

# A Greek Army on the March

Soldiers and Survival in Xenophon's *Anabasis*



JOHN W. I. LEE

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## A GREEK ARMY ON THE MARCH

*A Greek Army on the March* is a social and cultural history of the Cyreans, the classical Greek mercenary soldiers depicted in Xenophon's *Anabasis*. While historians have traditionally viewed the Cyrean army as a single political community, this book reveals that the soldiers' lives were largely defined by a pair of smaller social communities: the formal unit organization of the *lochos* ('company') and the informal comradeship of the *suskenia* ('mess group'). Drawing on an extensive array of ancient literary and archaeological evidence, along with perspectives from military sociology and modern war studies, the book provides a comprehensive portrait of the Cyreans' experience. It examines the environmental conditions of the campaign, ethnic and economic relations amongst the soldiers, the role of camp followers, and the practicalities of daily survival on the march. Anyone interested in ancient Greek warfare or in Xenophon's *Anabasis* will want to read this book.

JOHN W. I. LEE is Associate Professor in the Department of History at the University of California at Santa Barbara.



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## *Preface*

This book is about an army of Greek mercenaries who marched into Mesopotamia twenty-five centuries ago. Their objective was the fabled city of Babylon, but they never got there. In the spring of 2006, a former student of mine, once a history major and now a US Army captain, returned to campus to say hello after spending a year in Iraq with an infantry company. Ever the historian, he had wrangled a visit to the ruins of Babylon, and proudly showed me photographs. Looking at them, I was reminded that when I first started working on Xenophon's *Anabasis* in 1996, Mesopotamia was an abstraction for most of us. Now images of the war in Iraq appear daily. Eerie resonances between past and present occasionally emerge. For example, the mercenaries spent the night before the climactic battle of Cunaxa camped not far from the site of what is today Fallujah. As I write these lines, I am reminded again of both hometown friends and former students now serving overseas. I await their safe returns, and hope that someday soon nobody will have to become a warrior to see Babylon.

Santa Barbara, California  
July 2006

## *Acknowledgments*

This book would not exist without the generous guidance, assistance, and support I received from many people and institutions. Thank you all very, very much. I only wish there was space here to recognize everyone by name.

Lawrence Bliquez, Alain Gowing, and Carol Thomas at the University of Washington first sparked my interest in ancient history. At Cornell University, Judy Ginsburg, Charles Peterson, and Barry Strauss ably supervised the PhD dissertation that provided the seeds of this book. I owe a special debt to Barry Strauss, who first suggested I investigate Xenophon's *Anabasis*. He has been a model of rigorous, innovative historical practice.

The Departments of History and Classics at the University of California, Santa Barbara, provided a superb environment for research and writing. Apostolos Athanassakis, Randy Bergstrom, Beth Digeser, Hal Drake, Francis Dunn, Frank Frost, Mike Osborne, and Robert Renshan offered scholarly assistance and advice. Ralph Gallucci and Jack Talbott read and commented on numerous draft chapters. Jessica Chapman, Brice Erickson, Patrick McCray, Gabriela Soto Laveaga, and Paul Spickard made sure I got out of the office once in a while.

In Ithaca and Seattle, Dennis Ellard, Jean-Michel Kent, Michael Quinn, Nora Salvatore, and Sarah Stroup have offered years of unfailing friendship. I am grateful too for the enduring comradeship of Michael Dixon, Susanne Hofstra, Kathleen Lynch, Richard Neer, Brian Rutishauser, and Barbara Tsakiris, my *suskenoi* from the American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 1996–7.

I have been informed, challenged, and inspired by the example of many scholars in my field, from the early work of H. W. Parke on mercenary soldiering to the recent writings of Victor Hanson, Peter Krentz, James Roy, Christopher Tuplin, and Hans van Wees on Greek warfare and Xenophon. Any contribution this book has to make rests on the foundation of their research.

I received help from around the world during my research. Melissa Carlson, DVM, shared her expert knowledge of horses and other equids. 1LT Larry Cox and his fellow Rakkasans of 3–187th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) offered their perspectives on ancient and modern soldiering. Frank Frost taught me about cooking and meat preservation in antiquity. Kathleen Lynch took time from her research at the Athenian Agora to measure volumes and weights of Greek cooking pottery. Arman Oduncuoğlu went to great lengths in obtaining meteorological data from the Turkish Ministry of the Environment. Dr. Hakan Özhan explained the pharmacology of “toxic honey.” The staff of UCSB’s Davidson Library, especially in Interlibrary Loan and at the Map and Imagery Laboratory, speedily fulfilled my every request. A grant from the UCSB Academic Senate helped defray the costs of preparing the index.

I am extremely grateful to Michael Sharp of Cambridge University Press, who displayed an early interest in my project and has worked tirelessly on my behalf. Several anonymous readers for the Press provided invaluable comments and suggestions. Sarah Parker, Jodie Barnes, and the other members of the Cambridge staff efficiently managed all aspects of publication.

Finally, *mahalo nui loa* to my parents Samuel and Marilyn Lee, my sister Kammy, and my brothers Tom and Andrew. I could ask for no better family, and I dedicate this book to them.

## *Abbreviations, transliterations, and other conventions*

Abbreviations of ancient authors and works follow the style of Simon Hornblower and Anthony Spawforth (eds.), *The Oxford Classical Dictionary* (revised third edition 2003, hereafter *OCD*), except for the following:

Asclep.	Asclepiodotus
[Hyg.]	Pseudo-Hyginus, <i>On Camp Fortifications</i>
Onas.	Onasander, <i>Strategikon</i>

Xenophon's works are cited by title alone (*An.*, *Cyr.*, *Hell.*, etc.), using the abbreviations of the *OCD*. Archaeology, ancient history, and classical studies periodicals are abbreviated in accordance with the conventions of *l'Année philologique* ([www.annee-philologique.com](http://www.annee-philologique.com)). Other periodical titles are not abbreviated.

All translations are my own except where otherwise indicated. In order to make this book more accessible to non-specialists, most transliterations from Greek follow the Latinized style – e.g. Achaea, Arcadians, Cheirisophus rather than Akhaia, Arkadians, Kheirisophos – of the readily available Loeb Classical Library series. Technical Greek terms such as *lochos*, *suskenia*, and *taxiarchos* are transliterated more exactly, with singular and plural forms indicated, so Greekless readers who wish may look them up using the Perseus website ([www.perseus.tufts.edu](http://www.perseus.tufts.edu)). For clarity, final eta (ē) and omega (ō) receive macrons.

Measurements are provided in both metric and English units. For ancient measures of length, weight, and volume, see pages 942–3 and 1620–1 of the *OCD*. All figures resulting from calculations (multiplication, division, etc.) and conversions (from ancient to modern, or from metric to English measures) have been rounded up to two decimal places: e.g. 5.355 becomes 5.36.

## CHAPTER I

### *Introduction*

It all began with sibling rivalry. Darius II (r. 424–404 BC), Great King of Achaemenid Persia, had many children with his wife Parysatis, but his two eldest sons Arses and Cyrus got the most attention.<sup>1</sup> Parysatis always liked Cyrus, the younger of the two, better. Darius, though, kept Arses close, perhaps grooming him for the succession. Cyrus he sent west to Ionia on the shores of the Aegean Sea, appointing him regional overlord. Just sixteen when he arrived at his new capital of Sardis, the young prince found western Asia Minor an unruly frontier. Its satraps (provincial governors), cunning and ruthless men named Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, often pursued virtually independent foreign policies, and sometimes clashed with each other. There were also western barbarians for Cyrus to deal with. Athens and Sparta, now in the twenty-third year of their struggle for domination over Greece (today we call it the Peloponnesian War, 431–404 BC), had brought their fleets and troops to Ionia. The Athenians needed to preserve the vital grain supply route from the Black Sea via Ionia to Athens; the Spartans wanted to cut it.

The Achaemenids had their own interest in this war: after two humiliatingly unsuccessful invasions of Hellas in the early fifth century, they wanted to see Greeks lose. Hoping to wear both sides down, the western satraps had intermittently supported Athens and Sparta, but Darius desired a more consistent policy. That was one reason why Cyrus was in Ionia, to coordinate Persian efforts.<sup>2</sup> He made friends with the newly arrived Spartan admiral Lysander. Persian gold darics flowed into Spartan hands; the ships and troops they bought helped put the Lacedaemonians on the way to final victory.<sup>3</sup> In return, the Persians reasserted their old claims over the Greek cities of western Asia Minor.<sup>4</sup> To safeguard their interests, Cyrus and the satraps relied on an unlikely source of manpower: Greek soldiers of fortune.

<sup>1</sup> On Darius, Parysatis, and their sons, see Briant (2002) 612–20.

<sup>2</sup> Briant (2002) 600.      <sup>3</sup> Cawkwell (2005) 155–9.

<sup>4</sup> Briant (2002) 593–600, Buckler (2003) 39–41, Rhodes (2006) 149.

Mercenaries were nothing new in the eastern Mediterranean, but by the end of the fifth century unprecedented numbers of Greek hoplites (armored spearmen) had entered Persian employment. Many of them garrisoned the Persian-controlled cities along the Aegean coast.

In the fall of 405 BC, as Sparta tightened its grip on Athens, Darius took ill. He summoned Cyrus home; the prince arrived at the fabled city of Babylon with a bodyguard of 300 mercenary hoplites, a symbol of what Ionia could do for him. On his deathbed, Darius left the throne to Arses, who took the royal name Artaxerxes II. The satrap Tissaphernes took the opportunity to accuse Cyrus of plotting against the new Great King. Artaxerxes, believing the charge, had his younger brother arrested. Parysatis, though, intervened to keep Artaxerxes from executing Cyrus, and sent him back to Ionia. Cyrus took the lesson to heart. The only way to keep his head off the chopping block was to depose Artaxerxes and become Great King himself. He set about making his preparations.

Across the Aegean, the Peloponnesian War was coming to a close. In May 404, Athens fell to Lysander. The city was stripped of its fleet and empire, its walls pulled down to the music of flute girls. For nearly a year following the end of the war a murderous oligarchic junta ruled the city, and with democracy restored the Athenians would begin looking for scapegoats; Socrates was to be one of them. The victorious Spartans faced other challenges. Having promised liberation from Athenian domination during the war, Sparta now found itself ruling Athens' former subjects. The austere Spartan way of life provided poor preparation for the role of imperial master. Accustomed to unhesitating obedience at home, Lacedaemonian officials abroad alienated local populations with their harsh administration. Even wartime allies like Corinth and Thebes soon chafed under Sparta's overbearing hegemony. Then there was the problem of Ionia. While their struggle with Athens went on, the Spartans had acquiesced in Persia's expansionism, but now their attention began to turn eastward.<sup>5</sup>

It was against this backdrop that, probably in February 401 BC, Cyrus, now an impetuous twenty-three-year-old, again set out from Sardis. His goal: take Babylon, unseat Artaxerxes, and rule as Great King in his brother's stead.<sup>6</sup> At the head of some 13,000 mostly Greek mercenaries along with perhaps 20,000 Anatolian levies, Cyrus marched east from Sardis across the plains of Lycaonia, over the Taurus mountains through the famed pass of

<sup>5</sup> On Spartan imperialism and Asia Minor see Cartledge (1987) 77–115, Hamilton (1994), Buckler (2003) 1–34.

<sup>6</sup> On the revolt of Cyrus, see Dandamaev (1989) 274–85, Briant (2002) 615–34, Buckler (2003) 31–6, Cawkwell (2005) 159–61.



the Cilician Gates, through northern Syria, and down the Euphrates River valley into the heartland of Mesopotamia. Artaxerxes had been intent on suppressing a revolt in Egypt, but after being warned by Tissaphernes, he turned to face the new threat. Mustering an army at Babylon, the Great King waited until Cyrus was a few days away, then moved north against him.

In early August the two brothers and their armies met near the hamlet of Cunaxa, north of Babylon and west of present-day Baghdad.<sup>7</sup> The heavily armed mercenaries routed the Persian wing opposing them, but to no avail: Cyrus, charging forward against Artaxerxes, fell mortally wounded on the field.<sup>8</sup> In the days following the battle, the prince's levies quickly fled or switched loyalties to the Great King, leaving the mercenaries stranded in unfamiliar and hostile territory. Their generals tried negotiating a way out of the predicament, but the Persians had other ideas. After a shaky six-week truce, Tissaphernes succeeded in luring the senior mercenary leaders to his tent under pretense of a parley; then they were seized, brought before Artaxerxes, and beheaded.

Rather than surrendering or dispersing after this calamity, though, the mercenaries rallied, chose new leaders, burned their tents and baggage, and embarked on a fighting retreat out of Mesopotamia. Unable to return the way they came, they slogged north up the Tigris River valley, then across the rugged mountains and snow-covered plains of what is today eastern Turkey, finally reaching the Black Sea (the Greeks called it the Euxine) at Trapezus (modern Trabzon) in January 400 BC. From there they traveled west along the water, plundering coastal settlements as they went. Arriving at Byzantium (today Istanbul) that fall, the soldiers then spent the winter on the European side of the Hellespont, working for the Thracian kinglet Seuthes. Finally, spring 399 saw the survivors return to Ionia, where they were incorporated into a Spartan army led by the general Thibron. In two years of marching and fighting, the mercenaries of Cyrus, the Cyreans, had covered some 3,000 kilometers, or almost 2,000 miles – a journey roughly equivalent to walking from Los Angeles, California, to Chicago, Illinois.<sup>9</sup> Of the 12,000 Cyreans who set out with Cyrus, approximately 5,000 remained under arms to join Thibron. At least a thousand had deserted along the way; the rest had succumbed to wounds, frostbite, hunger, or disease.

<sup>7</sup> For the battle of Cunaxa see Rahe (1980), Bigwood (1983), Wylie (1992), Lendle (1995) 57–90.

<sup>8</sup> On Cyrus' death see Bassett (1999).

<sup>9</sup> I follow Xenophon (*Hell.* 3.2.6–7) in using the name "Cyreans." On the more common, but later, label of the "Ten Thousand" see Bonner (1910) 97, Stronk (1995) 22–3.

The march of the Cyreans fascinates on many accounts. Cyrus' machinations open a revealing window on Achaemenid dynastic rivalry and satrapal politics. His reliance on Greek mercenaries and Artaxerxes' attempt to destroy them dramatically symbolize the convoluted blend of cooperation and conflict that characterized Greek–Persian relations between the first meeting of Hellene and Persian in mid-sixth-century BC Ionia and Alexander's entry into Babylon some two centuries later. With its unprecedented mustering of more than 10,000 mercenaries, the campaign marks a crucial moment in the development of paid professional soldiering in the Aegean world. Perhaps most of all, though, Cyrus' revolt draws attention because of our main ancient source for the event: Xenophon's *Anabasis*.

