic philosophy and is earlier than the *Charmides*; the sequence of later definition dialogues can be determined in turn by the degree to which the secret of

the theory of Forms, which is first hinted at in the reformulated ontological question in the so-called *Thrasymachus*, more or less clearly reveals itself. By this measure the *Lysis* was conceived earlier than the *Hippias major* and that is earlier in turn than the *Euthyphro*.

If you were now to compare those questions by which the Platonic Socrates asks about the nature of individual virtues in the definition dialogues, with the interrogative paradigms with which Xenophon characterizes Socratic dialectic, you would be in for a surprise. The subjects of Socratic dialectic are the same in Plato and Xenophon—except for the *φίλον*, which is missing in Xenophon. This agreement is quite noteworthy: Xenophon expressly stresses that he is only giving a *selection* of the subjects of Socratic questioning, and if this selection of subjects to all intents coincides completely with the subjects dealt with by Plato in his definition dialogues, it can hardly be a matter of coincidence. It might be conceivable that both Plato and Xenophon, working independently, named the main subjects of dialectic questioning as the *historical* Socrates addressed. The fact that this is not the case, that in fact there exists a relationship of close dependency between Plato and Xenophon, can be learnt from a glance at the *formulation* of the questions. Here also there is again an astonishing level of agreement. Both Plato and Xenophon ask about bravery and sense using a noun; the questions about beauty, piety, and justice in contrast are articulated with adjectives. *This* agreement cannot possibly be a matter of chance. Nor can it go back to the historical Socrates, for the shift in formulation marks a conceptual leap on Plato's part regarding the theory of Forms, which the historical Socrates was not aware of. Accordingly it is beyond doubt that the two versions of Socratic dialectic that Plato lays out in the definition dialogues and Xenophon gives at the beginning of the *Memorabilia*, cannot have arisen independently.

Which one has priority cannot be in question. The *chronology* alone speaks decisively in Plato's favour. The Platonic definition dialogues were composed in the 390s and also possibly in the early 380s BC; but the composition of the Xenophontic *Memorabilia* took place only in the 360s BC. Even if the chronology were debatable and those who take the first two chapters of the *Memorabilia* to be a stand-alone *Apology*, dating it to the nineties (Birt 1891)—a thoroughly discredited hypothesis (Erbse 1961)—were correct in their

interpretations, even then there could not be the slightest doubt that Plato has priority over Xenophon.

Plato and Xenophon agree on the various individual virtues they use either nouns or adjectives to express. The formulations differ, however, as to whether they use the Greek *article* or not. Insofar as the subject of the what-is question is a noun, this question is of no consequence. Since the noun *per se* expresses a definite unity, the article can be dropped without clouding the question about the nature of the object in question. Thus the Platonic Socrates at the beginning of the *Laches* (190b and d) (to give one example) formulates the question about the *nature of virtue* and the question about the *nature of courage without* using the article: ὅτι ποτ' ἔστιν ἀρετή and τί ἐστιν ἀνδρεία. The Xenophontic Socrates formulates the question about the nature of courage in just this way and also drops the article in the question about the *nature of sense* without impairing understanding: τί σωφροσύνη. Matters are different when the what-is question is formulated with an *adjective*. In this case Plato *never* drops the article—justifiably and deliberately so. For it is the article alone that raises the adjective to a substantive concept, to a definite object of great generality, and the question as to what such an object is, enquires about the *nature* of what is defined adjectivally in the question, which now possesses the same conceptual force as a noun, whose nature is enquired into. In contrast to Plato, Xenophon drops the article in all cases when the what-is question is formulated adjectivally. This has consequences. Unlike the noun the adjective does not *per se* denote a definite object, but rather a class of objects, so that someone who formulates a what-is question adjectivally without inserting the article is not asking about the nature of an adjectival definition, but about all objects that fit this definition.

How can we explain such a consequential shift in the question paradigms, which puts clear sky between Xenophon and Plato? Let us take Xenophon at his word and assume that he undertook the paradigm shift *consciously* to demonstrate that Socrates used to ask two different basic questions in dialectic conversation: the *definitive* question about the nature of an object, and the *inductive* question about the objects that fit a definition. It can then be claimed that Xenophon has given us a more differentiated description of Socratic dialectic than Plato, who simplified and coarsened it, in that he

restricted it to the ontological question. By which reasoning Xenophon would also have priority over Plato. Anyone who makes this argument is thoroughly mistaken. For they would be overlooking the fact that in Plato the shift in the formulation of the ontological question serves a philosophical concept, which is the revelation of the theory of Forms. Such a unified concept cannot possibly owe its existence to the heterogeneous list of Socratic question paradigms that Xenophon provides. It is simply absurd to suggest that Plato changed the inductive what-is questions into definitive ones through the addition of an article and then gave precisely *these* definitive what-is questions a conceptually central role in the overall conception of the definition dialogues. There is no conceptual path from Xenophon to Plato.

But there certainly is one from Plato to Xenophon. Xenophon only had to quote the what-is questions he found in the early Platonic definition dialogues and drop the articles to produce what we read today: a list of inductive and definitive questions, the order of which came about because piety deserves first place in the eyes of the pious author. It is altogether unlikely that this list contains a philosophical concept of its own, such that Xenophon would have tried to correct the single focus of the Platonic Socrates on the definitive by adding in the inductive aspect. Xenophon would certainly have clearly marked this paradigm change if that had been the case, whereas in fact he positively disguises it, in that the article is also absent in the definitive what-is questions. But such philosophical intentions cannot be ascribed to Xenophon. Rather he hastily snatched up the questions he found in the early Platonic definition dialogues and just as hastily reproduced them, without realizing the conceptual consequences of the absence of the article in the formulation of the what-is question, and is thus intellectually like the Platonic *Hippias* (*Hipp. mai.* 287de), to whom Socrates must first explain the conceptual difference that arises according to whether the adjectivally formulated what-is question has an article or not: [‘he asks you not what is noble, but what is the noble’] ἐρωτᾷ σε οὐ τί ἐστὶ καλόν, ἀλλ’ ὅτι ἐστὶ τὸ καλόν.

Since Xenophon obviously has recourse to Plato for the formulation of the ethical paradigms of Socratic dialectic, the question arises whether he does not also owe to Plato the political paradigms, which he appends to the ethical ones. This is highly likely, for the polis is the

theme of the Platonic *Republic*, and the fact that in this magnum opus from the height of Plato's career—the most comprehensive Socratic dialogue we know of—there are no questions about the nature of the polis, but rather about the nature of the just and the good which are demonstrated to be a feature of the polis as if it were an enlarged reflection of the soul, must have mattered to Xenophon even less than when in Plato's late dialogue the *Statesman* (258b) the question about the nature of the politician is again explicitly asked. And since in these two Platonic dialogues there is also several times discussion of the variety of forms of leadership and its agents, this provided Xenophon with the following pair of paradigms—the questions about the nature of leadership and of the leader—a stylistically desirable augmentation. For by treating again the *genus* of the material that he has just formulated *in specie*, Xenophon doubles the number of political paradigms without great conceptual effort and lessens the numerical imbalance between the political and the ethical question paradigms. The two-fold use of the genitive ἀνθρώπων obviously serves stylistic ends. The last paradigm pair thus gains a greater compass and greater weight, so that the imbalance between the ethical and political question paradigms is less noticeable. The importance of stylistic concerns, which is also apparent in the uniform formulation of the what-is questions, characterizes the whole text, which, although it claims to be philosophical, is more concerned with the demands of rhetoric than those of philosophy.

In the sixth chapter of the fourth book of the *Memorabilia* Xenophon promises he will explain how Socrates made those he was in contact with 'more dialectic', διαλεκτικωτέρους (*Mem.* 4.6.1). The explanation follows: Σωκράτης γὰρ τοὺς μὲν εἰδότας τί ἕκαστον εἶη τῶν ὄντων ἐνόμιζε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἂν ἐξηγεῖσθαι δύνασθαι· τοὺς δὲ μὴ εἰδότας οὐδὲν δὲ ἔφη θαυμαστὸν εἶναι αὐτούς τε σφάλλεσθαι καὶ ἄλλους σφάλλειν· ὧν ἕνεκα σκοπῶν σὺν τοῖς συνοῦσι, τί ἕκαστον εἶη τῶν ὄντων, οὐδέποτ' ἔλῃγε ['S. thought that those who knew the definitions of each thing could teach others too. He said it was no wonder that those who did not know misled themselves and others. For this reason, he never stopped inquiring into the definitions of each thing with his companions.'] Xenophon is here repeating what he has already said in *Memorabilia* 1.1.16: that Socrates was of the opinion that dialectic alone was capable of making ethically worthwhile people. The two

texts either correspond word for word to each other (σκοπῶν, εἰδότης) or their wording is so close (διαλεκτικωτέρους—διελέγετο, μὴ εἰδότης—ἀγνοοῦντας) that there can be no doubt that Xenophon is consciously alluding to the earlier text. Those question paradigms however, which Xenophon individually listed there, are here replaced with one *general question*, that in dialectic conversations Socrates asked *what any given thing is* (τί ἕκαστον εἶη τῶν ὄντων). But this question that Xenophon presents twice with obvious pleasure in its high philosophical tone, only allows as its answer the *nature* of the object in question: it is the classical formulation that enquires of the *definition*. If Xenophon uses this definitive form to characterize Socratic dialectic, he is belatedly conceding the finding of the earlier analysis: the formulation of the inductive what-is questions does not owe its existence to any philosophical concept, but to a conceptually unsuccessful use of an early Platonic theoretical approach.

The fact that Xenophon exclusively understood the what-is question in the definitive sense, and exclusively intends to understand it in this way, can be seen in the following passage also, in which Xenophon expressly declares that he intends to give typical examples of Socratic definition technique (*Mem.* 4.6.1): ['It would be too much work to go through the manner in which he defined everything, but I will mention as many examples as I think will reveal the manner of his inquiry']. And there follows, sure enough, a sequence of short conversations between Socrates and Euthydemus, and at the end of each there stands a definition which is highlighted as such by the use of the 'so then' particle ἄρα. The theme of these short definitive dialogues is exclusively ethical issues: *piety* (εὐσέβεια), *the just* (τὸ νόμιμον or τὸ δίκαιον), *wisdom* (σοφία), *the good* (τὸ ἀγαθόν), *the Beautiful* (τὸ καλόν), and *courage* (ἀνδρεία). These are essentially the same themes as Xenophon named in the first book of the *Memorabilia* as paradigms of Socratic dialectic, except that 'sense' is missing, and in its place we have wisdom and the good. Clearly Xenophon intended to answer here the ethical questions he had asked there. *Mem.* 4.6.12 then also appends onto the six short dialogues that deal with the definition of ethical concepts another five short definitions of forms of *political* leadership (kingdom, tyranny, aristocracy, plutocracy, and democracy), so that here finally we also have an answer to the *political* question paradigms that were placed after the ethical paradigms in the first book of the *Memorabilia*.

If one looks at the Xenophontic definitions more closely, it is clear that in four of the exemplary short dialogues between Socrates and Euthydemus (*Mem.* 4.6.2–4, 5–6, 7, 10–11) Xenophon does not define the thing from which the conversation starts, but always the *person*, who bears the thing, and thus favours a method the early Platonic Socrates is concerned to dissuade his interlocutors from, inasmuch as he always insists we consider not the person but the *thing* as the object of definitive effort.

If the Xenophontic method of defining the bearer of the thing rather than the thing itself betrays a lack of philosophical sense, so especially do the two definitive dialogues (4.6.8, 9), in which he stays on the thing. Here he mixes up the *definiendum* with the *definitum* and thus gives, instead of a definition of the Good and the Beautiful, a definition of the *Helpful* (τὸ ὠφέλιμον) and the *Useful* (τὸ χρήσιμον), in the sense that the former is good and the latter is beautiful—a confusion that fatally reminds us of the confusion of inductive and definitive formulations of what-is questions, out of which the investigation arose. Xenophon again demonstrates that this confusion is not the result of philosophical intention but of carelessness of thought (not to say thoughtlessness) when he attempts to answer definitively, however incompletely, the question about the beautiful he formulated *inductively* in the first book and therefore adds here onto the *definiendum* what he had left out: the article.

Apart from that it can be established that Xenophon's argument regarding the beautiful is none other than a shortened excerpt from the *Hippias major* (295b to 296c): Socrates here attempts to postulate the thesis that 'what is useful is beautiful' (295c): τοῦτο γὰρ ἔστω ἡμῖν καλόν, ὃ ἂν χρήσιμον ᾖ. That is to say, the useful is beautiful in all its relations ['how, for what and when'] (295de): τὸ μὲν χρήσιμον καὶ ᾗ χρήσιμον καὶ πρὸς ὃ χρήσιμον καὶ ὁπότε χρήσιμον καλόν φάμεν εἶναι. And now the conclusion: the useful is beautiful (295e): ὁρθῶς ἄρα νῦν λέγομεν, ὅτι τυγχάνει παντὸς ὃν μᾶλλον καλὸν τὸ χρήσιμον. Even in Xenophon's abbreviated excerpt the Platonic wording shines through *word for word* (*Mem.* 4.6.9): τὸ χρήσιμον ἄρα καλόν ἐστι πρὸς ὃ ἂν ᾖ χρήσιμον. As in the case of the what-is questions Xenophon has here too adapted a Platonic theoretical approach and as he did there falls short conceptually. What the Platonic Socrates expressed

as a *hypothesis* is subsequently driven *ad absurdum* by the same Socrates (296d: [‘It seems that what is useful for us is not after all beautiful’]): οὐκ ἄρα... τὸ χρήσιμον ἡμῶν, ὥς ἔοικεν, ἐστὶ τὸ καλόν. Xenophon did not pay attention to this, but mistook the idea in those passages to be a definitive conclusion, with the result that in an exemplary conversation the Xenophontic Socrates puts forward a definition of the beautiful that the Platonic Socrates discarded as inadequate.

This one example should be enough. An analysis of all the definitions that Xenophon presents in the fourth book of the *Memorabilia* would be the subject for an exhaustive commentary that Socratic research is sadly still waiting for. However, such a commentary, which would also need to consider the definitions Xenophon puts forward in *Memorabilia* (3.9), would come up with quite similar conclusions to the analysis of the example of the definition of the beautiful; Xenophon constantly appropriates early Platonic theoretical approaches, without bearing in mind that what Socrates says here and there in the heat of the dialectic conversation cannot be interpreted as a fixed view, unless we want to totally misunderstand the Platonic Socrates—and the historical one too.

Hypothesis

After Xenophon has established Socratic dialectic as the technique of definition and presented it in typical examples, he next describes what form Socratic dialectic took when Socrates experienced unfounded disagreement about the description of someone in ethical terms (*Mem.* 4.6.13). If such a disagreement arose [‘if anyone opposed him on anything without being clear and without proof claimed the man he mentioned was wiser or more political or braver or suchlike’], Socrates ‘brought the whole discourse back to the basic proposition’, ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἐπανήγεν ἂν πάντα τὸν λόγον (*Mem.* 4.6.13–14). There then follows an example of this procedure that again takes the form of a short dialogue. There is dissent between Socrates and an (unidentified) interlocutor as to which of two citizens is to be described as ethically better. Socrates agrees initially with his speaking partner to ask the what-is question: ‘what is the

function of a good citizen' (*Mem.* 4.6.14: τί ἐστιν ἔργον ἀγαθοῦ πολίτου); then Socrates has his interlocutor confirm that for the purposes of his question the winner would be whoever makes the city richer by his administration of the finances, whoever defeats the enemy in war, whoever makes alliances with enemies through diplomacy, and puts down strife in the assembly and promotes harmony. Here the conversation breaks off; for Xenophon can trust the readers to complete the conversation for themselves: that the man who possesses those superior political qualities is no other than the man Socrates considers the better citizen. Thus Xenophon can sum up. By 'bringing the discussion back in this way in each case (to its basic proposition) οὕτω δὲ τῶν λόγων ἐπαναγομένων', the truth was revealed even to those who opposed him (*Mem.* 4.6.14).

The dialectic procedure that Socrates is using here is different from the one described earlier, because the premises of the conversation are different. Socrates is not leading a teaching discussion in which the interlocutor follows his train of thought without contradiction, instead he must demonstrate to an interlocutor who has made an unfounded objection where his view is mistaken. For this purpose Socrates goes back to the *basic proposition* (ὑπόθεσις), which underlies the discussion. This recourse takes the form of Socrates asking a *what-is* question, which here, because the dissent has to do with the ethical description of *two* citizens, asks about the function of a good citizen: τί ἐστιν ἔργον ἀγαθοῦ πολίτου. This question can be understood in two ways since the interrogative pronoun τί here, unlike in all comparable passages in Xenophon, can be understood either *substantively* or *adjectivally*, because the noun used in the question is neuter. That the *adjectival* interpretation is more compelling is shown by the following questions that explicate the *what-is* question and give as an answer a *list* of those characteristics that apply to the object in question. Thus we are not asked *what* the function of the good citizen is, but *which* function is characteristic of him. Or to put it differently: Xenophon here asks the *inductive* *what-is* question that he had mistakenly confused with the definitive one in the first book of the *Memorabilia*—and here with complete justification. For Socratic dialectic is not seeking here a definition, but the basic proposition of the discourse, which Xenophon labels with the originally mathematical technical term *hypothesis*.

One must deduce the implications of this term, because Xenophon breaks off the conversation he promises to be an illuminating example early, so that it remains unsaid what is the hypothesis formulated by the *what-is* question. However looking at the list of characteristics by which the meaning of the hypothesis is described one can easily reach the conclusion that it must have meant something to the effect that the function of a good citizen lies in being useful to the polis.

Socrates is forced to bring the discussion back to this (unspoken) hypothesis because his interlocutor disagrees with him without good cause. If no such disagreement occurs, then there will be no such recourse to what Xenophon twice calls *ἐπανάγειν*, which clearly has the status of technical terminology.

The way Socrates proceeds when there is no (unfounded) disagreement can be learned from the subsequent passage. When Socrates went through a subject on his own he 'took the bearings (of his investigation) from those issues on which there was the greatest consensus, *διὰ τῶν μάλιστα ὁμολογουμένων*'; for he was of the opinion that this would ensure the discussion's infallibility, *τὴν ἀσφάλειαν λόγου* (*Mem.* 4.6.15). There follows a confession from Xenophon. He does not know anyone who created as much consensus amongst their listeners when they spoke as Socrates did. The conclusion is a quotation from Socrates about Homer, who described Odysseus as an unerring speaker, *ἀσφαλῆ ῥήτορα*, because he was able to take his bearings 'from what seemed plausible to people': *διὰ τῶν δοκούντων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις*.

Xenophon is here describing what form Socratic dialogue takes when Socrates is allowed to discuss his topic on his own (*αὐτός*) without the disturbance of disagreement from his interlocutor. In this case Socrates ensures the infallible *success of the discussion* (*τὴν ἀσφάλειαν λόγου*) through arguments that offer *the best possible basis for consensus* (*διὰ τῶν μάλιστα ὁμολογουμένων*) and using *generally accepted assumptions* (*διὰ τῶν δοκούντων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις*).

In itself this description is understandable, but not in the context of the previous passage. The listing of characteristics of the good citizen by which the disagreeing interlocutor there gains insight into truth happens by means of the same assumptions allowing consensus that are here claimed, but they are made use of here in a Socratic

discussion that did *not* arise as the result of an unfounded disagreement. If then it was not argumentation through plausibilities that distinguished Socratic dialectic, whether it had to react to disagreement or could simply take its own course, what was it then? Again we must complete Xenophon's abbreviated account from the context. If Socrates was able to argue a topic through, then he did not have to lead the discussion back to the hypothesis, as in the case of unfounded disagreement, but could immediately proceed from the hypothesis and substantiate its truth through plausible arguments.

That this is the correct interpretation can be seen from the conversation about agriculture that Ischomachus has with Socrates in *Oeconomicus* (15–21). Ischomachus states, at the beginning, that the technique of agriculture has amongst other things the advantage that it is 'very easy to learn' (15.4). Then, after Ischomachus instructs Socrates in a lecture about the various aspects of agriculture, Socrates says at the end (21.1): ['But I see, Ischomachus,' he said, 'how well you have made the whole discussion help the hypothesis (ὥς ἐν τῇ ὑποθέσει ὅλον τὸν λόγον βοηθοῦντα παρέσχησαι). For you hypothesized (ὑπέθου) that farming was a technique easiest of all to learn and now, from all you have said, I am completely convinced that this is the case']. If one overlooks the fact that—ironically—Ischomachus is acting here as the leader of the conversation and not Socrates, this conversation meets exactly those conditions that the interpretation set out for it. The leader of the conversation establishes a hypothesis at the beginning (agriculture is the easiest technique) and immediately demonstrates with a *helpful discussion* (λόγον βοηθοῦντα) that the hypothesis is correct so that the interlocutor is finally *completely convinced* (παντάπασις... ἀναπέπεισμαι) on the basis of *all the arguments that have been advanced* (ἐκ πάντων ὧν εἶρηκας).

Correctly understood, Xenophon distinguishes two forms of hypothetical dialectic in *Memorabilia* Book 4: one proceeds from the hypothesis and leads through a sequence of assumptions that form the basis of a consensus towards the proof of the initial proposition; the other leads a false thesis back to its hypothesis by means of assumptions that form the basis of a consensus and thus disproves the initial thesis. If we translate this philosophical finding into the literary sphere, there are then two different types of Socratic dialogue: the *teaching dialogue*, in which the leader of the discussion—

usually Socrates—convinces an interlocutor through argument without substantial disagreement; on the other hand there is the *refuting* or rather *elenctic dialogue*. Here the leader of the conversation—Socrates—demonstrates to an interlocutor through argument, in the face of his strong disagreement, that he cannot possibly think what he believes he thinks, if he just considers the assumptions behind what he thinks. Both types of discussion are familiar to us—noticeably—or rather characteristically, less from Xenophon than from Plato. To all intents and purposes Xenophon is only aware of the Socratic teaching dialogue; Plato on the other hand makes use of both forms. The classical model of a Socratic teaching dialogue is *Republic*, the classical model for an elenctic dialogue is the *Gorgias*. Considering all this it would be remarkable if Xenophon did not also owe the concept of hypothesis to Plato as well.

The method of the hypothesis plays an important role in Platonic dialectic and is closely connected with the explication of the theory of Forms as the Platonic Socrates presents it in the dialogues from the height of his career. After a prelude in the *Meno* (96a–7b) Socrates discusses the hypothetical method more thoroughly in the *Phaedo* (100ab, 101de) and more thoroughly still in *Republic* (6.511ad, 7.532a–533d) (Stahl 1956; Rosenmeyer 1960; Rose 1961). The hypothesis, it emerges, is a conceptual method both of mathematics and dialectic. Whereas mathematics, however, ends with the hypothesis and effectively treats it as a premise, dialectic goes beyond hypotheses and through their removal (τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀναιροῦσα) arrives at the fundamental premise of being (ἐπ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρχήν, *Resp.* 7.533cd).

If one compares what Plato and Xenophon have to say about the hypothetical method of Socratic dialectic, the difference could not be greater. In Plato the hypothetical method culminates in *its own abrogation*, inasmuch as the hypothesis of the Forms finds fulfilment and basis in the unhypothetical idea of the Form of the good; in Xenophon on the other hand the hypothesis itself appears as *the fulfilment of the dialectical process*, in that, founded on consensus and plausibilities, it ensures insight and truth.

How are we to interpret this finding? Since the two theoretical approaches contradict each other, we are led to conclude that they arose independently of each other. From this we may further

conclude that Xenophon reproduces the view of the historical Socrates, which Plato made use of for the theory of Forms and so turned into its opposite. However it is not particularly likely that *Socratic* dialectic (not to mention Platonic dialectic) could actually have been based on such an unsophisticated premise as the Xenophontic hypothesis, according to which Socrates is not actually doing anything except making a claim seem plausible to an interlocutor once it has been put forward. This is actually the way the Xenophontic Socrates proceeds, and Xenophon can hence presume to say that he knew no-one who secured such consensus (*ὁμολογοῦντας παρέχεν*) from his listeners as Socrates (*Mem.* 4.6.15). If that were really the case, we would remain unable to discover how Socratic philosophy managed to develop the explosive force it did, and also unable to discover how the Athenians could have sentenced someone to death who obviously only said what everybody was thinking. And as it must be ruled out that Xenophon owes his concept of the hypothesis to the historical Socrates, it can equally be ruled out that Xenophon came up with this concept on his own and imputed it to Socrates; for then it would be impossible to discover why Xenophon chose such a philosophically ambitious expression to formulate such a conceptually modest issue. On balance it is most likely that Xenophon in the case of the hypothesis, as was the case with the definition, adopted a Platonic theoretical approach and in the process of adoption conceptually trivialized it (Maier 1913, 61).

It is not difficult to guess how this happened. Xenophon must have just overlooked or ignored the connexion of the concept of the hypothesis with the theory of Forms in Plato, with which he was unfamiliar, and he found evidence enough for his interpretation. It is more or less what the Platonic Socrates says in the *Phaedo* (100a): ['And assuming (*ὑποθέμενος*) in each case the principle I consider to be strongest, I take as true what seems to me in agreement with that']. This statement could also stand in Xenophon as much as the one the Platonic Socrates makes in the same context a little later on (*Phaed.* 101cd): ['holding onto the certainty of the hypothesis (*ἐχόμενος ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς τῆς ὑποθέσεως*) you would answer thus']. How reminiscent the phrasing *τὸ ἀσφαλὲς τῆς ὑποθέσεως* is of the *ἀσφαλεία λόγου*, which according to Xenophon (*Mem.* 4.6.15) is the characteristic of hypothetical discourse. Nor is it difficult to find

corresponding passages in *The Republic*. Such as for example in the sixth book where Socrates says (511b): [‘taking hypotheses not as absolutes but in truth as hypotheses’]. And in the seventh book (532bc) Socrates speaks of the *διαλεκτική πορεία* and of the *ἐπαναγωγή* of the soul thus using two substantives that turn up again in Xenophon (*Mem.* 4.6.13–15) as verbs, where the rare substantive *ἐπαναγωγή* is picked up precisely twice by the no less rare verb *ἐπανάγειν*.

Considering all this there can be no doubt that Xenophon took the concept of the hypothesis from theoretical approaches as late Platonic dialogues represent them, with the result that *mutatis mutandis* the same thing happened here as we have already confirmed in respect of the definitive what-is questions. Moreover, as he did there, Xenophon here too grasps the Platonic conception of hypothesis too hastily and incorrectly, separating it from the Forms, in an inversion, inasmuch as the hypothesis is no longer regarded as a premise of dialectical discourse to be overcome, but as its fulfilment. This unsuccessful recourse to Plato has little to do with the historical Socrates.

Dihairesis

In *Memorabilia* 4.5 Socrates leads a discussion with Euthydemus about self-control (*ἐγκράτεια*). Socrates repeats ideas in this conversation that he had already expressed earlier at another point on the same theme (1.5; 2.1). Socrates’ concluding words however demand attention; for they put forward a *new* idea, in that they put the *division according to categories* in the centre of Socratic dialectic (4.5.11): [‘But for the self-controlled alone (*τοῖς ἐγκρατέσι μόνοις*) it is possible to inquire into the most important affairs, and dividing them into categories (*διαλέγοντας κατὰ γένη*), in word and in deed, to choose the good and avoid the bad’]. What Socrates is saying here is confirmed again later by Xenophon himself (*Mem.* 4.5.12). Socrates was of the view that such means—the division of things into categories by those in a sober state of mind—produced the best, happiest and most dialectically capable men. But Socrates identified dialectic as the general discussion of the division of categories: [‘He said that dialectic itself (*καὶ τὸ διαλέγεσθαι*) was named from people

coming together and taking counsel together by dividing things into categories, διαλέγοντας κατὰ γένη τὰ πράγματα']. It was to this, the division into categories—that everyone was to turn their minds; for out of this—it is again emphasized—there will arise men who are the best, the strongest leaders, and the most dialectically capable.

What Xenophon is saying here about Socratic dialectic is not only new, but also obscure, inasmuch as it remains unexplained what the philosophically ambitious phrasing διαλέγειν κατὰ γένη τὰ πράγματα means. Unlike in the cases of definition and hypothesis, there is *no* example to explain to the reader what the meaning of the formulation is, which occurs here twice, having appeared as if out of thin air, without any information here or elsewhere as to what lies at issue behind the expression *division by categories*.

Here again we look to Plato (Maier 1913, 57–61). For what appears in Xenophon as an unexplained unique term, belongs conceptually and linguistically firmly in the late Platonic dihairesis dialogues, amongst which are the *Sophist* and the *Statesman*, as well as especially the *Phaedrus* (Stenzel 1917; Regenbogen 1950; Koller 1960; Philip 1966). We shall just note here that Platonic dihairesis is a procedure of dissecting a general object by means of division in two according to category until the indivisible object sought after appears at the base of the pyramid of objects. Plato uses various formulations for this dichotomic method of discovery by means of dihairesis, in that he characterizes the 'act of division' sometimes with the verb διακρίνειν (*Soph.* 253e), sometimes with the verb τέμνειν (*Phaed.* 227b) or διατέμνειν (ibid. 265e) or with the verbs διαιρεῖν (*Soph.* 253e; *Pol.* 286d) or διαιρεῖσθαι (*Soph.* 253d; *Phaed.* 273c). The manner of the division is expressed either by the formulation κατ' εἶδη (*Pol.* 286d; *Phaedr.* 265e, 273c, 277b) or κατὰ γένη (*Soph.* 253b) or κατὰ γένος (ibid. 253e).

The fluidity of the Platonic nomenclature, which here as elsewhere is due to the intention not to allow the thoughts to stagnate into a terminologically fixed jargon, allows a more precise identification of those passages that Xenophon had in front of him or in his mind when he made use of the conception of Plato's dihairesis dialogues to describe Socratic dialectic. Since Xenophon avoids the (more common) Platonic formulation κατ' εἶδη and prefers instead the (rarer) formulation κατὰ γένη, it was therefore a passage from Plato's *Sophist*

(253d) that he had in mind when he formulated it: τὸ κατὰ γένη διαιρεῖσθαι . . . μὴ οὐ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς φήσομεν ἐπιστήμης εἶναι; ['To classify by categories . . . shall we not say this is a function of the dialectic science?'].

Plato is here not just describing the dihairetic method, but is also declaring that this method is an essential component of dialectical awareness. Xenophon also adopted this idea, in that he derived the term *dialectic* from dihairetic method (*Mem.* 4.5.12). But Xenophon did *not* find the etymology that underlies this definition in Plato, and since it is not possible to divine which other Socratic could have spoken of the division of things κατὰ γένη, it will be a matter of *an original idea of Xenophon's*, which he passes off as a quotation from Socrates. This idea had the consequence that Xenophon could not adopt any of the verbs used by Plato for the act of division, but resorted to the verb διαλέγειν, which is found extremely rarely in the active voice in Attic prose and does not appear at all before Xenophon in its transferred sense (see Paper 1. 476, *LSJ* 400).

We can see the definitely non-Platonic origin of this etymology as evidence for the fact that Xenophon does not owe his account of Socratic dialectic *in toto* to Plato (Jaeger 1915, 382). If we are to discount this interpretation we need to reassess the end and beginning of the two dialectic chapters of the fourth book of the *Memorabilia*. At the end of the fifth chapter Xenophon notes that Socrates was of the view that the dihairetic method produced *highly dialectical* men (*Mem.* 4.5.12: διαλεκτικωτάτους). At the beginning of the following chapter, in which Socrates' definition dialectic is explained, Xenophon states that he intends to show that Socrates also made his companions *more dialectical* (*Mem.* 4.6.1): διαλεκτικωτέρους. Xenophon twice uses the adjective διαλεκτικός to characterize the effect both of dihairetic and of definitive dialectic. This dual use of the word is all the more striking since Xenophon does not use the adjective διαλεκτικός *anywhere* else. Now, the genesis of this adjective is well-known to us. It is a *neologism* that Plato coined to characterize the methodical procedure suitable for the development of the philosophy of Forms (Müri 1944; Sichirollo 1961). By appropriating this neologism Xenophon is advertising, without being aware of it, the fact that he owes his dihairetic dialectic as much to Plato as his definitive. This involuntary avowal can be shown to be as binding

in the case of dihairetic dialectic, as it is in the case of the definitive. The comparatively original etymology of the concept of dialectic does not refute this finding. It proves—to use a comparison—the originality of the Xenophontic interpretation of dihairetic dialectic as little as the comparatively original form of the Xenophontic *Socratica* proves that their content is original.

That this is the case can finally be shown by a passage from Plato's *Statesman*, which anticipates practically word for word what Xenophon says about dihairetic dialectic and in particular about the transition from dihairetic to definitive dialectic. There he states that people enquire about the nature of the statesman 'in order to become generally more dialectic' (285d): τοῦ περὶ πάντα διαλεκτικωτέροις γίγνεσθαι. In this context it is especially necessary to show consideration for the method itself which enables things to be distinguished according to categories (286d). And if one finds fault with the length of the investigation, one must then prove that the shorter version also made his companions more dialectic (287a): ὡς βραχύτερα ἂν γεγόμενα τοὺς συνόντας ἀπηργάζετο διαλεκτικωτέρους.

The conclusion of this passage is of special interest for this reason, because Xenophon adopts word for word what Plato says about the effect of the dihairetic method (except for the verb ἀπηργάζετο, which he replaces with the blander ἐποίει), in order to introduce Socrates' *definitive* dialectic. It becomes apparent here that Xenophon did not just fall back on Plato's early dialogues for his explication of definitive dialectic, but also made use of the products of late Platonic thought as well. While Xenophon states for example (*Mem.* 4.6.1) that only those who know *what any given thing is* (τί ἕκαστον εἶη τῶν ὄντων *bis*) can teach others, but the ignorant deceives himself and others, it is stated in Plato's *Phaedrus* (262b) that the art of deceiving others and defending oneself from deception is possessed only by those who are not ignorant about *what any given thing is* (ὃ ἔστιν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων).

Even more than in the cases of the definition and the hypothesis, in the case of the dihairetic Xenophon misunderstands and flattens out the Platonic theoretical approaches that he appropriates to put in his Socrates' mouth. For a start, what Xenophon gathered together from Plato's late dialogues the *Sophist* and the *Statesman* and then presented as Socratic is not even said by Plato's Socrates, but by the stranger from Elea, who acts as the leader of the conversation in both dialogues in the

place of Socrates. But Xenophon is not alone in employing such enterprising hermeneutics. For example in his fictional *Denunciation of Socrates* the rhetor Polykrates claimed for Socrates all the statements he found in Socratic dialogues (Gebhardt 1957). Xenophon in turn seems to have regarded Polykrates' fictional speech, which he disputes in detail at the beginning of the *Memorabilia* (*Mem.* 1.2), as Anytus' real prosecution speech. Close readings of fictional texts had not yet been invented (Rösler 1980); that Xenophon in particular was neither a close reader nor a precise thinker, was shown in the case of the definition and the hypothesis and proves to be the case here as well.

For even if Xenophon acknowledges the hermeneutic method he follows, he has not adequately understood what the Eleatic stranger explains, because he restricts the Dihairesis method, which in the late works of Plato is conceived as a universal thought-model, by means of which the totality of being is given order, to the ethical, so that the division by categories for the Xenophontic Socrates means nothing more in the end than a practical guide to correct ethical action (*Mem.* 4.5.11): ['and in word and in action, dividing things into categories, to choose the good and avoid the bad'].

This fixation on the ethical blurs Xenophon's view of the aporetic definition dialogues of the early Plato; here it contorts his view of the Dihairesis no less than it had to contort his view of the hypothesis, which, like the Dihairesis and also indeed like the definition, makes sense as a thought-method only from the perspective of the ontological concept of the Forms. As Xenophon did not or would not see this, all his recourses to Plato must miscarry and likewise his concept of Socratic dialectic, which in all places comes from Plato. Seen in this way, the dialectic of the Xenophontic Socrates is an interesting document for an early, if mistaken, reception of Plato; as evidence for Socrates—the historical Socrates—it does not come into consideration.

THE LIBERATION FROM XENOPHON

The question as to how Xenophon imagined the interaction of definition, hypothesis, and dihaireis in Socrates' dialectical discourse is

idle. Xenophon did not ask it of himself. And how could he have? The Platonic theoretical approaches Xenophon gathered together derive from completely different periods of Platonic thought and cannot be integrated into a coherent notion of dialectic any more. That is the reason for the obvious contradiction that Xenophon makes statements about Socratic dialectic quite different from how he has Socrates proceed dialectically in conversation. In the countless conversations that Xenophon's Socrates has in the *Memorabilia*, in the *Oeconomicus*, in the *Symposium*, and also in the so-called *Apology* there is no mention anywhere of definition, much less of category specific dihairesis. Only the hypothesis is in full bloom, in that Socrates is always expressing an opinion and then proves this opinion true through plausibilities capable of consensus. But Xenophon did not have to borrow such a lofty term for such a modest procedure. It is simply the case that Xenophon's Socrates, as a perfectly wise man, knows what to think, and also knows how to impart this thought to others so that they hold the same opinions. That is not philosophy, and if the historical Socrates had actually proceeded as Xenophon portrays him, the epochal philosophical effect that he has had would be completely inexplicable: *We must abandon Xenophon as a genuine source for the historical Socrates.*

The liberation from Xenophon, of which we are speaking with reference to Socratic dialectic, but which we can also talk of in terms of Socratic ethics as well, is not a minor matter for Socratic research. For only now do we have a clear view of Plato and the fragmentary Socratics. Plato, it has been shown, places the ontological question at the centre of Socratic dialectic in the early dialogues. No fragmentary Socratic does this; no fragmentary Socratic *can* do this, since the ontological question essentially presumes the theory of Forms as its answer from the outset, so that it obviously marks not the heart of Socratic philosophy, but the beginning of Platonic philosophy. It is fitting that the Socratic Antisthenes (SSR A 150), next to Plato the most significant thinker amongst the Socratics, expressly stated that it was 'impossible to define the question "What is?" οὐκ ἔστι τὸ τί ἐστι ὁρίσασθαι'. A strong contradiction of one Socratic by another Socratic—in the name of Socrates? Much, if not everything of the understanding of Socratic philosophy depends on the answer to this question. Xenophon, this much is clear, is the last place we will find an answer.

The Dancing Sokrates and the Laughing Xenophon, or the Other *Symposium*

Bernhard Huss

Xenophon's *Symposium* is one of his minor Socratic works, and even though other *opera Socratica Xenophontis*, his *Memorabilia*, and probably also his *Oeconomicus*, are much more famous,¹ occasionally it has been called his best work. Nonetheless the *Symposium* has often been judged very negatively in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.² If one looks closely at its *Forschungsgeschichte*, there can be no doubt about the origin of most of these critical statements: it has suffered from comparison with Plato's famous work of the same title. In 1972 Gallardo's report on recent research on Xenophon's *Symposium* had to state that little had changed (on this point) since the days of Wilamowitz-Moellendorff: 'while recognizing the reasonableness of this approach, we nevertheless think it more proper to study Xenophon's work by itself, dispensing in principle with any other considerations.'³

¹ See, e.g. Ullrich 1908, 45; Bux 1956, 194. It is interesting that as early as the mid-eighteenth century, in the praefatio to his 1749 edition of Xenophon's *Symposium*, Bach praises the qualities for which the work is still appreciated nowadays: the humanitas, urbanitas, humour, and immediate liveliness of Xenophon's narration: ['*Symposium* is so charming that nothing can be thought of that is sweeter. How much humanity is seen in the speeches, how much wit in the playing, how much urbanity finally in the replying. Indeed as often as I read it and I read it very often, I seemed to be in the midst of a symposium of men of great refinement and elegance, and to be speaking with Attic citizens, the leading ones at that.']

² See, e.g. Körte's view, mentioned below.

³ Gallardo 1972, 157.

The vast majority of modern Platonists and Xenophontists tend to agree about the relative chronology of the two works. There is very little doubt that Plato wrote his *Symposium* first. It seems certain that Plato's was published between 385/4 and 378,⁴ and Xenophon very probably produced his only in the late 360s.⁵ The considerable number of parallels between the two⁶ proves that Xenophon knew Plato's *Symposium*. And not only did he know it his own opusculum was strongly influenced by Plato's opus. Still, Plato's *Symposium* is not the only work Xenophon quotes and uses while constructing his story of the evening at Kallias' house: he is also influenced by Plato's *Phaedrus* and other Platonic dialogues as well as by other Socratics, namely Antisthenes and Aeschines. And one should not forget the well-known fact that Xenophon generally does not just quote other authors, but rearranges the elements he borrows from them according to his own needs in order to create largely independent new works of art which are neither Platonic nor Antisthenic but simply Xenophontic. Therefore Gallardo certainly is right: looking at Plato's *Symposium* while making statements about Xenophon's can be helpful, but 'it is better to study Xenophon's work on its own terms'.⁷

My primary goal here is to promote a better understanding of both the peculiar intention and the literary technique of this underestimated work. For this purpose, let us first look at a particular passage of Xenophon's *Symposium*, which has often been misunderstood by ancient and modern interpreters (and which is a good example of

⁴ See Dover 1965.

⁵ For details, see note 65 below.

⁶ Many of these parallels are listed in Hug 1852, 639–40; Hug and Schöne 1909, xvii–xix; Bury 1932, lxxviii n. 1; and Thesleff 1978, 158–63. Thesleff, however, argues that there were two versions of Xenophon's: an earlier one that made Plato write his *Symposium*, and a later, enlarged one which was Xenophon's reaction to Plato's. I lack space here to discuss at length why I cannot accept Thesleff's view; but in my opinion, its deficiencies are quite obvious. For details, see my forthcoming commentary.

⁷ Gallardo 1972, 157. Cf. Croiset and Croiset 1900, 375 = 1947, 386: ['As for the literary worth of the work [sc. Xen. *Symp.*], to do it justice, one must begin by forgetting the other [Pl. *Symp.*].'] In this context Gallardo is equally right in stressing the differences between the two *Symposia*: ['Plato's work is more elevated and philosophical, Xenophon's is more true to life in the atmosphere it creates']: 173–4. Cf. also the sage warnings of von Fritz (1935) that for decades have largely been ignored; and, further, Ehlers 1966, 118 n. 41.

more general misunderstandings concerning the work as a whole) and then attempt to draw a number of conclusions regarding the composition and meaning of this text.

I

The passage in question is *Symp.* 2.15–20. What is the context of this little scene? We are at a dinner party thrown by the rich Kallias in honour of his ἐρώμενος ['beloved'] Autolykos, victor in the *pankration* at the Panathenaea of 422 BC. What is the background? After the victory of his beloved Autolykos, Kallias, accompanied by the boy and his father, Lykon, and one Nikeratos, encounters Sokrates and a number of his friends, namely Kritobulos, Hermogenes, Antisthenes, and Charmides. He invites them to his house. After some hesitation, the Socratics accept the invitation. They take their seats (or, better, their ['couches'] *klinai*) in Kallias' *andrōn*, ['men's dining room'] impressed by the splendid beauty of the young Autolykos. While they are dining, they are joined by Philippos the jester (1.11–16) and later also by a Syracusan impresario and his little troupe of artists (2.1), which consists of two beautiful girls and a boy who, as it seems, does not yield too much to Autolykos as far as good looks go. The guests greatly enjoy their music, their dancing, and their artistic skills (3.1, 9.3–7), and Sokrates, throughout the symposium in a very relaxed and jovial mood, is the first to express this, praising both his host Kallias (2.2) and the troupe he has hired (2.9, 2.12, 2.15, 3.2). While the guests enjoy pleasant social conversation, the troupe performs various artistic interludes, which are warmly welcomed by the symposiasts (ch. 2 *passim*). This is the setting of our scene, which is described in 2.15–20.

What comes next is a parody of the young boy's dance, performed by the jester Philippos amid the laughter of those present (2.21–3). The passage 2.15–20 has caused problems among both ancient and modern critics. These problems derive from a fundamental misunderstanding of Xenophon's sense of humour. Let us first examine the six ancient references to our scene.⁸

⁸ The translations added to the following quotations are mostly based on the English of the current Loeb editions.

(1) Plut. *De Tuenda San.* 6, 124e ‘Socrates found dancing a not unpleasant exercise.’

(2) Plut. *Quaest. Conv.* 7.8.3, 711e: ‘Out of respect for the well-known praise of the dance that Socrates delivered.’

These two do not mention Xenophon or his *Symposium* as the source of the information which is given about Sokrates and dancing: no. 1 states that Sokrates found dancing ‘not unpleasant’, whereas no. 2 speaks of ‘well-known praise’ of the dance. But since, on the one hand, Xenophon’s *Symposium* is the only text known to us that could possibly underlie Plutarch’s short statements, and since, on the other hand, Plutarch knew Xenophon and his *Symposium* quite well,⁹ we have good reason to assume that both passages refer to that work. The historicity of Xenophon’s account is accepted by Plutarch without discussion.

(3) Lib. *Or.* 64.18: ‘Sokrates thought that dancing was a part of the things he should do. Sometimes he discussed it *νῦν μὲν διελέγετο*, and sometimes he was seen doing it, *νῦν δὲ ἐκείνο ποιῶν ἐφαίνετο*.’¹⁰

Neither does Libanius name his source and/or its author. But he knew Xenophon well enough,¹¹ and he shows indirectly that he is referring to Xenophon’s *Symposium* here: *νῦν μὲν διελέγετο* goes back to Sokrates’ brief speech in 2.15–19a, and *νῦν δὲ ἐκείνο ποιῶν ἐφαίνετο* is a summary of Charmides’ report in 2.19b. Again the historicity of the details related by Xenophon is not doubted.

(4) Luc. *De Salt.* 25: ‘And yet Sokrates . . . not only commended the art of dancing but wanted to learn it thoroughly, attributing the greatest value to observance of rhythm and music, to harmonious movement and to gracefulness of limb (*οὐ μόνον ἐπῆναι τὴν ὀρχηστικὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκμαθεῖν αὐτὴν ἡξίου, μέγιστον νέμων εὐρυθμίᾳ καὶ εὐμουσίᾳ καὶ κινήσει ἐμμελεῖ καὶ εὐσχημοσύνῃ τοῦ κινουμένου*); and even though he was an old man (*γέρον ἀνὴρ*) he was not ashamed to consider it one of the most important subjects of study. He would, of course, be uncommonly enthusiastic over dancing, since he did not hesitate to learn even trivial things (*οὐκ ὥκνει μαθηθῆναι*).’

⁹ See Münscher 1920, 127–31; Martin 1931, 175–9.

¹⁰ For this parallel cf. Münscher 1920, 201–2.

¹¹ See Münscher 1920, 200–2, and, e.g. Förster’s notes on Libanius’ *Apologia Socratis*, where Libanius often uses Xenophon’s Socratic writings.

As with both Plutarch and Libanius, there is no doubt that Lucian was familiar with Xenophon's *Symposium*; he even makes use of it when writing his *Symposium* or *Lapithai*.¹² In the passage quoted above there are various signals that this was Lucian's source: ἐκμαθεῖν αὐτὴν ἡξίλου and οὐκ ὤκνει μαρθάνειν refer to Sokrates' wish at 2.16 (cf. Kallias' remark at 2.20); μέγιστον... τοῦ κινουμένου sums up Sokrates' discourse at 2.16; γέρων ἀνὴρ is dependent on Sokrates' self-ironical πρεσβύτην ὄντα (2.18). Lucian does not express any doubts about the historical existence of the dancing Sokrates.

(5) D. L. 2.32: (Sokrates) 'And he used to dance regularly, thinking that such exercise helped to keep the body in good condition, as Xenophon relates in the *Symposium*.'

(6) Ath. 1.20 f.: 'Even the wise Sokrates was fond of dancing, and was often surprised in the act of dancing, as Xenophon says. He used to say to his acquaintances that dancing was exercise for every limb.'

Numbers 5 and 6 present no difficulty at all: Xenophon's account is summarized very briefly, and author or author and work are named as the source testifying the historicity of Sokrates' dancing.

We see that all the ancient writers cited here take Xenophon's account at face value: Sokrates is always concerned about his physical fitness, and since in our passage he expresses the wish to learn how to dance and Charmides apparently seems to confirm this to some extent, Sokrates is transformed into the Dancing Sokrates. Our ancient witnesses partly summarize Sokrates' views of dancing, which are expressed in our passage, as true teachings of the Master, and partly seem to believe that Sokrates actually had danced and that he did so regularly. However, the ancient understanding of Xenophon's account cannot be regarded as satisfying.

Do modern critics help us better to understand this scene? There have been various attempts to explain the passage. I think we can discard Ehlers' (1966) view that Xenophon in composing our scene meant to illustrate 'the shocking and offensive elements in Sokrates' character which gained him so many enemies' and that Sokrates is here 'ridiculed' by Xenophon, who tries to explain the grotesque

¹² See Münscher 1920, 143–4; Martin 1931, 224–5.

character of the philosopher in a joking manner.¹³ Sokrates is neither saying nor doing offensive things here, nor is he presented in a ridiculous light. But Ehlers at least considers the possibility of a humorous element in our passage. Others do not. In a note to his German translation (1957), Landmann says: 'One has found a contradiction in the fact that Sokrates only now finds out how good dancing is for him, and yet Charmides has already met him when he was dancing. Such inconsistencies result easily wherever a given element is to be integrated. Therefore we can take the dancing Sokrates as historical.'¹⁴ (Landmann thus basically shares the view of the ancient authors quoted above.) The 'one who has found a contradiction' in our scene is Körte, who in a detailed 48-page study (1927) subjected the *Symposium* to an examination of its structure and aim.¹⁵ His essay shows considerable insight into the structural composition of the work, but he apparently thinks little of Xenophon as a writer. Thus, in judging the composition of an author he does not like, Körte has no trouble finding fault with Xenophon in our passage. He observes, correctly, that Sokrates first says that he would like to learn from the impresario how to dance (2.16), and yet a few sentences later Charmides is said to have caught Sokrates, at some previous instance, early in the morning dancing! The only possible explanation Körte finds is that Xenophon in his clumsiness has confused two different points he is trying to make: first, that Sokrates watches the beautiful young boy dance, and this makes him reflect on the usefulness of physical training in general and dancing in particular;¹⁶ and second, that the historical Sokrates, contemptuous of conventions, was, rightly or not, said to have danced at home, and Xenophon is desperately trying to justify this odd behaviour.¹⁷ But this explanation is not convincing. Körte's attempt to interpret our

¹³ Ehlers 1966, 111.

¹⁴ Landmann 1957, 17 n. 1 (my English translation). Cf. also *RE* IV A.2 s.v. 'Tanzkunst', 2233: ['Sokrates likes to dance at barquets (sic!) in order to strengthen his body through exercise.'] This statement goes back to our passage and is virtually analogous to the ancient quotations above.

¹⁵ For what follows, see esp. Körte 1927, 4–5, 8.

¹⁶ This would apply to 2.15–18.

¹⁷ Körte 1927, 14–16. Passage 2.19 therefore would go back to the historical Dancing Sokrates.

scene must fail, because he saw only the Dancing Sokrates, but failed to notice the Laughing Xenophon.

I propose a reading of the dance scene that differs from all the interpretations, ancient and modern, cited so far: that Sokrates *never danced*. All he says here about dancing is meant jokingly, if not ironically.¹⁸ First, he observes that the young boy is even more handsome when he dances than when he is at rest (2.15). He adds some reflections on the rhythmical regularity of the boy's movements; then (and here the joke begins) he goes on, addressing the impresario: 'And for myself, I should be delighted to learn the figures from you' (2.16). When asked by the surprised Syracusan what use he would make of these figures, he replies: ['I shall dance by God'] (2.16–17). Roaring laughter is the answer. This is a clear indication that to everyone present at Kallias' party a Dancing Sokrates is a bizarre and hilarious idea (but certainly nothing which we should regard as historically true). And Sokrates continues his jesting remarks, asking 'Are you laughing at me?' (of course they are, and the joking Sokrates is just being disingenuous). This question is asked 'deadpan' (μάλα ἐσπουδακότι τῷ προσώπῳ), 'mit todernstem Gesicht'¹⁹ a perfect signal of irony for those who are willing to understand.²⁰

Sokrates then sets out to give reasons for his strange desire (2.17–19). Physical exercise has a number of positive effects on the body. Dancing is a sport that has a number of advantages: (a) he can do it alone and thus need not seek a partner; (b) he does not have to strip in public, and that is good, for he is an old man;²¹ (c) he can do it at home, because a small room is just big enough for it;²² (d) he can do

¹⁸ Cf. Strauss (1972, 147–8), who, however, presupposes a 'contest in making jokes' between Sokrates and Philippos, which does not convince me.

¹⁹ Excellent German translation by Wimmel 1958, 551.

²⁰ Cf. 3.10 for both the formulation and the structural introduction of another ironical remark by Sokrates. Asked what he is proud of, he replies ['making a very solemn face, "Procuring"; and when they laughed at him, he said, "Why are you laughing?"']. This is apparently just a παιδιὰ here, and the underlying σπουδὴ comes to the surface only much later in the evening.

²¹ Cf. Sokrates' criticism of naked old men in the gymnasium as ridiculous, also Pl. *Tht.* 162b.

²² Pangle's interpretation (1994, 144) is misleading: 'Socrates remarks to general laughter that *he is in the habit of dancing alone*, in a room with seven empty couches' (emphasis mine).

it indoors, and thus exercise under shelter in the winter and in the shade in the summer. And in addition to that he wishes to have some physical exercise, because he is too stout. Both Sokrates' insistence on the topic he has brought up and the laughter of his listeners are emphasized by the repetition of 'laughing' at the beginning of three paragraphs: 2.17, 2.18, 2.19. Xenophon thereby reminds the reader of the amused reactions of the symposiasts as well as of the tone in which these utterances are made 'deadpan'.

Once one has realized that Sokrates is not being serious here, the difficult and apparently inconsistent passage 2.19 is easy to explain. Sokrates extends his joke and, following a sudden notion, he says, winking at Charmides: 'Don't you know that just the other day Charmides here caught me dancing early in the morning?' The phrasing of the passage is exactly what one might expect from a person who is expanding a joke and trying to involve someone else in it. Charmides understands, and plays along with Sokrates: 'Indeed I did. And at first I thought you were going mad.' But when he heard from Sokrates the same reasons as those given in 2.16–17, he immediately went home (still early in the morning)—and did not dance, but practised shadowboxing! If Charmides' utterance is to be taken seriously, four logical inconsistencies are the result: (a) Sokrates dances in 2.19, but does not dance in 2.16–18 (see above). (b) In 2.17, Charmides does not know that Sokrates dances, and therefore laughs as all the others do, but in 2.19 he knows this very fact. (c) In 2.16–18 Sokrates reflects spontaneously about dancing, yet in 2.19 he is supposed to have said exactly the same things to Charmides 'the other day, early in the morning'. (d) Oddly enough, Charmides has learned about Sokrates' regular habit of dancing just the other day—what a coincidence! Once the joking character of the little dialogue between Sokrates and Charmides is recognized, these difficulties disappear. The passage is 'inconsistent' only insofar as the jokes made in it do not need 'consistency'. Xenophon is laughing here. He is not making mistakes or confusing historical facts and the reasoning of his own literary characters.²³ As far as the other ancient

²³ Note too the bizarre situation of Charmides' running home immediately after hearing these most illuminating explanations from Sokrates, and then, pseudo-realistically, not dancing but rather practising shadowboxing. Note furthermore

authors (quoted above) are concerned, who take the Dancing Sokrates at face value and unsmilingly, we may conclude this section of our argument with the words of Kahn: 'This is one of the many examples where the imaginary creation produced by a Socratic author has become the source of a pseudo-historical tradition.'²⁴

II

However, if the passage clearly must be interpreted as jocular, why has this been overlooked so often? Why did the critics not intuit Xenophon's sense of humour? An observation made by von Fritz (1935) points in the right direction: many passages in Xenophon's *Symposium* have been misunderstood because the critics were unable to recognize that it contains a mixture of serious and humorous elements.²⁵ He is certainly right, since in other writings Xenophon usually displays a great interest in moral seriousness and appears rougher, drier, less elegant, and more pedantic than in the *Symposium*.²⁶ By continuing this line of thought, we may arrive at a more detailed explanation of our passage.

A peculiar feature of Xenophon's literary technique is his art of remodelling and 'recycling' a number of *leimotifs*. He is adept at combining various ideas, melting them together in blocks, and

that the scene is followed by (a) the jocular remark from Kallias that he wishes to become Sokrates' fellow student in dancing (the richest man around and the most brilliant philosopher of Athens as the students of the Syracusan impresario), and (b) the hilarious dance-parody of Philippos. That gives a nonserious context to the whole topic of dance. I emphasize that Sokrates' remark at Pl. *Mx.* 236d ['If you were to tell me to strip and dance, I would oblige, since we are now alone together'] is no evidence for the historical Dancing Sokrates, since it is merely an ironical proposal for a striptease dance. But one wonders if Xenophon might have taken the idea of a Dancing Sokrates from this passage. However, it is also possible that Xenophon is influenced by certain scenes of Attic comedy here: cf. especially Philokleon's dance at Ar. *V.* 1482–95 (note the symposiac context) and Vaio 1971, 345 with n. 47. I owe this suggestion to John Vaio (Chicago).

²⁴ Kahn 1996, 10 n. 18 (about Phaedo's fictitious character Simon the shoemaker, who gets a chapter of his own in D. L. 2.122–3).

²⁵ Von Fritz 1935, 31. For *σπουδή* and *παιδιά* see below.

²⁶ Cf. von Fritz 1935, 31 and *passim*.

reusing these blocks in different contexts.²⁷ This 'blocky' character of his compositions makes it extremely difficult to find a convincing relative chronology for his works.²⁸ In the *Symposium* we have an extraordinary case in which such 'blocks' are not only reused, but are reused in a different sense: in our passage we can discern a number of motifs which Xenophon uses in serious contexts elsewhere, but integrates here into a non-serious context. He does not completely change them; some seriousness remains. This, together with Xenophon's generally serious character (mentioned above), has made ancient and modern interpreters take the whole passage seriously. The motifs in question are the following five.

- (1) 2.16: Sokrates' remark about the boy's neck, legs, and hands being active together, which he takes as a sign of a particularly healthy type of exercise, is echoed²⁹ by *Lac.* 5.9, 'So it would not be easy to find healthier or handier men than the Spartans. For their exercises train the legs, arms and neck equally' (trans. Marchant).
- (2) 2.17: The laughter of the guests after Sokrates' ['I shall dance by God'] is echoed by *Mem.* 3.5.15, where the Athenians are seriously reproached for making fun of people who care about physical exercise (dancing is not involved there, of course).
- (3) 2.17: Sokrates' observation that physical exercise leads to better health, better appetite, and better sleep is echoed by *Oec.* 10.11, 'Such exercise, I said, would give her a better appetite, improve her health, and add natural colour to her cheeks' (trans. after Marchant). Xenophon often emphasizes the importance of physical training. Cf. *Oec.* 11.11–20: Sokrates asks Ischomachos,

²⁷ For the chronological relations between the different Xenophontine works in question see discussion below in section III (note 64).

²⁸ See, e.g. Marschall 1928, and the brief and concise remarks by Higgins 1977, 131–2 and nn.

²⁹ In these items, 'echoed' does not mean that the work cited was written later than the *Symposium* and repeats a motif first created for the *Symposium*. Rather it means that the work cited has a motif that is strikingly similar to what we find in the *Symposium*. The motif may obviously belong to Xenophon's fund of motifs, which he uses and reuses in different contexts. But whether a given motif was written first for the *Symposium* may be uncertain; for our purpose it is relatively unimportant. This qualification, however, does not preclude the possibility (or even, as I believe, the probability) that all of Xenophon's writings were produced in a very late stage of his life. See my remarks on chronology in section III.

‘How do you take care of your health?’ In his reply, Ischomachos stresses the mutual effects of healthy nutrition and sufficient physical exercise and the impact which they have on both the private and the military sectors.³⁰

- (4) 2.17: The jocular, over-exaggerated description of different kinds of athletes who have different parts of their bodies especially well trained is echoed by *Mem.* 3.8.4: ‘Someone who is “beautiful” for wrestling is unlike someone who is “beautiful” for running.’³¹
- (5) Last but not least the motif ‘Sokrates cares about physical fitness’ is originally a serious one: see *Mem.* 1.2.4, ‘Neither did he neglect his body nor did he praise other people for neglecting theirs.’³² See also *Mem.* 1.6.7, 3.12.1–8,³³ 4.7.9.³⁴

Conclusion: our passage is evidence for a particular characteristic of Xenophon’s literary technique, namely the jocular use of motifs which are elsewhere used in a serious context. This is typical not only of our passage, but of Xenophon’s *Symposium* as a whole.³⁵ Thus we have a combination of ‘seriousness and laughter’ σπουδή and παιδιά as far as the use of ‘Xenophontine topoi’ is concerned. That may remind us of Xenophon’s introduction to the *Symposium*: Ἀλλ’ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ τῶν καλῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν ἔργα οὐ μόνον τὰ μετὰ σπουδῆς πραττόμενα ἀξιομνημόνευτα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἐν ταῖς παιδιαῖς (1.1), ‘To my mind it is worthwhile to relate not only the serious acts of great and good men but also what they do in their lighter moods’ (trans. Todd).

This sentence makes a grammatical statement about the content of Xenophon’s *Symposium*: the deeds of *kaloï kagathoi* are a significant expression of their character and of course are worth reporting. Yet what they did and said ‘in their lighter moods’ (and the whole *Symposium* is a memorable description of ‘lighter moods’) also should not be forgotten, but, via the literary medium of a Socratic writing, be remembered. The literary technique that has been described above reflects Xenophon’s efforts to produce a unified

³⁰ See also *Cyr.* 1.6.16–17 with Mueller-Goldingen 1995, 120.

³¹ Cf. Delatte 1933, 96.

³² For this passage cf. Gigon 1953, 30–2.

³³ For this passage cf. Delatte 1933, 162–6.

³⁴ See further my forthcoming commentary on Xenophon’s *Symposium* ad loc. and general *Cyr.* 6.1.24, *Lac.* 5.8, *Cyn.* 4.10.

³⁵ See my forthcoming commentary, *passim*.

picture composed of *σπουδή* and *παιδιά*, of serious and non-serious elements. He uses serious motifs (for example, Sokrates' interest in physical fitness, which is basically a *σπουδή*) as a kind of substructure for the conversations between the symposiasts. On the surface, however, *παιδιά* is displayed: Sokrates does not pontificate about the importance of physical training but rather expresses his views jokingly. Nonetheless, they are serious in the end. For Xenophon this is not a contradiction, but an aristocratic characteristic of the social demeanour of a *kalos kagathos* on certain occasions (see below). Another example for this demeanour is at 2.5–7, where the education of the young Autolykos comes up in conversation. In this context the symposiasts will soon begin a discussion on the teachability of *kalokagathia*, here virtually identical with *arete*. At this point the educated reader of Socratic literature would expect Sokrates to be eager to engage in such a discussion (which would be a brilliant example of *σπουδή*). The opposite happens. Sokrates postpones the question: he is more interested in watching one of the young dancing girls perform (see 2.8) which is a brilliant example of *παιδιά*: 'Since this is a debatable matter, let us reserve it for another time; for the present let us finish what we have on hand. For I see that the dancing girl here is standing ready, and that someone is bringing her some hoops' (trans. Todd) (2.7).

But a *kalos kagathos* never forgets *σπουδή* completely, and so the topic 'whether virtue is teachable' soon reappears (2.9–10). This shows that in its peculiar combination of *σπουδή* and *παιδιά* this *Symposium* is not to be understood as a simple piece of entertaining literature with no philosophical significance whatever. Xenophon is too serious a writer and too earnest a man to produce merely a silly catalogue of jokes with Sokrates as the wise guy. For the moment, however, Xenophon's *kaloi kagathoi* are not very interested in extended discussions on matters of 'virtue' (*ἀρετή*), and thus the discussion on the teachability of virtue remains a humorous verbal exchange between Sokrates and Antisthenes (2.10–12) that is concluded by a joking remark from the normally rigid and impassive Antisthenes (2.13), and, as a reaction to that remark, by a joke from Philippos the jester. Our dancing scene follows.

The humorous note that can be found in the two scenes which have been discussed so far predominates in almost all chapters of the

work. In chapter 1, Kallias' invitation to Sokrates and his friends proceeds as a mocking, semiserious conversation between Kallias and Sokrates (1.4–6) that plays on the fundamental divergence between sophists, who teach for money, and Socratics, who are 'do-it-yourself workers of philosophy' (1.5). A very serious topic, no doubt but it is just alluded to, not brought to a dialectically 'satisfying' end. The solemn and serious description of Autolykos' beauty and its effects on those present (1.8–11a)³⁶ is counterbalanced by the hilarious second half of the chapter: the introduction and first deeds of Philippos the jester (1.11b–1.16), who is admitted by Kallias because he fears that the solemn atmosphere might leave his guests in too serious a mood: ['for the company is as you see full of seriousness (*σπουδῆς*), but deficient in laughter (*γέλωτος*)'] (1.13). It takes some effort to make the *kaloï kagathoi* laugh (1.14–15, proof of their *σπουδῆ*), but in the end Philippos succeeds (1.16, *παιδιά*).

In chapter 2 the Syracusan impresario and his troupe are introduced and perform their artistic interludes, providing a framework for the brief and humorous conversations discussed above (*σπουδῆ* and *παιδιά*). At the end of this chapter Sokrates warns that they should not drink too much wine—['seriously'] (2.24–6, *σπουδῆ*)—but Philippos easily manages to get around these forbidding warnings ['jokingly'] (2.27, *παιδιά*).

Chapter 3 presents the first 'round of speeches': according to symposiastic custom, the guests speak 'to the right'. This is a traditional element of sympotic 'entertainment' (*παιδιά*),³⁷ but Sokrates and Kallias propose a relatively serious theme: 'What is the most valuable thing in your life?' (*ἐπὶ τίνι μέγα φρονεῖς*; 3.3–4). Is this purely a *σπουδῆ*? No, there is also *παιδιά* in chapter 3, for most of the statements made by the guests (and especially the statements that are more relevant from a philosopher's viewpoint) are here a sort of 'joking in riddles' (*γρίφοι*) that need to be resolved in the second

³⁶ Structurally this description prepares for the solemn speech about love delivered by Sokrates in chapter 8. Exactly as this moment is counterbalanced by the entrance of Philippos, the highly serious Erotikos Logos of chapter 8 is counterbalanced by the highly risqué performance of 'Dionysus and Ariadne' in chapter 9—a combination of *σπουδῆ* and *παιδιά* on the compositional level of the *Symposium* as a whole.

³⁷ See, in general, RE IV 1 s.v. Comissatio, 610–19, esp. 616.

[round of speeches], in chapter 4: for example, the poor Antisthenes is proud of his wealth (3.8), but it is the wealth of the soul (4.34–45), whereas the poor Charmides is proud of his poverty (3.9), which can be justified only by means of an ironically positive account of a poor man's independence (4.29–33); the most respectable Sokrates—and here everyone is amused—is proud of his pandering (3.10), but this refers to Socratic pandering and matchmaking similar to Pl. *Tht.* 149a–151d (4.56–64), whereas Hermogenes is proud of the virtue and power his friends possess, though no one knows who these 'friends' are (3.14) until it is revealed that they are the gods, not human beings (4.46–9).³⁸ Even in chapter 4, with its more or less serious solutions of the 'joking in riddles' delivered in chapter 3, *σπουδή* is mixed with *παιδιά*. The speeches of Kallias, Nikeratos, Kritobulos, Charmides, and Antisthenes are followed by humorous remarks or exchanges (4.5, 7–9, 19–28, 33, 45); the utterances of Philippos and the Syracusan are clearly hilarious (4.50–5); and the most important speech, Sokrates' [speech] is a paradoxically funny one: having determined what a 'pimp' (*μαστροπός*) is (4.56–60), he does not, as everyone expected, attribute the corresponding qualities to himself, but to—Antisthenes! (4.61–4).³⁹ Chapter 5 presents the topic of the relevance or irrelevance of outward appearance (*σπουδή*) in the form of a mock beauty contest between Sokrates and Kritobulos (*παιδιά*). Chapter 6 discusses two problems of 'drunken behaviour' (*παροιμία*) in a largely jocular manner (*παιδιά*), but referring (at 6.6) to the serious attacks against Sokrates made in Aristophanes' *Clouds* (*σπουδή*),⁴⁰ whereas the transitional chapter 7 relates Sokrates' refusal of another artistic interlude in favour of a

³⁸ Note too that Nikeratos claims that the greatest thing he possesses is his knowledge of Homer—but then it turns out that he can only recite him (3.5–6, 4.6–7); and that Kallias claims to be able to instill virtue—but only by paying money, and often with no thanks given (3.4–5, 4.1–4).

³⁹ This is also a *παιδιά*—the true reason why Sokrates had named himself a 'pimp' is not revealed here. The solution of this riddle is delayed until Sokrates speaks out in his great *Erotikos Logos* in chapter 8: there it becomes clear that he is indeed a 'pimp', but in the Socratic sense of Pl. *Tht.* 151b, that is, insofar as he is concerned with bringing people together who are willing and able to 'make each other better'.

⁴⁰ Cf. for 6.6, *φροντιστής*, Ar. *Nu.* 101 (with Del Corno ad loc.), 266, 456, 1039, and Dover ad v. 94; for 6.6, ['a thinker about things on high'] *τῶν μετεώρων φροντιστής*, Ar. *Nu.* 228, 333 (with van Leeuwen ad loc.), 360, 490, 1284; for 6.8, Ar. *Nu.* 143–53 (with scholl. ad loc.), 830; and see Körte 1927, 47–8.

musical performance (παιδιά).⁴¹ By contrast, the great Erotikos Logos delivered in chapter 8 by Sokrates is an impressive example of σπουδή: he directs this speech mainly to Kallias and Autolykos, trying to prevent them from indulging in the pleasures of homosexual love and exhorting them to 'care about their virtue' (8.26).

Quod erat demonstrandum: Xenophon's *Symposium* repeatedly attests the mixture of σπουδή and παιδιά in both content and form.

III

Given the emphasis on the dichotomy of σπουδή and παιδιά, an important question necessarily arises: why is Xenophon so concerned with the theme of παιδιά? What is the true reason for the Laughing Xenophon's presentation of a Dancing Sokrates? There is a twofold answer to this question: it is about the Laughter of the 'gentlemen' *Kaloi Kagathoi*, and the 'Golden Age of Sokrates' *Aurea Aetas Socratica*.

The Laughter of the Kaloi Kagathoi. I agree with the many scholars who assert that Xenophon's Sokrates is far from being an authentic portrayal of the historical Sokrates. He is rather one of Xenophon's typical *kaloi kagathoi*, an ideal personification of Xenophon's own moral canon. He belongs to the same [tribe of men] as Agesilaus and Cyrus the Elder. The significant difference, however, is that Xenophon's Sokrates incorporates the philosophical side of the Ideal Moral Man, whereas Agesilaus and Cyrus must be seen as the practical (or pragmatic) side of this ideal.⁴² Thus the symposia of the *kalos kagathos* Cyrus are an important

⁴¹ This proposal made in chapter 7 prepares for the performance in chapter 9: so the serious chapter 8 is framed by two passages devoted to παιδιά.

⁴² Mueller-Goldingen (1995, 273) is thus surely right in describing Xenophon's portrait of Cyrus as a ['projection of Socratic ideas about virtue onto an historical figure']. And (279) ['Xenophon shows his character as a kind of Sokrates, who in conversations that recall Socratic dialogues in *Memorabilia*, leads interlocutors to understanding']. See also Higgins 1977, 56–7; Due 1989, 185–206; and Gera 1993, 26–131 ('Socrates in Persia'). Generally, one must not forget that Xenophon is surely the most practical-minded Socratic writer and that the 'practical' and the 'philosophical' side of his Ideal Moral Man are not very far from each other.

point of comparison in interpreting the humorous symposium at Kallias' house, at which the *kalos kagathos* Sokrates plays the leading role.⁴³ In the *Cyropaedia* it is at symposia that the *kaloi kagathoi* have the opportunity to display *παιδιά*, and Xenophon's *kaloi kagathoi* love to laugh. They are supposed to have a sense of humour.⁴⁴ This gives them the characteristic element of 'affability' *εὐχαρι* (Ages. 8.1). A *kalos kagathos* such as Agesilaus, who is 'optimistic, has good humour, and is always cheerful' (8.2, *εὐελπὺς καὶ εὐθυμὸς καὶ ἀεὶ ἱλαρός*), not only cares seriously about his friends (an equivalent of *σπουδή*) but also shares their jocular moments (an equivalent of *παιδιά*) (Ages. 8.2, ['he was very pleased to share boyish stories (*παιδικῶν λόγων*), but he got serious (*συνεσπούδαζε*) with his friends in serving all their needs']). At one of his dinner parties the mighty Cyrus does not mind his guests mocking him for his bad jokes. He even laughs with them and is ready with a quick-witted reply (*Cyr.* 8.4.21–3). He expects his fellow symposiasts to be in a 'lighter mood' and he likes to begin telling jokes in a convivial round (2.2.28–31; cf. his 'Apology of the Humorous' at 2.2.12). A person who does not like to join in the laughter of his fellow symposiasts does not behave appropriately (cf. the taxiarch Aglaitadas, 'hostile to laughter' at 2.2.11–16). Why does Cyrus himself care so much about laughter? The answer is alluded to in 2.2.1: 'Whenever Cyrus entertained company at dinner, he always took pains that the conversations introduced should be as entertaining as possible (*εὐχαριστότατοι*) and that it should incite to good (*παρορμῶντες εἰς τὰγαθόν*)' (trans. Miller).

Cyrus wishes to have parties of exactly the same sort as Kallias': a mixture of *σπουδή* 'inciting to good' and *παιδιά* 'most entertaining'.⁴⁵ There seem to be two reasons involved: on the one hand, this certainly goes back to Xenophon's historical character and his personal con-

⁴³ Cf., in general, Gera 1993, 132–91 ('The Symposia of the *Cyropaedia*').

⁴⁴ Sometimes even when death is approaching: at *Hell.* 2.3.56 Theramenes, in the last moments of his life, loses ['neither his sense nor his playfulness'] *μήτε τὸ φρόνιμον μήτε τὸ παιγνιώδες* and therefore earns Xenophon's praise.

⁴⁵ Cf. *Symp.* 4.28, *καὶ οὗτοι μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἀναμῖξ ἔσχωψάν τε καὶ ἐσπούδασαν*, with *Cyr.* 6.1.6, *οἱ μὲν δὴ τοιαῦτ' ἐπαιζον σπουδὰ πρὸς ἀλλήλους*.

viction that 'learning noble things from the personal example of noble persons',⁴⁶ was not possible without the element of cheerfulness (εὖχαρι), and that such a combination of the useful and the cheerful was provided only in a context which is determined by σπουδή and παιδιά. (And for Xenophon, that a *kalos kagathos* might not display a sense of humour at symposia was obviously unthinkable.) On the other hand, the dichotomy σπουδή/παιδιά seems to have belonged to a larger context of symposiastic motifs: see *Adesp. El.* 27 West, an elegy dated to the end of the fourth century BC,⁴⁷ which recommends combining laughter and seriousness at symposia:

Hello, there, fellow-drinkers! . . .
 We have . . .
 to laugh, have fun, on our best behaviour,
 and, once together, to enjoy ourselves, to tease one another
 and to tell jokes that make us laugh.
 Let seriousness come later and let's hear the speakers
 in turn. For that is what is good about a drinking party.
 (trans. W. M. Calder)⁴⁸

However, since the opening of Xenophon's *Symposium* was well known and very influential in antiquity and is often quoted or alluded to by ancient authors,⁴⁹ we cannot completely exclude the possibility that this elegy too shows its influences.⁵⁰ But it is not surprising that poetry in a symposiastic context predating Xenophon had already established a connection between laughter and seriousness: see *Ion Eleg.* fr. 26.13–16 West:

And so, father Dionysus, you who give pleasure to garlanded banqueters and preside over cheerful feasts,
 my greetings to you! Helper in noble works, grant me a lifetime of drinking, sporting and thinking just thoughts. (trans. Campbell)

⁴⁶ Thus in a verse by Theognis which Xenophon quotes twice, *Symp.* 2.4 and *Mem.* 1.2.20. Cf. *Pl. Men.* 95d–e. For association with *kaloi kagathoi*, seen as ['an exercise in virtue'] cf. also *Cyr.* 3.3.55 with Mueller-Croldingen 1995, 142 n. 22.

⁴⁷ For a detailed commentary on this elegy see Fabian et al. 1991, 228–31.

⁴⁸ See Ullrich 1908, 17–18; Seng 1988, 129–30; Gera 1993, 144 n. 33.

⁴⁹ Cf. *Plut. Ages.* 29.2; *Quaest. Conv.* 7.6.3 708d, *Symp.* 2 147f; *Gal. UP* 3.25; *Philostr. VS* 1540; *Jul. Caes.* 314d; *Eun. VS* 1.1.1–2; *Methodius Symp.* 4.6 (§ 108); *Cic. Pro Planc.* 66 with Münscher 1920, 71.

⁵⁰ The elegy reminded Schubart and Wilamowitz (1907, 63) of Xenophon.

Besides this, Xenophon seems to have been influenced by Plato's *Symposium* as well: between the mostly serious (insofar as one can speak of Platonic 'seriousness' in such absolute terms) Erotikoi Logoi in Plato's work there are many elements of παιδιά: the introduction of Sokrates, the first conversations with the mentioning of 'yesterday's drinking', the famous hiccups of Aristophanes, much in Aristophanes' speech, the entrance of the drunken Alkibiades, and to some extent also the final scene.⁵¹ At the end of his praise of Eros, Agathon even says that his Logos 'is a mixture of cheerful and serious elements' (τὰ μὲν παιδιᾶς, τὰ δέ σπουδῆς μετρίως . . . μετέχων).⁵²

Thus, Xenophon's *Symposium* in its mixture of σπουδή and παιδιά—something which later would be called σπουδαιογέλοιον—is bound both to Xenophontine and also to more common literary requirements for dinner parties attended by *kaloi kagathoi*. But there is another reason why Xenophon emphasizes the 'lighter mood' of the symposium in Kallias' *andrōn* so much.⁵³

The 'Golden Age of Sokrates'. By describing Kallias' symposium in terms of σπουδή and παιδιά, Xenophon succeeds in creating a fictitious evening which well-educated, polite people spend together in a cheerful, yet partly also intellectual, atmosphere. Except for the minor disturbances of chapter 6—which, by the way, serve only to show that Sokrates is the perfect, sophisticated small-talk go-between and that in view of such sophistication Aristophanes' old attacks on him (see above and note 40) are wholly unfounded—everyone is on friendly terms with one another here. This is a microcosm of *kaloi kagathoi* which is not seriously affected by any social or political

⁵¹ Cf. Segoloni 1994, 206.

⁵² For Hermogenes (*Meth.* 36) both Xenophon's *Symposium* and Plato's serve as examples of Συμποσίου Σωκρατικού πλοκή σπουδαία καὶ γελοία καὶ πρόσωπα καὶ πράγματα; Cf. Martin 1931, 2 with n. 1. See also Plutarch's definition of the symposium as a ['blend of seriousness and play in words and in actions']: *Quaest. Conv.* 7.6.3 708d.

⁵³ In a very illuminating discussion of the relevance of the famous conversation between Sokrates, Agathon, and Aristophanes in the final scene of Plato's *Symposium*, Segoloni (1994, 217) observes that the mixture of seriousness and laughter has—not surprisingly—a rather concrete historical basis [in that the banquet was a real social institution, a central part of social life in archaic and classical Greece, where political, philosophical and learned discussion did mingle with music, singing love and symposiastic humour].

turbulence.⁵⁴ It is determined by the utterances of the 'lighter moods' of Socratic noblemen. Among them Sokrates is the most important, though not the only important figure. His prominent status is made explicit through his dominant role in the conversations, his long speech about Eros in chapter 8, and, at the end of that speech, by the words Lykon directs to him: (9.1), 'So help me Hera, Sokrates, you seem to me to have a truly noble character' (trans. Todd).

But here we arrive at a crucial point: in all probability, this Lykon is identical with one of the accusers of Sokrates in the trial of 399 BC,⁵⁵ a man whose character was doubtful enough to make him and his private life the target of violent attacks in Attic comedy.⁵⁶ And it is precisely this man who directs a praise of *kalokagathia* to Sokrates that can only be understood as praise and approval of the moral views which Sokrates has expressed in his speech that ended just moments before. Is this the only crack in the Socratic mirror into which we are gazing? No. Xenophon depicts the relations of Kallias and Autolykos as a 'Platonic' love which is in danger, because of Kallias' love for the body of Autolykos, but is so far still chaste hence Sokrates makes every effort to save this chastity. But Xenophon of course must have known that historically this relationship was far from being chaste: the fragments of Eupolis' *Autolykos*, a drama which because of its great success was performed twice,⁵⁷ do not permit any doubts on that, even discounting comic exaggeration. The affair of Kallias and Autolykos obviously was wild and known all over Athens! This is a further striking divergence between the historical truth and Xenophon's fiction.

⁵⁴ Cf. Charmides, who at 4.29–33 jokingly describes the positive effects of his property loss in the Peloponnesian War.

⁵⁵ See Kirchner no. 9271; Wilarnowitz 1893, 182 n. 88; Joel 1901, 724; Ullrich 1908, 43–4; MacDowell 1971, 302; Strauss 1972, 169; Higgins 1977, 148 n. 95; Kyle 1987, 198; Platis 1980, 125–52; Pangle 1994, 147; Segoloni 1994, 35–9. In an interesting interpretation Segoloni sees a close parallel between Aristophanes in Plato's *Symposium* and Lykon in Xenophon's, [the first as the 'old accuser' of Sokrates, the second as the 'new accuser'] (1994, 36). The identification of Lykon with the future accuser of Sokrates is doubted, though, without good reason, by Meyer (1958, 219 n. 1); Ollier (1961, 28); and Hansen (1995, 33–4).

⁵⁶ See Cratin. fr. 214 KA; schol. Ar. V. 1169; Eup. fr. 295 KA (cf. fr. 58, 232); Ar. *Lys.* 270 with schol.; Eup. fr. 61 KA; Metag. fr. 10 KA; further, D.S. 14.34.2; Paus. 4.26.2, 10.38.10; cf. Gallardo 1972, 160.

⁵⁷ See the note by Kassel-Austin ad Eup. testim. *iii and cf. Sutton 1980, 60.

But there is more: one of the guests at the dinner party (dramatic date: 422 BC), Charmides, would become an important member of the brutal, ruthless, terrorist Thirty Tyrants. He would be killed together with Kritias in a battle against democratic forces under Thrasybulos in 403. Two other guests at this symposium would be killed as well but *by* The Thirty Tyrants: the young Autolykos, because of his courageous opposition to them, and also Nikeratos, son of the famous *strategos* Nikias.⁵⁸

Xenophon, writing much later, did not arbitrarily place the scene in 422 BC.⁵⁹ He knew that at that time the whole town was talking about the homosexual liaison in which Autolykos was involved, the young man whose victory prompts Xenophon's fictional dinner party of *kaloi kagathoi*—a dinner party at which homosexual love is condemned by the Master himself. He knew that this liaison was *not* famous because of the moral and political excellence of the lovers and their families and therefore that his Sokrates was wrong (8.7). He knew that Lykon, the man whom he painted as a loving and caring father (see 2.4–5, 3.12–13), was famous for quite different qualities. He knew that in Athens' history dark shadows soon would grow longer and longer, and that the ordered fictional microcosm of his *kaloi kagathoi* historically would later fall apart, just as a good part of his hometown would fall apart. He knew that two of the guests would be killed and that a third guest would be among those responsible for

⁵⁸ See Kirchner nos. 2748 (Autolykos), 10741 (Nikeratos), 15512 (Charmides), and further, Davies 1971, 405–6 (for Nikeratos), 330–1 (for Charmides).

⁵⁹ Xenophon claims at 1.1 that he himself was 'present' (*παράγονόμενος*) at Kallias' dinner party, but he nowhere mentions his contribution to the entertainment, nor does he record his presence being acknowledged by the other guests. While scholars in earlier times (up to the nineteenth century) regarded Xenophon's *παράγονόμενος* as a historically true statement, despite Herodic. ap. Ath. 5.216d—which caused enormous problems: how could Xenophon, born around 430 BC, have attended a symposium as a nine-year old boy? Or was he born earlier? Or was the dramatic date to be postponed?—it is nowadays generally (and rightly) interpreted as fictitious *Beglaubigung*, a typical element of the Socratic dialogue. See, e.g. Woldinga 1938, 1–3; Bux 1956, 193; Ollier 1961, 8–9; Breitenbach 1967, 1874; Patzer 1970, 46–8; Kahn 1996, 32; and cf. the fictional character of Plato's *Symposium*: hiding behind the highly complex framework of his narrative (172a74a), the author relates events that would have taken place when he himself was thirteen (416). For a general characterization of the fictiveness of the *logoi Sokratikoi* see Momigliano 1971, 46–9; cf. further Patzer 1997.

killing them. He knew that Sokrates would be executed, and that yet another guest would be among those responsible for killing him. And yet he creates this harmonious round of *kaloi kagathoi*, controlled by Sokrates and charmed by his masterly display of serious and jocular conversation, *σπουδή* and *παιδιά*. He creates a 'Golden Age of Sokrates', with Sokrates as the man who leads the cheerful discussions of the aristocrats in a noble, peaceful way, and who communicates the most moral views on Love and other Socratic subjects to his fellow symposiasts, so that in the end even (and precisely) his future accuser has to acknowledge Sokrates' superior *kalokagathia*. Only later would the catastrophe occur.

What was Xenophon's aim in constructing this Socratic Golden Age? I suggest that he had at least two.

(1) The 'Golden Age of Sokrates' serves as Socratic apology: this Sokrates is not a corruptor of the young, but a moral man. Fathers hand over their sons to him in order to protect them from the dangers of homosexual lust (4.24), and the best proof that those fathers are right in doing so is Sokrates' long speech about Eros in chapter 8, which is mainly directed at Kallias. Sokrates tries to remind Kallias, lover of the beautiful Autolykos (who is still a boy of ['respect and moderation']; see 1.8), that the love of the soul is much better than the love of the body (see esp. 8.12). He describes the 'disgusting' effects of homosexual love in a clear language that occasionally becomes so blunt that he has to excuse himself (8.23–4) and exhorts both Kallias and Autolykos to do as many heroes have done: *not* to indulge in shameful desire but to do the 'greatest and most beautiful things together' out of friendship (8.31), which means, in their case, to engage in politics on behalf of their hometown, Athens (8.39–43). This shows not only the moral uprightness of Sokrates as far as *eros* is concerned, but also his burning interest in supporting Athens (8.41–3; cf. also his expression ['to add to the greatness of the homeland'] *τὴν πατρίδα αὔξειν* at 8.38). He is not an enemy of Athens but her friend (perhaps the greatest). Furthermore, he says some respectful words about the gods (4.49), in whom he seems to believe. He does not 'introduce new gods'. All this is embedded in a context of *σπουδή* and *παιδιά* in which Sokrates is presented as the perfect example of a civilized person: he acknowledges the efforts made by the host and easily enjoys the external

pleasures of a symposium (2.2); he is willing to adapt himself to the sympotic situation and does not insist on discussing 'Socratic' topics where this would be out of place (2.7); he is not offended by the critical remarks of Antisthenes (2.10) or the impolite attacks from the Syracusan impresario (6.6–10); he is dominant throughout the symposium and often decides what should be done and what should be avoided by the others (2.3, 3.2–3, 4.1; 7), and this, of course, is always good advice. Doubtless Xenophon at 9.1 makes his character Lykon⁶⁰ say what he wants the reader to think: this Sokrates is *the* καλὸς καγαθός.⁶¹

(2) Recent scholarship has increasingly taken into account the possibility that Xenophon returned to Athens after his banishment had been lifted (c. 368 BC).⁶² There he is supposed to have written a great part of his Socratic writings⁶³ as well as other works,⁶⁴ among them *Cyropaedia*. His *Symposium* too is to be dated to the 360s (and

⁶⁰ It is of course not accidental, but highly significant that this praise of Sokrates is uttered by Lykon, [who will be his prosecutor thereafter and is obliged to retract in anticipation the charges that he will sign off some 20 years or more later]: Segoloni 1994, 37.