Amongst the replacement generals the Cyreans selected in Mesopotamia was Xenophon the son of Gryllus, a twenty-seven-year-old Athenian aristocrat and sometime associate of Socrates.<sup>10</sup> A later biographer would call him "modest and superlatively handsome."<sup>11</sup> Having joined the army as a sort of observer at the invitation of his friend Proxenus the Boeotian, Xenophon stepped forward after Proxenus was seized at Tissaphernes' tent. At times as commander of the rear guard, at others as a skilled orator in the mercenaries' assembly, Xenophon played an active role in the army's successful retreat from Cunaxa to the sea and in its adventures along the Euxine coast and in Thrace. Three decades later, he set down his account of the Cyrean experience in a work entitled the *Anabasis*. Part military handbook, part ethnography, part retrospective self-justification, the *Anabasis* is above all a personal reminiscence of war, making it arguably the first soldier's memoir in world literature.<sup>12</sup>

Like Cyrus' revolt, the *Anabasis* has been approached from manifold angles. Traditional military historians have long mined the text for information on tactics and equipment, on discipline and leadership, and on the conventions of mercenary service. Those interested in politics and philosophy have examined Xenophon's panhellenism and his depiction of the Cyreans as an ideal, ordered society. Others have scrutinized Xenophon's evidence for Near Eastern geography and his ethnographic portrayals of the "barbarian." Yet others have followed a more literary bent, examining Xenophon's artful construction of a seemingly guileless yet subtly focused narrative.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>10</sup> On Xenophon's life and works see Delebecque (1957), Breitenbach (1967), Anderson (1974a); Krentz (1995) 1–11 offers an excellent short overview.

<sup>11</sup> Diog. Laert. 2.48.

<sup>12</sup> For the *Anabasis* as memoir and on the meaning of its title, see Lee (2005) 47–9.

<sup>13</sup> See below for more about Xenophon's style and the *Anabasis* as a source.

Although it draws on all these perspectives, this book is different. It is a history of the Cyreans themselves, an attempt to rediscover the daily rhythms of an army, not a generic “classical Greek army,” but a particular force in a particular set of circumstances. I employ three intertwining threads of analysis. First, I focus on the lived experience of ordinary soldiers, an approach well known to students of ancient and modern warfare. The second thread, that of military supply or logistics, is less familiar, but equally essential to understanding Cyrean life. The third thread, the concept of the army as a mobile community, began with Xenophon himself and has remained an enduring concern of *Anabasis* studies; I put a new twist on it by showing how the dynamics of small communities within the army shaped the troops’ behavior. None of these threads alone suffices to tell the story of the Cyreans. All three woven together, though, produce a remarkable tapestry, never glimpsed before, of soldiering and survival in an ancient army.

#### THE FACE OF BATTLE

John Keegan’s *The Face of Battle*, published in 1976, may well be the single most influential work of military history written in the past fifty years. Dissatisfied with a traditional historiography that privileged strategy and tactics, treated armies as sterile abstractions, and narrated fighting in stereotypical, bloodless terms, Keegan decided to examine battle through the soldier’s rather than the general’s eyes, from the “personal angle of vision,” as he called it.<sup>14</sup> Using three famous British examples – Agincourt, Waterloo, and the Somme – he focused on the physical and emotional dimensions of war at its most basic: how soldiers overcame their fears to advance into the fight, what combat sounded and smelled like, the effects of arrows, blades, and bullets on human flesh, the fates of the captured, the wounded, and the dead.

Keegan restored humanity to stale military history. Little wonder, then, that historians of modern warfare quickly and widely accepted his method.<sup>15</sup> In classical studies, although there had always been a few who combined conventional military studies with a concern for the lived experience of ancient soldiers, it took about a decade for the new approach to take hold.<sup>16</sup> Victor Davis Hanson’s *The Western Way of War*, appearing in 1989, explicitly acknowledged Keegan as progenitor, but went a step further. In addition to

<sup>14</sup> Keegan (1976) 42–3, 111–15.

<sup>15</sup> An important early example is Holmes (1985).

<sup>16</sup> See for example Griffith (1935) 322–4.

reconstructing the battle experience of the Greek citizen hoplite, Hanson also sought, by portraying the quest for decisive pitched battle as a defining aspect of Greek culture, to make an ideological point about the nature of Western civilization.<sup>17</sup> In a collection of essays on hoplite battle published a few years later, Hanson went on to argue that “in the future the pragmatic concerns of hoplites will not be a footnote to more conventional studies; rather they will rightly become the central focus of Greek military history.”<sup>18</sup> Battle, he asserted, and above all hoplite battle, represented the central, only truism of Greek warfare.<sup>19</sup>

Thanks to Keegan and Hanson, emphasis on the common soldier’s experience of combat has over the past few decades become a standard of Greek (and Roman) warfare studies.<sup>20</sup> Indeed, what was once revolutionary has now become so well entrenched that even books largely devoted to straightforward expositions of ancient strategy and tactics include an obligatory section on the face of battle.<sup>21</sup> The widespread acceptance of the approach has been invaluable for understanding Greek warfare not merely as an unreal game of faceless ranks and files but as the affair of ordinary people with ordinary concerns.<sup>22</sup>

There is no denying that battle deserves a central place in the story of soldiering and warfare. Keegan himself opined that “military history . . . must in the last resort be about battle.”<sup>23</sup> Nonetheless, if we want a full comprehension of the ordinary soldier’s experience, examining battle is not enough; we must go beyond the battlefield. Most soldiers in all times and places, after all, spend most of their time not actually engaged in combat. This brings us back to the Cyreans, who fought a single major pitched battle – Cunaxa – in two years’ campaigning. As we will see, they did a lot of other kinds of fighting, but combat was nowhere near the totality of their existence. Understanding the experiences of the Cyreans requires looking at the entirety of their lives, not just how they behaved on the battlefield. We must reconstruct the physical environment of the campaign and its effects on the troops. We must examine what soldiers carried, how they marched and encamped, where they obtained food and water, when and how they cooked, and where they disposed their waste. Acknowledging

<sup>17</sup> The book is now in a second edition: Hanson (2000). For an incisive critique of the idea of a “western way of war,” see Lynn (2003) 12–27; cf. van Wees (2004).

<sup>18</sup> Hanson (1991c) 253.

<sup>19</sup> Hanson (1991a) 3. His rhetoric notwithstanding, some of Hanson’s most important research has examined war beyond pitched battle; see for example Hanson (1998).

<sup>20</sup> See e.g. Mitchell (1996) 87, Goldsworthy (1996), Sabin (2000).

<sup>21</sup> See for example Daly (2002). <sup>22</sup> Hanson (1991a) 8, Hanson (2000) 6–8.

<sup>23</sup> Keegan (1976) 29, but cf. Keegan (1976) 30, which leaves room for “campaign history.”

these aspects of Cyrean life takes us to our second interpretive thread, the study of logistics.

#### LOGISTICS

If examining the face of battle has become a familiar trope of ancient warfare studies, the study of military supply or logistics has not. Indeed, logistics – shorthand for the feeding, maintaining, and moving of military organizations – is perhaps the most important but least appreciated facet of warfare in any place or period.<sup>24</sup> Yet the vast modern literature on military history has tended either simply to ignore, or at best to treat fragmentarily, how armies have been equipped and supplied.<sup>25</sup> Those who do tackle logistics tend to be a little apologetic about it, as if the subject were somehow not glamorous enough to merit attention.<sup>26</sup> The situation is a little better than average when it comes to Greek antiquity, where the philological impulse and dedicated scholarship have resulted at least in the collection and presentation of much of the literary evidence.<sup>27</sup>

The most influential treatment of ancient military supply, though, remains Donald Engels' slim volume, *Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army*, published in 1978, just two years after *The Face of Battle*. While the eminent Alexander historian W. W. Tarn had confined his examination of Macedonian logistics to a single passing reference, Engels made supply the key to understanding Alexander's astounding conquests. He combined close reading of ancient texts, mathematical calculations, and topographical analysis to create a logistical model for the Macedonian army that explained "how the availability, acquisition, distribution, consumption rates, and transport of provisions affected Alexander's strategy, tactics, and the timing and direction of his marches."<sup>28</sup> The method was not entirely unprecedented, for already in 1930 the British Army general Frederick Maurice had used topographical and hydrographical analysis to reevaluate the size of Xerxes' Persian army of 480/79 and its route through the Hellespont region.<sup>29</sup> Still, Engels was the first systematically to apply what might be called a mechanical model of logistics to examine the entirety of an extended ancient campaign.

<sup>24</sup> For the genealogy of the term see Thorpe (1986) xi–xxviii.

<sup>25</sup> Luttwak (1993) 3. <sup>26</sup> See for example Thompson (1991) xvi.

<sup>27</sup> See for example Tänzer (1912), Anderson (1970) 43–66, Pritchett (1971) 30–52, van Wees (2004) 102–8.

<sup>28</sup> Engels (1978) 1–3.

<sup>29</sup> Maurice (1930). The study by Perjés (1970) of early modern European logistics also seems to have influenced Engels.

Although less widely read than *The Western Way of War*, Engels' book has been equally influential, and with good reason. It provides extraordinary insight into the practical dimensions of supplying an ancient army on campaign: the complexities of moving columns of men and animals that could extend for kilometers, the problems of transporting large amounts of provisions overland, the difficulties of drawing water from a limited number of wells. Such is the usefulness of Engels' method that ancient historians have adopted it to analyze the logistical problems of other campaigns, including the Persian assault on the Greeks in 480/79, and Hannibal's march through Italy during the Second Punic War.<sup>30</sup> A few have borrowed the model to analyze portions of the Cyrean march, although not the entire campaign.<sup>31</sup> The book's reach today stretches well beyond classical studies. For example, several general surveys of the history of warfare, including one by John Keegan, rely almost entirely on Engels for their treatments of ancient Greek logistics.<sup>32</sup>

For all its value, though, Engels' book shares with most other works on logistics a highly impersonal view of the realities of daily life on campaign. If learning, for example, that 65,000 troops required some 195,000 pounds of grain daily heightens our appreciation of the Macedonian logistical accomplishment, we never discover how individual soldiers obtained their ration, how they carried and cooked it, with whom they ate.<sup>33</sup> To be sure, Engels did not set out to describe Macedonian logistics from anything but the commander's perspective, and his interest rests not so much in logistics itself but in Alexander's relation to supply factors. Nonetheless, his mechanical model largely keeps its distance from the realities of life at the army's lowest levels.<sup>34</sup> Reading Engels and his emulators, it is easy to forget that ancient armies existed not just as staff officers' ration lists, but also as living social organisms, comprising common soldiers, slaves, women, children, and animals, whose daily survival required the performance of essential but prosaic logistical tasks like foraging and cooking.

The reader may already perceive the direction we are headed: pairing Engels' emphasis on the practical constraints of logistics with the soldier's-eye view of Keegan and Hanson offers a promising path to recovering the totality of the Cyrean experience. Just as it is possible to reconstruct soldiers'

<sup>30</sup> Persians: Young (1980); cf. Tuplin (1997a). Hannibal: Shean (1996). For the extent of Engels' influence, cf. Manfredi (1986) 38–9.

<sup>31</sup> Lang (1992), Descat (1995), Gabrielli (1995).

<sup>32</sup> Ducrey (1986) 201–8, Jones (1987) 45–65, Keegan (1993) 301–5.

<sup>33</sup> Note that Foxhall and Forbes (1982) 80 make some important corrections to Engels' figures for grain requirements and bread production.

<sup>34</sup> See for example Engels (1978) 13.

behavior in battle, so too can we investigate the army's life on the march and in camp. The picture that such a combined approach can furnish, though, remains incomplete without one final thread, that of community life.

#### COMMUNITY

So much has been made of the Cyreans as a mobile community that it is worth taking a closer look at the various ways their society has been portrayed. Perhaps the most enduring tendency has been to concentrate on the mercenaries' political life. Xenophon himself started the trend: the *Anabasis* gives much attention to the army's politics and communal decision-making, its assemblies and speeches. Comparing the Cyreans to a stereotypical Greek *polis* (city-state) has been a scholarly habit since at least the nineteenth century.<sup>35</sup> Taken to extremes, it appears in Carleton Brownson's introduction, written in 1922, to his Loeb Classical Library translation of the *Anabasis*: "These Greek soldiers of fortune . . . have truly been called 'a marching democracy,' 'a roving commonwealth,' 'deliberating and acting, fighting and voting; an epitome of Athens set adrift in the center of Asia.'" <sup>36</sup>

Flaws in this formulation are easy to find. For instance, of the more than sixty Cyreans whose origins Xenophon records, only eight are Athenians; more than half the troops were actually from Achaea and Arcadia in the Peloponnesus.<sup>37</sup> More importantly, although assemblies were sometimes critical in altering the army's course, they were infrequent events until the Cyreans reached the Black Sea shore, more than halfway through the campaign. Most of the time, the generals made decisions without consulting the soldiery, and even in assemblies, the soldiers' role was often simply to rubberstamp officers' resolutions.<sup>38</sup> A *polis*, in any case, required much more than simply an assembly of male citizens. Children and wives, public buildings and temples, private households and shrines, not to mention a sense of common ancestry and shared customs, were its indispensable ingredients. The Cyreans themselves told Xenophon as much when they refused his proposals to settle on the Euxine coast.<sup>39</sup>

Even so, the notion of the Cyreans as a moving *polis* long persisted. Its foremost proponent, Gerald Nussbaum, divided the army into institutional components – soldiers, generals, captains – equivalent to the assembly, archons, and council of a generalized *polis*, and then enumerated a

<sup>35</sup> Bury (1852) 527, Grote (1852) XI.2, 191–2; cf. Dalby (1992) 16.

<sup>37</sup> See Chapter Three on the ethnic origins of the mercenaries.

<sup>38</sup> Stronk (1995) 27 and note 26. <sup>39</sup> *An.* 5.6.15ff.; cf. 6.4.7–8.

<sup>36</sup> Brownson (1992) xii–xiii.

bewildering array of formal relationships amongst these components.<sup>40</sup> Nussbaum considered this political framework so important that he denied the significance of life outside the assembly, asserting that in the simplified Cyrean political community, “the ‘private life’ of the individual and its interaction with ‘public life’ is also simplified and largely eliminated.”<sup>41</sup> Moreover, despite recognizing that non-citizens formed an important component of a “normal” *polis*, and that numbers of non-soldiers (“non-citizens” in his interpretation) accompanied the army, he deliberately omitted them from discussion.<sup>42</sup> The effect was an artificial view of the Cyreans as a monolithic creature comprising nothing but soldiers and concerned with nothing but politics.

While Nussbaum took the *Anabasis* as an objective account of Cyrean political reality, others recognize Xenophon’s artful narrative and subtle ideological purposes. John Dillery, for instance, sees in the *Anabasis* an attempt to depict the evolution and decay of a model community of order and discipline.<sup>43</sup> In a nuanced analysis, he demonstrates how the army’s shifting levels of unity and concord, changing objectives, division of tasks, and command structures both enact and contradict Xenophon’s utopian vision. Even so, Dillery, like Nussbaum before him, views Cyrean community only at the highest, most abstract level, that of the army as a whole. He does write of “an army of comrades,” but treats only the officers.<sup>44</sup> Thus we find Dillery asserting that in books three and four of the *Anabasis*, the soldiers themselves “do not figure in the narrative very much at all.”<sup>45</sup> That, as we shall see, is not the whole story. The soldiers’ actions, from marching to quartering to building fires and cooking, are central to any reading of the *Anabasis* that does not view events solely through political eyes. It is just that in books three and four the Cyreans meet only once in assembly, and that, for Dillery as much as for Nussbaum, is what counts.

Another view of Cyrean community comes from Andrew Dalby, who compares the army to a Greek colonizing expedition.<sup>46</sup> Thinking of the mercenaries as colonists is problematic, not least because the troops themselves made a point of refusing to found a colony anywhere. Nonetheless, by concentrating on what he terms “economic” aspects of Cyrean behavior – food collection and preparation – Dalby suggests an escape from the model of the army as an abstract political entity. He correctly observes that for

<sup>40</sup> Nussbaum (1967); cf. Mossé (1963), Aymard (1967). For critiques of Nussbaum see Perlman (1976–7) 242, Marinovic (1988) 192–5, Dillery (1995) 64–5. It is worth noting that there was not much modern scholarship on the *Anabasis* when Nussbaum wrote; he faced the additional challenge, as he remarks in his preface, of being blind.

<sup>41</sup> Nussbaum (1967) 10.

<sup>42</sup> Nussbaum (1967) 12.

<sup>43</sup> Dillery (1995), especially 59, 63.

<sup>44</sup> Dillery (1995) 64, 77.

<sup>45</sup> Dillery (1995) 93.

<sup>46</sup> Dalby (1992).



the Cyreans, finding food was usually more important than anything else, whether that meant assemblies or even getting home.<sup>47</sup> What is more, Dalby briefly argues for the importance of communities below the level of the entire army. The way he puts it, the troops “no doubt placed importance on the links between equals that are reinforced by certain kinds of food preparation and by communal eating.”<sup>48</sup> Community life, in other words, means not just politics, but also logistics at its most basic. Understanding everyday behaviors like cooking and eating as above all small group activities enables a whole new grasp on the notion of community.

#### THE STRUCTURE OF THIS BOOK

The triple threads of individual experience, logistics, and community, then, run all through this book. We begin with a pair of chapters explaining who the Cyreans were, where they came from, and where they went. Chapter [Two](#) lays out the march route and the changing environmental conditions the troops faced along the way. Chapter [Three](#) provides a portrait of the army as a whole, with particular attention to its changing contingent organization, and to its ethnic, demographic, and economic characteristics.

From there, we move to the heart of the study. Chapter [Four](#) concentrates on the set of small communities that most shaped the soldiers’ day-to-day lives. The first, the *lochos* (plural *lochoi*) or “company,” was a formal tactical and administrative unit, mustering about a hundred men. The *lochos*, the basic maneuver unit of the army, was also the basic marching and camping unit. A Cyrean could expect to live day and night with the same *lochos*, for the duration of the campaign. The second, the *suskenia* (plural *suskeniai*) was an informal small mess group, numbering at most ten to fifteen comrades (*suskenoi*; the singular is *suskenos*). *Suskeniai* developed within each *lochos* to compensate for the army’s lack of a developed logistical apparatus. Our focus will be on the pragmatic daily concerns of these communities – marching, quartering, foraging, cooking – on social interactions within them, and on the relationship between the structures of *lochos* and *suskenia*. Although *suskeniai* fostered the cohesion and effectiveness of their *lochoi* and of the army, it will also become apparent how the soldiers’ suskenic loyalties could bring them into conflict with the demands of the army’s formal unit structure. As we shall see, the daily mediation between demands of *lochos* and loyalty to comrades, not the occasional army-wide assembly, constituted the enduring dynamic of Cyrean experience.

<sup>47</sup> Dalby (1992) 23.

<sup>48</sup> Dalby (1992) 30.

To reveal the pervasiveness of *lochos* and *suskenia*, the following chapters delve systematically into the army's life on campaign. Chapters [Five](#) and [Six](#) work together, the former laying out the troops' arms and equipment, and the latter explaining their march formations and techniques. So too do Chapters [Seven](#) and [Eight](#), which examine bivouacking patterns and camp activities, especially cooking and eating. Chapter [Nine](#) covers medical and health aspects of the campaign, including sections on battle wounds, sanitation and disease, and environmental injuries like frostbite. Finally, Chapter [Ten](#) investigates the non-combatants who accompanied the army, including slave attendants as well as male and female companions. The Cyreans, unlike their citizen militia counterparts in mainland Greece, generally did not possess slave attendants or servants. As we will see, however, boys and women initially taken as captives over time became cherished companions of individual Cyreans and participants in the social life of their *suskeniai*. In the conclusion, I outline the wider implications of understanding the Cyreans from the "personal angle of vision," and tackle the larger question of why the army's overall logistical structure took the particular form it did.

#### SOURCES AND METHODS

Until recently, asking a classicist about Xenophon was prone to prompt polite condescension at best. Although praised in antiquity as the "Attic bee" for his pure prose, Xenophon was considered too simple and credulous for modern philologists to admire. His earthy portrait of Socrates earned few plaudits from those who preferred Plato's over-intellectualized version. As a historian he was typically compared unfavorably to Thucydides. Xenophon's penchant for didacticism, apparent in all his works but perhaps most prominent in the manual *On Horsemanship*, also did not endear him to the sophisticated.<sup>49</sup> As for the *Anabasis*, its widespread use in beginning Greek classes from the nineteenth century onward contributed little to help its popularity amongst literary types.

Whatever critics may say, Xenophon's *Anabasis* stands as great literature in its own right. It is a moving read, full of heroism, treachery, despair, jubilation, even dry wit.<sup>50</sup> Xenophon's style is perhaps best exemplified by the moment when the Cyreans finally reach the Euxine.<sup>51</sup>

<sup>49</sup> Horse trainers think differently; many in the US and UK still use Xenophon's manual today.

<sup>50</sup> Higgins (1977) 1–20, Hirsch (1985) 14–17, Dillery (1995) 59–98. For the literary reception of Xenophon since antiquity see Anderson (1974a) 1–9.

<sup>51</sup> *An.* 4.7.21–6 (transl. Dillery); cf. Rood (2004).

Now as soon as the vanguard got to the top of the mountain and caught sight of the sea, a great shout went up. And when Xenophon and the rearguard heard it, they imagined that other enemies were attacking also in front; for enemies were following behind them from the district that was in flames, and the rear guard had killed some of them and captured others by setting an ambush, and had also taken about twenty wicker shields covered with raw, shaggy ox-hides. But as the shout kept getting louder and nearer, as the successive ranks that came up all began to run at full speed towards the ranks ahead that were one after another joining in the shout, and as the shout kept growing far louder as the number of men grew steadily larger, it became quite clear to Xenophon that here was something of unusual importance; so he mounted a horse, took with him Lycius and the cavalry, and pushed ahead to lend aid; and in a moment they heard the soldiers shouting, "The Sea! The Sea!" and passing the word along. Then all the troops of the rearguard likewise broke into a run, and the pack animals began racing ahead and the horses. And when they had all reached the summit, then indeed they fell to embracing each other, and generals and captains as well, with tears in their eyes.

This passage well demonstrates how Xenophon's precise choice of words creates a scene whose details "seem to manifest themselves spontaneously even as [he] consciously focuses them into a coherent unity."<sup>52</sup> What is more, Xenophon draws striking characters: Dracontius the hoplite, exiled in youth from his native Lacedaemon for accidentally stabbing another boy; an unnamed mercenary from Macronia, once a slave in Athens, who realizes that the tribesmen blocking the army's advance across a river are in fact his countrymen; the "learned and beautiful" Phocaeen concubine of Cyrus, captured by the Persians at Cunaxa, who became a companion to Artaxerxes and eventually priestess of Artemis at Ecbatana.<sup>53</sup> Attention to detail and character are just a few of Xenophon's literary skills, and if scholars for long denigrated Xenophon, the pendulum now seems to be swinging the other way.<sup>54</sup>

The *Anabasis* is also, as Ernst Badian once wrote, "the only work that throws light on the facts of military life" in classical Greece.<sup>55</sup> In contrast to, say, Thucydides, Xenophon regularly describes the daily activities of soldiers on campaign, sometimes at length. He finds space to record the Cyreans' reactions to the physical and physiological stresses of the march: the effects of frostbite in the mountains, the difficulty of building a fire in driving wind and snow, the tastes of new and exotic foods, the emotions of

<sup>52</sup> Higgins (1977) 4.

<sup>53</sup> Dracontius: *An.* 4.8.25–26; Macronian: 4.8.4–7; Phocaeen: 1.10.2–3; priestess of Artemis: Plut. *Artax.* 27.

<sup>54</sup> Tuplin (2004b) 13–29; cf. Higgins (1977) 1–6, Georges (1994) xiv, Stronk (1995) 304.

<sup>55</sup> Badian (1979) 55; its importance was already recognized by Rennell (1814) 4.

soldiers who unexpectedly find themselves becoming attached to boys and women they had at first treated as mere captives or hostages. The care that Xenophon takes in constructing a varied and genuinely arresting narrative allows him to recount all sorts of episodes that other ancient aristocratic writers might have ignored.<sup>56</sup>

The *Anabasis* thus furnishes exactly the sort of material we need to study the Cyrean experience. Yet precisely because Xenophon has so deliberately constructed his narrative, we must not accept it unhesitatingly. We have only to reread the passage, just quoted above, of the army's first sight of the Euxine to see how the Athenian consistently places himself at the center of the action, whether in battle, on the march, or in assembly. Sometimes he takes credit for tactical innovations that may not have been entirely his own.<sup>57</sup> And, especially when the Cyreans run into difficulties along the Euxine coast, Xenophon carefully exculpates himself while skillfully denigrating his opponents. All of this has led some to judge him a self-justifying apologist.<sup>58</sup>

There are other criticisms. For one thing, Xenophon was a young man when he marched with Cyrus. Not until several decades later, his memories dimmed by time, did he sit down to write the *Anabasis*.<sup>59</sup> Nor was he the only Cyrean to pen a narrative of the campaign. There may once have existed several other accounts, none of which survive today – Sophænetus of Stymphalus, another Cyrean general, is known to have written one; perhaps these others were more accurate.<sup>60</sup> Furthermore, like virtually every classical Greek author, Xenophon was a wealthy, aristocratic male; an anti-democrat, laconophile, and panhellenist, he had many axes to grind. We must, in reading the *Anabasis*, always remember these biases.

Nevertheless, as William Higgins points out, it also bears remembering that “Xenophon figures so much in the *Anabasis* . . . because it is about him and his life; it is avowedly, not deceitfully or apologetically, one-sided.”<sup>61</sup> Moreover, for all that Xenophon emphasizes himself, he acknowledges his failings and limits along with his successes.<sup>62</sup> Furthermore, Xenophon

<sup>56</sup> Tuplin (2003a) 1629.

<sup>57</sup> For two examples of this tendency, see the discussion of *lochos* attack columns in Chapter Four and of hollow square (*plaision*) formation in Chapter Six.

<sup>58</sup> Most notably, Dürrbach (1893) found in Xenophon “une habilité d’apologiste.”

<sup>59</sup> Whether Xenophon kept detailed journals during the march on which he subsequently based his text remains debated. Cawkwell (2004) 54–5 makes a strong negative case, but Tuplin (1991) 45–7 allows for some sort of written record; cf. Roy (1968b). For the date of composition of the *Anabasis* see Lee (2005) 44–5.

<sup>60</sup> Breitenbach (1967) 1649, Stylianou (2004) 69–72; cf. Bassett (1999) 483.

<sup>61</sup> Higgins (1977) 96. <sup>62</sup> Seelinger (1997) 30.

shared in every day of the march, and the stories of otherwise forgotten common soldiers he preserves must reflect some real intimacy with their actual social conditions.<sup>63</sup> It is telling that much of the behavior he describes seems antithetical to the values of an aristocratic, wealthy, oligarchic Athenian. We should, therefore, give Xenophon some credit for, at least sometimes, telling the truth. We need not trust him unreservedly, but at a certain point we must rely on the presumption that he set out to record parts of the army's experience truthfully.<sup>64</sup>

For those reluctant to trust Xenophon at all, there is an alternative. Even if, and perhaps especially because, every sentence of the *Anabasis* represents a conscious literary construction by a highly self-aware author, we can nevertheless read "under" Xenophon. We are searching for recurrent, constant, typical behaviors – for such constituted the daily lives of the Cyreans – and Xenophon, despite his own self-awareness, repeatedly provides the evidence for these activities. In taking this approach, we can appeal to the wisdom of Jacob Burckhardt, who made a similar method central to his practice of cultural history:<sup>65</sup>

Cultural history . . . consists for the most part of material conveyed in an unintentional, disinterested or even involuntary way by sources and monuments; they betray their secrets unconsciously and even, paradoxically, through fictitious elaboration, quite apart from the material details they may set out to record and glorify, and are thus doubly instructive for the cultural historian.

So it is with Xenophon and the *Anabasis*. If, in the course of narrating the campaign, Xenophon makes offhand, repeated remarks about soldiers' everyday behavior, we can accept these statements as useful evidence, even if they are embedded in an otherwise self-interested, selective narrative.<sup>66</sup> To put it another way, consider Italo Calvino's remark that reading the *Anabasis* is like watching a black-and-white war documentary on late night TV.<sup>67</sup> Whatever Xenophon's voice-over is saying, in his flickering shots of Cyreans struggling against enemies and weather we can catch the candid images, gestures, and exchanges that reveal the army's inner workings.

Although the *Anabasis* forms the core of our evidence, in the coming chapters we will have occasion to consult Xenophon's other works for supplementary or comparative information. Most notably, there is the

<sup>63</sup> Cf. Dillery (1995) 64.

<sup>64</sup> Naturally, this does not mean never admitting ignorance. We will in the coming pages repeatedly face the frustrating truth that numerous aspects of Cyrean life can simply never be completely recovered.

<sup>65</sup> Burckhardt (1998) 5.

<sup>66</sup> For a similar approach, cf. Roy (2004) 264–5.

<sup>67</sup> Calvino (1999) 19.

*Cyropaedia*, a fictionalized biography of Cyrus the Great, founder of the Persian Empire.<sup>68</sup> *Anabasis* and *Cyropaedia* have often been seen as a pair, the former a work of memory, the latter of imagination.<sup>69</sup> Xenophon may have exaggerated his prominence amongst the Cyreans, but if he wanted to distort the realities of life on the march he could have presented in the *Anabasis* an army with perfect logistics and planning.<sup>70</sup> In fact, he does not. It is striking in this respect to compare the real difficulties the Cyreans faced with the idealized Persian army of the *Cyropaedia*, and there will arise several opportunities to make this comparison in the coming chapters.

Other ancient sources offer little specifically on the Cyrean campaign. Plutarch's biography of Artaxerxes, for instance, presents only information on prominent personalities, notably the subsequent career of Cyrus' Phocaeen concubine, and has nothing to say about the mercenaries after Cunaxa. Likewise, the account of Diodorus Siculus, perhaps little more than an epitome of Ephorus, affords only a bare summary of events Xenophon records at length.<sup>71</sup> These other sources do reveal something about Xenophon the author. For example, Diodorus' account barely mentions Xenophon.<sup>72</sup> The conclusion quickly follows that Xenophon exaggerated his prominence in the campaign. As we have already seen, though, careful reading of the *Anabasis* alone suggests this conclusion even without reference to Diodorus. More important is that neither Diodorus nor any of the other ancient sources provide more or better information about the Cyreans than does the *Anabasis*.

Ancient sources both Greek and Roman, however, do furnish some valuable supplementary and comparative information, especially about clothing and shoes, tents, camp layout, and everyday logistical tasks. The archaeological and art-historical evidence is helpful too, but as we will see in Chapter [Five](#) has its own difficulties. We will also have occasion to employ analogies and examples drawn from studies of modern armies, particularly by military sociologists. All such comparative material, as we will discover, is sometimes more useful for highlighting the divergences, rather than the similarities, between the mercenaries' behavior and the practices of other armies. It is in these contrasts that the particular lines of Cyrean life often stand out the most clearly. Finally, to supplement Xenophon's descriptions

<sup>68</sup> On the *Cyropaedia* see Due (1989), Tatum (1989), Nadon (2001); cf. Hirsch (1985) 6–13 and 61–100.