⁶¹ Needless to say, Xenophon's Sokrates differs greatly from the Sokrates presented in Plato's *Symposium*. Neither is he an almost superhuman genius who endures cold and heat as well as any quantity of alcohol without being physically damaged, nor is he inspired by a divine or semidivine notion of Eros. He remains the down-to-earth Sokrates known from the *Memorabilia* and *Oeconomicus*: practical, straightforward, and sometimes quite bourgeois.

⁶² For historical reasons it seems likely that Xenophon as an Athenian was not allowed to stay at Corinth beyond that point: see Higgins 1977, 128 with n. 2; cf. further the meaningful passage *Cyr.* 1.2.6, [where Xenophon in comparing Athenian with Persian education uses the phrase παρ' ἡμῶν, which reveals his proximity to Athens and confirms the repeal of his exile]: Mueller-Goldingen 1995, 49–50. See also Lauffer 1974, 159 n. 41.

⁶³ Cf. Kahn 1996, 398–9.

⁶⁴ In view of the strikingly high number of close parallels in content and form between Xenophon's writings—writings that do not show a chronologically continuous development of the author's thought—Schwartz made a somewhat prophetic statement in 1889 (191–2): contrarily to the opinion current in his times he suggested that the complete oeuvre might have been produced only very late in Xenophon's life, after he had had to leave his estate at Skillus (371). Even though the dating of Xenophon's writings is a crucial problem (see, in general, Marschall 1928, *passim*), Schwartz's assumption has been confirmed rather than refuted by later research. Xenophon's datable writings were indeed composed or completed after 371:

Mem. surely after 371, because the conversation between Sokrates and Perikles at 3.5 presupposes the political situation after the battle of Leuktra (Schwartz 1889, 191;

it seems that the *late* 360s are likeliest).⁶⁵ In that case it may likewise have been written in Athens when Xenophon had recently returned after many years in the Peloponnese. Insofar as symposia may be considered a mixture of *σπουδή* and *παιδιά*, the *Symposium* and *Cyropaedia* show remarkable similarities (see above). They are both late works that belong to the same period of Xenophon's life. And there is one passage in *Cyropaedia* that obviously refers to Sokrates and makes a somewhat surprising statement about the trial and death of the philosopher.

Maier 1913, 33–4), maybe in the late 360s (Maier 71), completed possibly as late as 355/4 (Delatte 1933, 73; Delebecque 1957, 477–93).

Eq. Mag. after ca. 368, i.e. after the banishment had been lifted, because it focuses on the Athenian situation and seems directed against Thebes (Breitenbach 1975, 1425–6); Marschall (85–92, 102) dates *Eq. Mag.* to 365.

Hipp. shortly thereafter, because of the reference to *Eq. Mag.* at 12.14 (Marschall 92–5, 102; see further arguments for a late date at Breitenbach 1967, 1764).

Cyr. between 362 and 359 (see the excellent chapter in Mueller-Goldingen 1995, 45–55).

Oec. completed after 362 (Pomeroy 1994, 5–8), possibly ca. 360 (Marschall 75–80, 102).

Hiero ca. 360 (Mueller-Goldingen 1995, 51 n. 18).

Ages. after Agesilaos' death in 360/59.

Hell. after 358/7 because of 6.4.37 (Breitenbach 1975, 1424).

Vect. 355/4, mainly because of 5.8–9 (Delebecque 1957, 470–6).

Even the completion of *An.* might belong to the post-Skilluntan period of Xenophon's life (Stronk 1995, 8). The dating of *Ap.* is much disputed: see, for a late date, Breitenbach 1967, 1892–3; for the opposite view, von Arnim 1923, 9–93; Hansen 1995, 32. Only *Lac.* is possibly a work from the time shortly *before* the battle of Leuktra (Breitenbach 1967, 1752), although the prefiguration of Xenophon's notion of Socratic Eros at *Lac.* 2.12–13 (cf. *Symp.* 8 *passim* and esp. 8.35) may suggest a later date even in this case.

⁶⁵ Marschall 1928, 72–5, 83–5, 102; Woldinga 1938, 189; Delebecque 1957, 346. The dating to the 360s is supported by references to Platonic dialogues: illustrating the Socratic concept of 'pandering', Xenophon gives as an example that Socrates sends students to Prodicus (4.62). This idea obviously is based on Pl. *Tht.* 151b, and the somewhat unclear distinction between *μαστροπεία* and *προαγωγή* in 4.61–4 seems to be derived from Pl. *Tht.* 149d–50a. That means that Xenophon's *Symposium* was composed after 369 BC (Woldinga 1938, 86; Caizzi 1964, 97–9; Ehlers 1966, 114–15; Kahn 1996, 400–1). Furthermore, its numerous parallels with Plato's *Phaedrus*—most of them listed in Bruns 1900, 36–7; Woldinga 1938, 101–25—leave no doubt that Xenophon had read *Phaedrus* when he composed his *Symposium*. This suggests a date of composition after c. 365 (for the dating of *Phaedrus* see de Vries 1969, 7–11; Heitsch 1993, 232–3, with the literature at 233 n. 561).

The Armenian prince Tigranes once had a teacher of virtue whom he admired (Cyr. 3.1.14). Cyrus knows of this man and asks Tigranes at a symposium⁶⁶ what became of him, a so-called 'wise man' (σοφιστής) (3.1.38). Tigranes answers that his father, Armenios, killed the teacher, accusing him of ['corrupting'] διαφθείρειν his son. Yet Tigranes himself thinks that the teacher was a *kalos kagathos* (cf. *Symp.* 9.1 about Sokrates), who said, shortly before he died, that the father was acting unjustly not out of malice but out of ignorance and that what was done out of ignorance was done unintentionally. Armenios tries to justify what he did: he was afraid that he might lose his son because of the teacher's activities (3.1.39). (Cf. *Mem.* 1.2.51, where the prosecutor accuses Sokrates of alienating young men from their relatives, and see *Ap.* 20–1, where Sokrates and Meletos discuss the same problem.) Then Cyrus makes the decisive statement (3.1.40): he says that Armenios 'made a human mistake' (ἀνθρώπινά μοι δοκεῖς ἀμαρτεῖν) and that Tigranes should 'forgive his father' (συγγίγνωσκε τῷ πατρὶ).

What does this passage mean? The right answer is given by Mueller-Goldingen (1995), 161: ['The clue lies in Cyrus' answer. He dismisses and excuses the Armenian's action as a human error. Behind that doubtless lay Xenophon's own conviction. He wishes to convey, at a time when his banishment has been cancelled, that he has forgiven the jurors who condemned Sokrates, and therewith the Athenians'].⁶⁷ Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1893), 182–3 n. 88 saw even more here. He makes the observation, of the highest importance, that there is a clear parallel between Sokrates/Lykon/Autolykos in Xenophon's *Symposium* and the sophist/Armenios/Tigranes in his *Cyropaedia*: Xenophon ['has in fact inserted a passage into *Cyropaedia* which is comprehensible only if for the eastern names one substitutes Lykon Autolykus Sokrates'].

Thus the 'Golden Age of Sokrates' in Xenophon's *Symposium* may also be seen as a statement of the forgiving Xenophon: as long as

⁶⁶ A remarkable coincidence! Compare the end of the brief symposium in *Cyropaedia*, ἀναβάντες ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρμαμάξας σὺν ταῖς γυναῖξιν ἀπήλαννον εὐφραυνόμενοι (3.1.40), with the way the guests leave Kallias' party at the end of the *Symposium*: ἀναβάντες ἐπὶ τοὺς ἵππους ἀπήλαννον πρὸς τὰς ἑαυτῶν γυναῖκας (9.7). The two passages echo each other.

⁶⁷ See also Scharr 1919, 40 n. 78; Luccioni 1953, 146 n. 2; Chroust 1957, 260 n. 479; Gaiser 1977, 87–8; Due 1989, 77–8.

Sokrates' influence was strong among the Athenians here represented by Kallias' guests—he was able to make them 'care about virtue'.⁶⁸ In Xenophon's fictional report even Lykon acknowledges that. Later, however, many of the guests cared less, and even committed crimes. How is this to be explained? A passage from his *Memorabilia* may be helpful here: beginning at 1.2.12 Xenophon discusses the question 'why did Alkibiades and Kritias commit criminal actions even though they had been followers of Sokrates?' And besides the argument that those two men had, from the outset, antiphilosophical, egoistic motives for joining the philosopher (1.2.14–16, 1.2.39; cf. 1.2.47), he offers another explanation which is both more complex and more generally valid: Sokrates was a 'teacher' who always 'showed to his companions that he was a *kalos kagathos*, talking most excellently about virtue and the other things that concern man' (1.2.17). As long as Alkibiades and Kritias shared the company of Sokrates, they could (and did) ['act with moderation'] *σωφρονεῖν* (1.2.18). Some say it is impossible to become 'unjust' and 'wanton' once one is 'just' and 'prudent' (*σώφρων*), but this, states Xenophon, is not true (1.2.19): one always needs 'training in virtue' (*ἀσκησις τῆς ἀρετῆς*) to remain virtuous. Such training is obtained if one spends time with 'useful men'; to be with 'bad men' has the opposite effect (1.2.20). If one leaves the company of 'useful men', one forgets their 'instruction'—Sokrates' *Erotikos Logos* in chapter 8 is such 'instruction'—and, as a consequence, one also forgets *sōphrosyne* itself (1.2.21).⁶⁹

This is exactly what happened to Alkibiades⁷⁰ and Kritias, and, so we might conclude, this is also what will happen to Charmides and to Lykon: as long as they are under the direct influence of Sokrates—the situation given in the *Symposium*—they are able to 'be prudent' (*σωφρονεῖν*). Later they 'forgot *sōphrosyne*'—obviously because they had separated from Sokrates and therefore no longer had a 'trainer in virtue' who with his 'instructions' made them 'care about virtue'

⁶⁸ For the Socratic 'care for virtue' cf. the passages listed by Maier 1913, 333–4 n. 3.

⁶⁹ In *Mem.* 1.2.23 Xenophon sums up: ['How is it not possible that one who was moderate before is not moderate later, and one who could act justly before is later unable to? All good things seem to me to need to be practised, and not least moderation'].

⁷⁰ N.B. Plato's Alkibiades admits this at *Pl. Symp.* 216a–c.

(ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι). They seem to have associated with 'bad men' instead, and thus to have been drawn to crime.

But in his *Symposium* Xenophon, the old soldier who is back in town (and who, by the way, personally did not know Sokrates very closely), presents not only Sokrates, but also his later accuser and all the other aristocrats invited by Kallias, in a mild light.⁷¹ To 'forget *sophrosyne*' means 'to make a human error' ἀνθρώπινα ἁμαρτάνειν, after all. And in that peaceful group of noblemen, the execution is no longer (and at the same time is not yet) important. The prosecutor himself is not a villain, but one who is full of caring love for his son (3.13) and gives the highest praise to Sokrates (9.1). Why should one not forgive him?⁷²

⁷¹ Contrast the well-known prophecy of Sokrates which is directed against Anytos' son at *Ap.* 29–30. Since, however, the dating of that work is much debated (see n. 64 above) and no satisfactory solution has been suggested so far, it is impossible to draw helpful conclusions from its divergence from *Symposium* and *Cyropaedia*. Even if one accepts Xenophontine authorship of the *Apologia Socratis* (which is today *communis opinio*), it might have been written earlier than these other two and, therefore, reflect a different attitude of its author regarding the trial of Sokrates. Maier (1913, 468–70 with n. 1 on 469) supposes that Xenophon took the motif 'Socrates attacks Anytos' from another Socratic writer (Antisthenes?).

⁷² This essay is an extended version of a public lecture delivered at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign on 9 May 1997. I learned much from the discussion that followed. The original style for oral delivery has in part been maintained. I am very much indebted to William M. Calder III, who read a draft and gave helpful suggestions. I also thank Carol Buckler for correcting my English and *AJP*'s anonymous referee for most helpful criticism.

The Straussian Exegesis of Xenophon: The Paradigmatic Case of *Memorabilia* IV 4

Louis-André Dorion

The movement to rehabilitate Xenophon's Socratic writings owes much to Leo Strauss (1899–1973). He was one of the rare thinkers of the twentieth century who took Xenophon seriously and considered him a philosopher worthy of consideration. Strauss's first study dedicated to Xenophon dates from 1939, and the last two books published in his lifetime are on *Oeconomicus* (1970) and the three other Socratic works (1972): *Memorabilia*, *Symposium* and *Apology*. Aside from these works, there is a commentary on the *Hiero* (1948), a posthumous article on the *Anabasis* (1975), and various lectures on Socrates;¹ to this one can add a puzzling book entitled *Socrates and Aristophanes* (1966). Since the renewal of interest in Xenophon's Socratic writings owes so much to the works of Strauss,² the question of what a modern interpreter of the *Memorabilia* can take from Strauss's works arises. It would certainly be a serious error to ignore his writings, as this would expose us to the risk of misinterpreting a great part of the work that has

¹ Cf. Strauss, 1989, 1995, and 1996. This paper is a revised and expanded version of 'L'exégèse straussienne de Xénophon: le cas paradigmatique de *Mémorables* IV 4', that appeared in *Philosophie antique* 2001 (1), pp. 87–118. I thank David M. Johnson for his many observations on the first version. I also derived benefit from the paper he gave at Philadelphia in November 2007: 'Leo Strauss, Xenophon, and natural law'. Although he did not manage to persuade me of the validity of the Straussian interpretation of *Mem.* IV 4, his arguments and objections let me clarify my position.

² I see two main reasons for this revived interest: Strauss's works and the impossibility of resolving the Socratic question (cf. Dorion 2000, xcix–cxviii, and forthcoming).

been published on Xenophon in the last three decades.³ In fact, although it is omnipresent, Strauss's influence is not always explicit or expressly asserted, so that any reader of these studies who is ignorant of Strauss runs a great risk of not correctly grasping the issues at stake in these interpretations. In a word, those interested in Xenophon's Socratic writings can hardly ignore the works of Strauss.

STRAUSS'S INTEREST IN XENOPHON

What explains Strauss's persistent interest in Xenophon? Is it because, as Strauss himself declares repeatedly,⁴ Xenophon was not only a disciple of Socrates and a direct witness of the conversations he reports, but also a historian, which would give his witness a certain advantage over Plato's? As I explain elsewhere,⁵ these three reasons were most often invoked in the nineteenth century by the defenders of the historical and documentary value of Xenophon's Socratic writings. But historical criticism has demonstrated—in a manner that I take to be definitive—that Xenophon is not to be taken as an impartial historian, neutral and objective, as we have pretended he was, and that we have no reason at all to take his word when he declares that he was present at the conversations that he reports.⁶ With respect to the third reason—that Xenophon was a disciple of Socrates—there seems to be no good reason to contest Xenophon's membership in the Socratic circle, but this reason alone should not justify a special interest in Xenophon's Socratic writings, because in this regard, the author of the *Memorabilia* does not distinguish himself in any way from other disciples of Socrates who composed *logoi sokratikoi*. The principal reason for Strauss's persistent interest—and it was never denied—lies elsewhere, in a typically Straussian paradox that I will explore in due course.⁷

³ Cf. among others, Wellman 1976; Bruell 1987, 1988–9, and 1994; Pangle 1994; Bonnette 1994; Stevens 1994; O'Connor 1994; Bartlett 1996; Buzzetti 2001; Nadon 2001.

⁴ Cf. Strauss 1966; 1970, 83; 1972, 59, 101–2; 1989, 126–7; 1995, 325, 330.

⁵ Cf. Dorion 2000, XVIII sq.

⁶ Cf. *Mem.* I 3, 8; I 4, 2; I 6, 14; II 4, 1; II 5, 1; II 7, 1; IV 3, 2.

⁷ Cf. the anecdote told by D. Clay: 'I do recall vividly some comments Strauss made on Xenophon in August of 1964 (and that I noted): "But Xenophon, Xenophon is a pure joy to read." (Raising his eyes to heaven.) "It is not like reading authors like Thucydides and Plato. These are incomparably great and always formidable, but with

As evidence of the immense influence of Strauss's work on Xenophon, I cite a passage from the article *Xenophon* that appeared in the most recent edition of the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*: 'A (perhaps *the*) central question, which divides modern readers into two camps, is how far style and context are really *faux-naïf* and informed by humor and irony.'⁸ Even if Tuplin does not expressly refer to the work of Strauss, in my view there is no doubt that he is here alluding to the debate begun by Strauss about Xenophon's apparent naïveté. Xenophon is traditionally considered a lucid author, flowing, but also a little naïve and simplistic, which at least partly explains the discontent with his works throughout the twentieth century.⁹ For Strauss and his followers, however, Xenophon was really a '*faux-naïf*'. We would let ourselves be taken in by the limpidity and fluidity of his style, that is, if we took his stylistic traits as the outward signs of a thought that expresses and delivers itself completely, clearly, and without ulterior motive.¹⁰ Far from being a naïve author who delivers his thought straightforwardly in each phrase he utters, Xenophon would be a master of irony who knowingly and carefully conceals his thought. While many modern commentators suggest that Xenophon's Socrates is sorely lacking in irony,¹¹ Strauss thinks that not only is Xenophon's Socrates ironical, but also that Xenophon himself—this disciple of Socrates—is a master of dissimulation. Why does Xenophon think he must conceal his thought? I leave this question unresolved for the moment.

Xenophon you are with an equal—a pure joy to read!" (1991, 264 n. 7. I owe this note to D. M. Johnson).

⁸ Tuplin 1996a, 1629.

⁹ Cf. Higgins 1972, 294: 'Perhaps his most lasting accomplishment was the development of the simple style. Yet it is this which has, by its very simplicity and utter clarity, beguiled most critics into thinking Xenophon a simple and lightweight thinker. But a closer reading and an appreciation of variations of tone will reveal not only an author of grace but of subtle irony and keen perception.' Higgins is agreeable to Strauss's interpretations (cf. 1972, 293 and 1977, xiii: 'But more important still, Strauss has understood, as few have, the absolute need when studying Xenophon to read between the lines and to appreciate the centrality of irony in a Socratic context').

¹⁰ Thus, Vlastos writes in a very critical review of Strauss's book on the *Hiero* (1948 = 1964), that Xenophon was 'nothing if not plain spoken and straightforward' (1951, 592). Xenophon himself insists on the clarity and simplicity of Socrates' teaching (cf. *Mem.* IV 2, 40; IV 7, 1).

¹¹ Cf., among others, Burnet 1914, 127 n. 2; Taylor 1932, 21; Vlastos 1971, 1; Long 1988, 152.

First I will present three examples of works that attest to the irony and the dissimulating desire of Xenophon's works in Strauss's eyes. These three works have this in common: they contain what I will call 'structural contradictions'. Unlike the contradiction that one could call 'isolated', inasmuch as it is a contradiction between two isolated assertions within the same work, or among different works of the same author, the structural contradiction involves entire sections of the same work. The contradiction between these sections indicates, according to Strauss, that the author seeks to attract the acute reader's attention to what is at the real heart of his thought: the thought of an author does not reside in what is the most apparent, i.e. the longest part of a given work, but in what attracts less attention, namely the shortest section, in the case of structural contradictions.

The first example of structural contradiction is from the *Constitution of Sparta* (= CS), which was the object, we recall, of Strauss's first study on Xenophon. This treatise presents itself, at least in appearance, as an apology for the constitution and the legislation introduced into Sparta by Lycurgus. In many passages of this treatise—which is in fact quite short—Xenophon shows his admiration for the laws established by Lycurgus. According to Strauss, this obvious interpretation, that one deduces from the letter of the work, is superficial; in fact, the CS must in reality be read as a satire of Spartan customs and a critique of Lycurgus' legislation. The indicator that we are dealing with a satire, and not an apology, is the penultimate chapter of the CS, in which Xenophon deplores the fact that the Spartans no longer respect the ancient legislation of Lycurgus.¹² For Strauss, this critique extends equally over everything that precedes, so much so that he re-reads the whole text of the CS attempting to show, behind the apparent admiration, concealed disapprobation, blame, and criticism.

¹² Strauss thus explains the fact that this criticism is in the second to last rather than the last chapter, where one would expect it: 'That is to say the treatise as a whole hides the censure, inserted toward the end, of contemporary Sparta. In order to hide that censure still more Xenophon uses a strange device: he does not put it right at the end, which would be its proper place but where it would strike the eyes, but sandwiches it in somewhere in the last section of the treatise' (1939, 502). The position of chapter XIV is in many ways mysterious and scholars have advanced various hypotheses to justify its placement or to propose its displacement: see Lipka 2002, 27–31.

It is important to emphasize that following Strauss's example, many scholars seem to have thought that the penultimate chapter XIV of the CS contradicts the rest of the work. Unlike Strauss, however, they are powerless to explain the contradiction. Instead, they have presented two types of solution for 'cutting' it from the text: 1) the chapter does not date from the same era as the preceding chapters, and it expresses an evolution in Xenophon's thought;¹³ 2) the chapter is apocryphal and must, for this reason, be cut.¹⁴ According to Strauss, it is because of inability to understand the purpose of the contradiction that scholars create multiple 'historicist' hypotheses (chronology, interpolations, etc.) to attempt to eliminate it.

The second work of Xenophon, which presents a structural analogy with the CS, is *Cyropaedia*. In most of this work, Xenophon appears to present Cyrus as a model of governance and as a man blessed with all the virtues. If we trust the assertion that we find at the opening of the work, it seems that Xenophon's intention is to present Cyrus as a model to imitate and to demonstrate the excellence of the institutions he founded. But, in an analogous fashion to the penultimate chapter of the CS, the epilogue of the *Cyropaedia* (VIII 8), where Xenophon keenly criticizes the decadence and degeneracy of Persian customs in his era, is a clue that the author's real intention is not what we thought at the outset. Strauss has not dedicated a specific study to the *Cyropaedia*, but the parallel with the CS has not escaped him.¹⁵ In fact, this parallel is so striking that various Straussians¹⁶ have not missed the chance to draw, for the *Cyropaedia*, conclusions like those Strauss had come to in the case of the CS. It is useful to note, once again, that various scholars have been so confused by the existence of this last chapter that they proposed all sorts of solutions to lessen the difficulty, real in their eyes. Bizo's judgement on the epilogue is altogether Straussian: 'That such a powerful empire, organized with such care by a king of such rare quality, was

¹³ Cf. Luccioni 1947, 173 n. 208: 'The *Republic of the Lacedaemonians* and its epilogue were written at two different times and each reflects the view of the author at that time, which changed under the influence of events'; Delebecque 1957, 195: 'Only chapter XIV (XV Ollier) contains blame that is real and sincere, as sincere as the praise in the rest, but this is because it dates from a later period.'

¹⁴ This is the radical solution adopted by some (Luccioni 1947, 173 n. 209).

¹⁵ Cf. 1964, 193–5.

¹⁶ Cf. Pangle 1994, 147–50; Bruell 1987, 99–101.

so vulnerable that it was corrupted so suddenly and so completely, is hardly believable, *and the thesis of the work, on a correct estimate, is greatly weakened.*¹⁷ But since Bizos, unlike Strauss, backs away from this conclusion he himself has made, he neutralizes the chapter by declaring it 'apocryphal' (xxxvi), which is one way of avoiding the difficulty.¹⁸ Another way is to claim that the epilogue was not written at the same time as the rest of the work, and that Xenophon's thought has, in the meantime, evolved.¹⁹

Weil offers a judgement on the epilogues of CS and of *Cyropaedia* that Strauss would probably not have disowned: 'He is also, under the guise of simplicity, an enigmatic author [Xenophon]. It is this Xenophon, famous for his transparency, who takes pleasure in overturning, in just a few lines, much of what a work has created; one thinks of chapter XIV of *Constitution of the Spartans* or the last chapter of *Cyropaedia*. Irony perhaps, but not exactly Socratic.'²⁰

The question of knowing whether the epilogues of CS and of *Cyropaedia* argue against the rest of these works is largely outside the scope of the present study. It suffices for the moment that I insist on the fact that the Straussian exegesis refutes the 'historicist' and unverifiable solutions offered by scholars to account for contradictions whose existence they recognize as much as Strauss did. But are we really dealing with contradictions? Nothing could be less sure. Given that Xenophon understands the city on the model of the individual,²¹ the causes of the city's decadence are not fundamentally different from

¹⁷ Bizos 1971, xxviii, my emphasis.

¹⁸ The state of the question raised by Delebecque is also very revealing: '... the epilogue (VIII 8) poses a particular problem. It is not in harmony with the rest. Just as the *Republic of the Lacedaemonians* ends with a chapter *that refutes all the earlier chapters, which glorify Sparta*, so the *Cyropaedia* ends with observations on the current decadence of an empire that flourished in the time of Cyrus. *People are shocked, and often deny the authenticity of these pages*' (Delebecque 1957, 405; my italics).

¹⁹ This is the position of Delebecque, 1957, 405–9, among others.

²⁰ Weil 1983, 473. On the epilogue of the *Cyropaedia*, Luccioni 1947, 246–54; Delebecque 1957, 405–9; Bizos 1971, xxvi–xxxvi.

²¹ The analogy between the individual and the city reappears over and over in the *Mem.* Consequently, we must command ourselves before commanding others (II 1); cities that waste away resemble athletes who do not train (III 5, 13); he who excels at governing his own domain is also he who will best administer public affairs (cf. I 1, 7; I 2, 48; I 2, 64; III 4, 6; III 4, 12; III 6, 14; IV 1, 2; IV 2, 11), etc.

those that cause the corruption of the individual. This is why it is to me illuminating to read the epilogues of *CS* and *Cyropaedia* in reference to a passage from *Memorabilia* (I 2, 19–23) in which Xenophon explains how and under what conditions an individual may lose the virtue he already possesses. In fact, the same goes for the city as for the individual: just as a disciple exerts himself towards virtue in the presence of a virtuous master who sets a good example for him, similarly an entire people becomes virtuous by respecting the good institutions that the sovereign has given, and whose implementation he oversees. And just as the disciple may turn to vice as soon as he no longer sees the example his master furnishes, so too institutions may wither and decay as soon as the good sovereign is not there to make the people respect them. For Xenophon, nothing is definitely acquired, neither individual virtues, nor collective respect for healthy institutions. But the cause of the decline is fundamentally the same, whether the subject is the individual or the city.²²

The third work that contains this kind of structural contradiction is *Oeconomicus*. This treatise is clearly divided into two parts: in the first part (I–VI), Socrates discusses with Critobulus the subject of poverty, of wealth and of the ways of making an estate prosper. Critobulus has an urgent desire for advice because his own affairs are going downhill. Since Socrates claims no competence in matters of domestic or agricultural administration, he proposes to recount the conversation he had with Ischomachus, a rich land-owner and an accomplished gentleman who knew how to make his estate prosper. This conversation with Ischomachus occupies the second part (VII–XXI), which is also the longest section of the dialogue. In appearance, it seems that Socrates is listening to the lessons and teachings that Ischomachus is giving him on the running of a household, on the role of the woman, agriculture, hunting, etc. However, the interpreters are so perplexed by Socrates' self-effacement and passivity that some have gone so far as to affirm that the *Oeconomicus* is not even a

²² Cf. Dorion 2002, 162–9. The political responsibility of the leader is immense, because it is on his virtue that the city's virtue depends. To be convinced of this, it suffices to re-read the introduction to the *Revenues*: 'For my part I have always held that the constitution of a state reflects the character of the leading politicians' (trans. Marchant). See also *Cyropaedia* VIII 8, 5: 'For, whatever the character of the rulers is, such also that of the people under them for the most part becomes' (trans. Miller).

Socratic dialogue.²³ For Strauss, the cause of such perplexity is that the reader does not perceive Xenophon's irony, an irony that can be detected, once again, from the internal structural contradiction of the *Oeconomicus*. This structural contradiction is not the same sort as that of the previous two, but more subtle. Instead of a final chapter that takes the opposite position to everything that precedes it, it is the first part—once again the shortest section—that indicates that one should not take the content of the second part to the letter. Given the chronological plan of the conversations reported in the *Oeconomicus*, the first part comes after the second because Socrates, when he is talking with Critobulus, has already met up with Ischomachus and discussed household maintenance with him. Moreover, Socrates, in his discussion with Critobulus in the first part, pleads in favour of a frugal lifestyle, limitation of needs, self-sufficiency, etc. This is to say that Socrates, after his encounter with Ischomachus, in the course of which he seemed completely beaming in admiration of the prosperity of the *gentleman farmer*, did not renounce any part of his identity and had no intention to change his way of life.²⁴ If Socrates really *was* convinced by Ischomachus' words, as he appears to be in the second part, he would not have offered a eulogy to Critobulus on the frugal life, the limitation of needs or self-sufficiency. In spite of its appearance, the *Oeconomicus* is therefore a vibrant plea in favour of the Socratic life. Strauss even holds that the *Oeconomicus* is the Socratic discourse *par excellence*,²⁵ which can only make it an immense paradox if we note that it is Ischomachus who is the leader of the game, who poses questions, who exerts the maieutic method on Socrates, not to mention the very subject of the *Oeconomicus* which seems rather to be anti-Socratic.²⁶ To judge by recent

²³ Cf. Caster 1937, 49; Delebecque 1951, 37. Cooper (1998, 8, 10, 19) does not mention *Oec.* among Xenophon's Socratic works. Brickhouse and Smith (2000) 39 do not see either that there is anything Socratic in *Oec.* and they declare that even the Socrates of Aristophanes in *Clouds* resembles the historical Socrates more than the Socrates of *Oec.*

²⁴ Cf. Strauss 1975, 124.

²⁵ Cf. 1964, 89: 'In Xenophon's Socratic dialogue *par excellence*, the *Oeconomicus*'; 1970, 86; 1989, 148: 'Xenophon has presented the tension between the two ways of life, the political and the transpolitical, most clearly in the *Oeconomicus*, which is his Socratic speech *par excellence*.'

²⁶ The apparent contradiction between the two parts of the *Oeconomicus* has not been lost on some scholars who have tried once again to resolve it, some by declaring

studies,²⁷ which insist on the ironic dimension of Socrates' praise of Ischomachus, and draw from it an irreconcilable contradiction between the Socratic way of life and that of Ischomachus, Strauss's interpretation of *Oeconomicus* remains very influential. But it is possible to show that there is no doctrinal disharmony between Ischomachus and Socrates and that most of the positions defended by the former are in perfect harmony with those that the latter defends in his own right in Xenophon's other Socratic writings. Socrates and Ischomachus represent economic models that are certainly different from each other, but no less for that, in Xenophon's eyes, compatible and valid.²⁸

Let us grant Strauss, for the time being at least, that Xenophon is an ironical author who excels in the art of dissimulation. Why is he constrained to conceal his thought and reveal it only to those able to read between the lines? The clearest response to this question may be found in the famous article of 1941 entitled 'Persecution and the Art of Writing', in which Strauss maintains that there is an original and irreconcilable conflict between philosophy and the city, in the sense that society depends on certain beliefs, but philosophy is by definition destructive of beliefs. The figure emblematic of this conflict between the city and philosophy is obviously Socrates, who was condemned to death because of the subversive character of his teaching.

Because of this conflict, philosophy must encrypt its message in order not to expose itself to persecution, but this is not the only reason that pushes him towards dissimulation. Philosophy as Socrates understands it is not within reach of most people: so that dissimulation is a way, for the philosopher, to select his readership. Only

that the first five chapters are apocryphal, some by maintaining that the two parts of the work belonged to different epochs and have been clumsily put together (cf. Delebecque 1957, 235–6, 363 ff.). As we see, the scholars most often invoke a hypothetical chronology, or even no-less hypothetical interpolations, to 'resolve' the apparent structural contradictions in some of Xenophon's words. Strauss's great merit with respect to these philological 'solutions' is his attempt to comprehend the text as it has come to us, as a coherent whole in spite of the contradictions detected.

²⁷ Cf., among others, Stevens (1994), Too (2001), Danzig (2003).

²⁸ Natali (2001) and Dorion (2008) emphasize the complementarity rather than the opposition between Ischomachus and Socrates.

those meant to understand it will be able to do so.²⁹ What is more, the responsible philosopher must be careful not to be understood by everyone; in fact, since philosophy is destructive of the beliefs on which society is built, it would be irresponsible on the part of the philosopher to extend to the greatest number without restriction or distinction, ideas that could entirely ruin the city. The responsible philosopher is thus the one who expresses himself with restraint and who keeps a kind of proper reserve fit to satisfy three objectives: 1) to protect himself from eventual persecution; 2) to select the 'happy few' who are worthy of understanding him; and 3) to avoid spreading ideas that could plunge the city into turmoil.

According to Strauss, Xenophon incarnates the type of philosopher who writes with restraint and reserve.³⁰ The writing of Xenophon, outwardly lucid and clear and with no ulterior motive, is in fact esoteric. In order to get a clear grasp of the nature of the esotericism that Strauss is thinking of, it seems to me to be illuminating to compare it to another esotericism, that which the Tübingen school attributes to Plato. Since Plato wished to reserve a part of his teaching to a chosen public with the necessary aptitudes and dispositions, he studded his dialogues with passages that were more or less 'coded', acting as cross-references to his oral teachings. So the esoteric teaching is signalled by the text, but is not immanent in the text, since it is the object of oral instruction. For Strauss, it is quite another matter: the esoteric teaching is not just signalled by the text, but it is also immanent in the text, so that it is within reach of the attentive reader.³¹

²⁹ Strauss's elitism corresponds exactly to that expressed by Nietzsche in these terms: 'One does not only wish to be understood when one writes; one wishes just as surely *not* to be understood. It is not by any means necessarily an objection to a book when anyone finds it impossible to understand: perhaps that was part of the author's intention; he did not want to be understood by just "anybody". All the nobler spirits and tastes select their audience when they wish to communicate; and choosing that, one at the same time erects barriers against "the others". All the more subtle laws of any style have their origin at this point: they at the same time keep away, create a distance, forbid "entrance"; understanding, as said above—while they open the ears of those whose ears are related to ours' (*The Gay Science*, 381; trans. W. Kaufmann).

³⁰ Cf. 1964, 197–8; Marshall 1985, 830 and the numerous references pointed out in note 87.

³¹ Szlezák (1998, 84–6) himself explains how Tübingen's esotericism is distinguished from Straussian esotericism, which he calls 'esotericism immanent in the text'. Aside from the fundamental difference that I have briefly noted (immanent

In his 1941 article, Strauss proposes a kind of method that would in his opinion permit the avoidance of arbitrariness to which the reader is inevitably exposed, who reads between the lines in search of what the author has deliberately concealed, thanks to an art of hidden writing lost to our time. This method, set out on its own in the 1941 article,³² had been explored earlier, notably in the 1939 article on the CS. This method will be slowly abandoned in Strauss's subsequent studies of Xenophon.

Before going further and examining an example of interpretation inspired by this method of reading between the lines, it is important to emphasize that the thesis of 1941, about the original conflict between the city and philosophy and of the resulting necessity that comes of appealing to esoteric literature, underlies all works by Strauss on Xenophon, so that one can hardly read his works from 1970–2, in which this thesis is implicit but is never developed or expressed in its own right, if one is not already well versed in the main tenets of Strauss's thought. This is why it seems to me that the obligatory point of departure for those who wish to read Strauss's works on Xenophon is his 1939 article on the CS. This study, in which the theses developed in the 1941 article are already present and are applied to a particular case, is the best way to access Strauss's writings on Xenophon. That article has the huge merit of clearly stating what in later works will be only hints for those who already know.

SOCRATES, JUSTICE, AND LEGALITY: THE EXAMPLE OF *MEMORABILIA* IV 4

In order to illustrate the 'method' of Straussian exegesis, and the issues it raises, I have chosen a text that is of strategic importance for Strauss. It is the exchange between Socrates and Hippias that

esotericism vs. esotericism external to the text), Szlezák especially emphasizes that the position of the Tübingen school does not have political implications, contrary to the exegesis of Strauss. Szlezák deplors the confusion of these two types of esotericism, which are very different in his eyes.

³² This method consists of seven rules (cf. 1941, pp. 496–8), which it is pointless to present here.

Xenophon reports in *Memorabilia* IV 4. In the course of this exchange, Socrates defines justice in legal terms; that is to say that he identifies what is just with 'what is lawful' or conforms to laws (*νόμιμον*). This definition can certainly leave us wanting, and even appear quite deceptive, but it is still the definition proposed by Socrates. Keeping to the letter of the text, one is forced to say that the position Xenophon gives Socrates is a form of 'legal positivism'.³³ That is, Socrates thinks that justice consists of obedience to the laws established and promulgated by the city. Since that position is then confirmed by Socrates (IV 6, 5–6) and also matches the position expressed by Xenophon outside his Socratic works,³⁴ we have on the surface no reason to doubt that this position captures Socrates' point of view and Xenophon's on the nature of justice.

Strauss does not believe that Socrates' position is to identify justice with obedience to the laws.³⁵ The reason for this disagreement seems to me clear enough, though Strauss does not express it clearly anywhere. If there is an original and irreconcilable difference between philosophy and the city, it would be astonishing for a philosopher to sincerely claim, without ulterior motive, that justice consists in the observance of laws, since one could not see, in that case, where the opposition resides between philosophy and the city. Strauss certainly cannot admit that Socrates, condemned to death by the city, really held that justice is nothing other than the obeying of the law. In order to dispel any misunderstanding, a clarification is in order: the question that preoccupies me, as a translator and interpreter of the *Memorabilia*, is to know not whether the historical Socrates conceived of the relationship between justice and legality otherwise, but

³³ I use here the expression of D. Morrison (1995) to characterize the position defended by Socrates in *Mem.* IV 4.

³⁴ Cf. *Cyr.* I 3, 17; I 6, 27. The importance that Xenophon places repeatedly on respect for the laws (cf. *Mem.* I 1, 18; IV 3, 16; IV 4, 2–4; *Rep. Lac.* I 2, IV 6, VIII 1–5, *Ag.* VII 2, *Cyneg.* XII 14) leads me to believe that Xenophon subscribed entirely and sincerely to the definition of justice in terms of legality, so that we have no good reason to doubt that Socrates is a legal positivist (see also Gera 1993, 74–5, Morrison 1995, Gray 2004a).

³⁵ Most recent commentators who challenge the idea that Socrates is a legal positivist make claim more or less overtly to the interpretation of Strauss (cf. among other Vander Waerdt 1993, 43 sq., Pangle 1994, 132–5, Nadon 2001, 48–9, Buzetti 2001, Johnson 2003).

whether Xenophon attempted to suggest anything other than what he wrote, in black and white, in IV 4. Strauss is of the opinion that Xenophon uses the definition of IV 4 as a diversion and smoke screen, that is to say that he conceives it as a concession made to the city and designed to clear Socrates of the accusations made against him, even while introducing subtle contradictions that would not escape the attentive reader.

The definition of IV 4 assumes, for Strauss, strategic importance, as witness the fact that he commented on it (if I am not mistaken) on at least three occasions:³⁶ in 1939 in his article on the CS,³⁷ in 1948 in his work on the *Hiero*,³⁸ and in 1972 in his commentary on *Memorabilia*.³⁹ The conclusion of Strauss's analyses is always the same—Socrates does not identify the just with the legal—but the arguments that permit him to arrive at this conclusion differ considerably from one analysis to another. Another indicator of the strategic importance of this definition is the fact that the interpreters who call on Strauss today consider as evidence the 'ironical' dimension of the identification of the just and the legal.⁴⁰ I propose therefore to examine in detail the different interpretations that Strauss gives of IV 4, beginning with that of 1939, which is in many ways the richest in instruction on the Straussian 'method'.

The *Constitution of Sparta* (1939)

In his 1939 article, Strauss clearly expresses his position on the apparent equivalence between justice and obedience to the laws: 'We conclude, then, that neither Xenophon nor Socrates accepted seriously the view that justice is identical with obedience to the laws of the city, regardless of the justice of the laws.'⁴¹ The text of IV 4 is

³⁶ In fact, Strauss often alludes to the text of IV 4, but the interpretations he gives, or rather sketches, only repeat or summarize more detailed comments that he has developed elsewhere (see the following notes).

³⁷ 1939, 518–20.

³⁸ 1964, 75–6, 77–8, 195.

³⁹ 1972, 105–14.

⁴⁰ Cf. Pangle 1994, 132–5. Gray (2004a) has recently raised objections to the 'ironical reading' of *Mem.* IV 4 proposed by Johnson (2003).

⁴¹ 1939, 520.

therefore not to be taken literally. On what does Strauss base such a conclusion? The identification of justice with laws is denied by four distinct contradictions.

According to Strauss, the contradictions present in the work of a great philosopher are always deliberate—so deliberate that they have to be considered as indications of concealment. The contradictions seek to be interpreted by the attentive reader, and this is precisely the interpretation that Strauss attempts to formulate. Instead of blindly accepting this interpretation, I will put it to a test, which I openly recognize is tedious. I also think that it is indispensable. I deplore that the majority of interpretations of Strauss sign him a blank cheque; that is to say they neglect the details of his interpretation in order to accept the principal conclusions that he draws, when he draws them, from his interpretations of the great works of the tradition. On one side, specialists of political philosophy only interest themselves with the broad lines of Straussian interpretation of Xenophon without asking themselves what this interpretation is worth and whether it stands the test of the texts themselves; on the other side, Straussian interpretations content themselves with re-hashing the dogma and never call into question the assumptions or conclusions of Straussian exegesis. Now it seems to me that the historian of philosophy cannot be content with either of these attitudes. He must test the value or the pertinence of the Straussian exegesis by confronting it relentlessly with the works themselves. Because in the end, if Strauss offers a method that can protect reading between the lines from the risk of arbitrariness, it is necessary to examine, in complete detachment, what comes from the application of this method. This is why it seems to me to be necessary to examine in detail each of the four presumed contradictions that, according to Strauss, would indicate between the lines that Socrates' true position is not the one that Xenophon appears to attribute to him in IV 4.

First contradiction: the superiority of actions over words

According to Strauss, Socrates believed that discourse was superior to actions. The premise of the discussion with Hippias is that acts are superior to discourse (IV 4, 10); it follows that the conclusion of this

discussion is necessarily false because it comes from a premise to which Socrates does not adhere. Is it really true that Socrates asserts the superiority of discourse over actions? Strauss presents no arguments for this in the actual body of his text; by way of justification of this stunning affirmation, we find only a reference to a note at the bottom of the page:

The positive part of the *Memorabilia* (I, 3 to the end) consists of 37 chapters of which only the first or, perhaps, the first three are devoted to 'deed', whereas almost all the rest is devoted to "speech". Cf. also III, 3, 11 with Plato, *Gorgias*, 450c–d. For the meaning of the 'deed–speech' antithesis, which is an ironical expression of the antithesis between practical or political life and theoretical life, compare Plato, *Apology*, 32a4–5 with *Crito*, 52d5. (1939, p. 519 n. 2)

This note does not offer an explicit argument, because it is limited to sending the reader to other passages that Strauss leaves the reader to check. Strauss's argument therefore presents itself as a Matryoshka doll: in order to establish an important assertion that is in the body of the text, Strauss sends the reader to a note at the bottom of the page, which does not offer an argument since it only sends the reader to other texts. In brief, either one takes Strauss at his word, or develops the interpretation on one's own.

- 1) With respect to the number of chapters that deal with the actions or discourses of Socrates, one should not allow oneself to be impressed by Strauss's observations.⁴² His conclusion seems to me incorrect and a non-starter for two reasons: *firstly*, the fact

⁴² Strauss's calculation of the number of chapters dedicated to the actions or discourses of Socrates is based upon a mistaken interpretation of I 3, 1. Following several commentators (Marchant 1923, xii; Erbse 1961, 270; Slings 1999, 177), Strauss gives the value of a plan to I 3, 1, and more particularly to the words ['showing what he was like in action, as well as using conversation τὰ μὲν ἔργῳ δεικνύων ἑαυτὸν οἶος ἦν, τὰ δὲ καὶ διαλεγόμενος']. The reference to 'action' would describe ch. 3, and the reference to 'conversation' introduces I 4, and all the conversations that follow it. The attribution of such a role to this expression seems to me mistaken for two reasons: 1) chapter 3 contains a dialogue (9–13); 2) after I 3, there are various passages (cf. I 5, 6; II 6, 14; IV 3, 18; IV 4, 1–4; IV 4, 10; IV 4, 25; IV 5, 1; IV 5, 11) in which Xenophon insists that Socrates was useful in action (by his example), and in words (his everyday discourses). The formula of I 3, 1 is therefore not to be understood as a plan, but more simply as a reminder that Socrates, like all good teachers, made his disciples better through his example and his words (cf. I 2, 17–18; I 2, 59).

that a greater number of chapters are given over to discourses rather than acts means nothing from a *Straussian point of view*: in fact, Strauss is not even loyal to his own rules of reading, more specifically rule seven,⁴³ which states that the point of view of the author does not necessarily correspond to the point of view expressed most often. *Secondly*, Strauss passes in silence, voluntarily or not, over the fact that Xenophon expressly puts Socrates' acts and speeches on the same footing. Xenophon asserts at several points that Socrates was useful to his people and city both in his actions and his discourses.⁴⁴ A Straussian could always object that this interpretation matches Xenophon's explicit statements, but that the essence is suggested between the lines: since the greater number of chapters are dedicated to speech, Xenophon would imply that acts and discourses are not on the same footing and speeches have, in effect, more importance. But why not interpret this difference in reverse? If a smaller number of chapters is about actions, why not see there, in virtue of rule seven,⁴⁵ the indication of Xenophon's greater interest in actions? Strauss's position appears to me to be arbitrary.

- 2) Strauss also offers his reader a comparison of III 3, 11 with *Gorgias* 450c–d. In III 3, 11, Socrates insists on the importance of speaking in the art of leadership. To secure obedience, a good leader must know how to address his soldiers. If we only consider III 3, 11, we have the impression that a good leader distinguishes himself in particular by his speeches. We would, however, be mistaken not to compare this passage with I 2, 17–18, where it is clear that a good leader has to act in conformity with his words.

As for *Gorgias* (450c–d), this is a passage where Gorgias asks to be shown why rhetoric distinguishes itself from the other *tekhnai* that accomplish their own work uniquely by way of words. I do not see how this comparison is significant, nor how it would establish, in Socrates' eyes, the superiority of discourse over actions. The superiority of speech, in III 3, 111, is not an absolute superiority, but a relative one: in the case of leadership, speech is indispensable for having people obey. But what is to be said of a leader whose

⁴³ 1941, 497.

⁴⁴ Cf. I 2, 17–18; I 3, 1: I 5, 6; II 6, 14; IV 3, 8; IV 4, 1; IV 4, 10; IV 4, 25; IV 5, 1; IV 5, 11.

⁴⁵ 1941, 497.

words are not confirmed by acts? He who occupies a post of leadership must at any price set an example and demonstrate that he is competent in his office, because it is in this way that he will most easily secure the willing obedience of his followers. This is a *leitmotiv* that pervades Xenophon's work.⁴⁶ In the case of *Gorgias*, it is Gorgias, and not Socrates, who asserts the demiurgic dimension of rhetoric and speech. Whatever the case, this comparison seems to me neither pertinent (from the point of view of the perspective of either passage), nor conclusive (for the assumed superiority of discourses over actions in Socrates' thought).

- 3) As for the opposition between discourses and actions, which would be an 'ironical expression' of the opposition between political and theoretical life, Strauss proposes to compare *Apology of Socrates* (32a4–5) with *Crito* (52d). In order to be able to judge these passages, here are the two texts:

A man who really fights for justice must lead a private, not a public, life if he is to survive for even a short time. I shall give you great proofs of this, not words but what you esteem, deeds (*οὐ λόγους ἀλλ' ὃ ὑμεῖς τιμᾶτε, ἔργα*). (*Apol.* 32a1–5; trans. Grube)

First then, answer us on this very point, whether we speak the truth when we say [*scil.* the Laws] that you agreed, not only in words but by your deeds (*ἔργῳ, ἀλλ' οὐ λόγῳ*), to live in accordance with us.—What are we to say to that, Crito? Must we not agree?—We must, Socrates. (*Crito* 52d3–7; trans. Grube)

In the *Apology of Socrates*, Socrates seems to leave the reader to understand that actions have more importance for the judges (of the city) than for himself (that is to say, philosophy). The opposition between actions and discourses would thereby correspond to the opposition between theoretical life (or the philosophical life) and practical life (or political life). The philosopher is therefore by definition a type of schizophrenic who could never reconcile, in himself, discourses and actions, in so far as the antinomy between philosophy and the city is reflected at the level of discourses (philosophy) and actions (practical life). In other words, everything happens as if the agreement between actions and discourses were *a priori* impossible

⁴⁶ Cf. among others, *Mem.* III 9, 11; *Cyrop.* I 2, 8; I, 6, 20–2; III 1, 20; IV 2, 35; *Anab.* II 3, 11–12; *Hell.* VII 5, 19–20; *Ages.* VII 2.

for a philosopher, by reason of the original conflict between the city and philosophy. The philosopher seems therefore condemned to a form of hypocrisy: his actions have to conform to the rules and demands of the city, whereas his discourses never cease putting the city's beliefs and constitutive norms into question. It is from this premise, equally, that the philosopher would accord superiority to discourses over acts.

Strauss is careful not to report all the passages in which Xenophon insists on the utility of Socrates' actions and words, or where Plato similarly expresses, in the voice of Socrates, the idea of a reconciliation and conformity between actions and words, between *logos* and *ergon*.⁴⁷ For those of us who have just re-discovered, thanks to the work of Hadot,⁴⁸ what the ancients understood by the word philosopher, namely a man who endeavours to live in conformity with a doctrine, it is very difficult, perhaps even impossible to follow Strauss when he claims that the philosopher's actions are but a type of concession or compromise that he is obliged to make because of the needs and constraints of public life. There is an insurmountable gulf between the Straussian representation of the ancient philosopher and the one Hadot has allowed us to rediscover.

Finally, let us examine more closely the passage from *Memorabilia* where Socrates recognizes some precedence of *ergon* over *logos*:

Indeed, Hippias! Haven't you noticed that I never cease declaring my notions of what is just?—And how can you call that an account?—I declare them by my deeds, anyhow, if not by my words. Don't you think that deeds are better evidence than words?—Yes, much better, of course; for many say what is just and do what is unjust; but no one who does what is just can be unjust. (IV 4, 10; trans. Marchant)

⁴⁷ Cf. *Laches* 188c sq.; *Crito* 52c–d; *Gorgias* 461c; *Republic* VI 498c–499a; *Timaeus* 19b–20a.

⁴⁸ Hadot has commented on *Mem.* IV 4, 10 at least three times (1995, 155; 1993, 36; 2002, 31). He sees confirmation there that philosophy is a way of life *before* being a method of discussion. The philosophical life is far from being a compromise or a hypocritical concession to the city; actions are the translation in life of philosophical convictions. A philosophical discourse that is not confirmed by actions is a hollow one. We cannot imagine an interpretation of IV, 4, 10 that is more opposed to that defended by Strauss.

This position Socrates takes is probably what inspires Xenophon to the introductory assertion of IV: 'As for his views about what is right (*περὶ τοῦ δικαίου*), so far from concealing them, he demonstrated them by his actions (*καὶ ἔργῳ ἀπεδείκνυτο*).'⁴⁹ Socrates did not hide his conception of justice, but above all through his actions he revealed it. If his actions are in a sense more 'evidential' than his words, it is simply because, as Hippias clearly explains it, a man's virtue is measured and shown more by his actions than his discourse. If the assertion of the supremacy of action over speech is just an 'ironical' assertion on Socrates' part, which need not be taken literally, must that be said of all the passages, outside his Socratic writings, where Xenophon takes the same position? Thus does Cyrus declare to his officers: 'And remember this, that if in their eyes you prove yourselves courageous, you will teach not only your comrades but many others also, to be courageous, not by precept merely but by example (*οὐ λόγῳ ἀλλ' ἔργῳ*).'⁵⁰ The captain similarly praises a man whose actions reveal his valour: 'and besides, by showing them not by precept but by example (*οὐ λόγῳ ἀλλ' ἔργῳ*), what sort of men they ought to be, he has made his whole squad of ten just like himself'.⁵¹ Xenophon praises Agesilaus in the same terms: 'Courage, as he displayed it, was joined with prudence rather than boldness, and wisdom he cultivated more by action than in words (*ἔργῳ μᾶλλον ἢ λόγῳ*).'⁵² Finally at the end of a chapter dedicated to self-control (*enkrateia*), where Socrates declares that self-control is the foundation stone of virtue (I 5, 4), Xenophon also recalls that Socrates was not content to speak on self-control, since he illustrated it even more in the example he set than through his speeches: 'Such were his words (*λέγων*); but his own self-control was shown yet more clearly by his deeds than by his words (*τοῖς ἔργοις ἢ τοῖς λόγοις*).'⁵³ In view of these passages where Xenophon reiterates the same position with a remarkable consistency, the idea that Socrates' position in *Mem.* IV 4, 10 is ironic seems to me to be out of the question. More basically, the importance that Xenophon's

⁴⁹ *Mem.* IV 4, 1 (trans. Tredennick/Waterfield).

⁵⁰ *Cyr.* III 3, 39 (trans. Miller).

⁵¹ *Cyr.* II 2, 30 (trans. Miller).

⁵² *Ag.* XI 9 (trans. Marchant).

⁵³ *Mem.* I 5, 6 (trans. Marchant). See also IV 1, 1.

Socrates attached to action comes without doubt from his 'ascetic' conception of virtue, that is his view that virtue is acquired most of all through exercise and training,⁵⁴ whence comes equally the need to imitate a model which is the concrete incarnation of virtue.⁵⁵

The parallel between *Mem.* IV 4, 10 and the *Apology of Socrates* (32a), cited above, is quite stunning. In both cases, actions are presented as more 'convincing'⁵⁶ than discourses. Should this shock us and does that put back into question the idea of conformity between actions and discourses? I do not think so. Confronted with a situation where someone tells us to prove that we have been just, would we not have recourse to our actions rather than to our words? This is the case in another passage from the *Apology of Socrates*, to which Strauss make no reference: Socrates himself invokes his own actions in preference to his words, to demonstrate that he has not committed any injustice:

Then I showed again, not in words but in action (οὐ λόγῳ, ἀλλ' ἔργῳ) that, if it were not rather vulgar to say so, death is something I couldn't care less about, but that my whole concern is not to do (ἐργάζεσθαι) anything unjust or impious. That government, powerful as it was, did not frighten me into any wrongdoing (ἄδικόν τι ἐργάσασθαι). (32c8–d5; trans. Grube)

Second contradiction: Hippias and Alcibiades

'Moreover, the argument which the interlocutor advances against Socrates' assertion that justice is identical with obedience to the laws misses the point, as is shown by a parallel argumentation used by a more intelligent or a franker man which occurs in the same work, and therefore Socrates' refutation of the interlocutor's denial is a mere *ad hominem* argument.'⁵⁷ Strauss's argument amounts to saying that IV 4 is in contradiction to a parallel passage in the *Memorabilia*, in which the interlocutor succeeds, unlike Hippias, in effectively opposing the identification of the just and the lawful. In other words, if Socrates succeeds in identifying the just with the

⁵⁴ Cf. *Mem.* I 2, 19–20 and my notes *ad loc.*

⁵⁵ Cf. *Mem.* I 2, 3 and my note *ad loc.*

⁵⁶ Cf. *Apology* 32a (μεγάλα τεκμήρια) and *Mem.* IV 4, 10 (ἀξιοτεκμαρτότερον).

⁵⁷ 1939, 519–20.

lawful in IV 4 it is only because Hippias is not an interlocutor of his stature and is incapable of formulating sound objections.⁵⁸ The parallel passage to which Strauss refers⁵⁹ is I 2, 40–6, which contains the conversation between Alcibiades and Pericles on the subject of the nature of law.

To recapitulate: Strauss thinks that the assertion of identity between justice and obedience to the laws does not represent Socrates' actual opinion. But there is no need to be shocked that Xenophon credits Socrates with such a concept, since it would be irresponsible, on Xenophon's part, to make Socrates display a concept of justice in virtue of which the just man could not coincide perfectly, in all ways, with one who respects the laws. The indication that the legalistic conception of justice does not correspond to Socrates' position is the contradiction between IV 4 and another passage of the *Memorabilia* that treats the same subject. Since Xenophon, who is a responsible philosopher, cannot openly put in Socrates' mouth the thesis that justice and legality are not identical, he expresses it through Alcibiades, whom we must therefore think of as a representative of Socrates' point of view.

Strauss's interpretation as expressed in 1939, and subsequently reaffirmed,⁶⁰ relies entirely on the postulate of an identity between Socrates (IV 4) and Alcibiades (I 2, 40–6). If one admits it, it is possible to think, with Strauss, that the equation of the just and the lawful is possible only by reason of Hippias' inadequacy. The definition of law given by Hippias corresponds very neatly to that which

⁵⁸ Following Strauss, Buzzetti (2001, p. 16) develops the same argument: 'He [*scil.* Hippias] was no better at conversing than Socrates' onetime student Euthydemus. Thus . . . we must suspect that what Socrates said to Hippias, including the claim that "justice is the law", was not primarily meant to make "the truth" "visible".' In short, we have here another example of Xenophon choosing an addressee for his Socrates whose limitations help cast the philosopher in a more traditional light.

⁵⁹ Cf. 1939, 520 n. 1.

⁶⁰ Cf. 1964, 75; 1972, 15: 'Not only is the refutation of the answer Socratic; the very question is Socratic. The young Alcibiades was a Socratic'; 1989, 137: 'Xenophon's Socrates never raises the grave and dangerous question, What is a law? This question is raised only by Xenophon's young and rash Alcibiades. Yet the young and rash Alcibiades who raises this question in the style characteristic of Socrates had not yet left Socrates, but was still a companion of Socrates at the time he raised this Socratic question.' Cf. again 1987, 67; 1995, 334. See also, in the same sense, Buzzetti 2001, 22–3.

Pericles presents to Alcibiades in I 2, 42;⁶¹ but while Socrates is fully satisfied with that definition, Alcibiades immediately perceives its inadequacy: if the law is whatever the established authority decrees what to do and not to do, it follows that the wishes of a tyrant, which he imposes on the people by force, are equally a law. Since he is not prepared to accept such a consequence, Pericles modifies his definition (44–5), but without managing to satisfy Alcibiades' objections. The criticism to which Alcibiades subjects Pericles' definition draws on an idealistic conception of law, since it is not enough that a directive be issued by the established authority to qualify as law: there is an equal need to persuade the body of citizens of the validity of that directive. On the one hand, Socrates declares that justice is nothing other than observing the laws (*νόμιμον*); on the other hand, Alcibiades sees that men who are respectful of the laws are praised (cf. I 2, 41: *νόμιμοι ἄνδρες*); but this did not satisfy him, in that being *nominos* raises question of law (*nomos*): in what exactly does it consist? How and by whom is it decreed and imposed? If justice is just obedience to laws, whatever the kind of regime he lives in, the man who honours the most iniquitous laws would still be considered just. In fact, the questioning of Alcibiades begins where Socrates' reasoning ends: while Socrates contents himself with defining justice as honouring the laws (*νόμιμον*), Alcibiades shows that the reputation for being *nominos* is only merited if the law is legitimate.

The whole question is therefore whether Alcibiades can be considered Socrates' mouthpiece. To answer this question, the exchange between Alcibiades and Pericles (I 2, 40–6) must be put back into the larger context of the argumentation that Xenophon deploys in an effort to clear Socrates of the suspicion of having been the evil genius behind Critias and Alcibiades (I 2, 12–48). What is the relationship between this conversation and Xenophon's answer to the accusation? Does Alcibiades' point of view reflect the opinion of Xenophon and Socrates? If it does, why insert this conversation in the defence of Socrates? Is it not a serious mistake, even a fatal one? In fact, this conversation shows that Alcibiades was disrespectful toward great political men like Pericles and contested the authority of the laws. Alcibiades' attitude, in this passage, is plainly subversive. It is one or

⁶¹ As Morrison rightly saw (1995, 334 n. 10) and Johnson (2003, 278).

the other: either Xenophon does not approve of this kind of insolence and wishes to show that Alcibiades' disrespectful attitude owes nothing to the teaching of Socrates; or Xenophon approves of Alcibiades' questioning, but this approbation is disastrous for Socrates, since the latter appears therefore as an inspirer of the question that Alcibiades puts to Pericles. Given that his questions challenge the basis of law well and truly, Socrates appears as a thinker who threatens the authority of the laws of the city. For reasons that I have discussed at length elsewhere,⁶² I refuse to believe that Alcibiades represents the view of Xenophon's Socrates. And if Alcibiades does not express Socrates' view, there is no contradiction between I 2, 40–6 and IV 4.

The opposing attitudes that Alcibiades and Socrates adopt on the definition of law have been read differently by interpreters; some commentators do not hesitate to maintain,⁶³ following Strauss, that Alcibiades expresses the real Socratic position and that Xenophon gives Socrates an inoffensive position that is more in line with his apologetic aims. All interpretations of this kind, which come back to saying that Socrates subscribes only on the surface to legal positivism and that his true position is that of his 'disciple' Alcibiades, seem to me untenable in that they lose sight of the fact that Xenophon would considerably damage his defence of Socrates if he let us believe, however slightly, that Alcibiades' refutation of Pericles was endorsed by Socrates. These two passages must rather be read like other antithetical pairs of corresponding passages in the *Memorabilia*.⁶⁴ That reading hypothesis seems to be the more possible since another passage in Book I, where Socrates criticizes the libidinous behaviour of Critias toward Euthydemus (I 2, 29–30), also finds its

⁶² Cf. Dorion 2000, CLX–CLXIX. It seems to me that Irwin (1974, 411) is correct to emphasize that the legalist position defended by Socrates, from one end of the *Memorabilia* to the other, would have been contested by Alcibiades if Xenophon had put them in the presence of one another.

⁶³ Cf., among others, Buzzetti 2001, 19–23. The position of Johnson (2003, 277–9) is more nuanced but it comes back all the same to saying that Xenophon deliberately gives Alcibiades a position that he dare not put in Socrates' mouth.

⁶⁴ Alcibiades, the bad disciple (I 2, 12–17; 24–8; 39–47), is opposed to Euthydemus (IV 2), the good disciple; Glaucon (III 6), who is impatient to get into politics when Socrates thinks him incompetent, is opposed to Charmides (III 7), who hesitates to get involved in politics though Socrates recognizes his competence.

positive reflection in Book IV, when Socrates ‘seduces’ Euthydemus in the manner proper to the context of a pedagogical and friendly relationship (cf. IV 2, 40 and I 6, 13–14). Similarly, Socrates’ defence of legal positivism represents the positive version of the criticism—worthy of blame in Xenophon’s eyes—of this same positivism by Alcibiades in Book I.

Third contradiction: on the difficulty in finding a master in just things

‘Besides, the talk opens with a statement by Socrates (IV 4, 5) which refutes in advance his later thesis (IV 4, 13), i.e. that it is extremely difficult to find a teacher of the just things (IV 4, 5); for if just were the same as legal, every legal expert, nay, every member of the popular assembly would be a teacher of justice.’⁶⁵ There would therefore be a contradiction between IV 4, 5 and IV 4, 13. From a Straussian point of view, Socrates’ position can be found in IV 4, 5, because the definition of IV 4, 14 is thereafter reaffirmed (cf. IV 6, 6). In case of contradiction between two passages, it is the most allusive and the least repeated that corresponds to the point of view of the author.⁶⁶ In the present case, the most allusive and the least repeated corresponds to IV 4, 5. Strauss’s new argument would not lack relevance if there really was a contradiction between the two passages, but it does not seem to me that these two passages are in contradiction. Contrary to what Strauss says, Socrates’ position is not ‘that it is extremely difficult to find a teacher of the just things’. If we carefully read IV 4, 5 Socrates instead expresses surprise that one has no difficulty finding teachers of the crafts of a cobbler, a carpenter, a blacksmith or an equestrian, but does not know whom to approach when seeking a teacher of justice. His surprise finds its sense, and must be interpreted in light of, what follows. Far from declaring that the teacher of justice does not exist, Socrates is astonished that one does not know whom to approach to receive such teaching. This teacher of justice does exist and is no other than Socrates himself. His

⁶⁵ 1939, 520. In the same sense, cf. Johnson 2003, p. 268.

⁶⁶ Cf. 1941, 497: ‘The real opinion of an author is not necessarily identical with that which he expresses in the largest number of passages.’

surprise that men do not know whom to approach to learn justice comes from his consideration of himself as a teacher able to teach the nature of justice. If Socrates meant to say here that there is no teacher competent in the area of justice, it would be hard to explain how he could himself give a long explanation of the nature of justice (IV 4, 12–25). Finally, contrary to Strauss, it is not ‘every member of the popular assembly’ who could be ‘a teacher of justice’, because one must not only know the laws of the city, but also above all be able to explain, as Socrates does,⁶⁷ why justice is the same as the lawful.

Fourth contradiction: the conflict between positive laws and unwritten laws

‘And finally... Socrates suddenly turns from the laws of the city to the unwritten (or natural) laws, and he thus, and only thus, indicates the crucial question, the question of the possible divergence and opposition of the laws of the city and the natural laws.’⁶⁸ The passage from the laws of the city to the unwritten laws is made in IV 4, 18–19 and the initiative for this transition comes from Socrates. Strauss sees a contradiction (at least potential) between these two sections of chapter 4, in that a situation could very well arise in which written and unwritten laws are in conflict. In such a case the just man would not be he who obeys the law of the city. The just therefore could not correspond simply to the lawful. We immediately think of *Antigone*,⁶⁹ whose drama illustrates a case of conflict between positive law and unwritten laws. But if we only consider Xenophon’s text, we are compelled to say that the possibility of a conflict between human laws and divine laws is not even mentioned. Everything takes place as if divine laws were added to human laws and complement them,

⁶⁷ Strauss (1972, 111) maintains that Socrates provides no argument to justify the identification of the just and the legal and interprets that ‘absence’ as an additional confirmation that this is not Socrates’ true position. Johnson (2003, 263 and 272) is equally of the opinion that Socrates does not justify the identification but is content to insist on the usefulness and advantages that come from obedience to the laws. But immediately after having affirmed this identification in IV 4, 12, Socrates offers at §13 detailed argumentation that justifies that assertion and supports it (cf. §13 at the end [‘so the lawful man is just then’]: ὁ μὲν ἄρα νόμιμος δίκαιός ἐστιν).

⁶⁸ 1939, 520.

⁶⁹ Cf. Sophocles, *Antigone*, 449–60.

without entering into conflict with them, because they merely reinforce and confirm them.

Given that the (potential) conflict between the laws of the city and unwritten laws is one of the main arguments that Strauss and his followers invoke to challenge the legal positivism (apparently) endorsed by Socrates,⁷⁰ I think it relevant to show how each of the four unwritten laws described by Socrates is in perfect accord with the positive laws of the city. The first unwritten law—to honour the gods (IV 4, 19)—is not in conflict with the positive laws in that the gods leave to men, whatever nation they belong to, the business of establishing rules and customs which must regulate the worship of gods. In declaring that men must honour the gods according to the laws of their various countries (cf. I 3, 1; IV 3, 16), the Pythia clearly shows that unwritten law that prescribes honour for the gods can be adapted to different legislations in force in human communities.⁷¹ The second unwritten law—to honour one's parents (IV 4, 20)—is equally in harmony with positive laws, since the city itself cracks down on those who prove ungrateful to their parents (cf. II 2, 13–14). Moreover, the main reason why they crack down on ungrateful children is precisely that this kind of ingratitude is particularly offensive to the gods. The third unwritten law—the ban on incest (IV 4, 20)—is elsewhere presented as a positive law,⁷² so that they are again in harmony. Even if the fourth unwritten law—the duty of repaying favour (IV 4, 24) corresponds to no positive law,⁷³ it is still in accord with usage and custom (*nomimon*), since men regularly shun those who show themselves ungrateful. A passage from *Cyropaedia* confirms at one stroke that there is no positive law that enforces gratitude—there is no legal process for ingratitude—but that although men often transgress that unwritten law, non-observance creates enmity between men:

⁷⁰ Cf. Johnson 2003.

⁷¹ Cf. Gray 2004a, 444: Socrates 'has the god of Delphi endorse obedience to the "law of the polis" in worshipping the gods, so that in conforming to the law of the polis one is also obeying the instruction of the god'.

⁷² Cf. *Cyr.* V 1, 10; *CS.* II 13.

⁷³ There is in fact no written law that prescribes showing gratitude for favour received (cf. *Arist., Rhet.* I 13, 1374a18–26; Johnson 2003, 260).

They [sc. The Persians] also take ingratitude as a fault that arouses a lot of hatred between people, but little legal process; and if they come to hear of a child who could show gratitude but has not, they punish him quite severely. They think, in fact, that ingrates are more than others likely to neglect the gods, their parents, their country, their friends; it seems also likely to them that the regular association of ingratitude is with shamelessness, and thus that there is nothing like it to lead to all the vices. (*Cyropaedia* I 2, 7)

This passage is valuable in that it shows clearly that the duty of gratitude underpins the first two unwritten laws: the duty to respect gods and honour the gods.

Xenophon certainly knows the debates on the controversial relations between the positive laws of the city and the unwritten laws, but one would be wrong to conclude because of his familiarity with debates raised by those who oppose the positive laws to the laws of god, that he tacitly recognized the possibility of a conflict between these two orders of law.⁷⁴ One must note and acknowledge that Xenophon to the contrary tries to show that far from involving controversial relations, the positive and unwritten laws are in accord, complement and reinforce each other mutually.

At the end of this examination of these so-called contradictions raised by Strauss, it seems that we do not have any good reason to believe that Xenophon leaves his reader to understand, between the lines, that Socrates did not adhere to the conception of justice that he expressly conveys to Hippias. Strauss's argumentation has all the appearances of a circular one: the conclusion—that Socrates did not identify justice with the obeying of the law—is effectively contained in the opening premise, which is nothing but the fundamental presupposition of the Straussian hermeneutic: that is, that there is a philosophical conflict between the city that constrains philosophy to dissimulate its thought and to subscribe, in appearance, to the opinions of the majority.

I am surprised that in his analysis of IV 4, Strauss does not resort to two types of considerations that are dear to him. These concern the structure of Book IV. First, Strauss does not pay attention to the

⁷⁴ I thus return to the objection that Gray (2004a, p. 443) addressed to Johnson (2003): 'Conflict between written and unwritten law is attested in other sources, but this should not prejudice the argument about *Memorabilia* iv 4.'

fact that chapter 4 resembles, in many respects, a kind of meteorite, dropped from nowhere, which comes unexpectedly to interrupt the series of conversations between Socrates and Euthydemus (IV 2–3 and IV 5–6). The actual placement of chapter 4 seems so incongruous that several commentators have supposed that it had been accidentally misplaced.⁷⁵ This species of anomaly, a kind that scholars are quick to consider as interpolations or ‘accidents’ that arise in the course of the transmission of the text, are never, according to Strauss, purely gratuitous or accidental; of an intentional nature, they are the sign and hint that the author is preparing himself to deliver an important teaching.⁷⁶ Secondly, since Book IV has eight chapters, chapter 4 is the middle of the book. Strauss frequently affirms that all important teachings are found in the centre of an account.⁷⁷ Thus, the culminating point of Book III of the *Memorabilia* would be the middle of the book, where Xenophon, after having successively reported two conversations with relatives of Plato,⁷⁸ ‘points to the possibility of a conversation with Plato’.⁷⁹ This allusion to a missed rendez-vous with Plato would divide Book III into two parts, a rise (III 1–7) and a fall (III 8–12).⁸⁰ More than thirty years after the first analysis of IV 4, Strauss finally recognized that the conversation between Socrates and Hippias is ‘the central conversation in Book IV’.⁸¹

The *Hiero* (1948)

In his commentary on *Hiero*, Strauss again defends the same interpretation of IV 4, but with a new argument:

⁷⁵ On the many problems that the actual placement of the dialogue between Socrates and Hippias have caused, I take the liberty of referring to Dorion 2000, CCXXXI–CCXXXVII.

⁷⁶ Cf. 1941, 496.

⁷⁷ Cf. 1970, 92; 1972, 58. Cf. also Bague 1974b, 322.

⁷⁸ These are the exchanges with Glaucon (III 6) and Charmides (III 7).

⁷⁹ 1972, 74.

⁸⁰ Similarly, of all the exchanges of Book II, ten chapters in all, the one with Critobulus (II 6) is indisputably the most important for the general theme of Book II, i.e., *philia*.

⁸¹ 1972, 106; cf. also 108: ‘The conversation with Hippias is the central conversation in IV.2–6.’

Socrates' doubt of the unqualified identification of justice and legality is intimated, however, by the fact that, on the one hand, he considers an enactment of the 'legislator' Critias and his fellows a 'law' which, he says, he is prepared to obey; and that, on the other hand, he actually disobeys it because it is 'against the laws'. (1964, p. 75)

Strauss here alludes to the law published by Critias in which it was forbidden to teach the art of argument (cf. I 2, 31 and 33). According to Strauss, the contradiction is patent: Socrates says that he is ready to obey this law (I 2, 34), but, on the other hand, he does not hesitate to infringe it (IV 4, 3). This flagrant contradiction would show that Socrates does not identify justice with obedience to the laws, whatever they are.

But the contradiction is not as plain as Strauss suggests. Before anything else, let us re-read the text of IV 4, 3, in which Xenophon describes Socrates' disobedience:

And when the Thirty commanded him something contrary to the laws (*παρὰ τοὺς νόμους*), he would not obey. For when they forbade conversing with the young, and commanded (*προσταξάντων*) him and some others of the citizens to lead someone to death, he alone did not obey, as the command given to him was contrary to the laws (*παρὰ τοὺς νόμους*).⁸²

This text is less clear than it seems at first glance; in fact, the reader has difficulty in determining whether Socrates' disobedience is single or double: did he disobey the ban on conversing with the youth *and* the order to arrest the someone mentioned (Leon of Salamis), or was it just this latter that he refused to carry out? We might believe that Socrates' disobedience concerns only the episode of Leon of Salamis. Since the text is clear that Socrates 'alone did not obey' (*μόνος οὐκ ἐπείσθη*), several people must have had the opportunity to disobey; so it was the order to arrest Leon of Salamis, which was given to Socrates 'and some others of the citizens' (*ἐκείνῳ τε καὶ ἄλλοις τισὶ τῶν πολιτῶν*). The expression 'alone did not obey' therefore does not seem to refer to the ban against conversing with the city's youth.⁸³ Moreover, the ban on teaching the art of argument exclusively and

⁸² IV 4, 3. I print the very accurate translation from Johnson (2003, 276 n. 44).

⁸³ According to Taylor (1917–18, 128) and Johnson (2003, 276 n. 44), one does not know whether Socrates finally obeyed or disobeyed the order to stop conversing with the young (I 2, 36).

directly targets Socrates (I 2, 31); in this case, it would be strange to specify that he was the only one who refused to obey. If Socrates' disobedience refers uniquely to the order to arrest Leon of Salamis, there is no contradiction between I 2, 34 and this passage. This hypothesis seems in any case to be refuted by the first phrase of the passage cited, in which Xenophon declares that in general Socrates did not obey orders that the Thirty gave him that were contrary to the laws. Even if Socrates' disobedience refers equally to the prohibition against conversing with the youth,⁸⁴ Strauss is still wrong to claim that Xenophon admits, in IV 4, 3 that Socrates disobeyed a law. Socrates has rather disobeyed *an order* out of concern to honour the laws. One can certainly disobey an order and remain respectful of laws, if the case is one in which the order is contrary to the law. This passage, which depicts Socrates with the characteristics of a man who does not hesitate to risk his life if respect for the law requires it, is therefore altogether in conformity with the rest of the chapter, in which Socrates equates justice with respect of the law.

The whole problem comes from the fact that this order that Socrates disobeys, according to IV 4, 3, is actually described as a law in I 2, 31 sq. Why such a difference of terms? It makes a great deal of difference whether one is dealing with a law or an order. A Straussian interpreter could, I imagine, propose the following explanation: since the apologetic aim assigned to IV 4 is to show that Socrates was so respectful of the law that he defined justice as the observation of law, Xenophon could have hardly reported, at the beginning of this same chapter, that Socrates had disobeyed a law. The contradiction would be really too blunt. Thence the recourse to a different vocabulary, which need not deceive us, however: it is a law that Socrates refused to obey. This interpretation does not satisfy me for the following reason: in his 1939 study, Strauss thought that he could identify a contradiction⁸⁵ at the very heart of chapter 4, so that I do not see why we should now believe that Xenophon tried to avoid a contradiction between the beginning and the rest of chapter 4.

⁸⁴ In any case, the problem raised by the construction of the second phrase stands firm. It is difficult to see how the ban on conversing with the youth is attached to the rest of the phrase, which uniquely concerns the arrest of Leon of Salamis.

⁸⁵ This is the third contradiction (cf. *supra*, pp. 306–7).

Whatever the case may be, the difficulty is real and we must not try to elude it. If the issue is about an illegal order, the refusal to comply does not mean that Socrates is not respectful of the law. If the question is about a law, as Book I expressly states, the problem is more delicate. But is it very clear, as Strauss says, that Socrates declares himself ready to obey *the law* decreed by Critias? There is perhaps a good reason to doubt this. When Critias and Charicles show Socrates the law that forbade conversation with the youth, Socrates replied that he was disposed to obey *the laws*.⁸⁶ Would this answer not be ironical? Does Socrates not want to thereby convey that he is disposed to obey the laws decreed before the time of the Thirty, which did not prohibit him from conversing with the youth? The laws that Socrates declares himself ready to obey at I 2, 34 are perhaps the same ones in the name of which he refuses to comply with the order of the Thirty at IV 4, 3. But that hypothesis raises another problem: in the case of conflict between the laws, what is the criterion that lets one determine the law that one ought to follow?⁸⁷

The *Memorabilia* (1972)

In the last book published in his lifetime, Strauss again returned to the question of *Memorabilia* IV 4. This last analysis is in many ways different from those that precede it. Instead of addressing the question directly, by systematically applying his method of reading and taking a clear stance, Strauss comments on the text of the *Memorabilia* while paraphrasing it. He accords importance to everything, including, particularly, what may seem small details, and tries relentlessly, but in an allusive fashion, to explore the implication of what Xenophon might pass over in silence. It is very difficult, if not impossible, to speak in general terms of the Straussian reading of

⁸⁶ I 2, 34: *παρεσκευάσμαι μὲν πείθεσθαι τοῖς νόμοις*. See also Johnson 2003, 276: 'Here Socrates professes a willingness to obey "the laws"; this is distinct from his saying that he will obey the law against teaching the art of words, of course.' Buzzetti (2001, p. 16) makes the same mistake as Strauss: 'Socrates says on one occasion to the "law-makers" Critias and Charicles that he is prepared to obey the "law" prohibiting conversation with the young, and yet he goes on to disobey that "law" precisely on the grounds that it is "something contrary to the laws".'

⁸⁷ Gray (2004b, 150–1) tries to reply to that question from the text of *Mem.*

the *Memorabilia*, since 'Strauss, in his usual way, extricates the hidden messages from each page, but without assembling them into a systematic whole'.⁸⁸ This type of commentary is very demanding on the reader, who must have in advance perfect knowledge of Xenophon's text, or be incapable of checking passages of the commentary in which Strauss stretches the text that he is paraphrasing, or of evaluating the drift of the more or less sibylline observations that Strauss covertly introduces into what is most often presented as a simple paraphrase. The paraphrasing doubtlessly represents, for Strauss, the mode of reading that is most appropriate to an exegesis that aims to understand an author as he understood himself. It is not in treating the text as an object, in putting it at a distance and applying a method to it, that we would be able to understand it from the inside, as the author himself understood it. Paraphrasing, which follows the progress and bifurcations of the text, seems to be the best road of access to that immanent comprehension of the text and the author.

At this point: a parenthesis. Why is Strauss so allusive and enigmatic? In fact, everything happens as if Strauss, in his last writings, had himself imitated the art of esoteric writing that the ancients supposedly practised.⁸⁹ Thence the abundant enigmatic observations⁹⁰ and sibylline remarks that rightly exasperate the reader who attempts to decipher his work. This legitimate exasperation comes from the fact that we rarely see the importance and significance of the details he notes. Take the example of piety. Strauss lets us understand that Socrates does not believe in religion or in traditional gods, but he never clearly explains the nature of Socrates' piety. His silence is explained first by an impossibility of fact: Plato and Xenophon can hardly go much further than to suggest, to the mind of the attentive reader, that Socrates' piety is not the kind that they explicitly accord

⁸⁸ Brague, 1974a, 275. Brague makes the same observation in his review of *Xenophon's Socrates* (1974b, 321–2): 'Professor Strauss proposes that we re-read Xenophon following, step by step, the thread of the text, and only rarely gathering from that any general conclusions.'

⁸⁹ Cf. Brague 1974b, 321.

⁹⁰ For example, Strauss accords a lot of importance to oaths, but the fleeting observations that he makes on this subject are completely obscure (cf., among others, 1970, 153, 165, 166, 170, 194; 1972, 61, 78, and 111).

to him; secondly, by an impossibility of right: if Strauss is loyal to the lesson of the ancients, a lesson about moderation and respect for the most important things, he must also practise self-restraint. In sum, Strauss strongly resembles, to repeat the happy expression of M. Burnyeat, a 'sphinx without a secret'.⁹¹ But what good reason could he have for practising esoterism in a democratic and liberal society, in which we enjoy entire freedom of expression? Let us not forget that the desire to protect himself from persecution is but one of the three reasons given for why the philosopher has recourse to the art of esoteric writing. The two other reasons—the selection of competent readers and responsible attitudes—remain valid in all times, whatever the regime is.⁹²

Up to this point, we have examined five distinct arguments. Two of them are repeated in the commentary on *Memorabilia*. They are about the alleged contradiction between IV 4, 5 and the rest of chapter 4,⁹³ and the apparent contradiction between IV 4, 3 and I 2, 31 sq.⁹⁴ Only the second argument was slightly modified or completed in the sense that Strauss rejects the possibility, mentioned above, that Socrates' answer to Critias is ironical.⁹⁵ It is notable that Strauss does not expressly draw out of these two arguments the conclusion that he did not hesitate to formulate in his previous analyses: namely that Socrates did not believe in the identity of the just and the legal. This conclusion is certainly suggested on several occasions in the course of his commentary, but it is never affirmed in black and white.

The principal new argument seems to me to be the importance that Strauss accords to Socrates' interlocutor, in this case Hippias. It would be in response to a requirement imposed by the figure of Hippias that Socrates agrees, outwardly at least, to equate the just

⁹¹ Cf. Burnyeat 1985. Similarly, in 'The secret philosophy of Leo Strauss', Larmore writes: 'By itself, Strauss's failure as a historian does not invalidate his effort to arrive at an objective morality. When we turn to his writing about this philosophical topic, however, we find a curious change of tone. He was no longer bold. He was coy. He had very little to say about the overall shape or content of moral truth' (1996, 74).

⁹² See also the conclusion of Strauss's 1941 article.

⁹³ Cf. 1972, 109.

⁹⁴ Cf. 1972, 107.

⁹⁵ Cf. *supra*, p. 313. I do not see how we can decide, in one sense or another, this prickly question.

with respect for the laws. This is what comes out of the interpretation that Strauss gives of paragraphs 12 and 13, in which the identity of the just and the legal is stated for the first time. These are the terms in which Strauss comments on this key passage: ‘Socrates proves to Hippias now that the legal (lawful, law-abiding) is just; Hippias understands this to mean that the legal and the just are the same, and Socrates accepts this interpretation. Socrates might have meant that everything legal is just but not everything just is legal (prescribed by law).’⁹⁶ Before even confronting this reading with the passage of *Memorabilia*, one can doubt that all that is lawful is just. In fact, if the lawful were necessarily just, it would be just to obey the laws of the tyrant, or any other law, as long as it is a law. Socrates’ position would then be no less satisfying on the philosophical level than to identify the just with the legal. Having said this, is Strauss’s interpretation confirmed by the texts? In order to respond to this question fairly, let us attentively re-read the key passage of chapter 4:

I say that what is lawful is just (*τὸ νόμιμον δίκαιον εἶναι*). Do you mean, Socrates, that lawful and just are the same thing (*τὸ αὐτὸ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, νόμιμόν τε καὶ δίκαιον εἶναι*); ‘I do.’ (IV 4, 12–13, trans. Marchant)

It is therefore correct, on the one hand, that Socrates is happy, at least at an early stage, to declare that the legal is just, and, on the other hand, that it is Hippias who takes the initiative in identifying the just with the legal; but since this identification takes the form of a question asked of Socrates, nothing stops Socrates at this stage of the discussion from correcting the direction of the question by telling Hippias that what he supports is not that the just and the legal are identical, but that the legal is just. But Socrates’ response (‘I do’) leaves no doubt: he responds affirmatively, without hesitation, to Hippias’ demand for clarification. Even though it is from Hippias that the initiative to identify the just and the legal comes, Socrates accepts this identification, and does not contest it. Why, if he does not adhere to it, does he not try to show Hippias that he is in error, and that there is an appreciable difference between declaring that the legal is just and maintaining they are identical? Strauss’s answer to

⁹⁶ 1972, 110.

this question is that Socrates' attitude is in fact determined by the personality and the thought of Hippias. The position is derived from this observation: 'Hippias was famous or notorious as a despiser of the laws.'⁹⁷ If Hippias had such a reputation, it was because he openly and publicly contested the authority of the laws. This is proof of irresponsibility, because the public critic of laws risks bringing on the ruin of the foundation of the society. Socrates therefore must convince Hippias, in the interest of the city, if not philosophy, that the just is nothing but respect for the law. What motivates Socrates' attitude toward Hippias is his conviction that it is preferable not to openly attack the authority of laws that assure the coexistence of the citizens and the cohesion of the city. As Strauss writes, 'while the identification of the just with the legal is theoretically wrong, it is practically as a rule correct.'⁹⁸

Strauss's interpretation relies entirely on implicit, tacit reasons that would have prevailed in the choice of Hippias as Socrates' interlocutor. I gladly recognize that one of the great merits of Straussian exegesis is the constant concern to interpret the dialogues in terms of the identity of the interlocutors involved. But this concern, which I consider to be fruitful and indispensable, sometimes gives way to mistakes in interpretation, as I believe is the case with Hippias. Strauss even interprets the rupture that brings chapter 4 into the series of exchanges between Socrates and Euthydemus (IV 2–3 and IV 5–6) as a function of the character of Hippias. Far from being an interpolation, or even a displaced chapter, as the scholars who are incapable of understanding the structure of the *Memorabilia* think, (Strauss compares it to a 'secret law'⁹⁹), the conversation about justice demanded an interlocutor who is not as docile and conformist as Euthydemus; effectively, 'proving to Hippias that the just is the legal is a much greater feat and has a much more persuasive power than proving it to Euthydemus'.¹⁰⁰ How can we take Strauss seriously? In 1939, he thinks that Hippias is a lame interlocutor and

⁹⁷ 1972, 108.