<sup>69</sup> Tatum (1989) 41–5, Tatum (1994) 17–18, Tuplin (1997b).

<sup>70</sup> Similarly, many of the Cyrean combats Xenophon narrates are far from the artificially perfect staff-college *exempla* that they are often considered; see Tuplin (1991) 46–7.

<sup>71</sup> For the latest opposing views on Diodorus and his source(s), see Cawkwell (2004) and Stylianou (2004).

<sup>72</sup> Diod. 14.19.1–14.31.5, 14.37.1; Westlake (1987).

of the soldiers' health, hygiene, and diet, or to fill in what he leaves out, we will consult modern reference works including medical manuals, nutritional guides, and sanitation handbooks. Here at least we can rest secure in assuming that however much the Cyreans differed culturally from us, they were physiologically as human as we are.

In sum, our analysis of the mercenaries of Cyrus combines the personal angle of vision introduced by Keegan and Hanson, the logistical perspective of Engels, and Dalby's emphasis on soldiers' small communities. It is a study grounded in Xenophon's text, tempered with a constant awareness that his narrative should never be accepted unquestioningly, and making as full and appropriate use as possible of comparative evidence. Let us begin, then, to discover the Cyreans.

## CHAPTER 2

### *The march route*

Open most any book on the *Anabasis* and you will find a map of the Cyreans' march. Invariably this is in stark black and white, the army's route traced decisively against a backdrop of cities, rivers, and mountains; the map in this chapter (Map 2.1) is little different.<sup>1</sup> Maps enable modern readers to comprehend Xenophon's narrative visually. They show the magnitude of the trek, all 3,000 kilometers of it. They allow us to place the Cyreans geographically as no ancient reader ever could have. Little wonder that figuring out exactly what path the Cyreans took from Ionia to Cunaxa and back again has been an enduring concern of *Anabasis* studies. Indeed, scholars have been producing reconstructions of the army's route since at least the eighteenth century.<sup>2</sup> Thanks to them, we can now trace the Cyreans' footsteps fairly precisely, although some of the most vexing topographical questions, especially for central Anatolia, can never be definitively resolved.

What maps are not so good at conveying, though, are the changing conditions the Cyreans encountered during successive stages of the campaign. To be sure, much attention has been paid to Xenophon's descriptions of weather and climate, often in attempts to fix an absolute chronology for the march. Yet, we can do more to set the Cyreans into their world. Call it an environmental rather than a topographical approach. Dividing the campaign into six stages or periods provides a clearer view of the physical realities that shaped the army's behavior. Conditions during each period were by no means wholly uniform, but each possesses enough climatic, geographic, logistical, and military similarity to warrant consideration as a unit.

<sup>1</sup> For another overview map see Dillery (2001) 44–5. For detailed maps of each section of the route consult Lendle (1995) and Talbert (2000).

<sup>2</sup> Rennell (1814), Ainsworth (1844), Koch (1850), Robiou (1873), Boucher (1913), Segl (1925), Manfredi (1986), Lendle (1995), Hewsen (2001). Rood (2004) 134–61 surveys the nineteenth- and twentieth-century geographers of the *Anabasis*.



Recovering the geographical, logistical, and military aspects of each period is the easier part of the task. Xenophon of course provides the core of our evidence; modern topographical, anthropological, and agricultural research helps fill in what he leaves out. For climate and weather, including temperature, precipitation, sunlight, and winds, we can correlate Xenophon's testimony with modern climatological and astronomical data. Fortunately, the climate of Anatolia and the Middle East in the fifth and fourth centuries BC appears overall to have been similar to today's.<sup>3</sup> Performing this correlation, however, requires fixing an absolute chronology for the march.

When did the Cyreans leave Sardis? The year, at least, is not in doubt: 401 BC.<sup>4</sup> Maddeningly, however, while Xenophon furnishes a fairly full accounting of the relative chronology of the campaign, including tallies of march days and lengths for about half the route, he gives no absolute indication of when the expedition began.<sup>5</sup> No other ancient source fills this gap, and the traditional departure date of March 6 is just an educated guess handed down from the nineteenth century.<sup>6</sup> Some, arguing that a March departure does not accord with environmental conditions described in the *Anabasis*, have advocated a late chronology, with the army leaving Sardis in April.<sup>7</sup> Glombiowski, however, has demonstrated that an earlier departure, with the campaign beginning in February, best matches both ancient and modern evidence, and his chronology has been adopted, with some modifications, here.<sup>8</sup>

Even with the expedition's start date fixed, there are some limitations to keep in mind. Xenophon was not on a geographical expedition, and episodes of severe weather tend to enter his narrative only selectively. In Carduchia, for instance, he notes the first heavy autumn rainstorm to emphasize the Cyreans' logistical predicament: they would have liked to take shelter, but lack of provisions made it necessary to keep going. He juxtaposes a second downpour with the beginning of an operation to seize an enemy-held ridge, and mentions a heavy fog the following day to explain the army's successful advance.<sup>9</sup> The snows of Armenia, likewise, make their appearance to highlight the generals' decisions or the soldiers' sufferings.<sup>10</sup> It probably rained and snowed, in other words, more often than Xenophon

<sup>3</sup> Beaumont et al. (1988) 117, Kuniholm (1990) 649, Sallares (1991) 391, Lemcke and Sturm (1996) 653–78.

<sup>4</sup> Diod. 14.19.1; Bickerman (1980) 138–9. <sup>5</sup> On these tallies see Tuplin (1997a).

<sup>6</sup> Koch (1850); cf. Boucher (1913). <sup>7</sup> Lendle (1984) 210–11, Lendle (1995) 291.


<sup>8</sup> Glombiowski (1994); see Table 1 for the complete chronology.

<sup>9</sup> *An.* 4.1.15, 4.2.2, 4.2.7. <sup>10</sup> *An.* 4.4.7–13, 4.5.1–22, 4.6.1–3.



Map 2.1 The march of the Cyreans, 401–399 BC

lets on. Nonetheless, it seems unlikely that he would have omitted weather conditions that did have a severe impact on the Cyreans. The modern data too need careful handling. Although weather records for Turkey and the Near East are relatively complete and reliable from the late nineteenth century onward, there are some gaps. Especially for eastern Turkey, snowfall is difficult to measure and few records exist. Local climate can also vary



Map 2.1 (cont.)

greatly according to topography.<sup>11</sup> At least with the astronomical data there are no difficulties: knowing the army's approximate latitude on any given date makes it simple to calculate the amount of available daylight.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>11</sup> Fitzner (1902), Naval Intelligence Division (1942) I.200, 225.

<sup>12</sup> To calculate daylight hours I estimated the army's latitude to the nearest whole degree using Talbert (2000) and then consulted the tables in United States Naval Observatory (2004). Although the

## FROM SARDIS TO THE EUPHRATES

The initial period of the campaign, from Sardis to the Euphrates crossing at Thapsacus, was in many respects the easiest. To begin with, the weather was nice. Traversing southern Anatolia in February, March, and April, the army took advantage of early spring conditions.<sup>13</sup> Nights might still be cool, but daytime temperatures were probably wholly tolerable to troops from coastal Ionia or mainland Greece. Spring rains occasionally made for muddy marching, but also meant abundant water, especially from springs along the northern flanks of the Taurus, for the men and their animals. Even semi-arid Lycaonia, which Cyrus turned over to his troops to plunder, apparently furnished sufficient food and fodder.<sup>14</sup> The coastal plain of Tarsus, which the Cyreans reached in early May, remained green and well watered; vegetation had not been broiled by the summer sun, and crops had not yet been harvested.<sup>15</sup> By the time the army left Tarsus in late May, the full summer's heat was still a month away.

From Tarsus the army marched east and south along the Mediterranean coast, before heading inland in an easy slope uphill from the port of Myriandus and across modern-day Syria. Although it was now mid-June, daytime high temperatures ranging up to 30° C (86° F) were hardly unbearable. Wells and perennial streams including the Chalus and Dardas Rivers afforded good water along the route.<sup>16</sup> An indication of how green the Cyreans found the region comes from the estate (*paradeisos*) of Belesys near the Dardas River, which contained "all the products of the seasons."<sup>17</sup> From Syria, the army marched into the upper Euphrates valley, reaching the river at Thapsacus at the end of June.<sup>18</sup>

The Cyreans experienced few supply problems from Sardis almost all the way to Thapsacus. There were numerous large, prosperous settlements along the way, so soldiers could purchase food directly from the locals as well

earth's rotational period has been gradually decreasing, the resulting increase in day length (only about 0.002 seconds each century) is negligible.

<sup>13</sup> For spring conditions in Anatolia see Mitchell (1993) I.144.

<sup>14</sup> *An.* 1.2.19–20; cf. Foreign Office (1920) 3. Although overlooked by Glombiowski (1994), the crossing of Lycaonia buttresses the case for an early chronology. Had the army traversed the region in mid-June, it would have encountered very hot and dry conditions, including the year's lowest rainfall. A mid-April crossing, following the early chronology, would mean lower temperatures and twice the precipitation of June; see Republic of Turkey (1977), Tanoglu et al. (1961).

<sup>15</sup> *An.* 1.2.21–3; Amigues (1995) 65.

<sup>16</sup> For the Chalus (Afrin Su) and Dardas (Kuweik Su) see *An.* 1.4.9–10, Manfredi (1986) 97, Lendle (1995) 38; on streams and wells see Naval Intelligence Division (1943) 49–50.

<sup>17</sup> *An.* 1.4.10, Tuplin (1996) 96.

<sup>18</sup> The location of Thapsacus (*An.* 1.4.11) remains uncertain; I follow Lendle (1995) 40–1, but cf. Manfredi (1986) 106–7. On the level of the Euphrates at Thapsacus (1.4.17–18) as an indication of the date, see Naval Intelligence Division (1943) 53–4, Glombiowski (1994) 42.

as from the merchants who accompanied the army. The fertile countryside, too, was ripe for foraging; there were even fish and doves to be had at the Chalus River.<sup>19</sup> Food and fuel probably got scarcer on the approaches to the Euphrates, but the troops could have stocked up in advance at the Dardas, where Cyrus ordered Belesys' park and adjacent palace to be destroyed. This must have furnished the troops the opportunity to cut firewood and plunder Belesys' larders.<sup>20</sup> And, with days lengthening as spring gave way to summer, there was plenty of time to forage, cook, and rest, even if Cyrus did on occasion push the troops to march hard.<sup>21</sup>

Lastly, the Cyreans had it easy during this period because for the most part no one was trying to kill them. There may have been minor skirmishing in hostile Lycaonia, and from Tarsus on the men increasingly suspected Cyrus' aims, but otherwise most Cyreans felt combat imminent only before the crossing of the Cilician Gates, when it looked for a moment as if the Cilician ruler Syennesis might hold the pass against them.<sup>22</sup> The big exceptions were Menon's two *lochoi*, assigned to escort Syennesis' wife Epyaxa back from her rendezvous with Cyrus, that mysteriously disappeared somewhere in the Tarsus mountains.<sup>23</sup>

#### DOWN THE EUPHRATES VALLEY

At Thapsacus Cyrus finally disclosed his true objectives to the mercenaries. Greed overcame anger and trepidation, and the Cyreans forded the Euphrates with visions of time-and-a-half pay and assorted bonuses including five silver minas apiece – the last alone amounting to more than a year's wages – dancing in their heads.<sup>24</sup> Another vision, though, competed for attention. Persian horsemen under Abrocomas were somewhere out there, having already burnt every boat at Thapsacus in a futile attempt to forestall any passage over the Euphrates.<sup>25</sup> Cyrean foragers probably began to go out more cautiously and to stay closer to camp.

Distant visions of minas and cavalry quickly dissipated in the face of difficulties finding provisions and fuel. Upon departing Thapsacus at the end of June, Cyrus feinted north toward the Royal Road, the more obvious

<sup>19</sup> Settlements: *An.* 1.2.6–7, 1.2.10–11, 1.2.13–14, 1.2.19–20, 1.2.23–4, 1.4.1–2, 1.4.6, 1.4.10; merchants: 1.2.18; foraging: 1.2.19, 1.2.25–6; fish and doves: 1.4.9.

<sup>20</sup> *An.* 1.4.10–11; for cutting firewood in *paradeisoi*, cf. Plut. *Artax.* 25.1–2.

<sup>21</sup> The summer solstice, with more than 14½ hours of daylight, would have occurred about June 22, around when the army reached Thapsacus.

<sup>22</sup> *An.* 1.2.21, 1.3.21.

<sup>23</sup> *An.* 1.2.25.

<sup>24</sup> *An.* 1.3.21, 1.4.11–18. Five minas on the Attic standard was 500 drachmas, or more than 16 months' pay at a drachma per day; see Dillery (2001) 87.

<sup>25</sup> *An.* 1.5.18.

and fertile route, and the one that Alexander's Macedonians would tread sixty-odd years later.<sup>26</sup> Then he turned his army south down the Araxes River to the Euphrates.<sup>27</sup> From there, the army advanced for three weeks, most of July, through desert country along the left bank of the upper Euphrates valley. This was not even a secondary route; the usual road went on the opposite bank.<sup>28</sup> It was a calculated risk. Cyrus probably hoped to surprise Artaxerxes by taking the less traveled path, but the valley had such sparse resources that his army would strip it bare on the passage downstream. If forced to retreat upstream, he and his men would starve.<sup>29</sup>

The first twelve days out from Thapsacus were not that bad. For example, there were villages full of wine and grain on the Araxes River delta, where it ran into the Euphrates.<sup>30</sup> From there, though, things got worse. The Arabian plain was utterly flat, with nothing but shrub and reed for cooking fuel.<sup>31</sup> Xenophon and other rich Cyreans with horses had varying degrees of success chasing the local wildlife in relays, but ordinary soldiers likely subsisted for five days mostly on what they had gotten at the Araxes. At least their animals could graze on the same foliage that nourished the region's gazelles and wild asses.<sup>32</sup>

The Cyreans were able to replenish their provisions at Corsote on the Mascas River, another tributary of the Euphrates, but whatever they collected was not sufficient for the subsequent march, thirteen days in late July, down the Euphrates through utter desert.<sup>33</sup> Their grain sacks emptied, the troops either refused or were too poor to patronize the price-gouging merchants tagging along with the army. They resorted to eating their baggage animals, some of which had died for lack of fodder.<sup>34</sup> The soldiers must have carried some cooking fuel with them from Corsote, for the land was bare save for patches of reeds and grass in the Euphrates shallows.<sup>35</sup> The sight of the city of Charmande on the opposite bank of the river, very near the end of these two weeks of desert marching, had to have been roundly

<sup>26</sup> Arr. *Anab.* 3.7.3; cf. Brunt (1976) 486–7.

<sup>27</sup> Lendle (1995) 43–5; but cf. Manfredi (1986). On the Araxes (Belekh) see Naval Intelligence Division (1943) 34.

<sup>28</sup> Barnett (1963) 3–7, Joannès (1995) 182–3.

<sup>29</sup> *An.* 2.2.11; Joannès (1995) 185 suggests Cyrus chose this route partly to ensure that his troops could not abandon him.

<sup>30</sup> *An.* 1.4.19, Naval Intelligence Division (1943) 36.