⁹⁸ 1972, 114. Cf. also 1989, 133: 'But Socratic moderation means also, and in a sense even primarily, the recognition of opinions which are not true, but which are salutary for political life.'

⁹⁹ 1972, 69.

¹⁰⁰ 1972, 108. In the same sense, cf. Johnson 2003, 272.

that is what permits Socrates to conclude that justice is identical with the legal;¹⁰¹ in 1972, he thinks to the contrary that Hippias is a fearsome adversary, a hard-headed interlocutor, and that this is the reason why—given that to vanquish without peril is to win without glory—Xenophon chooses to substitute him for Euthydemus in this crucial exchange. Here we find ourselves in a contradiction, pure and simple, one that is no doubt attributable, quite simply, to an evolution in Strauss's thinking: it is therefore not a clue of some secret instruction that Strauss would leave his reader the trouble to decipher...

Notwithstanding the reasons that explain why chapter 4 interrupts the conversation between Socrates and Euthydemus, what must we think of the assertion that is crucial to Strauss's interpretation, according to which 'Hippias was famous or notorious as a despiser of the laws'? True to his habits, Strauss does not provide any reference in support, and does not take the trouble to justify it. Of all the fragments relative to Hippias, I see only one that could have inspired Strauss to make such a pre-emptory assertion. It is a passage from the *Protagoras* (337c sq.) in which Hippias described the law as the 'tyrant of men' (τύραννος τῶν ἀνθρώπων). Hippias explains that men are all equal by nature, but it is the laws, which often do violence to nature, that divide them. This is the only text, to my knowledge, in which Hippias expresses a point of view that is critical of law.¹⁰² Does this suffice to make him a man 'famous or notorious as a despiser of the laws'? I leave it to my reader to judge. I note in passing that some of Strauss's disciples¹⁰³ are so convinced of the justness of this interpretation that they speak of a 'refutation' of Hippias by Socrates, as if Hippias had held that the just is not to be identified with the legal, and Socrates had then refuted this position. Now not only does Hippias *not* hold any such position; but he is not refuted by Socrates either, that is, he does not hold any position that is thereafter the subject of a refutation.¹⁰⁴ Hippias is a quite docile interlocutor, who

¹⁰¹ Cf. *supra*, pp. 302–3.

¹⁰² According to another fragment, Hippias subscribed entirely to *nomina* (cf. DK A 9 = *Hippias maj.* 286 a–b).

¹⁰³ Cf. Pangle 1994, 133 and 134.

¹⁰⁴ Johnson (2003), 279 also maintains that Socrates refuted Hippias. In fact, Hippias brags of holding a conception of justice that no one can refute (IV 4, 7),

offers little resistance and almost immediately adopts Socrates' position. There is nothing in the words of the text that permits us to suppose that Hippias openly contested the authority of the laws and that Socrates' goal was to bring him back to reason by making him adopt a more restrained and responsible position, but one to which he did not in reality subscribe.

To found his interpretation of IV 4, Strauss no longer appeals to contradictions, but to unspoken causes that would have determined the choice of Hippias as Socrates' interlocutor. This comes down to the interpretation of the text through its silences. This hermeneutic of silence does not unduly trouble Strauss; on the contrary, since he often asserts that the unspoken is more important than what is said explicitly.¹⁰⁵ But the unspoken in this case is nothing more, once again, than an avatar of the founding postulate of the Straussian hermeneutic: because of the conflict between the city and philosophy, the philosopher must conceal his thought and openly express his (feigned) adherence to the beliefs that consolidate the bonds between the citizens. If this assumption dominates the interpretation from the start, it is not surprising that we find it again at the end, in the form

but he refuses to declare it before Socrates presents his (IV 4, 8–9). Since Socrates acquiesces in this demand, and Hippias appears convinced of the accuracy of Socrates' conception, to the point even where he acknowledges that he has nothing to say in opposition (IV 4, 18), we cannot know the definition Hippias thought to be invincible (IV 4, 7). In any case, Hippias is not refuted, because he did not submit a thesis to be examined.

¹⁰⁵ Cf. 1989, p. 141: 'Xenophon suggests a peak of the third book, or, for that matter, of the whole work. He points to that peak, a conversation between Socrates and Plato, but he does not supply it. The peak is missing. This formula can be applied to Xenophon's Socratic writings as a whole. *The highest does not become visible or audible, but it can be divined. The unsaid is more important than what is said.* For the reader this means that he must be extremely attentive, or extremely careful' (my italics). For the excessive and arbitrary importance that Strauss accords to that which is unspoken, cf. also 1939, 529; 1972, 68, 71, 94, 130, 131, 134, 149, etc. The Straussian hermeneutic of the unspoken is open to the fair criticism of Hadot: 'I hate those monographs which, instead of letting the author speak and staying close to the text, engage in obscure elucubrations which claim to carry out an act of decoding and reveal the "unsaid" of the thinker, without the reader's having the slightest idea of what that thinker really "said". Such a method unfortunately permits all kinds of deformations, distortions, and sleight of hand. Our era is captivating for all kinds of reasons: too often, however, from the philosophical and literary point of view, it could be defined as the era of the misinterpretation, if not of the pun: people can, it seems, say anything about anything' (1998, x).

of a conclusion. This vice of argumentation is nothing other than the fallacy known since Aristotle as begging the question.

The identification of the just and the legal in IV 4 is not an isolated passage in the *Memorabilia*, nor even an exception in Xenophon's other works. In fact, Socrates restates the same position, in the same terms, on the occasion of an exchange with Euthydemus (IV 6, 5–6) and Xenophon himself reiterates it on at least two occasions in the *Cyropaedia*.¹⁰⁶ Is the very recurrence of the identification of the just and the legal not an infallible sign that we are dealing with a thesis dear to Socrates and Xenophon? The reasonable interpreter tempted to draw such a conclusion would expose himself, in Strauss's view, to the charge of naïveté, given that the position most often repeated by an author is precisely not the one to which he subscribes. The burden of proof falls here on Strauss and his followers; it appears, after examination, that this 'proof' describes a circle inside a network of presuppositions that enclose the Straussian hermeneutic.

Strauss's interpretations are so paradoxical that they have often disheartened the interpreters of the Socratic writings of Xenophon.¹⁰⁷ Should we be surprised that a hermeneutic of the unspoken that privileges reading between the lines often gives room for extravagant interpretations?¹⁰⁸ Strauss belongs to a category of thinkers whose reading teaches us much more about their own thought than that of the authors and works they claim to comment on and analyse, but which serve instead as covers for the exposition of their own ideas.¹⁰⁹ This being said, as I emphasized at the beginning of this

¹⁰⁶ Cf. I 3, 17; I 6, 27. See also *Ages*. I 36; VI 4; VII 2.

¹⁰⁷ Gray is very distrustful of Straussian exegesis: 'The desire to prove [Xenophon's] originality... generates an unjustifiable degree of ingenious reading between his apparently simple lines' (1992, 58). Cf. the same reservations in Gray (2004a) in her review of Johnson (2003).

¹⁰⁸ Cf. Larmore 1996, 69: 'Thus was born Strauss's famous doctrine of "esoteric teaching," his conviction that philosophical texts can contain hidden meanings reserved for an elite readership that knows truly how to read. Such a doctrine is easily abused, of course. Strauss himself often indulged in questionable, even preposterous, "reading between the lines," as when he claimed that the *Prince* contains twenty-six, or twice thirteen, chapters because Machiavelli believed that God was no different than luck; or that Locke was a closet Hobbesian, worshipping like Hobbes at the altar of power. For such fantastic claims Strauss has been justly ridiculed.'

¹⁰⁹ Cf. Clay 1991, 261: '[Strauss's] Xenophon has, I think, absorbed some of the subtlety and profundity of his commentator' (I owe this reference to D. M. Johnson).

study, the interpreter of the *Memorabilia* who turns his back on Strauss's works will be exposed to the risk of being misled by studies that draw inspiration from Strauss but without, in many cases, expressly admitting as much.

Lastly, it seems to me important to emphasize that Strauss did nothing else, in one way, but draw out all the consequences of a report already given by most of Xenophon's critics. One of the main charges we read in the work of Xenophon's detractors is to denounce distortions that result from his apologetic drive. Xenophon defends Socrates so well against the accusations brought against him that it is difficult to understand how it came about that he was put to death.¹¹⁰ In sum, we suspect that Xenophon has gone too far: if Socrates was as good as he depicts, he would never have been so troubled—not even a little—by the Athenian authorities. Socrates was therefore probably not as inoffensive, nor as devout, as Xenophon would have us believe. By presenting Socrates as a being adorned with all the qualities and virtues, including those that make the most conformist of men, Xenophon's advocacy sins by excess and self-destructs, given that it raises more doubt and incredulity, than it engenders conviction. It has not been sufficiently noted that Strauss gives exactly the same report: if Socrates had conformed to the portrait that Xenophon gives he would not have been the victim of the accusations brought against him, so that we may suppose that Xenophon deliberately erased most of the elements in the portrait of Socrates that could have reinforced the grievances held against his master. But instead of satisfying himself with this report, as do most commentators, Strauss makes it the point of departure of his interpretation, that is, he is convinced that the apologetic discourse does not reflect Xenophon's deeper intention: it is nothing but a concession made to the city, a smoke screen designed to mask another discourse which addresses itself exclusively to philosophers, and leaves the subversive

¹¹⁰ Cf. Burnet 1914, 149: 'In fact, Xenophon's defense of Socrates is too successful. He would never have been put to death if he had been like that'; Taylor 1932, 22: 'If Socrates had been what Xenophon wants us to believe, he would never have been prosecuted. Xenophon's apologetic purpose absolutely requires him to suppress, as far as he can, any feature in the character of his hero which is original, and therefore disconcerting to a dull and conventionally-minded reader.' Cf. also Chroust 1957, 10; Vlastos 1991, 161.

dimension of Socrates' philosophy to appear 'clearly'. It is because we do not know how to read between the lines that we have not noted this subversive dimension.

Unlike Strauss, I do not think that Xenophon's apologetic discourse is a façade, behind which an exposé of critical positions promoted by Socrates is hidden. It is true that Xenophon's witness sometimes permits one to catch a glimpse of a different Socrates: not because Xenophon leaves it deliberately to be understood, between the lines in a dissimulated fashion, but because he lets it be understood accidentally, through clumsiness. Unlike Plato, Xenophon takes up the challenge of reproducing the tenor of the political charges against Socrates, and responding to them directly; thus he accepts battle on the territory of his adversaries, with all the risks that this entails, among them presenting a defence that is not wholly convincing. So we see, in the *Memorabilia*, a type of tension or gap between, on the one hand, the gravity of the political accusations made against Socrates, and, on the other hand, the apologetic zeal that is deployed to defend the memory of the master who was condemned to die. In spite of all his efforts, Xenophon does not succeed in bridging this gap, nor in refuting in definitive fashion actual charges made against Socrates, and as a result the reader becomes more and more attentive to the awkwardness¹¹¹ that allows us to catch a glimpse of a Socrates who is much less conformist and inoffensive than as depicted by Xenophon. But these 'glimpses' of another Socrates must not be attributed to an improbable art of writing between the lines, but more to the failure of an author who does not succeed in reconciling all the tensions at the heart of his apologetic work, between the grave political accusations that he reports, and the sometimes deficient defence that he puts forward to neutralize them.

I will conclude with a paradox—completely in the spirit of Strauss even if it will not be to the taste of the Straussians: although Strauss knows and criticizes the studies that since the beginning of the nineteenth century have led to the banishment of Xenophon,¹¹² he

¹¹¹ The scope of this study does not lend itself an examination of these 'clumsinesses' of Xenophon. I have revealed some of them in the notes on my translation of Book I (cf., in particular, I 2, 9–11; I 2, 17–18; I 2, 27–8; I 2, 48; I 6, 15).

¹¹² Cf. 1964, 25; 1970, 83–4; 1989, 127–8.

subscribes nevertheless to the very harsh judgement that Schleiermacher (1815) once made on Xenophon's Socratic writings. According to Schleiermacher, the Socrates described by Xenophon is completely conformist and rather disappointing at the philosophical level, so much so that he would never have exercised the formidable philosophical influence attributed to the historical Socrates unless Socrates had been necessarily more than what Xenophon reports.¹¹³ Strauss does not believe either that one must be satisfied with the letter of Xenophon's text. But rather than appeal to Plato, as Schleiermacher recommended, to bring to light this 'supplement' to Socrates, Strauss believes one can discover it between the lines of Xenophon's text. I emphasized at the beginning of this chapter all that the movement for rehabilitation of Xenophon's Socratic writings owes to the works of Strauss; but I do not believe that the best means of rehabilitating Xenophon's Socratica is to promote reading between the lines, as if the text itself was drab, tiresome, and devoid of interest. To the contrary it seems to me that the task of the interpreter is to try relentlessly to understand the text in its own right, and reveal its interest by bringing to light its complexity, its coherence, and its depth.

¹¹³ Cf. Schleiermacher 1879, 11: 'And not only *may* Socrates, he *must* have been more, and there must have been more in the back-ground of his speeches, than Xenophon represents.' On Schleiermacher's work, which was the point of departure for criticisms made of Xenophon in the XIXth century, see Dorion, 2001.

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IV

Cyropaedia

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The Idea of Imperial Monarchy in Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*

Pierre Carlier

Despite the clarity of its style and the limpity of its linear narration, the *Cyropaedia* is an enigmatic work. Its principal difficulty stems from the uncertainty about Xenophon's intentions.

For the Greeks of the fourth century, the character of Cyrus sits between history and legend.¹ Everyone agrees that Cyrus reigned in the middle of the sixth century and that he was the founder of the Persian Empire. With regards to all other topics, including his

¹ The edition used for *Cyrop.* 1–5 is Bizos (I, 1971; II, 1973), for VI to VIII. Miller, *LCL*, 1914. Except where indicated otherwise, references are to *Cyrop.* It is probable that readers of Xenophon knew the works—though very different—of Herodotus (I, 75–216) and of Ctesias (*Persica* VII to XI). According to Jacoby (*FrGH*, II A, no. 90, F. 66, 361–70 (text) and II Cf. 251 (commentary)), Nicolaus of Damascus summarized Ctesias faithfully for Cyrus' childhood and first victories. Several other versions were in circulation in Greece and in the East: Herodotus on several occasions mentions traditions that are lost to him (I, 95; I 122; I, 214). DL lists four works of Antisthenes (VI, 15–18)—probably from the dialogues—that carried the general title *Cyrus*: *Cyrus* in vol. 4, *Cyrus or On Kingship* in 5, *Cyrus or the loved one*, and *Cyrus or the Spies*, in vol. 10. It is not altogether impossible that in one or another of these works, Cyrus was Cyrus the Younger. But, according to DL (VI 2), Antisthenes liked to 'give Heracles and Cyrus as examples': given this pairing, it seems more likely that Antisthenes' titles referred to Cyrus the Elder. Since Xenophon's *Symp.* presents Antisthenes very sympathetically (IV, 34–44, esp.), he may have read his works on Cyrus. On possible influences, see Höistadt, 1948, 77–94. All the sources for Cyrus are gathered in Weissbach, *RE*, Suppl. IV, col. 1129–66. A few extracts from the two most important cuneiform sources, the Nabonidus Chronicle and the Cyrus Cylinder, appear as appendices in Miller (II, 458–60). For a contemporary history of Cyrus, which draws extensively from oriental documents: Olmstead, 1948, 34–85.

childhood, his accession to the throne, the pace and extent of his conquests, and his death, the most contradictory versions exist. In order to *reconstruct* his history, Xenophon had great freedom then: on each point he could *choose* the traditions, either Greek or Oriental² that suited him best; and even on occasion substitute for sources that were uncertain, insufficient and contradictory, his own interpretation of events. 'All that we have learned and think we know about him, this we will try to recount' (I, 1, 6). Xenophon's tale is founded on his evidence, but also on his *intuition*. The *Cyropaedia* is less of a prudent and careful inquiry than an exercise of imagination on an historical person.

For all that, the hallowed expression, 'historical novel' is not right. The *Cyropaedia* is less picturesque and less Romanesque than the 'historical' tales of Herodotus or Ctesias. Xenophon's principal goal is not to entertain his reader with exotic descriptions, marvellous stories or adventures full of surprises. The choice or the invention of this or that a version of the facts cannot simply be attributed to a concern for historical exactitude or to the novelistic fantasy of the author.

Xenophon's intention in the *Cyropaedia* is fundamentally *didactic*. Almost all commentators admit this;³ but the question remains: what is Xenophon trying to show?

The first chapter, which serves as a prologue to the whole of the work, appears to answer this point. Xenophon begins his work with a series of observations. The first fact of experience that he mentions is the instability of political regimes: many democracies were overturned by oligarchies, many monarchies and oligarchies were destroyed by the *demos*, a tyrant is considered as a skilled man when he has kept himself in power for even a little time (I, 1, 1). The same theme is developed in *Agesilaus* I, 4, in which Xenophon attempts to

² On several occasions, Xenophon mentions what he saw and heard said in Persia, especially 'the stories and songs of the Barbarians who celebrate Cyrus' beauty' (I, 2, 1).

³ Histories of literature, philosophy or Greek political ideas dedicate a few lines—rarely a few pages—to the *Cyrop*. There are not that many deeper studies. The old work of Hemardinquer, 1872, contains a lot of outmoded rhetoric and some very judicious views. The two most useful remaining analyses are: Prinz, 1911 and Scharr, 1919. Castiglioni, 1922, 34–56 is mainly interested in the rhetorical aspects of the work. See also Luccioni, 1947, 201–54 and Delebecque, 1957, 384–410 (especially about the dating of the work).

magnify through contrast the stability of the Spartan kingship. Its function is the same in the *Cyropaedia*: the mention of general instability serves to introduce the exception of Cyrus' government.

Before the exceptional case of Cyrus is presented, however, the analysis gets broader and deeper. Xenophon notes that even in private houses, 'masters of households' (δεσπόται) often have great trouble getting their servants to obey them. The remark reminds the reader of the preoccupations of the *Oeconomicus*, in which the rule of the household is on several occasions compared to political or military rule (XI, 23; XIII, 5; XXI, 2). The difficulties that political leaders and household leaders have contrast with the ease with which the herdsmen direct their herds and gain profit from them (I, 1, 2). The comparison of the king and the herdsman had been traditional since Homer,⁴ but Xenophon is not simply happy to repeat it: he places human subjects and domestic animals in opposition to one another. The distinction is no longer about governors, but the governed. Never have the animals of any herd conspired against their herdsman: man is the most rebellious of all living creatures.

⁴ In Plato's *Republic*, the metaphor of the herdsman takes a central place in the discussion of ἀρχή between Thrasymachus and Socrates. Thrasymachus declares that rulers, like herdsman, only try to gain profit from their herd (343c). Socrates replies that a herdsman, *insofar as he is a herdsman*, has no other role than to procure the greatest possible good for his herd; if he devours or sells his sheep, he is no more a herdsman but becomes a feaster or a businessman (345d). In I, 1, 2 Xenophon insists on the fact that herds, contrarily to people, 'let their herdsmen use as they see fit the products that they produce'. It is probable that Xenophon is thinking more of wool than of meat. His point of view is nonetheless closer to Thrasymachus' than it is to that of Socrates.

Xenophon, VIII, 2, 14 gives Cyrus the traditional idea that the function of a good king is identical to that of the good herdsman, and notes that 'a good herdsman must get benefit out of his herd while rendering them happy'. Given this passage, a ruler could at the same time pursue his own interest and that of his herd. This conciliatory view does not diminish the difference between Xenophon and Plato.

In *Politicus*, Plato rejects the traditional image of the shepherd king. Only divinity, in the period of the cycle in which it regulates the course of the world, can make men graze (271e). The character of the divine herdsman is too high for a king: 275b. A king, unlike a herdsman, cannot assure food to his herd, but only watch over them as a 'carer': ἐπιμελητής (276d). If Xenophon has no scruples about comparing a human king to a herdsman, it is not because he has a higher idea of power than Plato—quite to the contrary, it is because he has a much less elevated conception of the pastoral art. For Plato, the herdsman is he who *feeds* his herd, for Xenophon, he is especially he who *shears* it.

At the end of this first paragraph, the difficulties met by human leaders appear insurmountable, because they seem to be explained by the indocile nature of man.

‘But when we considered that there existed one man, the Persian Cyrus, who made himself master of a great number of men who obeyed him, of a very great number of cities and a very great number of peoples, reviewing our opinion, we had to recognize that it is neither an impossible nor a difficult task to rule men (ἄρχειν ἀνθρώπων) if we know how to do it (ἣν τις ἐπισταμένως τοῦτο πράττει) (I, 1, 3).⁵ Cyrus’ success brings a complete change of point of view: it shows that followers obey because of the *savoir-faire* of the holder of authority. Cyrus conquered and maintained an immense empire because of his talents. *Qui peut le plus peut le moins*. A very simple *a fortiori* deduction permits one to offer Cyrus as an example to those who exert authority, in whatever position or regime one finds oneself.

According to the prologue, the *Cyropaedia* would be, in the etymological sense of the word, a demonstration of ἀρχή, the lesson of which would be useful not only to all monarchs, but also to all magistrates, and all military and household leaders. Xenophon proposes to make manifest, in large print, the necessary qualities for every ‘ruler’: ἄρχων. It is clear that the art of command is one of Xenophon’s major preoccupations and that we may take from the *Cyropaedia* the portrait of a good leader, which echoes many other works of the same author.⁶ A good leader must be competent, so that

⁵ Similarly in *Mem.* III, 9, 10, Socrates defines real authority as the ‘science’ of leadership: ‘kings and rulers are not those who carry scepters nor those chosen by first-comers, nor those the lot has designated, nor those who took power through violence or trickery, but those who know how to rule,’ ‘οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι ἄρχειν’. The term science ἐπιστήμη must not mislead; the ‘science of leadership’, according to Xenophon, is not the Platonic kind. Unlike the philosopher-king of the *Republic*, the ruler in *Cyrop.* or *Mem.* does not care about metaphysical truths to model his city on; it suffices that he knows ‘how to manage well both men and human affairs’ (*Mem.* IV, 1, 2). According to Xenophon, the science of command is nothing but a ‘knack’ (ἐμπειρία), given the criteria of Plato.

⁶ Two works by Xenophon focus on the art of command: *Oec.* and *Hipparch.* *Ages.* is in large part a eulogy to the good leader. Already in the first books of *Anab.*, which Delebecque, 1957, 199–206, dates to before 385 BC, Xenophon often analyses the qualities necessary to a leader. Cyrus the Younger is presented as an exemplary leader (I, 9 notably). Inversely, in the gallery of portraits in II, 6, Xenophon emphasizes the faults that prevent the Greek generals from being accomplished leaders: Clearchus was an excellent warrior, but his hardness alienated the sympathy of his troops (II, 6,

his subordinates know that their own interest consists in obeying his orders (I, 6, 21).⁷ A good leader must be an example of piety, moral righteousness and temperance (VIII, 1, 25–30).⁸ A good leader must attempt to implement justice, that is to say to distribute punishments and rewards according to the merit of the activity of each individual (I, 6, 2; II, 3, 16; VIII, 1, 39; VIII, 4, 3–5).⁹ A good leader must show himself to be benevolent and generous: this is the best way to obtain a return of benevolence from his subordinates (I, 6, 24; VIII, 2, 1).¹⁰ Finally, a good leader must be extremely vigilant; each person must feel protected and supervised (VIII, 1, 47 ff.).¹¹

All these precepts are important for Xenophon. It is beyond doubt that he did seek, as he says in the prologue, to teach the art of command using the example of Cyrus. Is this really, however, the *only* goal that Xenophon envisages in *Cyropaedia*?

It seems rather strange that Xenophon wrote a detailed biography in eight books in order to give his readers a series of sensible maxims that he could very well have presented in a few pages. If this was so,

6–15); Proxenus, on the contrary, knew only how to reward, and never punished anyone, was loved by honest people, but was neither feared nor obeyed by others. According to *Mem.*, Socrates proposed to teach his disciples ‘the art of ably managing men and human affairs’ in a house, in a polis, and ‘in general’ (IV, 1, 2). The examination of the qualities necessary for command is one of the themes most frequently explored by Socrates through books III and IV (III, 2, 2; III, 4, 12; III, 6, 14; III, 9, 10; IV 2, 11 esp.). From the many parallels between *Cyrop.* and the last two books of the *Mem.*, Delatte, 1933 and Delebecque, 1957, 477–95, conclude that the end of the *Mem.* is later than the *Cyrop.* The argument can be reversed.

⁷ Cf. *Hipp.* VI, 4–6. The description of the qualities necessary for a good leader is too frequent, in the *Cyrop.* and the rest of Xenophon’s corpus, for it to be possible to give exhaustive references. I am content on each point to cite a few passages, among those that have struck me as the most suggestive.

⁸ Xenophon’s Cyrus practises all the virtues, but less in search of moral perfection than through political concern, to win the respect and obedience of subjects. It appears to be altogether mistaken to make the Cyrus of the *Cyrop.* a sage, cynic or otherwise. The influence of the Cynics on Xenophon appears to have often been exaggerated: for instance Joël II, I, 1901, 387 ff. Xenophon does not shine in his egalitarianism or his detachment from material possessions.

⁹ On this very pragmatic type of justice, see also *Anab.* I, 9, 11–13, *Oec.* XI, 23 and XIII, 5.

¹⁰ Cf. *Anab.* I, 9, 20–8 and *Ages.* IV (financial generosity) and VIII, 1 (affability).

¹¹ Cf. *Oec.* XX, 6: among farmers, as among the leaders of armies, the inequality of success does not come from unequal wisdom, but unequal vigilance/application (ἐπιμέλεια).

Xenophon would merit the reproach that is often made of him by modern commentators of being superficial and feeble.¹² Before making a similar judgement, it is useful to be sure that the *Cyropaedia* is not inspired by other intentions that the author thought best to conceal in the first chapter. To imagine such concealment is not idle. Xenophon, having returned to Athens after more than thirty years in exile¹³ had many reasons to be prudent and to give his work as inoffensive an introduction as possible. Moreover, it was a general habit of Greek classical writers not to declare their personal opinions all the time, but to let the reader often draw their own conclusions: it is in the composition of the work, in the echoes and the subtle contrasts drawn between one passage and another, that the author's intentions are discovered.¹⁴

In the Greek tradition Cyrus' character is very often the incarnation of the good king.¹⁵ Aeschylus had already opposed his virtue and

¹² Since Niebuhr, 1847, I, 116, qualified the *Cyrop.* as 'elend und läppisch', severe and condescending judgements have been numerous (see esp. Gomperz, II, 1902, 96–112; Croiset and Croiset IV³, 1921, 413–22; Sinclair, 1953, 182–4). We sometimes have the impression that commentators accuse Xenophon of being superficial only because they read him superficially. In reaction to this tendency to depreciate Xenophon, Strauss has attempted, through precise reading of the texts, to illuminate the complexity, subtlety and the depth of Xenophon's thought: 1939, 502–36, on the *Lac. Pol.*; 1970 on *Hiero*; 1972 on *Mem.*, *Ap. Soc.* and *Symp.* Though Strauss's interpretations are questionable now and then, his method is the only legitimate one.

¹³ There is no real doubt that the whole of *Cyrop.* was composed after Xenophon's return to Athens: when he mentions Athenian education, he uses the expression 'among us' *παρ' ἡμῶν* (I, 2, 6). The epilogue that mentions in the revolt of the satraps the treason of Mithradates, and of Rheomitres (VIII, 8, 4) definitely postdates 362–361 BC. The other chronological indications gathered by Delebecque, 1957, 384–410, are more questionable. It is difficult to see why, notably, the *Cyrop.* had to predate the succession of Artaxerxes III Ochus. Certainly the picture of Persian decadence in the last chapter suits the end of the reign of Artaxerxes II more, but the rehabilitation of Ochus might not have been immediately perceptible to the Greeks, and nothing proves that the epilogue, which highlights the depth of the moral, political, and military ruin of the Persians, was not planned, among other goals, to minimize Ochus' apparent restoration of the Persian empire.

¹⁴ See on this point the masterly demonstration by de Romilly 1956, in which the analysis is not only about Thucydides' composition, but also that of Pindar (pp. 89–92), the tragedians (pp. 92–8), Plato (pp. 98–102) and Isocrates (pp. 103–4).

¹⁵ The character of Cyrus is frequently mentioned in the political literature of the fourth century in a very favourable way. Isocrates, *Evag.* 9.37, tries to show that the king of Cyprus, whom he praises, was superior even to Cyrus. Plato, *Laws* 694a–b praises the moderate government of Cyrus, which he opposes to the tyrannical kinds of his successors. Aristotle cites Cyrus among the benefactor-kings (*Politics* 5, 10,

moderation to Xerxes' arrogance: *Persians*, 768–72. To present Cyrus as a model to all those who rule is therefore not obviously original, nor subversive. Nevertheless we may ask whether Xenophon, having allayed his readers' distrust in the prologue, does not slip into his account political propaganda that is the more effective for being insidious. According to several commentators, Xenophon, by constantly eulogizing Cyrus, wanted to show not only that Cyrus was a good king, but also that royalty is the best kind of regime.¹⁶ The hypothesis is attractive. As soon as we have formulated it, however, we encounter a grave difficulty: in the *Cyropaedia*, Xenophon successively presents *two* very different political regimes that are extremely dissimilar, the traditional Persian constitution (πολιτεία), with its limited royalty, and the absolute monarchy established by Cyrus. Only one of these two regimes—at the most—may correspond to Xenophon's political ideal.

The traditional Persian πολιτεία evokes the idealized Sparta from the *Republic of the Lacedaemonians* and even, on some points, the *Republic* of Plato;¹⁷ nothing in its description prevents one from perceiving a 'political utopia'.¹⁸ However, the picture of traditional Persia occupies but one chapter of *Cyropaedia* (1, 2) out of forty-one. If we admit that it

1310b 35). One will find more complete references in Lévy, 1976, 204. See n. 1 above on Antisthenes.

¹⁶ This thesis is esp. upheld by Hemardinquer, Scharr, and Luccioni (see n. 3).

¹⁷ See p. 338. The differences between traditional Persia of the *Cyrop.* and Plato's *Rep.* prevail over the resemblances, however, whether in family life or the content of education. Certain moderns, taking the rivalry between Xenophon and Plato attested in some ancient sources (Aulus Gellius, *Attic Nights*, XIV, 1–4, *Athen.* II, XI, 504c; DL III, 34) have seen in the *Cyrop.* a reply to the *Rep.* (e.g. Scharr, 1919, 95–101 and Delebecque, 1957, 388 f.). The idea is only acceptable—at a pinch—for chapter 1, 2; the narrative of *Cyrop.* and the pragmatic analysis that ends it are, in the form and spirit that animate them, so far from *Rep.* that one could not put the two works in the same boat.

¹⁸ Scharr (1919) maintains that the whole *Cyrop.* is a political utopia, 'eine Staatsutopie' (95–138, esp.). He neglects the fundamental differences between the traditional Persian constitution and the imperial monarchy of Cyrus; in his illustration of Xenophon's ideal state, he mixes traits from Books I, VII, and VIII. Moreover he has to admit that Cyrus' monarchy differs from what we generally understand by a 'utopia'. He therefore distinguishes two types of utopias: egalitarian utopias of slaves who reject all authority, and those of masters ('Herren') who place themselves in supreme power. The *Cyrop.* would be in the second genre: Cyrus incarnates what Xenophon himself would have dreamed of being (p. 121 and p. 136). The opposition between utopias of masters and utopias of slaves reveals some currents of thought in 1919 Germany, but it seems difficult to give the name of a utopia in the strict sense to

reflects Xenophon's political ideal, it must be concluded that the rest of the *Cyropaedia* is just filling—which would be absurd—or that the *Cyropaedia* is a history of a regrettable evolution—which we would not be able to exclude *a priori*—or that Xenophon's principal goal in the *Cyropaedia* is not the description of a utopia.

The description of the absolute monarchy established by Cyrus occupies a much more important place in the work: VII, 5 and the whole of Book VIII are devoted to it, and the account of the conquest is in part a presentation of its genesis. In the *Cyropaedia* does Xenophon defend absolute monarchy? A point begs to be highlighted straight-away: absolute monarchy as established by Cyrus is the government of an *empire*. This territorial empire is, by its extent and structure, fundamentally different from Greek cities: even if Xenophon had eulogized (without reservation) Cyrus' absolute monarchy, we could not conclude that Xenophon is in favour of monarchy in a πόλις.¹⁹

The question of monarchy in the *Cyropaedia* is closely related to the question of empire. Does Xenophon advocate the conquest and organization of a territorial empire? This thesis was notably upheld—in a very brilliant fashion—by W. Prinz.²⁰ There are a number

a constitution fundamentally driven by the will-to-power of its author. On the notion of utopia, see notably Finley, 1975a, 178–92.

¹⁹ Lévy, 1976, 205, noted that Xenophon does not encourage the Athenians to imitate Persian monarchy. Some, notably Luccioni, 1947, 255–68, have seen in *Hiero* the proof of Xenophon's 'monarchist' sentiments. Certainly the second part of the dialogue has Simonides affirm that it is possible for a tyrant to become the benefactor of his fellow-countrymen and to obtain their affection and voluntary obedience. These declarations must not be isolated from their context: Simonides, in his advice and encouragement, tries to persuade Hiero to modify his habits of governance. The only sure conclusion we may glean from this is that a tyranny can be ameliorated. Besides, Simonides' argument does not eliminate the condemnation of tyranny by Hiero at the beginning of the dialogue. On the structure and the meaning of the *Hiero*, see the subtle analyses of Strauss, 1970, 21–109.

²⁰ The idea that *Cyrop.* is programmatic for Asiatic conquests is pre-Prinz: it can be found in Schwartz, 1896, 56 ff. and in Weil, 1902b, 120 f. Luccioni, 1947: 'the *Cyrop.* is like a manual for the future conqueror of Asia. Xenophon wrote it with knowledge of his cause' (232). Prinz, 1911, 19–35, whose second chapter is titled 'Xenophon describes in *Cyrop.* the war to be waged between the Greeks and Persians, *inter Graecos Persasque gerendum*', has seen in *Cyrop.* a 'fictitious history': the Persians would play the role that Xenophon hoped that the Spartans would play, the Medes that which he attributed to the other Greeks, and the Assyrians that of the Persians of the fourth century. These identifications were rightly criticized by Scharf, 1919, 32 sq., who emphasizes especially that the role of the Medes, who helped Cyrus to

of arguments in favour. To start, it is the interpretation that makes the most sense of the *ensemble* of narrative in the *Cyropaedia*. In that view, Xenophon would describe not only the leaderly qualities of Cyrus, or the regime that he established, but of *all his action*, military and political. Moreover, the idea of conquest marked Xenophon's life and work; it was, in Greece of 360 BC, the order of the day.

Xenophon had participated in two attempts at Asiatic conquest, Cyrus the Younger's campaign in 401 BC and the expedition of Agesilaus in 396–394 BC. Closer to the date of composition of the *Cyropaedia*, Agesilaus intervened again against the Great King, in Caria (365) and in Egypt (361). In the *Agesilaus*, Xenophon insists on the 'philhellenism' of the king of Sparta (VII, 4–7) and praises him especially for attacking the Great King on his territory and 'having made Asia the issue of the war' (I, 8).

Before his assassination in 370 BC, the intention of Jason the tyrant of Pherae was to conquer Greece and then the East. In the *Hellenica* (VI, 1, 4–16), Xenophon reveals Jason's projects through Polydamas of Pharsalus, and emphasizes the worries that they arouse: he appears to consider Jason's plan as realizable.

Even in Athens, from the time of the *Panegyricus* (380), Isocrates did not cease calling for a Pan-Hellenic war against the Barbarians. His programmes would find final expression in the *Philip* (346), but it seems that he had already addressed such concerns to Dionysus of Syracuse and Alexander of Pherae.²¹

The theme of a conquest—and particularly of a conquest led by a king—reminds us too closely of Xenophon's personal experience and the preoccupations of the moment for the readers of the fourth century not to see in outline, behind the half-historical, half-legendary figure of Cyrus, a possible Greek conqueror of Asia. The *Cyropaedia* must be

establish the Persian empire, would hardly attract the Greeks. The long argument of Scharr against Prinz, 1919, 25–94 is a lot less convincing when he affirms that neither Xenophon nor his public cared about the conquest of Asia: he even pushes the paradox to the point of claiming that Isocrates waited for the *Philip* for his conversion to Panhellenism.

²¹ Speusippus (in Bickerman and Sykutris, 1928) blames Isocrates for having addressed to Philip the same speech that he had already tried to 'sell' to Agesilaus, Dionysius, and Alexander of Pherae. On Isocrates' propaganda in favour of Asiatic conquests, see esp. Mathieu, 1924, Bringmann, 1974.

read between the lines. It is legitimate to search in the *Cyropaedia* for elements of answers to questions that the Greeks were often asking around 360 BC: is the conquest of Asia possible? Is it sustainable? What will be the political repercussions? What will become of the Greeks who leave, and of those who stay?

On all these problems, Xenophon's point of view cannot become apparent until precise examination of the work is complete. Only a rigorous analysis of the *Cyropaedia* will allow the reader to determine whether Xenophon creates propaganda in favour of the conquest, or if he is emphasizing the risks.²²

CYRUS BEFORE THE CONQUEST

The opening of the *Cyropaedia*, if contrasted with Herodotus' description of Cyrus' birth and childhood (1, 107–30) is surprising for its lack of any fantastical element. No dream, no prodigy comes to announce that the child to be born will rule the world. No miracle saves him from death. No supernatural sign makes him recognized. All these fairly traditional motifs of the 'legend of the conqueror'²³ were deliberately rejected by Xenophon. He did not want his hero to appear as a predestined character whose success was due to the mysterious action of superhuman powers.²⁴ For Xenophon, Cyrus'

²² This last hypothesis has never been put forward to my knowledge, since it appears a priori out of the question that the author of *Anab.* and *Ages.* is opposed to eastern conquest. But Xenophon also wrote *Oec.* and *Poroi* and in the latter work he advises the Athenians to renounce imperialism and live peaceably on the revenues of trade and the mines. Xenophon of course could quite well, as Isocrates did in *On the Peace*, praise peace between Athens and her allies and a panhellenic crusade against Persia. Nevertheless, the insistence on the advantages of peace in *Poroi* (5, 1) drives one to recognize some complexity, if not ambiguity, in Xenophon's personality: he is not just a soldier adventurer. So we search for the meaning of *Cyrop.* without prejudice.

²³ I borrow this expression from the fundamental work of Delcourt, 1944. As often noted, the tale of Cyrus as it appears in Herodotus recalls a number of other king myths with very different origins. The connection with Oedipus is relevant, but we can also refer to the childhoods of Romulus or Moses.

²⁴ This choice does not contradict the well-known piety of Xenophon, or of his hero Cyrus, who, on each important occasion, sacrifices to gods and worries about

exceptional conquests are explained rationally, even technically, by his exceptional qualities of leadership. His virtuosity in the art of command is explained by his birth (γέννα),²⁵ his nature (φύσις),²⁶ and especially by his education (παιδεία I, 1, 6).

Xenophon is content with a few words on Cyrus' ancestors and his innate qualities, but devotes an entire chapter (I, 2) to his παιδεία, or more precisely, Persian παιδεία, since Cyrus received exactly the same

omens. Certainly, the power of men is limited, their visions are uncertain, and they must seek the support of the gods and the help of divine wisdom (I, 6, 44). But Xenophon says that the gods give their support only to those who have themselves taken all measures at their disposal towards success. The advice that Cambyses gives to Cyrus evokes the maxim 'Help yourself, heaven will help also': 'there is impiety in asking the gods to win in a cavalry combat, if we have not taken the time to learn how to ride a horse' (I, 6, 6). In *Cyrop.*, the gods are constantly disposed favourably to Cyrus because he has an irreproachable piety, but also because he is the best strategist and the best leader.

²⁵ In the dialogue with Cyrus after the battle of *Thymbrara*, Croesus exalts the high birth of Cyrus even more. Since he himself is the descendant of a slave and usurper (Gyges), he repents for having confronted 'a child of the gods, a king who issued from a line of kings' (ἐκ θεῶν γεγονότι . . . διὰ βασιλέων πεφυκότη, VII, 2, 24). To celebrate the nobility of a hero is certainly part of the tradition of the epic and the encomium (Isoc., *Evag.* 13–18; Xen., *Ages.*, I). Still, by attributing, even only partially, Cyrus' success to his birth, Xenophon takes part in the great contemporary debate on the relationship between noble birth and merit. Unlike Antiphon (Diels-Kranz, 16th edn., 1972, t, II, p. 352 sq. fragment 44 b 2) and the Cynics, Xenophon takes the position of an aristocratic traditionalist. The mention of Cyrus' noble birth in the *Cyrop.* is even more remarkable because according to Ctesias (taken up by Nicolaus of Damascus, *FGH* II A no. 90 F 66, 3–4) Cyrus was the son of a brigand and a shepherdess, constrained by poverty to work as a slave. On the theme of the slave who becomes king: Höistadt, 1948, 86–94.

²⁶ Bizos (1972, ad loc.) translates φύσις as 'character'. This is too restrictive: the term designates moral qualities, but also Cyrus' physical qualities. A little later (I, 2, 2) Xenophon makes this clear: 'the natural quality (φύσιν) of his shape and his soul'. Xenophon especially insists on Cyrus' great beauty (I, 2, 1), which, from his youth, attracted sympathies, in particular, the loyal love of Artabazus (I, 4, 27–228). Already in *Symp.*, Critobulus declares that 'he who possesses beauty can obtain anything without trouble' (IV 13); he adds that we should choose only beautiful generals (IV 16). Ἔρως or 'desire' is for Xenophon a means of ruling. Cyrus' charm is not only erotic: his exceptional virtue also exerts a fascination upon his subordinates who obey him as a bee obeys its queen (V, 1, 24). Cyrus is a charismatic leader, but his charisma does not come from a divine nature. He knows that he is only a mortal: at the end of his life he congratulates himself for never having forgotten it (8, 1, 24). At *Oec.* XXI, 11, Ischomachus does declare that a good leader must be 'divine' θεῖος but it seems that the term is used metaphorically. Taeger, 1957, 118–20, rightly insists on Xenophon's religious conservatism in his conception of royalty.

education as the other young Persians of his class. Children were raised in groups, under the direction of teachers appointed by the elders. They then proceeded into the class of Ephebes, where they spent ten years in an entirely communal life of hunting and garrison living (I, 2, 6–12). This educational system recalls on several points the Spartan education system (*agoge*) described in the *Republic of the Lacedaemonians*.²⁷ But it is important to emphasize some significant differences. Persian education was theoretically open to all, even if in fact the children of rich families were the only ones who profited from it. The distinction between the *homotimoi* ['equals'] and other Persians is a lot less rigid and a lot less profound than that between the *homoioi* ['equals'] and the other social categories of Sparta. Moreover, even if the *Cyropaedia* exalts Spartan virtues of temperance, endurance, and obedience, Xenophon's Persians sought in particular to inculcate in their children a sense of 'justice', which was not a preoccupation of the Spartans. Finally, in particular, Cyrus, through being the successor designate decided by his father, was made to undergo the *παιδεία* of the Persians exactly like other children; he was not, as the hereditary princes of Sparta, exempted from the *agoge*.²⁸ The *παιδεία* of the *Cyropaedia* is devoid of aspects of Spartan education that could shock most Greeks.

It seems that in the fourth century a quite significant trend of opinion wanted the city to organize and more narrowly control the education of its citizens. This was not only Plato's wish, but also Aristotle's: 'it is clear that education must necessarily be one and the same for all, and that the responsibility for offering it must come from the community and not from private initiatives' (*Politics* VIII, 1, 1337a, 21–2). The reorganization of the Athenian *ephebes* and the creation of magistrates like the *paidonomoi* in many cities seemed to express similar preoccupations,²⁹ at least in part. The *παιδεία* of the *Cyropaedia* is more than an imitation of Sparta: it is the projection into a distant Persian past, of conceptions, ideals, and reform projects that were fairly widespread in all Greece towards 360.

²⁷ The very plan of I, 2 is that of *Lac. Pol.* 1–10: Xenophon goes over the successive age groups. On the 'legend of Sparta' in *Cyrop.*, see esp. Tigerstedt, 1965, 178 f.

²⁸ Plutarch, *Ages. I*. The importance of this exception is underlined by Kahrstedt, 1922, 178 f.

²⁹ On all of these questions, see esp. Marrou, 1948, 99–164.

Xenophon enlarges his description of the *παιδεία* in a presentation of the traditional Persian *πολιτεία*, thereby showing that according to him, the good education received by Cyrus was inseparable from the political organization of his fatherland. The *πολιτεία* of the *Cyropaedia* does not correspond exactly to any known regime. It evokes Sparta in its age classes and the important role it gives to the Elders, notably in judicial matters (I, 2, 14). But it is less oligarchic; *all* adults having 'lived their lives through in an irreproachable manner' become Elders and enjoy the same rights (I, 2, 15). The fundamental point nevertheless is that it is the *homotimoi* who hold themselves ever 'at the disposal of the magistrates' (I, 2, 13), and appear principally, if not exclusively, to dedicate themselves to war and to community service. This trait evokes Sparta, but a similar custom could have been adopted in any aristocratic city without overturning the whole social order. Even in Athens, such a regime was not inconceivable: the economic programme of the *Poroi* attempted to permit the upkeep of all Athenians as 'full-time citizens'.³⁰

The *πολιτεία* of the *Cyropaedia* can look like a model for Greek cities only because it is fundamentally a constitution of a Greek city. Inside each age class equality prevails and is equated with justice: *τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν δίκαιον νομίζεται* (I, 3, 18). All are subjected to the laws and to the magistrates, even the king. The traditional Persian kingship imagined by Xenophon corresponds exactly to the category of 'Spartan kingship' as analysed by Aristotle in *Politics* III, 14, 1285a: it is *κατὰ νόμον*, 'in conformity with custom' in its existence and execution; it is 'not entirely sovereign' (*οὐ κυρία πάντων*), hardly more than a 'hereditary generalship for life'. The legal and limited character of Persian kingship is emphasized in contrast to the 'tyrannical' despotism of the Medes. Mandane put Cyrus on guard against the imitation of his grandfather Astyages: if he adopted the same ways, on his return to Persia, he could well 'die under the whip' (I, 3, 18).

The Persia found at the beginning of the *Cyropaedia* has all the traits of a Greek *πόλις*: Cyrus himself, before the conquest, makes one think of a Spartan prince or more generally of a young and brilliant aristocrat from any Greek city. Xenophon thus suggests that a few political and pedagogical reforms would be sufficient to render

³⁰ See Gauthier, 1976, esp. 20–32 and 238–53.

possible³¹ the appearance of a Greek Cyrus³² anywhere in the Greek world of the fourth century.

THE CONQUEST

At the beginning of the expedition that would make him master of Asia, Cyrus has only few troops, a thousand *homotimoi* serving as hoplites and thirty thousand soldiers more lightly armed (I, 5, 5); he has no cavalry. His personal position is weak; he is not yet king of the Persians, but simply designated by the Elders as the leader of the army (I, 5, 5).³³ His uncle and ally Cyaxares, the king of the Medes, is more powerful. The contrast between Cyrus' initial weakness and the large scale of his eventual success obviously magnifies his ἀρετή and his ability, which appear to be essential factors of the conquest. At the start, Cyrus is nothing more than the leader of the Persian auxiliaries of Cyaxares: it is likely that for Xenophon's readers his situation recalled as examples the position of the Greek generals and *condottieri* who offered their support to the kings and satraps of the East—the generals of the *Anabasis*, Agesilaus in Caria in 365, Agesilaus in Egypt in 361.³⁴ If this connection is deliberately suggested by Xenophon—which is probable—we may draw an important conclusion about his idea for an eventual Greek conquest of Asia: that the—

³¹ Evidently, no one could predict *where* or *when* the Greek conqueror would appear, nor even say certainly that he would appear: all of this, according to Xenophon, also depends on the caprices of nature (I, I, 6).

³² A good education system has another advantage: to assure the military chief of a group of excellent combatants. On the eve of a battle, Cyrus declared that the good habits of the soldiers count more than the eloquence of the general (III, 3, 51–5). But in a general way, Xenophon attributes a determining role to Cyrus rather than his troops: their courage is most often presented as an *effect* of Cyrus' art of command.

³³ At the beginning of this expedition, Cyrus must report to the Persian magistrates and Elders. But this control is very loose: in IV, 5, 15–17, it is Cyrus who asks for a commission of inspection in order to receive reinforcements. The Persian authorities did not hinder Cyrus' conquest: Cyrus did not have the bad luck of Agesilaus, who was recalled to his country in the middle of his conquests in 394. Moreover, the more the role of the non-Persian troops, devoted to Cyrus alone, grew, the more Cyrus became independent of Persia.

³⁴ The fact that in *Cyrop.* the Assyrian king is presented as the aggressor and Cyrus and Cyaxares lead—in a defensive manner—a just war approved by the Gods (I, 5,

mere—intervention of a few Greek troops in one of the many revolts known in Persia at that time could have offered a good leader the occasion for the conquest of Asia. In this way, Xenophon's ideas appear to differ notably from those of Isocrates: for Xenophon, the Greek conquest of Asia could have begun with a modest expedition, officially destined to support a dynasty or a satrap, but then could, a little at a time, lay bare more vast ambitions as it proceeded to extend the course of its action. It was not necessary that it assume the form of a Pan-Hellenic crusade against the Great King. Given that the union of all the Greeks was not an indispensable preliminary, conquest remained possible despite the divisions of Greece emphasized in the conclusion of the *Hellenica* (VII, 5, 26–7). Everything depended on the quality of the leader, or, more exactly, on the scope of his superiority over the enemy and allied leaders.

Xenophon's Cyrus is a remarkable tactician and an excellent strategist;³⁵ he conducts campaigns at great speed, never leaving the adversary time to prepare themselves or time to recover their losses; he often surprises the enemy, but, always on his guard, is never himself surprised; he carefully hides his tactics, concealing his manpower and intentions, but his diversified and large espionage services³⁶ allow him to gain exact intelligence on the enemy's plans; knowing that 'the best strategies are new strategies' (I, 6, 39), at each battle he invents new tactics and new ruses. Certainly, *Cyropaedia* is, in some respects, a manual for applied strategy. However, Xenophon insists more on the *psychological* qualities of Cyrus than on his military qualities: if Cyrus became ruler of Asia, it is mainly because he knew how to gain the deep and exclusive loyalty of his own troops, of many enemies, and especially of allied soldiers and officers. Even before he left Persia, Cyrus enjoyed great popularity among the

13) does not rule out the parallel with a Greek expedition in Asia. The conquest of Asia by the Greeks is frequently presented, notably by Isocrates, as just *revenge* for the Persian Wars.

³⁵ On the properly military aspects of *Cyrop.*, see Anderson, 1970, 165–91 and 400 f. (the plan of the battle of *Thymbrara*).

³⁶ Cyrus obtained information on Croesus' army not only from prisoners, and spies that he sent to the enemy camp disguised as slaves (VI, 2, 11), but also from Ionian ambassadors (VI, 2, 2–10) and a noble Mede, Araspas, with whom he pretended to be angry in order to penetrate the heart of the enemy (VI, 1, 42–3; VI, 2, 17–20).

homotimoi, who knew his qualities from having exercised and hunted with him. On his arrival in Media, Cyrus obtains a supply of panoplies for each of the Persians from Cyaxares: not only does he considerably increase the efficiency of his army in this way, but also wins the recognition of the previously lightly armed thirty thousand armed combatants, who see themselves promoted by him to the same level as the *homotimoi* (II, 1, 9–19). Moreover Cyrus constantly and openly looks to security (V, 3, 56; V, 4, 43 for example), provisions (I, 6, 7–10), health (I, 6, 15–18) and the morale of his troops (VI, 2, 13–40). The Persians, trusting Cyrus, show themselves to be disciplined and full of enthusiasm for combat, which allowed them to conquer; each victory, in turn, adds to Cyrus' reputation and the confidence of his troops. This is the spiral of success.

The soldiers keenly obey Cyrus, because they know that it is in their interest to do so, so that Cyrus will lead them to victory... and to booty. According to *Cyropaedia*, the distribution of booty is indispensable for a leader to maintain his authority. It is in modest terms that Cyrus tells Croesus (VII, 2, 11): 'if my soldiers do not receive some fruit of their labours, I will not keep them in obedience much longer'. This booty of such importance, Xenophon's Cyrus tries to distribute justly, that is to say, in proportion to merit. When his army is still training in Media, before any operation, Cyrus calls the assembly to establish a principal for the sharing of the booty. At Cyrus' instigation, his friends gave speeches aiming to reject arithmetical equality (the same share for all) in favour of geometrical equality (to each according to his merit);³⁷ the solution conforming to his preferences was adopted (II, 2, 18; II, 3, 16). Of course, it is Cyrus himself who, after each battle, decides the respective merit of each participant. Thus, the hope of booty provokes emulation among the warriors and the eager service of each one for the chief.

³⁷ The notion—if not the term—of geometrical equality appears to go back at least to Solon, as attested by fragments of the elegies cited by Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.* XII, 3 and Plutarch, *Solon* XVIII, 5. The opposition of the two kinds of equalities is frequently developed by the political theoreticians of the 4th century; see esp. Plato, *Rep.* 558c, *Laws* 756e–758e, and Aristot., *NE* V, 6 and 7, *Politics* III, 9; III, 12; V, 1, 130ab29–1302a8. In Isocrates' *Nicocles*, 14–16, one of the main merits of monarchy would be to assure this geometrical equality and to protect the elite against levelling.

Cyrus was also a virtuoso in the art of acquiring allies. This talent appears first at the beginning of the expedition. Having forced the Armenians to surrender unconditionally, Cyrus makes their king appear before him, with an accomplished sense of theatre, and lets him fear the worst punishment. His magnanimity can only appear greater when he leaves the king with his life and his throne (III, 1). Thus, not only does Cyrus oblige the Armenians to pay tribute to Cyaxares again, which was the initial goal of the operation, but he also wins the admiration and gratitude of Tigranes, the son of the king, and the sympathy of four thousand Armenians, who will follow him in all his campaigns thereafter.

Later, in his campaign against the Assyrians, Cyrus benefits from several voluntary defections, most notably that of Gobryas (IV, 6). He does not rest there, but seeks systematically to *provoke* defections from the enemy ranks. When Gobryas comes to Cyrus full of hate for the new Assyrian king, who had killed his son, Cyrus asks him which other great Assyrian men were victims of the royal arrogance. Once informed, he tells Gobryas to contact Gadates, whom the Assyrian king had made a eunuch (V, 2, 27–9; V, 3, 15). When, after joining Cyrus, Gadates sees his land threatened by a campaign of retaliation by the Assyrian king, Cyrus, abandoning all other occupations, rushes to defend it. The reason for such haste is clearly expressed in his speech to the allies: ‘if we seem to neglect Gadates, by what arguments could we persuade others to be good to us?’ (V, 3, 33). In other words, the solid support assured to the first who joined him serves to encourage new allies.³⁸

Even while emphasizing Cyrus’ magnanimity and his skilled propaganda, Xenophon clearly shows that the brutality and the unpopularity of the Assyrian king made his work much easier: as much as his own qualities, it is the contrast with the enemy leader that was the decisive factor in the defections.

However, what makes Cyrus’ political ability appear most clearly is the way he delicately takes from Cyaxares the leadership of the

³⁸ The affair of Panthea, a pretty prisoner subject to the advances of her guard Araspas, gives Cyrus occasion for another psychological exploit. Protecting Panthea, Cyrus assured himself of the support of her husband Abradatas: by showing himself indulgent to Araspas, he reinforced this man’s devotion too (VI, 1).

expedition. After the first common victory of the Persians and the Medes over the Assyrians, Cyaxares wishes to 'rejoice' in his success (IV, 1, 13). But Cyrus wants to exploit it to pursue the enemy. In this, he acts in their common interest: since he does not yet have a Persian cavalry, he naturally asks Cyaxares to give him horsemen from among the Medes who are willing to fight with him; Cyaxares cannot refuse. Artabazus, a very passionate friend of Cyrus, then encourages other Medes to join Cyrus. He has complete success: all the Medes, except those in Cyaxares' tent, accompany Cyrus in the chase of the Assyrians. If so many Medes followed Cyrus, Xenophon says, it was through gratitude—Cyrus had won favour from many Medes during his first visit to Media with his grandfather Astyages—through admiration, ambition—Cyrus appears destined for a good future—and through hope of booty (IV, 2, 9–10). When, after a night of drinking, Cyaxares notices that he is almost alone, he becomes enraged, sending a letter of reproach to Cyrus, and orders the Medes immediately to return to him (IV, 5, 8–10). After stalling for a time, Cyrus writes to his uncle to justify himself, but he keeps his Median troops with him (IV, 5, 20–34). A little later, Cyrus suggests to the Medes that they take out a choice part of the booty for Cyaxares. The proposition is treacherous. Laughing, the Medes declare that they must 'choose some women' for Cyaxares (IV, 5, 51–2). By acting this way, Cyrus contributes to the development of the idea among the Medes that their king is a lazy sovereign and a sensual one.

For the meeting of V, 5, Cyrus prepares the best tent in the camp for Cyaxares, the one that once belonged to the Assyrian king, but he goes to the encounter with his uncle with his whole army, showing thus that, even as he recognizes Cyaxares' superior rank and offers him the greatest luxuries, he, Cyrus, has effective control of the greatest number of troops. Cyaxares is not deceived. Cyrus protests in vain about his loyalty, reminding him of his services to the common cause; but Cyaxares does not abandon his complaints and ends with the following reproach:

If you find me unreasonable in taking all this to heart, put yourself in my place and see how all this looks like to your eyes; if the dogs you bring up to protect you and yours, if someone, in caring well for them, made them more friendly to himself than they ever were to you—what pleasure would you

then gain from his care? If this comparison seems feeble to you... let us consider the thing that men cherish above all else and indulge as their most dear prize: if a man was wooing your wife and made himself loved by her more than you, would you be happy about that man's attentions? ... In fact, Cyrus, it seems to me that this is, if not exactly, at least close to how you treated me. (V.5, 28–33)

Cyaxares thus accuses Cyrus of having *seduced* his troops. Cyrus finds nothing to say, content to reaffirm his affection for his uncle (V, 5, 35–6). Cyaxares' complaints correspond too exactly to the preceding account not to express Xenophon's thinking. For Xenophon, a *conqueror* is, in the full sense of the term, a *seducer*.

The gift of winning goodwill (εὐνοία) is the most formidable weapon in dealing with enemies, and allies too. A leader who is deprived of the affection, esteem, and the obedience of his subjects by a happier rival has no recourse: with what troops could he recover those who abandoned him? Cyaxares, devoid of energy but not of clear-headedness, is careful not to provoke a trial of strength. He presides, still in great pomp, over the debate after the two successes over the Assyrians, which must determine to stop or pursue the expedition (VI, 1, 6). But the speakers are all friends of Cyrus, in concert with him, who promote the pursuit of the expedition. In these conditions, Cyaxares can only join the general opinion and accept the strategic plan proposed by Cyrus (VI, I, 21). A little later, Cyaxares lets Cyrus confront Croesus on his own, and contents himself with 'guarding his country' with a third of the Medes (VI, 3, 1). After this, he disappears completely from the military scene. He re-appears only to give Cyrus his daughter, with Media as a dowry (VIII, 4, 5).

From the story of Cyrus' conquest in the *Cyropaedia* comes a general lesson: it is possible for the leader of a small band, allied to a powerful sovereign who is idle against a powerful, unpopular sovereign, to make himself master of an immense empire, if he shows energy and strategic skill, and especially if he knows how to gain the sympathy and support of all. Evidently it does not depend on the conqueror dealing with mediocre adversaries or remarkable ones. But the contrast between Cyrus and the two other leaders does not come from just the caprices of their nature. It is also explained by

the different educations they received. Whereas Cyrus learned endurance and justice, Cyaxares developed a taste for pleasure and the future king of Assyria gave in to his natural violence. A leader who has received a good *παιδεία* in an isonomic *πολιτεία* has good chances of showing himself superior, as much in combat as in the management of men, over badly educated rivals in despotic regimes. If we compare this general lesson of the *Cyropaedia* with the contemporary situation through which Xenophon lived, we come away with the impression that for Xenophon, the conquest of a decadent Persian Empire would not have been difficult or impossible for a Greek leader with talent and good education.

Alexander's conquest on many points recalls the *Cyropaedia*.³⁹ Alexander's strategy, like Cyrus', was founded on speed and surprise. Like Cyrus, Alexander constantly used prizes to keep up the obedience of his soldiers; like him, he treated prisoners with magnanimity—particularly those of high rank;⁴⁰ and like him, he took noble enemies who had rallied to him into his entourage, in order to encourage more defections.

If the military and psychological qualities manifested by Alexander in conquest recall those of Xenophon's Cyrus, Alexander appears to have enjoyed, from the outset, advantages more significant than Cyrus'. His men were more numerous. As King of the Macedonians and Hegemon of the League of Corinth, he was automatically sole chief of the expedition; by his side he had no Cyaxares he needed gradually to separate himself from.⁴¹ It seems that at the beginning of the *Cyropaedia*, Xenophon placed Cyrus in the most difficult conditions that were still compatible with his success. In that way, the demonstrative value of

³⁹ It would be tempting to explain these similarities *a priori* by the influence of the *Cyrop.* on the historiography of Alexander: Arrian is a great admirer of Xenophon (Brunt, 1976, XIII). But the explanation would be insufficient: the parallels are too numerous and most often involve incontestable historical facts about Alexander. It is not to be ruled out that in some cases, Alexander deliberately imitated Xenophon's Cyrus. But most often, the resemblances appear to be explained by an identity of situation. They are proofs of Xenophon's *lucidity*.

⁴⁰ Plut., *Moralia*, 522a already compares Cyrus' attitude to Panthea with Alexander's to Darius' wife.

⁴¹ Although less powerful, the Greek cities showed themselves to be more difficult allies for Alexander than Cyaxares for Cyrus. Alexander, throughout his expedition, always feared a revolt in his rear. Xenophon's Cyrus had as allies and adversaries only kings whom he starves of the affection of their people—never free people.

the work attains a peak: if Cyrus succeeded, a leader with the same talent placed in better conditions must also succeed, *a fortiori*.

THE IMPERIAL MONARCHY⁴²

After the taking of Babylon, Cyrus offers the first fruits of the booty to the gods and divides out among them the sanctuaries of the city,⁴³ then distributes to his companions houses and official residences (VII, 5, 35–6). Then he introduces new customs ‘because he now desired to present himself too as he judged appropriate for a king’ (ἐπιθυμῶν ὁ Κῦρος ἤδη κατασκευάσασθαι καὶ αὐτὸς ὡς βασιλεῖ ἡγείτο πρέπειν VII, 5, 37). This is the first time Xenophon gives Cyrus the title ‘king’. But in Persia, Cambyses still rules; Cyrus is still only a prince-in-waiting. The context explains the use of the word: kingship is the part of the booty that Cyrus gives himself. Cyrus succeeds the king that he vanquished in Babylon.⁴⁴ His kingly power is founded

⁴² To designate the territory of the empire, as well as the power of Cyrus, Xenophon uses the general and traditional term ‘rule’ ἀρχή, sometimes qualified by the adjective ‘great’ (VIII, 1, 13 for example). In *Cyrop.*, there are no specialized expressions for a territorial empire or imperial monarchy. Nevertheless, the absence of a specific term does not prevent Xenophon emphasizing the originality of Cyrus’ monarchy, either the size of his domain, its structures or methods. Similarly, Alexander and the Diadochi, who will create new types of monarchies, will be happy with the traditional terms ‘rule’ and ‘kingship’.

⁴³ To proceed with this distribution, Cyrus summoned the *magoi* (VII, 5, 35). In other words, he gave the sanctuaries of the Babylonian gods to the Iranian ones. This sectarian attitude was in contradiction to the tolerant religious policy of the historical Cyrus, who was warmly welcomed by the Babylonian clergy and whom the *Cylinder* celebrates as protected of Marduk. Unlike the historical Cyrus, and Alexander, Xenophon’s Cyrus does not seem to have sought the support of the clergy of the vanquished people, nor the recognition of religious indigenous traditions. His brutal attitude appears to be inspired on the one hand by a sincere but narrow-minded piety—the wish to have *his* gods profit from *his* victory—and on the other hand, by a desire for propaganda for the sole benefit of his Persian and Mede companions. On this religious issue, Xenophon’s conceptions remain far from Alexander’s.

⁴⁴ It is the victory *over a king* that secures royalty for Cyrus. Given this, it is not appropriate to push too far the comparison with the Diadochi, who saw in their *victory* a sufficient reason to proclaim themselves kings. Cyrus is more like Alexander in posing as successor of Darius III than Antigonus and Demetrios in having themselves proclaimed kings after their victory in Cyprus.

on the right of the conquest. A little later (VII, 5, 57), he installs himself in the royal palace of Babylon, thereby making his new position clear to the eyes of the world.

For Xenophon's Cyrus, some pomp is 'appropriate' (πρέπειν) to kingship. The verb must be understood in its strongest sense; the absence of any pomp and circumstance would be *inappropriate* and shocking. If Cyrus 'desired' to adopt customs that emphasize the majesty of his royal power, it is not by whim of vanity, it was because he sees in the etiquette and in the 'magnificence' (σεμνότης) of his external appearance an important feature of the kingship that he was establishing, because he thought that a king must 'bewitch' his subjects with the use of artifices (καταγοητεύειν VII, I, 40).

The traditions that Cyrus wishes to introduce are very far from the traditional simplicity of Persian kingship, and from the familiarity that was the rule in the army.⁴⁵ Cyrus fears provoking hostile reactions in his entourage if he seeks to *impose* such innovations. He prefers to act 'with the assent of his friends'; this is why he has 'recourse to stratagems' (VII, 5, 37). One morning, Cyrus takes his seat in a public place that is very crowded and gives audience to all who approach; the crowds swell; those of his friends who are making a path through to him do not manage to speak with him. The next morning, the crowd is even denser. Cyrus thinks that this has shown that it was physically impossible to offer everyone an audience, and that in trying to be accessible to all, he deprives his friends of his company and himself of all leisure. He suggests that from now on those who want to obtain something from him be obliged to use as an intermediary one of his friends (VII, 5, 45). This is a skilful way to introduce the hierarchical administration he wanted to create; he agreeably emphasizes the increased influence that those close to him

⁴⁵ Like Xenophon's Cyrus, Alexander also wishes to install eastern protocols contrary to Macedonian traditions. He struck lively resistance, as witnessed by the attitudes of a Cleitus or a Callisthenes. This could give the impression that Xenophon exaggerated Cyrus' power and the naiveté of his companions. Nevertheless, two trends of dissatisfaction that irritated Alexander's Macedonians are spared to Cyrus' companions. Alexander is sometimes suspected of preferring the Persians to his Companions, but after the victory Cyrus no longer looked for any new allies: his reforms reinforced the privileges of the old companions. Further, Cyrus avoided appearing to impinge on the divine domain: he fancied himself neither god nor son of god.

would have over other subjects, but avoids mentioning the increased authority that he will exercise over them. Artabazus, Chrysantas, and many other speakers ask that Cyrus make himself less accessible (VII, 5, 48–57). The trick works. Cyrus has his hands free to organize the government of his empire as he intends it.

The institutions created by Cyrus, that is to say, the court (VIII, 1, 5 ff.), the royal guard (VII, 5, 59 ff.), processions (VIII, 3, 34), satraps (VIII, 6, 1–13), ‘eyes of the king’ (VIII, 2, 10; VIII, 6, 16), and the postal system (VIII, 6, 17 sq.)—were maintained by his successors (VIII, 1, 7); they are still in place in the Persian empire of Xenophon’s own day. Their quite detailed description is not for all that just a simple description in the *Cyropaedia*: by showing how and why Cyrus established the main features of the Persian regime, Xenophon gives them an exemplary value. All organizational measures taken by Cyrus were perfectly logical: they all unfold from the very existence of an empire. For instance, a great empire needs a numerous, hierarchical, and centralized administration, functioning as an army on the battlefield; each person transmits orders from the king to the echelon next down, so that decisions are quickly executed and the king retains the leisure necessary for the coordination of the whole (VIII, 1, 14). Likewise, to limit possible insubordination, it is fitting in an empire to divide the powers of public officials; this Cyrus did, notably avoiding giving the satraps the command of the garrisons installed in strategic places (VIII, 6, 1).

In the last two books of the *Cyropaedia*, Xenophon suggests that a vast empire can only be ruled by an absolute monarchy centralized in the Persian fashion. An eventual Greek conqueror of Asia would not escape this necessity.

Even more than the institutional structures created by Cyrus, Xenophon insists on the *psychological measures* that Cyrus used to ensure his domination.

The day after his victory, Cyrus’ power was resisted by some of the vanquished people, who were subjected only by force (I, 1, 4–5). He came up particularly against the hostility of the Babylonians: it is one of the reasons for which he gave himself a large guard (VII, 5, 59). On the eve of his death, to the contrary, all the peoples of his empire call him ‘father’: ‘it was a name’, Xenophon notes, ‘which clearly belongs more to a benefactor than to a destroyer’, τοῦτο δὲ τοῦνομα δῆλον ὅτι

εὐεργετοῦντός ἐστι μᾶλλον ἢ ἀφαιρουμένου (VIII, 2, 9). This change in the opinion of the vanquished people, a psychological achievement, is explained by the peace and security which Cyrus guarantees his whole empire (VIII, 1, 45), his particular care for farmers,⁴⁶ and by the care he took of those he destines for slavery, εἰς τὸ δουλεῦν (VIII, 1, 43). This last trait brings out the ambiguity of Cyrus' 'benevolence' toward dependent people: he certainly tries to get their gratitude, but even more so to make them weak and to maintain them in subjection.

Xenophon's Cyrus never envisages erasing the distinction between conquerors and conquered. The idea of a 'fusion of races' or even of a fusion of elites is totally alien to the *Cyropaedia*.⁴⁷ Not only did Cyrus *not* seek to establish a partnership between all his subjects, he takes pains to maintain tensions between conquerors and conquered peoples, dominators and dominated. Twice (VII, 5, 36; VII, 5, 72–3), he vigorously proclaims that the goods and the peoples who have been vanquished belong to the victors.⁴⁸ The vanquished people are often called slaves (δοῦλοι) who are 'our workers and tribute-payers' (ἐργάται ἡμέτεροι καὶ δασμοφόροι VII, 5, 79); one must avoid giving them the skill or the practice of war (VII, 5, 79); at most they served as valets (VIII, 1, 43). In Cyrus' empire, at least as it is depicted by Xenophon, a thin layer of managers monopolize all activities of war and live off a mass of subjugated peasants. Such social relationships evoke Sparta: the 'workers and tribute-payers' resemble the helots, even if they are treated with much more care and attention.

⁴⁶ In the midst of war, Cyrus had proposed a peace to his Assyrian adversary, in which the two pledged not to devastate the crops, and in a more general way, to spare the peasants the regular sufferings of war (V, 4, 24–8).

⁴⁷ Cyrus' entourage was certainly cosmopolitan, as a result of repeated alliances (not only Persians and Medes, but Armenians like Tigranes, Assyrians like Gadatas and Gobryas...), but, after the conquest, Cyrus sees no need to integrate the elite of the vanquished peoples into the managing class of his empire. The 'politic of fusion' and the universalist views that Tarn, 1948, attributed to Alexander are controversial: Badian, 1966, 287–306 esp.

⁴⁸ Cyrus' insistence and even the terms of VII, 5, 73 give the impression that Cyrus seeks to calm the scruples of some of his companions: 'Let none among you think that he holds the good of others. You will commit no injustice in keeping what you have.' It is probable that in the fourth century voices were being raised in Greece to contest the absolute right of conquest and this passage echoes these debates: Ducrey, 1963, 231–43.

This domination of a small elite over the masses is extremely vulnerable; as Cyrus said to his 'friends and allies', 'it is a greater task to maintain an empire than it is to conquer one' (VII, 5, 76). There could be no question of relaxing the effort and discipline of wartime. The very fragility of the empire was one of the facts that assured the king the obedience of the conquerors. In Cyrus' empire, collective domination of the Persians and some of the allies was not a corollary, as in Sparta, of equality and solidarity inside a dominant group, but, on the contrary, of the submission to the absolute government of a single man. From high officials to enslaved peoples, all Cyrus' subjects owe him unwavering obedience. In the *Cyropaedia*, what distinguishes free men (ἐλεύθεροι) from slaves (δοῦλοι) is not the fact that some have a master, and others do not, it is that they get different sorts of orders from the same master. So Cyrus remarks to his satraps, to make them proud, that he does not prescribe for 'slaves' (τοῖς δούλοις) any of the rules he has just given them (VIII, 6, 13). The privilege of the members of the dominant group is to be found in the power and the need to *imitate the king* (VIII, 1, 23–30) instead of taking on the chores of production.⁴⁹

⁴⁹ To encourage his companions to accept Cyrus' authority, Chrysantas declared that slaves serve their masters unwillingly (ἄκοντες) whereas free men obey orders they approve willingly (ἐκόντες VIII, I, 4). The argument is good, but the criterion of willing obedience does not establish a neat distinction between free men and slaves; a master always wants to get the willing obedience of his slaves, and a sovereign can sometimes be obliged to force certain 'free men' in his entourage to obey (see p. 354). In *Oec.* XIII, 7–9, Xenophon distinguishes two types of impulse to obey: some men are only sensible once their stomachs have been filled; for them ['animal education'] *θηρίωδης παιδεία* must be applied and they must be recompensed with gifts of food; others need compliments and satisfaction of *amour-propre*. But the distinction between 'animal' natures and ['honour-loving men'] *φιλότιμοι* does not cover the difference between freemen and slaves: all servants spoken about in the course of *Oec.* are slaves. The strategy on Cyrus' tables merits even greater attention. Cyrus often gave his servants dishes from his own table thinking that this attitude would attract their affection 'as it does with dogs too'. He also sent his friends food from his tables to honour them and augment their prestige in the eyes of the multitude. If the passage ended here, we might think that the servants, like dogs, were sensitive to the material aspect of the gifts, whereas Cyrus' companions were sensitive to the honorific effect of the 'generosity'. But the next part of the text considerably weakens this opposition. If everyone praised the dishes of the royal table so highly, it is because of the pleasure they get: the specialization of chores between the chefs permitted each to attain perfection (VIII, 2, 5–6). There is therefore no discontinuity between dogs and

In the *Cyropaedia*, the group of conquerors is linked to Cyrus through gratitude and the threat of a revolt of the conquered peoples. This collective attachment is not sufficient for Cyrus, who also seeks to establish strong personal links between himself and each of his 'friends'.

Some years after the conquest, Xenophon's Cyrus no longer fears individuals belonging to the subjected peoples: they were 'without courage or organization' and moreover they never approached him (VIII, I, 45). On the contrary, the great men, those on whom Cyrus conferred commands⁵⁰ could come to think that they were 'fit to rule' and aspire to supreme power; they had armed forces and were in contact with the king's guards (VIII, I, 46). The king could not 'separate himself from them' nor disarm them without putting the whole empire at risk (VIII, I, 47).⁵¹ For the king, they were at the same time a danger and an indispensable support. It was therefore essential to the king to gain and retain their *empathy*.

great men of the empire: for all, the good food was an excellent stimulus to obey. The only criterion in *Cyrop.* that distinguishes free men and slaves is difference in activity. If we adopt the traditional Greek criterion of political participation, it is very evident that in the Persian empire, 'all are slaves but one'. Xenophon develops this idea in *Hell.* VI, 1, 12.

⁵⁰ Luccioni, 1947, 240, thinks that in this passage Xenophon treats Cyrus' attitude toward the *nobles among the conquered people*. A precise analysis of the text encourages rejection of this. First, Xenophon opposes ['subjects'] *καταστροφέντες* to ['men of power'] *κράτιστοι*, without distinguishing two categories of subjects. Second, these *κράτιστοι* (VIII, 1, 46) have military commands; these functions are, after the victory, reserved for the victors (VII, 5). Last, the remark on the *κράτιστοι*, that he must manage them (VIII, 1, 46–8), serves to introduce the detailed treatment of Cyrus' generosity (VIII, 2, 1–23); it would be strange if Cyrus' 'generosity with gifts' profited the nobles among conquered people rather than his own friends. The return to the 'attentions' lavished by Cyrus on his friends when he could not yet satisfy them with gifts (VIII, 2, 13) seems to indicate that Xenophon speaks throughout of Cyrus' companions in combat promoted to high functions after the conquest.

⁵¹ The relationships of an imperial monarch with his friends recall those of a tyrant with his fellow-citizens; it is difficult for him to let them live, and it is difficult to kill them. Xenophon develops this in *Hiero*, VI, 15, in one of his favoured equestrian comparisons: 'it is, as if we had a horse, from which we fear some irreparable damage; we would have trouble killing him because of his qualities, but we would also have trouble letting him live and making use of him, because of the worry we would always have of him doing some irreparable damage in the midst of danger'. In all cases, for the king, the tyrant or the horseman, the solution is the same: to accommodate those who are both indispensable and dangerous.

In his talk with his son Cambyses on the eve of his death—his political testament—Cyrus declares that ‘loyal friends are for kings the truest and surest sceptre’ (VIII, 7, 13). ‘Men,’ he adds, ‘are not naturally loyal’—the passage echoes the themes of the prologue—‘we do not gain them by violence (σὺν τῇ βίᾳ), but rather by doing good by them (σὺν τῇ εὐεργεσίᾳ)’.

One of Cyrus’ great principles was that if we wish to win friendship, it is necessary first to give it: men in general only love if they themselves feel loved (VIII, 2, 1). Before the taking of Babylon, Cyrus, because of his poverty, had to be content to show his ‘goodwill’ (εὐνοία) in small gestures, notably by sharing the pleasures and pains of each man. Wealth considerably increases his abilities to be a benefactor (εὐεργέτης). His generosity with gifts (VIII, 2, 7) is not only a character trait, but also a method of government. This is what emerges from the dialogue between Cyrus and Croesus (VIII, 2, 15–23). Croesus reproached Cyrus for impoverishing himself by distributing his riches to his companions. To prove he is wrong, Cyrus sends Hystaspes to his friends, to request money for an urgent enterprise; the total that his friends are ready to give him is much more than he would have been able to hoard (VIII, 2, 16–18). So Xenophon’s Cyrus believes to have shown that generosity enriches a man more than avarice does. This anecdote shows further that Cyrus’ friends could, if he had need, respond to his gifts with their own, more valuable ones. In fact, Cyrus is careful not to abuse this possibility. What he most wants to gain in his gifts was the ‘goodwill and friendship’ (εὐνοία, φιλία) of his beneficiaries. What is more, he tries to surpass his friends in good deeds (VIII, 2, 13); thus, those who were *obliged* (in the full sense of the term) permanently have a *debt* of gratitude towards him.

Euergetism is indispensable to an absolute king. But according to the *Cyropaedia*, it does not seem sufficient to ensure the loyalty of the prominent men. Generosity does not always win gratitude. Ingratitude exists, which leads to insolence and vice (I, 2, 8).⁵² This is why

⁵² In traditional Persian education, acts of ingratitude receive exemplary punishment (I, 2, 7). It is probable that this measure was revived in the *παιδεία* instituted by Cyrus in his court (VII, 5, 86). Hemardinquer, 1872, 137 f. has justly emphasized the scandal that ingratitude represents in *Cyrop.*: ‘there is no vice more odious to Xenophon. This is not only because it wounds justice, but because it reverses all

Cyrus carefully supervises his friends, his officials, and the whole managing elite. All those held in honour (ἐντιμοί), if not on a mission, must attend court each day (VIII, 1, 6).⁵³ Any absence is attributed to debauchery, base motives, forgetfulness of duty, and provokes investigation (VIII, 1, 16). To bring a negligent courtier back to court, Cyrus first uses circuitous means. For example, he tells a loyal friend to take possession of some property belonging to the absent one; this absent one then comes to complain to the king, who makes him wait and thus accustoms him to 'keep court' (θεραπεύειν) (VIII, 1, 17–18). Another way of encouraging the attendance of his courtiers was to distribute the positions of favour only to those who were present (VIII, 1, 19). If these gentle measures fail, the king deprives the absent one of his goods and gives them to someone else 'in order to make a useful friend in place of an useless one' (VIII, 1, 20).⁵⁴ The court is evidently the place best adapted for the king to control the highest officials, but royal surveillance is widespread. Each satrap has a court that imitates the royal court down to the smallest details in his province; he watches over his subordinates and informs the king by letter about them; inspectors come often to verify that he is faithfully fulfilling all his duties (VIII, 6, 16). Moreover, Cyrus' 'generosity' means that no information escapes him: knowing that interesting information wins rewards, many people made themselves the 'eyes of the king'. As the king's informants are numerous and no external signs make them recognized, they are imagined to be everywhere. No one dares to speak ill of the king, no one plots against him; each behaves as though he is present (VIII, 2,

the theories that are so dear to our author on the necessity of commanding and obeying. Ingratitude is at once revolt and a confession of inferiority. It escapes the legitimate link of obligation. . . . The ingrate is beyond the pale, and we do not know where to place him.'

⁵³ When he establishes his court, Cyrus asks his companions to watch him as he watches them; thus, he says, the Persian tradition will be upheld (VII, 5, 85). This is a false symmetry and an illusory continuity. Cyrus' courtiers could not inflict any *sanction* on him while he has many means to maintain them or to bring them back to the right path. Whatever he does, it is evident that in Babylon, Cyrus does not risk being whipped as when he was only a Persian prince (I, 3, 18).

⁵⁴ In the regime Xenophon describes in *Cyrop.*, the king appears to retain the right of ownership over all the goods of the empire—notably the land. When he grants a domain, it is only a tenuous title; the concessions thus accorded to those close to the king are similar to the Lagid δωρεαί.

10–12). Everyone being suspicious of everyone else assures the security of the king.

Even though Xenophon's Cyrus uses very little violence and even though he takes great care not to offend any sensitivities, *fear* was one of the main sources of his power.

To better assure his domination, Xenophon's Cyrus also likes to maintain rivalry between the high officials in a methodical way. To do this, he can take advantage of a natural penchant in those with ambition. Those who want to have first place—that is to say, in a monarchy where all depends on the king, those who wish to rank first in the king's affection (οἱ πρωτεύειν δὲ βουλόμενοι φιλία παρὰ Κύρῳ, VIII, 2, 28)—most of the time also wish to get rid of their rivals rather than unite with them to achieve their ends. This universal tendency is encouraged in the *Cyropaedia* by various stratagems. Cyrus himself avoids judging disputes among the nobles. He prefers to ask the two parties to choose arbiters among his most influential friends. Inevitably the arbiters run afoul of the party they ruled against, without winning the other, who thinks he owes his success only to his being in the right (VIII, 2, 27). Likewise, the order of guests at the royal table, which reflects the esteem in which Cyrus held each of his companions, does not fail to arouse feelings of envy. So that Hystaspes is stunned that Chrysantas is better placed than he (VIII, 4, 9); but Cyrus explains to him that Chrysantas showed himself more eager in his service. The order of the royal table being mutable (VIII, 4, 3–5), each could hope to supplant his better-placed friends, and each was fearful of being downgraded in favour of another. The instability of placement guarantees permanent rivalry. Finally, games and competitions, which already held an important place in traditional Persian education and in Cyrus' training of the army (II, 1, 22, esp.), see their role considerably modified. When he departed for Assyria, Cyrus was not unhappy to put an end to the training of troops in Media; the competitions he had created ended by stirring jealousies among the soldiers, which Cyrus viewed as a threat to the cohesion of his army (III, 2, 10). But, in the court that Cyrus organized in Babylon, competitions aim less to encourage virtue than to provoke 'quarrels and jealousies' among the prominent men (VIII, 2, 26). What was once a drawback becomes the main

aim. An absolute monarch needs a certain amount of discord among his friends.

By all these procedures, Cyrus ensured that 'all the prominent men had more affection for him than they did for each other': *τοὺς κρατίστους αὐτὸν μᾶλλον πάντας φιλεῖν ἢ ἀλλήλους* (VIII, 1, 48; VIII, 2, 28). This formula, whose repetition is significant, is a good summary of the policy that Xenophon gives Cyrus. The king of the *Cyropaedia* wants to be loved as a father, a benefactor, and as a model of all the virtues (VIII, 1, 23–30); he wishes everything to be expected of him and everyone to feel supervised by him. He wishes to be the centre of life, thought, and the feelings of the people. To this end, the best companion, the most zealous, the most loyal and obedient, is the one who is, like Artabazus, a *lover* of the king.

To make such an effect on his subjects is not enough for the king: attachment to him in each of his subjects must come before all other feelings. Not only is Cyrus preferred over friends, but also, thanks to his generosity, over brothers, fathers, and children (VIII, 2, 9). It is even more advantageous, from his perspective, that friendship for the king be the only emotional attachment in the individual. This is why eunuchs are so appreciated by Cyrus—they have no wives or children, but are entirely devoted to their benefactor (VII, 5, 58 ff.) Eunuchs are ideal subjects only because the Cyrus of the *Cyropaedia* aspired to *total domination*.

All Greek political thinkers of the fourth century opposed royalty to tyranny, but the criteria varied from author to author, and even from one work to another. But none of them permits unhesitating classification of the regime of the *Cyropaedia* into one or the other category.

One of the most noted differences between a king and a tyrant is that the former serves the interests of the ruled, while the latter serves only his own interest.⁵⁵ Xenophon's Cyrus clearly acts as a benefactor, but this is less due to disinterested devotion in ensuring the welfare of the people, than an attempt to gain their sympathy and retain their obedience. He acts as a king, but his reasons are those of a shrewd tyrant.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ Esp. Arist., *NE* VIII 12 1160ab, *Pol.* III 7 1279b10. On the classification of constitutions and the criteria, see esp. Romilly, 1959, 81–99.

⁵⁶ In many ways, Cyrus follows the advice that Simonides gives Hiero in *Hiero* VIII–XI. On the methods of shrewd tyrants, see also Arist., *Pol.* V 11 1314a29–1315b34.

In *Memorabilia* (IV, 6, 12), Xenophon himself gives Socrates two criteria to distinguish royalty from tyranny: 'rule over consenting people (ἐκόντων τε τῶν ἀνθρώπων) according to the laws of cities (κατὰ νόμους τῶν πόλεων)' is 'kingship'; 'rule over those unwilling (ἀκόντων) and not according to laws (μὴ κατὰ νόμους), but to the whim of the ruler', is 'tyranny'.

Like a real king, on every occasion Cyrus eagerly and persistently seeks the willing obedience of his subjects; in general, he is successful. Nevertheless, he also makes special efforts to frighten into obedience those who could be tempted towards insubordination. Cyrus is a king who does not overlook certain traditional methods of tyrants, for example, the use of many informers (VIII, 2, 10–12). He wins thus the advantages of a king—the sympathy of his subjects—and those of a tyrant—fear. He tries to use only the former, but he keeps the latter in reserve. The composition of Cyrus' guard reveals the ambiguous nature of his power according to traditional Greek criteria: it consists of Persians—a royal trait—but also eunuchs who serve for pay—a tyrannical trait.

With respect to laws, it is clear that *in the government of his empire*, Cyrus—unlike in the Persian *kingdom* properly called—is not subject to any law external to himself; he himself *is* the law, 'law that sees and watches' (βλέπων νόμος VIII, 1, 22). If we refer back to the second criterion defined in the *Memorabilia*, we may be tempted to conclude that for Xenophon, Cyrus' imperial monarchy is a tyranny. A passage in the *Cyropaedia* perhaps confirms this point. The power established by Cyrus after the conquest is, due to its absolutism, quite close to that of Median kingship: and that is called 'tyrannical' (I, 3, 18). Moreover, the expression βλέπων νόμος recalls the argument of Plato's *Statesman*. In the *Statesman* (294a–297a), Plato forcefully proclaims the superiority of the philosopher-king over the law. The law, general and inflexible, is poorly adapted to the extreme mobility of human situations; only a king who is gifted in knowledge of the Good and of sure judgement could, according to the circumstances, make decisions that would realize justice in the city and assure the happiness of the governed people. It is possible that in this passage of the *Cyropaedia*, Xenophon echoes those who saw in the will of a king, a principle equal to, if not superior to, the law.

The regime established by Cyrus is very ambiguous in terms of traditional Greek ideas. Unlike the Assyrian king, Cyrus does not correspond to the usual image of a tyrant; he is not an envious man 'who spends his time hating those he suspects of being greater than he is' (V, 4, 5).⁵⁷ But neither is he a king, who is subject to the laws.

The imperial monarchy of Xenophon's Cyrus is very close to the 'ideal type' of 'absolute kingship' (παμβασιλεία) defined by Aristotle in the *Politics*: this is a limited case, the government 'in which a single man is master of all (ὅταν ἡ πάντων κύριος εἴς ὧν), just as each nation and each city is master of the public interest (ὥσπερ ἕκαστον ἔθνος καὶ πόλις ἐκάστη τῶν κοινῶν)' (*Politics*, III, 14, 1285b29–30). Aristotle goes on to compare this absolute kingship to rule of a household: 'as domestic government is a kind of kingship of a house, so too is παμβασιλεία a kind of domestic government over one or many cities, over one or many peoples' (*Politics*, III, 14, 1285b, 30).

Absolute monarchy is, in the etymological sense of the term, a *despotic* government. The comparison of the Persian Empire to a well-managed household is developed at length in the *Oeconomicus*, in which Xenophon's Socrates gives the Great King as an example to Critobulus (IV, 4–11). In the *Cyropaedia*, Cyrus governs his empire as Ischomachus administers his estate in the *Oeconomicus*. Like a master of a household, Xenophon's Cyrus has a limitless authority over the goods of the land and its people: 'he watches over everything and cares for everything as a father does'.⁵⁸

As in all Xenophon's works, it seems that in the *Cyropaedia* we are able to distinguish two main types of rule: the rule of a household on one hand, benevolent but absolute, and the rule of a polis on the other, which is ruled by laws and controlled by citizens. Traditional Persian kingship belongs to the second type, but Cyrus' imperial power belongs to the first. The transformation is in no way random. Xenophon's narrative strives to show that the establishment of an absolute regime is the logical consequence of conquest: the inhabitants of an immense

⁵⁷ The traditional image of the tyrant is already in Herodotus, esp. III 80 and V 92.

⁵⁸ Aristotle opposes paternal authority plainly to that of a master over a slave; the father seeks the child's interests, the master uses the slave as a simple instrument (*Pol.* 1253b). For Aristotle, a king's authority is like a father's, not a master's (*Pol.* 1259b, esp.). On the contrary, in Xenophon, the king is compared sometimes to a master, sometimes to a father (esp. VIII, 1, 1; VIII, 1, 44).

empire do not know how to form a political community; to administer a very vast territory, a central authority of uncontested and unlimited power is indispensable. The government of an empire is very close to that of a household and is very far from that of a city.

Does Xenophon wish to indicate that after the Greek conquest of Asia the Greeks should relinquish their traditional constitutions and submit to an absolute monarch? The narrative of Cyrus' time in Persia (VIII, 5, 21–7) throws some light on this. Before entering his homeland, he leaves most of his troops on the borders (VIII, 5, 21). His father, Cambyses, gathers the elders and the magistrates and announces to them that, in accordance with tradition, Cyrus will succeed him as king of the Persians. He asks the Persians to continue to stand by Cyrus and asks Cyrus himself 'not to rule the Persians like other peoples' (II, 5, 24). An exchange of oaths takes place: Cyrus will defend Persia against all invasions and maintain the traditional laws; the Persians will recognize Cyrus as their king and help him to maintain his empire (VIII, 5, 24–7).⁵⁹ At first sight this episode appears likely to reassure the Greeks: even after the conquest, they can keep their *πολιτεία*; the conqueror could easily be the absolute monarch of Asia and remain a simple military leader in his own city. Several details serve to nuance this optimistic interpretation. First, the institution of such an oath aims to appease the Persians' concern about Cyrus' power, which unbalances the traditional relationship between the king and his fellow-citizens; the maintenance of the *πολιτεία* is quite fragile, because it depends from then on entirely on the piety and loyalty of the king. In addition, Cambyses declares that Cyrus will perform the traditional sacrifices 'each time that he came to Persia' and that another member of the royal family will be given this function in his absence (VIII, 5, 26). Implicitly Cambyses seems to consider it evident that even when he is king of the Persians, Cyrus will maintain the centre of his power in Babylon⁶⁰ and be

⁵⁹ This oath recalls the oath exchanged every month in Sparta between the ephors and each of the kings (Xen., *Lac. Pol.* XV, 7). However, the resemblance is quite superficial: unlike the Persians, the Spartans had sufficient power to *impose* respect of their oaths on their kings.

⁶⁰ A little later, Cyrus gave himself three capital cities: according to the seasons, he lived in Susa, Ectabana, or Babylon (VIII, 6, 22). None of these three cities was in Persia. Alexander, like Cyrus, it seemed, had as a goal the establishment of his capital

satisfied with occasional visits to his native country. In other words, the Persians will have a non-resident king. After the conquest, the country of the conqueror is only a privileged annex of the empire. Finally and most importantly, Cyrus exercises a kingship limited by the traditional laws only over the Persians who stayed in Persia. The Persians who followed him and formed an important part of his army and administration are subject to absolute monarchy in the same way as the others held in honour (*ἐντιμοί*). The *Cyropaedia* suggests that after an eventual conquest of Asia, the Greeks would only have the choice, in the best of cases, between two possibilities: either to remain in Greece and live as a free citizen, though it be in obscurity and often in poverty, or to put themselves in the service of a new monarch and take riches and honours in return for unceasing obedience.

Unlike Isocrates, Xenophon did not imagine within the empire the formation of colonies along the lines of traditional Greek cities.⁶¹ It would be entirely insufficient to attribute this difference to the fact that there were no such colonies in the Persian Empire: if he had wished it, Xenophon could easily have distanced himself from the reality of history in this as he does on other points. If he did not imagine Persian colonies in Cyrus' empire, it was because such islands of liberty would contradict the fundamental premises of Cyrus' absolute monarchy.⁶² In particular, these would create between *ἐντιμοί* links of friendship likely to dangerously challenge attachment to the king. As discord among the privileged members of the court declines, the risk of plots against the king grows.

in the centre of his conquest—probably in Babylon. This intention aroused a passionate discontent among his Macedonian troops, who wished to go back to Pella with their king (Arrian, *Anab.* VII 8, Curtius, X, 2, 12).

⁶¹ So Isocrates advises Philip to 'take Asia from Cilicia to Sinope...to found πόλεις in this country and establish everyone there who wander now lacking livelihood and harm all those they meet' (*Philip*, 120, trans. Mathieu).

⁶² Bickermann, 1938, 157–76 esp.: the Achaemenid empire, like the Seleucid empire was a loose conglomerate of people and cities. In the narrative of conquest, Xenophon shows several times that Cyrus recognized local political units (III, 1, 2: the Armenian kingdom; VII, 4, 2: Cypriots and Cilicians; VII, 4, 3: Carians). In the description of Cyrus' empire, however, Xenophon never mentions the traditional communities and presents a centralized monarchy where all power emanates from the king. The Persian regime of the *Cyrop.* is more absolute than the historical one.

From the narrative of the *Cyropaedia* it is clear that conquest brings with it the development of imperial monarchy with absolute powers. They are interdependent. It is incongruous to wish for conquest but to refuse imperial power. One must accept monarchy or refuse conquest. This fundamental point being duly emphasized, at first glance Xenophon seems to be in favour of conquest and of its political results.

All the measures Cyrus took are presented in a laudatory tone. Xenophon's Cyrus knows only success throughout his reign. Xenophon even attributes the conquest of Egypt to him (VIII, 6, 20), which, according to other sources, will be the achievement of his son Cambyses. In Xenophon's account, Cyrus never falls into excess, he never forgets that he is a man, and he never encroaches on the prerogatives of the gods (VIII, 7, 3). He escapes the necessity of absolute power outlined by Herodotus' Otanes: the best man in the world, invested with unchecked authority, would be put 'outside his customary thoughts' and led by his prosperity to excess (*ὑβρῖς*) and envy (*φθόρος*) (Herodotus, III, 80). Xenophon's Cyrus does not perish under the blows of the Massagetae as in the tradition reported by Herodotus (I, 214).⁶³ He dies quietly, at the end of a long life, in the midst of general concern (VIII, 7). Given the evidence, Xenophon is not hostile towards Cyrus; what is more, absolute monarchy—patriarchal power extended out to the dimensions of empire—visibly fascinates the author of *Oeconomicus*. Could we therefore conclude that Xenophon is producing *propaganda* for the conquest; that he invites his readers to become the rich and honoured servants of a Greek monarch installed in Asia?

A number of passages from *Cyropaedia* throw some doubts onto this interpretation of the author's intentions. Xenophon insists on some aspects of Cyrus' monarchy at length that are offensive to all Greeks—for example, the eunuchs (VII, 5, 58–65), the informers

⁶³ This defeat of Cyrus puts an end to his career as a conquering king and appears to have been mentioned deliberately by the enemies of absolute monarchy. In the speech he makes to Alexander and the Macedonians to oppose *proskynesis*, Callisthenes declares that the Scythians, 'these poor but independent men' brought Cyrus, the founder of *proskynesis*, 'to his senses' (Arrian, *Anab.* IV, 11, 9). This discourse is probably largely fictitious, but it still bears witness to the role played by Cyrus in the polemics of the Hellenistic and Roman era about monarchy.

(VIII, 2, 10–12). This could be provocation, a sort of challenge to common opinion as when, in the *Republic of the Lacedaemonians*, Xenophon praises the complacency of Spartan husbands or the theft of the young Spartans.⁶⁴ The caution that Xenophon shows in the rest of the work, especially in the prologue, encourages rejection of this hypothesis. It is much more probable that the praise of Cyrus' monarchy is in large part *ironical*. Without any explicit criticism, Xenophon reminds his reader, through a series of suggestive hints, that absolute monarchy is not an agreeable regime.⁶⁵ This way, he can even make his reader question the interest in conquest: was it desirable to conquer a vast empire if the conquest necessarily brought with it the introduction of despotic government?

THE DECADENCE OF THE PERSIAN EMPIRE

Even if the *Cyropaedia* did end with Cyrus' death, we could not be sure that it is a work of propaganda in favour of conquest. The epilogue (VIII, 8), dedicated to the decadence of the empire Cyrus founded, is such as to reinforce scepticism.

The authenticity of the final chapter of the *Cyropaedia* has sometimes been contested, but the language, the style, and its preoccupations carry Xenophon's mark.⁶⁶ The problem is then to clarify the

⁶⁴ *Lac. Pol.* I, 3–9; II, 7–9; Strauss, 1939, suggests that such eulogies are ironical and that the work is in large part a 'masked satire of Sparta', full of winks directed at the Athenian audience. The idea, based on a subtle and precise analysis of the texts, is quite attractive. The principal argument that is brought against it is biographical: Xenophon, who depended on Sparta, could not permit himself such an 'exercise of insolence' (Delebecque, 1957, 194 sq.). But one would have to be sure that the *Lac. Pol.* was published during Xenophon's stay in Sparta or Scillus, and that the irony was perceptible to the Spartans themselves behind the apparent praise. Whatever the case, no such caution is applicable to the *Cyrop.*: Xenophon had no personal reason to handle Cyrus cautiously.

⁶⁵ οὐχ ἡδύ: the judgement of Herodotus' Otanes on monarchy, III, 80.

⁶⁶ Among those who consider the epilogue an interpolation: Hemardinquer, 226 ff., Miller, II, 438 sq. and Bizos, XXVI–XXXVI. Most commentators defend its authenticity: Prinz, 57 sqq.; Scharf, 876–87; Luccioni, 1947, 247 sq., n. 288; Delebecque, 1957, 407 ff. Gautier, 1911, 130, n. 1 is positive: the 'linguistic reasons' are 'proof enough to remove all doubts'.

relation of the epilogue to the rest of the work. It is clear that the tone changes: a very vigorous critical language replaces the eulogy. But there is no incoherence, if, as various signs indicate, the eulogy is largely ironical. The divergence seems more serious on the issue of the length of time that Cyrus' achievement lasted. Many times throughout *Cyropaedia*, Xenophon declares that this or that Persian tradition, this or that institution is in operation 'even in his time' (ἐτι καὶ νῦν). From these repeated phrases, the reader can get the impression that Cyrus' creation was long-lasting; the violent criticism of the decadence that hit the Persian empire after Cyrus' death can then be surprising. In fact, there is neither palinode in it, nor contradiction. In the epilogue itself, Cyrus' Persians, and those of the fourth century, are regularly contrasted in the following way: the customs were maintained, but they lost their ancient significance. The Persians of the present day, like those of old times, take only one meal a day—but they spent the whole day doing it (VIII, 8, 9); the Persians of today, like those of old times, eat nothing on the march, but they hardly march any more (VIII, 8, 11). In brief, the letter remained, but the spirit was lost.

The traditions were not abandoned, they were *perverted*. Cyrus wanted his subjects to be more attached to him than to each other. Mithridates, in delivering his father to Artaxerxes II and Rheomitres in leaving his wife and his children hostage to serve the king (VIII, 8, 4), just pushed devotion to the king to its final consequences, to the point of forgetting all familial ties. Xenophon severely condemns such 'impieties'; it is probable that the disapproval of such acts extends also to the principles that inspired them, namely the very sources of Cyrus' imperial power.

As soon as Cyrus' successors lost his virtue, decadence was inevitable. This link between the worth of the leader and the traditions is highlighted by Xenophon when he discusses the organization of the court: οὕτω δ' ἔχει καὶ ταῦτα ὥσπερ καὶ τὰλλα· ὅταν μὲν ὁ ἐπιστάτης βελτίων γένηται, καθαρώτερον τὰ νόμιμα πράττεται· ὅταν δὲ χείρων, φαυλότερον 'Here it is as in other things too: when the leader is good, the customs maintain their purity, but when he is bad, they are corrupted' (VIII, 1, 8). The rule is general, but absolutism and centralization of a regime accelerate its decadence. The court was instituted by Cyrus to be a noted school of justice; after his death,

young nobles continued to receive their education *παιδεία* at the court, but to learn injustice there and the art of the poisoner (VIII, 8. 13–14). Cyrus wanted the high officials to imitate the King: if the King is mediocre or vicious, the high officials become slack and perverted too; after which, the subject peoples adopt the impiety and injustice of their masters (VIII, 8, 5). One could paraphrase the famous saying of Montesquieu: all regimes become corrupt, but an absolute regime is corrupted absolutely.

For the regime instituted by Cyrus to retain its perfection, it would have been necessary, and it seems, sufficient⁶⁷ for the successors to have had the same virtue as Cyrus. The virtue of a ruler comes from his birth, his nature, and his education (I, 1, 6). On the first point, Cyrus' sons conform. Is it then necessary to attribute the defects of his successors to their nature or their education? Xenophon presents the decadence that followed Cyrus' death as immediate and absolute (VIII, 8, 2). So it does not seem possible that the caprices of their nature are a sufficient explanation. Would it not be rather that the education received by all the Persian kings—beginning with Cyrus' sons—was defective? In his account of Persian history in the *Laws*, Plato without hesitation explains Cambyse's madness, as well as the mediocrity of all the kings from Darius' line, in terms of the weakening education that 'the sons of very rich men and tyrants' received in the midst of women and flatterers (*Laws*, 694a–669a).⁶⁸ Can we attribute similar conceptions to Xenophon?

⁶⁷ In the system established by Cyrus, the king is the model for all subjects and controls them all. If the king is good and vigilant, virtue is practised everywhere. This scheme, which Cyrus hoped would maintain his empire, is according to Xenophon unrealizable since from a king to his successors, virtue *ἀρετή* inevitably declines (see above). Luccioni, 1947, 252 rightly notes that 'the reader is tempted to smile ironically when he compares the sage exhortations of Cyrus to his son with the events that, in Xenophon's words, followed immediately upon his death'. But it does not seem that it is possible to follow Luccioni when he sees this as an effect of Xenophon's lack of skill, or of the 'weakness' of his thesis. To the contrary, the contrast between Cyrus' hopes and the decline that followed his death proceed from the author's deliberate intention: Xenophon wished that the reader smile *at Cyrus' expense*.

⁶⁸ Also in *Laws*, 694a–696a, Plato accuses Cyrus of having neglected the education of his sons; in this, Cyrus committed the same error as all other kings. This passage probably alludes to *Cyrop.* Xenophon's explanation is close enough to Plato's. The only difference is that in *Cyrop.* Cyrus is not careless but *powerless* in the face of the factors of corruption that threaten his empire.

Xenophon's Cyrus was much preoccupied with the future of his creation. It is evident that he did not neglect the education of his sons any more than that of other Persians: it was in spite of all his efforts that his sons' education was defective and his empire came to know decadence. Cyrus was the most forward-looking and vigilant of kings: if his sons were badly educated, it was because this is the case necessarily for the sons of all absolute monarchs. Even though Cyrus tried to recreate the atmosphere of traditional Persia in his court, Cyrus' children were not raised in a free *πολιτεία*; their education was not controlled by watchful citizens, but by their father's servants. By establishing an absolute monarchy, Cyrus made the decadence of their education inevitable, and so too the decline of the empire.

Xenophon's demonstration in the *Cyropaedia* as a whole appears then to be very rigorous. The successive phases of his argument are:

- 1) Cyrus was a great conqueror due to his personal qualities, but also because of his excellent education. This *παιδεία* is connected with a *πολιτεία* that is governed by laws and magistrates, in which the king is first among equals, *primus inter pares*.
- 2) The success of the conquest brings about the institution of a centralized administration and an absolute monarchy for the whole empire.
- 3) Absolute monarchy makes it impossible to maintain the traditional *παιδεία*.
- 4) The abandonment of *παιδεία* brings about the decadence of the empire.⁶⁹

Imperial monarchy destroys the main foundation of imperial power. The loop is closed: the epilogue ends the cycle of birth and decadence of an empire. The *Cyropaedia* is based on two opposite *a fortiori* arguments:

- the first is that even with feeble means at the outset, it is possible for a good leader who has received a good education to conquer an empire.

⁶⁹ The crucial importance of *παιδεία* in Xenophon's argument fully justifies the title *Κύρου παιδεία*, which some commentators suggest is too narrow.

- the second is that even the best conqueror could not preserve his empire from decline.

All readers of the *Cyropaedia* could use Cyrus' example as a lesson in rulership. All were bound to examine the picture of traditional Persian *πολιτεία* sympathetically, even if they did not agree to imitate it on all points. In the success of Cyrus' army all were bound to see proof of the superiority of monarchic leadership in war. On the central problem of conquest, on the other hand, opinions were probably divided. Some would remember in particular that conquest was possible for small numbers of troops led by a brave and skilled leader, and would bring riches and honours to the victors. The *condottieri*, and the adventurers, all more interested in glory or profit than in liberty, were bound to see *Cyropaedia* as encouragement to conquest. On the contrary, Greeks who were attached to the traditional ideal of the *πόλις* would remember in particular that an empire had necessarily to be governed by an absolute monarchy, a regime that was 'disagreeable', and that in any case decadence would quickly follow. For those who shared the convictions of Demosthenes or of Aristotle, the *Cyropaedia* had to come out as a warning against the detrimental effects of conquest.

Xenophon was content to reconstruct Cyrus' history in his own way; he is careful not to offer explicit judgements, and leaves the readers to come to their own conclusions. Nevertheless, it seems that the analysis of the structure of the *Cyropaedia* lets the reader uncover his personal opinion. At the end of his life, Xenophon remains fascinated by the idea of an Asiatic conquest; but, after deep reflection he seems particularly sensitive to the political consequences of conquest: the establishment of an absolute monarchy, whose disagreeable aspects are not hidden—and especially to the fragility of a territorial empire. The *Cyropaedia* seems to be the work of a clear-eyed traditionalist, a man worried about the disruptions that the conquest of Asia would create for the Greeks.

Fictional Narrative in the *Cyropaideia*

Philip Stadter

We can share the lament of Xenophon, beginning his *Cyropaideia*, that mankind seems ungovernable. The evidence of bad government and revolt is all around us. It is Xenophon's response to this situation that is distinctive. He chose to tell a story, the story of one man whom he had heard actually was able to govern not just a city, but the greatest empire that the Greeks knew. In telling his story, Xenophon composed the first extant novel, and demonstrated the power and flexibility of fictional prose narrative. His work is heavily influenced by earlier narrative in poetry and prose, and yet developed new possibilities and emphases. In this chapter I shall first offer some general thoughts on the difference of the *Cyropaideia* from Herodotus and Thucydides and the rationale of his choice of didactic narrative, and then consider four aspects of Xenophon's fiction: the *Cyropaideia* as a utopian narrative, the dimensions of time and space, some features of narrative structure, and the treatment of characters.¹

FICTION

I have used the term 'fictional narrative', but I must note at once that Xenophon nowhere states or even implies that the *Cyropaideia* is

This chapter is a slightly revised version of the original paper, and has an addendum epilogue.

¹ Tatum (1989) provides an excellent point of departure. Among other recent studies of Xenophon, Gray (1989) is especially helpful on his use of dialogue in narrative.

fiction. On the contrary, in introducing his narrative of Cyrus, he suggests that he has made inquiries: 'we shall try to give an account of what we have found out and what we think that we have learned about him.' It is only rather far on into the story, in fact, that the reader concludes that the story should not be taken literally. The notice of Cyrus' parentage and the account of Persian customs could easily fit what we might call history: a carefully researched factual account. Even the series of conversations and anecdotes of Cyrus' youth might be encountered in a Greek historical account, as we know from the example of Herodotus. It is rather the unrelenting accumulation of long dialogues—that between Cyrus and Cambyses at the end of Book 1 runs some twenty-one pages—and the incredible success of Cyrus in dealing with friends and foes that force the reader to treat Xenophon's narrative of the past as fiction. In this straightforward narrative, no individual item is incredible, but the accumulation of victories on the personal and the military level gradually lead the reader to reconsider his initial evaluation of the work.² Without attempting to demarcate precisely what limits there might have been between factual and fictional narrative in Xenophon's day, it is possible to say that Xenophon has chosen to tell a story of which the verifiable factual content is a very small percentage of the whole.

Historical writers of the fifth century, most notably Herodotus and Thucydides, had justified their endeavour by appeals to their method. Herodotus in his preface noted his desire to preserve and understand the past, gave a sample of the oral traditions upon which he would draw, and pointedly claimed that he would start from what he himself knew, showing no partiality (1.1–5). In his first chapters Thucydides stressed the analytical and investigatory effort needed to ascertain the truth, and presented a schematic example of his mode of intellectual inquiry by analysing the growth of unified action and maritime power, with especial attention to the Trojan War (1.1–23). What is striking about Xenophon is that he makes no stronger claims to accuracy or method than he does. 'Recognizing that this man has

² In the *Anabasis* and the *Hellenica*, Xenophon's accounts of leaders (Cyrus the younger, Clearchus, Xenophon, Agesilaus) seem relatively reliable because the successes are limited.

been far superior in ruling men, and is worthy of admiration, we have considered who he was, in terms of his family, nature, and training. Therefore we shall try to give an account of what we have found out and what we think that we have learned about him' (*Cyr.* 1.1.6). There is no overt claim to factual accuracy, no statement on the difficulties of ascertaining the truth, especially concerning a distant period and country, no allusion to the weakness of memory or the reliability of his informants. The allusion to investigation conflicts with the absence of historiographical pretensions. If the reader of the *Cyropaideia* is reassured by the author's claims, he will expect something less imaginative than is in fact the case.³

This is not to say that there is no historical information in the *Cyropaideia*. Xenophon does on occasion accurately preserve customs—such as wearing high-soled shoes—or names, at least within the limitations of his own knowledge. But these items are subservient to the narrative, the source of which is Xenophon's invention, not historical tradition or research.⁴ The question whether Xenophon had access to and was influenced by Iranian oral tradition is still not resolved, but it is apparent that whatever Xenophon took from Iranian tradition was taken because it fit his own ideal of a ruler, not because he wished to retell or recreate a historical past.⁵ Xenophon shapes a story of Cyrus, which is composed of dialogues that were never spoken, battles that never took place, and people summoned and dismissed from the written page without any shadow of historical reality. Even the general historical framework, which Xenophon might have been expected to keep as accurate as possible, shows

³ Hirsch (1985b) 65–85, at p. 69 overstates Xenophon's pretensions to accurate research. Nor does Xenophon in the *Cyropaideia* examine the underlying causes of events in the manner of Herodotus or Thucydides.

⁴ Cf. Hirsch (1985b) and (1985a) 85–91. However, I do not agree with Hirsch's general argument that Xenophon has framed his narrative from elements of authentic Persian tradition. Xenophon's portrayal of Persian educational practice was strongly influenced by Spartan methods and by Xenophon's own notions: see Briant (1987) 1–10, esp. 7–8. Recent Achaemenid studies have challenged our understanding of the Persian empire and of the reliability of our Greek accounts, whose sources of information and interpretation of Persian history and culture are extremely difficult to define. See e.g. Lewis (1977); Briant (1982); Dandamaev and Lukonin (1989); and the series *Achaemenid History* I–III (Leiden 1987–8).

⁵ See Knauth and Nadjmabadi (1975); Sancisi-Weerdenburg (1985) 459–71; Cizek (1975) 531–52 and Drews (1974) 387–93.

extensive deviations from other traditions, and can only be ascribed to unknown Persian traditions by a naive insistence on Xenophon's determination to report the past as faithfully as possible. Central to the novel is Cyrus' relation to Media. Whereas all our other sources—including Xenophon in the *Anabasis* (3.4.8, 11–12)—report that Cyrus led a revolt against Media and established Persian rule over that country, before conquering Lydia and Babylon, in the *Cyropaideia* Xenophon has Cyrus aid the Medes as allies, and ascribes the victories over Lydia and Babylon to his activity as Median vassal. The figure of his overlord, the Median king Cyaxares, son of Astyages, is an invention, a necessary part of his revised history.⁶ The creation and selection of narrative episodes, the temporal and geographical framework in which they are set, and the mode in which the reader is expected to respond are fictional.

The overt purpose of the narrative is didactic,⁷ as stated in the preface: to allow the reader to learn how one man, Cyrus, was able to govern successfully an enormous empire. But the fact that Xenophon does not present a historical account of Cyrus means that the figure of Cyrus is not a literal model of historical action—like Pericles or Antiphon in Thucydides—but an imagined ideal of how one man might act to govern well. In the course of the narrative, that is, the reader comes to realize that Xenophon is writing not in the indicative but the subjunctive mood, not about things or people as they have been, but as they might be. In this respect the *Cyropaideia* is much closer to Plato's dialogues, especially the great dialogues of the middle period such as the *Gorgias*, *Symposium*, or *Republic*, than to the histories of Herodotus or Thucydides. Plato narrates dialogues that purportedly took place in Socrates' lifetime, to suggest means of

⁶ In Herodotus Cyaxares is the name of King Astyages' father. Since Greeks frequently named the eldest child for the grandfather, Xenophon's invention has a specious probability. The very existence of a Median empire may be doubted: see Sancisi-Weerdenburg (1988) 197–212.

⁷ The problem of the definition of the genre of Xenophon's work arises partially from the unity of concerns (historical, biographical, didactic, philosophical, political, and educational), which are more commonly separate in modern thinking. See Breitenbach (1966) 1707–8 (Sonderdruck from RE, IX A), and especially Tatum (1989), 3–35, who illustrates the interrelation between the history of the reception of the work, the successive readings of the *Cyropaideia* over the centuries, and the ascription of genre.

conceptualizing the major problems of human affairs, while simultaneously presenting Socrates as a model of a successful human life. Xenophon narrates the events and conversations of Cyrus' life to suggest means of governing men, presenting Cyrus as a model of successful rule. Both use a fictional mode to present what they perceived as fundamental truths.

DIDACTIC NARRATIVE

That fictional narrative could be didactic—indeed that it was a natural means of conveying both abstract and concrete truths—was a fundamental feature of Greek culture, deriving from the richness of mythical thought and expression. The Homeric poems, because they enshrined attitudes toward the divine, models of behaviour to be imitated or avoided, cultural values, and examples of generalship or social conventions, came by the fifth century to be used for didactic purposes. Folk tales and animal fables taught moral truths and practical wisdom, and even drama could be conceived as first and foremost didactic. A story was expected to convey truth, quite apart from the existence of a historical referent. The unusual step, in Greek terms, was not the invention of fiction, but rather the claim of some writers, represented for us by Herodotus and Thucydides, that they could present a larger truth even while maintaining precise historical referents. Although rightly considered historians, even they frequently used fictional modes of narration, and were ready when necessary to sacrifice unhelpful factual precision to a truthful account. Xenophon and Plato, in their different ways, reassert for prose the right to present the truth without focusing on the validity of the historical referent.

There are three principal reasons to use narrative in a didactic or philosophical presentation, and all are important in the *Cyropaideia*. The first is utility: a narrative is highly effective in conveying complicated information or concepts. Mankind universally experiences events as a sequence in time, a series of episodes strung together by the experience of personality. Narrative reproduces this chain, creating a vivid sense of the reality of the actions described. This reality

may be felt at several levels: if the actions narrated have nothing overtly incredible about them, the audience may accept them as possible events, part of a past which existed in this or a similar way. If the actions are contrary to common experience, the audience will use a variety of strategies to maintain meaning: the actions may be placed in a distant time or space (as with much of Odysseus' adventures), or seen as a mode of presenting a universal truth (as with animal fables). But in any case the ease of visualization, even of improbable events, enhances the effort to understand and interpret. By its very existence, a narrative can persuade us that the events narrated have a higher level of probability and of actualization than events not narrated. Thus, when Xenophon recounts how Cyrus was able to manage his temperamental and jealous king, Cyaxares, the technique employed is both more comprehensible and more convincing than if it had been presented in abstract form. Narrative used this way is an extended use of teaching by example.

As Aristotle remarks, fables are convenient to the orator, because often it is difficult to find real events which provide a suitable parallel.⁸ The parables of Jesus illustrate the usefulness of fictional narrative for moral instruction. Such stories profit from the effort needed by the audience to search for meaning and apply it personally. They allow the teller to teach at the level that each hearer is ready for, because the subtlety and richness of the lesson is regenerated by the hearer himself, who finds in the narrative points of application to his own circumstances and preoccupations. In the case of the *Cyropaideia*, the narrative permits and generates audiences of different types, including those never anticipated by Xenophon.

An extended narrative also permits the interweaving of themes, e.g. of love and loyalty, and their varied presentation in different characters or situations. In this way Xenophon can distinguish the friendship of two Persians close to Cyrus, Hystaspas and Chrysantas, or the treatment of two conquered kings, Croesus and the Armenian. The use of dialogue permits the author to incorporate discussions from different points of view within the narrative framework.⁹ The narrative mode,

⁸ Aristotle, *Rhet.* 2.20.7, 1394a, where he notes that actual historical examples are more useful, since the future tends to resemble the past.

⁹ On Xenophon's dialogue techniques see Gray (1989) and the unpublished study by Gera (1987). (Published in a revised form as Gera (1993).)

recounting a series of actions, gives scope for instruction or comment on a broad variety of topics. Xenophon's focus for the greater part of the narrative on military campaigns arises from his own assessment of the role of the general in all aspects of military life, from shaping a group of associates to share command to training troops, or planning a military operation. Furthermore, for Xenophon, the army is an example of social organization that can serve as a model for a well-run state. Thus the narrative of the campaigns can teach on many levels, from the nature of friendship or of love to the training of new recruits.

The second advantage of narrative is pleasure: good story-telling delights the mind and ear, and prompts us to ask for more. The reader enjoys the story, and is eager to press forward to hear what happens next. Far from needing to sugar the cup, the narrator combines delight and utility in one smooth mixture. Although for various reasons Xenophon's charm is less attractive to modern readers than it has been in some earlier periods, nevertheless even we find ourselves drawn into the story, curious about how Cyrus will handle the next situation presented to him, whether at the dinner table or in a battle, whether prompted by a love-struck subordinate or an envious friend.

Finally, the narrative mode aids accurate recall. A story is easier to recall than an abstract concept or argument, and the memory bears with it all the conviction and pleasure of the initial hearing or reading. Herodotus knew this well and depends on well-told stories to establish his major points, most notably in the Croesus narrative. In Xenophon, the success of Cyrus' self-restraint toward Panthea and the contrast between the views of happiness of Croesus and Panthea are both vivid in themselves and easy to recall, so that the lesson of virtue is not only learned and accepted, but remembered and available for use.

IDEALIZATION AND UTOPIA

It is sometimes said that Xenophon creates an idealized account of ancient Persia. There is truth in this statement, but it is necessary to

specify what precisely is meant. Xenophon does not suffer from nostalgia: he does not think that once the world was better, but has now deteriorated. Nor would his own experience of the duplicity of Artaxerxes and Tissaphernes permit him any illusions about oriental monarchy, which might lead him to propose a historical Cyrus as a model for Greek governance. Such an interpretation would read into the *Cyropaideia* a historicism that is not there. If Xenophon was aware of his own invention, as he surely must have been, then he knew that the Persians and Cyrus were not as he described them. We cannot accuse Xenophon of looking back at a rosy past, filling in details 'as they must have been'. Xenophon's idealization is essentially utopian, like Plato's *Republic*. It describes not what has been, but what ought to be.

A utopia holds out a vision of what life could be, if certain conditions were valid: if men were reasonable, or just, or peaceable, or some other condition equally lacking in the real world. Often these utopias are set in far away places, even at the ends of the earth, or on a different planet, of which a traveller brings back a tale. Or the distance might be temporal, in the past, or future. Some describe a dream of what was, and has been lost: the Garden of Eden, a golden age; others a dream of what might be, if only men could learn and change.¹⁰ Xenophon's utopia is of the latter type. The story of Cyrus is not a historical account of what happened, but a visionary account of how a government might be organized by a true leader and how we the readers might act if we shared his qualities.¹¹

In this utopian vision, the *Cyropaideia* functions on several levels. The work presents an image of how men might interact to form a political entity, first a successful army, and then an imperial state. In delineating this picture, Xenophon is able to express innumerable notions and suggestions about friendship, military organization and planning, and governmental relations and structures.¹² But the cen-

¹⁰ See H. Braunert (1969); Kytzler (1973) 45–68; Flashar (1974); and Ferguson (1975).

¹¹ Cf. Bakhtin (1981) 147, discussing the temporal inversion of mythological thinking: 'A thing that could and in fact must only be realized exclusively in the *future* is here portrayed as something out of the *past*, a thing that is in no sense part of the past's reality, but a thing that is in its essence a purpose, an obligation.'

¹² See Luccioni (n.p. 1947) and Wood (1964) 33–66.

tral focus of the work is not on this social aspect of government, important as it is, but on individual excellence, that is on the special qualities of his hero. It is these qualities, which derive from natural ability, suitable nurture, especially the training of his father, and a passion for self-improvement, which permit Cyrus to form the personal, military, and civic relationships and structures which permit him to be the perfect leader. The quality that Cyrus shows above all else is his ability to control his own actions and desires, to shape himself according to what is best. Being best, others then can recognize and accept the appropriateness of his rule.

The *Cyropaideia*, then, is not a novel of imperial rule, but a novel of virtue, of relating to others, whether superiors, equals, or subordinates, and especially of governing one's own desires. The utopian vision of Xenophon can be read in different keys. It applies first of all to the individual citizen, the *kalos kai agathos* seeking his proper role in society, especially as a leader in his polis and its army. Constantly the reader is invited to think as Cyrus does, to apply to his limited field of action the same reasoning and self-discipline which Cyrus applies to all matters, from the smallest military detail to the governance of the empire. Xenophon did not expect his readers to become masters of the world, or even to work toward a Greek empire: he still belonged to the polis system in which he grew up. At the time of writing, he had returned to Athens, and was fully aware of the problems facing the restricted democracy that governed the city.¹³ His audience is the elite in Athens and other Greek cities, who aspire to command, influence, and leadership. His view is conservative and hierarchical but tied to a free rather than an authoritarian society, since any citizen with the requisite virtues can aspire to greatness. He hopes that his readers, inspired by his vision of an empire ruled by a virtuous leader, will enact in their own lives and in their own polis the virtues he describes.¹⁴

At the same time Xenophon is considering the case of great men, who possess power and hope to exercise it more fully. He himself has

¹³ He returned to Athens in 365. The *Cyropaideia* would have been completed sometime after this (see Delebeque (1957), 404–9, Breitenbach (1966) 1742). His work *Revenues* reflects his preoccupation with current Athenian affairs.

¹⁴ On the power of a utopian vision to 'help us build bridges between the world we want to inhabit and the world we must', see Reckford (1987) 327.

known ambitious leaders such as Cyrus the Younger and Agesilaus, both of who contribute to his portrait of Cyrus the Great, and who, under other circumstances, might have become great monarchs. Other contemporary figures would have been in his mind and the minds of his readers: Dionysius and Dion in Syracuse, Jason of Pherae, the Macedonian monarchs, various Persian satraps who not infrequently revolted against the king. In the *Hiero* Xenophon explored the possibility of a tyrant becoming, or pretending to become, a just monarch. For such men, greater than the ordinary private citizen, and for all who were concerned with their activity, his account of Cyrus the Great demonstrated that power and greatness could only come by keeping one's own desires under careful control, by constantly thinking of the needs of one's allies and one's subjects and winning them with generosity, while keeping a cool eye on the realities of power.

Finally, for the Greek states as political entities, the *Cyropaideia* shows that the organization of armies and the maintenance of alliances, the main means of exercising power, depend on carefully planning, constant thought for the training and goodwill of their troops, and the same self-control, foresight, and generosity toward allies which was recommended to powerful individuals.

Xenophon constructs a utopian vision of the individual as political agent in an imagined historical setting. Plato confirms the interchangeability of the imagined and the historical utopia in his own treatment of the ideal state of the *Republic*. In that work, Socrates and his friends determine to construct in discourse (λόγῳ) a model of the good city. When it is finished, they recognize that this city, situated in discourses ἐν λόγοις, does not exist anywhere on earth, nor does it matter whether it does or ever will, since it functions as a model only (*Rep.* 472D, 592A–B). Sometime later, when he wrote the *Timaeus* and *Critias*, Plato completely transformed this notion.¹⁵ Socrates in the *Timaeus* expresses the wish to see his state in action:

I felt like someone who saw beautiful animals either in a painting or actually living, but standing still, and desired that he might see them moving and engaged in a contest worthy of their physical appearance. This same feeling

¹⁵ These works are usually placed between Plato's return in 360 from his third trip to Sicily and his death in 348/7. They may have been written after the *Cyropaideia*.

I felt regarding the state which we described. I would love to hear someone narrate the contests which this city wages, those which it fights against other cities, entering into warfare in a worthy manner, and during the war revealing in its relations with the other cities the qualities suitable to its system of education and rearing, both in action and verbal exchange. (*Tim.* 19 B–C)

Timaeus responds to this request, not with a continuation of the description of the ideal state, but with a historical account: Socrates' ideal city is exactly like the ancient and forgotten city of Athens of 9,000 years ago, of which Solon had learned from the Egyptians. 'The city and the citizens which you described yesterday as a myth (*ἐν μύθῳ*), we shall transfer into reality (*ἐπὶ τᾷληθείᾳ*), and assert that those citizens whom you imagined are our actual ancestors' (*Tim.* 26 C–D). With such a verbal trick, Plato transfers an imaginary world into the distant historical past, guaranteeing its truth with a complex apparatus of testimony concerning the Egyptian priests, written documents, and the oral tradition of the story from Solon to Croesus.¹⁶ Xenophon prefers for his utopia a much more recent yet still distant past, the principal features of which are no less imaginary.

PRESENT AND PAST

The *Cyropaideia* is set in an imagined past, but depends on a constant awareness of the present to achieve its goal of future development and change. The link to the contemporary world is achieved by several devices. Most obvious are the preface and epilogue, which frame the utopian narrative with the dismal reality of the present: the ungovernability of human kind, stated in abstract generalities in the preface, and in the dreary recital of Persian history in the epilogue. The book begins from the observation of the difficulty of human governance:

¹⁶ See especially *Tim.* 20 D–23 D, *Critias* 106 B–108 D, 113 A–B. On Plato's fictional primeval Athens, see Herter (1969) 108–34, Brisson (1970) 402–38, Gill (1977) 287–304, and (1979) 64–78. On Plato and history, see Gaiser (1961), Weil (1959). The fictional element in the *Republic* is stressed by Flashar (1974).

The thought has come to us how many democracies have been overthrown by those who wished to live otherwise than in a democracy, how many monarchies, how many oligarchies have been rejected by different populates, and how many of those who have tried to be tyrants have been overthrown immediately or, if they manage to survive for a time as rulers, are admired as wise and fortunate men... When we considered this, we decided that it is easier for a mortal man to rule every other animal than to rule men. (*Cyr.* 1.1.1, 3)

The epilogue (*Cyr.* 8.8) demonstrates that this general state of affairs is applicable to contemporary Persia as well, despite the institutions established by Cyrus. Persia needs the lessons of Xenophon's *Cyrus* just as much as the Greeks, despite the continuing existence of many institutions established by him. The ideal prince can establish good laws, but the laws and institutions are not sufficient in themselves to guarantee the health of the civic structure.¹⁷

This is the ground of reality from which Xenophon's vision rises. I do not see the epilogue, as Tatum does, as deconstructing the vision of the text,¹⁸ but rather as reaffirming the necessity of the vision by recalling the real world. The final chapter both disassociates the narrative from the instability of the contemporary world and reminds us of the need for the virtues *Cyrus* embodies. Xenophon confronts the reader with the necessity of profiting from his vision and changing his own life.

The second means of creating awareness of the present are the constant references to Persian customs which continue still to the present day: *eti kai nun*. These suggest a relation between the world of *Cyrus* and contemporary Persia, and enhance the probability of the fiction without comprising its utopian nature. They help us to accept the possibility that there could be a man with *Cyrus*' self-control and

¹⁷ Xenophon's *Lacedaemonian Constitution* is similar: after a presentation of the marvellous laws of Lyncurgus, Xenophon notes that the contemporary Spartans do not live up to its standards, and in fact reverse them (*Lac. Pol.* 14).

¹⁸ Tatum (1989) 215–39. Tatum is right, however, in noting the bond between epilogue and text, even as the epilogue contradicts the ideal world of the foregoing narrative. The various attempts to attack the authenticity of the epilogue (see most recently Hirsch (1985a) 91–7) fail to accept the connection between the unfavourable view of contemporary Persia and Xenophon's invented world. On the accuracy of Xenophon's statements in this chapter, see Briant (1987) 8–9, Sancisi-Weerdenburg (1987d) 117–31.

ability to manage others, and that rational and just institutions can be established in a state.¹⁹ Many of these references recall earlier observations in the *Anabasis* and the *Hellenica*. At the same time, they set up an expectation of the permanence of Cyrus' institutions, which will be abruptly (but not surprisingly, in the light of the preface) thwarted in the final chapter contrasting Cyrus' practices with those of contemporary Persia.

Finally, there is the constant interrelation between the readers' awareness of the present in his own behaviour and feelings and the world of Cyrus. The involved reader—and here the modern reader has more difficulty in entering into the interaction presumed by Xenophon—in following Cyrus' responses to everyday situations involving family members, superiors, and subordinates, is continually reminded of his own and his contemporaries' attempts to deal with the same situations, and is forced to compare his and their reactions to those of Cyrus. This constant dialogue of the reader with the text and oneself—Would I have acted this way, spoken this way? If not, why not? Would this response really have achieved that result? Have I tried it?—brings the utopian vision actively into the reader's world in a way that Plato's *Republic* does not, and creates the opportunity for learning and for change. That the *Cyropaideia* was in fact read this way in antiquity is evident from the comments of Cicero and other ancient writers.²⁰ The procedure in challenging the reader to think out his own response to the situations faced by Cyrus is similar to that invoked by Greek tragedy, and by Plato in his dialogues. The reader is not allowed merely to be an observer, but by the very immediacy and relevance of the situation becomes a participant.

¹⁹ I note thirty-seven such statements in the body of the *Cyropaideia* (1.2–8.7): *eti kai nun* twenty times, *kai nun eti* fifteen times, and once each *hosper nun* (6.1.27) and *par' hemin* referring to Xenophon's contemporaries (1.2.6). This is not a complete count of present references: note for example, the extended description in the present tense of Persian educational practices, 1.2.2–14. See in general Delebecque (1957) 394–409. Seventeen occur in 7.5.37–8.18, referring to the various customs and institutions established by Cyrus after he became king of Babylon. These serve as the basis for the criticism of the contemporary Persians in 8.8, since the practices continue but the spirit is not observed. The final chapter, with its rapid temporal alternation, uses adverbs pointing to the present twenty-five times.

²⁰ Cicero not only held up the Cyrus of the *Cyropaideia* to his brother Quintus as a model for a Roman proconsul (*Ad Q. fratrem* 1.1) but himself used the *Cyropaideia* as a handbook when in command of Cilicia (*Ad fam.* 9.25.1).

For this reason Xenophon makes no real attempt to recreate the historical reality of the Persian past. As has been noted by Anderson,²¹ the description of the great battle of Thymbrara between Cyrus and Croesus, and of other battles as well, must be seen from the point of view of contemporary tactics rather than those of two centuries earlier. For the same reason, the frequent dialogues discuss contemporary Greek questions, on the effectiveness of punishment, on the happy life, on the power of love, and so on. They are aimed at contemporary audiences, and make no attempt to portray ancient Persian ways of thinking.

TIME

I have discussed how Xenophon's didactic purpose and utopian vision shape the narrative of the *Cyropaideia*. Three points remain to be considered, the nature of time and space in the *Cyropaideia* itself, the narrative structure of the work, and the function of characters in the narrative. These are large topics, and the last has been treated at length by Tatum, but a few observations can help clarify the nature of Xenophon's fiction.

Mikhail Bakhtin in a suggestive essay develops the notion of the chronotope, the particular blend of time and place which distinguishes different types of novels.²² Time in the *Cyropaideia* is perhaps most closely comparable to Bakhtin's notion of 'biographical time', fittingly enough, since in fundamental aspects this is a biographical novel. But there are four distinct phases of temporal movement in the *Cyropaideia*. The first, occupying all of Book 1 after the preface, is developmental: the narrative unfolds the growth of the young Cyrus in a series of episodes.²³ Even at the age of twelve, after the customary

²¹ Anderson (1970) 170. Anderson argues that Xenophon had the battle of Leuctra in mind when framing his account: cf. pp. 191, 218.

²² Bakhtin (1981) 84–258: 'Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel.'

²³ 1.2.1–6.46. The major episodes are his dinner dialogue with Astyages (1.3.4–12), the dialogue with his mother Mandane on learning justice (1.3.13–18), his hunting (1.4.5–15), the Assyrian skirmish (1.4.16–24), the anecdote of the kiss (1.4.27–8), Cyrus' mandate to lead a Persian army to support Cyaxares (1.5.4–14), and the dialogue with his father Cambyses (1.6.2–46).

Persian training, Cyrus is still incomplete, and his immaturity is revealed in his actions. He is envious of his grandfather's wine-pourer; he is uncertain how to help his friends; he rushes precipitously forward in the hunt and in warfare, like a noble but untrained dog. But the long dialogue with his father, which ends the first book, establishes Cyrus' maturity and his understanding of the characteristics necessary in a leader.

The remaining Books, 2–8, are not developmental but static: they unfold for the reader the mature Cyrus, who has learned to deal with all situations. The effect is a time, in Bakhtin's words, which

discloses character but is not at all the time of a man's 'becoming' or growth... Historical reality itself, in which disclosure of character takes place, serves merely as a means for the disclosure, it provides in words and deeds a vehicle for those manifestations of character; but historical reality is deprived of any determining influence on character as such, it does not shape or create it, it merely manifests it. Historical reality is an arena for the disclosing and unfolding of human characters—nothing more.²⁴

In Book 1 Xenophon distinguishes the stages of Cyrus' passage through the Persian education from the much vaguer temporal dimension of the narrative of the following books. The age groups and their responsibilities are described at 1.2.5–14: someone is a *pais* up to age sixteen or seventeen, an *ephêbos* for the next ten years, to about twenty-five, then an adult (*teleios anêr*) to about fifty, and thereafter an elder (*geraiteros*). The moments are dated thus:

- 1.3.1 Cyrus at twelve or a bit older joins Astyages in Media for a Median supplement to his education.
- 1.4.16 Cyrus when about fifteen goes on a hunt in Media.
- 1.5.1 Cyrus on his return to Persia spends a year as a *pais*, after which he becomes an ephebe (age c. sixteen to seventeen).²⁵
- 1.5.4 Cyrus completes his ten years as an ephebe, and is now an adult (age c. twenty-six to twenty-seven).

²⁴ Bakhtin (1981), 141. Bakhtin is thinking especially of Plutarchean biography, to which the description is rather less apposite than to the *Cyropaideia*.

²⁵ When Cambyses calls Cyrus a ['child'] *pais* at 8.5.22, this refers not to his age class but to his position as Cambyses' child.

The long central narrative of Cyrus' adult years, 1.5.5–8.6.23, describes in three strikingly unequal parts the campaign against Assyria (2.1.1–7.5.36), the establishment of Cyrus' rule in Babylon (7.5.37–8.6.18), and finally, in a few sentences, his conquest and enjoyment of his empire (8.6.19–23). Old age and death follow at 8.7. In this whole narrative there is only one clear indication of large-scale time, at 8.6.19, 'When the new year began' (ἐπεὶ δὲ περιήλθεν ὁ ἐνιαυτός).²⁶ This has led Due and Tatum among others to conclude that all of 2.1.1–8.6.18 covers just one year. However, Cyrus' reference to the oncoming winter at 6.1.14 can reasonably be taken to imply that Xenophon thinks of the Assyrian war as having two campaigning seasons. Thus after Cyrus' army returns to the Median border, both sides would use the winter to seek new allies and make other preparations before Cyrus begins his march to Thymbrara at 6.3.1. The arrangements in Babylon may also be thought to take place in the winter of the second year, before the new campaigning season begins at 8.6.19. However, both conclusions are inference: Xenophon studiously avoids establishing a chronological framework for his central narrative.

Within this section Xenophon marks time in several different ways, but chiefly as an indeterminate period (usually of preparation) followed by a carefully marked sequence of days (usually a battle and its aftermath).²⁷ Thus in the case of the campaign against Croesus culminating in the battle of Thymbrara and the capture of Sardis, extending through Books 6–7, we find that the decision to continue the war, Cyrus' long range preparations, the decision to attack, and the march to the battleground at Thymbrara (6.1.1–6.3.37) are not defined temporally. The following four days (6.4.1–7.3.16) are carefully marked: Day 1 (6.4.1, τῇ δ' ὑστεραίᾳ πρῶ), the battle; Night 1 (7.1.45, ἤδη σκοταῖος), Croesus' flight; Day 2 (7.2.2, ἐπειδὴ ἡμέρα

²⁶ Cyrus speaks of a campaign to begin 'in the new year' at 8.6.15.

²⁷ The marked time sequences of the *Cyropaideia* are: (1) the Armenian campaign (2.4.9–3.2.31, five days), (2) the first Assyrian campaign (3.3.1–5.1.30, three days, a march (3.24–8), and another four days), (3) the march to Gobryas' land (5.2.1–5.3.1), (4) the Thymbrara campaign (6.1–7.3.16, preparations plus 4 days), (5) the siege of Babylon (7.4.16–7.5.36, preparations (7.4.16–7.5.14) plus two days), (6) Cyrus' first year (7.5.37–8.6.19, one year). Between (3) and (4) and between (4) and (5) there are indeterminate periods, 5.3.2–5.5.48 and 7.4.1–15.

ἐγένετο), the attack on Sardis; Night 2 (7.2.3, τῆς ἐπιούσης νυκτός), the assault on the wall; Day 3 (7.2.4, ἅμα τῇ ἡμέρᾳ) Cyrus enters Sardis, and a bit later the troops breakfast (7.2.8, ἀριστοποιεῖσθαι), followed by the dialogue with Croesus; Night 3 (7.3.1, ἐκοιμήθησαν); Day 4 (7.3.1, τῇ δ' ὑστεραίᾳ), Cyrus' meeting with Panthea. Time seems to end with Panthea's death: the next sequence begins at 7.4.1 with the vague ἐκ δὲ τούτου. The first indeterminate period, presumably several months, occupies thirty Oxford Classical Text pages; the four days of the battle and its aftermath twenty-three and a half: length of treatment has no relation to length of time. Even within the clearly defined sequence of days, Xenophon is using the temporal markers merely to define the narrative structure, not to establish a true chronology. We certainly are not to imagine that Panthea has been sitting on the ground with her dead husband's head on her lap for three days when Cyrus goes to see her on the third day after the battle. Rather, Xenophon's narrative has been occupied with other matters: now finally Cyrus can be allowed to turn to personal feelings. Moreover, until Cyrus had held his conversation with Croesus on the happy life, and Croesus uttered his fatuous satisfaction at living as soft and carefree as a woman, Xenophon was not ready to introduce the contrasting heroic figures of Abradatas and Panthea, who expressed in their actions the truly happy life shaped by virtue. Panthea is forced to wait with her husband's corpse until the narrative is ready for her.

The account of Cyrus' first year at Babylon is timeless, treating the various measures and practices which Cyrus instituted to establish his rule: his 'trick' to create a new relation with his friends, a typical dinner, defining court practice, the first great ceremonial procession, and so on. These present the first occasion of a practice as an undefined statement of the practice as it would continue throughout Cyrus' reign. The time notices that appear within these episodes are limited to them, to clarify the sequence of actions within the episode.²⁸ The whole process is conceived as occupying one year, a

²⁸ e.g. in the account of the trick on his friends: 'at dawn' he presents himself to all (7.5.37), 'evening arrived' before his friends could see him (7.5.39), 'on the next morning' the situation threatens to repeat itself, and Cyrus presents his plan (7.5.41). On Cyrus in Babylon, see Breebaart (1983) 117–34, which examines the stages by

purely formal unit, marked by a striking phrase, ‘when the year had come full circle’ (8.6.19), and the notice of a review of the troops: 120,000 cavalry, 2,000 chariots, 600,000 infantry. A summary account of the intervening decades, running perhaps three-quarters of a page (8.6.20–3), bridges the gap to the fourth section.

The precise length of the gap is not stated, but at 8.7.1 Cyrus is now an old man, whose mother and father have long since died. The time is marked by notices of campaigns against Syria and Egypt, and an extremely formal definition of the boundaries of the empire to the east, west, north, and south: the Red Sea, the Black Sea, Cyprus and Egypt, and Ethiopia, limits uninhabitable because of heat, cold, water, and desert (8.6.20–1). Cyrus, residing in the middle of this empire, now lives in a timeless repetition of actions, moving on a regular round between his three capitals: ‘thus they say he led his life in springtime warmth and freshness all the time.’ All countries and cities send him of their abundance, and he shares with all. The timeless repetition is continued at the beginning of the next section, with the words [‘so when his time had advanced’] οὕτω δὲ τοῦ αἰῶνος προκεχωρηκότος and the statement ‘Cyrus comes to Persia for the seventh time’, where the present tense and the number seven indicate undetermined length of time.²⁹

The final section of Cyrus’ life is devoted to the omens and prayers before his death, and his speech to his friends and family. Again time notices serve merely to structure the narrative: Cyrus dreams at night, sacrifices the next morning, eats nothing for two days, and on the third day delivers his speech and dies. The days provide a framework for Cyrus’ arrangements with the gods and his advice to those who survive him.

The four sections of the life thus mark off four special times: youth and growth, military campaigns and accession to power through

which the monarch’s virtue was channelled to his subjects. While presented as temporal, they are in fact arranged schematically, according to the relation of different social groups to the monarch.

²⁹ No intervals are stated, so the visits do not define a determined chronological period. *Αἰών* itself is a poetic word, used here and in Cyrus’ prayer at 8.7.3 for its epic connotations. Xenophon’s Cyrus at 8.6.19 Cyrus would have been ca. 30 to 31 years old, and seems to have died much later (Deinon says he lived till 70, *FGrHist* 690 F 10). Our evidence indicates that Cyrus conquered Babylon in 539, and died in 528.

winning of friends and defeat of enemies, devolution of the monarch's virtue through friends to subjects, and finally last testament and death. Xenophon marks the stages of Cyrus' youth to delimit the periods of his different studies, but the remaining sections are viewed in the timeless biographical mode, with no sense of growth or development of Cyrus in time.

SPACE

The space defined in the *Cyropaideia* is similarly a construct of the author's fiction, determined less by physical reality or the knowledge of the Persian Empire acquired by the Greeks or by Xenophon in his travels, than by the needs of the narrative. Cyrus acts in a vaguely marked world of several major states: Persia, Media, Assyria, Armenia, and Lydia. Other peoples figure as allies of one or the other side: Egyptians, Hyrcanians, and so on. No specifics are given of boundaries, rivers, or mountain ranges, except that an unnamed river flows through Babylon (7.5.8), and the Pactolus is near Sardis (6.2.11, 7.3.4). Only eight places are named in the body of the narrative. Two are named several times: Babylon, the capital of Cyrus' opponent and the seat of his own kingdom after his victory, and Sardis, Croesus' capital. The others are Thymbrara, the site of the great battle (6.2.11, 7.1.45), Cyllene and Larisa, the 'Egyptian' cities of Aeolis (7.1.45), Lacedaemon (6.2.10), Caystroupedion (2.1.5), and Ecbatana and Susa (8.6.22–3).³⁰ This meager list should be compared with the numerous place names of Herodotus or Thucydides. Herodotus, for example, records the march of Xerxes from Cappadocia to Sardis with seven named cities.³¹ In describing the expedition of the younger Cyrus from Sardis to Cappadocia, Xenophon names

³⁰ Xenophon names the Euphrates often in the *Anabasis*. The location of the battle of Thymbrara is taken from the battle of Agesilaus outside of Sardis in 395 bc, recorded by Xenophon at *Hell.* 3.4.21–4 and *Ages.* 1.28–32, cf. *Diod. Sic.* 14.80. Larisa, and no doubt Cyllene, was known to Xenophon from Agesilaus' campaigns: cf. *Hell.* 3.1.7; Caystroupedion from the expedition of Cyrus, *Anab.* 1.2.11.

³¹ From Critalla in Cappadocia Xerxes successively passes to Celaenae, Anaua, Colossae, Cydrara, Callatebus, and arrives at Sardis (*Hdt.* 7.26.1–31).

eight cities on the route.³² The same could have been done with Cyrus the Great's supposed march to Sardis, or any other of his expeditions. The fact that it was not points to a quite different conception of historical space in the *Cyropaideia*.³³

Cyrus' actions, whether said to be in Media, Persia, or one of the other states, always occur in a dislocated and unspecified area, with almost none of the precise topographical and ecological detail familiar from the *Anabasis*. Thus although the setting is within the territory of the Persian Empire of Xenophon's day, it is not firmly located in the context of contemporary geographical and ethnographical knowledge of the region, but rather in an undifferentiated 'Asia', a kind of 'every-territory', in which the important facts are not the precise nature of a given river, mountain, city, or country, but universal problems of warfare and administration.³⁴ To display his virtue Cyrus must have enemies, so there must be an Assyria, a Lydia, an Armenia, but the nature of these places is not dictated by geography but by didactic convenience. Cyrus must demonstrate how to seize beforehand a mountain retreat, or how to defeat raids from mountaineers, so Armenia is mountainous.³⁵ The countries do not figure as real places, simply the proper locale for specific types of action. In the same way nothing is made of the difficulty of Cyrus' march to Thymbrara and Sardis, with three hundred war-chariots, or of Croesus' problems in transporting 120,000 Egyptians by sea to Lydia (6.2.10), or other such details. Xenophon's Persia is a notional country, which offers few obstacles to the reader transposing the lessons of Cyrus' life into his own world. Only the factor of size, in terms of men and distance, indicates the disproportion between

³² Colossae, Celaenae, Peltae, Ceramon agora, Caystroupedion, Thymbrion, Tyraeion, Dana (*Anab.* 1.2.5–20).

³³ No location is given for the significant meeting of Cyaxares and Cyrus after Cyrus' victories, which is simply 'in the borderlands' (*ἐν τοῖς μεθωρίοις*) of Media and Assyria, nor to the Armenian king's capital, nor to the territory of Gobryas or Gadatas.

³⁴ Xenophon is sometimes quite vague about geography: e.g. the Assyrians at 1.5.2 conquer Syria and Arabia, but also the Hyrcanians, and besiege the Bactrians, before engaging with Media. Even places that Xenophon knew and had described in the *Anabasis*, such as Armenia, are left indeterminate, though the mention of the Armenians' neighbours the Chaldeans surely refers back to the incident described at *Anab.* 4.3.4.

³⁵ *Cyr.* 2.4.24; 3.1.2, 4; 3.2.1–14.

Cyrus' achievement and that which might be imagined of a Greek general or polis.³⁶ The actual locations are influenced but not set by earlier tradition. Xenophon found it useful to play his own account of the battle of Croesus and Cyrus and the fall of Sardis against that of Herodotus, so he makes Sardis a locale for action. But another famous Herodotean locale, Cyrus' final confrontation with the Massegetae on the Araxes frontier, is ignored.

In analysing Xenophon's decision to employ a Persian setting, therefore, what emerges is not that Xenophon is exploiting his first-hand knowledge of the territory and its varied peoples, flora, and fauna, but that he has suppressed this knowledge and generalized his presentation, employing specific items only as subordinate to his narrative purpose. The world of the *Cyropaideia* is not contemporary Persia pushed back into an early historical period, but a universal territory, localized for convenience in the general space occupied by the Persian empire.

Why then speak of Persia at all? What effect did Xenophon hope to achieve? I have already noted the usefulness of a historical setting—a reference to an empire known to have existed, and to a king renowned as a great leader—and the ties with the present which Xenophon was able to establish by his references to Persian customs and contemporary Persian degeneracy. Natural additional motives would have been Xenophon's own experience and fascination with Persia, and the reading public's curiosity about a nation so vast, powerful, and different from themselves. Xenophon's contact with and admiration for Cyrus the younger and the Persian virtues which he thought he embodied no doubt played an important part. Most important, perhaps, was that this setting permitted him to universalize his thinking to encompass the highest values both of the Greek polis and of the Persian ruling class.³⁷

³⁶ Bakhtin (1981), 99–100, associates this sort of abstract space with the adventure-time of the Greek romances. 'What happens in Babylon could just as well have happened in Egypt or Byzantium.' This is true of the *Cyropaideia* in so far as Cyrus might have as easily conquered any other kingdom as Armenia, and the great battle of Thymbrara might as easily have taken place elsewhere.

³⁷ On the influence of Persian values (as Xenophon understood them) in Xenophon's conception of an ideal ruler, see Knauth and Nadjmabadi (1975), 40–64.

SEGMENTATION OF MINOR NARRATIVES

The discussion of time has indicated that the structure of the *Cyropaideia* is episodic, grouped around major incidents such as campaigns or dinner parties, each marked by an independent time frame. The sequence of these episodes forms the narrative background of the book. Another narrative technique is employed in recounting the major subplot, the story of Panthea and Abradatas. This is told in segments interspersed in the course of Books 4–7, fitting each segment into a suitable context within the larger story of Cyrus. Apparently this method of recounting a story was an innovation in prose: we see no evidence for the technique in Herodotus or Ctesias. In the *Odyssey*, Homer had shown what could be done by following several narrative strands simultaneously (Odysseus' adventures, the suitors and Penelope, Telemachus' travels) and then bringing them together into one tale. Herodotus had experimented with having a character from one story appear in another. Croesus is at the centre of his own complex of tales, but also is introduced as an adviser to Cyrus the Great in the campaign against the Massegetae, and as a scorned adviser to Cambyses. Artabanus figures as adviser to Xerxes in several episodes, and other figures reappear in Herodotus' narrative from time to time. The Herodotean story perhaps closest in technique to that of Panthea is the two-part tale of Pythius the Lydian, who first is honoured by Xerxes for feeding his army, then punished for requesting that his son be spared from the expedition (Hdt. 7.27–9, 7.38–9). The two halves of the account are complementary, revealing the two sides of despotism, generosity and arbitrary cruelty. But exactly because of its function in revealing Xerxes' despotism, the story is not permitted to develop its own shape as a novella.³⁸ The Panthea story, on the other hand, is carefully developed in four acts (after the tantalizing preliminary reference to the beautiful captive at 4.6.11), each of which is significant for the development both of the novella

³⁸ The figure of Pythius did attract other fuller tales: see Plutarch *Mul. virt.* 262D–263C and Stadter (1965) 120–4. Thucydides through his divisions by years achieved some of this effect for, e.g., the stories of Corcyra and Plataea.

subplot and the account of Cyrus' success. A review of the scenes will make this clearer.

The beautiful captive: a story in four acts

Prologue. Cyrus is awarded 'the most beautiful woman in Asia' (4.6.11).

Act I. The power of love (5.1.2–18): Cyrus reveals his self-control and self-knowledge.

Cyrus appoints Araspas custodian of the woman, Panthea.³⁹ In the dialogue that follows, Araspas reports her extraordinary beauty, but Cyrus, wary that her beauty will cause him to fall in love and distract him from his duty, refuses to see her. Araspas insists that love is subject to rational control and that there is nothing to fear. After the dialogue, Xenophon as narrator notes that Araspas soon 'was captured by love, and perhaps suffered nothing surprising'.

Act IIa. Cyrus saves the impetuous lover and the captive (6.1.33–44): Cyrus finds the right use for a brave but weak subordinate and gains a major ally through his self-control.

Cyrus decides to send Araspas as a spy against Croesus. A flashback reviews how Araspas, overcome by passion, attempts first to seduce then to violate Panthea, and how Panthea rejected him and warned Cyrus. Cyrus, without anger, insisted that Araspas use persuasion, not force, with Panthea. However, his messenger Artabazus⁴⁰ reproached Araspas with impiety, injustice, and lack of self-control. Araspas' fear of Cyrus and the expectation in others' minds that he will become his enemy permits Cyrus to set up a pretence that they have in fact quarrelled and Araspas has deserted to the enemy: in fact he will be a spy. Araspas joyfully accepts the opportunity to show his worth.

Panthea, on the other hand, respecting Cyrus for his treatment of her, engages to win over her husband Abradatas, the prince of Susa, as an ally, replacing the supposed loss of Araspas. Abradatas, persuaded by Panthea's words and Cyrus' actions, eagerly joins his whole force of one hundred chariots to Cyrus' army.

Act IIb. Araspas returns from his spy mission (6.3.14–20).

Araspas now furnishes valuable information on Croesus' troops and dispositions, which permit Cyrus to frame the tactics which will result in victory.

³⁹ Xenophon identifies Araspas as an old friend of Cyrus, referring to 1.4.26, where no name is given. Otherwise Araspas appears only in the episodes of the Panthea story.

⁴⁰ Artabazus is himself erotically attached to Cyrus: see the story of the kiss at 1.4.27–8 (with 8.4.27), although he is not named until 6.1.9.

Act IIIa. Abradatas receives the most dangerous position in Cyrus' formation (6.3.35–6).

Act IIIb. The leave-taking of Panthea and Abradatas (6.4.2–11).

Panthea tenderly sees Abradatas into his chariot, as he leaves to join Cyrus' forces at the battle of Thymbrara. She urges him to fight bravely to repay Cyrus for his generous treatment of her.

Act IVa. The death of Abradatas (7.1.29–32).

Abradatas makes a valiant charge against the massed Egyptian contingent and breaks their line, but is thrown from his chariot and killed.

Act IVb. The lovers reunited (7.3.2–16).

After the battle, Cyrus hears of the brave death of Abradatas, and goes to where Panthea sits with her husband's body. He states the honours he is planning for Abradatas and his willingness to marry her to whomever she wishes, and departs. Panthea kills herself over the body of her husband.

The story of Panthea has the form of a romance: a loving married couple are separated when the woman is captured by a king. The woman resists seduction and rape by her guardian, supported by the good king. The faithless guardian redeems himself by going on a dangerous spy mission. The couple are reunited when the woman persuades her husband to join the king as ally. Because of their own high standards of behaviour, and to please the king, both man and woman are eager that he fight in the forefront of the battle. The man is killed fighting bravely, and the woman, unable to endure separation, kills herself on his body. All of this story could have been told as a unit, in connection perhaps with the aftermath of the battle of Thymbrara. But by breaking the story into segments Xenophon redefines its nature, creating a series of lessons on the relation of personal virtue to long-term goals and values.

The beauty of Panthea permits Xenophon to display concretely and memorably the forethought, self-knowledge, and sexual self-restraint which he considers essential in a leader. Cyrus is not without feeling, or asexual: on the contrary, he sees himself as naturally prone to be defeated by the passion of love when he has contact with a beautiful woman. But not being as rashly self-confident as Araspas, he sternly reins in his natural desire to see Panthea, because at the

time he must be occupied with more important matters. His awareness of his long-term goals prohibits self-indulgence; his self-knowledge keeps him from putting himself in a position where he would no longer be able to control himself. Araspas provides the counter-example, the man who by recklessly indulging in the sight of Panthea's beauty, is smitten by love, and led first to violate his trust by attempting to seduce Panthea, and then to violate his own sense of honour and justice by threatening to rape her.

Araspas' failure permits Xenophon to demonstrate Cyrus' management of his associates, in particular how he attempts to find the proper job for each person. Cyrus is not offended by Araspas' failure: he realizes that Araspas has yielded to human nature, as he himself might have done, and that Araspas can once more be useful when the circumstances change. Xenophon permits Cyrus' initial error in making Araspas the guardian so that he can demonstrate the technique of converting a potential enemy to an ally by modifying the situation in which he is operating. Coupled with this knowledge of human nature is an absolute freedom from possessiveness or defence of privilege. Cyrus does not feel threatened or challenged by Araspas' behaviour, exactly because he recognizes it as a human failing rather than betrayal or rivalry. While others presume that Cyrus will consider Araspas an enemy, he himself is seen scheming with Araspas against Croesus, the real enemy. The scheme is successful, and Cyrus gains information significant to the following victory.

In addition, the story reveals—what has already been demonstrated in other cases—that generous, honest, and self-restrained treatment of others will win even enemies to one's side: Abradatas defects to Cyrus as a result of the treatment his wife has been given, and in fact becomes the most valuable of Cyrus' allies, the one who by his fearless attack on the Egyptians determines the victory over Croesus. Xenophon draws a direct line between the self-knowledge and self-restraint of the commander and his military success. Cyrus initially refuses to see Panthea, for fear that he be distracted from more important duties. What Cyrus does not know is that this decision will in fact empower him to fulfill those very duties, by giving him special advantages in the campaign against Croesus.

Finally, the scene with Panthea and the mutilated corpse of Abradatas reminds the reader of the tragic nobility of bravery, and the

honour that it is due. Simultaneously it draws a startling contrast with the fatuous figure of Croesus, who as a commander should know the true value of virtue. Instead, in his immediately preceding dialogue with Cyrus on the nature of the happy life (7.2.15–29), Croesus had said that Cyrus now had given him ‘happiness’ (εὐδαιμονία), because he had made him like a woman, comparing his future state to that of his wife, who lives softly and without worry supported by her husband. Panthea, a different kind of wife, gives the lie to this definition: true happiness lies in encouraging virtue in oneself and others. Abradatas, though now a mutilated corpse, has met ‘the finest end’ (τὸ κάλλιστον τέλος) and Panthea’s love has been more of an ornament to him than all the rich garments Cyrus could bring (cf. 7.3.7, 11).

In his treatment of the Panthea novella, Xenophon’s narrative originality in dividing the story into episodes and interweaving it with the main story line of Cyrus’ campaign has permitted him to develop dramatically and persuasively the moral virtues which underlay Cyrus’ military victories. As the cruelty of the Assyrian and the weakness of Croesus assure their defeat, Cyrus’ self-knowledge and self-restraint assure his success.⁴¹

CYRUS’ PAIDEIA

The static nature of time in the *Cyropaideia* has important consequences both for the understanding of character and the meaning of *paideia* in the title and throughout the novel. The narrative discloses Cyrus’ character, reveals the nature of his training (παιδεία) and in the process trains the reader as well, by describing Cyrus’ words and behaviour in particular difficult situations and in relating to particular characters. The major emphasis of the work is on Cyrus as an example for the education of the reader, not on Cyrus’ own education.

⁴¹ This lesson of the narrative is reinforced by many other narratives, some of which are also broken into segments, such as the intertwined stories of Gobryas (4.6.1–10, 5.2.1–22, 5.3.1–14, 7.5.24–32) and Gadatas (5.2.28–9, 5.3.15–33, 5.4.1–6, 7.5.24–32).

In so far as a principal facet of Xenophon's ideal leader was the ability to wage war effectively, the military situations of the narrative form a kind of handbook of military training, strategy and tactics. An unusual economy prevails in Xenophon's account, quite different from the narrative technique of Herodotus or Thucydides. In these historians, repetitive patterns are employed to allow the reader to understand the underlying similarities of apparently diverse historical events. Xenophon, working not from history but from invention, employs a series of episodes, of which each is independent, and each conveys a particular lesson.⁴² The result is a narrative which is simple compared to that of the historians, linear rather than interwoven, and requiring much less of the reader.

A short example will clarify my point: there are several campaigns involving marches to a battle area, but only one such journey is described in detail, the march to Thymbrara. First, Cyrus in a long speech (6.2.25–41) explains to his commanders the needs of the fifteen-day march. They will have to prepare grain for the march, and should at once become accustomed to drinking water, since wine will be scarce on the march and their bodies will need time to adjust to the change. Likewise they should prepare clothes and bedding, preserved meats, handmills, medical supplies, tools for reworking weapons and for clearing roads, men trained in bronze-working, carpentry, and leather work with their tools, and sutlers to supply a market when needed. The speech reads like a modern traveller's guide, listing all that might be necessary before a trip. The march itself follows, and again Xenophon specifies precisely the order of march, the position of the baggage train under various conditions, and the manner of reconnoitring (6.3.1–6). The purpose of the passage is evidently to set forth Xenophon's ideas of the preparations and formation needed for a long march. The information appears only here; in narrating other campaigns, Xenophon treats other problems, such as the use of deception in concealing the attack against the Armenians as a hunting expedition (2.4.18–32).⁴³

⁴² Similarly Xenophon avoids problems which do not interest him in this context, such as the difficulty of training the newly formed Persian cavalry (cf. 4.3.3–14, 4.5.43–9, 5.2.1), treated in his *Hipparchicus* and *Peri hippikes*.

⁴³ At 7.4.16 a sentence covers the return march from Sardis to Babylon, the conquest of the Phrygians, Cappadocians, and Arabs, and the equipping of 40,000

CHARACTERS

Just as incidents are determined by the nature of the lesson Xenophon intends to impart, so also are the characters with whom Cyrus deals. The characters of the *Cyropaideia* depend for their existence on their role in Xenophon's scheme of virtue, not a historical tradition or earlier historical narratives. Xenophon does use characters with historical names, and some of these are tied to historical actions, but he refuses to let historical tradition determine his story.

Consider his treatment of women. Herodotus and Ctesias, our best representatives of the Greek tradition on Persia before Xenophon, both place royal women at the centre of their accounts of oriental monarchy. From Candaules' wife to Amastris the wife of Xerxes, from Semiramis to Parysatis, Herodotus and Ctesias introduce powerful, intelligent, vengeful, dangerous women, who assume power and dominate their hapless spouses.⁴⁴ Harem intrigues and bedroom plots were a standard feature of rule in the orient. Xenophon himself notes in the *Anabasis* the major role played by Parysatis in protecting Cyrus the younger and encouraging his revolt against his brother. When we turn to the *Cyropaideia*, we are in a different world. Only four women are brought to our attention, Panthea, Cyrus' mother Mandane, and the wives of the Armenian king and of his son Tigranes.⁴⁵ Panthea, as has been seen, is the opposite of the dangerous women of Herodotus and Ctesias: she is intelligent, brave, and strong-minded, but sees herself in relation to her husband, who gives meaning to her life, and whom she joins in death. Mandane is the caring mother, thoughtful for the growth of her child, but set aside when Cyrus joins a man's world.⁴⁶ She is a far cry from Parysatis, attempting at all costs to advance the position of Cyrus the younger. In the small scene allotted to her, Tigranes' wife reinforces the loyalty and affection shown by her husband. Her pride in

more cavalry. Actions of these types have already been treated, and so are of no interest.

⁴⁴ Cf. recently Sancisi-Weerdenburg (1983) 20–33 and (1987b) 33–45.

⁴⁵ Cyrus' wife, the daughter of Cyaxares, is a silent figure at 8.5.18–20, 28.

⁴⁶ *Cyr.* 1.2.1, 1.3.1, 13–18, 1.4.1. Cyrus consults her together with his father concerning his marriage (8.5.20, 28); both parents die long before Cyrus (8.7.1).

his virtue introduces the theme that will be developed in the Panthea story. Here also erotic attachment is indicated without elaboration ('Then, as was to be expected after such a conversation, they lay down with each other').⁴⁷ The two are close, and she accompanies her husband in Cyrus' army. The wife of the defeated Armenian king appears briefly in a lesson on the use of wealth. As Cyrus leaves Armenia, she meets him, and gives him the gold, which previously had been hidden in the ground. Cyrus returns it to her, so that she can use it to furnish fine weapons for her son, and a decent life for her family, adding that only bodies should be buried, not gold.⁴⁸ Xenophon has consistently challenged the Hellenic tradition on Persian women to present figures of virtue and display Cyrus' leadership.⁴⁹

The wives of the Armenian king and of Tigranes are two examples of many minor figures which Xenophon introduces briefly for a particular purpose, then dismisses. The gloomy taxiarch⁵⁰ Aglaitadas objects at a dinner party to the laughter of Cyrus' comrades. His criticism provokes a discussion on the proper season and role of humour, at the end of which Aglaitadas himself is brought to smile by a witticism (2.2.11–16). The Sacan wine-pourer of Astyages arouses the envy of the young Cyrus for his influence on the king (1.3.8–11, 1.4.6); Sambulus, one of Cyrus' officers, is teased by him for his ugly companion (2.2.28–31). Daiaphernes, who thought he would appear more independent if he did not immediately respond to Cyrus' summons, is given a lesson (8.3.21–2).⁵¹ These figures and others like them are introduced once, play their scene, and then are never heard from again.⁵²

⁴⁷ *Cyr.* 3.1.41, cf. 3.36–7, 43. Xenophon recalls the scene at 8.4.24.

⁴⁸ *Cyr.* 3.3.2–3.

⁴⁹ Women do not play a large role in Xenophon's historical works. In the *Hellenica*, there is only the local dynast Mania (3.1.10–16, 26–7) and Parapitas, who appears as mother of Pharnabazus' son (4.1.39–40). The women in the *Anabasis* are more powerful, and occasionally have a sexual role: Parysatis the queen mother (1.1.1, 3, 1.4.9, 1.7.9, 2.4.27), the Cilician queen Epyaxa, who aided Cyrus and perhaps shared his bed (1.2.12–20), Cyrus' Phocian mistress, Aspasia (1.10.2–3), and the wife of Gongylus, who aided Xenophon (7.8.8–9).

⁵⁰ Note the reference to his character: ['the manner of the harsher of men'], τὸν τρόπον τῶν στρυφνοτέρων ἀνθρώπων.

⁵¹ Again he is characterized appropriately: ['a man rather rude in his manner'], σολοικότερος ἄνθρωπος τῷ τρόπῳ.

⁵² There are some fifty-five persons named in the *Cyropaideia*, of which approximately thirty-three appear on a single occasion. About twenty names appear in catalogues,

There are thirteen major figures: the members of Cyrus' immediate family, Astyages, Cambyses, Cyaxares, and Mandane; his allies the Persians Chrysantas and Hystaspas, the Mede Artabazus, the Assyrians Gadatas and Gobryas, the Armenian Tigranes, and Panthea and Abradatas; and his enemy Croesus. These can serve multiple functions, but always their appearance and behaviour is dictated by the particular qualities in Cyrus which their interaction with him will reveal. A review of two encounters between Cyrus and his uncle, Cyaxares, who becomes king of Media and Cyrus' overlord, will illustrate the practice. As has been seen, the figure of Cyaxares does not appear in our record apart from the *Cyropaideia*, and must be seen as a creation of Xenophon's imagination.

The first encounter is when Cyrus is a young man, accompanied on a hunt by Cyaxares, who is older but has not yet assumed the throne from his father Astyages.⁵³ In his youthful eagerness Cyrus rushes ahead of his cautious uncle, pursuing first a stag, and then a boar. Cyaxares protests, and fears king Astyages' anger, but Cyrus is determined to bring back his trophies despite the risk. Cyaxares yields to him, saying, 'Do as you wish, since you already seem to be king.' The words are prophetic of Cyrus' future power over his uncle, even after Cyaxares becomes king. The whole scene conveys Cyrus' prowess and determination to excel, as well as his ability to manage even his seniors. Nevertheless, as appropriate to the developmental stage of the narrative, Cyrus has not shown wisdom either in pursuing his quarry so rashly nor in confronting his uncle so directly. He has still much to learn.

The second occasion comes much later, after Cyaxares has become king and enlisted Cyrus' aid in the great war against the Assyrians.⁵⁴ Despite Cyaxares' caution and disinclination to pursue the enemy, Cyrus has managed the war so successfully that the Assyrians are

marching orders, or battle lists but are repeated nowhere else. These people, such as Andamias, leader of the Median infantry (5.3.38) or Euphratas, commander of the siege machinery (6.3.28), serve to make the narrative more precise and real. At the same time, they exemplify Xenophon's idea of leadership, which includes knowing the names of subordinates, as Cyrus explains at 5.3.46–50.

⁵³ *Cyr.* 1.4.7–9. See also the full treatment of Cyaxares by Tatum (note 1 above), 115–33.

⁵⁴ *Cyr.* 5.5.5–36.

defeated and Cyrus returns triumphant to the king. Far from being content, the king is frustrated and enraged because Cyrus has done battle without his approval and conquered while he was partying and sleeping. The scene is set: how will Cyrus deal with a superior jealous of his achievements, unwilling to take risks himself, and pained at the glory won by others, even when done in his name and to his advantage. The problem is common in business and even academic life today; it must have been common as well in Xenophon's society, with its emphasis on personal honour and achievement. In the background there lie echoes of Achilles' quarrel with Agamemnon. Like Agamemnon, Cyaxares is a ruler who is basically good-hearted, but weak and resentful of the obvious superiority and dynamism of someone under him.

Accompanied by his victorious and booty-laden army, Cyrus presents himself to Cyaxares, but the king refuses his kiss of greeting and turns away weeping.⁵⁵ Cyrus does not become angry or challenge the king, but gently leads him by the hand to a secluded spot under some palm trees, has the king sit upon pillows, and then himself sits beside him to discuss the matter. The scene, of course, recalls that of the conversation on the grass between Agesilaus and Pharnabazus, when their relationship had become difficult.⁵⁶ In the long dialogue that follows, Cyaxares touchingly speaks of his feelings of shame, frustration, and anger when he sees Cyrus taking his men from him, and winning the glory that should be his.⁵⁷ Although Cyrus argues that the victory was won for him, Cyaxares is not mollified, accurately describing the feelings of one who is dominated by the benevolence of another more dynamic person: 'You know that the greater these benefactions of yours are, the more they weigh on me' (5.5.25). Finally Cyrus promises to demonstrate in deed that the Medes respect Cyaxares and honour him. He returns to his army, and the Median commanders who had accompanied him, encouraged by

⁵⁵ *Cyr.* 5.5.6: ['and he did not kiss him, but was clearly in tears'], *καὶ ἐφίλησε μὲν οὐ, δακρύων δὲ φανερός ἦν*.

⁵⁶ See *Hell.* 4.1.29–40 and Gray (1989) 11–78, 'Conversationalised Narrative'.

⁵⁷ Similar feelings of alienation had caused the Armenian king to kill Tigranes' sophist counsellor (3.1.38–40). In that case, the parallel between the sophist and Socrates is patent, so that Xenophon in the scene with Cyaxares is also suggesting that the Athenians' execution of Socrates was natural, though wrong.

Cyrus, do in fact come forward with great honours for Cyaxares, so that he feels he is honoured as a king should be. From that point forward Cyaxares accepts Cyrus' predominant role and does not oppose him. It is of course obvious that the honours paid to Cyaxares are dependent upon Cyrus' good will, and not an independent achievement of the king. Yet Cyrus, by his willingness to give the pre-eminent honour to Cyaxares, being satisfied himself with second place, is able to achieve a stable relation with the king, and be left free to accomplish his own goals. The act requires an extraordinary act of renunciation on Cyrus' part: it is rather as if Achilles had said with good humour, 'By all means, Agamemnon, take Briseis. After all, I have been fighting for you, and you as king deserve more honour.' The whole scene has been conceived by Xenophon to illustrate his idea of how one might handle the resentment of excellence, which Cyrus faced.⁵⁸

CYRUS AS A PARADIGM

The *Cyropaideia* is built of such scenes, each an example of virtuous behaviour in human relations. Cyrus in this utopian, didactic narrative is an ideal figure, displaying always the paradigmatic behaviour envisioned by Xenophon. In his book, James Tatum has examined many of these incidents with a fine eye for detail and the underlying implications of a conversation or a scene. Yet, from my own reading of the narrative form of the *Cyropaideia*, I would disagree with his analysis in one important particular. Tatum finds that Cyrus is at bottom an actor, consciously manipulating his behaviour so as to manage all those with whom he comes in contact, shaping himself anew each time so that nothing will stand in the way of the accom-

⁵⁸ As on other occasions, the reader may not be convinced that this procedure would work. Xenophon himself seems to sympathize with Cyaxares to a certain extent, although his portrait shows a man who has inherited the throne, but is not himself kingly. The power of Cyaxares' words is Xenophon's way of recognizing that the problem envisioned was a serious one. If the narrative is not convincing, it is because Xenophon cannot overcome the reader's sense, based on his own experience, of the way such situations resolve themselves in real life.

plishment of his goals.⁵⁹ In this view, as Cyrus persuades Cyaxares by pretending to be humble, all the while insisting on his own way and working toward his own imperial goals, so he does with each person he meets. Dialogues do not persuade him, nor do conversations reveal his true character under the banter. Even those fabled lovers, Panthea and Abradatas, learn to their sorrow that Cyrus will use anything, even their love, to achieve his ends. This interpretation reflects our own contemporary sense of scepticism toward authority and our idea of personal excellence. Moreover, it seems to imply that the *Cyropaideia* is a history, and Cyrus a real person, who can be judged on the basis of his actions.