<sup>31</sup> *An.* 1.5.1. The wormwood (*apsinthion*) Xenophon mentions could hardly have made suitable cooking fuel, as it produces toxic fumes when burned; on *apsinthion* see also Tuplin (1999) 339.

<sup>32</sup> *An.* 1.5.1–3. On the apparent absence of nomadic Arabs, see Tuplin (1991) 48–51, Retsö (1990) 129.

<sup>33</sup> *An.* 1.5.1–7, Monchambert (1999) 235–6. In the early twentieth century, the region below the Araxes was hospitable to grazing and non-irrigation agriculture only in spring; see Naval Intelligence Division (1943) 35–6, Naval Intelligence Division (1944) 26–8.

<sup>34</sup> *An.* 1.5.6–7. <sup>35</sup> *An.* 1.5.7; cf. Engels (1978) 68.

welcomed. So eager were the soldiers for food that some built makeshift rafts and paddled across, bringing back wine and millet bread.<sup>36</sup> The locals soon crossed the river themselves, setting up an impromptu market on the left bank. There was also firewood here, a welcome change after the desert.<sup>37</sup> The mercenaries did not know it at the time, but Charmande was their last chance to rest before the decisive encounter with Artaxerxes. Indeed, as the army resumed its march, now out of the desert and into fertile Babylonia, hoof marks and dung offered the first indications that Artaxerxes' cavalry were scorching the way ahead.<sup>38</sup> In less than a week the Cyreans would be forming line of battle at Cunaxa.

Although food, fodder, and fuel were often scarce during this period, the Cyreans could count on copious water from the Euphrates River.<sup>39</sup> Drawing water, though, was no simple matter of stepping from road to riverbank. Instead, the Cyreans' path ran roughly parallel to but at some distance, perhaps up to a kilometer, from the Euphrates channel. Between them and it were rocks, occasional bluffs, and numerous short gullies. Only some gullies had slopes gentle enough to permit access to marshy bays at the river's edge. Not even a Persian prince could compel geology to shape access points at regular intervals, so the army had to make daily marches of varying length in order to reach spots where it could reach water. Getting out of such gullies could be difficult, especially for wagons or carts.<sup>40</sup>

It was a good thing the Euphrates was close, for the Cyreans and their animals now needed all the water they could get. The days were getting shorter by the time the army left Thapsacus at the end of June, but the sun still beat down for some fourteen hours at a time throughout July. True, the river valley was cooler than the surrounding desert, but daytime high temperatures were probably rising to 40° C (104° F) or more, and it only got hotter as July passed into August and the Cyreans entered Babylonia.<sup>41</sup> To combat the heat, the army marched as much as possible during the cooler

<sup>36</sup> *An.* 1.5.10; for Charmande and its vicinity see Naval Intelligence Division (1943) 221, 229 and Lendle (1995) 48–9.

<sup>37</sup> For market and firewood see *An.* 1.5.12.

<sup>38</sup> *An.* 1.6.1; these were not the same cavalry who had burned the boats at Thapsacus, for Abrocomas' force had gone east on the Royal Road, only joining Artaxerxes' main army after Cunaxa (1.7.12–13).

<sup>39</sup> Admiralty Naval Staff (1918) 14, Naval Intelligence Division (1943) 53–4, Beaumont et al. (1988) 356–7. The Euphrates in July and August had subsided from its spring peak but not yet reached its October minimum flow.

<sup>40</sup> *An.* 1.5.7–9, Naval Intelligence Division (1944) 26, Barnett (1963) 5.

<sup>41</sup> Naval Intelligence Division (1943) 78, Republic of Iraq (1962) 44–6, 107–8. In the Baghdad area, from two to five days in July may see daytime highs exceeding 45° C (113° F); in August, there may be five or more such days.

mornings and evenings or at night.<sup>42</sup> The men must have been thankful they had tents, both to shade against the intense sun and for warmth at night, when desert temperatures could drop twenty degrees below daytime highs.<sup>43</sup>

#### FROM THE EUPHRATES TO THE TIGRIS

The third period of the campaign, from the battle of Cunaxa in early August until the entry into Carduchia in mid-October, saw the end of Cyrus' hopes and the beginning of the mercenaries' struggle for survival. Although the decisive clash of the two brothers draws much attention, the Cyreans spent less than half of this period actively engaged in combat, mostly against Mithradates' and Tissaphernes' pursuers in the last week of September and the first two weeks of October. Cunaxa itself was a blip of violence between the plundering of Tarsus in May and the massacre of the generals in late September.

Still, those weeks of combat posed formidable challenges. Xenophon's dismissive rhetoric notwithstanding, the Persian pursuit forces were a well-equipped, highly skilled, and hard-marching mixture of cavalry and light infantry.<sup>44</sup> The Cyreans devised new formations and fielded new units in response, but the Persians accomplished their strategic goal of driving the mercenaries out of Mesopotamia and into Carduchia.<sup>45</sup> As far as they were concerned, nobody got out of that mountainous land alive.<sup>46</sup>

In some respects, the going was easier in central Mesopotamia than it had been on the advance down the Euphrates. The land between the rivers was densely settled and fertile, and provisions were readily obtainable, whether through agreement with the Persians, by purchases from the locals, or, after the massacre of the generals, from plundering and foraging.<sup>47</sup> On the way up the Tigris, cities and towns gave way to clusters of villages. Though each cluster was sometimes several days distant from the next, all held plentiful

<sup>42</sup> See Chapter Six for this marching pattern.

<sup>43</sup> Night-time lows in July average 20°–24° C (68°–75° F); see Republic of Iraq (1962) 56–7. This may not seem cold in absolute terms, but the swings between night and day temperatures are what count. Having lived several summers in canvas tents while doing archaeological fieldwork in central Greece, I can attest that a night-time temperature of 24° C (75° F) feels freezing after a day in 40°+ C (104°+ F) temperatures.

<sup>44</sup> *An.* 3.2.18–20, 3.4.34–7.

<sup>45</sup> For more on Cyrean formations during this period, see Chapter Six.

<sup>46</sup> *An.* 3.5.16.

<sup>47</sup> Settled and fertile: Naval Intelligence Division (1944) 41–7, Kuhrt (1995), Joannès (1995), Briant (2002) 808–9. Agreement: *An.* 2.4.26; cf. 2.3.14, 2.4.9, 2.4.27, 2.5.30. Purchase: 2.4.28; cf. 2.4.13–14, 2.4.25. After massacre: 3.3.11, 3.4.9, 3.4.18, 3.4.31, 3.5.1.



provisions.<sup>48</sup> Firewood and fodder too were widely available.<sup>49</sup> Indeed, despite Clearchus' bluster about the army having no breakfast, the troops were really only short of supplies during the few days between Cunaxa and the conclusion of a truce with the Great King.<sup>50</sup>

As for water, though the Tigris and Euphrates were approaching their seasonal lows, they continued to provide a fair measure for drinking and washing. What the rivers could not provide, the region's numerous canals could.<sup>51</sup> As the Cyreans withdrew up the left bank of the Tigris in September and October, the river's level was gradually diminishing, but at least the gently rolling slopes of the valley made fetching water easy.<sup>52</sup> Although the Tigris itself remained impassable at points, its tributaries were also reaching their yearly minimums.<sup>53</sup> This may explain why Xenophon draws no attention to the crossing of the Greater Zapatas River, which would have been a major obstacle at other seasons – the river's level may have been low enough that fording it was an unremarkable task.<sup>54</sup>

If supplies were no problem, the heat was. Nights in Mesopotamia might dip to only 24° C (75° F), but noontime temperatures in August, with the sun beating down from a cloudless sky for more than thirteen hours at a time, could reach a relentless 42°–45° C (107°–113° F) or more. The air would have been so dry that what rain fell usually evaporated before reaching the ground.<sup>55</sup> After a month of living in the desert, the soldiers had acclimated to the heat, and the army had perfected its technique of marching at night or in early morning to take advantage of cooler temperatures. Even so, on the day of Cunaxa the Cyreans may have suffered some casualties from heat stroke and exhaustion as they advanced under the midday and afternoon sun to meet Artaxerxes.<sup>56</sup> The intense heat may

<sup>48</sup> *An.* 3.4.18, 3.4.24, 3.4.31–3, 3.5.1; cf. Shiel (1838) 85, Naval Intelligence Division (1944) 47, 90–6. Limited archaeological survey confirms the settlement pattern Xenophon describes; see Wilkinson (2000) 237, 242.

<sup>49</sup> *An.* 2.2.15, 2.4.11–12. <sup>50</sup> *An.* 2.3.5.

<sup>51</sup> Both rivers reach minimum flow in October, the Tigris slightly earlier than the Euphrates; see Admiralty Naval Staff (1918) 14, Naval Intelligence Division (1944) 26, Beaumont et al. (1988) 357. For canals see *An.* 2.3.10, 2.3.13, 2.4.17.

<sup>52</sup> Naval Intelligence Division (1944) 41–5. Note that at Caenae in late September (*An.* 2.5.28), rafts were still needed to cross the Tigris, while three weeks later the locals were able to drive their cattle across the river (3.5.1).

<sup>53</sup> *An.* 3.5.7–9.

<sup>54</sup> *An.* 2.5.1. The Greater Zapatas (Zab) typically hits its annual low in September–October, and is fordable in October; see Naval Intelligence Division (1944) 42, Beaumont et al. (1988) 356. On the topographical problems of the Lesser and Greater Zapatas, see Tuplin (1991) 45, Lendle (1995) 122–3.

<sup>55</sup> Naval Intelligence Division (1944) 166–9, Republic of Iraq (1962) 45, 57, 108.

<sup>56</sup> For more on the timeline of Cunaxa see Chapter Six; on heat illness and acclimation to high temperatures see Chapter Nine.

also explain why both Cyreans and Persians sat motionless for twenty days – the balance of August – after Clearchus and Tissaphernes concluded a truce. Tissaphernes said he was going off to consult with the Great King, but it may simply have been too hot to move.<sup>57</sup>

As the army trekked north and August gave way to September, the heat fell off dramatically. Although daytime temperatures in the region of the Greater Zapatas could still reach into the upper 30°s C (95°–100° F or so) in late September – around the time of the seizure of the generals – days were getting shorter and nights cooler. Nonetheless, the skies remained mostly clear and the ground level and dry. For the Cyreans, there was no hint of what was to come.

#### CENTRAL ANATOLIA

The fourth period of the campaign, from the entry into Carduchia in mid-October 401 until the arrival at Trapezus in early February 400 BC, was the most grueling. To begin with, there were the hills and mountains of southern Anatolia. Aside from short climbs to reach the Cilician and Syrian Gates, and the gentle ascent up and down the Syrian plateau, the Cyreans had heretofore traversed mostly level ground. On the upper reaches of the Tigris, they encountered rolling hills, but the passage through Carduchia really took them into the mountains, with a net elevation gain of some 500 meters (1,625 feet) in a week.<sup>58</sup> This was no steady uphill hike, either. The precipitous wooded folds of the Carduchian mountains, cut only by gorges and streamlets, meant that often only narrow paths were accessible to the army, and each day's march might involve more vertical distance – up and down ridges and crests – than horizontal travel.<sup>59</sup>

After crossing the Centrites River out of Carduchia, the Cyreans found themselves in the gentler terrain of western Armenia. They continued steadily to ascend as they made their way northward along the Upper Tigris and Teleboas river valleys into central Anatolia.<sup>60</sup> By the time the soldiers reached the Teleboas at the end of October, they had climbed another 600 meters.<sup>61</sup> The army spent November traversing the lava tablelands of

<sup>57</sup> *An.* 2.3.29, 2.4.1.

<sup>58</sup> Modern Cizre in Turkey, near where the army made its initial entry to Carduchia, is about 450 meters above sea level (masl); Siirt, near the Centrites River (Bohtan Su) is about 900 masl; cf. Manfredi (1986) 171, 188.

<sup>59</sup> *An.* 4.1.7, 4.1.10, 4.1.14, 4.1.20, 4.1.25, 4.2.16. On Carduchia's topography see Shiel (1838) 81–2, Pollington (1840) 449, Naval Intelligence Division (1942) I.174–6, Manfredi (1986) 179–89.

<sup>60</sup> *An.* 4.4.1, 4.4.3, 4.4.7; Naval Intelligence Division (1942) I.175.

<sup>61</sup> Bitlis, along the Upper Tigris, and Mus, on the Teleboas, are both about 1,500 masl; the average elevation of the region is ca. 1,650 masl.

northern Armenia, gaining further altitude as it wound along the banks of the Phasis River and past the site of present-day Erzurum.<sup>62</sup> The undulating plains here, punctuated by scattered stands of trees, would have made for relatively smooth traveling had it not been for enemy pursuit and winter weather.<sup>63</sup> Occasional steep river gorges broke the plains, and the army seems often to have made its track parallel to these gorges rather than bulling across one river line after another.<sup>64</sup> Marching along river and stream beds, many of them tree-lined, also kept water and fuel close by.<sup>65</sup> At places low mountain ranges, some covered with scrub oak, lay across the route; on one occasion, the Cyreans had to make a night attack to dislodge enemies blocking the pass over one such range.<sup>66</sup> Elsewhere the locals secured themselves and their possessions in mountaintop strongholds. The army was able to storm one of these, in Taochia, but otherwise had little luck attacking fortified refuges or settlements.<sup>67</sup>

Before reaching Trapezus, there was a final obstacle: the Pontic coastal mountains. These were so lofty that the troops caught their first glimpse of the sea from Mount Theches several days before actually reaching the coast.<sup>68</sup> The coastal range was heavily wooded on its lower reaches. In Macronia, for example, the Cyreans had to clear dense tree growth blocking their way across a stream while hostile natives gathered on the opposite bank.<sup>69</sup> Fortunately, a Macronian peltast serving in the army recognized the language of his countrymen, and was able to negotiate safe passage.<sup>70</sup> After this the Cyreans brushed aside a Colchian attempt to hold one last set of heights against them.<sup>71</sup> From there it was downhill all the way; the army would have reached the sea several days sooner had it not stopped to indulge in narcotic honey in the hills just above Trapezus.<sup>72</sup>

<sup>62</sup> The army's route in this region is impossible to pin down exactly; Lendle (1995) 237 provides a summary of various suggested itineraries. Erzurum lies about 1,950 masl.

<sup>63</sup> These trees (*An.* 4.5.5, 4.7.3) would have mostly been pines; see Amigues (1995) 72.

<sup>64</sup> For this pattern see e.g. *An.* 4.7.18–19 on the Harpasus (Çoruh) River.

<sup>65</sup> For this topography see Naval Intelligence Division (1942) I.179–80; cf. *An.* 4.3.11.

<sup>66</sup> Scrub oak: Shiel (1838) 70; night attack: *An.* 4.6.4–27. <sup>67</sup> *An.* 4.7.1–14, 4.7.17.

<sup>68</sup> *An.* 4.7.20–7. This was perhaps above the Zigana Pass, northwest of Gümüşhane: Lendle (1995) 273–8; cf. Naval Intelligence Division (1942) I.225. For another view, see Mitford (2000) and Manfredi (2004).

<sup>69</sup> On the Pontic forest see Amigues (1995) 72. <sup>70</sup> *An.* 4.8.1–8. <sup>71</sup> *An.* 4.8.8–19.