However, if what I have argued is true, and the narrative employs a historical setting only to create a utopian vision of ideal human behaviour, then the Cyrus portrayed by Xenophon is not an actor who assumes different poses, but one who knows what is right on all occasions, and has such perfect control of himself that he can put his knowledge into action. Because he is the ideal, he has no second thoughts, dialogues do not persuade him, he always triumphs. As I noted in discussing the temporal dimension of this novel, the major part of the book is not developmental but revelatory: the reader is not shown Cyrus working out the difficulties he faces in a dynamic, exploratory way, but Cyrus demonstrating the proper response.

Xenophon's fictional narrative reads like history, but the idealization of Cyrus, the generalization of space and time, and the control over the characters reveal it as something quite different, in which the author attempts to consider the nature of human experience not on the basis of previous events, attitudes, and actions, however broadly understood and interpreted, but by the creative effort of his own imagination. Plato attempted to blend everyday life and philosophical insight in the figure of Socrates, a historical figure idealized beyond recovery.⁶⁰ Xenophon, with his focus on the problems of leadership, especially in war, chose instead Cyrus, a historical conqueror and king, revered as a father by the Persians, as the vehicle for his ideal ruler.

⁵⁹ See Tatum (1989), 65–6, and often.

⁶⁰ For one minor yet quite influential incident where Plato reinvented a historical event to convey his philosophical point, see Gill (1973) 25–9.

ADDENDUM

Among the many works on Xenophon published since this article was written, two especially relate to its subject. Bodil Due's book (1989) independently developed and particularized more fully many of the ideas presented here. Her observation (p. 30) that Xenophon in the *Cyropaideia* combines the structure of his minor works, employing an introduction and conclusion, with the extent and mixed narrative form of earlier historical works, especially his own *Hellenica*, clarifies the technique he used to express philosophical ideas in a biographical narrative. Among the many contributions of Christopher Tuplin to our understanding of Xenophon, Tuplin (1997) forcefully argues against my article and Due (1989) that the *Cyropaideia* should be considered historiography, not fiction. My own effort was not to establish the genre of the work, but how a reader might respond to it. Tuplin offers many excellent observations, including important corrections to my own errors in speaking of time (100–5), which have led me to rewrite a paragraph (p. 475 in the original text, here p. 382), but I still believe in the validity of my thesis, that the *Cyropaideia* is a utopian fiction employing historical material.

The Question of the *BIOΣ EΥΔΑΙΜΩΝ*: The Encounter between Cyrus and Croesus in Xenophon

Eckard Lefèvre

Amongst the best-known tales from antiquity are the encounters of the Lydian king Croesus with the Athenian statesman Solon and, after the Persian capture of Sardis, with Cyrus. The improbability that the former has any kernel of historical truth in no way diminished its impact;¹ both tales, narrated by Herodotus in *Histories* (1.29–33, 86–91), were constantly retold. The former is found in, amongst others, Diodorus, Plutarch, Diogenes Laertius, and Lucian,² the latter in Diodorus, Plutarch, and Nicolaus of Damascus.³ It was only to be expected that Xenophon too would not let the confrontation of the captured king of the Lydians with the victorious king of the Persians escape him in his glorification of the elder Cyrus (*Cyr.* 7. 2. 9–29). In this account Croesus achieves a higher profile than the other minor characters in the *Cyropaedia*, so that he can serve as a foil to the renowned conqueror of Sardis. It must therefore seem all the

¹ The encounter between Solon and Croesus must be a novelistic invention: cf. Weissbach, *RE*, Suppl. v (1931), 470. The attempt of Regenbogen (1930), 375 ff. to prove the story of Tellus in Solon's speech an original pre-Herodotean version of the threefold parable still does not mean that a historical core is to be supposed, at least in this way. On the other hand it is very likely that Cyrus and Croesus met in some way or other at the capture of Sardis (cf. too pp. 413 f.). Naturally romantic invention flourished here too; on the various sources see Weissbach *RE*, Suppl. v (1931) 462 ff. Cf. too Olmstead (1948), 40–1.

² References in Weissbach (1931), 471–2.

³ References *ibid.* 463.

more surprising that in recounting his fate Croesus does not mention his meeting with Solon. On the other hand, the question of happiness in life plays a decisive role in his account just as it does in Herodotus' dialogue between Croesus and Solon. Even a cursory glance at Xenophon's depiction, shows that he has blended what in Herodotus were Croesus' two separate encounters with Solon and with Cyrus into a single complex and remoulded them motif by motif. I may therefore be permitted in what follows to raise the question of the purpose that Xenophon may have pursued in so doing.

Naturally one must consider whether this reinterpretation should not be traced back to Xenophon's sources. If, of the models used by Xenophon in the *Cyropaedia*, only Herodotus and Ctesias can still be certainly identified,⁴ it can be established from the outset that a historical tradition for the encounter between Croesus and Cyrus in Xenophon is completely improbable. Above all it is important to note that the intermediary source for the references to Herodotus, namely Ctesias, cannot have known a comparable encounter between Cyrus and Croesus. While it is precisely in this point that Justin cannot be used to reconstruct Ctesias' account of the war with Croesus,⁵ it is clear from Photius' report (*Bibl.* 72, p. 36^b)⁶ that an encounter such as Xenophon depicts was impossible in Ctesias (cited by name at 35^b35, 36^a25), in whose account Croesus took refuge during the capture of Sardis at the temple of Apollo and was there put in chains three times by Cyrus; three times he mysteriously escaped despite the posting of guards. Captured in the palace and chained more securely, but again released from his chains amid thunder and lightning, 'he was then set free by a reluctant Cyrus' (καὶ τότε μόλις ὑπὸ Κύρου ἀφίεται): 36^b14–16. After which Cyrus received him into his entourage and granted him the city of Barene near Ecbatana. Obviously this story, in which Croesus is freed by powers against which Cyrus can do nothing, and is accepted by the latter against his will, is incompatible with the portrayal of the humane treatment that Xenophon's Cyrus grants Croesus. It follows that Ctesias cannot have been the source for Xenophon's account.

⁴ See Breitenbach, *RE*² ixB (1967), 1709.

⁵ Justin 1. 7, on which see F. Jacoby, *RE*, xi/2 (1922), 2058.

⁶ Cf. Jacoby, *FGrHist* III C, p. 456.

In any case it is unlikely that we should posit any intermediate source between Herodotus and Xenophon, for the novelistic cast of the encounter between Cyrus and Croesus matches in every detail Xenophon's tendency, observable in almost every chapter of the *Cyropaedia*, to a morally edifying presentation.⁷ In view both of this consistent tendency and of the fact that, as we shall see, this encounter forms the high point of the work, it is extremely improbable that Xenophon in reinterpreting it made use of a source in which both the theme of the *Cyropaedia* and the structurally emphasized comparison between the two kings were already present. In that case one would have to posit that Xenophon copied out his source word for word, which there is no reason to suppose.

On the other hand, it is impossible to deny that Xenophon's presentation did not come into being independent of Herodotus. This is shown, not only by individual details, but above all by the fusion of Croesus' two dialogues, with Solon and Cyrus, into a single encounter. Moreover, besides the main topic, the question of *εὐδαιμονία*, which is debated in his confrontation with Herodotus, further references to other parts of the *Histories* show Xenophon's portrayal to be inconceivable without them as a background. On the other hand, it goes without saying that a direct relationship between similar motifs is not always demonstrable or even probable. Nevertheless, that will not be a consideration in the particular points to be made below, since my purpose is rather to show how Xenophon's interpretation as a whole is opposed in its guiding principle to Herodotus' depiction.

CYRUS AND THE SACK OF SARDIS (7. 2. 9–14)

Even the opening of Xenophon's narrative feels like a reinterpretation of Herodotus. After the capture of Sardis, Cyrus causes Croesus to be brought before him. When the latter greets him and addresses him

⁷ L. Breitenbach's readiness in his annotated edition of the *Cyropaedia* (1869), xv ff. to credit Xenophon with a relatively far-reaching conscientiousness as a historian meets with almost no agreement nowadays; cf. above all Breitenbach *RE*² ixB (1967). The attentive reader even of the poem will find Cicero's judgement on the portrayal of Cyrus confirmed (below, p. 417).

with the title 'master' (δεσπότης)⁸ Cyrus answers καὶ σύ γε, ὦ Κροῖσε, ἐπεὶ περ ἄνθρωποι γέ ἐσμεν ἀμφοτέρω (7. 2. 10: ['You also, Croesus, since we are both human beings']). Herodotus' Cyrus had already felt this way towards Croesus, for when the latter was already standing on the pyre, Cyrus realized ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸς ἄνθρωπος ἐὼν ἄλλον ἄνθρωπον... ζῶντα πυρὶ διδοίη (1. 86. 6: ['that though a man himself as well, he was burning another human being alive']), and ordered his release. But the difference is considerable: Xenophon's Cyrus is led to speak thus by the general humanity of his outlook, which Xenophon is never tired of pointing out, whereas in Herodotus he needs an external impulse that makes him think. For following Croesus' cry of woe, 'Solon', Cyrus obtains through interpreters a report of his encounter with the Athenian statesman, in which Croesus stresses that Solon's doctrine that no one was to be called happy before his death 'referred to himself [no more than to all the human race and most of all those who seemed to themselves to be happy]': οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἐς ἑωυτὸν λέγων ἢ <οὐκ> ἐς ἅπαν τὸ ἀνθρώπινον καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς παρὰ σφίσι αὐτοῖσι ὀλβίους δοκέοντας εἶναι (1. 86. 5). It is therefore 'in fear of punishment', δέισαντα τὴν τίσιν, that Herodotus brings Cyrus to his insight (1. 86. 6). From such a stimulus Xenophon's humane Cyrus is far removed.

In what follows Cyrus asks Croesus for advice: he can see that his troops, who had captured the richest city in Asia after Babylon, desire booty, and he thinks that is right, but he does not want the city to be looted, especially because it is precisely the worst men who will come off best. Croesus offers to make the Lydians willingly bring gold and treasures,⁹ by telling them that he has obtained Cyrus' agreement that the city shall not be sacked. That would also be in Cyrus' interest,¹⁰

⁸ In Herodotus too Croesus addresses Cyrus as δέσποτα (1. 90. 2) and even says with emphasis (1. 89. 1: ['since the gods have given me to you as a slave']).

⁹ In §12 the transmitted reading is θέλω or ἐθέλω (retained by L. Dindorf and L. Breitenbach in their editions: (thus Croesus makes his offer to 'those whom he wishes'). Gemoll proposed ἐλωμαι, referring to the MS variation θέλωμι, ἐλοίμην in §23, but that does not improve the sense. By contrast Hug's conjecture ἔλθω, which Marchant prints in the text, appears to hit the mark: Croesus wishes to speak to 'anyone, i.e. everyone he meets'; that is more credible than that he should wish to speak only to select persons (the meaning of ἐθέλω and ἐλωμαι).

¹⁰ The explanation of τέχνη in §13 as 'agriculture etc.' was taken over by L. Breitenbach from Dindorf's commentary. However, the context, in which only

since the city is capable of producing the same treasures again next year. In Herodotus too Croesus advises Cyrus about looting. First, he counters Cyrus' statement that the Persians are plundering his city by saying that it is no longer his city but Cyrus' city. Obviously such a *bon mot* can have no place in the portrait of Xenophon's Cyrus. Then Croesus advises him to take the booty back off the Persians under a pretext, since the richest of them might rise against him. 'Cyrus is highly delighted with this good advice' and acts upon it (1. 90. 1).

Here again Xenophon's minor changes are significant. Whereas in Herodotus the Persians, in Cyrus' full knowledge, loot uninhibitedly, Xenophon's Cyrus has scruples about letting them loot at all. That indeed is why he asks Croesus for advice on how to prevent it. We should also note the attitude underlying his words. Whereas Herodotus' Cyrus takes to heart Croesus' warning that booty-laden Persians might rise against him, and therefore endeavours to take their plunder away again, Xenophon's Cyrus holds it right and proper that the soldiers should receive their share: ἀξιῶ ὠφεληθῆναι τοὺς στρατιώτας (7. 2. 11). He is the good king who strives at all times to do his soldiers good, and even lets them have his own booty: οὕτως ἐγὼ ὑμῖν διψῶ χαρίζεσθαι, as he himself stresses in another place (5. 1. 1: ['I have a craving to serve you']). He is therefore a stranger to the worries of Herodotus' Cyrus and in no way could he be delighted by such advice. His only inhibitions during the sack are of a moral nature (7. 2. 11: ['that the worst men should get an advantage']). He thus acts with regard to the common good, not, as in Herodotus, to himself.¹¹

Thus, although in this first part of the encounter it is Croesus who gives instruction, every word must be related to the chief figure, Cyrus. We have therefore to do less with a 'didactic dialogue that amongst other things quite rightly points to the economic basis of

treasures are at issue, demands the meaning 'artēs', the craftsmanship that can produce 'many beautiful things' as at 5. 3. 47, 6. 2. 37. The description of the τέχνηαι as πηγὰς τῶν καλῶν ['sources of beautiful things'] should also suggest this interpretation. Cf. Crusius (Leipzig, ²1860), s.v.

¹¹ In Herodotus Croesus says of Cyrus that his subjects are insubordinate in nature (φύσιν ἐόντες ὑβρισταί) and therefore ought not to acquire too many treasures in looting (1. 89. 2).

prosperity'¹² than with a dialogue between the crafty king of the Lydians and his moral superior Cyrus: it is Cyrus' reaction to Croesus' mode of address and his concern about the sacking of Sardis to which this discussion is directed. As against Herodotus the roles are reversed.

CROESUS AND THE ORACLE (7. 2. 15–19)

The second part of the encounter between the two kings clearly shows that Xenophon is taking note of Herodotus' account: in contrast to the *Cyropaedia's* placid and leisurely mode of exposition, the portrayal of Croesus' relations with the Delphic Oracle offers mere hints, permitting the inference that Xenophon is presupposing a well-known narrative. When Croesus admits with regard to Apollo: ἀπεπειρώμην αὐτοῦ εἰ δύναίτο ἀληθεύειν ['I made trial of him, whether he could speak truth'], he obviously means the test of the oracle described at length by Herodotus 1. 47–8 as the ἀρχὴ κακῶν ['beginning of bad things']. For without knowledge of the previous history, that the oracle was to say just what Croesus was doing on the appointed day, we cannot understand the statement that Apollo knew he was doing something strange even though Croesus lived so far from Delphi (7. 2. 18).

In what follows, too, Xenophon departs noticeably from Herodotus. Since Croesus has to recognize Apollo's prophetic art, he asks him for advice ['about children'] περὶ παίδων, but the god does not vouchsafe him a reply because Croesus had put him to the test. Only when he has been placated with lavish dedications does he answer the question how Croesus could get children, ὅτι ἔσονται (7. 2. 19: ['that there would be children']). He spoke the truth, but Croesus had no luck with his children: the one remained dumb, the other died in the bloom of life. The latter is a reference to Atys, killed by Adrastus (Her. 1. 36 ff.), who had indeed suffered a lamentable fate. But in the case of the dumb son in Herodotus' account, it then happens that at the decisive moment, when at the capture of Sardis a Persian is set to kill

¹² Breitenbach *RE*² ixB (1967), 1720.

Croesus, he recovers his voice and frightens off the Persian with the cry (1. 85. 4): ['Do not kill Croesus, sir']. From that time on he could speak again. Not only then does Xenophon's ['he continued mute'] not fit him, but in contrast he brought his father the greatest good fortune. Xenophon relates what is known from Herodotus briefly, the discrepancies at length. Why did he make these changes?¹³ In Herodotus, Croesus is an example of how things divine can be misunderstood. Both his questions, whether he may march against the Persians (1. 53) and whether his reign will last long (1. 55–6), receive answers that he misunderstands. If Xenophon wished to present Croesus in this fashion, he had to find a substitute for the oracles familiar from Herodotus,¹⁴ since he was confronting Croesus with Cyrus himself, with whom both oracles are concerned. Croesus must be seen by him *πάντα τάναντία εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς πράττων* (7. 2. 16: ['acting against my interests in all things from the beginning']), but Xenophon had to forgo the examples in his source and create at least one new example, using the well-known motif of the childless father—think of Xuthus in Euripides' *Ion*. It is therefore clear that the different structure results in this case from dramaturgical considerations. Since Croesus must be seen 'acting against his interests', this whole passage (7. 2. 15–19) serves only to introduce the ensuing discussion of the happy life.

THE QUESTION OF THE *BIOΣ ΕΥΔΑΙΜΩΝ* (7. 2. 20)

It is the subsequent sections—the high point of the dialogue—that present the greatest surprise. The famous question about happiness in life addressed by Herodotus' Croesus to Solon, is here reworked as an enquiry to an oracle and deftly linked to the fate of Croesus' sons, the topic of the discourse: Croesus, grieved by his son's misfortune,

¹³ Another is that in Herodotus Croesus offers his unusually lavish dedications at Delphi in thanks for the answer received in the test (1. 50–1), but in Xenophon it is to get the oracle to speak at all, when he asks for information about children (7. 2. 19).

¹⁴ In Herodotus Croesus had asked only about his son's dumbness and received the answer that the boy would become able to speak on the day of his father's misfortune (1. 85).

asks 'how he may live the rest of his life in the greatest happiness': *τί ἂν ποιῶν τὸν λοιπὸν βίον εὐδαιμονέστατα διατελέσαιμι* (7. 2. 20). It is known that in Herodotus Solon had answered Croesus' question: *σκοπεῖν δὲ χρὴ παντὸς χρήματος τὴν τελευτὴν κῆ ἀποβήσεται* (1. 32. 9: ['one must look to the end of everything, how it will turn out']). As we know, in asking his question Croesus had been principally thinking of himself. Now, when Xenophon's Croesus asks how after his sorrow he may live the rest of his life in the greatest happiness, he as it were incorporates Solon's answer, which he naturally could assume the reader to know, since he speaks explicitly of the end of life. Xenophon has thus not only linked the motif with what precedes, but above all altered Croesus' attitude. In Herodotus the point of the dialogue between Croesus and Solon is of course to show that it is not luck itself, but 'relying on one's luck that even without moral guilt demands retribution, since such self-assured pride fails to recognize the limitations of the human race'.¹⁵ From such an attitude Xenophon's Croesus is far removed. He is not so much 'arrogant' *ὕβριστής*¹⁶ as in his literary model, but god-punished. Whereas in Herodotus he may be blamed for misunderstanding the two oracles about his Persian expedition and Cyrus,¹⁷ it cannot be held against him in Xenophon that he did not put an adverse construction on the prophecy that he will have sons. In this matter, then, one can hardly speak of arrogance. Perhaps this exoneration of Croesus, as against his Herodotean model, is also the reason why in Xenophon the testing of the oracle appears only in a barely comprehensible allusion.

Now we perceive the reason why the figure of Solon has been eliminated from its traditional context: Croesus is no longer the arrogant man with whom the wise man is contrasted, but a man who in his dealings with divinity seeks good fortune.¹⁸ Herodotus'

¹⁵ Pohlenz (1937), 114.

¹⁶ So Breitenbach *RE*² ixB (1967), 1720.

¹⁷ The Pythia does that herself; that Croesus' failure to understand the pronouncement that by crossing the Halys he would destroy a mighty empire is his own fault, since he ought to have asked the god [whether he meant his own empire or that of Cyrus] (1. 91. 4).

¹⁸ Too vaguely Breitenbach *RE*² ixB (1967): 'the figure of Solon naturally has no place in the Cyrus romance'. On this point see too below, pp. 416 f.

Croesus puts a question that Solon can answer, Xenophon's one that only a god can. The latter then answers (7. 2. 20):

σαυτὸν γινώσκων εὐδαίμων, Κροῖσε, περάσεις
 ['Knowing thyself, Croesus, you will be happy']

It is the Delphic *γνώθι σαυτόν*, which Solon does not expressly utter in Herodotus but which lurks behind his tenet: *πάν ἐστι ἄνθρωπος συμφορῇ* (1. 32. 4: ['man is a complete accident/disaster']), for *γνώθι σαυτόν*, 'in its original sense, means nothing other than: Know yourself for the feeble human being that you are.'¹⁹ Solon could give Croesus only a hint; it is in the further course of events after the departure of the Athenian statesman that the king's fate comes to exemplify the truth of Solon's teaching.²⁰ If then Xenophon makes the oracle answer Croesus' question with the well-known *γνώθι σαυτόν*, he so to speak interprets Herodotus' story from its outcome. It is thus not only the form of the question, but also the answer, that he has adapted to his new context; for Solon's answer, as does not need stressing, would not be appropriate here. That too explains why Xenophon dispensed with him.

THE *BIOΣ ΕΥΔΑΙΜΩΝ* (7. 2. 21–4)

That the oracle is an exhortation to 'good sense' *σωφροσύνη* is clear from Croesus' explanations. It is the warning to consider one's worth correctly within one's limitations. Croesus' folly is precisely that he thinks that consideration to be very easy: ['I thought that everyone knew who he was'] *ἑαυτὸν δὲ ὅστις ἐστὶ πάντα τινὰ ἐνόμιζον ἀνθρωπὸν εἰδέναι* (7. 2. 21). At first Croesus saw no reason to be dissatisfied with his fate. Then his participation in the war with Cyrus brought him into grave danger, but he was rescued. Even on that account he did not want to blame the god for a false oracle: *οὐκ αἰτιῶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ τὰδε τὸν θεόν* (7. 2. 22). As in Herodotus then, so also in Xenophon, it

¹⁹ Regenbogen (1930), 385.

²⁰ The connection of the subsequent events with Solon's discussion was shown by Marg (1953), ii. 1103 ff. = (1965) 290 ff. at 291 ff.

is Croesus' way that twice, as is expressly said, he at least considers accusing Apollo of false prophecy rather than laying the blame on himself. This attitude is all the more noticeable in that, as we have seen,²¹ Xenophon's Croesus has less reason than the Herodotean Croesus to mistrust the oracle.

And then, for the reader familiar with Herodotus' narrative—without doubt it is such a reader on whom Xenophon reckons—comes the great surprise: whereas Herodotus' Croesus does not attain insight by himself, Xenophon's Croesus does, recognizing his situation, that is to say his limitations, in other words knowing himself. First he emphasizes that he fared well in the struggle against the Persians so long as he was aware that he was no match for them (7. 2. 22). But then he was led astray by wealth, gifts, and flatterers, by whose words he was puffed up (*ἀναφυσώμενος*), so that finally he accepted election by the kings as supreme commander of the war against Cyrus [‘as one fit to become most great, not knowing myself, *ἀγνοῶν ἄρα ἐμαυτόν...*’] (7. 2. 23). Croesus had taken on this supreme command, as Xenophon reports at 6. 2. 9, without being the real driving force; that was supplied rather by the kings who had elected him. It should therefore hardly be supposed that his accepting this election merits condemnation. Even if Croesus had been himself of the opinion that his allies were inferior to the Persians, he could hardly decline election. However, these conventional notions, which could be multiplied at will, are irrelevant for Xenophon's scheme: concepts like war morale, troop strength, or patriotism lose their meaning for the enemy once Cyrus is concerned. Even Croesus recognized that when he said to Cyrus that he estimated himself wrongly [‘because I thought myself fit to war against you, who are, first of all, descended from gods (*ἐκ θεῶν γεγονότι*), secondly born from a line of kings (*διὰ βασιλέων πεφυκότι*), and thirdly trained in virtue since childhood, (*ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρετὴν ἀσκοῦντι*)’] (7. 2. 24). These three points in which Croesus deems himself inferior to Cyrus are in fact extremely surprising. The possible objection to point 2, that after all Croesus descends from the renowned royal

²¹ See above, pp. 406 f., on the first oracle in Herodotus: the Pythia herself reproaches Croesus. And the second even takes the form of a warning: cf. Marg (1965), 293.

house of the Mermnads, is met by the observation that the first king of his line ['became a king and a free man at one and the same time'] *ἄμα τε βασιλέα καὶ ἐλεύθερον γενέσθαι* (7. 2. 24).²² By that he means that he is not descended from 'proper' kings. How little this argument holds water becomes clear if we set Cyrus' descent against it. To be sure, Xenophon traces his lineage back to Perseus (1. 2. 1); that covers point one, but everyone knew that in Herodotus²³ and Ctesias²⁴ Cyrus' origin was less illustrious. Naturally Xenophon had every right to alter it in accordance with his plan; taken by itself this point is perfectly valid. However, the second argument remains most unsatisfactory, and one wonders why Xenophon used it when such a construct must seem incredible, even to the reader who is well disposed. We may therefore suppose that Xenophon set great store by the threefold articulation: *ἐκ θεῶν γεγονότι. . . διὰ βασιλέων πεφυκότι. . . ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρετὴν ἀσχοῦντι*. Once one realizes that, it is not hard to recall the programmatic terms at the end of the proem that Xenophon prefixed to his portrait of Cyrus: *ἐσκεψάμεθα τίς ποτ' ὦν γενεὰν καὶ ποίαν τινὰ φύσιν ἔχων καὶ ποία τινὲ παιδευθεὶς παιδείᾳ τοσοῦτον διήνεγκεν εἰς τὸ ἄρχειν ἀνθρώπων* (1. 1. 6: ['We inquired as to what descent, what nature and what education he had to be so superior in ruling men']). Lesky has observed that the proem speaks with the educational optimism founded by the Sophists, but that on the other hand, Xenophon makes a combination often found elsewhere too of this high valuing of education with old aristocratic notions, when he names lineage and natural disposition, next to education, as the causes that permitted his hero to scale such heights.²⁵ It is therefore certainly no accident that these terms are

²² Gyges was Candaules' 'spear-bearer' according to Herodotus 1. 8. 1, his 'shepherd' according to Plat. *Rep.* 359 D 2.

²³ In Herodotus Astyages does not consider Cambyses, Cyrus' father, of equal birth even to a Mede of middling status (1. 107. 2). On Cyrus' origin cf. Weissbach, *RE*, Suppl. iv (1924), 1132 ff.

²⁴ In Ctesias Cyrus is low-born: his father is a bandit, his mother a goatherdess. Besides Weissbach see too Jacoby, *RE*, xi/2 (1922), 2056.

²⁵ Lesky (1963), 668. These three concepts from the proem are treated by Erasmus (1954), 111 ff. (esp. 120 ff.), without noticing their return in Croesus' speech. When he calls the lineage descent the 'least significant factor' (124) and thinks that Xenophon has not 'observed [*sic*] that it ought not to be mentioned alongside nature (*φύσις*)' (121), he mistakes Xenophon's conception, in which Cyrus' origin is not to be divorced from his nature. The importance of this point for Xenophon is clear even from the different account in Ctesias (see previous n.). Furthermore, the weight he

repeated at a decisive place in Croesus' speech: Cyrus alone fulfils all three requirements in an ideal manner—not even Croesus, of whom Pindar said ['his kindly virtue does not perish']: οὐ φθίνει Κροίσου φιλόφρων ἀρετή.²⁶

Croesus has thus come to know Cyrus deeply in his character. And on the basis of that knowledge he also becomes aware of his fault and attains self-knowledge: ['Ignorant of this,' he said, 'I have my just deserts. But now indeed, Cyrus,' he said, 'I know myself'] (7. 2. 24–5). That is a truly astonishing turn of events: Croesus becomes aware of his limitations only in comparison with the ideal ruler Cyrus. Daring to oppose him was the sorely afflicted Lydian king's decisive error. Now we see why Croesus is so much more positively portrayed in Xenophon than in Herodotus, why he is depicted in an authentic striving after the *εὐδαιμονία* that in Herodotus he so effortlessly throws away: what mattered for Xenophon was the comparison between the two celebrated kings, the more impressively to illustrate the supremacy of his hero. Only a man like him could cause Croesus to fail. That is no shame to Croesus, but brought fresh lustre to Cyrus' star.

In the end Herodotus' Croesus also reaches insight (1. 91. 6: ['I realized it was my own error and not the god's']). Yet, here too the difference is significant: he is taught by the divinity, as the Pythia lists his errors point by point, whereas Xenophon's Croesus is taught by a human being, as he becomes aware of his inferiority to him. In Xenophon, if one may say so, Cyrus takes the place of the divinity.

CYRUS AS GUARANTOR OF THE *BIOΣ ΕΥΔΑΙΜΩΝ* (7. 2. 25–9)

After Croesus has recognized his limitations—*γινώσκω μὲν ἑμαυτόν* (7. 2. 25)—he is faced by the question of whether Apollo's oracle

placed upon it is shown by the artificial explanation in Croesus' speech of the two kings' difference in lineage descent. Erasmus' remarks are generally vitiated by their faulty method, which is to suppose that Xenophon had an intention of 'systematizing' and then brand it as 'not at all successful' (esp. 121).

²⁶ *Pyth.* 1. 94.

spoke true now that he is Cyrus' prisoner. The problem is made the more pointed by the unambiguous formulation. Croesus asks: 'Do you still think that Apollo spoke the truth, that I shall be happy if I know myself (ὡς εὐδαίμων ἔσομαι γιγνώσκων ἑμαυτόν)? I am asking you, because you seem the best able to judge at the present moment. For you can achieve it' (καὶ γὰρ δύνασαι): 7. 2. 25. That means, taken strictly, that Apollo's veracity is dependent on Cyrus, or to put it more sharply: that the god is dependent on Cyrus. It is advisable not to trivialize the problem by supposing that Apollo knew how Cyrus would behave, or that Apollo meant that gross violation of the commandment 'know yourself' could even incur death. In these cases Xenophon would hardly have made the problem so pointed. Above all the expression 'for you can achieve it' is unambiguous: it is on Cyrus, not Apollo, that everything depends. This phrasing reminds us of the archaic prayer-tag 'for you have the power': δύνασαι γάρ.²⁷

And in fact Cyrus is Croesus' guarantee of the βίος εὐδαίμων; for when Cyrus says that he means to leave him with everything, wife, daughters, servants, friends, and wealth, merely relieving him of the worries of war, Croesus feels that not as a restriction, but as unqualified happiness: μὰ Δία μηδὲν τοῖνυν . . . σὺ ἔτι βουλευού περὶ τῆς ἐμῆς εὐδαιμονίας (7. 2. 27 ['I swear, take no further thought for my happiness']). Naturally we must ask whether this is an objectively perceived εὐδαιμονία—to the extent there is such a thing—or Croesus' subjective opinion, which is in reality, that is in the author's opinion, a shameful one, as Breitenbach found: Xenophon, he argues, contrasts 'the βίος γυναικώδης ['feminine life'] ironically with the πόνος ['toil']-ideal'.²⁸ First, it needs to be said that Cyrus in other cases too spared the kings of conquered realms and treated them with kindness.²⁹ Furthermore, it appears from the Nabonidus Cyrus Chronicle that Cyrus left the defeated Croesus in nominal possession of his kingdom and merely deprived him of his command in war.³⁰

²⁷ On this 'old prayer formula' see Eduard Norden's commentary on Verg. *Aen.* 6. 117 (p. 157); id., *Agnostos Theos*, 154. Cf. further Appel (1909), 153 (reference kindly supplied by D. Fehling). Among the passages not cited there one might, in a broader context, compare Homer, *Od.* 4. 827, 5. 25, 16. 208.

²⁸ Breitenbach (1967), 1721.

²⁹ Weissbach, *RE*, Suppl. v (1931), 464.

³⁰ Proof was attempted by Lehmann-Haupt (1929), 123 ff.

That would match Xenophon's account, in which Cyrus says to Croesus: ['I restore to you... your wife... daughters... friends and followers and the table you used to keep, but of battles and wars, I deprive you (μάχας δέ σοι καὶ πολέμους ἀφαιρῶ)'] (7. 2. 26). If we also take Ctesias' account into consideration,³¹ we may take it to have been Cyrus' normal behaviour, which did not necessarily entail dishonour to the beneficiary. Still, we might be surprised that Croesus not only accepts his new position, but also perceives it as εὐδαιμονία. But two considerations may save us from the false conclusion that Xenophon meant to be ironic at Croesus' expense. First and foremost, the comparison drawn by Croesus between his new life and his wife's is misleading. He says expressly that a generally recognized ideal is at stake: ['a life which *others* considered to be most blessed and I agreed with them'] (7. 2. 27). And in answer to Cyrus' question he then cites his wife *as an example*, saying emphatically of her (28: ['whom I loved most of all']). To be sure that is a way of life that Xenophon would feel to be unworthy of Cyrus, but hardly—and that is the second point we must consider—of Croesus. He cannot be seriously compared with Cyrus, however superior he may be to the rest of humanity, as the comparison has shown: he is already utterly inferior to him by birth, and by nature too (7. 2. 24); what befits him is different from what befits Cyrus. What for Cyrus is a reproach may still be an honour for others.

CONCLUSIONS

The comparison between Croesus and Cyrus, as has been said, would have to be the high point of the *Cyropaedia*. In order to bring out the new connection between these two characters, Xenophon had to transform the story of Croesus as known from Herodotus even in the individual details. Above all, in order to preserve a worthy

³¹ Cf. the excerpt from Photius already mentioned, 36^b16 ff.: ['and Cyrus gave Croesus Barene, a large city, near Ecbatana, in which there were 5,000 horse, 10,000 peltasts and javelin men and archers']. Here too Croesus retains a certain independence.

counterpart for Cyrus, he had to portray Croesus more positively than Herodotus had done, by eliminating the traits of self-assuredness³² and reinterpreting his conduct towards the gods. That meant both that the testing of the oracle had to retreat into the background, and above all that the accusation against the divinity had to be cut out. In Xenophon Croesus becomes a person earnestly striving for the βίος εὐδαίμων. In the *Cyropaedia* Xenophon likes to bring in characters only with the function of being a mirror for some specific behaviour on Cyrus' part: that applies to grandfather Astyages in his youth just as it does to the Median king Cyaxares, whom Xenophon has probably invented;³³ it applies to the Assyrian ruler Gobryas who changes sides as it does to Abradatas and Panthea. We have already seen that in the encounter between the two kings Cyrus is the moral superior, whereas in Herodotus the balance lies on the side of the shrewd Lydian king. This relation remains in force for their subsequent encounters in both authors.

In Herodotus' account of the expedition against Tomyris, queen of the Massagetae, it is Croesus whose advice prevails over the resolution of the 'leading Persians' (1. 206–7). Cyrus not only listens to Croesus, but even recommends to his son Cambyses that if he himself should be killed in the war he should continue listening to Croesus. Xenophon too describes a further meeting between Cyrus and Croesus. Since Cyrus daily gives away a great deal of gold and property to assist his friends and followers, Croesus warns him (8. 2. 15 ff.) that thereby he may become poor. Cyrus gets him to estimate how much gold he has accumulated during his reign, and then sends messengers to seek money from his friends for a fictitious enterprise; he thereby receives a considerably larger sum than Croesus had mentioned. He is able thus to demonstrate that he has invested his money better than the shrewd Croesus could imagine. Once more, in contrast to Herodotus, it is Cyrus who teaches and Croesus who is taught. It is significant that Cyrus, at the end of his speech, refers again to εὐδαιμονία and so echoes the great discussion of this topic: ['I do not consider happiest (εὐδαιμονοεστάτους) those who have the most

³² Croesus' self-assuredness, as the paradigm case for this attitude in Herodotean characters, has already been studied by Marg (1953).

³³ Cf. Breitenbach (1967) 1709–10.

and hoard the most...but whoever has the power to acquire the most with justice and make use of the most with goodness, this man I judge happiest *εὐδαιμονέστατον*'] (8. 2. 23). Thus, once again, as in the great dialogue with Croesus, it is Cyrus who instructs the other about *εὐδαιμονία*. Of course it hardly needs emphasizing that Cyrus himself embodies the *βίος εὐδαίμων*: (8. 2. 23: ['And it was clear that his practice followed his words in this matter']).

The second theme connected to *εὐδαιμονία* that played a part in the dialogue with Croesus,³⁴ the emphasis on the fact that even Cyrus is only a 'human being', also reappears in both accounts. In his advice mentioned above, concerning the attack on Queen Tomyris, Croesus reminds Cyrus of his human limitations: 'if you think you are immortal... there would be no point in my giving you my opinions, but if you recognize that you too are a human being, receive instruction first on the circularity of human affairs' (1. 207. 2). Herodotus' Cyrus listens to the warning, Xenophon's, as we have seen, needs no such instruction (7. 2. 10). That this recognition is his maxim for living, Cyrus himself declares on his deathbed, when he thanks the gods ['that I never had more than mortal thoughts in my successes, οὐδεπώποτε ἐπὶ ταῖς εὐτυχίαις ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπων ἐφρόνησα'] (8. 7. 3). Cyrus is the true sage, who surpasses not only Croesus, but naturally Solon too and for this reason alone he cannot have the Athenian statesman at the Lydian king's side. He fulfils in his own person what in Herodotus is the object of Solon's reflection. In his last speech on his deathbed he confesses he has always been afraid to rejoice overmuch in his good fortune ['the fear attending me that in future time I might see or hear or experience some disaster did not permit me to take pride to its limits or to rejoice unreservedly'], expressly referring like Herodotus' Solon to the future (8. 7. 7). It is indeed this final speech in which the well-known themes are once again heard together: Cyrus is the *ἀνὴρ εὐδαίμων* (8. 7. 6), and above all—it is here that Xenophon's glorification of his image, already manifested in the encounter with Croesus, culminates—he is the guarantor of the *εὐδαιμονία* of others: (8. 7. 7: ['I saw my friends made happy (*εὐδαίμονας*) through my services']). Cyrus unites in himself both Solon's wisdom and the didactic manner of Herodotus' Croesus, who

³⁴ Cf. above, p. 404.

is superior in his counsel to the rest. For that reason Xenophon, as must have become clear by now, in contrast to Herodotus' narrative, had to eliminate the figure of Solon and considerably reinterpret that of Croesus, thus creating a completely new picture of the traditional encounter between Cyrus and Croesus.³⁵ In Xenophon's *Cyrus* all good qualities are concentrated; he is, as Cicero already saw, the ideal ruler with the ideal virtues: ['That Cyrus was written not for historical accuracy but to produce the image of just rule, in which great seriousness is mingled by that philosopher with singular charm . . . no duty of a caring and moderate rule is omitted'].³⁶

³⁵ That Xenophon did not describe Herodotus' episode of Croesus on the pyre is expressly noted by Philostratus, *Imagines* 2. 9. 2.

³⁶ *Ad Q. frat.* 1. 1. 23. *Cyrus ille a Xenophonte non ad historiae fidem scriptus sed ad effigiem iusti imperii, cuius summa gravitas ab illo philosopho cum singulari comitate coniungitur. . . . nullum est enim praetermissum . . . officium diligentis et moderati imperii.*

Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* and the Hellenistic Novel

Michael Reichel

THE CYROPAEDIA AND GREEK PROSE FICTION

When Eduard Schwartz wrote his *Fünf Vorträge über den Griechischen Roman* in 1896 he avoided even mentioning Chariton, Achilles Tatius, or other well known Greek novelists, but he devoted no less than twenty pages to Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*.¹ Since that time it has been the *communis opinio* in novel scholarship that the *Cyropaedia* (and particularly the Pantheia story included in it) has had some impact on the rise of the Hellenistic novel, although the extent and the nature of this influence are difficult to ascertain. When dealing with the origins of the Greek novel, we are faced with several problems, which also affect our present question. (1) Between the *Cyropaedia*, written around 360 BC, and the earliest extant novel, Chariton's *Callirhoe*, there is a time gap of at least 250 years. The *Ninus Romance*, one of the works that may have been a connecting link between the *Cyropaedia* and the fully developed Hellenistic love romance, is only attested in four scanty fragments. Other early novels may have been entirely lost from our knowledge. (2) Schwartz and other scholars, notably Jaroslav Ludvíkovsky,² thought that the novel developed from degenerated historiography. Although the idea that the novel can be

Bibliography has been added to the original version of this paper.

¹ Schwartz 1896, 45–64.

² Ludvíkovsky 1925.

derived from one single literary genre is now rejected by most scholars, there can be little doubt that the genre of historiography was one of several genres that influenced the rise of the Hellenistic novel. This leaves us with the problem of discerning to what extent the impact of the *Cyropaedia* on the later novelists is based upon a direct imitation of Xenophon and to what extent on his indirect influence on the novel via Hellenistic historiographers. (3) Ben Edwin Perry³ questioned the traditional view, based on a 'biological' model, that the novel developed out of one or several literary ancestors (such as historiography, epic, travel tales, drama, love poetry etc.), and instead proposed the theory, now widely accepted, that it was the artistic creation of one individual mind, facilitated by the social and cultural environment of the Hellenistic age.⁴ If we adopt this explanatory model we would, of course, like to know if the *protos heurtes* of this new literary genre was inspired by the *Cyropaedia*. But while the question of literary influences and models is already difficult to answer for a literary genre whose origins and early specimens lie in the dark, it is virtually impossible to make any statements about an individual writer of whose work we possess not a single line (unless this writer was, as Perry thought, the author of the *Ninus*). Again it would be important to know, provided that this writer was somehow influenced by Xenophon, whether the later novelists were indebted to Xenophon's work as a direct model or as an indirect influence by way of imitating the earliest novelist(s).⁵

³ Perry 1967; see esp. chs. I and IV.

⁴ Seen from the 'biological' perspective, Perry's concept of the origin of the novel might perhaps be compared to a 'spontaneous mutation'. However, the difference between Perry's view and the traditional approaches is much smaller than many scholars argue. No one could reasonably deny that literary history in its entirety consists of the works of many individuals, each of which is exposed to multifarious literary and other influences. The crucial difference seems to be that between tradition-dependence and innovation on the part of the single author. The question of literary models (or 'inspirations') for the early novels is as relevant as it was before Perry's study, though the terminology may have slightly changed.

⁵ Although starting from different methodological premises, both Ludvíkovský and Perry attribute an important influence to the *Cyropaedia* on the rise of the novel. See Ludvíkovský 1925, 155 f. et *passim*. Perry 1967, 167 ff., 173 f., 177 f., esp. 173: 'Like *Ninus*, the first Greek romance must have been modelled structurally on the pattern of Xenophon's *Cyropedia*, because the earliest known romance, that about *Ninus* and *Semiramis*, is, as a matter of fact, so constructed, and because the name *Xenophon* was used as a *nom de plume* by the authors of at least three romances, serving to

In the scope of the present chapter it is impossible to deal with these far-reaching questions in any satisfactory manner. Instead I shall restrict myself to pointing out the most evident parallels (as well as differences) between the *Cyropaedia* and the later novels and try to suggest some explanations for them. I shall mainly concentrate on the love romances, leaving out the *Alexander Romance* by Pseudo-Callisthenes and some other forms of the ancient novel.⁶

The *Cyropaedia*⁷ itself is difficult to define in categories of literary genres. In depicting the life of the Persian king Cyrus the elder, who ruled in the sixth century BC, Xenophon combined elements of different genres such as historiography, biography (especially encomium), ethnography, political utopia, philosophical dialogue, technical writing, novella, and anecdote. As a single literary work the *Cyropaedia* can

conceal their real identity.' Perry also called Xenophon 'the patron saint of the first romancers' (174). On the impact of the *Cyropaedia* on the novel see also Braun 1938, 10 n. 3; Todd 1940, 3, 5; Helm 1956, 9–12; Reardon 1971, 350–3 et *passim*; Reardon 1991, 60–2 et *passim*; Cizek 1977, 106–28, here 108; Heiserman 1977, 7–9; Hägg 1983, 113; Kuch 1989b, 47–50. Müller 1981, 379, voices reservations: ['...in spirit and content no path leads from the *Cyropaedia* to the novel—in spite of the interposed "novella" of Panthea and Abradatas']. Holzberg 1986, 24, comments on the Pantheia story: ['an important stimulus to the development of the Greek novel'], but apart from that he sees only a very loose genetic connection between the *Cyropaedia* and the later novel.

⁶ For the impact of the *Cyropaedia* on the Alexander historians see e.g. Currie (1990), 63–77. For the place of the *Cyropaedia* in the genre of the 'utopian novel' see Kytzler (1988), 7–16, here 9 and 15.

⁷ For general treatments of the *Cyropaedia* see Breitenbach 1967, 1707–42; Delebecque 1957, 384–410; Schmalzriedt 1965, 893–6; Bizos 1971, v–liv; Higgins 1977, 44–59; Hirsch 1985a, 61–100, 168–83; Due 1989; Tatum 1989; Zimmermann 1989; Stadter 1991; Gera 1993; Mueller-Goldingen 1995; Nadon 2001. On the impact of the *Cyropaedia* on the novel see especially Zimmermann 1989, 101, who considers the Pantheia story as ['a starting point for the later Greek romantic novel']; on p. 105 he comes to the conclusion that the *Cyropaedia* is the ['connexion between the encomium and the later Greek romantic novel']. Schmalzriedt 1965, 895, stresses the 'epoch-making' importance of this work and regards Xenophon as ['creator of the novel, particularly the historical novel']. Stadter 1991, 461, calls the *Cyropaedia* 'the first extant novel'. Due 1989, 235: 'If we take the Pantheia-story there can be no doubt that it was a forerunner of the later romances.' Tatum 1989, 165: Pantheia 'inspired the heroines of later romance'. Higgins 1977, 53: 'The vignettes of Abradatas and Pantheia begin a tradition in the Greek novel, but Pantheia's true heirs are not the silly damsels of a decadent genre. Her kin are women like Shakespeare's Cleopatra who have immortal longings in them.' Münscher 1920, in his extensive treatment of Xenophon's afterlife and his literary influence mentions of the ancient novelists only Iamblichus (p. 146) and Achilles Tatius (p. 151 f.).

be called 'an open form' with no less justification than the entire genre of the Greek novel, which has quite correctly been labelled the 'open form *par excellence*'⁸ in ancient literature. What sets the *Cyropaedia* apart from the later novels is primarily its didactic and paradigmatic purpose.⁹ Almost every part of the work is subordinated to the writer's main intention: to present Cyrus as the ideal ruler of men and to show how he acquired and developed the necessary qualities. This does not exclude the notion that the *Cyropaedia* also contains a considerable amount of good story-telling. Xenophon indeed knew how to advance its didactic purpose by including entertaining and amusing sections in his work that would help to keep the reader's attention awake and his memory alive.¹⁰

At the end of the preface Xenophon writes in the manner of a historian: 'What we have found out or think we know concerning him [sc. Cyrus] we shall now endeavour to present' (1,1,6).¹¹ But the following eight books of the *Cyropaedia* contain much material that is either demonstrably incorrect (for instance, the circumstances of Cyrus' death), anachronistic, or of a purely private, unhistorical character.¹² There is no need to assume that Xenophon was misled by his sources in all these cases. What he did in practice was to develop a new concept of fictional prose-writing in a historical setting.¹³ In some respects he may have followed the way paved by

⁸ Perry 1967, 47 (silently following Altheim and Grimal).

⁹ Note, however, that G. Anderson 1984, 51 f., stresses the historical connection between fictional and didactic literature, viewing the *Cyropaedia* within the framework of its Oriental predecessors.

¹⁰ See the good remarks by Stadter 1991, 465–7. Cf. also Breitenbach 1967, 1709 and 1717.

¹¹ This and further English translations of the text are taken from Miller, 1914.

¹² The historical reliability and authenticity (in Persian matters) of the *Cyropaedia* are judged very low by most scholars. Exceptions are: Knauth and Nadjmabadi 1975; Hirsch 1985a, 61–100, 168–83; see, for instance, p. 67: 'the common allegation that he [sc. Xenophon] fabricated most or all of the content of the *Cyropaedia* is perverse'. It should be added here that recent research on the Greek sources about Persian history, documented in the publications of the *Achaemenid History Workshop*, ed. by H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg (et al.), 1987 ff., has led to a re-evaluation of the relevant texts. For a comparative interpretation of Greek accounts of Cyrus see also Cizek (1975), 531–52.

¹³ Cf. Perry 1967, 178: 'Xenophon in the *Cyropaedia*, followed by the author of *Ninus*, was the first to transfer the values and recognized licences of poetic fiction relating to characters far away in time or place to narrative in prose.' On the importance of this

Ctesias in his lost *Persika*. The latter's work, too, probably exerted some influence on the Hellenistic novel, especially his predilection for fabulous and exotic stories, for situational details and melodramatic effects.¹⁴ But the twenty-three books of Ctesias' work encompassed long stretches of Assyrian, Median, and Persian history. Xenophon, on the other hand, concentrated on certain periods in the lifetime of an individual. In that respect the later novels are much closer to the *Cyropaedia* than to the *Persika*. In general, the 'historiographical' attitude as expressed in Xenophon's introductory remark quoted above is still very much in evidence with later novelists, although the fictional character of their subject matter must have been obvious to any erudite reader.¹⁵

The main figure of the *Cyropaedia* is an Oriental prince and later king who is portrayed in political as well as in private affairs. This is a striking parallel to the *Ninus Romance*,¹⁶ in which an Assyrian prince of a former century, regarded by the Greeks as a historical figure, plays the main part.¹⁷ But there is also an important difference between the *Cyropaedia* and the *Ninus Romance*, one which at the

work for the exploitation of fictional prose-writing see also Tatum 1989, *passim*. Zimmermann 1989, 98. Stadter 1991, *passim*. See also Momigliano 1971, 54–6, who, dealing with the *Cyropaedia* within the context of this genre, states: 'The borderline between fiction and reality was thinner in biography than in ordinary historiography' (56). On the development of fictional writing in late fifth and fourth century Athens in a broader context see Rösler (1980), 283–319.

¹⁴ On Ctesias' influence on the Greek novel see esp. Holzberg 1996, 629–32. Note, however, the *caveat* by Hägg 1983, 114: 'Ctesias' direct influence on novelists is ... hard to distinguish from what might have come from Ionic and Hellenistic historiography in general.'

¹⁵ On the historiographical pose of later novelists see e.g. Müller 1976, esp. 123 ff.; Morgan 1982, 221–65.

¹⁶ For a comprehensive discussion of the fragments see now Kussl 1991, 13–101; Stephens/Winkler 1995, 23–71.

¹⁷ Considering the fact that Ctesias was a much used (if unreliable) source for Assyrian history and especially the figure of Ninus (cf. Diodorus 2, 1–20, whose account is based on Ctesias), we are again faced with the problem of Ctesias' influence, either as a direct model or through intermediary sources. The difference in the characters, however, as far as our scanty evidence goes, is considerable and led Braun 1938, 12, to conclude that the *Ninus Romance* is independent of Ctesias. Holzberg 1986, 47 f., shares this view. On the historiographical tradition about Ninus and Semiramis and the problem of its influence on the *Ninus Romance* see Kussl 1991, 84–95. Braun, 1938, 12 n. 2, compares Ninus' fragmentary speech to his Assyrian forces in *Ninus fr.* B 3,34 ff. with the speech of the Assyrian king to his troops in *Cyr.* 3,3,44 f.

same time constitutes a parallel between the latter and the Hellenistic romance proper: the romantic love theme, which in the *Cyropaedia* appears only in connection with minor characters, but not with Cyrus himself, is linked up with Ninus, the hero of the story. He falls in love with his cousin (Semiramis?) and has to undertake military campaigns and undergo other adventures before he is reunited with his beloved. Apart from this, the parallels between the *Cyropaedia* and the *Ninus Romance* are conspicuous enough for us to assume direct literary influence. The French scholar Henri Weil, who was the first to notice them in his edition of the fragments in 1902, even gave it the title *La Ninopédie*.¹⁸ Another quasi-historical novel in which an Oriental, in this case an Egyptian, prince falls in love and goes to war, is the *Sesonchosis Romance*.¹⁹ But it is difficult to fit this work into the development of the Greek novel because the papyrus fragments date from the third or fourth century AD, and we do not know how much earlier it was composed.

In the earliest extant romance, Chariton's *Callirhoe*, the historical colouring is still quite strong. The Syracusan general Hermocrates and the Persian king Artaxerxes II are historical figures (although the latter's reign did not coincide with the former's lifetime). The greater part of the action takes place in Persia and other countries of the Near East, which may be noted as a parallel to the *Cyropaedia*. The male hero, Chaereas, embarks on warlike exploits in the course of the novel, but he is neither a prince nor a historical person of any importance.²⁰ As far as we can tell, Chariton's novel is a new type

¹⁸ Weil 1902a, 90–106. Holzberg 1986, 50 f., thinks that the *Cyropaedia* was directly imitated in the beginning chapters of the *Ninus* (and the *Sesonchosis*) *Romance*.

¹⁹ See O'Sullivan 1984, 39–44.

²⁰ According to the criteria proposed by Hägg 1988, 169–81, esp. 170–3, *Callirhoe* fulfills the requirements of a 'historical novel' better than the *Cyropaedia* (or the *Alexander Romance*): 'The typical historical novel deals with fictitious characters—that is after all what makes it a "novel"—in a historical setting: in the focus of attention are the personal experiences and concerns of private individuals... But to make the novel "historical", we expect real historical figures to appear as well, ideally mixing with the fictional ones so as to create a "mixture of the real and the imaginary on the same plane of representation"' (171). But it seems better to use the term 'historical novel' in the broader sense and to differentiate within this genre between varying degrees and shades of 'historicity' with regards to the personage, the events and the general social, political, and economical background of a particular novel. For the applicability of the term 'historical novel' with reference to the *Cyropaedia* see also Kuch 1989b, 50.

of (quasi-)historical narrative that does not involve a well-known historical person in fictional adventures, but instead places unknown characters in a historical setting.²¹ In the later Greek novels of Xenophon of Ephesus, Achilles Tatius, and Heliodorus, the historical colouring is still present, but it has almost entirely lost importance for the action itself.

So it is possible to postulate a hypothetical and probably incomplete line of development leading from Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* to the *Ninus Romance*, to Chariton's *Callirhoe*²² and to the later novels, a line in which the emphasis is gradually shifted from historiographic veneer to pure fiction and from political to private subject matter.²³ Many ingredients and constituents of the Hellenistic novel are already present in the *Cyropaedia*, which continued to exert an influence on later specimens of this genre not only indirectly, but also as a superior narrative and stylistic model to be followed and imitated.

Xenophon's name seems even to have been used as some sort of trademark among the later novelists. Apart from Xenophon of Ephesus, whose work has come down to us,²⁴ we know from the *Suda* lexicon of two more who called themselves Xenophon (of Antioch, and of Cyprus). Although it cannot be proven, it seems likely that this is simply a pseudonym which reflects their obligation to the Athenian Xenophon.

²¹ The same may be said of the fragmentarily attested *Metiochus and Parthenope Romance*. Cf. Maehler 1976, 1–20.

²² The argument in favour of a historical connection between Chariton and Xenophon is strengthened by the fact that there are several stylistic and motivic resemblances between the *Callirhoe* and the *Cyropaedia* (and also the *Anabasis*). See Perry 1967, 169 f., 358 n. 16. Chariton's novel is divided into eight books, like the *Cyropaedia*.

²³ Cf. the similar theory of Ludvíkovský 1925, which includes the *Alexander Romance*. For a different view see Müller 1981, 391: ['The Greek novel did not develop from "historical" to "fictional". It is fictional from the start and it retains its penchant for historical masquerade through to its final versions. Between the *Ninus-Romance* and Iamblichus' *Babylonica*, between Chariton and Heliodorus there is in this respect at most a difference of degree']. See also Müller 1976, 126. Cf. Holzberg 1986, 50 et *passim*.

²⁴ It has been argued that the couple in Xenophon of Ephesus, Anthia and Habrokomes, owe their names to the phonetic resemblance to Pantheia and Abrodatas in the *Cyropaedia*. Cf. Kuch 1989b, 49 (with further literature). Abrokomas is the name of the satrap of Phoenicia in Xenophon *An.* 1,3,20 et *passim*. On the influence of the *Cyropaedia* on Xenophon of Ephesus see Schmeling 1980, 23 f., 40 f.

THE PANTHEIA STORY

After these more general remarks on the influence of the *Cyropaedia* on the Hellenistic novel I shall now turn to a particular part of this work, the Pantheia story, which has often been considered a Greek love romance *in nuce*.²⁵ It is told in interspersed sections of Books 4–7.²⁶ Its content may be summarized as follows: Pantheia, the wife of Abradatas, the king of Susa, becomes Cyrus' prisoner during his campaign against the Assyrians. Cyrus places her in the charge of his Median friend Araspas, who falls desperately in love with her. But Pantheia repulses his advances and remains true to her husband, who has been sent on an embassy by the Assyrian king. When Araspas threatens to use force if Pantheia does not submit, she turns to Cyrus for help. Cyrus sends Araspas away on an espionage mission. With Cyrus' permission Pantheia writes a letter to her husband. Abradatas feels obliged to Cyrus for his behaviour towards Pantheia and becomes his ally. In the battle against the Egyptians he is killed while fighting on Cyrus' side. Pantheia, who had exhorted her husband to bravery before the battle, reproaches herself bitterly. Cyrus tries in vain to comfort her. Pantheia kills herself over Abradatas' dead body.

This story is probably the most moving novella of the pathetic type in ancient literature. At the same time it anticipates in more than one respect the story pattern of the Hellenistic love romance in its more or less standardized form.²⁷ The most evident parallels are:

²⁵ See the literature in n. 5 and n. 7 above.

²⁶ *Cyr.* 4,6,11; 5,1,2–18; 6,1,31–51; 6,3,35 f.; 6,4,2–11; 7,1,29–32; 7,3,2–16. On the Pantheia story itself see Schwartz 1896, 59–64; Breitenbach 1967, 1717 f.; Due 1989, 66–8, 79–83; Tatum 1989, 163–88 (who offers a new, almost deconstructionist, reading of this story); Stadter 1991, 480–4; Gera 1993, 221–45 et *passim*. Stadter notes on Xenophon's narrative technique of telling the Pantheia story in interspersed segments, each of which is fitted into a suitable context within the larger story: 'Apparently this method of telling a story was an innovation in prose: we see no evidence for the technique in Herodotus or Ctesias' (480). Cf. *ibid.*, 484 n. 41. Of course, important forerunners for this narrative strategy are Homer (within the restrictions of 'Zielinski's law') and the Greek historians from Herodotus onward. The use of parallel action and different threads of plot (mostly centred around the hero and the heroine, respectively) is much in evidence in the later novels. Cf. Hägg 1971, 138–88, 311–14 (without reference to the *Cyropaedia* as a possible narrative model).

²⁷ Brief remarks on some of the parallels can be found in Heiserman 1977, 7–9; Kuch 1989b, 48 f.; Zimmermann 1989, 102. For the motifs of the Greek romances see also Stark 1989, 82–7 (without reference to the *Cyropaedia*).

- (1) Pantheia is a paradigm of female beauty: she is said to be the most beautiful woman in Asia (*Cyr.* 4,6,11; 5,1,7). This also holds true of Callirhoe in Chariton's novel (5,3 et *passim*). Extraordinary beauty is also a characteristic of all the other heroines in the Greek novels, such as Anthia in Xenophon of Ephesus, Leucippe in Achilles Tatius, or Chariclea in Heliodorus.
- (2) Araspas falls in love with Pantheia, although in the beginning he is convinced that love is a matter of will (*Cyr.* 5,1,11) and that he could never become a slave to *eros* (5,1,14), as he says to Cyrus in a long discussion about the nature of love. It is an old motif that a person who claims to be immune against the power of love is punished for this *hybris*. What interests us here is that this motif is employed in several of the later novels, as has been noticed by Sophie Trenkner: 'The mundane heroes and heroines of romance boast of their immunity to love and indulge in philosophical and rhetorical arguments against love, just as Araspas does, until they too are humiliated by falling in love, which involves them in long and arduous adventures.'²⁸ She compares Chariton 2,4,4 and 6,3,2; Xenophon of Ephesus 1,1,5; Heliodorus 3,17; 2,33; 4,10; and the *Parthenope* and *Metiochus* fragment.
- (3) At the same time Araspas is the prototype of all those countless figures in the later novels who threaten the chastity or marital fidelity of a woman who is under their care or in their power, but who do so without success.²⁹
- (4) Pantheia remains true to her husband and manages to avoid the menace to this love.³⁰ She develops initiative of her own in order to get free of the man who wants to seduce her and in order to be

²⁸ Trenkner 1958, 27.

²⁹ The means used by Araspas in order to reach his goal are 'persuasion and force', *peitthein* and *anankazein*. This parallel to later novels (e.g. Xenophon Ephesus 4,5,2 ff.; 5,4,5; Heliodorus 1,22) was noticed by Braun 1934, 88 f. For the motif 'the woman as prisoner' in the Greek romances cf. Stark 1989, 85 f.

³⁰ Cf. Stark 1989, 83, who points out that all Greek romances have a common characteristic: ['This central structural element is the motif of true love and fidelity. But if true love is to prove constant, it must necessarily be submitted to trials']. She specifies these 'trials' as ['external threats to their heroes,—often coupled with danger to their lives—but not internal threats to the feelings by way of a psychological, intellectual or emotional change in the character of the heroes as a reaction to external events']. We may add that this definition is valid, without reservations, for the Pantheia story as well.

reunited with her husband. She is a prefiguration of the heroines of the Hellenistic novel who also very often play a more active rôle than the male heroes.³¹

- (5) After a time of involuntary separation Pantheia and her husband are reunited. However, this reunion happens not at the end of the story as in the later novels, but constitutes only an intermediate stage. Abradatas has to leave Pantheia after that, never to see her again. The final reunion is in death, to which Pantheia follows her husband. (See below, 7.)
- (6) As compared with Pantheia and Araspas, Abradatas' rôle shows fewer similarities to that of his later counterparts, the male heroes of the Hellenistic novel. Abradatas does not appear until the second half of the story,³² and he does not undergo many adventures in order to be reunited with his beloved. The search motif, which is a main constituent of the later novels, is absent from this story. Abradatas is first reunited with Pantheia and then goes into a battle. But it should be noted that he does so on Pantheia's behalf. As a matter of fact, his willingness to fight on Cyrus' side is a precondition for his meeting with his wife. Chaereas in Chariton's novel and Ninus in the *Ninus Romance* also embark on warlike exploits for the sake of their love.
- (7) The most striking difference between the Pantheia story and the later novels is the unhappy ending. Abradatas is killed in action, and Pantheia kills herself because of her grief; in the Hellenistic novel the main characters live happily together after they have been reunited.³³ Yet the death theme does appear in virtually all

³¹ Due 1989, 83, notes: 'Pantheia is very far from the normal ideal of a woman. She nurses the same ideals as the men and she is depicted very much as her husband's equal. She bears a strong resemblance to some of the strong women of tragedy.' On the rôle of the woman in the ancient novel cf. R. Johnes 1989, 150–77, here 155–9 (with further literature), esp. 158: ['...the heroines are often depicted as more intelligent, active and generally sympathetic than their often bloodless lovers']. See also Egger (1988), 33–66. Cf. already Rohde 1914, 383.

³² In contrast to the later novelists, Xenophon does not tell his readers how the hero and the heroine of the romance met for the first time and how they fell in love with each other. Even when narrating this romantic novella, his interest is focused on Cyrus which accounts for the 'delayed' entry of Abradatas into the story.

³³ For this stereotype of the novels cf. Müller 1981, 386: ['The happy ending is irreversible; it is taken away from the grip of fate. Thus its eschatological character is clear. From then on the luck of the lovers lasts their lives long and never more leaves their home'].

of these works, it is almost omnipresent. Greek novelists seem to be obsessed by the thought of death and the escape from it. Apart from the actual killings and suicides of many minor characters, we find, in connection with the main figures, the motifs of apparent death and of threatened or attempted suicide; very often a dead body may be mistaken for the hero or the heroine. Leucippe in Achilles Tatius, for instance, is taken for dead three times. Other examples are Callirhoe in Chariton, Anthia in Xenophon of Ephesus and Apollonius' wife in the *Historia Apollonii Regis Tyri*. In the fragments of the *Chione* and the *Calligone* the heroines consider suicide. The novels of Iamblichus and Antonius Diogenes play with the death motif in all possible variations, as we can see from the excerpts. The suicide motif is parodied by Petronius in the fake suicide attempt of Giton in the *Satyrica*. These motifs can be regarded as untragic variations of an originally tragic motif as it appears in the *Cyropaedia*.³⁴

We do not know whether Xenophon invented the Pantheia episode or took it over from an earlier (Persian or Greek?, oral or written?) source.³⁵ Scholars in the past have looked for sources and models, but even the thorough-going analysis in the recent monograph by Deborah Levine Gera has not settled the matter. There are noteworthy resemblances to Homeric scenes and tragic motifs.³⁶ Pantheia provides

³⁴ This parallel was noticed by Wehrli 1965, 144 f. On the death motif in the novel see Stark 1989, 86 f. and recently Wesseling 1993 (non vidi).

³⁵ It is elsewhere only attested in texts as late as Lucian *Im.* 10 and Philostratus *VS* 524; *Im.* 2,9. According to *Suda*, the epic poet Soterichus (c. AD 300) wrote a poem about Pantheia. Rohde 1914, 139 n. 1, thought the story was '[a free invention of Xenophon]'. Perry 1967, 169, speculates (contrary to Rohde, 374): 'Xenophon may have whitewashed the characters and suppressed an earlier form of the story followed by Celer' (cf. for the latter Philostratus *VS*, l.c.). Hirsch 1985a, 63, attributes an 'Oriental feel' to the Pantheia story. Breitenbach 1967, 1718, bases his assumption that Xenophon took this story over from a (Persian?) source on some circumstantial detail: '[the macabre scene with the chopped off hand §§ [7,3] 8 f. is what indicates that Xenophon has taken over the whole story]'.
³⁶ Breitenbach 1967, 1718, notes the striking detail that Abradatas' armour is made of gold (*Cyr.* 6,4,2): '[a completely fairytale feature within the realistic scene of war]'. This detail might also be labelled 'Homeric' (cf. e.g. *Il.* 6,235 f.). On the Homeric strains of the Pantheia story see also Helm 1956, 11; Rinner 1981, 151 ff.; Tatum 1989, 179 f.; 183. Gera 1993, 223, 236 f., 239. The rôle of the nurse in *Cyr.* 7,3,14 is analogous to that in Greek tragedy, e.g. Euripides *Hipp.*; cf. Breitenbach, 1718; Gera 1993, 242.

Abradatas with a new armour as Thetis does for Achilles in *Il.* 19,3 ff. The farewell scene of Pantheia and Abradatas in *Cyr.* 6,4,2–11 resembles in some points the *homilia* of Hector and Andromache in *Il.* 6,399–502; however, Pantheia does not try to prevent her husband from going into battle as Andromache does. The motif that a woman kills herself after the loss of her husband has antecedents in Euripidean tragedy (e.g. Laodameia in the *Protesilaus*, Evadne in the *Supplices*). Other details of this novella can be compared to events and characters in Herodotus and Ctesias. Araspas' rôle of a supposed defector reminds us of Zopyrus' espionage mission in *Hdt.* 3,153–60.³⁷ Ctesias' quasi-historiographical work contained a pathetic love-story: that of Stryngaios, who killed himself because of his unhappy love to Zarinaia (*FGrHist* 688 F 7. 8 a/b). Gera points out some affinities between Pantheia and Zarinaia: 'both lovely women refuse would-be lovers because involvement with them would lead to a breach of marital fidelity. Both stories also include lovers who commit suicide because they cannot bear living without their beloved.'³⁸ There are also parallels between the Pantheia story and events in Xenophon's own lifetime. Abradatas' death on the battlefield (*Cyr.* 7,1,29–32; 7,3,3) reveals some resemblances to the death of the younger Cyrus (*An.* 1,8,24–8). Furthermore, the mutilation of his corpse offers a parallel to the gruesome incident in *Cyr.* 7,3,8 f., where Abradatas' severed hand comes away in Cyrus' grasp.³⁹ Oost considers it possible that the rapport between Pantheia and Abradatas is a 'heroized' rendering of the good relationship between Xenophon and his wife.⁴⁰

Even if Xenophon invented this particular story, that does not necessarily mean that it served as the sole or main model for the

See also Due 1989, 82 n. 132: 'The collection of Abradatas' severed body is reminiscent of the fate of Pentheus in Euripides' *Bacchae*, especially 1298 ff.'

³⁷ Cf. Gera 1993, 231. On p. 223 f. Gera compares Pantheia to another female prisoner of war, the beautiful daughter of Hegetorides of Cos in *Hdt.* 9,76. For a comparison between Pantheia and Atossa in *Hdt.* 3,134 see *ibid.*, 237. Keller 1910/11, 252–9, here 257, compares *Cyr.* 7,3,8 f. to Herodotus 2,121 (the episode with the clever thief), but this parallel is very superficial, as Due 1989, 82 n. 133, rightly points out.

³⁸ Gera 1993, 201 f.

³⁹ Cf. Tatum, 180–2; Gera 1993, 240 f., 244. Note also the parallel between *An.* 1,8,29, where, according to one tradition, Cyrus' *skeptoukhos* and ardent follower Artapates stabs himself over his dead body, and Pantheia's death in *Cyr.* 7,3,14.

⁴⁰ Oost 1977/78, 225–36, here 234.

early love romances in Hellenistic times. It is very likely that similar stories circulated in the tradition of oral story-telling, in the form of folk-tales, legends or *Märchen*. If it was not the Pantheia episode itself that influenced the storyline of the later novels, it can at least be considered as an early testimonium of an archetypal story-pattern that had a major impact on the rise of the genre of the novel.

Besides the Pantheia story, there are several other semi-independent *logoi* in the *Cyropaedia*, many of which can be labelled as novelle. Before turning to these, it is necessary to discuss briefly the relationship of the novella and the novel in general.

NOVELLE AND THE NOVEL: STRUCTURAL AND TYPOLOGICAL ASPECTS

Since the early nineteenth century, scholars have occasionally taken the view that the genre of the Hellenistic novel developed from the novella. One of the most insistent advocates of this view was Otmar Schissel von Fleschenberg,⁴¹ who argued that the genre of the novel was developed in a gradual process, first by joining together several novelle within a frame story, second by transferring the emphasis of the action from the novelle to the frame story, and third by expanding the plot of the frame story, which was still based on material taken from novelle. Trenkner started from the opposite direction, collecting and investigating all that we can tell about the novella from the traces it left in literary genres such as historiography, tragedy, comedy, and rhetoric. She comes to the conclusion that oral narratives, i.e. novelle, were 'the prototypes of the historical and marvellous novels and those of romantic and realistic adventures'.⁴² On the other hand, there were strong opponents to the theory that novelle had a decisive impact on the development of the novel. These scholars often started from Erwin Rohde's verdict in his book *Der Griechische Roman und seine Vorläufer*.⁴³ Nowadays the novella is

⁴¹ Schissel von Fleschenberg 1913. The relative chronology of the novels, on which Schissel based his line of development, is now outdated.

⁴² Trenkner 1958, 179 f.

⁴³ Rohde 1914, 4–9. See also Rohde 1876b, 55–70; repr. in Rohde 1914, 578–601.

usually considered one of several influences on the formation of the Hellenistic novel, but perhaps not a decisive one.⁴⁴

A useful definition of the novella is given by Trenkner: 'It is an imaginary story of limited length, intended to entertain, and describing an event in which the interest arises from the change in the fortunes of the leading characters or from behaviour characteristic of them; an event concerned with real-life people in a real-life setting.'⁴⁵ However one may evaluate the impact of the novella on the emergence of the novel it is beyond doubt that the novella is an important constituent in the narrative structure of virtually all of the ancient novels.

For the sake of clarity I should like to propose a short typological classification of the different forms of the novelle in the novels. They can be classified according to their subject matter, the main division being that of novelle dealing with *erotic themes* and those with *other themes*. They can deal with *historical* (or *presumably historical*) *persons* or with *everyday people*. Another difference, which is important but has perhaps been overstressed in previous scholarship, is that between the so-called *idealistic* and the *realistic* novelle. Idealistic novelle can have a *tragic* or an *untragic ending*. Erotic novelle with a tragic ending can be called *pathetic*, those with an untragic one *romantic*. The so-called 'realistic'⁴⁶ novelle can be realistic in the strict meaning of the word, i.e. *authentic* in the portrayal of human behaviour, or *comic*, as based on an exaggeration of human failure, which may sometimes even be pushed to absurdity. In this last case the term *satirical* seems appropriate. The comic element is present also in the *parodistic* novelle, but within a different frame of reference: it is characterized by its relationship not to people in real life, but to another literary work, and therefore contains an element of *metapoiesis*. Novelle can be told by one of the characters in direct

⁴⁴ For different views on the impact of the novella (or, more generally, short fictional tales in prose) on the novel see further Lavagnini 1921, 1–104; repr. 1950, 1–105; Haight 1936, 1–45; Braun 1938, 88 ff., 94; Todd 1940, 3 f., 78; Helm 1956, 8; Cataudella 1957, 7–172; Giangrande 1962, 132–59; repr. in: Gärtner 1984, 125–52; Weinreich 1962, 7; Wehrli 1965; Perry 1967, 79–84; Müller 1981, 378; Kuch 1989b, 44. See also Scobie 1969, esp. 20–9, and 1979, 229–59.

⁴⁵ Trenkner 1958, xiii. Cf. the definition by Rohde 1914, 583.

⁴⁶ The inappropriate use of this term for certain types of the novella is pointed out by Perry in his review of Trenkner 1958, in: *AJPh* 81 (1960), 442–47, here 447.

speech so as to interrupt the action of the novel, or they can be told as a normal part of the action by the narrator himself. In the first case they might be labelled as *digressive*, in the latter as *episodic* novelle. This category overlaps with the following, but is not entirely identical with it. Novelle can be concerned with persons not appearing in the main plot of the novel, or they can contain episodes in the life of one of the main figures or of the minor characters of the novel. In the first case they are *incorporated*, in the latter *integrated* into the storyline.

It is sometimes difficult to distinguish novelle from other genres of short fictional prose tales. A novella proper should contain an element of *peripeteia*. Otherwise it can hardly be distinguished from the anecdote, apart from the different length. Length is, however, an external criterion which often depends on how much space the author wants to devote to a given story, not on how much space the story itself needs to be told in any appropriate manner. Short prose tales in which the emphasis is on a witty remark on the conclusion, the *apophthegmata*, hardly allow for the development of action. Stories in which the emphasis is on the narrated action or on a mixture of dialogue and action can be told within a few lines or in several pages with the essence of the story still remaining the same. As is the case with the novel, the novella was not a subject of literary theory in antiquity. There was no clear-cut terminology. Terms like *ainos*, *mythos*, *logos* or *geloion* could be applied to stories which we would label novelle or anecdotes.

NOVELLE AND ANECDOTES IN THE *CYROPAEDIA*

The reason for the foregoing digression is that Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* contains a large number of novelle and anecdotes of very different types. It is one of our most important and, at the same time, relatively early sources for the genre of the short, self-contained prose narrative within the framework of a larger work. In the scope of this paper it is not possible to narrate and interpret the content of all of these *logoi* in the *Cyropaedia*, so I must deal with them in a rather summary fashion.⁴⁷

⁴⁷ For a detailed discussion of the novelle in the *Cyropaedia* see now Gera 1993, 192 ff. et *passim*.

I have already dealt at some length with the Pantheia novella, a pathetic love novella with a tragic ending, told by the narrator in dispersed sections of Books 4–7. It is connected with the main storyline by the role that Cyrus plays in it.

In 4,6,2–7 the Assyrian Gobryas tells Cyrus about the death of his son, who was killed by the Assyrian prince when they were out hunting. When Gobryas' son had brought down a bear and a lion, the prince, who had missed twice, could not restrain his jealous wrath. The connection with the main story is through the revenge motif: Gobryas offers himself as an ally to Cyrus.

Another ally of Cyrus is the Assyrian Gadatas, whose story is told by Gobryas in 5,2,28. The Assyrian king, to whom he was a close friend, had him castrated 'because his concubine had praised his friend, remarking how handsome he was and felicitating the woman who should be his wife; but the king himself now maintains that it was because the man had made advances toward his concubine'.

Jealousy of a different kind serves as a motif in a story which is narrated in a conversation between Cyrus, the Armenian king and his son Tigranes in 3,1,38–40. The king had the teacher (a *sophistes*: 3,1,14) of his son killed because he felt that Tigranes regarded the teacher more highly than his father.⁴⁸

This novella follows upon and is thematically connected with the one told in 3,1,1–37. Cyrus brings a charge against the Armenian king who had defected from the Medians. The king's son Tigranes engages Cyrus in a discussion about *sophrosyne* and achieves a pardon for his father.⁴⁹ It may be noted here as a parallel that a juridicial process of some kind also appears as a part of the story in the novels of Chariton, Xenophon of Ephesus, Achilles Tatius, and Heliodorus. This literary element, as it appears in the *Cyropaedia*, may have been influenced by the different *apologiai Sokratous*.

A somewhat similar novella is the one dealing with Croesus and Cyrus in 7,2. It is a historical novella that contains not one, but two peripeties, when Croesus first seems to lose all his power and even his life, but then regains at least a part of his former might.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ The parallel between the sophist and the Athenian Socrates has been noted by many scholars, e.g. Schwartz 1896, 57. See especially Gaiser 1977, 78–100.

⁴⁹ Cf. Tatum 1989, 134–45; Gera 1993, 78–98.

⁵⁰ Cf. Lefèvre 1971, 283–96. See also Tatum 1989, 146–59; Gera 1993, 265–79.

The last two novelle mentioned are integral parts of the action, and Cyrus plays a decisive rôle in both.

The novella told in 8,3,25–33 and continued in 8,3,35–50 is an intermediate form between the serious and the comic type. A private soldier, a Sacian, wins a horse race. Cyrus asks him if he would take a kingdom for his horse. The Sacian refuses but says he would give his horse for the gratitude of a brave man. Cyrus advises him to shut his eyes and throw a clod in the direction where most of his friends are. The Sacian does as he is told and accidentally hits the Persian Pheraulas, who is just riding by carrying some message under orders from Cyrus. Though he is struck in the face and blood flows down from his nose, Pheraulas does not even turn around but goes on to complete his mission. The Sacian makes his horse a present to Pheraulas, who afterwards invites him to his house and entertains him. He complains of the burden of his riches and gives everything he has to the Sacian, who gladly accepts. The element of *peripeteia* is present here though without any tragic colouring.

A comic element based upon a mixture of dialogue and action appears in two anecdotes told by guests at Cyrus' dinner table. The emphasis is not on a witty remark at the end, they are not anecdotes of the *apophthegma*-type. They belong rather to a certain form of *geloia* which can also be found in the *Aesopea*, the *Margites* or the *logoi Sybaritikoï*.⁵¹ Both anecdotes are set in the military life which, of course, was well-known to the former officer Xenophon.

In 2,2,2–5 the Persian Hystaspas tells a story about a common soldier who, during a meal, tried to secure for himself the biggest piece of meat but left empty-handed. This anecdote is meant to illustrate the behaviour of a certain character-type, the *dyskolos*, as is explicitly stated in 2,2,2.

In 2,2,6–9 one of the captains tells of a young recruit who obeyed all commands literally in a drill exercise and stirred up complete confusion in his unit.

⁵¹ On this type of the 'realistic' anecdote see Trenkner 1958, 5–13. For a definition of this type of *logoi Sybaritikoï* which is also applicable to the anecdotes that interest us here see Rhode 1914, 588: ['But another style of stories specific to the town of Sybaris seems to have existed, in which the humour lay not in studied wit, but in the purely spontaneously laughable, one might properly say silly behaviour, of any inhabitant of Sybaris']. The contextual element of effeminacy or luxury (*tryphe*), characteristic for the Sybaritic tales, is, to some degree, discernible in the first anecdote, but absent from the second.

Erotic novelle of the explicit type are not to be found in the *Cyropaedia*, but there are two harmless anecdotes with a homoerotic element.

In 2,2,28–31 the officer Smbaulas has adopted the Greek fashion of bringing along a young man as his companion at the dinner table. The other guests all laugh because Smbaulas' favourite appears to be exceedingly hairy and ugly. Smbaulas explains that this man is the most dutiful and industrious soldier and a good example for his comrades. The 'moral' of this anecdote bears some resemblance to the more seriously elaborated discussion in Xenophon's *Symposion* (c. 8), where Socrates maintains that affection for a person's character is far superior to a merely physical concupiscence.⁵²

In 1,4,27–8 the Median Artabazus has fallen in love with Cyrus, who is still a teenager. Artabazus manages to steal some kisses from Cyrus by pretending to be one of his kinsmen.

My final example of a relatively short self-contained *logos* in the *Cyropaedia* happens to be the first one in the chronology of the story. In 1,3,4–12 Cyrus appears as a twelve-year-old boy dining together with his grandfather Astyages, the king of Media. In narrating the fictional conversation between the two Xenophon gives one of the most authentic portrayals of childish behaviour in all of ancient literature, a portrayal which is at the same time very amusing. For instance, young Cyrus avoids sipping from the wine he has just brought to his grandfather, because he is convinced, as he declares upon questioning, that the wine has been poisoned. This tale is a realistic novella of a unique type and one of the highlights of this work.

The novelle in the *Cyropaedia* are characterized by a remarkable typological variety⁵³ that sets them apart from those in the *Histories* of Herodotus,⁵⁴ who is our main representative of the early Ionian novella.⁵⁵ Yet there is one functional element which holds all the stories in the *Cyropaedia* together: their paraenetic purpose.⁵⁶ Xenophon

⁵² Cf. also Plato *Smp.* 181 D 1–3; 183 D 8 ff.; 210 B 6 ff. *Chrm.* 154 D 1 ff.

⁵³ Cf. the brief remarks by Anderson 1982, 4.

⁵⁴ For a different view of the novelle in Herodotus and Xenophon see Gera 1993, 215–21.

⁵⁵ See Aly 1921.

⁵⁶ See Breitenbach 1967, 1709: ['The novelistic element...has in first place a moral-protreptic purpose...and only secondarily serves as relief and variation']. Cf. 1717 f. See also Trenkner 1958, 27 n. 3.

himself gives evidence of this intention, which is the main objective of the entire *Cyropaedia*, by projecting it into the paradigmatic figure of Cyrus. In 2,2,1 we read: 'Whenever Cyrus entertained company at dinner, he always took pains that the stories introduced should be as entertaining as possible and that they should incite to the good' (... ὅπως εὐχαριστότατοί τε ἅμα λόγοι ἐμβληθήσονται καὶ παρορμῶντες εἰς τὰγαθόν).

Shortly afterwards, in 2,2,11–16, Xenophon provides a discussion between Cyrus and his guests which centres around the question whether and why people should tell fictitious stories. This passage is one of the very few theoretical statements in ancient literature about fictional prose narrative. It has been all but overlooked by scholars working in the field of ancient literary theory.⁵⁷ It follows upon the two anecdotes about the recruits mentioned above. When Aglaitadas, one of the officers present at the dinner, objects that these stories can hardly be true, Cyrus asks him what object the storytellers could have had in telling a lie. Aglaitadas answers: 'What object, indeed, except that they wanted to raise a laugh.' Cyrus defends this objective.⁵⁸ Then the officer who had told one of the anecdotes intervenes and says:

Verily, Aglaitadas, you might find serious fault with us, if we tried to make you weep, like some authors who invent touching incidents in their poems and stories and try to move us to tears; but now, although you yourself know that we wish to entertain you and not to do you any harm at all, still you heap such reproaches upon us.

Aglaitadas answers:

Aye, by Zeus, and justly, too, since he that makes his friends laugh seems to me to do them much less service than he who makes them weep... At any rate, fathers develop self-control in their sons by making them weep, and teachers impress good lessons upon their pupils in the same way, and the laws, too, turn the citizens to justice by making them weep. But could you

⁵⁷ Some have dealt with this passage as a testimony for the ancient theories of humour. See Grant 1924, 23; Arnould 1990, 114, 117, 140 f.

⁵⁸ Cyrus' tolerance of humour in a military environment is corroborated by soldiers' experiences throughout the ages. Cf. Nazareth 1988 (including many more recent anecdotes that support this view). Nazareth expects that his book 'should prove most useful to the Service officer' by giving him 'a new dimension in the exercise of military command by the use of humour to mitigate the stresses of peace and war' (ix).

say that those who make us laugh either do good to our bodies or make our minds any more fitted for the management of our private business or the affairs of state?

Afterwards Hystaspas, who had told the other anecdote, turns to Aglaitadas and treats his position with irony. Then the matter is dropped without the question being really settled.⁵⁹

In this passage Xenophon may have had two purposes in mind. First, he wanted to justify the fictional *logoi* interspersed in his account of Cyrus' life. Second, this section may have been written as some sort of rejoinder to a passage in Plato's *Republic* (388 D ff.), where Socrates condemns poetry that arouses laughter.⁶⁰ The fact that the discussion in the *Republic* centres around poetry, whereas the passage in the *Cyropaedia* deals with prose tales, does not disprove this possibility. The crucial point is the acceptance or rejection of *pseudos* 'fiction' and the evaluation of the moral effects it has upon the listeners. We may also note that in *Cyr.* 2,2,13 Xenophon stresses the connection between poetry and prose (ἐν ᾧδαῖς καὶ ἐν λόγοις), as far as the points under discussion are concerned. Perhaps Aglaitadas, 'one of the most austere of men' (ἀνὴρ τὸν τρόπον τῶν στρυφνοτέρων ἀνθρώπων: 2,2,11), serves as a caricature of Plato himself, of whom Diogenes Laertius 3,26 reports that he never laughed excessively in his youth. Already in antiquity many people thought, as we know mainly from Aulus Gellius 14,3, that the *Cyropaedia* was written as a response to Plato's concept of an ideal state as laid down in the *Republic*. So it seems plausible that this passage from the *Cyropaedia* contains an intertextual reference to Plato's work.

CONCLUSION

Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* was one of the first prose works, and probably the most influential, which combined a large amount of fictional

⁵⁹ On jesting and humour in the *Cyropaedia* cf. the brief remarks in 5,2,18 and 8,1,33. See also Hdt. 2,173.

⁶⁰ I have discussed this issue, which goes beyond the topic of this chapter, in detail in Reichel 1997.

narrative with an outwardly historiographic manner of writing. In this respect it laid the ground for the Hellenistic novel. As for the subject matter and the historical and oriental setting, the *Cyropaedia* had an important, if not decisive, literary influence on the early novel, especially the *Ninus Romance*. The Pantheia episode in Books 4–7 of the *Cyropaedia* contains several elements of the story-pattern of the Hellenistic love romance in its standardized form. It may either have served as a direct model for later novels or be considered an early literary testimonium of an archetypal story-pattern that (by the way of other oral or literary traditions lost to us) influenced the genre of the Greek romance. The *Cyropaedia* contains a great number of typologically different novelle and anecdotes. It is an important source for the genre of the short fictional prose narrative, which is a formative element in all Greek and Latin novels. In *Cyr.* 2,2,11–16 we find one of the very few discussions about fictional prose narrative in ancient literary theory. This passage may have been written as a response to Plato *Rep.* 388 D ff. dealing with the criticism of poetry.⁶¹

⁶¹ My thanks are due to John Dillery and Amy Pratt for correcting my English. For helpful comments and criticism I am much obliged to John Dillery and Ludwig Koenen.

The Death of Cyrus: Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* as a Source for Iranian History

Heleen Sancisi-Weerdenburg

Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* is something of a problem. Incessantly read and quoted for more than 2,000 years, the book has been neglected in more recent times and scholarship has paid virtually no attention to it.¹ Classical philologists seem to be bored with the book. The author himself does not represent one of the intellectual summits of his age and among his other writings the *Cyropaedia* is often regarded as particularly monotonous and dull. In short, the *Cyropaedia* contains too much virtue for our age. Some of the criticisms may have to do with problems in classifying the work. Is it a didactic pamphlet, a romantic history, a fictitious biography, a philosophical treatise or a combination of any or all these elements? On what merits should it be judged—as fiction or as non-fiction? About one point at least there seems to be general agreement: 'c'est qu'il n'y a pas fait œuvre d'historien'.²

Iranists on the other hand seem to find Xenophon's largest work more interesting. After all it is the lengthiest extant monograph at least seemingly dedicated to Iranian matters in the Achaemenid period. Passages from the *Cyropaedia* are frequently used without further discussion of the historical reliability of the whole work or parts of it. They are treated as ordinary historical evidence; and (here one would agree with Bizos) that is certainly not what the *Cyropaedia*

¹ Breitenbach (1966), 1908 f.; Todd (1968), 5 f.

² Bizos (1972: I, vi): ['that it is no work of history'].

is. In no way can it be considered as historiography. This, however, should not imply that the *Cyropaedia* is therefore useless as a source for Iranian history; only that a discussion of its relationship to Iranian historical reality is a necessary requirement before it can be put to any cautious use.

Attempts to establish the historical value of the *Cyropaedia* have often been limited to the factual data. The results of such a procedure have been summarized by Breitenbach: Xenophon has drawn heavily on Herodotus and Ctesias, and possibly on other Greek writers of *Persika* as well. If Xenophon used Iranian traditions he only did so through his Greek sources.³ Authentic Iranian data in the *Cyropaedia* are usually ascribed to Xenophon's familiarity with contemporary Persian habits.⁴ Still Christensen,⁵ Pizzagalli,⁶ and more recently Knauth⁷ have pointed out the striking resemblance between parts of the *Cyropaedia* and later Iranian epic tradition. Even if Xenophon's Cyrus often looks like a Socratic philosopher, at the same time he resembles an Iranian king of the epic tradition.

Did Xenophon use Persian information independent of the data contained in previous Greek works? If so, what kind of information was it? Did he have access to oral sources?⁸ Did he embroider his tale about the exemplary monarch on a framework that ultimately derived from Iranian oral tradition? I think it is possible that he did, as did Herodotus and Ctesias for large parts of their work.⁹ They, of course intended to write historiography as Xenophon obviously did not. Yet their methods were largely the same: they selected from the sources at their disposal in accordance with their purpose, their explanatory cadre and their abilities. This, however, is not the only reason for their widely divergent results: the great variety of the Iranian oral tradition must have allowed them at least this freedom of choice. In the case of Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* the positions in the discussion have usually been based on comparisons with either

³ Breitenbach (1966), col. 1709.

⁴ e.g. Eddy (1961), 53.

⁵ Christensen (1936), 124 ff.; and (1938), 248 f.

⁶ Pizzagalli (1942), 41 f.

⁷ Knauth and Nadjmabadi (1975).

⁸ 'Volksüberlieferungen' is suggested by Cejpek (1959), 470.

⁹ Briant (1982b), 491 ff.

the Greek tradition or the Iranian evidence.¹⁰ One-sided comparisons inevitably distort the results. It is evident that Xenophon worked at least some Persian material into his book, and it is undeniable that a large number of Greek ideas found their way into this life-story of Cyrus. Since the balance between these components is not everywhere the same, no generalizations based on investigations of single passages should be made. This implies that the results of the present study will be formulated in cautious terms, and should not be taken to prove anything about the *Cyropaedia* as a whole.

In this chapter I intend to analyse the three main reports on the death of Cyrus. I shall argue that there is no case for regarding Herodotus as the most reliable authority on the circumstances of Cyrus' death and at the same time assuming that the Xenophontic version is patently fictitious, whereas Ctesias simply is a bad historian who usually mixed up his data. Although I do not want to diminish Herodotus' qualities as a historiographer or to propose a reappraisal of Ctesias, I shall nevertheless argue that there is no such thing as a historically reliable account of the last days of Cyrus. By comparing the three stories we may get some insight into the mechanics of the Iranian oral tradition, and into the methods of Greek writers working with these data.

IRANIAN ORAL TRADITION

There is no indication whatever that written historiography existed in Iran in the period of Cyrus' reign. If the Pasargadae inscriptions were written down during Cyrus' lifetime, the paucity of data they provide is indicative of the general lack of historical information. With the exception of the Behistun inscription, this is true for later periods also. In what has been for a long time regarded as the only other piece of history written by a Persian king, the Daiva inscription, one can clearly see that timeless values matter more than temporal events.¹¹ There is a marked neglect of history, except in

¹⁰ This is stressed by Knauth (1975).

¹¹ Sancisi-Weerdenburg (1980), 31.

the one case, where in imitation of Mesopotamian examples, Darius uses history for his own interests.¹²

Though no material traces of it have so far been found, it is likely that in Cyrus' time the administration made use of Elamite or Akkadian. It is not impossible that in the same way some annalistic data were preserved. But the scarcity of information available for a large part of Cyrus' reign, and in particular for the period when he must have been busy conquering the Eastern parts of his Empire, persistently argues against the existence of such an annalistic tradition. Written evidence on Cyrus' life is however to be found in the Jewish and Babylonian tradition and as such is pertinent only to the time preceding and following the conquest of Babylon.

There are clear indications of the existence of oral traditions: Herodotus relates that he has heard various reports about Cyrus' death (I, 214) and that several tales were told about his birth and youth (I, 95). According to Xenophon, in his time Cyrus was still the subject of song and praise among the 'barbarians'. The existence of oral sources, however, has never been denied. The problem is whether an oral tradition can be used to extract reliable historical data. And if so, what kind of data? And on what criteria?

The trustworthiness of any kind of oral tradition is closely connected with its nature. Is it safeguarded by mnemotechnic devices; is it a sacred tradition or does its popular character reflect itself in looser treatment of its material? Vansina, on the basis of African evidence, has argued that oral traditions can store and keep a considerable amount of historically reliable information.¹³ His pupil Papstein has argued from different African evidence that even in apparently old traditions contemporary political and social changes bring about substantial innovation.¹⁴ Other anthropologists as well are acquainted with the changeability of apparently rigid traditions.¹⁵ The substitution of one ancestor for another in agreement with new political realities or the assumption of a new 'age-old' political symbol are well-attested phenomena. These anthropological examples should

¹² Bickerman and Tadmor (1978), 240 f.

¹³ Vansina (1961), 153.

¹⁴ R. J. Papstein (1980), 563.

¹⁵ de Josselin de Jong (1980).

make us cautious of relying, for instance, too heavily on the genealogies of the Persian kings to reconstruct some of the pre-Achaemenian history of Iran. Instead of trying to explain away the discrepancies and inconsistencies, it would be useful to inquire whether these lists do indeed have documentary value, or whether they are rather produced in accordance with the exigencies of a specific moment.¹⁶

For Iran, the existence of a sacred tradition that was carefully preserved is beyond doubt.¹⁷ This is obviously not the kind of oral tradition we are looking for behind the screen of Greek historiography. Although there may be some faint reflections of the religious tradition, most of the material clearly has a secular character.

The workings of such an oral tradition are well described by Mary Boyce: 'fixed elements of subject-matter, diction and style are carried along by a current of fresh improvisation from one generation to the next. This oral literature tends to be highly conservative (because its existence is only possible through intensive training and cultivation) and yet is capable of innovation, since new elements can readily be adopted and harmonized with the old, as each generation composes the texts anew within the established tradition.'¹⁸ These remarks concern the religious tradition, but can be applied to the more secular narrative tradition as well, if, that is, so sharp a distinction can be made.¹⁹

For an analysis of the Greek reports that may derive from Iranian oral tradition, the analogy of the well-studied Homeric oral poetry is helpful. It is, of course, impossible to recover stylistic elements such as the Homeric formula from Greek elaborations of originally Iranian stories. But the distinction between the structure of the story, and *themes*, the various elements from which the story is built up, as proposed by A. B. Lord,²⁰ can be usefully employed on other literature.

By comparison with the Yugoslav *guslar* tradition, Lord has demonstrated how the *pattern* of a story is the least changing element, while the various *themes* may be more or less elaborated and sometimes left out, according to the abilities of the singer or the circumstances of the

¹⁶ Cf. Barth (1961): the ideas of the *khan* of the Basseri about their lineage, even not farther distant than three generations, are very confused.

¹⁷ M. Boyce (1975, I), 19.

¹⁸ Boyce (1975, I), 19 f.

¹⁹ Boyce (1975, I), 292.

²⁰ Lord (1974), 68.

performance.²¹ Every now and then a theme even moves from one story-pattern to another.²² Elsewhere Lord remarks that the historical element in a story is usually younger than the story itself: 'the story mold came first and the attachment of the historical figures second'.²³ A demonstration of this principle can be seen in Drew's analysis of the Cyrus-Sargon myth.²⁴ In the Greek reports on Cyrus' death we will see that the pattern and themes of a story are more recurrent than the unique historical figure they serve to delineate.

HERODOTUS, I, 204–214

Herodotus has chosen his account of Cyrus' death from 'a number of tales in circulation' (πολλῶν λόγων λεγομένων) since this particular story (I, 214), seemed to him 'the most trustworthy' (ὁ πιθανώτατος).

There is no indication in this passage of what the variant versions might have been. It is, however, not difficult to see why he was inclined to give credit to the story that we find incorporated in the *Histories*: it is a death that befits the Herodotean Cyrus and it agrees very well with Herodotus' conception of historical causality.²⁵ It suits the author and it suits the work.

Towards the end of his life, according to Herodotus, Cyrus became over-confident, partly because of the divine portents surrounding his birth, partly because of his great military successes (I, 204). He chose to attack a people that had never caused the Persians any harm and lived a quite contented life. The Persian king had no reasonable motive for aggression against these Massagetae (I, 206). This is dramatically underlined by Cyrus' crossing of the Araxes (I, 205). He had nothing to seek beyond the river but his own doom. The hybris, the river and the sober-living people on the other side of the water are recurrent elements in Herodotus' reports on ill-fated expeditions of Persian kings. Though the Massagetae with their

²¹ Lord (1974), 109.

²² Lord (1974), 123.

²³ Lord (1970), 27.

²⁴ R. Drews (1974), 392.

²⁵ Cf. e.g. Lateiner (1982), 100 f.: Herodotus uses the same words to indicate a process of excessive prosperity that unavoidably leads to disaster.

abundant wealth of gold were obviously not as poor as the Greeks, Herodotus makes it quite clear that they were uncorrupted by wealth (I, 201, 215). Freedom from corruption is a trait the Massagetae shared with other intended victims of Persian greed, the Ethiopians, the Scythians, and the Greeks. In crossing the Araxes, Cyrus trespassed in the same way as Darius was to do by bridging the Istros, and Xerxes by yoking the Hellespont. Cambyses did not have to cross a river in his expedition against the Ethiopians, but otherwise the Ethiopians fall into the same category as the Scythians, Massagetae, and Greeks. They never gave the Persian king offense (III, 21). Moreover they enjoy a long and healthy life and do not drink wine; all very commendable virtues in Greek opinion (III, 22). The similarity between these four expeditions is underlined by a remark of Artabanus when he finally has to agree with Xerxes about the Greek expedition (VII, 18). Persian kings in Herodotus' opinion were inclined to try one conquest too many. Cyrus' death in Herodotus' version is equally consistent with the portrait drawn of him in the *Histories*. Though it is mentioned that the Persians call Cyrus 'father' (III, 89) and that Cyrus' name is the most honoured among his people (III, 160), there is not very much in his description of Cyrus' *faits et gestes* that exemplifies gentle behaviour. In fact in the *Histories* Cyrus is hardly ever represented as the magnanimous monarch who acquired the great reputation for tolerance of later tradition. Cyrus does indeed show clemency towards Croesus (I, 86–90) and the Lydians, though the good treatment of these last is mainly due to the shrewd advice of their former king (I, 89 and I, 155). Cyrus' behaviour towards Croesus is the only elaborate account of his generosity; other instances are mentioned casually and without further comment. This is in the case of Astyages (I, 130) whose life is spared after his defeat²⁶ and in the case of Babylon (III, 159) which is allowed to keep its walls intact. In fact, if the *Histories* were the only extant source for Cyrus' life, his reputation might well have been rather different. Talent for leadership (I, 126) and great military qualities (I, 77, 79; 191) with incidentally some harsh witticism (I, 141; 153), unruliness towards his superior (I, 114–15), and a bad temper (I, 189) characterize the Herodotean Cyrus more than

²⁶ In I, 73 and 75 Hdt. uses the expression 'subdued and held', καταστρεφόμενος εἶχε.

tolerance or kind and gentle behaviour. His preference for a sober life, illustrated by the anecdote that concludes the *Histories* (IX, 122), is not completely consistent with the promises for a better life he makes to the Persians once they have defeated the Medes (I, 126). In Herodotus' opinion Cyrus' good name among his countrymen was mostly due to the fact that he brought them the sweet fruits of victory, the advantages of supremacy in Asia, and above all freedom from their Median overlord.²⁷

At least in one case Herodotus explicitly states that he has heard a more flattering tale about Cyrus than the one he prefers to report (I, 95). He may well have rejected the other tales on Cyrus' death precisely because they contained too much glorification. Regrettably there is no evidence to attempt even a speculation as to the contents of the other tales. They may have been slightly divergent (as e.g. the end of Cyrus in Diodorus Siculus, II, 44, where Cyrus is crucified after he has been taken prisoner by a Scythian queen) or as completely different as the Ctesian version.

The existence of these tales, however, points to the pluriformity of the Iranian tradition on Cyrus. It seems doubtful whether there was any real dynastic tradition, preserved in documents that were intelligible to everybody.²⁸ Not only have such documents never been found, but Ctesias' story about an expedition against the Sacae by Cyrus (Photius 36a) indicates exactly the opposite. It contains the same elements as Herodotus' reports on the Massagetan expedition.

The Sacae are led by their queen, whose husband Amorgēs is taken prisoner; with an enormous army the queen defeats Cyrus in battle. Unlike the Herodotus story the Sacian prisoner does not commit suicide, consequently the Persian king does not die in battle. Prisoners are exchanged and peace will be ensured. Later on, this Amorgēs was to become one of Cyrus' most valuable advisers (Phot. 37a) and would fulfill much the same role as Croesus in Herodotus: he is also entrusted to the care of Cyrus' sons, as is the former king of Lydia to Cambyses before the battle against the Massagetae starts (Hdt. I, 208).

²⁷ III, 65; III, 75: 'all the good Cyrus had done the Persians', ὅσα ἀγαθὰ Κῦρος Πέρσας πεποιήκοι and also III, 89: 'and he contrived all good things for them'... καὶ ἀγαθὰ σφι πάντα ἐμηχανήσατο.

²⁸ As Momigliano (1969), 196.

It seems that the narrative structure of the story is independent of the historical facts reported in it. It is like a mould that could be used repeatedly: first, to report a successful conquest as in Ctesias; secondly, to present a campaign that ended in failure as in Herodotus; or, thirdly, possibly even to depict a war concluded by a diplomatic arrangement, as in the anonymous *De Mulieribus bello claris*, 2, where Ctesias is cited as the source. Fighting a Scythian queen may have formed part of a conventional Iranian repertory of heroic feats, just as fighting against Amazons seems to have been a required task for many Greek heroes.

CTESIAS

Ctesias' story about Cyrus' death (Phot. 36–37a) is not only chronologically but also structurally half way between Herodotus and Xenophon. The cause of death is this time a wound incurred in battle. The king does not depart from earthly life before he has made a farewell address to his family and courtiers. There is no queen in the story; the Derbicae are led by their king Amoraïos. Although Cyrus dies after the battle, the expedition was to end successfully: Amorgēs, who has come to the rescue with a numerous army, destroys the Derbican forces, their king is killed and the country subjects itself to the Persians. The only similarity to Herodotus, I, 214 is the location of the events—on the eastern borders of the empire. There is some resemblance between Cyrus' death in Ctesias and Cambyses' death in Herodotus (III, 64–5): both die in consequence of a thigh-wound, but not before they have solemnly spoken their last words (unlike Cambyses in Ctesias (Phot. 38a), who similarly dies from a wound in the thigh, but, at least to judge from the excerpt of Photius, without uttering a single word). The final sayings of both kings contain instructions on the government of Persia, as well as a blessing and a malediction to enforce these last orders. The exhortation to both the sons of Cyrus to honour and obey their mother seems to be an example of Ctesias' interest (or that of his sources) in the mothers of kings and future kings. The final message of a dying king to his heir

and court belongs to the Iranian tradition.²⁹ It may be suspected that in Herodotus' report of Cyrus' fatal campaign, such a spiritual testament is hidden behind 'giving him many instructions to honour him and serve him well' *πολλὰ ἐντειλάμενός οἱ τιμᾶν τε αὐτὸν καὶ εὖ ποιεῖν*—the instructions with which Croesus is sent back to Persia (1.208).

The thigh wound is also a recurrent theme. In Ctesias, Cyrus (Phot. 37a), Cambyses (Phot. 38a), and Megabyzus (Phot. 41a) are wounded in this manner. Only Megabyzus survives the injury. Thigh wounds are not necessarily fatal. Odysseus was said to have recovered from one (*Odyssey*, XIX, 449). A professional physician such as Ctesias might have felt the need to explain this high mortality rate resulting from thigh wounds, for he added, at any rate in one case (Cambyses), that the wound was so deep that the muscle was involved.³⁰ Thigh wounds may well have been considered a honourable mark of valour in earlier heroic tradition (the commonest way to be hurt in this part of the body would probably be in fighting a wild boar or other wild animal); in the later stages of this tradition, as reflected by Ctesias, the topic must have lost its original meaning and have become a simple theme.

However, the structure of Ctesias' story of Cyrus' battle against the Sacae and of Cyrus' death points towards a flexible oral tradition as the source for these tales. Whether or not Ctesias' Iranian informants based *their* communications on an annalistic tradition (*basilikai diphtherai*) is hard to tell, but may legitimately be doubted.³¹

XENOPHON *CYROPAEDIA* VIII, VII, 1–8

Xenophon does not report any final battle by Cyrus. Instead Cyrus is forewarned of his end in a vision; after the necessary sacrifices he prays to the gods, delivers a sermon to his friends and Persian courtiers, addresses his sons, philosophizes concerning the body

²⁹ Christensen (1936), 127 f.

³⁰ Cf. *Od.*, 19.451: οὐδ' ὀστέον ἵκετο φωτός ('nor did it reach the man's bone').

³¹ Cf. La Bua (1976), 189 f.

and the soul, gives instructions for his burial, and finally slips quietly away from life.

Clearly, a martial death would not have befitted the Cyrus of the *Cyropaedia*. Although it cannot be excluded that a version of the death of Cyrus lacking a final battle scene was in circulation in the Iranian tradition, it is more likely that Xenophon has here taken the same liberty with his source as he did in the case of Croesus, where he clearly has reworked the Herodotean tale of the meeting between the Lydian and Persian king to make it fitting with the image he draws of Cyrus.³² The similarity between *Cyrop.* VIII, vii, and later Iranian tradition was noted also by Christensen. That still leaves the important question whether Xenophon had at his disposal an independent source or whether he merely elaborated schemes of events established by earlier Greek authors such as Ctesias and Herodotus. Photius' very short excerpt of Ctesias makes a comparison particularly difficult. In the original work Cyrus' final speech was likely to have been more elaborate. Photius' summary contains four elements:

- (i) the succession of the eldest son and a large domain for the younger son;
- (ii) a plea to Cyrus' sons for obedience towards their mother;
- (iii) a pledge of friendship between the sons and the councillor Amorgês; and
- (iv) a blessing for the just and a curse for the unjust.

Xenophon offers more. In the prayer to the gods and in the speech to his fellow Persians the following elements can be discerned:

- (i) thanks to the Gods (ancestral Zeus, Helios, and all the gods) who favoured his reign and all his enterprises;
- (ii) theirs is the praise: Cyrus himself had never fostered thoughts above his human station;
- (iii) a prayer to the gods for prosperity for his children, his wife, his friends and his country;
- (iv) his name should be kept in honour;
- (v) his life was as it should have been;
- (vi) everything he attempted was successful;

³² P. Briant (1982b), 495 f.

- (vii) his friends were made happier and his enemies have been subdued;
- (viii) his country is the greatest in Asia;
- (ix) never did he lose a conquest once achieved; and
- (x) fear of future failures restrained his behaviour.

Where Ctesias' Cyrus deals with affairs on a personalized level, the tone of the Xenophontic discourse reminds one of the Naqš-i Rostam inscription. Here also the king's life is regarded in retrospect in very unspecific terms. There is more in this comparison between *Cyrop.* VIII, vii, 1–8 and Darius' tomb inscription than just that. Although (ii) and (x) are obviously Greek ideas that put the Xenophontic Cyrus diametrically opposite the Herodotean one, the other points can be paralleled with topics in both inscriptions at Naqš-i Rostam.

- (i) DNa 1–8; 47–51 Ahuramazdā made Darius king and has helped him throughout his undertaking;
- (iii) DNa 51–3: 'Me may Ahuramazdā protect from harm, and my royal house and this land'. The 'wife, children, and friends' mentioned by Xenophon sound extremely Greek, and consistent with the stress on the importance of friendship throughout the work;
- (iv) DNb 50–5. The reputation of the king should be promulgated truthfully;
- (v) DNb 27–45. Xenophon mentions the king's happiness at various stages in his life. At any period he was the best. Darius states his qualities as a soldier and as a ruler and points to his physical prowess. In both cases the purpose of these statements is to underline the idea that the king had the right to rule, and that his reputation should be held in honour in later generations;
- (vi) DNb 45–9. Ahuramazdā gave the king physical skilfulness;
- (vii) DNb 16–21. Cooperation is rewarded; harmful actions are punished;
- (viii) DNa 15–47. These are the countries conquered by the king: 'the spear of a Persian man has gone forth far';

- (ix) DNa 15–21. The countries that were conquered bore tribute and obeyed the king's law; and
- (ii) (x) may be compared with DNb 13–15: 'I am not hot-tempered. What things develop in my anger, I hold firmly under control by my thinking power. I am firmly ruling over my own (impulses)'.

Elsewhere I have argued that in the process of transmission from Persian tradition to Greek literature, it is the form of a particular piece, rather than the ideas it contains that tend to be preserved.³³ Even in a literal translation something of the original would get lost. Very little on Persia in Greek historiography can be regarded as an attempt at a literal translation. In the act of retelling, narrative structure, plot, the form of a story, the things done by a person in the story, are more likely to be preserved than the meaning of their sayings. So if Xenophon's Cyrus at a first glance seems to speak like a Greek, that is only what might be expected. While separately all the elements in Cyrus' prayer and farewell address can be accounted for as Greek, the entire group of topics strikingly coincides with the Naqš-i Rostam inscriptions. In both cases we find an acknowledgement of the divine benevolence, a justification of the personal right of the king to rule, a retrospect of his period of government, both on the moral and the military level, care for the future of family and kingdom and care for the reputation of the king himself among posterity.

Is this similarity accidental? In Herodotus and Ctesias we have seen the final discourse of a dying king as a theme that found its way from the Iranian tradition into Greek literature. Both cases however are completely different in tone and subject-matter from the tomb inscription of Darius. They contain mainly concrete indications for the near future, although both end with a blessing and a curse to ensure the enactment of their orders. The last words of the Xenophontic Cyrus, both as regards their subjects and their tone, are raised above the level of temporal events and present a marked similarity to the Darius text.

³³ Sancisi-Weerdenburg (1980), 231 f.

In recent literature the Naqš-i Rostam inscription tends to be regarded as a *Fürstenspiegel* (Mirror of a Prince).³⁴ The whole of the *Cyropaedia*, and more particularly the passages discussed above, can be seen as belonging to this genre. In fact, the *Cyropaedia* is frequently seen as the first work of this category in the European tradition, whatever other aims Xenophon may have had in mind at the same time. Can we go further than that? Xenophon never reached Persia itself and the possibility can be excluded that he saw the inscriptions on the tomb facade. Even if he had, he would not have been able to read them. Copies of the inscription may indeed have been in circulation.³⁵ Still the fact that the passages are set in the context of Cyrus' death argues against the notion that Xenophon could have seen a copy of the text. If, for instance, only XPf had been preserved on stone, and DNb had not, it would have been impossible to guess that the latter could serve also as a funeral inscription. It is much more likely that the contents of Cyrus' final discourse in Xenophon reached the Greek author in a story on the death of the Persian founder. Whether his source was a well-informed Greek or an Oriental remains a matter for further investigation. In view of the similarity noted above between *Cyropaedia*, VIII, vii, 1–8 and the Naqš-i Rostam texts, an Iranian model for these chapters of the *Cyropaedia* is, at least, not unlikely. The contents of Cyrus' last words are nearer in spirit to Darius' tomb inscriptions than their other well-known paraphrase in Greek literature: 'I was friend to my friends; as horseman and bowman I proved myself superior to all others, as hunter I prevailed; I could do everything', as reported by Strabo (XV, 3, 8).

CONCLUSION

The narrative structures of the stories concerning Cyrus' last campaign in Herodotus and in Ctesias, and the *themes* that are employed to give form to these *patterns*, point to a lively Iranian oral tradition

³⁴ Mayrhofer (1979), 96; Herrenschmidt (1982), 13.

³⁵ From the last paragraph (DNb 50–60) a translation into Aramaic is known, cf. Sims-Williams (1981), 1 f.

in which older moulds were used to relate more recent events. Even the location of Cyrus' last battle, the only common detail in the various stories, may originally have been related to a narrative structure prominently featuring an Amazon-like queen. This means that for events at the end of Cyrus' reign, we have only an oral tradition and (at least in Greek historiography) no firm historical evidence. Whatever liberties Xenophon took with his source-materials, he may well have drawn upon this same oral tradition. Since he was interested in the phenomenon of monarchy, and in the way it functioned in its social setting, his attention may have been caught by Iranian reflections upon kingship, and upon the role and person of the monarch as elaborated in death-bed scenes of kings.³⁶ His scope would thus have been different from that of his predecessors Herodotus and Ctesias, but his sources may have been of the same kind.

³⁶ For a possible relation between the royal inscriptions and the Iranian oral tradition, see Sancisi-Weerdenburg (1980), 106 f.

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V

Historical Writing

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The Sources for the Spartan Debacle at Haliartus

H. D. Westlake

The complex series of events leading to the Spartan invasion of Boeotia in 395 BC and the outbreak of the Corinthian war has evoked much interest from modern scholars, largely because of discrepancies between the principal authorities.¹ On the other hand, the episode at Haliartus in that year has attracted little attention despite its momentous consequences in bringing about the death of Lysander and the disgrace of King Pausanias. One reason for the relative neglect of that episode may be that, whereas the London papyrus of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* contains a detailed account of the developments leading to the Spartan invasion of Boeotia, the papyrus unfortunately breaks off before reaching the section in which the invasion itself must have been recorded. It is, however, surprising that scholars have tended to accept uncritically the version of the events at Haliartus by Xenophon in his *Hellenica* (3.5.6–7 and 17–25), the only primary authority, and virtually to ignore accounts by Diodorus (14.81.1–3 and 89), Plutarch (*Lysander* 28.1–30.1), and Pausanias (3.5.3–6).²

¹ Hamilton (1979) 192–201, discusses the problems lucidly and judiciously.

² For example, Jones (1967) 104–6, cites only Xenophon, while Beloch, *Gr. Gesch.* 3.1 (1922) 68–71, though citing other authorities, bases his narrative almost exclusively on Xenophon, as does Schaefer, *RE* 18.4 (1949) 2581–3. Accame (1951) 33–41, repeated in Accame (1966) 113–24, examines all four accounts but considers only those of Xenophon and Diodorus to be trustworthy. He maintains that additional material contributed by Plutarch and Pausanias is largely distorted by the influence of rhetoric or prejudice. His conclusions are, in my opinion, for the most part

The account of Diodorus is brief and that of Pausanias not much longer, but that of Plutarch is substantial and contains far more topographical detail than that of Xenophon.³ Each of the four versions includes information not found in any of the other three. The purpose of this chapter is to suggest that they supplement one another and that they represent four separate and independent traditions, each of them being very largely trustworthy and making a contribution of some value.

Before discussing the four accounts separately and then in conjunction, it will be convenient to give a bare outline of the campaign, including only basic essentials on which they are in general agreement. Lysander was sent to raise an army from Phocis and neighbouring states and to invade Boeotia from the north, while King Pausanias with a Peloponnesian army was to conduct a second invasion from the south. According to two of the accounts they were to have met at Haliartus. Lysander arrived there first and without waiting long for Pausanias delivered an attack on the city in which his forces were routed and he himself was killed. The survivors fled to high ground, where they inflicted losses upon the pursuing Thebans. When Pausanias arrived, he eventually decided against engaging the enemy and, after negotiating a truce whereby he recovered the bodies of the fallen, withdrew from Boeotia. At Sparta he was impeached and without awaiting the verdict fled into exile at Tegea.

THE FOUR ACCOUNTS ASSESSED SEPARATELY

The account by Diodorus (14.81.1–3), besides being the shortest of the four, is also the least illuminating. It is a record of action taken and does not reflect any definitive viewpoint. Its brevity and lack of colouring is most unfortunate because it must surely be derived,

unconvincing, as will be seen below, where his work (the 1951 publication) will be cited as Accame. It is gratifying to find that Bommelaer (1981) 193–7, treats the account of Plutarch as valuable evidence, though he chooses, mistakenly in my view, to ignore that of Pausanias (193, n. 108).

³ There are bare references to the episode at Andoc. 3 (*On the Peace*) 20 (see below, pp. 465–6), Nepos *Lys.* 3.4, and Justin 6.4.6–7.

through Ephorus, from the Oxyrhynchus historian, whose evident interest in the antecedents of the Spartan offensive against Boeotia (Bartoletti 16–18) suggests that his treatment of that operation was detailed and would, had it been preserved, have proved most valuable. Diodorus here exhibits his usual capriciousness in deciding how fully to reproduce the substance of his source: he devotes considerably more space to operations in the following year in central Greece, which may be thought to have had far less impact and to be less interesting (82.6–10). He does, however, include on the Spartan offensive two items of information not recorded elsewhere: that few soldiers were sent with Lysander to Phocis⁴ and that the army led by Pausanias numbered 6,000 (81.1). He notes that the Athenians were persuaded to support the Boeotians (81.2), but he does not mention the presence of Athenian troops in Boeotia at any stage. His account ends with the withdrawal of Pausanias to the Peloponnese, but in a later note derived from his chronological source he refers to the prosecution of the king and his flight into exile (89.1).

The account by Pausanias (3.5.3–6) is more valuable than that of Diodorus and has not received from modern scholars as much attention as it deserves. It is included in a biographical sketch of King Pausanias belonging to a long survey of Spartan kings. The author draws a highly complimentary portrait of his namesake and, unlike Xenophon and Plutarch, seeks explicitly to vindicate the decision of the king to negotiate a truce instead of fighting a battle (5.5). The most distinctive feature of this version is its emphasis on the part played by the Athenians, which is not at all prominent in any of the other versions. Here Pausanias is stated to have resolved, on arriving in Boeotia, to continue offensive operations, despite the defeat of the other invading force and the death of Lysander, but to have changed his mind on hearing that Thrasybulus with an Athenian army was not far away and was planning to take the Spartans in the rear when they were committed to battle with the Thebans (5.4–5). The extent to which the Athenians influenced the outcome

⁴ Accame (1951) 40 maintains that there is inconsistency here with Plut. *Lys.* 28.1, where Lysander is stated to have had many soldiers with him, but the passages refer to different stages of the campaign. When Lysander left Sparta, he had only a small force with him, but when he invaded Boeotia, he had assembled troops from Phocis and several other states.

may well be exaggerated in this account, but there is no reason to dismiss it as a fabrication.⁵ That feature, however, together with the reference to the unfulfilled plan of Thrasybulus, does suggest that the author from whose work Pausanias derived his material was an Athenian. Any attempt to identify this author must be conjectural, but of Athenians known to have written on this period Androtion is perhaps the likeliest. His *Atthis* is quoted verbatim by Pausanias on the execution of the Rhodian Dorieus at Sparta (*FGrHist* 324 F 46), which occurred in the same year as the offensive against Boeotia. Pausanias has preserved another fragment of Androtion (F 58): its context is uncertain, but together the two quotations show that he had some acquaintance with the *Atthis* or at least with a work based on the *Atthis* and containing quotations from it. Another passage of Pausanias (3.9. 11) mentioning an Athenian mission to urge the Spartans to refer the dispute with Thebes to arbitration, to which there is no reference elsewhere,⁶ provides a further indication that for the events leading to the Corinthian war he is dependent on an Athenian source. In addition to Androtion, a celebrated Athenian known to have written about these events is Philochorus (*FGrHist* 328 F 148), but Pausanias nowhere cites his work.

The account by Plutarch (*Lys.* 28.1–30.1) contains, as is his practice in the *Lives*, a sprinkling of notes on topics somewhat loosely connected with his main theme but evidently considered by him to be interesting and worth recording.⁷ Of these passages one is concerned with local myths (28.7–9), interrupting the military narrative at a crucial stage, and a second with oracles (29.5–12, cf. *Mor.* 408a–b). Such minor digressions are demonstrably the fruit of widespread investigations by Plutarch himself and reflect his assiduous reading in various fields. On the other hand, the bulk of his narrative in this

⁵ See below, pp. 470–1. Although the Athenian assembly had voted *unanimously* πάντες in favour of supporting Thebes (*Hell.* 3.5.16), some Athenians liable for enlistment seem to have been reluctant to serve in the expeditionary force (*Lys.* 16.13, cf. 14.14; Aristoph. *Eccles.* 193–6), as is pointed out by Seager, (1967) 98–9.

⁶ Accame (1951) 26–7 seems to me to be right in suggesting that Androtion is the probable source of this report but wrong in believing it to be false. Martin (1940) 538–40, doubts its authenticity but does not positively reject it. Bruce (1967) 120, and Hamilton (1979) 204–5, accept it.

⁷ For a survey of such passages in the *Pelopidas* see Westlake (1939) 12–15.

instance has a uniformity suggesting that it is founded upon material derived from a single work. Its content also indicates that the author of that work was thoroughly familiar with the characteristics of Greek warfare at the beginning of the fourth century and that his interest in the campaign was not confined to the fate of Lysander.

A feature prominent in the narrative of Plutarch is that most of it, though not all, reflects the viewpoint of the Thebans. Hence, while it does not betray any flagrant prejudice in favour of Thebes, there is a strong case for ascribing its ultimate origin to a Boeotian source. Its wealth of information on Boeotian topography, noted above, points in the same direction: this topographical information, though doubtless of special interest to Plutarch as a Boeotian, cannot have been introduced by him on his own initiative. These features are especially noteworthy because elsewhere in the *Lysander* he has certainly derived a substantial amount of material from the *Hellenica* of Xenophon.⁸ Here, however, when for the first time in the career of Lysander relations with the Boeotians are paramount, the version by Xenophon, though doubtless known to Plutarch, was certainly not his principal source. He appears rather to have chosen to derive his material from the work of some author who was either himself a Boeotian or had access to Boeotian sources. Boeotia developed a modest tradition in historiography. In the fourth century Daimachus of Plataea (*FGrHist* 65) and Anaxis and Dionysodorus, also Boeotians (*ibid.* 67, 68), produced works which were apparently general histories of Greece and included at least some material on events of their own times.⁹ These Boeotian historians are little more than names, and it is most unlikely that Plutarch had access to their obscure works.¹⁰ His version of the episode at Haliartus may well, however, be based upon an account by a better known historian who in turn was dependent on the work of some Boeotian predecessor.

⁸ Cf. Flaceliere, vol. 6 (1971) 165–6; Bommelaer (1981) 44.

⁹ There were also works on local history, though only a few were written by Boeotians, cf. Jacoby, *FGrHist* 3 b Komm. (1955) 151–3, for a general introduction.

¹⁰ He does quote (*Lys.* 12.6–8) a passage of some length from a work *On Piety* by a Daimachus (F 8), but this author could well be a different person from the fourth century historian, cf. Jacoby *ibid.* 2 c (Berlin 1926) 4, and in any case Plutarch, as often in passages of discussion, may well have extracted his quotation from an intermediate source.

This better known historian can hardly be Ephorus, although he was accused of plagiarism from Daimachus (*FGrHist* 65 T 1 a = 70 T 17): his main source for this period was almost certainly the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*, and the version by Diodorus, which, as noted above, is surely dependent on Ephorus, has little in common with that of Plutarch and does not reflect the viewpoint of the Thebans. If Plutarch is following his normal practice of deriving historical material from standard histories, his immediate source here may well be the much-read *Hellenica* of Theopompus.¹¹ There seems to be no means of dating the publication of this work at all accurately, but it preceded the more famous *Philippica* and followed the *Hellenica* of Xenophon. Although Theopompus is accused of plagiarizing the latter (*FGrHist* 115 F 21), he might well have chosen to rely for his account of the episode at Haliartus on a Boeotian historian who was more familiar with the terrain and perhaps had been an eyewitness of the events. Plutarch was well-acquainted with both the major historical works of Theopompus (cf. F 321–37), and indeed in the next sentence, after concluding his account of the sequel to the Spartan withdrawal from Boeotia, he quotes a passage of Theopompus (F 333), evidently from the *Hellenica*, extolling the private virtues of Lysander.

As will be noted in the next section, Plutarch includes in his account a considerable amount of information not found in any of the other three accounts, and none of it is demonstrably apocryphal.

The account by Xenophon (*Hell.* 3.5.6–7 and 17–25) differs from those by the other three authors in being manifestly dependent on oral, and not literary, sources. Virtually all his narrative throughout the *Hellenica* is based either on his own experiences or on reports from informants who were in some cases eyewitnesses and in others had some personal knowledge of events on which they were consulted. Most of such informants on events recorded by him from the beginning of the third book onwards were certainly Spartans, so that, especially as his own sympathies lay with Sparta, the narrative

¹¹ Flacelière (1971) 162–5 lists passages in the *Lysander* where Plutarch, though not citing Theopompus or Ephorus, may be thought to have derived material from their works. These passages are exceptionally abundant in 28.2–12 on the Spartan invasion of Boeotia. Since Theopompus evidently used the work of Xenophon for parts of his *Hellenica*, he is likely to have used a written source for this invasion, which occurred almost two decades before his birth.

normally reflects the Spartan viewpoint. His account of the events at Haliartus is no exception. It is true that he claims to be well-informed about fluctuations of Theban morale at various stages after the death of Lysander (21–2). This passage, however, is evidently influenced by his notorious animosity towards the Thebans¹² and probably reproduces camp gossip on the Spartan side based on observation of Theban reactions to changing circumstances rather than trustworthy evidence from Theban sources. This interpretation is supported by the vague use of *ἔφασαν* ‘they said’ without a subject expressed (21).

His version of the strategic plan on which the Spartan offensive was based (6) strikes an authentic note and may well be founded on information from Spartans of high rank who helped to frame it. On the other hand, his narrative of successive developments at and around Haliartus, though doubtless dependent initially upon reports by Spartans who served there, is not so complete or so clear as might have been expected. For example, he is uncertain why Lysander persisted in his ill-fated attack on the town, and he offers alternative explanations (19).¹³ He does not provide sufficient topographical detail to provide the reader with even a rough understanding of the movements by the various bodies of troops involved in the operations; nor does he mention the part played by the Athenians, apart from a reference to the arrival of an Athenian force (22). It is noteworthy that during 395 and much of 394, when there was intensive activity, both diplomatic and military, in Greece, including the Spartan invasion of Boeotia, Xenophon was abroad in Asia and can have had no personal experience of events at home.¹⁴ Nor, until he returned with Agesilaus, can he have begun to collect from others the information about these events upon which he based his account of them in two substantial sections of the *Hellenica* (3.5.1–25 and 4.2.9–23). These two sections were probably not written until some years later, and indeed the penultimate sentence of the first section (3.5.25) refers to the death of

¹² Cf. Sordi (1951) 273–348, at 303–4. An even more disparaging passage (4.2.18) accuses the Thebans of cowardly reactions at Nemea in the following year.

¹³ Breitenbach (1950) 23–4, believes that the two explanations derived from different informants. It is perhaps more likely that Xenophon was unable to obtain satisfactory information from any Spartan eyewitness and suggested the alternative explanations on his own initiative.

¹⁴ Breitenbach, ‘Xenophon’, *RE* 9A2 (1967) 1680–1.

Pausanias, which must be dated after 381, since he outlived his son Agesipolis, who died in that year (*Hell.* 5.3.19).¹⁵

Xenophon does not give an unequivocal answer to the crucial question whether Pausanias, having agreed to be outside Haliartus on a prearranged date, was late in arriving or whether Lysander reached the rendezvous before the prearranged date and decided to take action without waiting for Pausanias.¹⁶ Possibly Xenophon lacked trustworthy evidence, but Pausanias had long been a controversial figure, and the issue of his guilt or innocence at Haliartus was hotly disputed among leading Spartans at the time and doubtless long afterwards. Hence Xenophon is likely to have been reluctant to commit himself explicitly. In 403, when he was apparently a moderate member of the city faction at Athens, he had deplored the harshness of Lysander and approved the relatively mild policy of Pausanias in effecting a reconciliation between oligarchs and democrats, as is shown by his own account (*Hell.* 2.4.35–9), and he seems to have felt at least doubtful whether the verdict of the Spartan tribunal in 395 was just. Many Spartiates, however, believed Pausanias to be guilty or at any rate welcomed his removal from the political arena, and they doubtless included some whom Xenophon, now a protégé of Sparta, could ill afford to offend.

In accounts of episodes discreditable to Sparta Xenophon tends to betray some embarrassment, which renders his treatment of them somewhat unsatisfactory. The influence of this tendency is discernible here, though it is less striking than in accounts of other discreditable episodes, notably the battle of Leuctra.

¹⁵ Breitenbach, *ibid.* 1681, who also justifiably believes that the speech by the Theban envoy at Athens asking for assistance (3.5.8–15) was written after a long interval. Much of the argument contained in it gives the impression of having been supplied by Xenophon rather than a Theban envoy, who would hardly have been tactless enough to have referred so bluntly to the conflict between rival factions in the Athenian civil war (9). Cartledge (1979) 278–9, notes that the speech contains misrepresentations, which he tentatively attributes to the hostility of Xenophon towards Thebes.

¹⁶ Neither the statement that Lysander ['arrived before Pausanias at Haliartus'] (17) nor the charge brought against Pausanias by his accusers ['that he arrived at Haliartus after Lysander'] (25) provides a basis for a satisfactory solution of the problem.

THE FOUR ACCOUNTS COMBINED¹⁷

The Spartan strategic plan

Xenophon provides more valuable information on this aspect of the campaign than any of the other authors. He alone makes clear that the Spartans planned in advance a two-pronged, concerted offensive by forces invading Boeotia from opposite directions and under orders to converge on Haliartus on a prearranged day, when King Pausanias was to assume command of the united army (6). The rendezvous was admirably chosen, since Haliartus dominated a rather narrow route between mountainous country and Lake Copais.¹⁸ An army occupying this strategic position would cut off the Thebans from north-western Boeotia, which Lysander was expected to win for Sparta by diplomacy or by force, and would also have an excellent base from which to launch offensive action against Thebes and its broad and fertile plain.

There are indications in other sources of a factor to which Xenophon does not refer, namely that the Spartan plan was designed to be kept secret and to take the Thebans by surprise. According to Diodorus (1), Lysander, when sent to raise an allied force in Phocis, had only a few soldiers with him: he probably took them across the Corinthian Gulf¹⁹ in order to avoid detection. Plutarch (28.3–5) implies that the Thebans were unaware of the Spartan plan until it was already being implemented (see below on the intercepted message). Some support for this interpretation is provided by a very brief reference by Andocides in a speech delivered in 393/2 (3.20), in which he declares that the Boeotians ‘went to war with the intention of not permitting Orchomenus to be independent’.²⁰ Although Andocides is notoriously unreliable, even on contemporary events,²¹

¹⁷ Hereafter, unless otherwise stated, references to Xenophon are to *Hellenica* 3.5; those to Diodorus are to 14.81; those to Plutarch are to his *Lysander*; those to Pausanias are to 3.5.

¹⁸ Strabo 9.2.30, [‘in a narrow place’]. Wallace (1979) 117–19, in a note on this passage, supplies a useful account of the terrain. See also Roesch (1976) 374–5.

¹⁹ Flacelière (1971) 209, n. 2.

²⁰ Nepos *Lys.* 3.4. makes the same point, cf. Andoc. 3 (*On the Peace*) 20.

²¹ Cf. Westlake (1977).

this passage is probably accurate in suggesting that initially the Boeotians regarded the defection of Orchomenus as the principal threat to their security. They doubtless expected the Phocians, with whom they were already at war, to support Orchomenus and other dissident cities. They may possibly have already learned that Lysander was in Phocis, but they apparently could only guess what his next move would be.²²

The fate of Lysander and its sequel

After assembling an army of Phocians and other allies, Lysander invaded north-western Boeotia, where a contingent of Orchomenians joined him (Xen. 17). This invasion is almost certainly the occasion of a passage included by Plutarch in a collection of apophthegms by Lysander not assigned to any specific context (22.4; *Mor.* 229c): when the Boeotians were vacillating, he asked whether he should march through their country with spears vertical (as in peace) or horizontal (as in war).²³ His question suggests that, when he crossed the border from Phocis, some Boeotians in that area other than the Orchomenians were disposed to support him, hoping to establish their independence. Lebadeia, however, resisted and was plundered (Plut. 28.2). He then pressed on towards Haliartus.

At this stage, according to Plutarch (28.3–4), Lysander sent a message to Pausanias, then at Plataea, urging him to join forces with him outside Haliartus, where he would himself arrive at dawn, but the message was intercepted en route and fell into Theban hands. There is no reason to disbelieve this story.²⁴ It is not incompatible with the statement of Xenophon (6) that Pausanias had agreed to reach Haliartus on a prearranged day. Because of the difficulties experienced in attempting to synchronize the movements of Greek

²² Xenophon 7, cf. 17, implies that their appeal to Athens was made very shortly before the invasion of Boeotia.

²³ The significance of these terms is explained by Anderson (1970) 88–9.

²⁴ Accame (1951) 39 rejects it as a rhetorical fabrication. The messenger would however have had to pass through territory controlled by the Thebans, where the risk of interception was certainly high. Messages in antiquity might for various reasons go astray, cf. Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.23 and Plut. *Dion* 26.7–10.

armies,²⁵ the two commanders were doubtless prudent enough to wish to communicate with one another as they approached their rendezvous, so that each would know the whereabouts of the other. Pausanias appears to have sent word to Lysander that he was approaching Plataea,²⁶ and the intercepted message was the reply. The reaction of the Thebans on learning the content of this message shows that, whatever they may have known or guessed about the Spartan offensive plan, they can have had no inkling that Haliartus was its keystone. Now, benefiting from their windfall, they made a forced march by night from Thebes to Haliartus, a distance of about twenty kilometres. They arrived shortly before Lysander, and, while some entered the town, others, certainly the majority and including cavalry as well as hoplites (cf. Xen. 19), remained outside. An Athenian force, which had come to Thebes to support them, was left to guard their city (Plut. 28.5).²⁷

Lysander evidently fulfilled his undertaking to reach a position close to Haliartus at dawn, but he seems to have remained ignorant that Theban forces were in the neighbourhood.²⁸ At first he stationed his troops on a hill, presumably south-west of the town in the direction of Helicon, and waited for Pausanias. Later in the day, however, when, as both Xenophon (18) and Plutarch (28.6) indicate, his patience became exhausted, he led them in column to within a short distance of the wall and then himself went forward with a small detachment to try to persuade the Haliartians to revolt.²⁹ He must have been encouraged by dissidents to believe that his offer of autonomy might be welcomed, but his overtures were stifled by the

²⁵ The risks involved had been illustrated by the disastrous failure of the Athenian plan for concerted action against Boeotia in 424 (Thuc. 4.76–7, 89–101).

²⁶ The phrase ['from Plataea'] in the text of the intercepted message (Plut. 28.3) suggests this conclusion.

²⁷ Xenophon (19), apparently dependent upon observation by Spartans for information on Theban reaction (see above, p. 463), is evidently under the impression that the Theban army did not begin its forced march to Haliartus until news was received that Lysander had already arrived there.

²⁸ See the preceding note. The same conclusion is suggested by the uncertainty of Xenophon (19) on the reasons why Lysander had not moved from a vulnerable position close to the town wall when attacked by the Thebans.

²⁹ From the action described in Plut. 28.10 it is clear that he was separated from the main body.

Thebans recently sent into the town.³⁰ Thereupon he launched an assault on the wall, but at this point his troops, evidently not yet deployed, were attacked in the rear, near a spring called Cissoussa, by the Theban army operating outside the town (Plut. 28.7).³¹ The Theban and Haliartian troops inside the wall, who had hitherto remained inactive, were doubtless encouraged by seeing the attack on the rear of the enemy by the Theban hoplites and cavalry. Conscious that Lysander with his advance guard was isolated in a vulnerable position close to their wall, they made a sudden sortie from the town gate. They killed Lysander, his seer, and a few others, but most of those with him escaped to the main body. Xenophon (19) does not make altogether clear how Lysander met his death, but Plutarch (28.10, cf. 29.9)³² and Pausanias (3) agree that the force making this sortie was responsible.³³

Xenophon (18–20), Diodorus (81.2), and Plutarch (28.11–12) all state that the troops hitherto led by Lysander, mostly Phocian, fled to high ground, doubtless west or south-west of Haliartus, hotly pursued by the Thebans, but that they then rallied, aided by the rugged terrain, and inflicted substantial casualties upon their pursuers.³⁴

³⁰ According to Pausanias (3, cf. 9.32.5) Athenians as well as Thebans had secretly entered the town.

³¹ By failing to explain where this spring was Plutarch, who must have known the area well himself, has deprived his readers of an indispensable key to the movements of both sides. Bommelaer (1981) 194–6, cf. 52–3 makes a praiseworthy attempt to reconstruct the topographical details, but his conclusions are necessarily speculative. He also suggests that the aim of Lysander was to lure the Thebans into committing themselves to an attack on his force in order that they might be caught in a trap when Pausanias arrived and could strike at their rear. This ingenious hypothesis is unconvincing. The tactical plan attributed to Lysander would have been very hazardous, since it demanded the arrival of Pausanias at precisely the right moment. Lysander had already awaited him in vain and, especially as there had been a breakdown of communications between them, cannot have known exactly where the Peloponnesian army was. There is also every reason to believe, as noted above, that the Thebans outside the town somehow concealed their presence from Lysander, perhaps behind high ground, until they attacked his rear guard.

³² The latter passage, in which Lysander is said to have been killed by a Haliartian, occurs in one of the anecdotes about oracles which are probably derived from a source different from the main narrative (see above, p. 460).

³³ In *Comp. Lys. et Sulla* 4.3–5 Plutarch charges Lysander with ill-considered rashness, but this judgement, as is normal in *Comparisons*, is probably based on his own impression and not derived from his source.

³⁴ The Theban losses amounted to 200 according to Xenophon and Diodorus, to 300 according to Plutarch, who alone gives the figure of 1,000 for the allied, mostly Phocian,

Plutarch (28.12) alone adds that some Thebans, who had been accused of Spartan sympathies, squandered their lives recklessly to prove their loyalty. This statement, certainly derived from a Theban source, is very probably authentic, since, according to the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* (17.1–2; 18.1), a faction favouring Sparta still remained powerful at Thebes. Despite this partial reversal of fortune the morale of the Phocian and allied troops was so shattered by the death of Lysander and their defeat that they slunk away homewards on the night after the battle (Xen. 21).

The dilemma and disgrace of King Pausanias

Pausanias had assembled his Peloponnesian army at Tegea (Xen. 7; Paus. 4) and then led it via the Isthmus and Cithaeron to Plataea (Plut. 28.3, 29.1), evidently choosing this route to avoid encroaching on Athenian territory.³⁵ While at Plataea he had no news of Lysander because the message sent to him had been intercepted. He cannot, therefore, have known whether the invasion from the north was progressing satisfactorily and whether the simultaneous arrival of the two armies at Haliartus, which was a crucial element of the Spartan plan, was likely to be achieved. He may well have remained at Plataea longer than he had intended, waiting for a communication from Lysander, and, when it did not arrive, have set out for Thespieae en route for Haliartus (Plut. 29.1) at an abnormally slow pace. In the circumstances he had every reason for wariness, even if delay meant that he would not reach Haliartus on the prearranged day. Although his enemies must have accused him of deliberate dawdling designed to endanger or at least discredit Lysander,³⁶ it is most improbable

losses. This figure may be an exaggeration, though some of the contingents recruited by Lysander may have suffered heavily because they were poorly armed and ill-trained.

³⁵ Hammond (1954) 103–15 has demonstrated, by reconnaissance of routes in the northern Megarid, that armies could, and on several occasions did, move from central Greece to the Peloponnese and vice versa without touching Attica. The most significant parallel to the march of Pausanias is that of Cleombrotus, who in the winter of 379/8 led an army over Cithaeron to Plataea, avoiding the route through Eleutherae because it was guarded by Athenian troops (Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.14). On the topography of this area see also Van de Maele (1980) 153–9.

³⁶ Parke (1945) 110.

that he was guilty of such treachery.³⁷ His failure to arrive at Haliartus in time to support Lysander is more convincingly explained on other grounds.

He was on the road from Plataea to Thespieae when he received news of what had happened at Haliartus (Plut. 29.1). He must thereupon have advanced more speedily, since he reached Haliartus, with his troops in battle formation, apparently early on the day after the death of Lysander. He received a further shock on learning that the Phocians and other allies had fled during the night (Xen. 21). According to his namesake (4) he was determined to engage the Thebans in battle,³⁸ but no action developed on that day. The Thebans doubtless took up a strong defensive position awaiting the support of the Athenian force under Thrasybulus, which they must have urged to come to their aid with all speed. On the following day this force arrived (Xen. 22) from Thebes (Plut. 29.1), and the Thebans now offered battle (Paus. 4).

At this point there occurs for the first and only time an irreconcilable disagreement between two of the authorities. According to Xenophon (22) the Athenians took up a position in battle formation beside the Thebans in support of them (*συμπαρετάξαντο*), whereas according to Pausanias (4) Thrasybulus was waiting, evidently not very far from Haliartus, for the Spartans to attack the Theban army and intended then to take them in the rear. It is difficult to decide which version is the more convincing. Xenophon had the advantage of being able to consult contemporary witnesses, but any Spartan giving him information on this stage of the campaign might well have heard that the Athenians were near at hand without having actually seen them or having learned exactly where they were, since

³⁷ Bommelaer (1981) 196 is inclined to accept the accusation against Pausanias. Hamilton (1979) 206 prefers the less dishonourable explanation that he 'delayed out of reluctance to bring on a war that was contrary to his whole career'.

³⁸ Here the statement that he led his army ['toward Thebes'] is, if the text is sound, surely a slip, perhaps the result of an intimation that the Spartan army, when united, was to have moved against Thebes (above, p. 465). It is strange that this statement seems to be accepted without question. Admittedly there is here no explicit mention of an agreed plan for Pausanias to join Lysander at Haliartus, but the passage implies that he would have played a part in the engagement there if he had arrived in time ['he arrived after the engagement']. It also suggests that he was at Haliartus when he came to terms with the Thebans (5).

no fighting developed. It has already been noted that Pausanias evidently derives his account from an author eager to assign a decisive role to the Athenians and also to exculpate King Pausanias (above, p. 460). Nevertheless, the strategy attributed to Thrasybulus is entirely reasonable and indeed must have seemed likely to prove the best method of exploiting the situation outside Haliartus to the advantage of his Theban allies. If, however, he did adopt these tactics, his action probably had a less decisive influence upon the outcome than is claimed in the account of Pausanias.

King Pausanias was now faced with an agonizing dilemma. He was in honour bound to recover for burial the bodies of Lysander and the other Spartans, but they lay close under the town wall, so that their recovery would be difficult even if he were to defeat the Thebans in battle (Xen. 23; Plut. 29.3). On the other hand, to make a request for a truce for the restoration of the bodies would be highly discreditable to the Spartans, who were not accustomed to having to admit defeat. It would also expose him to strictures by his enemies at Sparta, which might, and in fact did, lead to impeachment and bring his career to an ignominious end. Xenophon (22–3) and Plutarch (29.2–3) give widely different accounts of his contacts with his subordinates at this critical stage.

According to Xenophon, he called a meeting of senior and junior officers to consider whether to fight or to negotiate. The arguments put forward in favour of negotiation are said to have been: that Lysander was dead and his army defeated and dispersed; that the Corinthians had refused to supply a contingent and the other allies were serving without enthusiasm; that the enemy was much superior in cavalry; and that, above all, the bodies were lying close to the wall. Xenophon may have obtained reports from officers attending the meeting, but the reference to the absence of the Corinthians suggests a wider context, and his account could well be based on arguments produced later by friends of Pausanias at Sparta. Xenophon appears to be guilty of inaccuracy in explicitly attributing the decision to negotiate not to Pausanias alone but to his officers as well (23), which perhaps reflects attempts to mitigate his personal responsibility. A Spartan king might listen to, and even seek, advice from others, but when in command of an army he was normally vested with

absolute authority.³⁹ Thus on this occasion responsibility for deciding whether to fight or negotiate rested with Pausanias alone. According to Plutarch, the older Spartiates were indignant on learning that the king intended to negotiate a truce for the recovery of the bodies; they protested to him, demanding military action and declaring that, if this failed, they would deem it an honour to lie dead beside Lysander.⁴⁰ Despite their remonstrance Pausanias, evidently exercising his personal authority,⁴¹ proceeded to negotiate a truce. These two accounts are not so irreconcilable as they appear to be at first sight.⁴² While a majority of the officers serving under Pausanias doubtless agreed with him that negotiation was unavoidable in the circumstances, it is perfectly credible that some older men, influenced by an intense patriotism which was perhaps already becoming outmoded, were prepared to sacrifice their lives rather than bring dishonour to Sparta.⁴³ This difference of opinion may also reflect a division of loyalties, some being devoted to Lysander and others to Pausanias. The two accounts supplement, and do not contradict, one another.

On the closing stages of the campaign also they dovetail neatly into one another. Xenophon (24) alone mentions that the Thebans refused to allow the removal of the bodies unless the Spartans undertook to withdraw from Boeotia. To impose conditions when an enemy requested a truce for the recovery of the dead was a breach of established practice.⁴⁴ The Spartans might have been expected to protest, as the Athenians did in somewhat similar circumstances after the battle of Delium (Thuc. 4.97.2–99), but, according to Xenophon,

³⁹ Busolt and Swoboda 2 (1926) 676. In 431 Archidamus called a meeting of officers before his invasion of Attica (Thuc. 2.10.3), but after addressing them he dismissed them (ibid. 12.1) without seeking their advice. At Leuctra Cleombrotus, after being offered advice by his friends (Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.5), held several councils of war before the battle began (ibid. 8).

⁴⁰ The criticism of Agis by an elderly Spartan at Mantinea (Thuc. 5.65.2) is comparable.

⁴¹ Here the version of Plutarch reflects a more punctilious attitude towards the legal position of Spartan kings on active service than that of Xenophon.

⁴² Accame (40) dismisses the version of Plutarch as another rhetorical fabrication.

⁴³ News of their opposition to Pausanias could well have become known to the Thebans during the negotiations for the truce. It is not necessary to postulate a change of source.

⁴⁴ Pritchett 2 (1974) 261–2.

they were glad to accept. His reference to their low morale during their retreat suggests a reason for their compliance. He adds that the Thebans treated the withdrawing Spartans most arrogantly, beating any who ventured from the road into the adjoining countryside. In this passage his hatred of the Thebans may have led him to exaggerate their vindictiveness, though Spartans supplying him with information perhaps tended to make the most of sufferings to which they had been subjected.

Plutarch (29.4) conveniently completes the narrative of the campaign. The Spartans, withdrawing westwards, crossed the border into Phocis and buried Lysander in friendly territory near Panopeus, where a funerary monument to him still stood in the time of Plutarch on the road from Chaeronea to Delphi.⁴⁵ Because Pausanias marched his army so far westwards instead of returning, as he had come, via Plataea and Cithaeron, he must have had it ferried across the Corinthian Gulf to the Peloponnese. He may have chosen this route in order to reach the protection of an ally as quickly as possible, but he may also have feared that the Corinthians, who had refused to supply him with a contingent and must already have been expected to join the alliance against Sparta, might try to bar the Isthmus against him.

None of the surviving accounts, except that of Xenophon, devotes more than a few words to the trial of Pausanias, which concludes the episode. Diodorus (14.89) does not even mention the charges brought against him. Plutarch (30.1) suggests, without any explicit reference to charges, that he was impeached because he was held responsible for the death of Lysander. According to Pausanias (6) his namesake was accused of slowness in conducting the offensive against Boeotia.⁴⁶ Xenophon (25), who gives more detail, was probably able to consult well-informed Spartans about the trial, as about the Spartan strategic plan, and they may have included some holding positions of authority. He lists three charges on which Pausanias was condemned to death in absentia: that he arrived at Haliartus later than Lysander (above, p. 464); that he negotiated a truce for the

⁴⁵ Flaceliere (1971) 168 and 211 n. 2, points out that Plutarch must often have passed this monument when travelling from his home to perform his duties as a priest of Pythian Apollo at Delphi.

⁴⁶ Cf. 5, where the Spartans are stated to have disagreed with his decision to negotiate.

return of the bodies instead of trying to recover them by force of arms; and that, after trapping the Athenian democrats at the Piraeus, he allowed them to escape. The inclusion of this third charge, harking back to the Athenian civil war, is so remarkable that Xenophon might be thought mistaken in believing that the prosecution raked up an accusation on which Pausanias had been acquitted about eight years earlier (Paus. 2). There is, however, evidence that under Spartan law, which tended to be unorthodox, a defendant even after acquittal remained liable to indictment (Plut. *Mor.* 217b, ὑπόδικος),⁴⁷ apparently for an indefinite period. Xenophon is also doubtless justified in maintaining that Pausanias by deciding not to defend himself before the tribunal contributed to his conviction.

CONCLUSION

The episode examined in this paper is of historical interest because it marks the beginning of opposition to the Spartan domination of Greece and because it encouraged that opposition by demonstrating that Sparta was not irresistible. Of even greater interest perhaps is that the foregoing study of the sources, if it has any validity, illustrates a general principle of considerable importance, which tends to be neglected by modern scholars. Where two or more accounts of the same episode have survived, bias, carelessness, forgetfulness, or misunderstanding at some stage of transmission may, especially if secondary sources are involved, lead to distortion so that irreconcilable disagreements may develop. It is to such cases that most attention has been devoted by scholars, who, not unnaturally, engage in controversy on the respective merits of conflicting versions. There is, however, another category, in which the extant sources, though belonging to separate and independent traditions, may be combined to form, with hardly any discrepancy, a single, essentially trustworthy account.

One reason for consensus of this kind doubtless is that, apart from the orators, who tend to distort history in support of their own arguments, most Greek authors when dealing with historical events

⁴⁷ Cited by Michell (1952) 155.

are both honest and painstaking, even if, like Plutarch and Pausanias, they do not claim to be historians.

Another reason is more complicated. Authors seeking information on recent history were very largely dependent on oral reports from eyewitnesses, as Thucydides makes clear in a celebrated passage (1.22.2–3),⁴⁸ though his own experience was an important source. After his time the number of historians increased, and most of them, though only meagre fragments of their works have survived, are known to have devoted themselves, wholly or partly, to recent history for which their principal source must have been reports obtained from their contemporaries. Accordingly several independent versions of the same episode might be written, and each might form the basis of a separate literary tradition. Eyewitnesses were fallible, as Thucydides points out (1.22.3), and hardly any historians can have been as meticulous as he was in sifting oral evidence: Xenophon certainly was not. Nevertheless widely divergent and yet trustworthy reports could have been made on the same episode to different historians by informants who were on opposing sides in war or political disputes, or who witnessed events occurring more or less simultaneously in separate locations, or who were associated with different leaders. There was plenty of scope for the development of independent traditions supplementing one another and each containing a very high proportion of truthful material. The case discussed above affords a most illuminating example because the sources seem to belong to as many as four traditions. Another general principle exemplified here, which might be thought to be self-evident but tends to be insufficiently observed (above, pp. 457–8, with n. 2), is that, where both primary and secondary accounts of the same episode are extant, the former should not necessarily be accepted to the virtual exclusion of the latter.

⁴⁸ His conscientiousness in applying this method is illustrated by 7.44.1, cf. 5.26.5.

Xenophon's *Anabasis*

(An inaugural address, largely unrevised,
delivered in Tübingen 14 December 1965)

Hartmut Erbse

Whoever sets out to speak about Xenophon's *Anabasis* runs the risk of arousing unpleasant memories in the audience. The very fact that each of them had to cover every parasang of Cyrus the Younger's march through the rocky mountain ranges and desert plains of the Near East as a student in high school means that they do not think back with fondness on the prosaic chronicle of an unsuccessful incident of minor historical importance. The stereotypical sentence beginning ἐντεῦθεν ἐξελαύνει ['thence he marched'], which is engraved on every reader's memory, appropriately heralds the dryness of an account which may well be conducive to the acquisition of Greek syntax, but which excludes from the outset any of the stirring of enthusiasm or feelings of engagement that are aroused through contact with the great works of world literature in a receptive heart. This disfavour also predominates in academia: Xenophon's works, and not least the *Anabasis*, are believed to have been well enough studied in one's school years and so, being apparently unproblematic and unimaginative, are left, without reluctance, to the care of school-teachers. Those who discard this learned view however, and reread the short work in their later years will be somewhat surprised. As long as the old prejudices have been shed, they will immediately realize that a rather special side of the Greek character is being revealed here, an aspect that should seize our interest due to its

very one-sidedness. However in this hour it is not my intention to characterize the peculiarities of the events as related by Xenophon or even just the way they are depicted. In order to do them justice one would have to bring to them a refined sense of the ingenuous naivety, courtesy, and quick-wittedness of the author, but also the freshness and roughness of the soldier's life, and above all the particular problems of discipline shaken or even broken down in unimaginable circumstances. Indeed, one would probably have to have experienced situations as complicated as the ones Xenophon describes and felt their bitterness to correctly gauge the plain impartiality with which the author juxtaposes the important and the inconsequential, without ever finding the distance of a true historian.

The question I would like to draw your attention to today is much more unassuming than the one I have just sketched out: it takes as its aim not the value of the representation but its meaning. One might well think that the solution to this straightforward problem ('What was Xenophon attempting to achieve through his composition of the *Anabasis*?') must have been found long ago, at least before it was thought to hand out a grade to the author. But as so often happens, the schoolmaster in the philologists came before the 'systematician', and judgement was quickly passed before a justified reason for the judgement had been found. In fact research has dodged the question of the point of the work; where it has felt itself compelled to give an answer, opinion has been divided.

In the first half of the nineteenth century it was mostly thought that Xenophon had, after turbulent and active years, used the breathing space after the march of the Ten Thousand to Asia Minor or the leisure and isolation of the rural life in Elis (on his property at Scillus) to tell the Greek public the tale of the most interesting adventure in his life up to that point. The memoir-like nature of the entire Xenophontic oeuvre only adds to the plausibility of what is already at first glance a very natural hypothesis. But this was thrown into doubt, when Schenkl and above all Schwartz (the latter in his rightly famous study of the sources for Greek history¹) showed that Xenophon wrote down his work only many years after Cyrus' march, probably when he was not even in Scillus any more, but only when he got to Corinth. Schwartz believed the *Anabasis* had a pronounced apologetic

¹ Schwartz, 1889, 161–93 = *Gesammelte Schriften* 2, 1956, 136–74.

purpose, which was meant to defend its author and the Ten Thousand collectively against 'unfavourable judgement'. This thought will prove itself to be extraordinarily productive in our examination. Schwartz reached this conclusion however almost solely from reports about Xenophon's life, and since in that process he accepted Niebuhr's dating of his banishment as the year of the battle of Coronea (394 bc), he jeopardized the very basis of his thesis. After that, he barely asked how far the apologetic purpose informed and shaped the details of the presentation. The French researcher Dürrbach attempted to make up for this a few years later,² but he used Schwartz's thesis to detect on Xenophon's part an unseemly desire for renown in the *Anabasis*, though he also drew many correct conclusions. Dürrbach thought Xenophon had arbitrarily rearranged the facts and without good grounds placed himself centre-stage in self-justification. Since such strong doubts about the credibility of the author contradict the internal plausibility of his reports as well as our other witnesses, Dürrbach's approach seems also to have cast suspicion on Schwartz's thesis. In any case, shortly after the First World War Körte thought it necessary to put forward a different view: in a lecture delivered in 1921 in Jena he argued that Xenophon had not set pen to paper to justify himself, nor to correct other accounts of the march, but to achieve a practical ideal: the union of Sparta and Athens, against Persia if possible. 'There in far off Asia', he explained,³ 'men of all Greek tribes *had* fought side by side, under Spartan and Athenian leadership. Athenians and Spartans (it is Xenophon's intention to say) can work together perfectly well to the benefit of all Hellenes, so long as the Athenians are smart enough to renounce their external pretensions: that is so to speak the moral of the book.' We must at this point make certain objections (as were made to Körte immediately following the publication of his lecture): while we can be sure that Xenophon subscribed to such pan-Hellenic ideals, the programme Körte suggests constitutes one of the essential points of Xenophon's historical work (the *Hellenica*), not of the account of the march with Cyrus. For it to be significant in this work, it would have to come out much more clearly in the words and deeds of those involved. And even then one would still be able to question whether the ancient author would have

² Dürrbach, 1893, 343–86.

³ Körte, 1922, 21.

considered such a frontline ideal as effective as the modern critic, obviously influenced by the wishes and dreams of present circumstances. But Körte's thesis likewise implies the claim that Xenophon had faked his account in important details. He must, for example, have reproached the Arcadian and Achaean contingent of the army for their obstinacy and recalcitrance primarily because he wanted to show the homeland Greeks that these petty states—compared with Athens and Sparta—were unreliable partners. Such political intentions would however scarcely have been fit to give resonance to the book, no matter how carefully the author might have hidden them. At best they could have earned him a charge of an unparalleled lack of tact.

In judgements of the *Anabasis* today praise is rightly given for the powerful immediacy in the portrayal of an event that is meant to stand as a glorious chapter in Greek military history. But of Schwartz's impressive attempt to grasp the meaning of the work from a centre outwards, little has been heard. Instead attempts have been made to re-employ analytical (compositional) approaches (following on from the Dutchman Hartman this was particularly carried out by the French researcher Delebecque⁴), although their arguments have long been exhausted and refuted. The last representative appraisal of the work of Xenophon (by Lesky⁵) described it as certain, with a brief description of the narrative technique, that Xenophon had been exiled following his participation at the battle of Coronea. Lesky writes: 'Nothing can excuse his taking up arms against his fatherland at that time, not even the pro-Spartan mood of the circles he came from. It was because of this act and not as the ancient sources have it, because of his participation in the march of Cyrus, that he was exiled by Athens.' But Lesky fails to draw the consequences for the appraisal of the *Anabasis* that follow from suspecting his character in this way, as he avoids raising the question of the aim of the work. And so one part of Schwartz's interpretation is accepted here, the other is rejected, which raises the question whether, if Schwartz's thesis is to be halved in this way, the useful half has not ended up being discarded and the mistaken half incorporated into the centre of the literary portrait.

It will be useful for our topic to briefly reacquaint ourselves with the content of the *Anabasis*, even at the risk of boring the members of

⁴ Delebecque, 1957, 83 ff., 199 ff., 288 ff.

⁵ Lesky, 1963, 664.

the audience familiar with Xenophon. Such a thing is by no means easy to attempt, since the book does not have a preface for the author to introduce himself and set out his aims, but instead there are just summaries following the various sections—summaries, moreover, which are generally athetized by modern editors, although their Xenophonic origins must be clear even to those who are not familiar with C. Høeg's⁶ defence. Our investigation will hopefully show that a preface had never even been planned. Xenophon actually begins with the unassuming statement: 'Darius and Parysatis had two sons; the older one was called Artaxerxes and the younger one was called Cyrus.' The simplicity, if not downright banality of the beginning changes swiftly however. After just a few indications, readers already have their bearings on the lead up to the events that are about to play themselves out: Cyrus, dissatisfied with the new hierarchy instituted by his father, seeks its overthrow with heady energy. He does not just gather a grand regular army about himself and employ it in the siege of the city of Miletus, but he also engaged Greek mercenary generals on his behalf. They received money with the instructions to proceed to assemble a company under their own command who should be available to the prince for special assignments. In the first chapter Xenophon straightaway names five *strategoí*. They all work tirelessly for Cyrus, but only one (Clearchus, a Spartan) knows what Cyrus is planning and, being a smart general, keeps it secret. When Cyrus gathers all of his contingents about him (the Greeks provide 11,000 hoplites and 2,000 peltasts), all the Greek soldiers, with the exception of Clearchus, think that they have been called up to fight in a short, minor war against rebellious tribes in southern Asia Minor (Pisidia). Evidently it matters to the author to make it clear from the outset that the great and (as the parade before the Cilician queen Epyaxa shows) grand military force marches east in complete ignorance of its true purpose. Only later does the reader discover that among these unsuspecting Greeks there is also a friend of the Boeotian general Proxenos, the Athenian Xenophon. In Tarsus the situation reaches the point of mutiny: the Greeks refuse to continue, but are forced to recognize that retreat is no longer possible. Clearchus employs the tried and tested technique of a 'test' or *peira*, doing something similar

⁶ Høegs, 1950, 151 ff.

to what Agamemnon does in the second book of the *Iliad* (in fact the third chapter of the *Anabasis* is the best parallel to the often suspected Homeric text): as soon as the rumour springs up that Cyrus is marching against the king, Clearchus has his soldiers called together and declares he would rather desert his royal friend than his countrymen. He says he will go where they want, so long as safety and supplies are assured. So the return home appears to be an open possibility. However, clever people immediately come forward, some according to the plan, and some spontaneously, to point out the difficulties in its execution: Cyrus should not be made an enemy in the middle of his own territory, and above all the assumption should not be made that the army could be fed on such an improvised march. These arguments, amongst others, win through: after some grumbling the soldiers declare themselves ready to continue to follow the Persian prince, but they only officially find out the end goal of the march in Thapsakos on the Euphrates. The march then continues on from there without disturbance: the Persian king's forces are first encountered near the village of Cunaxa shortly before Babylon. In the battle against the numerically superior enemy forces the Greek soldiers are able under Clearchus' leadership to defeat the part of the enemy army set against them. But Cyrus himself falls in battle, and the Persian regiments previously under him go over to the king. And so the bold undertaking is a failure, and the actual *anabasis* ('the march up-country', which only takes up the first book) is over, but the Greek mercenary army is exposed to deadly peril in complete isolation. The second book describes its march down to the Tigris and its Eastern tributary the Zapatas. Tissaphernes, following with a large contingent, hesitates to attack the victors of Cunaxa. Finally he manages, under the pretext of a mutually beneficial reconciliation, to lure five *strategoï* and twenty captains into his tent. There they are imprisoned or killed in cold blood. By depriving the troops of their energetic leadership, the satrap believes he will quickly gain control of them. But he is mistaken, for an assembly of the army that the Greeks have called together just in time elects suitable replacements (one of them being Xenophon) and orders the army to march on, initially under continual, often heavy engagements with Tissaphernes' cavalry, until they enter the Armenian mountains (described in the second half of the third book), and then (as is vividly

described in the fourth book), in constant gruelling battles with the natives, over the snowy mountains down to the Black Sea. In spring of 400 the land of Colchis is reached, where, nearby the city of Gymnias, the view opens up for the first time to the sea, and shortly afterwards they reach the Greek colony of Trapezus. Books 5 and 6 comprise the journey along the south coast of the Black Sea to Byzantium. The original hope of the soldiers that they might be able to travel effortlessly by sea is dashed as Trapezus does not have enough transport available. The *strategos* Cheirisophos, a Spartan, promises to fetch ships from the harmost in Byzantium, his friend Anaxibios. Since it was taking too long for him to return however, the army marches by Cerasus to Cotyora, a settlement of the colony of Sinope. There Sinopean envoys immediately arrive, with whom they arrange the transport of the entire force via Sinope to Heraclea Pontica. Here, on the march onward through Bithynia the army splits into three as the result of internal disputes, but reunites near the harbour of Calpe after the Arcadian-Achaean contingent is defeated; and following the death of Cheirisophos who had already returned to the army in Sinope without having accomplished his aims, it put itself entirely under the command of Xenophon. In the city of Byzantium, Xenophon—this is the content of the seventh (and last) book—initially manages to curb the soldiers' unhappiness with the behaviour of the Spartan leadership. For Pharnabazus, the Satrap of Phrygia, appears to have won over the Spartan harmost and nauarch to have the mercenary army sent away to the Chersonesos and there disbanded, but to have Xenophon, the current commander, arrested and delivered to the Persians. Xenophon therefore takes up an offer of the Thracian ruler Seuthes: he assembles the men of the Ten Thousand in Seuthes' service and, during the winter 400/399 reconquers for him a part of his father's lost kingdom. Just as this relationship begins to sour due to Seuthes withholding the promised pay, a Spartan embassy arrives to offer the army service with their general Thibron. For in the meantime Sparta has responded to a request from the Greek cities in Asia Minor (particularly the Aeolian ones) for help against Tissaphernes' assault. Xenophon however, whose intention to return to Athens has been thwarted several times by the Spartan commanders in Byzantium, now has the opportunity to return home. He lets this opportunity pass him by

because friends ask him to stay with the army until it has been given its new appointment, and he only relinquishes command to Thibron in Pergamon.

It is appropriate to pause here after this overview and first answer the question touched upon at the beginning: whether Xenophon was exiled from Athens during these months (meaning that return was henceforth ruled out), or whether this only happened, as Schwartz, following Niebuhr, explicitly stresses, in 394 BC (after the battle of Coronea). Schwartz must reject two important post-Xenophon witnesses, Pausanias (5. 6. 5) and Dio Chysostom (*or.* 8. 1). Both claim that Xenophon was exiled for his participation in the march against the king, who was well-disposed to the Athenians, and in their view it was clearly unacceptable to let the citizen who had taken a leading position in the army of the rebellious prince Cyrus go unpunished. Schwartz must then also alter one of Xenophon's statements, since it stands in the way of his thesis. Xenophon says in his last book (7. 57) after the conclusion of the Thracian campaign: 'it was clear to everyone that Xenophon was preparing to go home, for Athens had not yet exiled him' (*Ξενοφῶν . . . φανερόν ἦν οὔκαδε παρασκευαζόμενος· οὐ γάρ πω ψήφος αὐτῷ ἐπῆκτο Ἀθήνησι περὶ φυγῆς*). Obviously the author would not have been able to phrase it like this if the banishment had been declared five years later, since the negative particles *οὐ γάρ πω* ('for not yet') can hardly be applied to such a long period of time. Even Schwartz admits this. So in order to rescue his thesis he removes the sentence *οὐ γάρ πω ψήφος αὐτῷ ἐπῆκτο Ἀθήνησι περὶ φυγῆς* from the text on the grounds that it is linguistically unusual (*ibid.* 144). But this manipulation is not acceptable, since the phrasing *ψήφον ἐπάγειν τινί* ('petition for a vote against someone') is sound. However Schwartz deals with the quoted passage from the seventh book only in passing; his main argument (which derives from an essay by Niebuhr) deals with the famous digression in the fifth book, in which Xenophon speaks of the construction of his sanctuary of Artemis at Scillus. He does this following the description of the division of plunder from Cerasus and reports that Apollo's share, which had been entrusted to him, had been later dedicated at Delphi. As for what he was meant to keep for the Ephesian Artemis, he gave this to the warden of the goddess's temple in Ephesus before the march to Boeotia (therefore in 394 BC), with instructions for it to

be delivered to him, should he survive the campaign, but for it to be dedicated to the Artemis of that place in a suitable form if anything were to happen to him. This money was later handed over to him by Megabyzos (as the temple warden was called) in Scillus, where he had a small sanctuary constructed with it for the goddess.⁷ The decisive passage begins with a subordinate clause (ἐπειδὴ δ' ἔφευγεν ὁ Ξενοφών or in the other equivalent manuscript tradition ἐπεὶ δ' ἔφυγε Ξενοφών); after this we have a genitive absolute ('while he was already living as a Spartan settler in Scillus, κατοικοῦντος ἤδη αὐτοῦ ἐν Σκιλλοῦντι ὑπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων οἰκισθέντος'), onto which the main clause is connected: Megabyzos 'handed over (on the way to Olympia) the deposit to him' (ἀποδίδωσι τὴν παρακαταθήκην αὐτῷ). If one takes the introductory clause as determining the time of this ('however when Xenophon was living in exile' or, in the other version preferred by Schwartz 'however when Xenophon was banished'), one is forced to refer this statement to after 394 bc. However, anyone would concede that we are not compelled to translate it in this way, indeed we are not led to do so if we consider that the mention of the beginning of the banishment is in no way meaningful in the context of a report about the whereabouts of a particular portion of booty. One should think that the reference to Xenophon's loss of Athenian citizens rights at best is able to explain his presence in Scillus and thereby the fact that the handover of the money happens there. This is the meaning one gets as a necessity if one takes the introductory clause

⁷ Both sentences in context read (5. 3. 6–7): τὸ δὲ τῆς Ἀρτέμιδος τῆς Ἐφεσίας (sc. ἀνάθημα), ὅτ' ἀπῆει σὺν Ἀγησιλάῳ ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας τὴν εἰς Βοιωτοὺς ὁδόν, καταλείπει παρὰ Μεγαβύζῳ τῷ τῆς Ἀρτέμιδος νεωκόρῳ, ὅτι αὐτὸς κινδυνεύσων ἐδόκει ἰέναι, καὶ ἀπέστειλεν, ἣν μὲν αὐτὸς σωθῆ, αὐτῷ ἀποδοῦναι. ἣν δέ τι πάθῃ, ἀναθεῖναι ποιησάμενον τῇ Ἀρτέμιδι ὃ τι οἴοιτο χαριεῖσθαι τῇ θεῇ. ἐπεὶ δ' ἔφυγε Ξενοφών (det.) ἐπειδὴ δ' ἔφευγεν ὁ Ξενοφών (cett.) κατοικοῦντος ἤδη αὐτοῦ ἐν Σκιλλοῦντι ὑπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων οἰκισθέντος, παρὰ τὴν Ὀλυμπίαν ἀφικνεῖται Μεγάβυζος εἰς Ὀλυμπίαν θεωρήσων καὶ ἀποδίδωσι τὴν παρακαταθήκην αὐτῷ. [‘The share for Artemis of the Ephesians, when he left Asia with Agesilaus to march against the Boeotians, he left behind in the charge of Megabyzus, the priest of Artemis, because he seemed to be about to risk his life; and his instructions were that if he was saved, the money was to be returned to him, but if he suffered any harm. Megabyzus was to have made and dedicated to Artemis whatever offering he thought would please the goddess. When Xenophon survived/when he was in exile, and was living in Scillus, where he had been settled by the Lacedaemonians, Megabyzus came to Olympia to attend the games and returned to him his deposit’].

not temporally but causally (which completely reflects Xenophontic usage) and if one moreover prefers the imperfect to the aorist. The sentence would then read: 'however since he had been banished (that is while he had been staying in Ephesus)', Megabyzos came, when he was already living in Scillus, to see the Olympic games, and handed over the deposit to him. But this interpretation too sounds artificial, twisted even. It is much more natural, after the explicit declaration of an alternative ['if he was himself saved—if he suffered any harm'] (*ἤν μὲν αὐτὸς σωθῇ—ἤν δέ τι πάθῃ*) to expect an indication as to whether Xenophon survived the campaign of Agesilaos, and not leave the reader to make the deduction that he must have come away with his life, since otherwise he would not have been able to compose the text in front of us. That is why Delbrück suggested in 1829 in 'Xenophon, zur Rettung seiner durch Barthold Georg Niebuhr gefährdeten Ehre' ('Xenophon, for the defence of his honour besmirched by Barthold Georg Niebuhr') that the verb *φείγεται* should not be taken in its constitutional sense ('to be banished') but rather in its original sense, as can be understood for example in the proverb *ἔφυγον κακόν, εὔρον ἄμεινον* ['I escaped evil, I found a better thing'] and as attested many times in classical Attic literature. There follows now, entirely naturally, a very attractive translation: 'However since Xenophon survived (that is, the first of the two possibilities considered by the author occurred and Xenophon survived the campaign of 394), Megabyzos arrived at Scillus when Xenophon was already living there, on his way to Olympia, and handed over what had been entrusted to him.' Delbrück was scarcely able to believe nearly one and a half centuries ago that the more complicated interpretation (and one fatal for the modern picture of Xenophon) had been preferred to the more simple and obvious solution: 'Anyone who considers', he declares (*ibid.* 57), 'how badly the grammarians, who make themselves out to be so generally thorough, have misrepresented here one of the noblest of men, could be tempted to cry out: "Woe betide you scholars who conquer midges and swallow camels!" That is to say: woe betide you language teachers who are scrupulous and meticulous in quibbling and logomachy, but err wildly in the important things, and take it lightly, as though it were nothing to deprive a righteous man of his noble name.' Today too we might recognize that this

temptation, given the acceptance that Schwartz's thesis has found, has not waned. But Niebuhr's interpretation of the above sentence is, as Schwartz has shown with his bold *athetesis* and his disregarding of two important witnesses, too costly and not satisfying enough: Xenophon was not exiled, if we have interpreted it correctly, because he was a Spartan partisan or even fought at Coronea against Athens' allies, but because he took part in the march against the Persian King and, as the ignorant observer must have mistakenly assumed, appeared to have knowingly encouraged Cyrus' treacherous plans.

We must bear this justification for the condemnation in mind if we are to understand the *Anabasis*, since this text is in fact a defence of his actions in the years 401–399 directed by Xenophon to the Athenian reading public. Schwartz was then correct when he spoke of an apologetic intention of the work. But neither he nor his thesis's adherents were able to prove the existence of the intention they were thinking of in the text before us; since the effects of the condemnation were not actually directed against the Spartan mercenary, much less his attachment to King Agesilaus, as an object of hatred in Athens, Xenophon could not defend himself either against such accusations in his book. Rather he is thinking solely constantly of the other, yet more serious allegations that he had been an accomplice of the traitor Cyrus. We can now see and engage interpretatively with the aim to counter this idea, or even to refute it, since we have dispelled the greatest obstacle for an appropriate understanding. For this purpose we shall examine the role that Xenophon has himself played in his report.