<sup>72</sup> The drunken, crazed behavior the Cyreans exhibited (*An.* 4.8.20–2) on this occasion was probably the result of ingesting toxic honey containing grayanotoxins from rhododendron pollen; see Geroulanos et al. (1992), Sütlüpinar et al. (1993), Mayor (1995), Özhan et al. (2004). Lane Fox (2004a) 35–43, claiming that only “absolutely fresh combs and flowers” produce such honey, pushes the arrival at Trapezus forward to mid-May or early June, the end of the rhododendron flowering season. In truth, the toxicity of this honey is related only to the amount consumed, not to its freshness; see Özhan et al. (2004). Turkish physicians have observed cases of honey intoxication in all seasons

Crossing the mountains and rivers of Anatolia would have been challenge enough under fair skies. The Cyreans, though, confronted weather as well as terrain. The climb into Carduchia in mid-October, for instance, heralded the arrival of autumn. While nights cooled gradually, daytime highs receded more rapidly, and soon probably averaged only half of what they had been a month before. The lower temperatures must have felt unseasonably chilly to men who had just spent the better part of four months sweltering in Mesopotamia. At least the troops were sometimes able to shelter in native villages; the Carduchians who gathered to oppose them had to bivouac in the open. There were also the autumn rains, which commenced a few days after the army entered Carduchia.<sup>73</sup> These downpours probably left the troops soggy and miserable, their wet clothes and armor chafing and hindering them.<sup>74</sup> The only benefit they got from the rain was a thick mist, caused by moisture condensing in the cool air, which allowed them to surprise an enemy force one morning.<sup>75</sup> At least the army passed through Carduchia in October, meaning it caught only the beginning of the rains. A month later it might have faced double or triple the precipitation.<sup>76</sup>

With the ascent to the central Anatolian plateau, in early November, temperatures dropped further and rain gave way to snow. The first flakes fell as the Cyreans bivouacked outdoors in western Armenia, just over a week after leaving Carduchia.<sup>77</sup> It was a sign of how cold the nights were getting that the troops actually welcomed as insulation the snow that fell on them as they slept.<sup>78</sup> From western Armenia they marched eight days, traversing bands of deep snow alternating with barren patches, before reaching the underground villages of central Armenia.<sup>79</sup> As long as men could find shelter in villages, or at least stay in camp and build fires, the snow

(personal communication, Hakan Özhan), and Turkish emigrants in Austria and Germany have been hospitalized for grayanotoxin poisoning after consuming imported Black Sea honey; see Gössinger et al. (1983), von Malottki and Wiechmann (1996). The appearance of toxic honey, therefore, cannot be used to fix the date of the arrival at Trapezus. Probably the Cyreans plundered honey that bees had produced the previous spring and stored for winter survival; as Crane (1990) 189 points out, a hive may stockpile some 12–20 kg (25–45 lb) of honey for this purpose. The troops may have encountered hundreds or thousands of simple beehives stacked together; for this pattern in traditional beekeeping see Crane (1983) 40–1.

<sup>73</sup> *An.* 4.1.14–15, 4.2.2.

<sup>74</sup> For more on the health effects of the Carduchian rains, see Chapter [Nine](#).

<sup>75</sup> *An.* 4.2.7, Naval Intelligence Division (1942) I.218–19.

<sup>76</sup> According to Republic of Turkey (1977), October rainfall in the Siirt area is 40–80 mm (1.5–3 in.); in November this rises to 90–125 mm (3.5–5 in.), with more at higher elevations.

<sup>77</sup> *An.* 4.4.8, 4.4.11; Glombiowski (1994), *pace* Lendle (1995) 227.

<sup>78</sup> November temperatures average 0°–8° C in Bitlis region, according to Republic of Turkey (1977); for more on snow as insulation see Chapter [Nine](#).

<sup>79</sup> *An.* 4.5.1 (snow on passes), 4.5.2 (barren), 4.5.3 (snow). Xenophon's description (4.5.4) of snow a fathom deep need not be taken literally. Underground villages: 4.5.25; cf. Pollington (1840) 447.

and cold were not a mortal danger. It was when the army had to spend consecutive days and nights outside in a raging blizzard that men and animals began to die.<sup>80</sup> The freezing wind that blew straight into the soldiers' faces only made matters worse.<sup>81</sup> Even so, by passing through western and central Armenia in early November, the Cyreans apparently evaded the worst of the winter snows, which typically do not begin in earnest until late November.<sup>82</sup>

From mid-November through the end of December, as the army made its way through northern Anatolia, temperatures may have dropped even further, perhaps as low as  $-8^{\circ}$  C (about  $18^{\circ}$  F) on some nights. By now, though, the surviving Cyreans would have become accustomed to the cold, much as they had previously acclimated to Mesopotamia's heat. As for snowfall, Xenophon mentions none after the army's departure from Armenia. Since November–December precipitation in this region averages far less than it does further south, possibly the Cyreans were spared more than sporadic flurries during this period.<sup>83</sup> If it did snow at times, the hard-packed cover might actually have made marching easier, provided the weather stayed cold and clear.<sup>84</sup> Precipitation was higher on the coastal range, with semi-permanent snow patches on the highest peaks, and accumulated drifts lower down.<sup>85</sup> Still, Xenophon again makes no note of snow, suggesting that there was not enough to impede the army's passage across the mountains to Trapezus.

Terrain and weather obviously influenced the army during this period, but another factor bears considering: the days had been getting shorter since before the Cyreans crossed the Euphrates at Thapsacus in late June. The massacre of the generals, in late September, roughly coincided with the autumnal equinox, but that still meant a good twelve hours of daylight. In northern Anatolia, however, the winter sun was tracing its lowest arc of the year, with barely nine hours of light daily under optimum conditions; overcast skies could make this seem even less.<sup>86</sup> Shorter days meant less time

<sup>80</sup> *An.* 4.5.4–22; for more on the effects of snow and cold, see Chapter *Nine*.

<sup>81</sup> *An.* 4.5.4. Strong afternoon winds of this sort, descending from the mountains onto plains, are a particular feature of eastern Turkey; see Naval Intelligence Division (1942) I.208.

<sup>82</sup> For winter beginning in late November see Shiel (1838) 64.

<sup>83</sup> November precipitation in the Erzurum area, for instance, averages 30–50 mm (1.25–2 in.); in December this drops to 20–40 mm (0.75–1.5 in.). Averages in the Mus–Bitlis–Malazgirt triangle, roughly the area where the Cyreans endured their snow and wind, are 90–125 mm (3.5–5 in.) in November and 100–150 mm (4–6 in.) in December; see Republic of Turkey (1977).

<sup>84</sup> Naval Intelligence Division (1942) I.227.

<sup>85</sup> Naval Intelligence Division (1942) I.225. Even in intense winters, the Zigana pass, by which the Cyreans probably crossed, remains practicable.

<sup>86</sup> Naval Intelligence Division (1942) I.220–1.

for marching. If the army pressed on despite the waning light, the troops would have to set up camp and forage in the darkness.<sup>87</sup> In central Armenia, dusk fell before the whole army could reach safety in underground villages; some of those forced to spend the night in the open perished.<sup>88</sup> Only after the Cyreans had reached the Euxine in January would they again see more than ten hours of light a day.

Anatolia's human landscape also shaped the army's behavior during this period. Between Carduchia and the sea the Cyreans encountered only a single place, Gymnias, that Xenophon deemed worthy of calling a city.<sup>89</sup> Otherwise, Anatolia was a world of scattered villages and fortified strongholds. For larger sites, there exists a modicum of archaeological evidence. The satrap's palace (*basileion*) the army ran across after crossing the Centrites River, for instance, may have contained storage magazines as well as religious and administrative buildings, in addition to the defensive towers Xenophon notes.<sup>90</sup> Of the humbler settlements there survives no trace, although we can recover some of their characteristics by comparing the *Anabasis* evidence with the observations of nineteenth-century travelers and twentieth-century anthropologists in central Anatolia. The former often explicitly compared the architecture they saw with the villages of Xenophon's narrative, and studies by the latter suggest long-term continuity in settlement patterns and architecture.<sup>91</sup>

In Armenia and northern Anatolia, the Cyreans tended to encounter villages in clusters. The villages of each cluster were close enough – perhaps within a diameter of 3–6 km – that they were all mutually visible, but still far apart enough that the army might consider itself dangerously dispersed if it spread out to quarter in them.<sup>92</sup> Several days' march could separate one cluster from the next, although if the nineteenth- and twentieth-century pattern of hiding settlements in dips and folds of the central Anatolian plateau was already operating during the fifth century BC, the Cyreans probably passed some villages without noticing them.<sup>93</sup> In mountainous

<sup>87</sup> Although the army was familiar with night marching, the bitter night cold and the lack of landmarks on the snowy plain would have made such marches extremely hazardous.

<sup>88</sup> *An.* 4.5.9–11. <sup>89</sup> *An.* 4.7.19.

<sup>90</sup> *An.* 4.4.2; cf. 3.4.24, 4.4.7. Xenophon notes provisions were plentiful here (4.4.3); cf. the Achaemenid fortified palace site at Aluntepe, southeast of modern Erzincan: Summers (1993) 88–95, Briant (2002) 742–3. On the defensive towers see Tuplin (1991) 55.

<sup>91</sup> Travelers: Shiel (1838) 58, 83, Pollington (1840) 445. Anthropologists: Galloway (1958), Villa and Matossian (1982) 30–3.

<sup>92</sup> Villages in clusters: *An.* 4.2.22–3, 4.3.1, 4.4.7, 4.5.23, 4.7.18, 4.8.19–20; cf. Shiel (1838) 57. Village spacing: Shiel (1838) 94. Mutually visible: 4.5.23–4. Danger of dispersed quartering: 4.4.10, Tuplin (1991) 55.

<sup>93</sup> Beaumont et al. (1988) 145. The troops who pursued the Cyreans in central Armenia must have known where to find such villages, for they were apparently much better rested and fed than the Cyreans; see e.g. *An.* 4.5.17–18.

Carduchia, small hamlets, each nestled into folds of the surrounding slopes, could scatter linearly along a road or track.<sup>94</sup> Elsewhere, as near Mount Theches, rugged terrain might leave room for only a single village.<sup>95</sup>

Lowland settlements, to judge from modern comparisons, could muster perhaps one or two hundred houses apiece, while a small mountain hamlet might have as few as ten or twenty.<sup>96</sup> In the plains, a village might clump tightly together around a central water supply, houses abutting on two or three sides. The narrow lanes and continuous walls that this arrangement produced made the village defensible even without formal fortifications.<sup>97</sup> In Taochia and Chalybia, settlements were strongly fortified; the Taochians also had a hilltop refuge, to which many of them fled at the appearance of the Cyreans.<sup>98</sup> House architecture varied widely by region, from the cisterned dwellings of Carduchia to the turreted houses near the Centrites River to the underground homes of central Armenia.<sup>99</sup>

Lowland or highland, large or small, Anatolia's villages meant life to the Cyreans. They provided shelter from the elements, a chance to warm up, sleep, and perhaps unwind a little before resuming the journey. Their inhabitants were a source of vital geographical information, as the army had entered Carduchia in mid-October with only a vague idea of the way home.<sup>100</sup> Whether driven by death threats, expedient collaboration, or strategic deviousness, locals across Anatolia pointed the Cyreans on their way.<sup>101</sup> Usually the directions they provided took the army only a few days further, but that was the best it could hope for. Wherever the natives could resist, they did.

Such resistance was fierce but localized. Large portions of central Anatolia were not under firm Achaemenid control and the Cyreans only twice encountered Persian-officered contingents. At the Centrites River in late October, troops of the Armenian satrap Orontas under his general Artuchas attempted to block the army's crossing, and in early November, Orontas' subordinate Tiribazus harassed the army in western and central Armenia.<sup>102</sup>

<sup>94</sup> *An.* 4.1.7, Beaumont et al. (1988) 146. <sup>95</sup> *An.* 4.7.27.

<sup>96</sup> Helburn (1955) 375, Galloway (1958) 361, Villa and Matossian (1982) 30, Beaumont et al. (1988) 145–6.

<sup>97</sup> Naval Intelligence Division (1942) I.362, Villa and Matossian (1982) 30. The underground village in central Armenia may have had an outer wall (*An.* 4.5.10) because its houses did not form a defensive circuit; cf. Tuplin (1991) 54–5.

<sup>98</sup> *An.* 4.7.1–2, 4.7.17. Xenophon calls the Chalybian settlements *polismata*, perhaps indicating their larger size; the Chalybians' vigorous defense, at any rate, suggests they fielded many warriors.

<sup>99</sup> *An.* 4.2.22–3, 4.4.2, 4.5.25. <sup>100</sup> *An.* 3.5.17–18.

<sup>101</sup> Death: *An.* 4.1.23–5; collaboration: 4.6.1–3 (it is unclear whether the village chieftain here believed the Cyreans' claim that they were in Persian service; cf. 4.5.10); deviousness: 4.7.19–21.

<sup>102</sup> Artuchas: *An.* 4.3.3–5; although this passage also mentions Orontas, the satrap himself was probably still on his way back from Mesopotamia (2.4.8–9, 3.4.13). Tiribazus: 4.4.4–5. Tiribazus concluded



Both Artuchas and Tiribazus fielded mixed cavalry and infantry forces, but neither was able to inflict the sort of damage that Tissaphernes had on the Tigris. Artuchas' troops were more menacing in appearance than reality, and quickly took to their heels in the face of a rapid Cyrean attack across the Centrites.<sup>103</sup> Tiribazus, too, was more of a perceived threat; the mercenaries successfully stormed his camp, after which he managed only a sporadic pursuit.<sup>104</sup>

Both Artuchas and Tiribazus employed Anatolian mercenaries, but more frequently the Cyreans met native warriors fighting in defense of their own homes and families.<sup>105</sup> The intensity and tactics of resistance depended on a region's terrain and population. The Carduchians, for instance, evacuated their settlements, taking their women and children, then assailed the army with stones and arrows or blocked defiles in its path.<sup>106</sup> Their response must have been hampered by the surprise Cyrean advance and by the time it took to assemble from their scattered homes. The Taochians and Chalybians, in contrast, apparently had some warning of the Cyrean approach in late November, for they joined a multi-tribal coalition in an unsuccessful attempt to forestall the army's entry into their territories.<sup>107</sup> After the Cyreans dispersed this coalition on the battlefield, its erstwhile members presented divergent challenges. The Taochians withdrew into walled settlements or hilltop refuges, and might have evaded the army altogether had it not been compelled to assault one such refuge in search of supplies.<sup>108</sup> The Chalybians too had strongholds, but they combined this static defense with an aggressive hounding of the Cyrean column.<sup>109</sup>

Not every locality was able or willing to resist. The Cyreans represented a gigantic force in sparsely populated central Anatolia. They probably outnumbered every tribal group or coalition they met between Carduchia and Trapezus, and possibly had more men in ranks than Artuchas and Tiribazus together. Vastly outmatched, the inhabitants of some of the smaller unfortified villages along the route must have fled in terror.<sup>110</sup> Those who did

a truce with the Cyreans (4.4.5–6), which he allegedly had no intention of keeping (4.4.17–18), but it was the Cyreans who initiated open hostilities by attacking Tiribazus' camp (4.4.19–22).

<sup>103</sup> *An.* 4.3.20–3.

<sup>104</sup> *An.* 4.4.19–22, 4.5.16–18. Tiribazus' troops must have suffered from the snow and wind too, so Xenophon's claim (4.5.16–17) that "many enemies" were pursuing the army during the Armenian blizzard may have been an exaggeration intended to prod tired and sick men back onto their feet.