At the beginning of the third book as part of the description of the critical night following Tissaphernes' betrayal, attentive readers will not be surprised to hear of a certain Athenian called Xenophon, who is taking part in Cyrus' march as a friend of the Boeotian Proxenos. They have already encountered him, the confidant of this general, twice in the previous book. And when on top of that we belatedly find out in this chapter that Proxenos had earlier promised to introduce him into Cyrus' circle of friends, we may consider that to have also happened, since shortly before the battle of Cunaxa Xenophon had ridden close to Cyrus and asked him for orders for the right wing (1. 8. 15–17). It also emerges from the splendid epilogue dedicated to the fallen prince (1. 9) that Xenophon had become more closely acquainted

with him. What is new however is the autobiographical retrospection with which the author prefaces the description of his intervention in the fate of the Ten Thousand, the depiction of his reaction to the guest-friend invitation (3. 1. 5–7): When Xenophon (so proceeds the text) had read Proxenos' letter, he sought advice from Socrates about taking part in the expedition. Socrates was concerned that Xenophon could incriminate himself in the eyes of the state through initiating friendly relations with Cyrus, since Cyrus had supported the Spartans in warring against the Athenians, and so he advised Xenophon to go to Delphi and put the question before the god to decide. Xenophon did this and asked Apollo which god he should pray to and which god he should sacrifice to in order to travel the path he intended with safety and good luck. He was told who the gods were. On his return to Athens he shared the oracle's answer with Socrates. But Socrates reproached him for not first asking what would be better for him, going or staying. He had prematurely decided this question for himself, whereas he only let the god determine *how* he should travel with the best fortune. 'However since you asked in that way,' Socrates continued, 'you must actually do that which the god has told you to do.'

This passage has drawn criticism down on the author because it was believed that it could be assumed from the words that he had fraudulently secured sanction for an undertaking that he himself did not regard as permissible 'religiously'. This is the view of Schmid⁸: '[he] very characteristically but disreputably obtained for himself, in order to overcome his well-founded reservations, the permission of the Delphic god for a plan he knew was incompatible with the interests of his *polis*.' We have already heard, however, that Xenophon has done everything to make the ignorance of all the Greek participants in the expedition clear to his readers. Xenophon, who had only come along as the guest-friend of Proxenos, could not have known any more than Proxenus did. On top of all this, it is explicitly confirmed once more after the quoted section (§ 10: ['Xenophon went on the expedition in this way then, deceived about its purpose—not by Proxenus, for he did not know that the attack was directed against the king, nor did anyone else among the Greeks with

⁸ Christ-Schmid, 1912, 495.

the exception of Clearchus'])). Furthermore we should ask, if Schmid were right, why Xenophon did not keep completely quiet about the remarkable episode that only he and Socrates knew of? Judging by our assumptions up to this point however, the solution is much closer to hand: for reasons that can be ascertained Xenophon decided to participate immediately because he considered a military campaign against rebellious tribes under Cyrus to be harmless. He does not share Socrates' fear of the pettiness of the *demos*, rather he announces through his method of asking the oracle that he does not credit such small-mindedness to the democratic Athenian government. The apparently naïve retelling of an apparently trivial episode contains at the same time an acute criticism of Athenian impetuosity, since this *demos* was prepared to justify his banishment on assumptions that had been proven false by Xenophon's behaviour. The people should in fact be ashamed to hear after the fact how much magnanimity their victim had expected of them, and how badly they had repaid his optimism!

Add to this that the Athenian readership of the *Anabasis* would in fact not have been all that surprised by Xenophon's hasty decision to follow Proxenos' invitation. Xenophon was an aristocrat. He had probably had to serve in the cavalry for the thirty tyrants as a young man. Schwartz has already pointed out that his description of Thrasylbulus' battles with the tyrants (in the second book of the *Hellenica*) fairly teems with details, 'in particular when the cavalry are present' (ibid. 141). Since this style of report is noticeably different from the style of presentation elsewhere in the first two books, one may legitimately conclude that Xenophon is here speaking as an eye-witness. He had cause not to emphasize this state of affairs: after the re-establishment of the democracy the former cavalry was disbanded. Service for the rulers was not, in accordance with the general amnesty, to be held against those concerned. We are aware however from Lysias that the list was published of knights that had served in the cavalry for the oligarchy and that it was on whitewashed or plastered wooden boards. This caused those affected to be exposed to the anger of the democrats for years.

Three examples of this. Twelve years after the ratification of the act of amnesty in 391 Mantitheos had to defend himself in a *dokimasia* case against the suspicion that he had been in the cavalry under the

Thirty. In his indignation he called attention to the falsehoods that had been put forth on that published list (Lys. 16. 6). Around another ten years later (probably 382) the prosecutor in his statement against Euandros was able to claim that in the *dokimasia* the mere proof of cavalry service under the Tyrants was sufficient to exclude a candidate from holding office on the council (Lys. 26. 10). What Xenophon relates in the *Hellenica* (3. 1. 4) is particularly significant: in 399 the Spartan Thibron requisitioned Athenian cavalry troops in the northern Asia Minor (Athens was obliged to contribute as a conquered city and Spartan ally). The Athenians sent 300 knights who had served under the Tyrants, 'since [*sic*] they believed it benefited the *demos* if these men were to go overseas and die'. It is evident: the Athenian democrats were small-minded and petty. Despite the official amnesty they could not forget, let alone forgive.

And so we have reason to accept that staying in Athens had become very uncomfortable for the young aristocrat Xenophon in 401. He grasped the seemingly harmless opportunity offered to temporarily leave home. Naturally it was not appropriate to develop the background to this decision in the chapter of the *Anabasis* and offend or even aggravate the Athenian readership by mentioning the *demos*' passionate desire for revenge and the officially endorsed disregard for the amnesty. What mattered to him was to prove that he had taken part *in ignorance* in a plan that was aimed at the destruction of the Persian King, and to interpret his behaviour during the march on the basis of this premise.

Thus he acts in his own report as a scarcely involved spectator so long as Cyrus' ambitious plans are to be realized, and still when Clearchus maintains a strong grip on the mercenary force following Cyrus' death (i.e. in the first two books). But now he steps forth, in the hour of need depicted at the beginning of the third book, with the army leaderless and mired in deep depression, full of drive and energy, to save his countrymen and himself. His performance of the office of *strategos* with this responsibility carries this one idea: one enemy after another is fought off and passage is won out of a land that was entered reluctantly, under compulsion through Cyrus' deception, aided by Clearchus. Only in order to avoid certain doom for himself and to save his comrades does Xenophon allow himself to be chosen as Proxenos' successor; it is only for this reason that he—as

the youngest—takes up the rearguard and thereby the dangerous protection of the rear of the whole army. It is made clear then to the reader that in the first place the author is not the sole leader; not even leader of a wild mercenary band, as it might have appeared to the casual observer of the events depicted in the seventh book. One might well (along with many modern researchers) take the view that Xenophon exaggerated his accomplishments out of vanity, that, under the blandishments of flattering memories of a danger survived through luck and often recapitulated with pride, he has glorified himself. This is of no more importance at the moment than the traces of consideration given to Spartan politics, which are detectable here and there. He has not by any means however, as we can show later, assumed supreme command in this narrative, indeed for the very reason that the particular type of military organization did not allow this. But he does emphasize that he alone took the initiative that put an end to the general lethargy and hopelessness and finally made possible the safe return that the Greeks accomplished together.

On that disastrous night when the news of Tissaphernes' betrayal reached the Greek camp, Xenophon, who has had no particular function on the march up to this point, although being continually in the company of the supreme leaders, first calls together the captains of his murdered friend Proxenos (3. 1. 15), then with their help the surviving generals and lieutenants from the rest of the army (3. 1. 32). These choose the new *strategoî*, set watches and assemble the troops to secure the approval of the entire body. To these different audiences Xenophon makes three different speeches. In them Xenophon is less concerned with making practical suggestions than with the revival of the stricken morale. He uses simple, sometimes almost naïve arguments, that on their own are not even particularly relevant. At the general assembly for example he claims that the Persian cavalry is not dangerous, since the infantry stands on solid ground whereas the horsemen have to be careful not to fall off: only when it comes to running away do they have the edge over hoplites (3. 2. 19). How unsatisfactory these claims are is for the army to find out in the following days when Tissaphernes sends the Persian cavalry repeatedly, and not at all unsuccessfully, against the Greek column. Only then, in the moment of actual danger does Xenophon develop practical counter measures and

implement, with the other generals, provisional armament of cavalry and slingers. However, in the decisive assembly in which the army's approval for resistance against the king is needed, the speaker makes use of mere enthymemes: just as he downplayed the dangers of the cavalry so he glosses over the difficulties of subsistence and route finding, and above all those of the river crossings. In the first part of his speech he promises the gods' aid (this is said to be certain, since the Persians have broken solemnly sworn oaths), he gives *exempla* from Greek history and reminds the audience of the spirited victory of the Greek wing at Cunaxa. These familiar tropes of Athenian rhetoric provide scarcely any grasp on how to deal with the present situation. But they do give the exhausted troops the will to live again: Xenophon manages to *get something* to happen, and demonstrates that only he, the educated and rhetorically trained Athenian in the midst of the rough mercenaries, has access to the means for this success. The reader understands why he makes a point of appearing before the soldiers resplendent in full armour to allow his personality to cast its spell over the crowd.

Obviously it is important above all to him not just in the depiction of this night but also in the representation of the whole retreat to highlight his exemplary personal behaviour and his steadfast care for his comrades and subordinates. That regardless of his youth he has military experience, an impressive eye for the terrain and tactical possibilities cannot be disputed, though he may unduly emphasize his own role. The strictly military aspects take a back seat in this field also to the emotional: again and again he discovers new ways to escape difficult situations, is simply indefatigable in finding stratagems. When he makes mistakes, he admits them candidly (3. 3. 12) and compensates with more effective suggestions. More important than all this are his leadership skills. The examples for this unique ability are only inconsequential at first glance, indeed presumably deliberately so. They are meant to show that the undertaking would have been repeatedly endangered at decisive moments, had Xenophon himself not shaken the army, threatened as it was by indifference, sullenness, even panic, out of its despair. In the last battle on the Tigris, shortly before entering the Armenian mountains, a commanding point of high ground needs to be taken. Xenophon is about to storm it with selected troops, and he calls on them to

think of their countries, of their wives and children. However Soteridas, a Sicyonian, says that the *strategos* spoke well sitting on a horse, while he as a poor hoplite had to drag his heavy shield with him. So Xenophon leaps from his horse, grabs the shield of the dissatisfied man and storms ahead with the others, even though he is impeded by his equestrian armour. Immediately everyone cheers him on, his enthusiasm catches, and the heights are conquered in a rush of competitive spirit. In Armenia in winter (to give another example) a great deal of snow falls at night: it covers man and beast and in the morning nobody can find the strength to get up. So Xenophon leaps from the camp and, clad only in a shirt, he cuts wood. And this activity catches on; one after another the men recognize what is needed, soon fires are blazing, the soldiers warm themselves and rub themselves with oil. Similar events occur several times on the journey through the wintry mountains: as the leader of the rearguard it is Xenophon's job to get the exhausted and sick to march on, for which his means stretch from pleading words to hard blows.

Most of these seemingly inconsequential incidents reflect, it seems to me, the intention of the work particularly clearly; for they show what Xenophon did in his way to preserve as many human lives as possible. The mercenaries are not a crowd of men of little worth thrown together, as Isocrates disparagingly termed them in his *Panegyricus* (4. 146). Xenophon is aware not only of their courage and capabilities (this theme is addressed not least by his description of the battle of Cunaxa), above all he knows their fate: it is essentially his own; for both he and they were hoodwinked and through no fault of their own thrown into a situation they never would have chosen of their own accord. Until the handover of the army to Thibron, Xenophon feels bound to his abandoned countrymen, who were only reluctantly allowed into even the Greek city-states on the Black Sea. This becomes especially clear after he takes on the supreme command following the death of Cheirisophos, particularly in the last account of the voyage home he had planned to Athens (7. 7. 57, a passage that we have encountered above): after the campaign in the service of the king of Thrace Xenophon considers his job done and at a point when the passage home appears to be open, he prepares for departure. But his friends in camp plead with him not to leave before he has handed the army over to the Spartan Thibron. Giving in to

their request, he wastes the opportunity and thereby probably his last chance to be able to represent himself personally in Athens. Xenophon does not say that this opportunity no longer existed after his arrival in Pergamon. But such an interpretation is certainly suggested by the words used and presumably the author counted on it that the Athenian reader would understand him.

Xenophon admittedly had to experience how capricious a band of men can be when released from the firm grip of military discipline, only held together by momentary need and dependent on raids and irregular plunder. His depiction of the march to the south coast of the Black Sea provides several instances. The most striking are the scenes in Cotyora: here Xenophon has to account for himself in the general assembly because his plan to settle the Ten Thousand on the Black Sea is revealed too soon and arouses great disapproval. He does this with particular psychological deftness by taking the suspicion to absurdity and diverting attention to other grievances in the army (envoys had been assaulted). Thus he can demand punishment for the guilty, expiation for the rest of the army, and finally a statement of account from the generals. In this he manages to demonstrate with very dramatic examples how right he was to act the way he did (particularly in beating people and using harsh words) during the perils of the previous winter. Again the soldiers cheer him on. But he is unable to return to his plan for settlement. And yet the reader feels how much his heart hangs on this nearly heroic idea. The way he argues for it shows here too that his ungrateful country was meant to recognize his sense of responsibility and reward his consideration for the entirety of Greece: 'It seemed like the right thing to him', so he says (5. 6. 15), 'to win land and power for Hellas by founding a new city.' The mercenaries are unable to appreciate this plan, and their reaction is perhaps, if I interpret the dry language of the text correctly, an especially bitter disappointment for Xenophon, who believes he has found an opportunity here to enable him to rise in a sense above himself. It is all the more astonishing that he does not hold the rejection against the uncomprehending and selfish multitude, but stands by them to the end. Finally he includes his home town in his deliberations on being offered the supreme command in Sinope, and he makes an effort to have this point of view emerge in his account: 'He thought', he writes (6. 1. 20) of himself,

'he would be held in higher esteem by his friends, and in Athens he would become more famous, and maybe he could make this work to the army's advantage as well.' This sentence is also stamped with the aims of the whole work.

One may well make the objection: he was an adventurer, he enjoyed the freedom from rules the mercenary life afforded, and may well have guessed what awaited him in Athens. In an apologetic work especially, statements that advance the interests of the author ought to be treated with care. And rightly so. But all these Xenophontic statements may be freely assessed only if one separates the bias of the text in front of us from the actual events and examines the characters of the two separately.

As far as the bias of our text is concerned, one can probably claim: *Anabasis* is trying to convey that its author acted rightly, in fact should even be recognized for his special achievements. The many incidents and countless speeches tend so uniformly in the same direction, that there can arise no doubt as to this aim. If we accept this, we will be able to understand the remarkable pseudonym or rather the fiction that Xenophon uses at the beginning of the third book of the *Hellenica* to dismiss the events of 401–399 with a brief mention of the recently published *Anabasis*. He writes 'Now how Cyrus gathered his army together and marched with it against his brother, how they came to battle, how he fell and how the Greeks fought their way through to the sea afterwards, all this has been described by the Syracusan Themistogenes'—a man, who by all accounts, did not exist (the name formation is unique). Most scholars today agree that Xenophon is not referring to another work (and why should he?) but rather to his own book. Its author is here called *descendant of justice*. Xenophon loves this kind of wordplay. In the *Anabasis* itself (2. 1. 12) he introduces a young Athenian *Theopompus* who indicates to the Persian negotiator Phalinos that after Cyrus' death the Greeks are left with only two possessions, their weapons and their *arete*. If they were to give up their weapons (as the other side demands) they could no longer use their courage. To which Phalinos replies (2. 1. 13): 'Young man (*ὦ νεαρίσκει*), you resemble a philosopher, and what you say is not without a certain charm. Know though, that you are a fool if you think your *arete* can outclass the power of the King.' In several

manuscripts, presumably already in antiquity, the conclusion intended by the author was made, and it was assumed that the Athenian *Theopompus* was none other than Xenophon, who had been 'sent by god' on this march, or rather 'guided by god'. Xenophon himself confirms this interpretation of the name, for he tells (6. 1. 23) that he had seen, as he marched inland from Ephesus to meet Cyrus, on his right hand an eagle calling, but on the ground. The priest he consulted for interpretation revealed to him that the sign meant fame and leadership, but bound up with hard work and poverty. Thus Xenophon signifies that he saw himself as placed under divine protection from the beginning. The belief in his own rectitude seems never to have left him, not even in 394 when as an unwilling émigré he took part in the campaign against Thebes and its ally Athens, that is, against a regime that had rejected him, failing to appreciate his point of view.

Things could well stand differently though as far as the historicity of many of the events depicted in the *Anabasis* is concerned, especially for the minor ones that characterize their author. In most cases we have no way to assess them, and it is hard to counter anyone who considers Xenophon an arrogant, deliberately self-promoting aristocrat, ousting better qualified candidates for military honours in the process. The author's credibility can be checked at least at one point though. It is connected to modern criticism's most serious accusation, namely that Xenophon kept quiet about the Spartan Cheirisophos being named supreme commander of the leaderless Ten Thousand. Were this true, then we would have found in the apologetic intent of the book, not only its peculiar vital force, but also a reason for a certain amount of manipulation of the facts. But in all the cases we could not check, we would have to reckon with distortions to the credit of the vain author. Let's have a look.

Diodorus Siculus (14. 27. 1), in his account of the march of the Ten Thousand, based on Ephoros, reports that Cheirisophos was elected supreme commander immediately following the deaths of the previous *strategoi* ['they elected more generals, but gave the command to one over all: Cheirisophus the Spartan']. Xenophon does not mention this. Instead he tells of the Spartan being elected shortly before his death (at Herakleia on the Black Sea), not forgetting to mention that the army had first invited *him* to take on sole command. This

account, it is thought, was deliberately distorted; since (according to Niese, *RE* cf. 'Cheirisophos' 1899, 2220) 'it is reasonably clear from Xenophon's own account that Cheirisophos had supreme command of the Ten Thousand over the course of the entire retreat; he goes ahead and leads the main body or the right wing, while Xenophon commands the rearguard; it is from him [*sc.* Cheirisophos] that the orders go out, and only Xenophon outdoes him in courage and insight.'

The status of the Spartan in the Xenophontic account can be easily outlined. As the leader of 700 (800, according to Diodorus) Spartan hoplites he joins up with Cyrus late in Issos by ship (1. 4. 3). After Cyrus' death he goes as an emissary on behalf of the army to Ariaeus, whom the Ten Thousand wanted to install as King, but he returns quickly with a negative answer. On the night after the murder of the leaders of the army he commends Xenophon in the assembly of the captains and invites them to elect successors to the betrayed *strategoi*. He opens the general assembly which follows, in the centre of which stands Xenophon himself, and goes along with his suggestion (3. 2. 37), that, being Spartan, Cheirisophos take the head of the marching column, the two oldest *strategoi* should cover the flanks, and the youngest, Xenophon and Timasion, lead the rearguard. This organization is kept throughout the entire march north (cf. 4. 1. 6). The reader can twice follow the way the leadership of the main troop and the rearguard work together in full detail: before marching into Carduchia the Spartan calls the Athenian forward because a commanding point of high ground needs to be taken. He tells him (*κελεύει* 3. 4. 38) to bring the light infantry along. Xenophon hurries forward, but does not pull the peltasts from the rear of the column as he is aware the Persians are nearby. He consults with Cheirisophos about how to occupy the heights and straight away comes up with a plausible suggestion (3. 4. 38–41). In a similar situation near the river Phasis—again it is a matter of important high ground—several commanders discuss how to drive the enemy from their position. Xenophon offers to go around the pass with his men, but Cheirisophos thinks he should not abandon the rearguard, but rather, if possible send volunteers instead (4. 6. 6–20). In both cases these are not orders from a supreme commander, but counsel between equals, which must always, as the author assures us, have been

conducted peacefully; for there was only once a difference of opinion between the Spartan and himself, when Xenophon was annoyed because a native village leader who had proven himself to be a useful guide was beaten up by Cheirisophos and immediately fled.

The Spartan plays only a minor role later on the Black Sea: as we have already heard, he declares himself prepared to travel to Byzantium and request transport ships from the harmost, Anaxibios (5. 1. 3), but he returns only after a long delay, in Sinope, with just a single trireme. What happens next among the soldiers is of utmost importance for the assessment of his status: the crowd does not want to go home empty-handed, they still want to make pillaging expeditions and enrich themselves (6. 1. 18): 'However they believed at this point that if they made *one* man supreme commander he would be able to better direct the army than if the current multiple leaders were to remain (πολυαρχίας οὔσης) ... and that what was needed was not general counsel but *one* head to make its mind up.' This passage clearly shows how the military authority had been structured in the mercenary army, which has been compared to a wandering *polis*,⁹ and with good reason: it evidently lay with a small number of *strategoí* on an equal footing, who possessed full powers of command only over their own contingents. Orders that affected everyone were issued only after general discussion, usually only after considerable time. If the van and the rearguard wanted to operate as one, the agreement of at least two commanders was necessary. This picture exactly matches what Xenophon reports about the nominations of the new *strategoí* after the previous generals were detained. He writes (3. 1. 47): 'Thereupon the Dardanian Timasion was elected in the place of Clearchus, for Socrates the Achaean Xanthicles was chosen, for Agias the Arcadian Cleanor, for Menon the Archaean Philesios, and for Proxenos the Athenian Xenophon.' Except for the volunteer Xenophon, these are captains (λοχαγοί), who are rising to the rank of generals (στρατηγοί). Cheirisophos is not mentioned. Did Xenophon deliberately keep quiet about him for the reasons we have mentioned? Hardly. As commander of a Spartan contingent Cheirisophos *already was*, like Sophainetos, a *strategos*. He had not joined his

⁹ Cf. Nussbaum, 1959, 16–29.

colleagues with Clearchus on that fateful day,¹⁰ and thus did not fall victim to Tissaphernes' treachery. After the election reported by Xenophon the new colleagues were of the same rank as Cheirisophos. Only his age and his experience distinguish him from then on, and the younger ones, Xenophon himself especially, clearly were not lacking in respect for him.

The description of the structure of this military organization and the way it functions is completely coherent. There is no passage that could permit us to doubt that our interpretation is correct. However, then we must ask: did Xenophon simply manage to invent such a profound distortion of the previous arrangement as implemented by the mercenaries of Sinope through the election of a single field commander, just to promote himself by keeping quiet about the role of Cheirisophos, the real supreme commander up to that point? He surely must have counted on the fact that, even thirty years after the events, his account would be checked by the participants. Was there any better way to foil the success of his literary efforts than through such blatant falsehood? Those who say no to this—and I am inclined to do so myself—must concede that the account of an eyewitness is more credible than that of an Augustan historian who based his version of the march of the Ten Thousand entirely on Ephoros.

Ephoros was according to Jacoby's apposite observation,¹¹ nothing more than a man of letters. He used Xenophon's work in his account, but also made use of the description of the less reliable Ctesias and probably that of the now obscure Sophainetos as well. As far as our question is concerned it is important to recognize that he typically changed or re-ordered Xenophontic passages as he saw fit. The words cited above of the witty, and somewhat cheeky Athenian *Theopompus* that are so characteristic of Xenophon, the Athenian and student of Socrates, are transferred without thought (cf. Diod. 14. 25. 4) to the Boeotian Proxenos. The anti-Xenophon bias betrays itself here only too clearly, since that answer does not fit the style of the Boeotian who was characterized in detail by Xenophon; in Diodorus' text it

¹⁰ We do not know why not. Meyer, 1958, 179, believed there had to be a secret reason.

¹¹ *FGrHist* 70, Commentary p. 30.

also stands next to what the author thought was a similar bon mot by Clearchus deriving from the Leonidas legend, which dilutes its charm. In Xenophon Clearchus, as supreme commander, gives this decisive reply last—surely its original position. Nor can we accept moreover that Xenophon stole a spirited, brave reply from the mouth of his friend to attribute it to himself. Schrömer's recent attempt to find an original model in the lost *Anabasis* of Sophainetos for the whole Diodorus passage¹² does not convince me. But as soon as one acknowledges the method of the Hellenistic historian (i.e. Ephoros), who is more concerned with an effective than a reliable presentation of the material, one must keep a close eye on him in other Diodorus passages as well. We encounter the same eagerness to detract from Xenophon in Ephoros' claim that Cyrus had already told 'all the leaders' the true aim at the beginning of the campaign (Diod. 14. 19. 9). In that case, one can immediately conclude, Proxenos must have known about it, and naturally also his friend Xenophon. But this claim of Ephoros contradicts Xenophon's internally coherent account of the mutiny at Tarsos that was dealt with through the skilled demagogy of the only one who knew about it, Clearchus. We are thus within our rights to sceptically examine what Diodorus tells us about the status of Cheirisophos as well, the more so since the effort seems again here to be directed at knocking Xenophon off his pedestal. It almost seems simply that Ephoros maliciously changed the words he spoke in the general assembly (3. 2. 37: 'if no-one has a better suggestion, then let Cheirisophos lead', ἡγοῖτο, i.e. take on the van of the main force) to hegemony, supreme command. However that may have been, our interpretation follows quite unforced from the sum of Xenophon's statements, as we do not fall into the difficult situation (like his modern critics) of having to prefer the claims of a world history, known to be biased, to the testimony of a participant. If it was the case that Xenophon in fact intended to show the real motives for his participation in Cyrus' march and win over the reasonable among the Athenians, he was bound to respect the truth, lest he ruin everything and end up less fortunate and more disdained than before.

¹² Schrömer, 1954 (masch.).

Modern historical criticism has lost its way in excessive zeal, apparently because it has prematurely foisted on Xenophon, without ascertaining and appreciating the author's intentions, dishonest, one might even say underhand motivations. It is worthwhile as we conclude to cast another glance at the origin of the dismissive judgement. Xenophon was read a great deal and nearly always admired in antiquity and in the modern era until the end of the eighteenth century. It was Niebuhr who first broke with this tradition and felt compelled to replace the image of Xenophon that had been handed down to him with one that he thought was more authentic, less amateur. He thought as part of an analysis of the *Hellenica* to establish glaring discrepancies between the approach in the first two books and views recognizable in the rest of the work. That is, initially Xenophon is the true friend of the Athenian people, but later we see the 'hateful perfidy of the renegade'. This discovery can be easily illustrated from Xenophon's biography: he wrote the first part after the return from Persia, but then interrupted his work in order to march with Agesilaos against Athens' allies. He was then unable to suppress his resentment at the banishment passed shortly after 394 by the Athenian *demos* (we have already pointed out that this dating is wrong) in the rest of his account of contemporary history. It is in this context that Niebuhr made the following statement, which was eagerly seized upon by nineteenth century research¹³:

Truly no state has ever exiled a more degenerate son than this Xenophon! Plato was not a good citizen either, he was not worthy of Athens, he took incomprehensible steps, he stands like a sinner against the saints, Thucydides and Demosthenes, but still differently from this old fool! How abhorrent he is with his prattling¹⁴ and the lisping naivety of a little girl!

One must assume this judgement was formulated in the heat of the moment. Although it could never be called correct (the analysis of the *Hellenica* on which it is based is suspect and generally abandoned today), it is accepted and even elaborated. Gomperz incorporated¹⁵

¹³ Niebuhr, 1828, 467.

¹⁴ Niebuhr: 'with his *στωμύλμασι*', Delbrück (ibid. 133) translates 'mit seinen Gackeleien'. (Erbse translates 'mit seiner Plauderhaftigkeit'.)

¹⁵ Gomperz, 1903, 96 ff. = II, Berlin and Leipzig 1925, 92 ff.

further traits into a new, elegantly written portrait of Xenophon in the Niebuhrian style, above all the art of silence and the art of deceit. It is with both these, highly dubious, abilities that the vain aristocrat tries to mask his shortcomings and failings, without ever realizing that his plan could never succeed; for he undertook it without recognizing the difficulties, thus staying his whole life long a true amateur. It is conceded that he did possess talent, but impaired on every side by vanity and dishonesty. In this argument plangent with emphasis, striding forward in sweeping periods, the incidents of the march of the Ten Thousand play a central role; but anyone who makes the effort to check and compares the original wording against the modern presentation will not be able to spare Gomperz the charge of only superficially interpreting the text. The question of Xenophon's intentions was one he simply did not ask, indeed he is almost embarrassed to remember those things familiar to every scholar: 'The quick and disastrous result of that campaign is well known', we read on p. 97 (93), and with that the recapitulation of the first book is already nearly done. But are the principles by which the author selected and shaped his material well known? It is necessary here, as it is in dealing with all ancient literature, to first ascertain the intentions of the author and exercise patient observation before one makes a momentous judgement, particularly in contexts and branches of literature that are more distant from us than at first we think. Just such a modest work as Xenophon's *Anabasis* is, it seems to me, a suitable example to illustrate the authority of this principle and to commend it afresh.

You Can't Go Home Again: Displacement and Identity in Xenophon's *Anabasis*

John Ma

INTRODUCTION

Who I am, where I am? The relation between place and identity is brought into sharp relief by the tag which I made into this chapter's title: you can't go home again—a wistful middle-class American tag, about the impossibility of regaining the nest once flown, about the loss of childhood safety. The tag, 'you can't go home again' seemed to me appropriate because it encapsulated a major theme in the *Anabasis*: the relation between displacement and identity, as it appears in the ways in which change of place puts interesting stresses on individual and collective identities. I wish to read the *Anabasis* as a story of displacement and reintegration, attempted yet impossible, and try to relate this reading to a historical context, the fourth century, and to historical questions, the elaboration of identity in a context of displacement throughout Greek history, from the Archaic to the Hellenistic period.

Two moments drawn from Xenophon's narrative might make the theme clear. The first incident comes towards the end of the mercenaries' march towards the Black Sea, when they have reached the land of the Macronians.

From there, the Greeks travelled through the land of the Macronians, for three days and ten parasangs. On the first day, they came to the river which separated the land of the Macronians and that of the Scytheni. They had on

the right a position that looked very strong, and on the left another river, into which the river which formed the boundary flowed, the river which had to be crossed. This river was bordered with trees which were not thick, but close together. As the Greeks advanced, they cut down these trees, being eager to move away from the fortified position. The Macronians, who were equipped with wicker shields, lances, and hair tunics, had drawn themselves on the opposite side to the crossing point, and encouraged each other and threw stones into the river; these failed to reach their target and did no harm. At this point there came to Xenophon one of the peltasts, who claimed he had been a slave at Athens, saying that he knew the language of these people. 'And I think,' he said, 'that this is my fatherland. And if there is no objection, I want to speak to them.' 'There is no objection,' said Xenophon, 'speak to them and first find out who they are.' When the peltast had asked them, they said that they were Macronians. 'Ask then,' said Xenophon, 'why they are ranged against us and want to be our enemies.' They answered, 'Because you march against our land.' The generals ordered the peltast to say 'we do not come to harm you, but having fought against the king, we are returning to Greece, and we wish to reach the sea.' The Macronians asked if they would give pledges of this. The Greeks said they wanted to give and receive pledges. Then the Macronians gave a barbarian lance to the Greeks, and the Greeks gave them a Greek spear, since they had said these were the pledges; both called on the gods. Immediately after the exchange of pledges, the Macronians helped in cutting the trees and built the road, to make the Greeks pass through, mingling freely with the Greeks, and they provided a market for supplies as much as they could, and they led the Greeks on until in three days they had brought them to the frontiers of the Colchians.¹

The geography is marked by obstacle, physical and human. Yet this landscape of physical and human obstacle soon turns to an arresting story of encounter and communication. Earlier, such communications were always imperfect. The Persians prove untrustworthy, from noble Cyrus to Tissaphernes. The Carduchi do not communicate, or only under duress; Armenians are lied to, or made to act as serving boys through gestures.²

Here, at last, the two parties communicate clearly, simply, through an interpreter. This particular individual is one of the rare slaves whose life story is known in any detail. Presumably, the Macronian

¹ *Anab.* 4.8.1–8.

² The uncommunicativeness of the Carduchi: *Anab.* 4.1. Dealings with the Armenians: *Anab.* 4.5.25–36.

was sold off as a boy by his kin, or captured in a raid. He ended up in classical Athens, that great consumer of slaves: the slave trade and its concomitant social impact (raiding, dislocation of local interaction) must have been one of democratic Athens' signal exports to lands on the margins of the classical world, and it is remarkable from how far to the east this particular victim came. I would guess that our Macronian slave ran off during the Deceleian War, somehow escaping re-enslavement by the Boeotians at Deceleia, or regaining his freedom.³ He perhaps fought as a peltast in Attica, on the Peloponnesian side, helping ravage the fields of his former owner's compatriots. After the end of the Peloponnesian War, he was recruited as a mercenary by Proxenus, marched with Cyrus to Babylonia, attended the battle at Cunaxa, marched on through the land of the Carduchi and Armenia, until one day he had the odd sensation of recognizing the language.

The story is astonishing enough in its details, as we can reconstruct them; but the careful description of the peltast's reaction is the most haunting feature of the incident, at least in our eyes. He has undergone social death: from identity to no identity. He has undergone enforced displacement from his homeland and from any social position he had, through being sold as a chattel slave. When he arrives back in the land of the Macronians, his reaction is curiously uncertain: I think this is my *patris*. There is no emotional recognition, or at least no way of expressing it, for our lost Odysseus: instead, a mixture of intellectual recognition and failed memory. What takes over is the military impulse to report to the commanding officer: the Macronian is now a peltast, and finds his identity in the military hierarchy which figures so importantly in the desired authoritarian politics of the *Anabasis*. No name is given for the peltast; how could there be? No indication is given on his fate: did he stay, did he go on? This absence of name and of final resolution are emblematic of the Macronian peltast's fate: on the move, he finds no identity, even when he returns home.⁴

³ Hunt (1998), 169, also suggests manumission after Arginusae.

⁴ The Macronian certainly lost his native name once in Athens, to be called by a generic Greek name, or an ethnic name such as 'Paphlagonian' or 'Colchian' (see *ML* 79, line 44 for an example). On his role as translator, see D. Gera's unpublished paper on 'The figure of the translator in Xenophon's *Anabasis*', from the conference at Liverpool in 1999 organized by C. Tuplin; Gera emphasized Xenophon's lack of interest in the Macronian himself (as opposed to the instrumental usefulness as translator).

The second incident occurs slightly later, when the Ten Thousand are celebrating athletic games near Trapezus, when they have reached the Black Sea.

To take care of the racetrack and preside over the contest, they chose Dracontius, a Spartiate who had gone into exile in his boyhood because he had killed a boy accidentally by striking him with his whittling-knife [*xuēlē*]. And when the sacrifice had taken place, they handed over the hides to Dracontius, and they ordered him to lead them to where he had made the racetrack. But he showed the place where they were standing, and said, 'This hill is best for running wherever one wishes.' 'But how', they said, 'will people be able to wrestle in a place so rough and overgrown?' He answered, 'Whoever falls will suffer the more.'⁵

Dracontius truly cannot go home again: he has been in exile, for decades, since his accidental killing of another boy, with the Spartan whittling-knife.⁶ The incident recalls the competitive, ritualized Spartiate education; it acts as a reminder, to Dracontius, of the very specific and special place he has left forever. Dracontius' identity is frozen in a certain state of Spartiate life—the excessive harshness of the educative system, which in fact is only one point of the evolving identity of the Spartiate male, from the infant to the harshly treated boy to shining, manly, youthful hoplite hopeful of beautiful death to respected elder. Dracontius' self is frozen in the in-between space of boyhood, the transitory, reversed, deliberately harsh, *rite-de-passage* moment of boyhood.⁷ Dracontius' Spartiate identity is an expatriate's parody, incomplete, misunderstood, within his own mythology of self, his own distorted version of his fatherland's practice. Living in his own private Sparta, did Dracontius wear a threadbare cloak in winter, sleep on a pallet of rushes, and steal his food? How did he relate to the other, real, Spartiates in the army, how did he meet their embarrassed or contemptuous eyes when their authenticity looked upon his made-upness? At least, he confidently enacts his Spartiateness before his

⁵ *Anab.* 4.8.26–7.

⁶ As T. Braun suggests to me, Dracontius presumably fled to Tegea, living there in exile. He may have been recruited by Sparta to join the not-so-secret military aid sent to Cyrus (*Anab.* 1.4.2–3; *Hell.* 3.1.)—with a promise of reinstatement in case of good service?

⁷ On all this, Vernant (1991), ch. 13; also Kourinou-Pikoula (1992–8), 259–76, for a recent epigraphical example.

companions, oblivious to their surprise, perhaps even their embarrassment, when they discover that in return for the privileges of *agōnothesia*, of superintending the games, he actually has done nothing, expecting the remembered tags of a Spartiate boyhood and his ostentatious Spartiate toughness to be enough, and perhaps even to excite admiration (as Spartiates are meant to do).

RECOUNTING APORIA, EXPERIENCING DÉJÀ VU

These stories about not going home fit into a broader text structured around the difficulty or impossibility of return. At first sight, the *Anabasis* is about going home: fighting, marching to sea, and back to the Greek cities: that is the shape in which the text is often remembered, and in fact Xenophon himself summarizes it thus when mentioning it as the account of 'Themistogenes of Syracuse'. But in fact, the *Anabasis* is much more complex: the protracted activity of 'going home' solves nothing; resolution and return are constantly deferred.⁸

From the start, going home was always going to be difficult. This even applies to Cyrus' attempted return to Persia, which leads him into a successor plot out of which he emerges with great trouble. Generally, the earlier part of the text is driven by Cyrus' relentless movement forward, through a disconcertingly changing landscape, in which the final goal is constantly deferred: the objective is the Pisidians, then the Lycaonians, then Abrocomas, and finally the Great King. The battle of Cunaxa itself is oddly disorienting: the enemies flee, the Greeks pursue into nothingness, a charge that settles nothing. This 'victory' leads to an unclear situation where the Greeks, on their way back, have to mount another charge, which again leads to no satisfactory, decisive resolution.⁹

This world of *aporia* is peopled by actors who are conscious of obstacles, and constantly speak of them. Very early on, in Cilicia,

⁸ 'Themistogenes': *Hell.* 3.1.20. On the further narrative complexities of this volume, see also Rood (2004).

⁹ Cyrus' attempted return to Persia: *Anab.* 1.1.2–3. Lack of resolution at Cunaxa: *Anab.* 1.8; 1.10.4–7.

when Clearchus' men realize where they are going, they have to accept that there is no turning back, only *fuite en avant*: the realization is carefully, didactically set up by Clearchus. After Cunaxa, a whole series of speeches is devoted to the themes of distance and the impossibility of return.¹⁰

This awareness colours the Greeks' perception of the physical landscape, converting it to constant suspicion: rivers might be impassable; sluice gates are opened, trenches flooded. Once hostilities break out, this imagined landscape of hostility and obstruction turns all too real: the Greeks retreat in the face of Persian harassment, and they must deal with the obstacles posed by rivers and hills. The land of the Carduchi offers the threatening image of a place that is no place (*dyschōria*), where a whole Persian army once vanished.¹¹

This image is realized in a geography of constant fighting, through passes and heights, a threatening geography of obstacle which the Greeks must overcome: they do so by the application of fluid, light infantry tactics, which unlock the passes and the heights, and turn these physical features into advantages against the human opponents who first exploited them. The Greeks' successes lead them to believe that they will emerge from the impassable landscape. The Colchians are presented as the last obstacle. Once the sea is reached, Leon of Thurii dreams of return, stretched out like Odysseus.¹²

But a curious *déjà vu* sets in: again we encounter speeches about obstacles, psychologies of distrust, and opacity in human interaction, starting with the dealings between the Ten Thousand and Hecatonymus of Sinope. The incidents on the march are about the same problems of geographical obstacles and entrapment by human opponents; both Paphlagonia and Bithynia prove to be places where one gets stuck, full of obstacles such as impassable gullies, and familiar-looking enemies, barbarians holding the passes and the high ground, and Persian cavalry (the horsemen of Pharnabazus); the Straits, once reached, become a human obstacle, as well as a geographical feature: Xenophon's dealings with Spartans are deeply

¹⁰ Realization in Cilicia: *Anab.* 1.3, esp. 1.3.16. Distance and the impossibility of return: *Anab.* 2.1.11; 2.4.5–7; 2.5.9.

¹¹ Impassable rivers, flooded trenches: *Anab.* 2.3.10–13; 2.4.3. The land of the Carduchi: *Anab.* 3.5.36.

¹² The Colchians as the last obstacle: *Anab.* 4.8.14. Leon and Odysseus: *Anab.* 5.1.

murky, since they are ambivalent about whether the Ten Thousand should pass the Straits or not, and about where exactly they should go. The Spartans prove almost as treacherous and dangerous as the Persians in the earlier part of the work.¹³ After creating an ideal, military community of Greeks, arrival among real Greeks leads to a much more complicated situation, and recreates, in ways often different, but with similar results, the cloud of uncertainty in human interaction which makes progress simultaneously the only solution and a very dubious proposition.

Xenophon himself tries to slip away to go home, on his own, only to be sent back from Parium to Byzantium; at the end, Xenophon, hoping to go home, embarks on a foray which leads to an odd mini-Anabasis, an expedition against an eminent Persian, with a messy fight, and, again, Greeks trapped by Persian forces. The abrupt, indeterminate ending of the whole work produces another effect of *déjà vu*—the survivors of Cyrus' expedition are in western Asia Minor, fighting against Tissaphernes, precisely back where they started.¹⁴

The whole story ends with no real escape, but only a starting over again. The *Anabasis* is about repetition: nested structures of obstacle and escape towards other obstacles. The gestures and narratives of sacrifice, divination, and religion offer meaning and certainty. But the constant movement is corrosive of certainty; it subverts certainty about where one is going, except into a succession of trials where survival and loss are present in equal measure. In this context, we should return to Xenophon's dream of a thunderbolt setting on fire his paternal house. The first interpretation is suggested to us—Xenophon will escape this predicament. But in fact, once he achieves escape, Xenophon will find himself in exile—the paternal house is destroyed by fire, there is no going home. One escape from danger only leads to another situation where return is impossible; one exile leads to another.¹⁵

¹³ Hecatonymus: *Anab.* 5.6.3. Impassable gullies: *Anab.* 6.4–5. Dealings with the Spartans: *Anab.* 6.6; 7.1.

¹⁴ Xenophon, Parium, and Byzantium: *Anab.* 7.1.40, 7.2.8. The 'mini-Anabasis': *Anab.* 7.7.

¹⁵ On divination and religion, see Parker (2004). The dream of the thunderbolt: *Anab.* 3.1.11–13 (and cf. once more Parker). On dates and details of the exile, Tuplin (1987), 59–69.

DISPLACEMENT AND IDENTITY: BAND OF BROTHERS?

As an introduction to this chapter, I looked at some cases where movement created dislocation of identity. Yet within the tale of impossible return, there also is a story of piecing together identities and creating, pragmatically, new ways of interacting with the self and the other, in constantly recreated contexts. The 'Odyssey' of the Ten Thousand is also the story of Odysseus-like experimentation with identity, under the pressures of survival and the constant changes in context and interaction brought about by movement. J. Dillery has shown how the *Anabasis* is about the creation of community. Staying alive entails staying together, creating a new form of community, which, in the march in Carduchia, takes on a new, rather non-*polis* or post-*polis* form: military, ordered, hierarchical, but collaborative, mobilized, and Hellenic: as P. Gauthier has shown, the Ten Thousand are never quite the '*polis* on the march' that they are sometimes said to be.¹⁶

The founding moment takes place in Babylon when, after the capture and murder of the generals, an ad hoc war council convenes in the murdered Menon's detachment. Apollonides' lack of resolution, his insistence on *aporiai*, and his view that safety only resides in petition to the King, endanger Xenophon's project to resist and to fight: all these traits are matched by his foreignness. He is opposed by Hagesias of Stymphalia, the tough Arcadian, an image of Hellenic authenticity (his plainness, bravery, *aretē* are a leitmotiv in the work): he duly detects Apollonides' foreignness—the latter is a soft, earring-wearing Lydian. This is no time for half measures, cultural interaction or curious exploration; the Other is driven out into the nowhere of *aporia* and danger, where his fate remains unknown and no matter of concern. We might wonder about Apollonides' story: whether he was indeed a Lydian who learned Aeolian Greek in Cyme or Phocaea, and hence sounded 'Boeotian', if not completely convincing, to mainland Greeks; or perhaps a Boeotian who had spent time (during the Ionian War?) in Lydia. If the former, Hellenism

¹⁶ Dillery (1995), 59–98. Gauthier (1986), 237–69.

was brutally redefined as descent based, in terms of ethnic character; if the latter, then the members of the council that night invented a convenient Other out of one of their own comrades, and cast him out. The remaining Greeks, defined by solidarity, after this primal, scapegoating scene of Greekness, can later listen to a speech by Xenophon in which he proceeds to a localized reworking of Greek history, especially the Persian Wars, a privatized, instrumentalized 'invention de la Grèce', borrowing from Athenian rhetoric to create a community of Greeks from the mercenaries lost in Babylonia. The specifically Athenian elements are blurred, to enable the cooptation of the Persian Wars as a 'national past' by the diverse groups of mercenaries.¹⁷

For now, this new community becomes the only community. Clearchus had already said to his own contingent: I think that you are my *patris*, my *philoï*, my *summachoi* ['fatherland, friends, allies']. At that time, the Greek mercenaries existed not as a group, but as several contingents with their leaders and their own solidarities: in a dispute between his men and Menon's, he decided the latter were the culprits, and struck a man in Menon's contingent, nearly leading to a pitched battle between the two bodies of mercenaries. Yet later, after Cunaxa, during the 'phony war' between Clearchus and Tissaphernes, and when the Greeks already exist as a single body, his fearsomeness has become accepted by all. As the Greeks struggle to cross muddy canals by bridging them with palm trunks, Clearchus rains blows with his Spartiate stick, but these are now recontextualized whacks: his Spartan traits of looking out for his men, and applying violence to subordinates, now produce the social goods of collaboration and hard work beyond one's duty: *suspeudein* ['assist zealously'] is the word used. It also recalls a similar situation: Cyrus' order to his noblemen to help a chariot out of the mud—*suspeudein* is also used. Clearchus' violence now participates in a new project, the emergence of a disciplined, hierarchical military community, similar to Cyrus' entourage of mobilized and loyal Persians. Clearchus' Spartan bloody-mindedness and violence become good

¹⁷ The war council at Babylon: *Anab.* 3.1.26–30. Xenophon's 'Invention de la Grèce': *Anab.* 3.2.10–12; the phrase refers to Loraux (1986). My attention was drawn to this passage in a paper by an undergraduate at Princeton, M. Poe.

things; so do the Rhodians' skill with the sling, exploited to create an ad hoc body of slingers, or the Cretans' skill at light infantry warfare.¹⁸

The new Hellenic community picks and mixes pragmatically; identity and survival collaborate. Later, when the forward movement of the Ten Thousand has taken them forward to the Black Sea and its frustrating world of postwar politics and unhelpful Greek cities, older loyalties reassert themselves: the soldiers parade *kata ethnē*, by ethnic groups rather than the contingents which form the Ten Thousand's original, specific subdivisions; later, the Arcadians and Achaeans secede, driven by their own interests and their memories of their earlier, pre-expedition identities: 'it was shameful that an Athenian and a Spartan should command Peloponnesians, when neither had provided troops'.¹⁹ The seceding body is all made up of hoplites, in contrast to the diverse, multi-tasking army of the Ten Thousand; the Arcadians get into serious trouble, and have to be rescued by the rest of the army, after which the army is reunited, passing a decree against any future proposal to split up, and reconstituting the original regiments which left with Cyrus the previous year: the formal corporate decision both embodies as well as imposes unity. Unthinking adherence to earlier identities is disastrous; in the new community, with its pragmatic identity-making, lies safety.

The Ten Thousand as community can create their own memories and culture. I earlier analysed Dracontius' rootless identity. But in the context of the Ten Thousand, it proves good enough for the there and then: it provides the opportunity for a good joke; more importantly, the contests turn out to be a splendid affair, *kalē thea*.²⁰ Slave boys race the *stadion*, no less than sixty Cretans run the double *stadion*, the oddly shaped race track makes for a gripping horse-race, complete with whoops and laughter and encouragement by the mercenaries' women. Out of the disparate elements at hand (slaves, exiles, camp-followers, mercenaries from different backgrounds), the occasion allows for the improvisation of community.

Just as revealing is the scene of ethnic dancing. The dances, whatever their original context (symposiastic or festive), are used

¹⁸ 'My *patris*, my *philoi*': *Anab.* 1.3.6. Clearchus' ferocity accepted: *Anab.* 2.3.11. Cyrus and the wagon in the mud: *Anab.* 1.5.7–8. The Rhodian slingers: *Anab.* 3.3.16.

¹⁹ Parade *kata ethnē*: *Anab.* 5.5.5. Secession of the Arcadians and Achaeans: *Anab.* 6.2.

²⁰ *Anab.* 4.8.27–8.

for a purpose, to entertain but also to intimidate the Paphlagonians, by giving an image of the prowess, the diversity but also the unity of the Ten Thousand: fencing, light infantry raiding and footwork, hoplitic square-bashing. (The Paphlagonians duly ask for alliance after these terrifying displays.) The dances also include an improvisation, now commemorating the Ten Thousand's own folklore: a female dancer performs the *pyrrichē*, and the Paphlagonians are told that the women not only fight, but drove off the King from the Greek camp (in reality, Xenophon tells us, Cyrus' mistresses were captured, though one of them, 'the Milesian, the younger one', slipped away naked). A dance is invented to cap traditional performances; the event captures a shared memory, refers to common achievement, and adds a private joke.²¹

For this ad hoc community, the temptation or the desire is to find place; to look at a landscape otherwise than as a sequence of battle scenes; to convert strategic and tactical space—the space of march and supplies, of battle terrain, of frontal assault and clever flanking moves, of ambushes and high ground, of tactical problems and hard fighting, the landscape of the Ten Thousand's war—into a place of one's own, where identity and community could exist fully.²²

The temptation is there from the start, at least as a jibe or a joke. Xenophon professes fear that the Greeks might want to stay in Babylonia, comparing the Greeks to the Lotus-Eaters. The temptation to stay on is used rhetorically to transform the threatening landscape into a landscape where the Greeks are empowered to stay or leave; the same figure is used in Thucydides' portrayal of the Sicilian expedition.²³

But rhetoric soon turns into desire: this mass of armed men which turns into a community evokes the possibility of settling down as a *polis*, the only move needed to convert this guild of warriors into a city-state, under the paternal leadership of Xenophon himself. Since

²¹ Ethnic dancing: *Anab.* 6.1.7–12. The escape of Cyrus' mistress: *Anab.* 1.10.3.

²² On place as a lived, human reality, Tuan (1974), 211–46.

²³ The Lotus-Eaters: *Anab.* 3.2.25. Compare Thuc. 7.70.8: Athenian generals ask shirkers if they find this most hostile of lands more familiar than the sea; cf. also Nicias' last speech, Thuc. 7.77.5, you are so powerful *qua polis*, that no city in Sicily could resist you or uproot you if you settled: fighting is like home. On the rhetoric of colonization and the army as *polis*, see also Hornblower (2004).

the mass of armed men is one of the ways in which a *polis* likes to imagine itself, the reflex is to find a place to realize the potential. Calpes Limen is described at length, in a description which, for the first time, gives a sense of place, of possible syzygy between the community and a geographical setting. But it is only one of many locales mentioned as possible places to stay on: north-western Asia Minor and Chersonese are evoked, as well as Phasis, Byzantium, and the various places proposed by Seuthes to Xenophon himself.²⁴

But this desire is constantly frustrated: the soldiers want to go home and hence condemn themselves to the move and to this identity without place. When soldiers are interested in settling in Byzantium, setting up Xenophon as a tyrant, he is terrified of the Spartan reaction. The common identity is centred on a common project: keep moving, get out of here; identity is not founded on 'being there', but precisely on an 'elsewhere': coming from elsewhere, going elsewhere. Contradiction lies in the shared project itself: it creates, but also destroys community.²⁵ In the end, the temptation is simply to slip away, as even Xenophon tries to do.

The other way in which finding a place figures in the *Anabasis* is the desire for social situatedness, for a place within a network of benefaction and *charis*. Clearchus' speech early on lays out this theme: he tells his soldiers, 'I think that I am *timios* [honoured] among you, because I can do good to people.' Xenophon insists that most people went not for profit or poverty but out of the honourable desire to increase social substance, by coming back richer and being able to help—starting with one's family, but presumably also one's friends; in other words, to gain honour.²⁶ Xenophon's own desire, visible at the end, is that of being able to do good, *eu poiēsai*, to his friends; to be someone in a network of reciprocity. Cyrus offered precisely this possibility; once Xenophon lost this best friend he never had, the same desire colours Xenophon's stay with the Thracian dynast Seuthes. There, too, the dream of social substantification through

²⁴ Calpes Limen: *Anab.* 6.4.1–6. Other locales canvassed: *Anab.* 5.6.19–25; 5.6.36–5.7.9; 7.1.21; 7.2.38.

²⁵ The desire for home: *Anab.* 6.4. Settling at Byzantium: *Anab.* 7.1.21–31. The contradictions of the shared project: Dillery (1995), 59–98.

²⁶ On *charis*, see Azoulay (2004). 'I think that I am *timios*': *Anab.* 1.3.6. Gaining honour: *Anab.* 6.4.8.

interaction with a potentate ended badly (though Xenophon finally did get rich thanks to the final *coup de main* on Asides' estate).

Both these ways of being there, being someone—locally rooted community, and social context—come together in Xenophon's description of the sacred estate at Skillous. Xenophon finds an identity, but a constructed one: the reference is not Xenophon's Athens, but Ephesus, a reminder of places he has been to, and adventures he has experienced; cult, architecture and hydrography hark back to Ephesus, in a sort of personal myth of colonization gathering echoes meaningful to Xenophon in terms of his personal history. In this place, festival creates community, from local citizens, travellers (perhaps pilgrims on their way to Olympia), neighbours, women; hunting involves Xenophon's sons and all comers, *hoi boulomenoi*. The latter phrase is not a political expression as in Athens, but designates the festival community and its apolitical basis. At last, a place to be, where money has been used to create social relations and local meanings; at last, somewhere for Xenophon to develop his desire for place, over the years and thanks to collective religious experience. But there also is a twist: the play of tenses hints at a difference between the things that stay the same, in the present tense, and the imperfect, which might suggest loss, probably Xenophon's exile from Skillous after 371. The inscription is curiously impersonal and periphrastic, and already implies future absence: 'The place is sacred to Artemis. Let him who holds it and exploits it offer the tithe every year, and out of the remaining income repair the temple. If one does not do that, it will be the goddess's concern.' Even here, finding place is uncertain.²⁷

TOWARDS A HISTORY OF GREEK IDENTITIES ON THE MOVE

The fourth century, as everyone knows, started in 404 (just as the eighteenth ended in 1815 and the nineteenth in 1914): in this respect,

²⁷ The estate at Skillous: *Anab.* 5.3.7–13 (present tense: 11–13). I owe the notion of 'festival community' to P. Martzavou.

the story of the *Anabasis* belongs to the fourth century. It is all the more justified to start by considering this text in a fourth-century context because it was written in the course of that century, and because its theme of displacement resonates in that great century of migration. The *Anabasis* itself is peopled with exiles (starting with Clearchus), as is Xenophon's *Hellenica*. The *Anabasis* also shows free-booting Greeks searching for military or court positions in non-Greek contexts, the fourth-century 'brawn drain': Phalinus the military instructor, Coeratadas the unsuccessful condottiere from Boeotia, Heraclides of Maronea at Seuthes' court.²⁸

Should we read the *Anabasis* as a text about fourth-century free-floating *particules élémentaires*, indeed, as a text written by one of these free-floating elements? P. McKechnie, among others, has argued for the increasing importance of mobility and individuals in the fourth century, culminating (in his view) with the King's Friends of the Hellenistic age. Does the *Anabasis* show the fourth century to be an age of 'rootless individuals'? McKechnie himself warns us against any such facile assumption, in view of the evidence for the continued relevance of *polis* ideology and institutions; a recent collection of essays on the fourth century, edited by P. Carlier, shows the complexity of the period, and the persistence of *polis* identity into the Hellenistic period. How to read the *Anabasis* within its century?²⁹

The *Anabasis* is precisely not a text about 'rootless individuals', but the relation between migration and the desire for identity. Identities are on the move, but also being made on the move, as in the case of the improvised, pragmatic community of the Ten Thousand. A striking example of identity on the move occurs early on in the *Anabasis*. The Arcadian mercenaries in Cyrus' guard celebrate an Arcadian festival, the Lycaea, under their officer, Xenias of Parrhasia, one of Cyrus' original Greek captains (he later deserts from the expedition, leaving his relatives behind as Cyrus' hostages). The Arcadians must have kept

²⁸ Chronology of the *Anabasis*: cf. Cawkwell (2004). Exiles of the *Hellenica*: *Hell.* 5.2–3; 7.4.3. Note also *Mem.* 1.18, being deprived of one's city features among the unknowables in life, if you marry into a grand family; among the epigraphical references, *SEG* XXVI, no. 1282, Tod 141–2. On Coeratadas, see Parker (2004). The 'brawn drain' (an expression I owe to E. Fantham): *Anab.* 2.1.7, 7.1.33–41, 7.3.16.

²⁹ McKechnie (1989). Carlier (1996); see especially the concluding essay by J. M. Bertrand, pp. 369–81.

a calendar; on their march, they packed the gilt fillets for the victors. But what is the status of the festival when celebrated in Phrygia rather than south-west Arcadia? Is it a private version of the official festival? What is the status of the athletic victors? Is the celebration of a festival about time rather than place? Is it about those who celebrate? How unusual was this sort of phenomenon? What needs are being fulfilled by the gesture? All these and many other questions are raised by this celebration. These questions reflect our curiosity, but were already implied in 401, by the completion of ritual out of context; yet the ritualized nature of the occasion perhaps subordinated such questions ('just what are we doing?') to the creation of community feeling ('who are we?'), literally on the march: the Arcadian mercenaries reaffirmed their group identity by performing their local festival before their Persian employer and his court, non-Greek soldiers, and other Greeks. A later parallel may be found in the fragments of Callimachus: Pollis of Athens keeps the Attic festival calendar in Alexandria, and celebrates the Feast of Cups with friends.³⁰

And what if Xenophon had founded a city—the *polis* of the Calpitaie, or the Limenitae? We might now know about its fortifications and its harbour, thanks to early modern and modern travellers and more recent (but still badly published) excavation. We could ponder its Arcadian onomastics, myths, cults, and festivals, notably the Lycaea (alluded to on fine bronze and silver coinage). We would have found a *temenos*, probably for an *oikist*, in the agora, [... 3–4...]phon son of Gryllus; we could meditate evidence for cultural exchange with nearby Persian elites, but also subordinate Paphlagonian villages. We would debate the city's economy, and especially the evidence for trade relations across the Black Sea and with the Aegean. Amphora stamps would tell us of imports: some wine, and much olive oil. Solid, old-fashioned historical geography would allow us to guess at probable resources, especially timber (we would examine nineteenth-century travellers and pore over twentieth-century Turkish maps). Hellenistic decrees would inform us of institutions, Panhellenic in inspiration and names; the local funerary *stelae* would show evidence of a surprisingly martial culture, throughout the fourth and third

³⁰ The Lycaea: *Anab.* 1.2.10, and cf. also Parker (2004). The Feast of Cups: Callim. frag. 178.

centuries. For this imaginary city of Xenophon's desire, I have of course been summarizing an imaginary article by L. Robert. What matters is that this virtual city of the very early fourth century can be imagined in Hellenistic or 'pre-Hellenistic' terms, and could have been treated with the same attention to invented identity, cultural politics and Hellenism which L. Robert devoted to the Hellenistic city at Ai Khanoum, founded in the very late fourth century or the early third.³¹

CONCLUSION

Both the Lycaea and the potential cultural history of Xenophon's intended city are 'pre-Hellenistic', in that they fall before the formal definition of the Hellenistic period, but show close similarity with the characteristics of the Hellenistic world. This similarity invites us to consider the phenomena of migration and identities on the move. For the Hellenistic period, mobility coexisted with strong *polis* identity, as can be seen in the institutions of peer polity interaction between *poleis* in this period: one striking example is the *syngeneia* politics between 'kindred' communities related by myth.³²

But exile, *anastasis*, and emigration can also be seen in the archaic period: witness the Phocaeans' saga after their emigration when the Persian came; Arion striking it rich in Sicily, misguidedly wishing to entrust his person and his cash only to a good Corinthian ship; the astonishing trajectory of Democedes of Croton, who finally did manage to get home, where all his Persian-gained wealth allowed

³¹ If need be, here are some imaginary references, drawn from the library of L. Robert's great unwritten books: see generally L. Robert, 'Cultes et onomastique de Calpè', in *La Bithynie*, vol. 1, pp. 27–118 (cf. *Hellenica* 14, pp. 279–83; *Paysages et gens d'Anatolie*, pp. 422–31 and plates 14–15 with captions, especially for travellers' accounts, abundantly quoted; *Noms indigènes de l'Asie Mineure*, vol. 2, 12 n. 5 and index s.v. Calpè, for the mix of Arcadian, Persian, and Paphlagonian onomastics). To leave the realm of fictional scholarship: for Robert on Ai Khanoum, see 'De Delphes à l'Oxus. Incriptions grecques nouvelles de la Bactriane', *Comptes rendus de l'Académie des inscriptions et belles lettres* (1968), pp. 416–57, reprinted in *OMS* 5, pp. 510–51.

³² 'Pre-Hellenistic': Millar (1983), 55–71. *Syngeneia* politics: Curty (1995); Jones (1999); see also Parker (2004). I hope to return to Hellenistic 'peer polities'.

him to cut a dashing figure in his home town and contract a good marriage; and especially, the case of the Samian aristocrats, exiled by Polycrates, who went on an Aegean spree and founded Cydonia, in East Crete, where they lived happily before the Aeginetans intervened to destroy their *polis* and their corporate existence. All these incidents come from Herodotus; Thucydides provides equally striking instances for the fifth century: the Aeginetans in the Thyreatis, the Plataeans settled in Scione, the Delians in the Troad, during the Peloponnesian War.³³

In all these periods, individual mobility and group identity, even community coexist. We are not dealing with floating individuals, but a complex relation between mobility and community. What matters is not the supposed existence of 'floating individuals', but the impact which the experience of floating had on the issues of identity and place: it resulted in a nexus of inventiveness and memory. The *Anabasis* is both a document about and an artefact produced by these processes. It points to a swathe of experience, shared by the individual exiles, as well as the groups waiting to go home, the fourth-century exiles which opened this section: the Thespians and Orchomenians who waited till 338 to go home, the Samians who waited till 323 until, to the Athenians' anger, they started swarming back to their island from the neighbouring cities which had sheltered them, and all those who never went home—the Proconnesians who died in exile after Cyzicus took over their island, the scattered Olynthians after the capture of their city by Philip II.³⁴

In this chapter, I have tried to show that displacement takes its toll on identity, but also that it can prove a boon for it. Umberto Eco, in an essay on his *patris*, Alessandria (Piedmont), tells a small story about an immigrant which might balance the two Xenophontic stories at the opening of this chapter. Aged twenty, Salvatore leaves his home town for Australia, where he spends forty long years working and saving. At sixty, Salvatore embarks on the long journey

³³ Herodotean examples: Hdt. 1.23; 3.129–37; 3.57–60. See also Purcell (1990), 29 ff. Thucydidean examples: Thuc. 2.27.2, 5.32.1, 8.108.4.

³⁴ Generally, McKechnie (1989), 34–51. Proconnessus: Robert (1967), 15–22, with Robert (1946), 88–90. For a parallel, see Duby on the agglutinative tendencies ('société granuleuse') of the freebooting young men of the eleventh and twelfth centuries: (1986). Mobility and associative tendencies precisely coexist.

home. As the train finally brings him closer Salvatore's excitement grows. Will anyone still know him? Will he find his boyhood friends? Will they recognize him, ask for stories about kangaroos and Aborigines? At the deserted, sweltering station, Salvatore sees an old railway employee. In spite of the now worn face and sloping frame, he recognizes his old school mate, Giovanni. Salvatore walks towards Giovanni, pointing at his own face with a trembling finger: 'It's me, I'm back.' Giovanni turns towards Salvatore, and says, 'Hello Salvatore, are you leaving us?'³⁵

³⁵ Appropriately (or not), I only know this story from a French translation: Eco (1997), 272. The Italian original can be found (I assume) in Eco (1992)—*non vidi*.

Irony and the Narrator in Xenophon's *Anabasis*

Patrick J. Bradley

The *Anabasis* of Xenophon remains to many a perplexing historical and literary puzzle. Many readers of the *Anabasis* over the years have displayed a bored familiarity with a text known since their days of Greek primers. They have been led thereby to focus their efforts on dissecting the author's work in search of historical inaccuracies and personal bias, while ignoring or avoiding the deeper mystery of the text. Most readers would agree with the characterization of the *Anabasis* as a text which is ostensibly a work of history but which is shaped in some profound way by its author's personal agenda. However, the locus of the puzzle is precisely this, the author's use of novel literary techniques to effect this appropriation and manipulation of the genre of history to communicate a personal perspective to an audience. Too often scholars are guided in their readings by their confidence in their understanding of the *Anabasis* as a defective work of history that needs to be salvaged and redeemed for use by scholars of history. But it is not only this that keeps readers from adequately treating this text. It is perhaps also their uneasiness with a text that is at once so seemingly obvious and yet so elusive, and that is more than a work of a heavy-handed, second-rate historian blinded by simple biases.¹

¹ Perhaps Xenophon's *Anabasis* does not seem apt material for a collection of essays honouring a master teacher and scholar of Latin poetry. It must be noted, however, that Gordon Williams himself was hardly dissuaded from taking on the role

I contend that in writing the *Anabasis* Xenophon has created a hybrid literary genre the motivations of which are at least dual and which manifests a unique narrative strategy employing a complex narrator and multi-layered narrative in the portrayal of an enigmatic historical figure and author. In the first part of this chapter I examine the question of the generic uniqueness of Xenophon's *Anabasis*, and demonstrate how his exploitation of the genre of history is a component of his narrative strategy. Next, I analyse his construction of the beginning of the text as a device to create the narrative space needed to develop his novel and complex plot. I then discuss the unique convergence in one text of Xenophon the author, of the character who is called 'Xenophon' in the text, and of the historical character Xenophon who participated in the events narrated in the text. I explore the ramifications of Xenophon's employment as author of the persona of an anonymous third-person narrator to mediate the relationship among these three figures in presenting the text to his audience. Then I describe the techniques Xenophon uses to lead the reader through and engage the reader in the transformation of the narrative from historical monograph about the Ten Thousand to novelesque autobiography.² Central to this is his exploitation of irony on various levels. This irony is made possible not just by the inherent inequality in knowledge between narrator and reader, but also by the unique relationship between the author Xenophon, the extradiegetic historical actor Xenophon, the character called Xenophon in the text,

of advisor to a dissertation on the *Anabasis* by such an apparent incongruity. When approached some seven years ago to guide a project outside his own primary research interests, Gordon Williams energetically and generously shared his time and considerable talents. He thereby demonstrated the conviction that, as classicists, we are first and foremost educators, and that no degree of specialized expertise should blind us to that broader vision of our research and teaching. I am pleased, therefore, to be able to offer this contribution in his honour. Discussions of the *Anabasis* generally assume a low level of self-conscious manipulation of the material on Xenophon's part, often supposing that this text is merely a slightly polished and fleshed-out diary. See e.g. Roy 1968 and Gwynn 1929. Dalby 1992 mentions the 'apparent artlessness' of Xenophon's account. Cawkwell 1972, 26 calls Xenophon 'plain' and this text his 'least perplexing'. Wencis 1977 and Higgins 1977 are exceptions in noting the literary merits of the *Anabasis*.

² By 'novelesque autobiography' I mean a prose narrative that exhibits narrative structures and characteristics typical of the novel in presenting the author as a fictively wrought character at the centre of recent historical events.

and the anonymous narrator created to mediate this relationship. I demonstrate, finally, how the elliptical ending is comprehensible in light of the strategy pursued throughout the narrative.

The text of Xenophon's *Anabasis* exhibits an undefined, unbounded quality that makes it *sui generis* in the history of Greek literature. I hope this study will ultimately show that the text of Xenophon's *Anabasis* is a more fertile ground for rhetorical and literary studies than has hitherto been realized.³ Study of this innovative novelesque autobiography and its complex narrative strategy has more to tell us about an important literary historical figure, and, thus, about the evolving possibilities of the written prose text as a medium for communication, persuasion, and entertainment in the fourth century.

QUESTIONS OF GENRE: HISTORIOGRAPHY AND THE ENDING OF THE *ANABASIS*

Let us first approach the *Anabasis* from the perspective that most readers do, namely, that it belongs to the genre of history, and see what emerges from a brief historiographical analysis. The beginning and ending of the *Anabasis* give the impression that the whole narrative is merely part of a larger narrative, specifically a historical narrative:

Darius and Parysatis had two sons born to them, of whom the elder was Artaxerxes and the younger Cyrus. (1.1.1)

Meanwhile Thibron arrived and took over the army, and uniting it with the rest of his Greek forces, proceeded to wage war upon Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus.⁴ (7.8.24)

The first sentence gives no hint as to what came before, and the last, no hint of what will come later. The reader has no idea why the

³ Of course in ancient times Xenophon was held in higher esteem as the object of complex literary analyses and stylistic emulation. See Rutherford 1998 for a thorough discussion of 'the taste for Xenophon in the early empire' (124), and especially chapter 5 ('Xenophon: *Kanon* of *Apheleia*') for some of the stylistic readings of Xenophon in the early empire, especially that of *Peri aphelous logou*.

⁴ Trans. Brownson 1992. All other translations of passages from the *Anabasis* will be my own unless otherwise noted.

narration was begun and why it ended where it did. Were the text of the *Anabasis* embodied in some larger narrative context, the reader might understand the motivation for the starting and stopping points. Perhaps more importantly, the reader might have some way to judge why the author saw fit to narrate these events at such length or at all. Moreover, nothing at the start or the end of the text indicates that what is to follow and what has preceded constitutes an entity unto itself, some sort of self-contained whole. As it stands, the dominant impression is that this is a narrative excerpted from a larger history, with the connective elements left out, and with no critical framework to evaluate the historical significance of the events narrated.

At *Hellenica* 3.1.1–6 Xenophon signals where such a narrative could fit, but does not narrate it there himself. He refers the reader instead to another source and moves on. The initial impression of this passage is that, while the subject matter is of historical interest and warrants the attention of the other author and the current reader (albeit at another time), the affair is really only tangential or of minor importance to the current historical narrative. Otherwise, Xenophon would consider it in more detail at this point. Nonetheless, he is quite clearly signalling where the material of the *Anabasis* would and should fit within a larger historical narrative. A closer look, however, at how the time period and events of the *Anabasis* are treated in the *Hellenica*, as well as in other ancient sources, strongly suggests that the narrative of the *Anabasis* is, from a historiographical perspective, out of step with the common wisdom of historians. In terms of both the relative historical importance ascribed to these events, as well as, on a more fundamental level, where the story of Cyrus and the Greek mercenaries begins and ends, the narrative of the *Anabasis* is unique. This basic observation, that Xenophon included material in his narrative that other histories did not and ended his narrative at a different point than other writers, will have important ramifications for our reading of the text as a whole.

The introduction to the narrative at *Hellenica* 3.1.1 and the synopsis at 3.1.2 covers the period from Cyrus' gathering of an army until the Greeks' safe return to the sea. All this, Xenophon tells us, was

written by Themistogenes the Syracusan.⁵ The narrative of the *Hellenica* continues with Tissaphenes' attempts to retake all the Ionian cities which Cyrus had ruled, and, shortly thereafter, the combining of the Cyreans with Thibron's forces (3.1.3–6). If we map the narrative of *Hellenica* 3.1.1–6 against that of *Anabasis* 1–7, we see that *Hellenica* 3.1.2 (the synopsis of Themistogenes' work) corresponds to *Anabasis* 1–4, that is, up to the famous sighting of the sea and subsequent arrival at Trapezus (the first friendly territory they reached on the sea). *Hellenica* 3.1.3–6 corresponds to *Anabasis* 5–7, that is, from the Greeks' safe arrival at the sea until they joined forces with Thibron. Now, the material of *Anabasis* 1–4 clearly seems here to be of historical note. Xenophon mentions it in his *Hellenica*, and another author saw fit to write a full account of it. So the decision not to treat this material at length in the *Hellenica* is made to appear to be based not on a lack of historical significance in the material, but rather on a desire to avoid covering ground already treated by another historian and/or to avoid an unnecessary digression. But of all the events in *Anabasis* 5–7, the *Hellenica* mentions directly only the combining of the Greek mercenaries with Thibron's army. There is no reference to another source to get the full story of what occurred during the period covered in *Anabasis* 5–7. Clearly, then, that material is not deemed to have the same wider historical significance. Nor, apparently, did Themistogenes of Syracuse consider it to be as historically significant, if the synopsis of his work is accurate.⁶ Judging from the *Hellenica*, then, the material included in *Anabasis* 5–7 is either lacking historical significance, or at least does not belong to the story of the Cyreans. This jibes with the opinion that many students (both modern and ancient) of Greek history seem to have of these events. It is, after all, 'The sea! The sea!' that stands out most in the minds of readers of the

⁵ The theory that Xenophon had published his *Anabasis* (or even part of it) under this pseudonym has had many adherents over the years. The evidence for it, however, is so meager that nothing of substance can derive from the assumption of it. In any case, my argument considers how the synopsis of this other work is framed, and does not require a firm answer to the pseudonym question.

⁶ Even if it is not accurate (i.e. if Xenophon has for some reason given a truncated synopsis), it is still significant that Xenophon has selected arrival at the sea as an appropriate point to end a synopsis or outline. And, of course, this synopsis would also be inadequate if it were referring (under the pseudonym theory) to his own *Anabasis*.

Anabasis, as if that passage, which falls just a shade past the halfway point of the text (4.7.24), were the conclusion. To appreciate better the uniqueness of the *Anabasis* in terms of the scope of its narrative, it will be helpful to compare it to the few other extant ancient accounts of the Cyreans.⁷

Plutarch, in his *Life of Artaxerxes*, treats Cyrus' attempt on the throne, but does not follow for long the retreat of the Greek Cyreans. He sums up their retreat by saying only that, 'they rescued themselves from his very palace, as one might say'⁸ (20.1). The key point for Plutarch is that they managed not to be destroyed by the king's forces though they were in the very heart of his domain. The emphasis is on where they came from, not where they went. Plutarch, in fact, uses this point, the proof of barbarian weakness in the face of Greek might, to introduce his narrative of the start of Lacedaemonian efforts to liberate the Greek Ionian cities (20.2).

In telling the story of Xenophon's life, Diogenes Laertius does not offer his own narrative of the adventures of the Cyreans. He refers to Xenophon as having narrated sufficiently 'the events that occurred during the expedition (τὴν ἀνάβασιν) and the return' (τὴν κάθοδον 2.50). While at least one translator renders ἡ κάθοδος as 'the return home', nowhere in the *Anabasis* is it stated or implied that the Cyreans had completed a journey home, even if home is taken in its broadest sense to mean Greece.⁹ Diogenes does not specify what he considers the end point of the return journey, so it is unclear to which part of the *Anabasis* he is here referring. When Diogenes mentions the subsequent 'misfortunes in Pontus and the treacheries of Seuthes' and the hiring out of the Cyreans to Agesilaus (2.51), the reader gets the impression that these events were not included in

⁷ There remain only fragments of the accounts of Ctesias, Sophacetus, Deinon, and Ephorus (all in *FGrHist*), none of which indicate the scope of their narratives of the Cyreans. Isocrates makes a number of references to the Greek Cyreans, but none that can be said to provide a comprehensive account. See e.g. *On the Peace* 8.98, *Panath.* 12.104 and 4.145–9, and *Philip* 5.90 ff. Only Plutarch, Diogenes Laertius, and Diodorus Siculus speak explicitly enough of a beginning and end of the story of the Cyreans to allow for a comparison with Xenophon's narrative.

⁸ Transl. Perrin 1954.

⁹ Hicks' translation (1980, 181) reads too much into the Greek. The question of where exactly Xenophon and the Cyreans wanted to go, where they actually did go, and when a story about them should/must end is precisely the question.

Xenophon's narrative of τὴν κάθοδον. The fact that Diogenes has either forgotten that Thibron, not Agesilaus, had taken over the army or has purposely edited him out to compress his story, adds to the sense that this is an ambiguous, if not inaccurate, synopsis of Xenophon's narrative. As with the synopsis of the work attributed to Themistogenes in the *Hellenica*, the material that constituted a unity in the *Anabasis*, is treated as belonging to distinct historical narratives.

Diodorus Siculus provides the most extensive account after Xenophon of the expedition of Cyrus and its aftermath. An examination of his account (14.19–31 and 14.37) reveals not only a more precise and explicit conclusion to a narrative of the Cyreans than any other source, but also a conclusion at a different point in place and time. He follows the Cyreans as far as Chrysopolis (14.31.4 ['with difficulty they escaped to Chrysopolis']), and states that 8,300 of the original 10,000 survived. The emphasis is on the arrival in safety to the Bosphorus, the traditional juncture of Europe and Asia, the Greek world and the barbarian world. Once they had emerged safely from the interior of the barbarian world to even the farthest edge of the Greek world, for Diodorus, their journey was successfully completed. This was where the Cyrean army split, where different groups went their own way and the 'Cyreans', 'The Ten Thousand', were the 'Cyreans' no more. Of the survivors, 'some' (τινές), he says, 'got back in safety, without further trouble, to their native lands',¹⁰ while 'the rest' (οἱ λοιποὶ)¹¹ 'banded together around the Chersonese and laid waste the adjoining territory of the Thracians (14.31.5)'. Diodorus sees this split in the army as so large, and the directions of the two groups as so divergent, that it would no longer make sense to

¹⁰ This is a most significant point, as we shall see later in this essay, since Xenophon never made any mention at all of any member of the Cyreans actually accomplishing a return to his home. Only once does he even mention that soldiers had sailed away, but it is not specified to where (7.2.3). It is left for the reader to assume that it was homeward, as Brownson did in his Loeb translation, 'As time wore on, however, many of the soldiers sold their arms up and down the country and set sail for home in any way they could.' This passage in Book 7 will be important for my argument about Xenophon's narrative strategy. Translations of Diodorus, unless otherwise noted, are from Oldfather 1963.

¹¹ He later calls these 'the larger part' (14.37.1). This 'larger part' of the 8,300 who had made it to Chrysopolis was, according to Diodorus, about 5,000 men (14.37.1).

speak of a 'Cyrean army'. The arrival of the troops at Chrysopolis, therefore, represents for Diodorus the end of the story of the Cyrean army. This is the point where he ends his narrative of Cyrus' attempt on his brother's throne: 'And so the campaign of Cyrus against Artaxerxes had *such an outcome*' (14.31.5 τοιοῦτον ἔσχε τὸ τέλος).¹² Diodorus punctuates his narrative with the term τὸ τέλος, which he aptly places at the end of the sentence. What Xenophon had narrated through another full book (Book 7), Diodorus, like Diogenes, summarized in a few sentences (14.31.5 and 37.1–4). He thereby signals his judgement on the historical importance of those events, and finds a definite end to his narrative where Xenophon saw just one more turning point. Although Diodorus and Diogenes take their narratives as far as *Anabasis* 6 while Themistogenes had followed the story only as far as *Anabasis* 4, all three accounts stop well before Xenophon. Xenophon's account stands alone.

It must also be noted that there is enough evidence to suggest that an author would be justified in continuing a narrative of the Cyrean army still further than Xenophon had in the *Anabasis*. It is likely that the Cyreans remained intact as a unit within Thibron's army. Some passages of the *Anabasis* itself suggest that the Lacedaemonians had planned to maintain the command structure of the army (7.6.1 and 7).¹³ At *Hellenica* 3.1.6 language similar to that of *Anabasis* 7.8.24 is used to describe the combining of the two forces. While the language is ambiguous as to how the Cyreans were integrated into the Lacedaemonian forces, another passage in the *Hellenica* suggests that the Cyreans likely continued to form their own unit.¹⁴ Even Diodorus, who had ceased to consider the Cyreans 'the Cyreans' by this point, uses language that suggests that they had maintained some sort of separate group identity (14.37.4). Moreover, the figures he gives for the troops of the Lacedaemonian and Cyrean armies (c. 7,000 and c. 5,000, respectively (14.36 and 37) suggests that, due to their comparable sizes, the Cyreans could not really be absorbed by

¹² This translation is my own.

¹³ See Rahn 1981, 105–6 for the belief that the Cyreans 'remained an independent unit' under Xenophon's command perhaps as late as 396/5. Parke 1993, 24 also sees the Cyreans as maintaining a group identity.

¹⁴ See 3.2.6–7 for the 'leader of the Cyreans' speaking up in defense of the troops' behaviour under Thibron.

the Lacedaemonians. Diodorus says that the Cyreans fought 'with' (μετά 14.37.4), alongside the Lacedaemonians, as if they were an allied force. It would presumably be easier and more effective, from a command and combat standpoint, to allow the Cyreans to maintain their structure than to disperse a proven fighting force.

We conclude from this discussion that Xenophon chose to create a narrative of the revolt of Cyrus and its aftermath that followed the story beyond what is commonly thought of as the terminus of the historically significant actions of the Cyreans. Moreover, while Xenophon went further than any of our other sources, his ending point was not necessarily imposed by the historical events themselves: he could have gone farther. Simply put, Xenophon as author made conscious decisions to take a different approach to the content and scope of a narrative of the Cyreans. This simple observation raises questions whose answers can reveal a great deal about the nature of Xenophon's *Anabasis*: Why did Xenophon not end his story at the great climax so many remember? Why did he not follow the Cyreans in their expeditions with Thibron and subsequent Lacedaemonian commanders? What does Xenophon as author gain by making Thibron the conclusion?

As we pursue these questions about the content and scope of Xenophon's narrative (*what* and *how much* he chose to include), we must begin to ask *how* he chose to present his material and *why*. I will contend in the remainder of this chapter that Xenophon crafted a narrative that was unique in its content, scope and, more importantly, in its style. The narrative shifts almost imperceptibly from a monographic history into an adventure *nostos*-tale which demonstrates a narrative style and structure that have only superficial resemblance to 'real', 'straightforward' historical prose, and that shows clear signs of conscious literary artifice. The shifts in content and narrative style do not occur at the same point in the text, and they are neither complete nor announced. While it is clear to any reader by the end of the narrative that the *Anabasis* is more about Xenophon than Cyrus or the Cyreans, this is not clear at the beginning. The way the narrator moves his reader from the start of an apparent historical prose text to the end of what is clearly an autobiographical work, is both deft and novel, and the subject of the analysis of the rest of this chapter.

THE BEGINNING OF THE *ANABASIS* AND THE CREATION OF NARRATIVE SPACE

If we shift our focus from the end of his narrative back to the beginning, we can see once more that Xenophon has far less in common with other ancient historians, or writers of prose in general, than might be expected. In this section I will analyse the manner in which Xenophon commences the *Anabasis* and compare it to the beginnings of the works of Xenophon's predecessors in the field of history, Herodotus and Thucydides, as well as to the beginnings of Xenophon's other works.¹⁵ I will be concerned in particular with showing the devices and strategies Xenophon uses in the *Anabasis* to communicate or disguise the content and purpose of his text, engage the interest of his audience, and establish authority for the narrative. It will be demonstrated that Xenophon's construction of the beginning of his text is crucial to the narrative strategy he pursues throughout it.¹⁶ Its primary contribution is the creation of the narrative space Xenophon needs to employ the unique type of narrator he has created to present the story.

The moment a critical reader begins to ask questions of any text of Xenophon, it becomes clear that its meanings and answers are developed as much by what is not said as by what is said.¹⁷ This holds especially true in the case of the opening pages of the *Anabasis*. The

¹⁵ Dunn and Cole 1992, demonstrating a variety of approaches to reading the beginning in the various classical genres, has been helpful in formulating my discussion about the *Anabasis*.

¹⁶ This aspect of Xenophon's style was recognized in antiquity. One of the main themes of the literary analysis of Xenophon found in the Second Sophistic treatise *Peri aphelous logou* is that, as Rutherford 1998, 68 puts it, he 'gives the impression of writing without a definite purpose in view,' and that '[t]his is especially true of the beginnings of works' (ibid.). 'However,' as Rutherford continues, 'in fact there always is a definite purpose to it, and in fact the impression of simplicity is always an impression, because everything is brought about by technique or handling (*μεταχειρίσις* is his [scil. the author of the treatise] word for it)' (ibid.).

¹⁷ See Higgins 1977, 13 ('Reading Xenophon'), who adduces as a telling example of Xenophon's 'ironic mode' *Oec.* 8.20, where Xenophon 'remarks on the beauty of ordered arrangements but points out that what is left untouched around them also contributes to their beauty, like the empty space a circular chorus maintains in its centre as it dances. It is this pure and unarticulated region wherein irony dwells.'

names of the members of the dysfunctional family in question and the origin of the enmity between princely brothers appears to be an appropriate place to start the story of Cyrus' attempt to unseat his brother as king. However, it is only *after* the reader has moved further into Book 1 that this judgement can be made. The narrator gives no indication at the outset as to what is in store for the reader. The narration commences with no introduction. It is incumbent upon the reader to judge from the immediate, continuous flow of the narrative the content and genre of the story. The reader deduces, but is never told, that this is the history of the attempt by Cyrus to overthrow Artaxerxes. By the end of Book 1, however, this judgement about the content of the story, and, thus, the adequacy of its beginning are called into question. Cyrus is dead; his attempt is a failure; and, consequently, the central tension moving the plot (viz. the enmity between brothers) is removed. What the reader had come to assume about the text he is reading is no longer correct. Its beginning is proved inadequate.¹⁸

The commencement of the narrative is so immediate, the movement into the beginning of Cyrus' expedition so swift that the reader is hardly given time to consider just how much is lacking at the beginning of this text. There is no programmatic statement of any sort. There is no hint as to the scope of the narrative, nor statement of motive or method in composition or presentation. The narrator says nothing explicitly to situate the reader within or lead the reader to expect any particular genre. Perhaps most striking of all is the lack of an authorial signature. This text simply does not announce to the reader who claims to have written it or who is narrating it.¹⁹

Herodotus and Thucydides each had provided a signature, topic, motive, and method for their histories. The very first word of each historian's text serves as a signature, or 'by-line' as it were, announcing the author. They both go on to state what they will write about

¹⁸ Murnaghan 1997 describes how the *Iliad* 'escapes the limits' of its announced plot, and how 'the expected boundaries of its action are repeatedly dissolved'.