<sup>105</sup> For Anatolian mercenaries see *An.* 4.3.4, 4.4.18.

<sup>106</sup> *An.* 4.1.8, 4.1.10, 4.1.16, 4.1.20–1, 4.2.4, 4.2.24–8.

<sup>107</sup> For a coalition of Chalybians, Taochians, and Phasians see *An.* 4.6.5–6; cf. 4.8.1–3 and 4.8.8–9 for possibly similar efforts by the Macronians and Colchians.

<sup>108</sup> *An.* 4.7.1–14. <sup>109</sup> *An.* 4.7.15–18.

<sup>110</sup> This would explain why some villages appear empty of inhabitants (*An.* 4.6.27, 4.7.18, 4.7.27, 4.8.19–20; cf. 3.4.9); even fortified villages were sometimes undefended (4.4.2–3).



not flee collaborated with the Cyreans in hopes of preserving their homes and at least some of their food. One way or the other, apparently little or no fighting occurred within settlements. Furthermore, fleeing inhabitants seem never to have torched their villages before leaving. The Cyreans, though, had no compunctions about causing such destruction.<sup>111</sup>

The settlements of Anatolia represented the Cyreans' main source of provisions for some two and a half months. The soldiers pillaged larders and stables, drank whatever alcohol they could find, and made off with anything else, especially warm clothing, that looked valuable and light enough to carry.<sup>112</sup> Yet, despite Xenophon's enumeration of the bountiful provisions the Cyreans discovered en route, there were probably some limits on settlement resources.<sup>113</sup> A large agglomeration of well-stocked villages surrounding a palace, such as the Cyreans encountered in western Armenia, might furnish rations for a week or more, but a group of small hamlets, as in Carduchia, probably could not produce more than a day or two's supplies.

In the end, the army was chronically short of food but rarely entirely out of it, and probably no one literally starved to death. The real killers during this period of the campaign, as Xenophon pointed out, were the weather and enemy action.<sup>114</sup> By the time the soldiers reached Trapezus in early January 400, about a quarter of those who had joined Cyrus the previous spring were dead.

#### THE BLACK SEA COAST

The fifth period of the campaign, roughly spring and summer 400 BC, took the Cyreans westward from Trapezus to Byzantium. The Black Sea coast was a mixture of the familiar and the exotic. On the one hand, there were the trappings of Aegean Greek life: the *poleis* of Trapezus, Cerasus, Cotyora, Sinope and Heracleia, sailing ships and merchants, even starch-stiff Spartan officers. On the other hand, there were tribal peoples like the Mossynoecians, with their dugout canoes, dolphin blubber for oil, and tattooed children.<sup>115</sup>

The Euxine shore was a pleasant change from the rugged mountains and undulating plateaus of Anatolia. The Cyreans kept to the level coastal plain for nearly their entire trip to Byzantium, with only occasional forays into the neighboring foothills for provisions or plunder.<sup>116</sup> From Trapezus to

<sup>111</sup> *An.* 4.4.14–15, 4.7.20–2; cf. 4.4.6.

<sup>112</sup> The single exception was in Carduchia (*An.* 4.1.8), where the Cyreans refrained from appropriating some fine bronze vessels in the futile hope of appeasing the locals.

<sup>113</sup> On Xenophon's descriptions of provisions cf. Tuplin (1991) 49.

<sup>114</sup> *An.* 5.3.3. <sup>115</sup> *An.* 5.4.11, 5.4.28, 5.4.32.

<sup>116</sup> For forays into hills see *An.* 5.2.1–2, 5.4.15, 5.4.30–2, 5.7.13–15, 6.3.2–4, 6.5.12–32.

Cotyora, the plain had room for roads, which the inhabitants refurbished to speed the army's passage.<sup>117</sup> From Heracleia to Chrysopolis (across the straits from Byzantium), the littoral was narrower and cut by hills, but still traversable. Between Sinope and Heracleia, though, seaside cliffs and ravines made land travel trickier, and seaborne movement was preferable.<sup>118</sup> Traveling entirely by water, as the soldiers did in mid-April from Cotyora via Sinope and its port of Harmene to Heracleia, made possible huge strides: in only four days of sailing, the army covered more than 760 kilometers (472 miles).<sup>119</sup> This was a fantastic pace compared to the two and a half months it had taken to slog from Carduchia to Trapezus.<sup>120</sup> Sea travel also enabled the Cyreans to bypass mountains, river barriers, and hostile forces.<sup>121</sup>

The weather, too, took a pleasant turn during this period of the campaign. The Cyreans had more than a month at Trapezus to adjust to the mild coastal climate, and from spring through summer, as they made their way westwards, they enjoyed the moderate temperatures and cool onshore breezes of the Pontic coast.<sup>122</sup> Indeed, high temperatures that summer might not have topped 24°–28° C (75°–82° F) anywhere from Trapezus to Byzantium.<sup>123</sup> Even the Black Sea water was swimmably warm.<sup>124</sup> The coast could be rainy and humid, but the high year-round precipitation also produced plentiful water from springs and streams all along the coast.<sup>125</sup> If moisture-laden winds sometimes brought clouds and thick sea fog to hinder navigation, at least the spring and summer days were long, with thirteen or more hours of daylight to illuminate the voyage from Cotyora to Heracleia.<sup>126</sup>

The favorable terrain and climate supported extensive settlement, both Greek and non-Greek. The Greeks concentrated in *poleis*, the most important being Sinope, a Milesian colony which had itself launched colonies

<sup>117</sup> *An.* 5.1.13–14, 5.3.2.

<sup>118</sup> On this topography see Naval Intelligence Division (1942) I.103–11. For more on sea travel see Chapter Six.

<sup>119</sup> The straight-line distance from Cotyora (modern Ordu) to Harmene/Sinope (modern Sinop) is 254 km (158 miles); from Harmene/Sinope to Heracleia (modern Ereğli) is 512 km (318 miles). Since their ships had to follow the coastline, probably the actual distance the Cyreans traveled was at least 800 km (500 miles); cf. Manfredi (1986) 239–40, Lendle (1995) 364–5.

<sup>120</sup> The straight-line distance from modern Cizre (in Carduchia) via Erzurum to Trabzon (Trapezus) is 482 km (299 miles). The winding route the Cyreans took likely doubled or tripled this distance.

<sup>121</sup> *An.* 5.6–10.

<sup>122</sup> The army remained about thirty days in Colchian territory near Trapezus (*An.* 4.8.22), after which there was a further wait, perhaps up to another month, for Cheirisophus to return from his search for ships to carry the army (5.1.3–4).

<sup>123</sup> Naval Intelligence Division (1942) I.207, Republic of Turkey (1977).

<sup>124</sup> Tanoglu et al. (1961) 54.

<sup>125</sup> Naval Intelligence Division (1942) I.212–13.

<sup>126</sup> On these navigational hazards see Naval Intelligence Division (1942) I.218–19.

eastward to Cerasus, Cotyora, and Trapezus and west to Harmene.<sup>127</sup> Sinope and her daughters boasted fertile rural hinterlands, those of Trapezus and Cotyora being set amidst the territories of the Colchians and Tibarenians.<sup>128</sup> West of Sinope was Heracleia, a Megarian and Boeotian foundation dominating the native Mariandynians.<sup>129</sup> Large and prosperous as these *poleis* were, they viewed the Cyrean approach with trepidation, if for no other reason than sheer numbers: there were probably more Cyreans than Heracleots, and Heracleia was among the most populous coastal cities.<sup>130</sup>

Around and between these outposts of Hellenism, other peoples flourished. Most notable were the Mossynoecians between Trapezus and Cotyora, the Paphlagonians between Sinope and Heracleia, and the Bithynian Thracians in the region of Calpe Harbor.<sup>131</sup> Between Trapezus and Sinope, non-Greek settlements varied in size but emphasized defensibility. Nearest the Greek cities, as in Colchis, were fortified lowland villages, while mountain dwellers such as the Drilae enjoyed the protection of walled towns with ditches and towers.<sup>132</sup> The Mossynoecians too lived in hilltop towns and citadels, some up to eighty stades (12–16 kilometers or 7–10 miles) apart. Like the Drilae they knew how to build wooden palisades and towers.<sup>133</sup> Even the relatively weak Tibarenians possessed fortified coastal strongholds.<sup>134</sup> From Sinope to Chrysopolis, there were fewer large settlements. Heracleia's rich countryside did not encompass any native habitations, but at least around Calpe Harbor the land was thick with unfortified villages.<sup>135</sup>

The populations of the Pontic coast, Greek and non-Greek, were bound together by a complex web of alliances and enmities. The Trapezuntians, for instance, simultaneously maintained diplomatic relations with the Mossynoecians to their west, protected some but not all of the lowland Colchians near their city, and constantly warred with the Drilae in the hills above it. Although a colony of Sinope, Trapezus apparently did not pay tribute to the metropolis as her sister Cotyora did.<sup>136</sup> The Mossynoecians, with subject

<sup>127</sup> *An.* 4.8.22–4, 5.3.2, 5.5.3, 6.1.14, Lendle (1995) *passim*, Hansen and Nielsen (2004) 954–64.

<sup>128</sup> *An.* 4.8.22, 5.5.6, 6.2.8; cf. Gorman (2001) 248.

<sup>129</sup> *An.* 6.2.1, Burstein (1976), Hansen and Nielsen (2004) 955–8.

<sup>130</sup> Burstein (1976) 40 estimates Heracleia's citizen body at ca. 6,000 in the early fourth century BC; more than 9,000 Cyreans made it to Trapezus, and there were still 7,000 in ranks at Byzantium.

<sup>131</sup> *An.* 5.4.1–34, 5.6.1–8, 6.1.1–13, 6.2.17–19. <sup>132</sup> *An.* 5.1.17–5.2.2, 5.2.3–7.

<sup>133</sup> *An.* 5.4.15, 5.4.26, 5.4.31–2. <sup>134</sup> *An.* 5.5.2.

<sup>135</sup> The absence of villages near Heracleia is implied by *An.* 6.2.4; for Calpe Harbor and its environs see 6.3.2–4, 6.4.3–6, 6.6.5.

<sup>136</sup> Diplomatic relations: *An.* 5.4.2; lowland Colchians: 4.8.24, 5.2.1–2, 5.5.13–14; Drilae: 5.2.2; Cotyora's tribute: 5.5.7.

peoples of their own, were in the midst of a civil war when the Cyreans met them; the army took sides, helping one faction of Mossynoecians take over the disputed “capital” and intimidating others into surrender or flight.<sup>137</sup>

For the Cyreans, all these people meant consistent and abundant supplies, another nice change from Anatolia. Trapezus, Sinope, and Heracleia gave generous gifts of hospitality (*xenia*) – bribes, really – to help speed the army on its way, and non-Greeks including the Colchians and Tibarenians did likewise.<sup>138</sup> The fertility of the region finds clear reflection in the quantity of grain Sinope and Heracleia proffered: 3,000 *medimnoi* of barley meal each, totaling more than a month’s rations for 8,000 troops.<sup>139</sup> There were as well gifts of wine, enough to get every soldier in the army drunk several times over, and herds of sheep and cattle to barbecue. Finding firewood must have been no problem anywhere along the Pontic coast, one of the principal forested regions of antiquity.<sup>140</sup> The coastal peoples were also eager to make a profit from the Cyreans. They held markets outside city walls from Trapezus to Byzantium, and even sailed to trade with the army during its sojourn at Calpe Harbor.<sup>141</sup> The soldiers themselves caught the scent of commerce, some heading up into the hills above Cerasus to trade with the locals, while others sold produce gathered in foraging expeditions around Calpe.<sup>142</sup>

Where gifts or markets were absent or insufficient, the Cyreans fed off the countryside. At Trapezus in January and February, for example, the soldiers made forays on the more distant Colchian villages and a longer expedition against the mountain-dwelling Drilae.<sup>143</sup> On the way through Mossynoecia, they sustained themselves partly on captured food stores.<sup>144</sup> And, in March and April at Cotyora, when the Cotyorites refused to provide a market, they helped themselves to the rural fruits of the city and raided neighboring Paphlagonian territory.<sup>145</sup> The Cotyorites soon relented, offering both *xenia* and a market.

Only after the Cyreans entered the *polis*-free zone between Heracleia and Byzantium did villages again become a supply mainstay. Initially the soldiers targeted booty more than provisions. During their brief secession from the rest of the army, for example, the Arcadians and Achaeans announced their

<sup>137</sup> Mossynoecian subjects: *An.* 5.5.1; civil war: 5.4.15; capital: 5.4.26; intimidation: 5.4.30.

<sup>138</sup> *An.* 4.8.22–4, 5.5.2, 6.1.15, 6.2.3.

<sup>139</sup> 6,000 *medimnoi* equals 288,000 *choenikes*; for one *choenix* as a day’s rations see Foxhall and Forbes (1982).

<sup>140</sup> Naval Intelligence Division (1942) I.230–5, Amigues (1995) 72.

<sup>141</sup> *An.* 4.8.23, 5.5.24, 5.7.23–4, 6.1.1, 6.2.8, 6.5.1, 6.6.3.

<sup>142</sup> *An.* 5.7.13–14, 6.6.37.

<sup>143</sup> *An.* 4.8.22–3, 5.1.5–6, 5.2.1–2.

<sup>144</sup> *An.* 5.4.27–9.

<sup>145</sup> *An.* 5.5.5–7.

arrival at Calpe Harbor by sacking numerous villages.<sup>146</sup> During the more than two months the army stayed at Calpe, probably in mid-summer, the troops resumed their old habits, repeatedly embarking on foraging expeditions against native settlements in the area.<sup>147</sup> The first of these, led by the general Neon, was an unqualified disaster, but after the Cyreans had established a fortified base at Calpe and repelled the cavalry of Pharnabazus, they had great success plundering the countryside.<sup>148</sup>

The bloody setback of Neon's foragers near Calpe was not the only defeat the army suffered along the Black Sea coast. Indeed, in military respects this period of the campaign was one of the worst, with more than 1,300 Cyreans killed in action between Trapezus and Byzantium.<sup>149</sup> It was not that they were any less skilled. Indeed, through constant practice the troops had perfected their techniques in a range of combat situations, from pitched battle to urban assaults, to night marches, combined arms skirmishing, and ambushes.<sup>150</sup> Some men had developed a knack for climbing, born of repeated assaults on hilltop strongholds, that helped pry open even the strongest fortified places.<sup>151</sup> The Cyreans by the summer of 400 BC were probably the most versatile, battle-hardened fighting force in the Greek world, better even perhaps than the Spartans, whose real strength lay largely in hoplite warfare.

The army on the Black Sea coast, though, did not always fight as a team. There were too many temptations to go after provisions or plunder alone, and on several occasions small raiding units came to bad ends when their intended prey turned about and bit back hard. Even larger expeditions, such as Neon's at Calpe, ran into trouble when the troops got careless or greedy and neglected to maintain formation.<sup>152</sup> The Arcadian and Achaean hoplites had a different problem at Calpe. Without cavalry or peltasts, they could not repel the Thracian light troops and horsemen who swarmed against them. Only blind luck saved the Arcadians and Achaeans from complete destruction; as it was, some 800 of them were cut down.<sup>153</sup> Xenophon emphasized the hoplites' vulnerabilities to highlight the foolhardiness of the Arcadian/Achaean secession, but the tactical lesson was no less true for that.