¹⁹ What Tatum 1989, 35 says of the *Cyropaedia* might be said of the *Anabasis*: '[Xenophon] does not say that he is writing fiction. Nor does he claim to be writing history. There is never a hint of verification or methodology anywhere in the *Cyropaedia*. He does not name himself, like Herodotus and Thucydides... he maintains a vague profile to the end, never actually declaring *what* it is he is writing, in terms of genre. He exploits our disposition to take prose narratives for granted and believe what an author says.'

and why. Thucydides provides a detailed discussion of how he went about researching and composing his work, and even Herodotus discusses his method at times. Such (seemingly) full and open disclosures aim to set the reader at ease by presenting an apparently unproblematic text, a text which will deliver exactly what it promises. Moreover, by affixing a name to it, the author also is forging a more immediate, even personal, relationship with the reader.

This was a novel strategy, perhaps, for the father of history, but for Thucydides in the succeeding generation it was a way of situating his text within an established and familiar genre. Thucydides, to be sure, was also explicitly attempting to set himself apart from other historians and to establish another, more legitimate, source of authority for his work. But he was starting within a tradition to which he clearly signals his allegiance. Xenophon's abrupt beginning to his *Hellenica*, although lacking any preliminary material, is as loud and clear a generic statement and rhetorical gesture as any full-blown introduction. With the simple phrase, 'After this', and the mention of one event, Xenophon accomplishes two things. He implicitly communicates his subject and genre (a continuation of the history of the Peloponnesian War begun by Thucydides), and he gains authority and, at the same time, immunity (his text is the heir of Thucydides' and will be of the same high quality, but any criticism can be referred to the original signatory). In forming such a brisk opening Xenophon can rely upon the reader's expectations as to genre and content to provide the critical framework and context needed to continue reading knowledgeably and confidently. What Xenophon might lose in terms of publicity for himself by leaving his name out of his text, he certainly can make up for by appending his work to Thucydides'. In the *Anabasis* Xenophon gives the *impression* that the narrative is an historical narrative. However, unlike in the *Hellenica*, Xenophon ultimately exploits and defeats these expectations as to genre and content.

If we look beyond the *Hellenica* and *Anabasis*, we see that every other work of Xenophon, except his *Hiero*,²⁰ begins with the first

²⁰ The *Hiero* is a special case. It is a dialogue with a thin narrative frame, but it is identifiable as belonging to a particular, familiar genre. The *Oeconomicus* is also a dialogue with the thinnest of frames, but it is announced in the first person and, like the *Hiero*, belongs to a recognizable genre.

person²¹ or is revealed in the conclusion to be a first-person narrative. While no work of Xenophon bears his name within the narrative, there is also always the impression that there is a person with a particular and explicit point of view communicating to the reader. Moreover, these narrators always provide at some point an explicit statement of content and purpose. This, of course, does not guarantee that these texts will not contain hidden narrative or rhetorical strategies, or that they can be taken at face value. But it does suggest that these strategies will be of a different sort than in the *Anabasis*. More importantly, it points out the uniqueness of the *Anabasis* even within Xenophon's own corpus.

Xenophon wrote across a broad spectrum of genres and was innovative in many of them. All of his works, however, save the *Anabasis*, either fit into an established genre or, by the explicit words of the narrator, make a claim for and effectively announce a new genre. There is no explicit announcement at the beginning, or anywhere, in the *Anabasis* of genre or content. Moreover, while the *Anabasis* seems early on to be a straightforward history, it is clear by the end of the narrative that it in no way fits the mould of the typical historical text. This text is not obviously relying on some other text or genre to lend it authority. The comparison with beginnings in Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon's other works forces us to ask a number of questions. What will this text be about? Is it an historical text in the manner of Thucydides or Herodotus, and, if so, can we expect certain things of it? Who is the author of this text, and what is his motive for writing it? What can we expect to gain from it, what is its value? How can we, why should we trust what we read here? What, finally, is the strategy behind the abrupt, elliptical inauguration of the narrative, what is the effect of it on the reader and what is gained by it? Such questions of authorship, purpose, content, and genre are left without any explicit answer in the *Anabasis*.

²¹ The *Cyropaedia* and the *Art of Horsemanship* are narrated in the first-person plural, but this does not seem to be implying a group effort, rather simply the editorial 'we'. The *Cyropaedia* has received a considerable amount of attention in recent years and presents some of the greatest interpretive challenges of Xenophon's corpus. See e.g. Gera 1993, Due 1989, and Tatum 1989. As with Xenophon's other works, however, more work remains to be done on understanding the strategy behind the crafting of its narrative voice.

The primary strategy behind Xenophon's decision to launch the narrative immediately with no contextual or analytic framework is the creation of narrative space. By this I mean that by having his narrator make no programmatic statement, withhold his identity, and give nothing but the 'facts', Xenophon does not commit his narrator (or reader) to one storyline, chronology, point of view, thesis, method, or genre. The narrator is free to ignore generic conventions or to exploit his reader's expectations about them. The narrator is not bound to fulfill any promises implicit in a thesis statement or introduction, and the reader is not obliged to hold the narrator to them. Nor is the reader called upon to agree or disagree, approve or disapprove of anything the narrator says. The reader is, in a sense, invited to put aside the burden of criticism (which Thucydides so sternly places on his readers) and enjoy a good story. At the same time, by leaving the roles and relationships of narrator and reader so undefined at the outset, Xenophon allows the narrator the flexibility to craft a complex narrative structure that develops dual narrative strands, operates in more than one chronological framework, and allows its apparent *telos* to evolve and change. This strategy ultimately allows Xenophon as author to invite the reader into a unique relationship with himself as author, as former participant in the actual historical events, and as character portrayed in this text, a relationship which is mediated and negotiated by an anonymous third-person narrator. The space gained for that narrator by the unstructured beginning is the element needed to develop this unusual relationship by means of an unusual narrative.

IRONY AND THE ROLE OF THE NARRATOR

With this strategy of inauguration in mind, let us take a closer look at the genesis of this unique convergence of author, character in a text, and historical actor, and at the character and role of the narrator in presenting it to a reader. The facts of Xenophon's status as exiled Athenian, and his decision to author a text in which he is characterized in a narrative depicting historical events in which he some years

earlier had participated, allowed, even necessitated, the use of unprecedented methods. Such a text could fit into no typical or traditional context for literary production or performance. While it may have seemed to the Greeks that the most difficult task was to praise to one's own people their archenemy,²² perhaps the next most difficult task would be to praise oneself to anyone. It was a risky business for Xenophon to portray himself so prominently and so positively in the narrative of such a large event as the march of the 10,000. Had he announced himself in the text as author and/or narrator, he would have been battling an audience's natural reluctance to hear someone talk too much about himself, and inviting them to bring to their reading too many assumptions and biases, and perhaps too much prior knowledge about the historical events. In refraining from assigning a name to the author or narrator, Xenophon still risked endowing his narrator with too much personality, making him speak too obviously from an identifiable point of view. An overly intrusive or partisan narrator might distract or provoke the audience, and negatively colour their evaluation or enjoyment of the story.²³

Xenophon carefully navigated the hazards inherent in this decision. The strategy Xenophon chose to mediate his presentation of this narrative to an audience depends on two basic elements. The first, his decision to craft an opening with no introductory material in order to limit the reader's preconceived assumptions, thereby making the reader dependent upon the narrator, has already been discussed. This strategy granted the narrator the space needed to develop a narrative whose authority rests not on the identity or personality of the narrator, but rather on the immediate, unmediated unfolding of the story. The events, depicted with no critical or contextual apparatus, are allowed to stand on their own authority.

²² See Plato *Menex.* 235d.

²³ Whether this text was circulated under Xenophon's own name or a pseudonym is not the issue of this discussion. That is, whether the reader believed the text to be written by Xenophon the Athenian or Themistogenes the Syracusan does not matter for this analysis of the character and persona of the intratextual narrator. The point is that Xenophon needed to find a strategy that would disarm his readers, that would make them forget who the author was once they were into the narrative.

The second element of Xenophon's strategy was the creation of his narrator.²⁴ The character and the role of this narrator is perhaps the most important element and most significant achievement of this text. As I mentioned earlier, the subject matter of the *Anabasis* shifts from a history of the attempt of Cyrus and its aftermath to a narrative more aptly labelled a novelesque autobiography. The character and role of the narrator evolve as well, showing markedly different tendencies in Books 3–7 than in Books 1–2. This is reflected in the degree to which the narrator explicitly makes his presence as narrator felt, either by breaking from third-person mode and saying 'I', or by citing the testimony or evidence of someone other than himself.

The trait of the narrator we notice first and which remains constant through all seven books is his anonymity, the unusual withholding of a signature from a work of history. The narrator also operates almost exclusively in the third person. He says 'I' only to comment on a very specific point, and never says 'I' to speak about the overall enterprise of the narrative. It is significant that the four passages where he does use the first person, as well as the passages where he indicates that he is writing a work of history, are in the first two books. Such narratorial intrusions disappear almost entirely in Books 3–7.²⁵

In Book 1, in the midst of his encomiastic obituary of Cyrus, the narrator says, as he asserts yet another of Cyrus' fine qualities, 'And he received the most gifts, *I suppose*, as a single individual' (οἶμαι: 1.9.22). A few sentences later the narrator suggests that *in his opinion* (ἐμοίγε . . . δοκεῖ 1.9.24) the care and eagerness Cyrus displayed in the act was the most impressive part of the many favours he performed. As he works toward a conclusion of his eulogy, the narrator sums up his opinion of Cyrus' character by saying, 'Thus, as *I at least judge* from what *I hear*, no one, neither Greek nor barbarian has ever been

²⁴ Any discussion of the relationships among author, narrator, and character will owe a debt to Winkler 1985. My discussion in this section, especially in regard to the role of irony, has also profited from Conte 1996.

²⁵ The only passage in Books 3–7 where outside authority is invoked is in a description of a strange people met by the Cyreans. The narrator says that, 'those who served on the expedition said (ἐλεγον) that these were the most barbarous people they had met' (5.4.34).

loved by more people' (ἐγὼ μὲν γε ἐξ ὧν ἀκούω οὐδένα κρίνω 1.9.28). Again, in the obituary of Clearchus, the narrator says, 'And so these deeds *seem to me* to be of a man who is fond of war' (μοι δοκεῖ 2.6.6). These first-person statements are from passages where the narrator is very clearly delaying the movement of the narrative temporarily. In neither instance, however, does the narrator acknowledge or announce that he is stepping back from the narrative to comment on some of the characters. The connection of these set-pieces of praise and blame appear to fit seamlessly into their narrative contexts.

In Book 2, as he is describing the tense stand-off between the Greeks and the king's forces after the battle at Cunaxa, the narrator asserts that the king was terrified by the approach of the Greek forces (2.2.18). The narrator revisits this point a few sentences later, and says, 'The fact which *I just wrote* (ὃ δὲ δὴ ἔγραψα), that the King was terrified by the approach of the Greeks, was made clear by the following circumstances' (2.3.1). This is easily the most striking intrusion by the narrator in the entire *Anabasis*. Not only does he use the first person, but he calls attention as well to the fact that this is a written text. This is the only time that the narrator invites the reader to consider the veracity of an element of the narrative. Early in Book 1 the narrator had made a similar reference to a portion of his previous narrative. After describing Cyrus' mustering of troops, the narrator says that 'Cyrus, with the troops *I have mentioned* (εἶρηκα), set forth from Sardis' (1.2.5). This calls the reader's attention to the temporal, mediated nature of the narrative. That is, there is an 'I' who is in the process of telling a story. This 'I', however, is limiting his intrusion into his narrative to a narrowly circumscribed portion of it, a reference to a single antecedent bit of information.

The narrator later suggests to the reader again that this is a work of history, and that history is a written enterprise. In the obituary of Clearchus he states that 'the arguments whereby he [Clearchus] persuaded Cyrus *are written elsewhere*' (ἄλλη γέγραπται 2.6.4).²⁶ There had been another notice that this was a work of history earlier

²⁶ This 'elsewhere' is not in the *Anabasis* or any of Xenophon's other works. Either this is a mistake on Xenophon's part in thinking he had provided such information earlier in this text, or a deliberate withholding of a reference. In either case, the passage still stands as a reference to history as a written enterprise.

in the description of the fight between Cyrus and Artaxerxes. Cyrus is said to have rushed upon his brother and stabbed him through his breastplate 'as *Ctesias* the physician says, and *he* says that he himself healed the wound' (ὥς φησι Κτησίας ὁ ἰατρός, καί... φησι 1.8.26). A paragraph later *Ctesias* is again cited: 'The number that fell on the King's side *Ctesias* states' (Κτησίας λέγει 1.8.27).

These passages help to foster the impression that the narrative in Books 1–2 is of a work of history. The narrator is willing to cite the written works of other historians, to suggest that another source of his is the spoken word of rumour and reputation,²⁷ and to supply proofs of the veracity of his statements.²⁸ He also betrays the fact that this is a written text. However, when he makes critical judgements or steps back from the narration of events, it is not to evaluate the significance of the events or to allude proleptically to later parts of his narrative, but to comment on individual characters. He uniformly refrains from presenting any comprehensive analyses or judgements about the events he has described. The narrator does not state initially that this is a story of Cyrus' attempted coup, nor does he preview the new direction his narrative will take after the defeat at Cunaxa or after the slaughter of the generals. He does not evaluate or judge Cyrus' attempt to overthrow his brother. He allows the events as described to stand on their own authority.²⁹ In doing so, he is establishing a relationship with the reader in which the reader's understanding of the story being narrated grows through a cumulative process that calls for constant revision and re-evaluation. Since the narrator gives no help towards processing the continuous flow of narrative detail, the reader is compelled to re-evaluate the narrative at

²⁷ There are two instances in his obituary of Cyrus: ὁμολογεῖται (1.9.1) ['it is agreed'] and ἐλέχθησαν (1.9.18) ['they were said']. The narrator relies on others' 'reports' for his description of the battle at Cunaxa: λέγουσι (1.8.18), ἔφασαν, ἐλέγετο (1.8.20), λέγεται (1.8.24 and 28), and φασι (1.8.24).

²⁸ The narrator twice offers a τεκμήριον ['proof'] in the conclusion of his obituary to illustrate his point that Cyrus was the most beloved of all men (1.9.29 and 30).

²⁹ Reichel 1999, 6–7, as part of the preliminary to his study of the *Cyropaedia*, briefly analyses the historical apparatus in the *Anabasis* and finds it wanting, from a historiographical perspective, in its spare use of references to outside sources. The conclusion to his discussion neatly sums up the sense that a reader takes away from the *Anabasis*, [that the meaning is open and elusive]: 'Wodurch die Wahrhaftigkeit der *Anabasis* eigentlich gegenüber den Lesern verbürgt werden soll, bleibt offen. Auch ein Prooimion fehlt ja. Der ganze Bericht hängt gewissermaßen in der Luft.'

each step in light of the preceding narrative, without the guiding hand of the narrator.

As we examine the behaviour of the narrator in Books 3–7, we see how this narrative process and narrator–reader dynamic become energized and characterized more thoroughly by an exploitation of irony on various levels as the personality of the narrator fades from view and never again says ‘I’. The unique, threefold status of Xenophon as author, historical figure, and literary character allows for these multiple forms of irony when mediated to the reader by an anonymous narrator. In Books 3–7 the narrator remains in the third person, does not acknowledge or appeal to extratextual authority, and does not draw his reader’s attention to his act of narrating. By muting the explicit ‘I’ of his narratorial personality, the narrator removes a barrier between himself and the reader. The sense that this is a story mediated by another person becomes less prominent, and the reader enters into a more immediate (in the sense of less mediated) relationship with the narrative.

In Book 3 the narrator calls the reader to view the narrative as more than an historical exposition. At the point when the historical events take a dramatic turn (for the worse) for the Cyreans, the narrator commences, again without any introductory notification, what is essentially a new narrative. The narrator does not simply follow in the same manner the new course of the Cyreans as they turn to retreat without their original command and support structure. He constructs Books 3–7 as a story that is unified by structure, theme, character development, and narrative strategy—an approach essentially independent of Books 1–2. In these books the narrator no longer appears to be a historian concerned or willing to cite other sources or prove a point. Instead, he exploits his superior knowledge in comparison to the reader to create tension and suspense concerning the homeward journey of the Cyreans. At the same time, however, he exploits his advantage in comparison to the character Xenophon to invite the reader to share his privileged perspective about the past, present, and future life of this character. The narrator’s manipulation of his privileged perspective as narrator is the key to understanding how the *Anabasis* simultaneously can be an exciting adventure tale about the Cyreans and an intensely focused and personal portrayal of Xenophon. Furthermore, it is the key to understanding the

conclusion of the narrative at the end of Book 7, a conclusion that, on one level, defeats the reader's expectations, and, thus, seems to lack closure.

HISTORY TO AUTOBIOGRAPHY: TWO NARRATIVE STRANDS

A historical treatment of the events of the whole of the *Anabasis* from a more remote perspective, such as in Diodorus, might be expected not to vary the treatment of the material after the slaughter of the Greek generals. On the other hand, a history which tries to proceed from the Persian perspective, such as Plutarch's *Life of Artaxerxes*, or perhaps Ctesias' *Persica*, might be expected to give more weight to the events leading up to and immediately succeeding the Battle at Cunaxa. The effort lavished on the narrative of Books 3–7, therefore, will not be surprising, given the identity of the author. How this narrative is structured and performed requires a closer look.

If asked to summarize the narrative of the *Anabasis*, the typical reader might say that the *Anabasis* is the story of the retreat from the heart of Persian territory of the Greek Cyrean army in which Xenophon plays a leading role. Such a characterization of the *Anabasis* hits upon its two fundamental narrative strands: the retreat of the Cyreans and the portrayal of Xenophon. It gives, however, no hint as to the connection between the two and how they are woven into one coherent narrative. Readers of the *Anabasis* thus far have failed to note how the narrator exploits the irony inherent in his superior knowledge as narrator³⁰ to develop simultaneously these two narrative strands, and then ultimately to allow one (the portrayal of Xenophon) to emerge as the dominant and unifying element in the text. This process produces the shift from history to novelesque

³⁰ See e.g. Scholes and Kellogg, 1966, especially chapter 7, 'Point of View in Narrative' (240–82), for a general discussion of this sort of irony. They refer to the *Anabasis* there, but provide no full treatment of the narratorial persona. Conte 1996, especially chapter 1, 'The Mythomaniac Narrator and the Hidden Author' (1–36), has been helpful for my framing of this discussion. See also Higgins 1977, 1–20 for an insightful and sympathetic discussion of the role of irony in Xenophon's writings.

autobiography, which I claim for the *Anabasis*. In this section I will focus on the development and interplay of these two narrative strands, and the way in which the treatment of the character of Xenophon provides the overarching structural and thematic coherence to the narrative.

The beginning of Book 3 marks a new beginning in the narrative of the *Anabasis* that corresponds to the new situation in which the Cyrean army finds itself. They are in their most perilous situation: their mission has been a failure; their Greek generals have been murdered; they have no means of support to make a return journey; and they face the hostile and massive forces of the king. The narrator sets this scene of gloom, but he in no way anticipates for his reader the ending that his narrative will have: no reassurance that they will make it back in safety; no preview of the type or quantity of dangers they will face; and certainly no mention of their eventual hire by the Lacedaemonians. The reader starts from a position of ignorance about the coming narrative.³¹ As with the beginning of Book 1, the narrator has retained a large measure of narrative space. He then proceeds to develop his narrative as if it were a *nostos* tale, a tale of homecoming for the Greek Cyreans.

This is a key point to recognize in the story—that it is specifically a *homecoming* that the narrator is depicting the army as striving for, not just a return to Greek territory. Through his own explicit statements about their intentions³² and the words he puts into various characters' mouths, especially in instances where a leader is shown trying to motivate the troops,³³ the narrator insists to the reader that the operative word in the story of the Cyreans' journey is *οἴκαδε*, *homeward*. The narrator thoroughly establishes the rhetorical primacy of 'home' over 'Greece', both among the characters within his narrative and between himself and the reader.³⁴ It was impossible, of

³¹ While Xenophon's original audience might have known that the Cyreans had, for the most part, made it out of barbarian territory in safety, they had no way of knowing how this particular narrative of the Cyreans' adventures would proceed or end. They might have known the story, in a general sense, of the Cyreans, but they do not know *this* rendering of the story, and the narrator does nothing to prepare them for the tale he is about to tell.

³² See e.g. 3.1.2–3, 6.1.17, 7.2.2–4, and especially 6.4.8.

³³ See e.g. 1.7.4, 3.4.46, and 6.4.14.

³⁴ For a more thorough treatment than is possible here of this point, as well as of the development of the theme of the homeward journey in general, see Bradley 1994, 5–73.

course, to tell such a tale about the Cyreans because the army never had a homecoming. In fact, the greater part of the Cyreans never had any real end to their journeys, either in Xenophon's *Anabasis* or in real life. But it is precisely this goal of *nostos*, of travelling a 'homeward route' (ἡ οἴκαδε ὁδός 3.1.2), that the narrator develops from the very start of his renewed narrative in Book 3. By not explicitly announcing the direction or limit of his narrative and developing a goal that cannot be achieved, the narrator is exploiting the disparity in knowledge between himself, his characters, and the reader to build impossible expectations and to shape the way the reader understands the narrative.

In addition to what he says or what he has his characters say about going home, the narrator also fosters expectations and builds suspense surrounding the outcome of his story by pacing and balancing his episodes in cycles of rising and falling action, of optimism and pessimism, about the homeward journey. The reader quickly senses a pattern to the movement of the action within books and from book to book.³⁵ An initial positive mood quickly gives way to the onset of various problems and obstacles to the homeward journey. The action is narrated through to a climactic conclusion and pleasant resolution of the tension that had developed in the course of the book. The endings look ahead optimistically to a continuation of the action and a progression towards the larger goal of *nostos* in the next book. There are carefully positioned markers at the endings and beginnings of books to effect smooth and natural transitions. Nightfall and daybreak are used as devices to signal the transition from Book 1 to 2. Book 2 does not end with any indication of time, but by beginning Book 3 with night, the narrator carries over the mood of darkness and gloom which had ended Book 2. The army's initiation of their journey early in Book 3, then, represents a metaphorical movement

³⁵ The question of the origin of the division into books as we have them is not important here. Even if Xenophon had not labelled each segment of his text a λόγος, βιβλίον, ἱστορία, ['account, book, history'] or simply α', β', γ', etc., as in the various manuscripts, there are unmistakable divisions in his narration that would have led to the initial marking of books. Xenophon's narrative is not monolithic or undifferentiated. It contains book or chapter-like divisions whether Xenophon labelled them himself or not. See Jones 1913, xxiii and Macan 1895, ix–xi for two brief discussions on Thucydides and Herodotus (with comments on Xenophon) exemplifying the difficulties surrounding this topic.

from the darkness of Book 2's disaster into the optimistic light of the homeward march. This same device of nightfall/daybreak is then used between Books 3 and 4, with the same metaphorical connotation. Book 4 ends on the climax of *θάλαττα θάλαττα* ['the sea, the sea'] and the arrival at Trapezus, and Book 5 continues on that high note. Book 5 then ends with the opportunity of a fresh start afforded by the ritual purification of the army and the resolution of all the internal turmoil that had threatened the safety of the entire journey. The dinner party described at length at the beginning of Book 6 (6.1.3–13) and the feeling that they were 'getting nearer' (*ἐδόκουν ἐγγὺς γίνεσθαι* 6.1.17) continue the optimism of the end of Book 5. Cleander's promise at the end of Book 6 of an enthusiastic reception (6.6.36 ['we will receive them as grandly as we can']) is an inspiring climax which the army hopes is the signal that their troubles are over as they cross over from Asia to Europe at the beginning of Book 7.

The transitions between books are like scene changes. One scene is concluded, the next begins in a continuous, natural progression as part of a larger plot that is always portrayed as directed homeward. The dramatic tension of that plot is increased by the tantalizing false climaxes of Books 4, 5, and 6, each one ending with the feeling that the journey is all but over, that the hard part has ended. The action of each succeeding book, however, shows that there is still a long way to go, and, thus, the tension builds again toward another climax. This pattern of rising and falling action and the employment of irony against the reader (and of course at the expense of the characters he is depicting) to create suspense and tension has a number of effects. The reader is conditioned to think of the overall movement of the narrative as homeward. The reader gets the sense that this narrative will conclude with a safe and happy homecoming, and, thereby, a resolution of the tension that had been fuelling the narrative. Like the modern viewer of an action film whose hero escapes one crisis after another as he moves inexorably toward his goal, the reader is encouraged to anticipate a happy ending while remaining engrossed in the suspenseful drama. The narrator exploits the disparity in knowledge to keep the reader's interest, while fostering expectations that he will bring closure to the story.

It is the material depicted in this narrative strand (the movement of a Greek mercenary army out of Persian territory), as well as the

material of Books 1–2 (the attempt and failure of Cyrus), that constitute the historical nature of the *Anabasis*, that primarily make this work of interest and value to historians. Yet, even in the treatment of what is ostensibly ‘straightforward’ history there are clear manifestations of the literary artifice that informs the entire work: the insistence on the rhetorical primacy of ‘home’ over ‘Greece’; the careful patterning of the narrative in scenes and cycles; the use of irony in the development of suspense; and the ultimate subordination of this narrative strand to the treatment of the character of Xenophon. This last aspect, the decrescendo of the plot-line of the homeward march of the Cyreans and the concomitant crescendo of the plot-line of Xenophon’s own homeward movement, is the most subtle and deft move of the narrative. An analysis of the way the narrator achieves this provides the key to understanding the fundamental structure of the text, the way its ending is to be read, and, ultimately, its generic and rhetorical goals.

Central to this strategy is the way the narrator creates dramatic tension by emphasizing the character Xenophon’s unflagging patriotic desire for a *nostos*, while simultaneously signalling to the reader that exile rather than home awaited him after the journey. He frames the present time narration of the Cyreans’ retreat in Books 3–7 with three key passages that provide the reader with backward glances to his pre-expedition life in Athens and forward glances to his exile from Athens.³⁶ The treatment of the character Xenophon, then, is at work on three chronological levels.

Early in Book 3, in a flashback to Xenophon’s meeting in Athens with Socrates (3.1.2–14), his motives in leaving his home to follow the expedition are carefully portrayed as religious scruple and youthful indiscretion rather than a traitorous lack of patriotism. The narrator develops this passage, which marks Xenophon’s main entrance into the narrative,³⁷ immediately after he has finished sketching the

³⁶ Higgins 1977, 22–4 highlights the same passages in a discussion of the date and reason for Xenophon’s exile. He treats them, however, less as elements of narrative strategy than as pieces of historical evidence.

³⁷ Xenophon had first appeared in Book 1 at the moment just before the pivotal Battle at Cunaxa (1.8.15–17). Valera 1986, 186 makes much of this scene as an example of the way an author can dramatically introduce himself into his own work while remaining anonymous and dissociating himself as author from himself as actor/character.

condition and mood of the army at their lowest point (3.1.1–3). The reader is then quickly treated to a description of the thorough and inspiring way Xenophon pulls the army out of its self-pity and despair and sets it on the right track. The reader can view this portion of the narrative as a point of rising, optimistic action as the army begins its homeward journey. However, at the same time the narrator shines the spotlight on the emerging protagonist Xenophon, the words of Socrates concerning possible negative repercussions for Xenophon instill a mood of foreboding in the reader that will inform their understanding of the entire ensuing narrative as it relates to Xenophon.

The lengthy digression on Scillus in Book 5 (5.3.4–13) previews and emphasizes Xenophon's exile. The pleasant aspects of this 'fair place of refuge'³⁸ are set in terms of Xenophon's fulfillment of his religious devotion to Artemis, while his own life there is portrayed as the life of a resident-alien, an exile, rather than of a resident of his own home. This passage, set just a little before the halfway point of the narrative of Books 3–7, confirms for the attentive reader that some misfortune had befallen Xenophon subsequent to his participation in the expedition.

Near the end of Book 7, as he is describing Xenophon's last attempt to sail away home, the narrator adds a mention of an impending vote of exile against him (7.7.57). This passage is juxtaposed ironically to a scene in which Xenophon and his friend Eucleides fondly recall Xenophon's pre-expedition life in Athens and look ahead to a happy conclusion to his wanderings (7.8.1–4).

The narrator in that novel states that Xenophon 'never says "I" in his *Anabasis*' ('no dice yo en su *Anábasis*'), instead naming himself in the third person. Scholes and Kellogg 1966, 243 also comment on the 'striking absence' of named first-person narration in the *Anabasis*. What Scholes and Kellogg, Valera, and all other critics fail to note and pursue is precisely the character of this narrator who does not say 'I' or 'I, Xenophon'.

³⁸ Xenophon uses this phrase, ἀποστροφήν...καλήν (7.6.34), which Brownson translates, 'fair place of refuge', in his speech of self-defence before the army in describing what he has lost in the course of putting the army's needs before his own. This is probably another instance of the narrator's exploiting his superior knowledge to pique the reader's interest in Xenophon's particular situation vis-à-vis home. This is a peculiar passage: did Xenophon really know at that time that he was in imminent danger of being exiled and the reason? Who were the 'men far stronger than' he (7.6.35) whose hatred he had incurred? As we have seen thus far, it is typical that the narrator has left such questions unanswered.

The reader already knows that this optimism is in vain, and needs no explicit comment by the narrator to share this moment of dramatic irony at the expense of Xenophon the character.

These backward and forward glances frame, comment upon, and inform the reader's experience of the narrative of Books 3–7. The flashback with Socrates contains references to even earlier events (Cyrus' involvement in the war with Sparta), as well as to events far in the future (Xenophon's ultimate exile from Athens). The present-time narration of the encounter with Eucleides recalls Xenophon's life before the expedition and comments on his behaviour during the course of it (both in regard to his religious practices). It suggests as well (ironically, the reader understands) a means to a happy conclusion for Xenophon. Through this complex interplay of shifting, multi-layered perspectives the narrator invites the reader to share his own privileged perspective on the character Xenophon. This accustoms the reader to viewing the *Anabasis* not primarily as a story of the Cyreans' adventures, but as a personal odyssey of one man that is not limited by the chronological frame of the narrative of the Cyreans' journey, and that does not end the way the character Xenophon thought it would, but as the reader knew it would. The narrator has built expectations about the army's return home and played upon the reader's ignorance to build tension and suspense about its fulfillment. In the particular case of Xenophon, however, the narrator is working with the reader to develop a plot-line that focuses exclusively on this one character.

By the end of Book 5 the narrator has established these two synchronic narrative strands: the homeward movement of the Cyreans and the development of the character Xenophon. In Book 6 the narrator begins to bring his treatment of Xenophon to the forefront while making the Cyreans' story fade in intensity and prominence. By the middle of Book 7 this shift is complete, and the character and story of Xenophon remain as the sole energizing principle in the narrative. The narrator uses the theme he had worked so hard to develop for the narrative as a whole, the goal of a homecoming, to differentiate Xenophon from the rest of the Cyreans. He disentangles his two narrative strands as it were, by a subtle portrayal of their respective attitudes and actions toward the goal of going home.

The narrator had maintained that both Xenophon and the other Greek soldiers had signed on to Cyrus' mission with the intention of

returning to their homes after its completion. As the narrative moves closer to its conclusion, however, the reader clearly senses that there is no longer the same correspondence between Xenophon's motives and eventual fate, and the army's. As the army's eagerness to get home fades completely, Xenophon's grows keener. While the army finds itself unable to complete its *nostos* for one set of reasons, Xenophon is blocked by his own individual situation.

The narrator depicts five attempts by Xenophon to extricate himself from the army to make his way home alone. The first appears early in Book 6, and the last is set late in Book 7. These five passages are presented with an increasing degree of suspense and drama culminating in the mention of the impending vote of exile against Xenophon that accompanies his final attempt (7.7.57). Xenophon first tries to get free of the army and 'sail away' (*ἐκπλεῦσαι* 6.2.15) at Heracleia. He is stopped, the narrator says, by the signs he received from his sacrifices to the eponymous hero of the city, Heracles the Leader (6.2.15). When the army is at Byzantium Xenophon is shown trying three different times to extricate himself from the army to sail home. The first time, Anaxibius ordered (*ἐκέλευσεν*) Xenophon to remain after he had expressed his desire 'to sail away' (*ἀποπλεῖν*) on his own (7.1.4). Shortly after this, he informed Cleander 'that he was about to sail away at once' (*ὥς ἀποπλευσοῦμενος ἤδη* 7.1.8). Cleander advised him and Anaxibius again ordered him to wait (7.1.8–11). His attempts seem to take on a greater urgency as they are thwarted by the need to obey authorities, both human and divine.

The frustration of the army with their treatment at the hands of the Lacedaemonian command at Byzantium reaches a crisis at this point. The rationale for this treatment is never fully explained by the narrator. It is as if the narrator wants the reader to experience the same ignorance about the Lacedaemonian policy as the army, and thus share their frustration. The narrator portrays Xenophon as caught in the middle of the situation, and thereby prevented from returning home. The mood at the end of Book 6 was that the end of the journey and the troubles was at hand for the army.³⁹ In light of this, the whole opening sequence of Book 7 reads like a frantic dash toward some closure. The character Xenophon seems to think that

³⁹ See e.g. 6.6.36–8.

the journey and thus his obligations are complete since he tries to go on his own. The reader begins to expect some imminent end.

The portrayal of Xenophon's fourth attempt is the most dramatic, and serves as a crucial turning point in the narrative. Once Xenophon has brought some order to the troops who had stormed Byzantium out of fear and frustration (7.1.12–37), Cleander informs Xenophon that Anaxibius has been convinced, with much difficulty, to allow him 'to sail away' (ἀποπλεῦσαι 7.1.38–9). When Xenophon goes inside the city to join Anaxibius for the journey (7.1.40), the reader senses that Xenophon will finally have his homecoming. With Xenophon seemingly safely on his homeward passage, the narrator focuses again on the army. He mentions now, and for the last time, that the army was still aiming at a return home (7.2.3). But immediately after he states the corporate desire to return home, the narrator describes how the army begins to disintegrate as many soldiers sell their arms and sail off on their own or mingle into the local populations (7.2.3). At this moment, when it seems Xenophon will achieve his goal and the army will unravel, Xenophon is pulled back from his *nostos* as Anaxibius sends him back to take control of the army once more (7.2.8–9). The dramatic effect is like that of the scene in the *Odyssey* (10.46–55) when Odysseus awakens to find Ithaca receding from view as his vessel is blown backwards by the released winds.

By linking so closely Xenophon's best chance of getting home and the last mention of the army's homeward goal, the narrator achieves the shift toward which the entire narrative of Books 3–7 had been building. The driving motivation and defining goal of the journey as portrayed in this narration now pertains only to the character Xenophon. The narrative strands have been untangled. That a homecoming *en masse* was no longer the goal of the army as a whole is confirmed for the reader shortly after Xenophon's return. The narrator summarizes the arguments of various soldiers in favour of joining with Seuthes. Because of winter weather, they say, 'it was not possible to sail back home *for the one wishing this*' (οὔτε οὔκαδε ἀποπλεῖν τῷ τούτῳ βουλομένῳ δυνατόν εἶη 7.3.13). It is significant that this is stated in the negative, and as only one goal among others that an individual might have, not as the assumed aim of all. From this point on there is no discussion of or reference to the army's going home. Xenophon is now fully foregrounded as the protagonist of this

nostos-tale and dominates the remainder of the narrative. He is the single chosen leader of the army as they head into Thrace and is depicted as being at the centre of their experiences there, their difficulties with Seuthes over money, and the negotiations about the transfer to the Lacedaemonians.

While the narrator allows the goal of homecoming to fade from the reader's view in regard to the army, he continues to emphasize it in the case of Xenophon. He reminds the reader that those four attempts 'to sail away' had been attempts to sail away 'homeward'. He has Xenophon refer twice in a speech of self-defence before the army (7.6.11–38) to the time he turned back to help them after he had already 'set out for home' (ἤδη οἴκαδε ὠρμημένος 7.6.11; ἐγὼ γὰρ ὅτε μὲν πρότερον ἀπῆα οἴκαδε 7.6.33). The narrator then shows Xenophon trying to go home for the fifth and final time in the narrative. The two sections of the narrative leading up to this (7.6–7) were dominated by Xenophon. Sixty percent of the text there is devoted to speeches by him.⁴⁰ His speeches and actions in 7.6–7 are the culmination of the self-defence he is portrayed as having to mount all through the journey. The speeches touch on the issues of discipline, money, and, especially, the direction of the army. The narrative has become focused even more on the character of Xenophon, with a corresponding escalation in tension about how he will extricate himself from this situation and set out for home once more. The narrator relates, finally, that he was clearly 'preparing himself for a homeward journey' (οἴκαδε παρασκευαζόμενος 7.7.57). In the same sentence, however, he implies that, while it still made sense for Xenophon to prepare in this direction, it soon would not: 'for not yet had the vote against him been pronounced at Athens regarding exile'⁴¹ (οὐ γὰρ πω ψῆφος αὐτῷ ἐπῆκτο Ἀθήνησι περὶ φυγῆς 7.5.57). Socrates' foreboding of trouble with the Athenian *demos* hints at exile, and the description of the estate at Scillus sets the physical context of the exile before the reader's eyes. Now the fact of exile

⁴⁰ Xenophon responds to the troops' complaints about his leadership (6.11–38), and to Medosades' threats (7.4–10). Xenophon makes a lengthy appeal to Seuthes to do the right thing by him and the army, especially concerning payment (7.21–47).

⁴¹ I keep the phrase 'regarding exile' at the end of the clause at the expense of an awkward English rendering in an attempt to mirror the dramatic withholding of the phrase until the end of the Greek clause.

seems imminent.⁴² The reader is now made privy to this information that the narrator has known all along but is still unknown to the character Xenophon.

After Xenophon is dissuaded from this climactic final attempt by the pleas of his friends, he encounters his old friend, Eucleides, and enjoys a financial windfall after performing sacrifices with him (7.8.1–6). The remainder of the narrative (7.8.7–24) then reads like a denouement to the story of Xenophon. The narrator presents only two more scenes, each entailing a religious sacrifice by Xenophon followed by a lucrative raid led by him (7.8.10–19 and 20–3). After the second one, all those involved arranged for Xenophon to get the best pick in the division of the booty ‘with the result that he was now in a position to do good even for another’ (7.8.23). After this bit of good fortune for Xenophon, the mention of the transfer of the army to Thibron reads like an afterthought (7.8.24). The preparations had apparently already been made, and the Lacedaemonians, it seems, had been in command of the army for some time.⁴³ The narrator, however, has kept the details of this in the background, alluding to, but never outlining explicitly the status of the army’s relationship to the Lacedaemonians or the particulars of the transfer. It was Xenophon’s role in the affairs involving Seuthes, the army, and the Lacedaemonians, and the difficulties they caused for him, that had been highlighted. All the reader is told about the army at the end is that they are going with Thibron to fight Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus. Xenophon’s status at this point is even more elusive. He is left in a solid financial situation, enjoying the esteem of those with whom he had been engaged in pillaging. But where did he go from here? When did the vote of exile that the reader now foresees take place?

CLOSURE?

What is the reader to make of this brisk, elliptical ending to the *Anabasis*? It is not the silence about where the army is going next that

⁴² See Higgins 1977, 23, who asserts that this passage probably (although not definitively—see 150 n. 17) indicates that the vote of exile came shortly after the time in this passage.

⁴³ See e.g. 7.6.7–8 and 40, 7.7.10, and 7.8.6.

leaves the reader unsatisfied with the ending, nor even the knowledge that they did not ever go home. By avoiding any proleptic allusion to the conclusion of the army's march, and by thoroughly establishing *nostos* as the main goal of his story, the narrator sets up his reader for a disappointment of expectations. Moreover, by signalling no explicit *telos* to his narrative and by providing no means to follow the story of the Cyreans beyond the last sentence, the narrator leaves this narrative strand as a loose end. However, the narrator has long since allowed this theme of *nostos* to wither in the case of the Cyreans while bringing Xenophon to the fore as the true protagonist. The reader has become accustomed to viewing this as Xenophon's story. Expectations about closure for this narrative and, in particular, the central theme of *nostos*, therefore focus on the character Xenophon. An analysis of the ending in light of the autobiographical focus of the narrative and the narratorial strategy suggested in this essay reveals a more complex and productive closural strategy than may be apparent on the surface.⁴⁴

While the narrator never reveals how or when his narrative will end, and never brings closure to the story of the Cyreans, he does provide the reader with the critical tools to construct for himself the closure to the story of Xenophon that makes sense in light of the narrator's privileged perspective.⁴⁵ The narrator provides these critical tools by actively engaging the reader in a continual process of evaluation and re-evaluation of the narrative based not on what the narrator says *about* his narrative, but on what he says *in* his narrative. Through a dual strategy of withholding and sharing information, the narrator conditions the reader to identify more with Xenophon than any other character, and to understand the text from this perspective. The reader, trained in this way, cannot help but sense the absence of the 'proper' ending for the story of Xenophon, and this perceived deficiency generates the sense that it is open-ended and unsatisfying. The reader is then led to construct for himself an extradiegetic closure matching what would be the desired, satisfying conclusion

⁴⁴ Roberts, Dunn, and Fowler 1997 suggest a number of productive approaches to closure, but points out that more still needs to be done in the area of ancient prose narrative (see the introductory note to the bibliography on pp. 275–7).

⁴⁵ Conte 1996, 35 speaks of the reader who 'accepts the perspective of the author and so reaches this superior level of knowledge'.

for the character Xenophon—a homecoming. By supplying for himself what would constitute the ‘proper’ ending of the story, the reader collaborates in and completes the strategy of the narrator,⁴⁶ a strategy aimed ultimately at presenting Xenophon as a sympathetic character, desirous and worthy of a homecoming. Such a sense of closure must, of course, remain suspended and contingent, depending for its fulfilment on historical, extradiegetic events. Therein, however, resides the unresolved tension which animates the text and strikes a chord resonating beyond the point when the reader stops reading. The narrator has shown the reader how to read the ending, but the reader, in doing so, finds the character Xenophon at the end of Book 7 desiring a homecoming that for him, *as character*, must forever be deferred. The homecoming that the character Xenophon earnestly desired within the narrative was also, ultimately, the goal of this narrative’s author. The homecoming for the historical actor and author Xenophon depended upon the good will of the Athenian *demos* and their rescission of the penalty of exile against him. The text is structured, whole, and completed, yet there is still something left to be considered and resolved: Xenophon and his still problematic relationship to his home. This was likely the immediate rhetorical effect Xenophon as author was hoping for, and what has helped this text hold the perennial interest of readers.⁴⁷

The context of Xenophon’s authoring and disseminating his text was unique, and so is the text itself. The facts of his physical separation from his home and the absence of any genre suitable for communicating his message force Xenophon to forge a new literary, rhetorical, and performative medium. Xenophon exploits the established genre of the written prose historical monograph as a vehicle for communicating a message that, in more typical circumstances, would likely find expression in a public speech. In the process, he

⁴⁶ Thus Conte 1996, 35–6 speaks of the ‘competent reader’, the ‘intelligent reader’ able ‘to respond to the strategy of the author’. He also suggests that, ‘The ironic manner... is realized only through the collaboration of a reader able to satisfy certain requirements: of perspicacity and of adequate literary education.’ It is precisely the strategy of Xenophon to have his narrator provide this education for his reader.

⁴⁷ For more detailed discussion of Xenophon’s literary treatment of the political issues behind the expedition and his participation in it, and of other elements of his rhetorical strategy in the *Anabasis*, see Bradley 1994.

expands the developing potential of prose narrative, perhaps less in historiography than in fictional prose narrative. It is particularly in regard to strategies of inauguration and closure, and the self-conscious crafting and manipulation of narratorial personae that Xenophon makes his greatest literary contribution with the *Anabasis*.

Interventions and Citations in Xenophon's *Hellenica* and *Anabasis*

Vivienne J. Gray

Herodotus and Thucydides have benefited from the impetus that narratology has given to the analysis of historical narrative,¹ and Xenophon deserves this too, not least because his first-person interventions into his narratives and his citations of 'what people say' are, in the absence of prefaces for either *Hellenica* and *Anabasis*, the only evidence he gives us of his historical programme and his use of sources.²

¹ For example, Gribble (1998) on interventions in Thucydides, de Jong (2001) on the structure of Herodotus. I am indebted to narratology, but do not consistently use its terminology, preferring 'historian' and 'audience' to 'narrator' and 'narratee'. I restrict my inquiry to interventions in the first person because these have been the focus of debate, but there is a fine line between these and those that do not use the first person; I call these others 'virtual' first-person interventions where I do address them.

² Perhaps he wrote no prefaces in order to give his audiences an impression of unmediated historical objectivity; Gribble (1998), 41–3 indicates that historians can promote belief in their narratives by removing themselves from them or by engaging with the audience through them. It is certainly to objectify the account of his own achievements that he attributes *Anabasis* to 'Themistogenes': *Hell.* 3.1.2: Plut. *Moralia* 345F; MacLaren (1934); Marincola (1997), 186; and he presents *Hellenica* as a continuation of Thucydides to the same end: Marincola (1997), 237–8. However, this investigation of his interventions and citations will show that he is not as completely absent from his narrative as suggested by Marincola (1997), 10: 'The narrator in Xenophon . . . is not only unintrusive; he is practically anonymous. His works recognize the value of a mostly impersonal narrative told in a style largely free of rhetorical adornment, in achieving credibility.' Ibid. 69: 'Xenophon, as so often, leaves his methodology to be inferred from the text.'

The most recent discussion considers his interventions 'the closest thing that *Hellenica* offers to programmatic content', but concludes that 'their unhelpfulness is manifest' in establishing it, and that the anonymity and uneven distribution of the citations reduces them to a mere 'stylistic quirk'.³ This chapter argues that his interventions and citations do reveal a coherent programme and method and that this addresses the historian's requirement to narrate 'great deeds that provoke wonder'.⁴ Xenophon used these techniques to similar effect in *Cyropaedia*. Their analysis offers insights into his narrative techniques and his historiography.

FIRST-PERSON INTERVENTIONS

Most of Xenophon's first-person interventions are evaluations for praise and blame, which are recognized as one of his characteristic contributions to historical writing. Most of them address the leadership of individuals, though some also evaluate the actions of whole communities. They have been called digressions, but many of them are an integral part of the main narrative, which is written entirely to support them.⁵ They have been supposed to defend content that Xenophon acknowledges to be 'unworthy of account' because it addresses ethical concerns that are new to history,⁶ but, to be more precise, they define great virtue or vice in ways that are new, sometimes in content which is also new to history; they often take into account the circumstances in which the qualities are shown or the status of those who exhibit them, or reveal more important qualities than those that are apparent. Xenophon thus reflects the interests of

³ Tuplin (1993), 36–41, with n. 91.

⁴ Marincola (1997), 34–9 addresses this as a major task of the historian, but without reference to Xenophon.

⁵ Marincola (1997), 174, locates praise and blame after Thucydides 'mainly in digressions removed from the basic narrative'. This is true of Xenophon's evaluation of Cyrus and the Greek generals (*An.* 1.9, 2.6), and the praise of the Phliasians (*Hell.* 7.2), but not the praise of Teleutias (5.1.4), Iphicrates (6.2.32), and Epaminondas (7.5.19).

⁶ Marincola (1997), 21–2: 'Xenophon, interested in ethical questions, seems to chafe at the restrictions of political history.'

his teacher Socrates in ethical definitions (*Mem.* 1.1.16; 3.9.1–3, 14–15). Narratives had always revealed the qualities of their participants, but the definition of what constituted greatness was open to debate.

Narratology emphasizes the engagement between the historian and his audience and holds that interventions can address tensions in the reader–narrator relationship caused by unusual presentations or interpretations of events, or present confrontations between the time of narration and the time of the event in order to point to themes and improve the reader’s understanding.⁷ Xenophon’s interventions often address tensions caused by the reader’s superficial evaluation of the narrative as unworthy of record, acknowledging their impression that the events have nothing worthy of narration in them, but then uncovering a greatness that is not immediately apparent. They confront readers’ ignorance about what is worthy of praise or blame, and encourage them to question appearances and assumptions.⁸ They also direct their attention to narratives that exhibit a special kind of magnitude.

The pattern is illustrated in the evaluation of Theramenes (*Hell.* 2.3.56), the first intervention in that work (with the first citation). He ‘is said’ to have made jokes as he was led away to his death. Told that he would suffer if he was not silent, he responded, ‘Will I not suffer even if I am silent?’ And he tossed out the dregs of the poisonous hemlock with the toast, ‘This to the lovely Critias!’ Xenophon then intervenes: ‘I am not unaware that these sayings are οὐκ ἀξιόλογα, but I judge this admirable in the man, that with death at his side neither his wit nor playfulness deserted his soul.’ No historian needed to defend the inclusion of ‘sayings’ in history, but he might have to defend his inclusion of jokes to a reader of a serious disposition. It helps to know that Xenophon wrote *Symposium* precisely to re-evaluate playfulness; his introduction calls play as ‘worthy of memory’ as serious achievements (1.1) and he recorded Socrates’ own courageous playfulness as he was also led away to death (*Ap.* 27–8).

⁷ Gribble (1998), 49 and 50–1.

⁸ Xenophon’s virtual first-person interventions have this same function; for example, *Hell.* 5.1.19–24 confronts and corrects a reader’s impression that it was foolish for Teleutias to sail into Piraeus with only twelve ships.

His comment on Theramenes introduces this new definition into historical narration, acknowledging that the reader may think the jokes unworthy of narration, but uncovering, with greater perception, the self-control that lay behind them and was so remarkable in the circumstances in which they were made. He made no such comment on the saying of Pasimachus (*Hell.* 4.4.10), perhaps because, in the context of battle, he did not consider the reader likely to misinterpret its worth, but he makes Theramenes use one when he reveals the hidden significance of his action in clinging to the altar; he acknowledges that it will not protect him (this is the reader's superficial impression), but that his removal from it will demonstrate the impiety of his persecutors (*Hell.* 2.3.51–2).

Theramenes sets the pattern for subsequent interventions. *Hellenica* 5.1.4 acknowledges the apparent lack of 'worthy expenditures, perils and stratagems' in the preceding scene of farewell for Teleutias, but then uncovers the secret of great leadership that lay behind it. The evaluation of Iphicrates (6.2.32) acknowledges that there is apparently nothing special about his preceding preparations, but defines a focus of greater praise: that he combined preparation with speed. His choice of his enemies as colleagues (*Hell.* 6.2.39) also uncovers hidden worth; the choice seems to be against his better interests and no cause for praise, but the intervention reveals the immense confidence or immense good sense that the choice revealed. *Hellenica* 7.5.8 acknowledges that the campaign of Epaminondas was unlucky, but praises him for his foresight and daring, showing that great qualities can be found even in unsuccessful actions. *Hellenica* 7.5.19 acknowledges that there is nothing special in his ambition, but praises as greater how he prepared his troops to fulfill it. *Anabasis* has fewer interventions of this sort, but 1.9.24 also redefines greatness in the same way: 'It is no cause for wonder that Cyrus outdid his friends in doing them more service, because he was more powerful; but it was a cause for wonder that he outdid them in caring for them and in showing a keenness to do them favours (which do not depend on power).'⁹ The evaluation of the achievements of the Phliasians (7.2.1) acknowledges that it is more usual for a historian to praise the fine achievement of the large polis, but finds greater cause for praise in

⁹ *Cyr.* 8.2.13 evaluates the same quality in Cyrus the Great in the same way.

the many fine achievements of the small polis, because their small size made it extraordinary. Other evaluations redefine greatness with the virtual first-person. So Agesilaus 'won reputé' for an action that is acknowledged to be 'small' but whose greatness lay in being 'timely'; for it restored the morale of the army whose presence on the heights ensured the capture of the Heraion (*Hell.* 4.5.4). *Hellenica* 4.4.19 acknowledges that 'it is possible to say without doubt' that he was courageous, but adds, to reveal even greater courage, that there was a safer way open to him, which he did not take; this encourages reflection that courage is greater when voluntary.

Hiero 2.3–5 indicates that Xenophon's ability to see through appearances distinguishes the philosopher from the ignorant majority. Dionysius of Halicarnassus admired the same discrimination in Theopompus, who also exhibited it in his own evaluations: 'not only to see and mention in each event what is apparent to the many, but to search out the hidden causes of deeds...and the passions of the soul, which are not easy for the many to know, and to unveil the mysteries of seeming virtue and unseen vice'.¹⁰ Xenophon's acknowledgements of the unworthy appearance of his material anticipate what this unperceptive 'majority' might think without the philosopher's intervention.¹¹ He is of course constructing the reader's beliefs and may exaggerate their superficiality, but his construction allows him to advertise his discrimination in contrast and to overcome any resistance his real audiences may in fact feel.¹² His interventions also demonstrate a discriminating persona that gives him the authority as a historian that he might have more overtly claimed in a preface. Their characterizing function is made explicit in the evaluation in *Agesilaus* 2.7, where he says that if he praised Agesilaus merely for joining forces with fewer and weaker troops, he would show himself to be 'a fool' in praising such recklessness, and Agesilaus to be 'witless'.¹³ More discriminatingly he admires how

¹⁰ D. H. *Pomp.* 5.

¹¹ Narratologists identify these readers as 'narratees': Prince (1980). The technique of negating their views is as old as Homer: De Jong (1987), 61–8.

¹² Hornblower (1994), 152–8 has various interpretations of negation in Thucydides.

¹³ Arist. *Rhet.* 3.1.1 indicates that the technique comes from rhetoric, where belief derives from the character that the speaker projects and how he disposes the audience to believe what he says.

Agésilas had, with equal discrimination, prepared his troops to be the best possible. His discrimination may guard against the charge of prejudice, which became a serious problem for later historians,¹⁴ because it was supposed to make them distort the facts.¹⁵ Xenophon was the contemporary of those he evaluates, and contemporaries were particularly liable to the charge,¹⁶ but Lucian calls him 'just' in his evaluations.¹⁷ Lucian also says that the historian should be a 'stranger in his own works' to guard against the charge,¹⁸ but discriminating intervention achieved the same end.

Most of Xenophon's interventions are for praise, but he also presents new reflections on what is worthy of blame. *Hellenica* 5.3.7 acknowledges that when a master attacks slaves in anger, he suffers for it; but when a commander such as Teleutias attacks the enemy in anger, his status makes him even more blameworthy; his 'complete error' caused not only his own death but the destruction of the useful part of his army (5.3.6), and gave the enemy a new confidence that required the dispatch of a second army (5.3.8). *Hellenica* 6.5.51 finds the blame for Iphicrates' bad generalship greater 'in that crisis' because success on the occasion in question would have achieved so much; the vulnerability of the opposing forces is spelled out in the preceding narrative. *Hellenica* 5.4.1 reveals that the gods blamed the Spartans for their impiety in transgressing their oaths about autonomy, and the tyrants they installed for their injustice in enslaving their people; for they were both overthrown by inferior numbers, the Spartans by those alone whom they had wronged, and the tyrants by seven exiles, and such inexplicable outcomes had to have divine causes. The blame of the gods then marks these particularly great transgressions, rather than the merely human blame of the narrator.

¹⁴ Marincola (1997), 158–74 defines the problem; Lucian, *Hist. Conscrib.* 39–41.

¹⁵ Marincola (1997), 61.

¹⁶ Cf. Lysias 12.62–78 on the contemporary controversy about Theramenes. *Hell.* 1.6–7 paints a fairly black picture, which is balanced by the courage of his death.

¹⁷ Lucian, *Hist. Conscrib.* 39. Xenophon shows this justice in blaming Proxenus even though he was his friend: *An.* 2.6.16–20, and in *Hell.* where he both praises and blames Teleutias (praised: 5.1.4, blamed: 5.3.7) even though he was a half-brother of Agésilas, and gives Iphicrates the same treatment (praised: 6.2.32 and 39, blamed: 6.5.49–50), showing his even-handedness toward Spartans and Athenians.

¹⁸ Lucian, *Hist. Conscrib.* 41.

Hellenica 5.4.1 introduces a narrative with a statement of blame and *Hellenica* 5.3.7 closes one with a similar statement. Another category of first-person interventions announces the beginning of a narrative in which greatness is then subsequently redefined for the reader.¹⁹ So the introductory description of the battle of Coronea as 'unlike any other in our times' (*Hell.* 4.3.16) anticipates the new evaluation of Agesilaus' courage. *Hellenica* 4.8.1 announces: 'I will record those events that are worthy of memory and pass over those not worthy of report',²⁰ and then has Dercylidas define worth in a new way in the first episode it narrates about the loyalty of the men of Abydos, using the form of evaluation that Xenophon uses of Epaminondas: that there is 'no wonder' in loyalty in good fortune, but loyalty in misfortune is 'worthy of memory' for all time (4.8.4).

Some other interventions order the narrative without evaluations (cf. 3.2.31 and 3.3.11), but two major instances open and close digressions on the overthrow of great tyrants by very small numbers. These are similar in their content to 5.4.1 and seem to draw attention to praise for actions that are all the greater for being achieved by smaller numbers, just as the deeds of small poleis are greater as those of larger ones (cf. 7.2.1). *Hellenica* 6.5.1 closes the account of the assassination of Jason, who is called the greatest man of his times, at the hands of a mere seven youths (cf. 32) and of his tyrant brother at the hands of his wife and brothers-in-law; another introduces the assassination of the tyrant Euphron at the hands of a few exiles, and their acquittal (*Hell.* 7.3.4). Other introductory interventions draw attention to actions in which the praise or blame is very great for other reasons. The virtual first person intervention: 'the disaster to the regiment happened in the following way' introduces an account in which carelessness and incompetence secure the defeat of an entire regiment of hoplites by light-armed peltasts (*Hell.* 4.5.11). *Hellenica* 7.5.27 closes the entire narrative with a concluding evaluation of the indecisiveness of the final struggle, which so confounded all expectation, and introduces a narrative yet to be written of an even 'greater anarchy' to come, which the writer passes on to another to record.

¹⁹ *Hell.* 4.2.16, 4.8.1, 6.5.1, 7.5.3, 7.5.27 and *An.* 2.3.1.

²⁰ Herodotus uses this announcement too: 1.177, but without redefinition.

There is also a category of very brief interventions that occur within episodes to mark great numbers and superlative reputations. So *Hellenica* 4.2.16 'I shall reveal the masses on either side' highlights the great numbers who fought at Nemea; a citation then validates the especially large numbers of the Argives, who 'were said to be' 7,000. So *Anabasis* 1.2.5 refers back to 'the numbers I have mentioned' of men that Cyrus had gathered—large enough to worry Tissaphernes (1.2.4). Interventions such as 'I think' mark Cyrus' superlative reputation for giving and receiving of gifts (1.9.22), and his superlative popularity (1.9.28); in the latter, citation reinforces intervention: 'from what I hear (i.e. people said), I judge no man to have been loved by more people'. Interventions (2.6.6) in combination with citations (2.6.1) also mark Clearchus' superlative reputation for love of war.²¹ *Anabasis* 2.3.1 also refers back to 'what I said earlier' about the great fear of the Great King of Persia at the approach of the Greeks; his fear is made all the greater by the intervening description of how Clearchus controlled equal fear in the Greek camp. *Hellenica* 3.4.8 has the same arrangement; Xenophon says that Agesilaus controlled his anger, but showed it later; in the meantime he punished the person who angered him; but Agesilaus' anger was less remarkable than the king's fear and draws no comment.

CITATIONS

As indicated above, first person interventions are sometimes found alongside citations of what others have said, about the superlative reputation of Cyrus (*Anab.* 1.9.28), and the large numbers at Nemea (*Hell.* 4.2.16–17). The first citation in *Hellenica* is also found alongside the first intervention in the evaluation of Theramenes (2.3.56), so that while the citation validates his witty words (λέγεται . . . ἔφασαν), the intervention points to the self-control they revealed. Xenophon has at his disposal a range of narrative devices to mark what is worthy

²¹ The first-person also introduces material of special significance for the praise of Cyrus in *Cyropaedia*, for example: the super enthusiasm of his men (3.3.59), his excellence as a commander (8.2.6), his remarkable generosity (8.2.12). *Cyr.* also marks the disposition of such material, clustering in the arrangements that Cyrus made for his empire: 8.1.17, 40, 48; 8.2.2, 7, 8.3.1, 8.4.5, 8.5.2, 8.6.16–17.

of report, and in particular, in the case of citations, to validate it for the reader.

Autopsy was a powerful source of validation in historical writing. Xenophon makes no overt claims to his own autopsy,²² or that of his witnesses, but he evidently values it; he has his characters endorse it,²³ claims it in his other works,²⁴ bases his assessments of Cyrus and Clearchus on the universal agreement of those who had experience of them,²⁵ and cites Ctesias where his medical autopsy counted.²⁶ This makes it likely that those he cites for details of his information are witnesses. Their anonymity has deprived them of authority, and their irregular distribution has reduced them to a stylistic feature of *Hellenica*.²⁷ Yet their appearance in *Anabasis* makes them more than a stylistic feature; and Homeric speakers already give the anonymous voices of 'those who have seen or heard' the authority of witnesses.²⁸

²² *An.* is the product of his own autopsy and probably also *Hell.* 3.1–4.7. D. L. 2.51 says that Xenophon returned to Asia with Agesilaus; he probably continued to serve him until the end of the Corinthian War.

²³ Agesilaus' indication that Dercylidas would give the Greeks in Asia the 'finest' report of the battle of Nemea 'because he was there' *ἐπεὶ παρεγένεον* (*Hell.* 4.3.2) is not as positive about eye-witness as Marincola (1997), 69 n. 31 suggests, since Agesilaus may expect him to give an exaggerated account of the battle to impress the Asiatic Greeks (as participants customarily do: *Hiero* 2.15–16); Iphicrates is a better paradigm; he does not believe that Mnasippus has been defeated because 'he had heard from no eye-witness' *αὐτόπτου μὲν οὐδενὸς ἡκηκόει*, and he suspects deceit until he finds such witness (*Hell.* 6.2.31); he shows the same respect for autopsy in his campaign against Anaxibius (*Hell.* 4.8.36); he is blamed indeed for devoting too many forces to the task of eye-witness: *Hell.* 6.5.51.

²⁴ *Oec.* begins 'I once also heard him'; *Symp.* begins 'I want to reveal the events at which I was present from which I know these things'; *Ap.* cites Hermogenes, an eye-witness, for the events surrounding Socrates' death; the claims to have heard or been present punctuate the conversations of *Mem.* too: e.g. 1.4.2, 4.3.2.

²⁵ *An.* 1.9.28: 'from what I hear'; 1.9.1, 20: 'agreed by all those who seem to have experience of Cyrus': cp. 1.9.5, 23; cp. 2.6.1, 7, 8, 10, 11, 15 for Clearchus.

²⁶ Drews (1973), 103–16: he was the physician of Artaxerxes and wrote a history of the period covered by Xenophon's *An.*, but giving a Persian perspective and continuing the story down into the nineties BC. Xenophon does not introduce him as the historian however, but 'the doctor' who was 'at the king's side' and he limits his evidence to his witness as a doctor, such as wounds and casualties: *An.* 1.8.26–7.

²⁷ Tuplin (1993), 39 n. 91.

²⁸ De Jong (1987), 237–8 discusses *φᾶσι* in Homer; *Od.* 7.322 and 19.383 demonstrate that such voices are witnesses; *Od.* 3.184, *Iliad* 4.374–5 use them to supplement the speaker's autopsy. *Od.* 8.487–91 describes the effect of the convincing story, told 'as if' present as a witness or hearing it from one who was.

The major function of citations is to validate content that the reader might find too great to be believed. The writer engages with his reader to authorize: excessively large or small numbers,²⁹ sensational deaths,³⁰ significant reputations,³¹ great impiety or the activities of gods,³² significant sayings,³³ and that which is generally excessive.³⁴ *Cyropaedia* uses them in the same way.³⁵

Those who speak to the writer as sources do need to be distinguished from those who speak within the narrative to other characters.³⁶ The latter are more common and provoke reactions from within during the action, but sources comment after the event. The present tense might indicate a source, but there is a mixture of present and past reports on Theramenes' sayings and the present tense 'they say' can refer vividly to the past as well as to the narrator's

²⁹ *Hell.* 3.2.27 (said to measure out silver by the bucket), 5.3.2 (said to have killed 80 men single-handed), 6.2.16 (said to have a lot of money), 6.4.12 (the small numbers of the line at Leuctra), 6.2.30 (the tenth-part tithing of the Thebans), 6.4.29 (the huge numbers of sacrificial animals), 6.5.29 (huge numbers of released helots); probably also the 'great' silence and depression in the camp of the Thebans (3.5.21); *An.* 1.10.1 (the four stades of flight 'through his own camp' underlines the cowardice of Ariaeus and his men), 1.10.18 (the large numbers of supply wagons), 1.2.12 (another large amount of money).

³⁰ *Hell.* 3.1.14, 4.4.10, 5.3.2, 5.4.7, 6.4.37; *An.* 1.6.11 (the disappearance of Orontas' body), 1.8.24, 26, 28, 29.

³¹ *Hell.* 3.1.8 ('called Sisyphus'), 3.3.8 (most beautiful), 5.4.57 (very beautiful); *An.* 1.10.2 (beauty again), 1.10.7–8 (Episthenes), 4.3.4 (Hyrceanians) 6.4.2 (validates the sensational brutality of the Thracians), 7.4.15 ('they say that they use clubs to chop the heads off spears' validates more of their extreme brutality). Homer's voices also confirm reputations: de Jong (1987) as her category B3.

³² *Hell.* 6.4.7–8 (the report of an atheistic view) 6.4.30 (impiety), 7.1.31 (divine signs), 7.5.12 (divinely inspired madness), also 1.4.12 and 5.4.17 (omens); *An.* seldom mentions gods in the narrative, but 1.4.18 wrongly credits the fall of a river level as homage to the future king.

³³ *Hell.* 2.3.56, 4.4.10, 7.1.30.

³⁴ The enthusiasm of the troops and the tears of the hierarchy in the Tearless Battle (*Hell.* 7.1.31–2), bribery (*Hell.* 5.4.20), drinking (*Hell.* 6.2.6, 6.4.8), and extra-marital sex (*An.* 1.2.12). The enthusiasm of troops attracts comment throughout Xenophon's works (*Hell.* 7.5.19, *Cyr.* 3.3.59, *An.* 1.5.8).

³⁵ For example, reputations (1.2.1, 3.2.7, 4.6.11, 8.2.13–14, 8.5.28); things divine (1.6.1, 4.2.15); and the tears that prove the excessive and almost romantic love of the young Cyrus (1.4.25–8); cf. above the tears of the Tearless Battle; a good range of things excessive in other ways are: Cyrus' subjugation of all the races that fill the earth (8.6.20) and his enjoyment of perpetual springtime (8.6.22).

³⁶ De Jong (1987), 114–18; Richardson (1990), 70–82 defines such short reported utterances as 'speech-acts' or 'speech as action'.

own times. The distinction sometimes calls for fine judgement, but the very need to make the distinction shows how closely sources are engaged in the action as eye-witnesses.³⁷ For this reason, they include other historians only where they were also participants; this is why Xenophon calls Ctesias 'the doctor' rather than the historian and limits his evidence to what he saw as a participant (see below).

The citations do not authorize entire stories, only details in a larger story that the narrator tells in his own voice, but this is also true of Homer's. The strength of the device would be lost if it applied to the entire story, and a story in which every detail was sensational would certainly be beyond belief. So, Xenophon tells most of the story of Mania in his own voice, but cites others for her strangulation; her son-in-law Meidias 'is said' to have done it: *Hellenica* 3.1.14. The detail that exceeds ordinary belief is in this case the shocking betrayal of the woman's trust in a family member. *Hiero* 3.7 shows that such relationships were normally the most secure. He does not use citations where his own knowledge falls short, or because he disbelieves the report, or for any other straight research reason. It is to anticipate the disbelief of shock about Mania's strangulation that the narrator reminds the reader of his engagement with witnesses. He vouches in his own voice for other detail that was just as inaccessible to outsiders as the strangulation, but not sensational enough to require validation, such as her interviews with Pharnabazus. Similarly, he vouches for most of the invasion of Laconia, but marks with citations the 'near-miss' that almost prevented the invasion, as well as the huge numbers of the helots freed in that invasion. The comment on the significant near-miss: 'if Ischolaus had gone forward . . . they said that

³⁷ For example, what 'they said' at *Hell.* 4.8.34 is part of the action, whereas what 'was said' at 4.8.36 may be a source or a report that Iphicrates heard. An anonymous referee for *CQ* brought several examples to my attention, which could fall into either category. Those who 'said that' many soldiers turned up before Iphicrates, and 'blamed him' for his delay (*Hell.* 6.5.49) look like reports that were made in the course of the action; Iphicrates reacts to them when he ceases to delay. The ambassadors give the reports about Epaminondas to their assembly (*Hell.* 7.4.40); the Heraclaeots similarly report Lycon's threats to their assembly (*An.* 6.2.8). The characters that have crossed the river receive the reports about its source (*An.* 4.5.2). *Hell.* 3.5.21 looks like a possible report from the opposing camp ('they thought they were in great danger again and they said that there was great silence and depression in their camp'); otherwise the Thebans report on their own mood.

none would have got through this pass' (*Hell.* 6.5.26) validates a very significant turning point. The subsequent narrative makes it plain that the Thebans would not have been emboldened to burn and plunder if the Arcadians had not penetrated the pass and killed Ischolaus' force. The narrative can draw attention to the area of disbelief in various ways, including its language. *Hellenica* 4.2.22 highlights a turning point in a battle which gave the Spartans a victory with no casualties: 'as the first polemarch was preparing to engage the enemy face to face, someone, to their surprise (*ἄρα*) is said to shout the command to let the first ranks pass'. The particle registers how unusual this was in such a disciplined army.

The persuasive potential in such voices is their autopsy, but also the narrator's ability to confirm or deny their reports and produce further conviction. Xenophon confirms what 'is said' of Theramenes with his intervention; he confirms the murder of Mania more obliquely when he adds that Meidias 'also' killed her son; he sometimes adds a confirming explanation ('they thought' that Agis was unwilling rather than unable to take Elis—'for' it had no walls: *Hellenica* 3.2.27; 6.2.16: 'it was said' that Mnasippus was unwilling rather than unable to pay his soldiers—'for' most allies had sent cash); or presents the detail as the result of an account he has already given (the report that Mnasippus' mercenaries reached a very high level of luxury is the result of the preceding account of the richness of the land they plundered: *Hellenica* 6.2.6); or presents confirming statements introduced by the particle combination *δ' οὐν* ('at any rate', restricting the proof to a single detail, as *γ' οὐν* does); 'Cyrus *δ' οὐν* then paid his troops' confirms the reports that the queen gave him a lot of money (*Anab.* 1.2.10–12). *Anabasis* 1.10.7–8 thus confirms what 'was said' of Episthenes' reputation as a clever commander: 'Tissaphernes *δ' οὐν* as if he was at a disadvantage, did not re-engage.' The universal agreement of those cited confirms the reputation of Cyrus, 'agreed by all those who seem to have experience of Cyrus' (*Anab.* 1.9.1, 20; cp. 1.9.5, 23, and of Clearchus (2.6.1, 7, 8, 10, 11, 15). Very occasionally Xenophon dissents, for example from the view that the Theban leaders engineered the omens before Leuctra (*Hell.* 6.4.7–8). He states his own view elsewhere that the gods influenced the outcome (*Hell.* 5.4.1). Reports received by other characters

confirm this, as does his comment $\delta' \omicron\upsilon\nu$ that everything was looking bad for the Spartans and good for the Thebans.

The account of Cunaxa (*Anab.* 1.8) has special interest because of this interaction and because it includes the only reference to a named source in *Anabasis* or *Hellenica*. Citations mark the great moments in the two main phases of the narration: how the Greeks survived the charge of the scythed chariots of King Artaxerxes, and how Cyrus fought in personal combat with his brother. The narrator frequently vouches for two stages of the action but leaves the third more sensational stage to other voices to validate. He describes how the Greeks sang a war-song and charged (1.8.18), but others say that they clattered their spears on their shields to frighten the horses. There seems no reason why he should vouch for the first two phases, but not the third, except to validate their audacious courage against the chariots, which were the major threat. He has an almost live debate with these other voices to confirm the sensational failure of the chariots to inflict any casualties at all: (1.8.20). He asserts as if he were a witness that: 'There was a man overtaken, like one amazed at a horse-race.' Yet he adds that 'they said' that not even he was hurt, and as if bowing to their report, he denies all casualties from the chariots and accepts only the injury of a man who 'was said' to have caught an arrow on the left wing from the archers. He allows his sources to reject his own already minimal estimate of the numbers to maintain that the chariots caused none at all, and the only casualty was from the archers; this is his central conviction.

In the other phase of the battle, the account of the remarkable casualties that Cyrus inflicted, the narrator again vouches for two actions, but leaves the climactic third to a source. He vouches for Cyrus' charge against the king's forces, his victory and routing of the enemy, but Cyrus 'is said to have killed their leader Artagerses with his own hand' (1.8.24). He vouches for Cyrus' pursuit, his sighting of Artaxerxes and the words that he uttered as he charged, but 'Ctesias says' that he wounded him right 'in the chest and through the breast-plate', adding that he treated the wound himself: 1.8.26. He describes the wound that Cyrus sustained 'under his eye' and the numbers of those who died on his side, but cites Ctesias for 'all those who' died around Artaxerxes. Cyrus dies, eight of the best die with him and his trusted servant 'is said' to have died with him in a climactic act of

devotion, unusual in an attendant: 1.8.28. In *Hellenica* too, the narrator vouches for Derdas' pursuit of the enemy over 90 stades: 5.3.2, but his personal slaughter of 80 horsemen is vouched for by other voices; 'he is said' to have achieved this.

Ctesias has the same validating role here as other anonymous voices.³⁸ He is not cited for everything that he witnessed on the king's side,³⁹ only those features which challenged belief: the epic wound that Cyrus gave the king and the great numbers (ὁπόσοι) he slaughtered. His participation gives him his authority, and his authority is the stronger in that he is a hostile witness in the service of the king. Perhaps he exaggerated the seriousness of the wound or the numbers of the casualties in order to praise his own medical service, but Xenophon uses him to validate the power of Cyrus' blow against the king and the numbers that he killed. *Anabasis* 1.7.13 also uses hostile witness: 'what was said' about the numbers of the forces of the king came from deserters before the battle and was confirmed by captives after it. Xenophon doubly validates these numbers because they were so large. He may share the reader's initial disbelief, but confirms them with witnesses who agree from different conditions and loyalties.

Neither the citations nor the interventions are found very frequently. That would exhaust and destroy their power. On the other hand, their power is proven by their clustering in accounts of remarkable events. Teleutias' audacious naval attack on Piraeus, and Iphicrates' careful campaign to re-establish the naval power of Athens, attract two interventions each (*Hell.* 5.1.4 and 19, 6.2.32 and 39). Citations cluster in the account of Cunaxa above, and in *Hellenica* to mark the battle of Leuctra, where the Spartans met with a great disaster. The omens before Leuctra attract citation because they are one of the usual areas that strain belief. Other voices also describe the Spartan drinking that attended their last council of war,

³⁸ Herodotus also cites anonymous sources as well as named ones, for example in order to validate reports of the activities of the gods: 6.94.1, 105.1–2, 117.2–3.

³⁹ Plutarch, *Art.* 11 has him sustain the wound under his eye which Xenophon mentions, but then he wanders about the field, eventually to sustain a further wound in his thigh, rupturing a vein, and collapsing, not without also hitting his head on a stone. 'Such is the story of Ctesias, in which, as with a blunt sword, he is long in killing Cyrus, but kills him at last.'

which attracts citation for its excessive indulgence, as well as the very small numbers of the Spartans, who lined up for battle in threes in their enomotia and (in continuing reported speech) produced a line no more than twelve men deep (*Hellenica* 6.4.12). His familiarity with the Spartans suggests that his own doubt about their numbers is not the reason for the citation; rather the remarkable thinness of their line challenged the belief of the reader.

The Tearless Battle, which re-established the pride of the Spartans, has four citations marking remarkable features: that Archidamus called on his men to recover their ancestral honour; that there was ominous lightning and thunder when he made the speech; that the men were so filled with energy that it was a job for the leaders to restrain them; that Agesilaus and the elders and the ephors cried at the news (*Hell.* 7.1.30–2). Similar clustering voices confirm the details of the enormous power of Jason: ‘they said’ that his demands on each polis were very moderate, yet produced a vast amount because there were so many poleis that he could call on; ‘they said’ that he intended to manage the festival and the games himself; the god ‘is said’ to have told inquirers that these were his concern. The narrator confirms the reports in calling him the greatest man of his times: *Hellenica* 6.4.27 (captured in the triple colon of 6.4.28), and in describing him δ’ οὕτως as ‘being so great and having intentions so great and of this kind’. *Anabasis* uses similar clusters in the account of the relations between Cyrus and the Cilician Queen (1.2.12, 14). She ‘was said’ to have given him a large sum of money; he ‘was said’ to have slept with her; she ‘was said’ to have asked for an exhibition of the army. Women who act like men frequently do things that are ‘hard to believe’. Mania is another; there is also Alexander’s wife (*Hell.* 6.4.37).

It may be easily objected that source citation does not mark all content in a category. This is because other ‘strategies of verisimilitude’ are available.⁴⁰ Homer for example introduced an imaginary witness as a participant into the action being narrated.⁴¹ Xenophon calls on such a witness to visualize Agesilaus’ transformation of Ephesus into a ‘workshop of war’ (‘it was possible to see...he

⁴⁰ Schmitz (2000), 50–1 cites *tekmeria*, probability and witnesses among a range of ‘strategies of verisimilitude’ in fictional and non-fictional writing.

⁴¹ de Jong (1987), 54–60 for ‘visualization’ in Homer: e.g. *Iliad* 4.539–42.

made the whole polis worthy of sight... a man would have been cheered on seeing this': *Hell.* 3.4.16–20). Citation and visualization seem to be alternative ways of validating events: through the witness of others, or by making a witness of the reader.⁴² He heightens visualization with the metaphor, and a rhetorical question (3.4.18). *Hellenica* 4.4.12 similarly draws attention to the role of the gods in a rhetorical question and visualizes the sensational numbers of the dead in the battle for Corinth: 'Men accustomed to gaze on heaps of corn or wood or stones then gazed on heaps of corpses.' The same use of visualization is found in *Anabasis* 1.5.8, 4.7.13–14 and *Cyropaedia* 3.3.70, 7.1.38.

The narrator's choice of device lies in his judgement about the main focus of his material. Comparison shows that he reserves visualization for scenes where spectacle is central. The account of the reception of the news of Leuctra (*Hell.* 6.4.16) visualizes the paradoxical spectacle that the ephors produced: 'it was possible to see those whose relatives had died walking about in public looking sleek and gleaming, but you would have seen few of those whose relatives were announced as living, and these going around looking grim and humiliated'. The reaction to the Tearless Battle (*Hell.* 7.1.32) uses citation instead of visualization because the weeping is less visual than the contrasting appearances of the two groups of grieving relatives after Leuctra. The writer also uses the more argumentative techniques of the lawcourts, such as the *tekmerion*, for example to prove the early success of the Spartans at Leuctra: 'A man would recognize from this clear *tekmerion*' (that they were able to remove Cleombrotus' body from the field) that they prevailed in the first stage of the battle. This is not made into a spectacle and is different from citation in that the reader is more directly involved in establishing the truth from the evidence; *tekmerion* may be even stronger than citation, since it is so very rarely used (another instance at *Hell.* 5.2.6).

Xenophon's respect for autopsy makes it unnecessary to believe that his voices do not represent 'sources' in the real world of his research. Fehling believed that they were fictions in Herodotus (as in

⁴² Homer makes visualization an alternative to citation when he describes what 'you would say' (if you had seen it): *Iliad* 15.697–8.

the poets), designed to lend the narrative the mere air of authority. This at least acknowledges their persuasive function.⁴³ But scholars have since presented his views as one extreme of a debate, in which Herodotus is nothing but a researcher, or is a complete liar. The debate should really be about two different kinds of authority, which coexist: that of the real world of research, and that of the world created in the process of literary composition. The historian might have consulted many authorities in the real world, but when he organized their information, he determined where he would mark his narrative as 'sourced'. This is what happens in Xenophon. The research process ends with the historian in complete control of the compositional process. This shapes his material so much that there is little possibility of recovering the research process, which it overlies.

Xenophon goes beyond actual sources when he cites hypothetical reports of what people might say about: Agesilaus' courage (*Hell.* 4.3.19: 'it is possible to say'); the punishment of the Spartans (*Hell.* 5.4.1: 'a man could cite many other instances'); the Spartans; resistance against the Thebans (*Hell.* 7.5.12: 'it is possible to blame the gods, but also possible to say that none could resist madmen'). He also uses hypothetical alternatives without citation (*Hell.* 7.4.32: a god 'could inspire' such bravery in a day, but men would never achieve it without long training). Their potential expression does not rule out the idea that they were said as well as being possible to say, but seems to cast the reader as a source of the citation and engage him more actively in evaluating the event; the narrator again manipulates citations to shape his reader's reactions.

Xenophon occasionally leaves two reports unresolved, but these are not often mutually exclusive, as one would expect them to be if they reflected the problems of research (such as 'some say he strangled Mania, but others deny it'); they more regularly give complementary perceptions of a central truth which he endorses in his own voice (as he cites two sets of witnesses for the large numbers of the Persian army above). The shocking alternative motives for the murder of Alexander of Phrae by his wife (another case of a sensational family murder, like Mania's) characterize him as equally abusive in his personal relationships, homo- and hetero-sexual (*Hellenica*

⁴³ Fehling (1989). For the debate, see most recently Fowler (1996).

6.4.33–7).⁴⁴ This complements Xenophon's description of him as 'harsh' and 'unjust' in his public relations: 6.4.35. The reports that those who killed the Theban tyrants were dressed either as the wives of prominent citizens, or as revellers (*Hell.* 5.4.7), both confirm that the tyrants enjoyed low pleasures, which Xenophon says was their central characteristic (5.4.4). There are alternatives in *Anabasis* too, such as the two reports about the heroic death of Cyrus' *θεράπων*, Artapatas, who had leaped from his horse to embrace the fallen body of his beloved commander (1.8.29): 'Some say that the great king ordered someone to slaughter him on top of the body, others that he drew his sword and slaughtered himself; for he had a golden one.' The narrator supports the self-commanded death when he explains (*γάρ*) that he did have a sword; the suicide means that it was in free command of his own person that he deliberately chose death with Cyrus.⁴⁵ The preference for this alternative also confirms that Cyrus had in this way distinguished his attendant as among the 'best of the Persians': cf. *Anabasis* 1.2.27. This brings the focus back to Cyrus as leader, and thus reinforces the total effect of the alternatives, which is contrast to the different characters of Cyrus and his brother the king, the one winning the loyalty of good men through honour, the other, jealously, slaughtering them. This contrast is a feature of *Anabasis* 1.9. 29–31 and of Book 1 generally. The reports on how Menon's men died (*Anab.* 1.5.25): either massacred for plundering friends, or perishing after losing contact with the rest of the army, both present them as undisciplined, a characterization that Xenophon confirms elsewhere. The resolution of Lysander's two motives for remaining by the wall of Haliartus is also 'unclear', but both explain the central feature that is 'clear' and determines the course of the rest of the engagement, that the battle took place by the wall (*Hell.* 3.5.19).

The distribution of citations and interventions is irregular because of the irregular distribution of praise and blame and remarkable content. *Anabasis* 1 reveals a gradually increasing number of citations toward a concentration at Cunaxa, with interventions also culminating in the obituary of Cyrus (1.9). *Hellenica* has no interventions in 1 or 3, one in 2, the bulk in 4–7; no citations in 1, one in 2, an even

⁴⁴ These alternatives are also found in Herodotus: Lateiner (1989), 76–90.

⁴⁵ Suicide is self-chosen: *Hell.* 6.2.36.

spread over 3–4 and 7, with greater concentration in 5–6. Investigation of other devices with similar functions, such as visualization, might alter the pattern, but evaluations and citations should be representative. *Cyropaedia* has a similarly irregular distribution, with quite a few citations and interventions in 1, few in 2–6, but increasing over 7–8. The truly significant statistic remains that of *Hellenica* 1–2, which lacks citations or interventions before the death of Theramenes (2.3.56). Anonymous voices do evaluate the homecoming of Alcibiades on the day when the statue of Athena was veiled from sight: ‘which some said was an unhappy omen for him and the polis’ (ὁ τινες οἰωνίζοντο ἀνεπιτήδειον εἶναι καὶ αὐτῷ καὶ τῇ πόλει: 1.4.12); this validates one of the usual categories that attract citation (the gods) and anticipates those who interpret the ominous wind for Cleombrotus in *Hellenica* 5.4.17: ‘and some said it was an omen to signal events in the future’ καὶ οἰωνίζοντό τινες σημαίνειν πρὸ τῶν μελλόντων.⁴⁶ Yet this is an exception; the continuation of Thucydides (1.1.1 to 2.3.10) is (mostly) written on a smaller scale than what follows and has other variations. These have been attributed to an early phase of composition or the influence of Thucydides,⁴⁷ but other historians also connected fuller narratives back to where their predecessors ended by means of smaller-scale bridging narratives; the peculiar qualities of Xenophon’s bridging narrative might not seem so peculiar if their work survived.⁴⁸

Xenophon’s interventions and citations authorize his narrative in his own voice and the voices of others. His interventions encourage readers to question assumptions and accept his views about what warrants great praise or blame, sometimes in material that is new to historical writing. Socrates had taught him that nothing was obvious; even injustice, which seemed an obvious vice, was a virtue when used against enemies, and against friends for their own good (*Memorabilia* 4.2.13–19). Interventions also structure his narrative, drawing attention to episodes where the praise or blame is unusually great or capable of redefinition. His citations use the actual authority of

⁴⁶ Reports also validate premonitions of doom in *Iliad* 12.125–6, 15.699–700.

⁴⁷ The statistics are set out in Gomme, Andrewes, Dover (1981), 437–44; Gray (1991) identifies some of the differences as normal within *Anabasis*.

⁴⁸ See Gray (1991).

eye-witnesses to validate details that would otherwise exceed the belief of the reader. They do this even in disagreement with each other or their author, and are part of an arsenal of other persuasive devices, which it would be useful to investigate in their entirety at another time and place.⁴⁹

⁴⁹ For partial fulfilment of this: Gray (2004c). It is significant that Westlake (1977b), in his investigation of anonymous citations in Thucydides, though he saw them mainly as indications of uncertainty, acknowledged that some instances cannot be conveying uncertainty. In my view, Thucydides uses such phrases in the way proposed here for Xenophon. He thus marks incredibly large numbers, for example. At 2.98.3 Thucydides gives 150,000 as 'what is said' for the force of Sitalces. Thucydides knows the details of its various contingents (2.98.4) and does say that it caused great fear, which suggests that he is using it to mark magnitude rather than uncertainty. In another example at 2.77.6 what 'is said to have happened' is that a storm quenched the flames that threatened Plataea. Westlake concludes (p. 354) that he is marking his own unease about the implicit idea that the gods may have been responsible. In my view he is using it to mark the magnitude of the role that chance plays in human affairs, which is one of his regular concerns in his historical writing. He has emphasized the magnitude of the flames as something never created before by the hand of man and as 'great' (2.77.4–5) and he speculates on the utter destruction it would have caused if the wind had blown the right way. This enhancement of the threat makes the storm an instance of a chance of great magnitude that saved the polis from destruction. The very phrase 'is said to have happened' conveys this idea of chance.

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