<sup>146</sup> *An.* 6.3.2–5. Despite Lycon's claims at Heracleia (6.2.4), the Arcadians and Achaeans clearly wanted captives, sheep, and property, not grain; cf. the plundering of villages for booty (6.6.38) on the way to Chrysopolis, and Lendle (1995) 373.

<sup>147</sup> *An.* 6.4.3–6, 6.4.23–6, 6.5.7, 6.6.2–3.

<sup>148</sup> For Neon, see Chapter Three. <sup>149</sup> For casualty figures see Table 3.

<sup>150</sup> Constant practice: *An.* 5.6.15; pitched battle: 6.5.27–32; assaults: 5.2.11–15; night marches: 6.3.2; skirmishing: 6.3.18–19; ambushes: 5.3.28–30.

<sup>151</sup> *An.* 5.2.15, 5.5.20, 7.1.17.

<sup>152</sup> *An.* 5.1.17, 5.4.16, 5.7.16, 6.4.24.

<sup>153</sup> *An.* 6.3.2–9, 6.3.25–6.

Not everyone who went off on his own got killed. From Trapezus onward, men began to leave ranks, either disappearing into one or the other of the Greek *poleis*, or taking ship and sailing west. Xenophon portrayed the most prominent of these men, Silanus the Ambraciot and Dexippus the Laconian, as traitors and scoundrels, but his own account of the army's dwindling numbers suggests that these two were not alone in taking their leave.<sup>154</sup> In the end, about 6,000 Cyreans made it to Byzantium, out of the 9,000 or more who reached Trapezus. Perhaps 1,500 had been killed in battle; the rest had deserted along the way.<sup>155</sup>

#### THRACE AND THE PROPONTIS

In early fall 400 BC, the Cyreans finally arrived at Byzantium. Here began the sixth and final period of their campaign.<sup>156</sup> If the Black Sea coast had been a mixture of the familiar and unfamiliar, Thrace and the Propontis represented a homecoming of sorts. Some of the men hailed from these parts, and others, notably Clearchus' former troops, had served in the region before.<sup>157</sup> Winter 400–399 would take the Cyreans north into European Thrace for several months to serve the dynast Seuthes. Although they saw some combat, the soldiers spent most of this period waiting: waiting for the Spartans to figure out what to do with them, waiting for their generals to decide where to lead them, waiting for Seuthes to pay them, waiting for the right weather so they could sail for home.

Waiting in villages near Byzantium or under the walls of Perinthus, as the Cyreans did throughout the fall and into the winter, was miserable and boring.<sup>158</sup> The cold was probably not intolerable on the coast, with November temperatures perhaps still a mild 8°–12° C (46°–53° F) and even January lows generally well above freezing. Fall and winter, though, were rainy and damp. Sometimes it snowed, but at least the snow cover was never as thick or persistent as it had been in Anatolia.<sup>159</sup> The soldiers likely had to build shelters of some sort, perhaps rude wood huts and lean-tos, to shield themselves from the elements. It must have been galling to sit outside Byzantium or Perinthus and watch taunting wisps of smoke curl up from inside the city walls, where the townspeople rested snug under

<sup>154</sup> *An.* 5.2.15, 5.6.18, 5.6.34, 6.4.13.

<sup>155</sup> See Tables 2 and 3 for troop strengths and casualties during this period.

<sup>156</sup> For this period generally see Stronk (1995). <sup>157</sup> *An.* 1.1.9, 1.2.9, 5.6.22–4.

<sup>158</sup> *An.* 7.2.1–2, 7.2.11, 7.6.24; for Byzantium and Perinthus see Hansen and Nielsen (2004) 912–23.

<sup>159</sup> Naval Intelligence Division (1942) I.199, 223, 226, Republic of Turkey (1977).

real roofs, warming themselves around proper hearths. Sick and injured Cyreans who sought winter quarters in Byzantium were apprehended and sold into slavery by the Spartans. Hundreds of men tired of the wait and deserted at Byzantium, while at Perinthus another 800 broke off under Neon to pursue their fortunes elsewhere.<sup>160</sup>

The winter rains meant a steady water supply, and wood for cooking and heating does not seem to have been scarce, but food was probably short.<sup>161</sup> At Byzantium, where the soldiers quartered in Thracian villages near the city, provisions seem to have been more readily obtainable than at Perinthus, where the locals provided only a scanty market and the neighboring villages were hostile.<sup>162</sup> There was also interference by Byzantium's Spartan governor, Aristarchus, who forbade the Cyreans to plunder certain villages.<sup>163</sup>

Sometime in mid-winter, perhaps in December or January, the Cyreans broke camp at Perinthus and marched inland to take service with Seuthes in Thrace.<sup>164</sup> Seuthes promised regular pay and free rein to forage in Thracian villages, but delivered only the latter.<sup>165</sup> For a month or so, the Cyreans encamped on the plain of Thynia, feeding off its villages, gathering slaves and cattle for sale, and attempting to force the Thynians to come down from their mountain refuges.<sup>166</sup> From Thynia the army moved eastward to the so-called Thracian Delta above Byzantium, then up the coast to Salmydessus, then back south again to Selymbria on the northern shore of the Propontis, perhaps two months of campaigning all told.<sup>167</sup> Provisions do not seem to have been a problem during any of this time. Nor was shelter, as the army repeatedly quartered in Thracian villages.<sup>168</sup> Indeed, even the Cyreans who stood up at Selymbria to complain that Xenophon had led them into Thrace were really only mad about one thing: Seuthes had not delivered the pay he had promised.<sup>169</sup>

As long as they could feed themselves, the Cyreans could take the weather. In the Delta, at Salmydessus, and at Selymbria, the coastal climate was probably similar to that at Byzantium and Perinthus: chilly and damp but

<sup>160</sup> *An.* 7.2.3–4, 7.2.6–7, Neon: 7.2.11. Any remaining Thracian peltasts (1.2.9, 2.2.7) probably departed at this time; this would explain why Xenophon found no peltasts amongst the Cyreans when he rejoined them at Perinthus (7.6.26); cf. Roy (1967) 320.

<sup>161</sup> For vegetation around Byzantium and Perinthus see Naval Intelligence Division (1942) I.235–6.

<sup>162</sup> *An.* 7.6.25–6.

<sup>163</sup> This seems to be the sense of *An.* 7.3.5, although Aristarchus had earlier (7.1.13, 7.2.1) directed the Cyreans to draw their provisions from Thracian villages near Byzantium.

<sup>164</sup> *An.* 7.3.7–14, 7.6.24. <sup>165</sup> *An.* 7.3.8–11, 7.5.4–5.

<sup>166</sup> *An.* 7.3.48, 7.4.2–6, 7.3.48. <sup>167</sup> Roy (1967) 320, Stronk (1995) 250, 274–5.

<sup>168</sup> *An.* 7.6.31, 7.3.15, 7.4.11, 7.4.14–19, 7.7.1. <sup>169</sup> *An.* 7.6.9–10.

not intolerable.<sup>170</sup> Away from the sea, Thrace was colder, with patches of deep snow on the Thynian plain and elsewhere.<sup>171</sup> Although inland temperatures in December, January, and February today average 0°–4° C (32°–39° F), Xenophon reports that it got cold enough in Thynia to freeze wine in ceramic jars. This would have required temperatures in the area of –4° to –5° C (23°–25° F), suggesting that the winter of 400–399 was unusually bitter.<sup>172</sup> Still, although the soldiers coveted the fur caps and cloaks their Thracian allies wore, they do not seem to have suffered excessively from the cold.<sup>173</sup> Having spent the winter of 401–400 marching through frozen Anatolia, the troops were experienced at dealing with this sort of weather, although those who had suffered from frostbite or exposure the previous winter may have had a permanently reduced cold tolerance.<sup>174</sup>

#### JOURNEY'S END

By early spring 399 BC, after much wrangling, the Cyreans managed to extract a portion of their pay from Seuthes.<sup>175</sup> Even before that deal was done, though, a new opportunity arose, as Spartan emissaries arrived at Selymbria, bringing a proposal from Thibron, now Sparta's top commander in western Asia Minor. The Spartans were on the warpath against Artaxerxes and Tissaphernes, who had reasserted control over the Greek cities of Ionia.<sup>176</sup> Thibron needed troops, the Cyreans needed money, and Thrace had nothing more to offer. So it was that the army shipped itself back over to Asia, landing at Lampsacus and then marching south across the Troad and to Pergamum. There, perhaps a month after leaving Selymbria, the 5,000 or so surviving mercenaries, still under Xenophon's command, presented themselves to Thibron.<sup>177</sup> Two years after setting out with Cyrus, once again they would be going to war against Artaxerxes.

<sup>170</sup> At Selymbria, the army actually encamped on a plain above the city, some 30 stades (4.5–6 km) from the sea (*An.* 7.5.15) but still in the coastal climatic zone.

<sup>171</sup> *An.* 7.3.42, 7.4.3.

<sup>172</sup> *An.* 7.4.3, Naval Intelligence Division (1942) I.213, Republic of Turkey (1977, Stronk (1995) 217–19, 224.

<sup>173</sup> *An.* 7.4.3–5. <sup>174</sup> For more on reduced cold tolerance see Chapter Nine.

<sup>175</sup> *An.* 7.7.53–7, Stronk (1995) 250–3. <sup>176</sup> *An.* 7.6.1, Cartledge (1987) 209–10, 354–7.

<sup>177</sup> *An.* 7.8.7, 7.8.24, Stronk (1995) 252.



## CHAPTER 3

### *The army*

To the citizens of Ionia's coastal cities at the end of the fifth century BC, the sight of mercenaries in the streets was nothing new. For decades, the Persian satraps of western Asia Minor had been employing Greek professionals, Arcadians especially, in their personal guards and urban garrisons. The latest satrap, prince Cyrus, was no different.<sup>1</sup> In Persian eyes, hiring from the other side of the Aegean was far preferable to recruiting locally. The Arcadians and their ilk were just Greek enough that the Ionians would not chafe excessively at their presence, but still outsiders enough to have few qualms about cracking Ionian skulls when ordered to. From the Ionian standpoint, mercenaries were probably tolerated if not entirely welcome. Unless he had to quarter some in his home, the average city dweller probably appreciated the way Cyrus' soldiers enforced order and suppressed crime.<sup>2</sup> Men hoping to make connections with the imperial administration might even seek to marry their daughters to mercenary officers.<sup>3</sup> And for those in the right line of work – tavern-keepers, prostitutes, and armorers come to mind – the presence of a garrison meant steady customers and tidy profits.

If mercenaries normally blended into the fabric of Ionian life, an attentive citizen strolling through town in early 401 BC would have felt something afoot. Garrison units tended to be under strength, but now barracks brimmed with fresh recruits, and smiths and shield makers were doing a brisk business fashioning new sets of arms and refurbishing old ones.<sup>4</sup> Down by the docks, say at Ephesus, a careful observer might have remarked on a quiet increase in passenger traffic, as ships from the west unloaded more than the usual season's share of Arcadian highlanders, along with an atypical influx of Achaeans, Boeotians, and Thessalians.<sup>5</sup> Indeed, there was

<sup>1</sup> Parke (1933) 14–15, 23, Seibt (1977) 39–51, Tuplin (1987b) 174–5, 209.

<sup>2</sup> *An.* 1.9.13. On quartering see Launey (1950) 699–700.

<sup>3</sup> The generals Xenias and Pasion, for instance, had wives and children at Tralles (*An.* 1.4.8); they may well have married local women.

<sup>4</sup> *An.* 1.1.6, Roy (1967) 297–8; cf. *Hell.* 3.4.17.

<sup>5</sup> Xenophon himself landed at Ephesus (*An.* 6.1.23) after crossing over from Athens.

activity up and down the coast: troops everywhere were leaving their bases, all apparently heading in the direction of Sardis. To be sure, Cyrus was always sending detachments out on expeditions – more than a thousand mercenaries had been with the force besieging rebels in Miletus for some time now – but this was something different. Only the most meager garrisons remained, hunkered down on each city's *acropolis* where they could hold out if anybody took advantage of their weakness to raise a revolt.<sup>6</sup> There was even a report of a column of Greeks and Thracians coming south overland from the Chersonese.<sup>7</sup> Throughout Ionia, at market stalls and in back-street brothels and taverns, the absence of soldiers meant a painful drop in revenue, and everyone hoped the customers would return soon. The rumor making the rounds was that Cyrus meant to chastise the Pisidians in the hill country to the east.<sup>8</sup> To optimists, that meant maybe a few months of campaigning, with the garrisons back before summer. The more reflective, hearing of the general departure of troops from city after city, concluded something much larger was brewing.<sup>9</sup> So the Ionians waited for the mercenaries to return. It would be two years before any did.

#### CONTINGENTS AND COMMANDERS

While the Ionians speculated about the disappearance of the garrisons, Cyrus was awaiting their arrival. Some 7,300 hoplites and 800 light infantry joined him at Sardis, whence he set out in February 401 BC under the cover story that he was going to attack the Pisidians.<sup>10</sup> A further 3,300 hoplites and 1,500 light-armed troops, plus 40 cavalry, made rendezvous in the following weeks at Colossae and Celaenae.<sup>11</sup> His satrapal levies, perhaps 20,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry, probably also made their appearance during this time.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>6</sup> *An.* 1.1.7–8, 1.2.1–2, 1.9.14.

<sup>7</sup> This was the contingent of Clearchus (*An.* 1.1.9), described in more detail below.

<sup>8</sup> *An.* 1.1.11, 1.2.1.

<sup>9</sup> Tissaphernes came to the same conclusion (*An.* 1.2.4) and quickly set off to warn Artaxerxes.

<sup>10</sup> *An.* 1.2.1–3.

<sup>11</sup> *An.* 1.2.5–7. The seven-day halt at Colossae and the thirty-day halt at Celaenae were probably to allow the contingents of Menon and Clearchus, which had to travel the farthest to join Cyrus, to catch up.

<sup>12</sup> On Cyrus' levies see Lendle (1966) 436, Anderson (1974a) 99–100, Bigwood (1983) 341, Briant (2002) 620. Although Xenophon does not mention these forces until Tyriaecum (*An.* 1.2.14), it would have made more sense for them to have marched east up the Hermus valley from their mustering place on the Castolus plain (1.1.2), meeting the mercenaries at Colossae, Celaenae, or Peltae, than to have gone west down the Hermus towards Sardis, joined Cyrus there, and then backtracked east past their mustering place. For the Castolus plain see Talbert (2000) 62.

The mercenaries who arrived at Sardis, Colossae, and Celaenae belonged not to a unified command but to disparate contingents (*strateumata*), each with its own general (*strategos*).<sup>13</sup> The largest contingent was that drawn from the urban garrisons, 4,000 hoplites under Xenias the Parrhasian, Cyrus' leading general. Like many of his men, Xenias was an Arcadian; his homeland of Parrhasia nestled below the peaks of Lycaenum and Lycosura in the central Peloponnesus.<sup>14</sup> Like some of them, he had made a new home in Ionia: he left behind a wife and children at Tralles southwest of Sardis. Xenias had been in Cyrus' service for years, long enough to build up the trust required for the prominent position he held. In 405 BC, at the head of 300 hoplite guardsmen, Xenias had accompanied Cyrus to Babylon, whither the young prince had been summoned to his father's deathbed. Having seen the vastness of Persia's empire with his own eyes, Xenias must have been inclined to caution against rash undertakings. Perhaps this explains why Cyrus did not reveal the expedition's true aim to him.<sup>15</sup>

Xenias had lieutenants, amongst them Pasion the Megarian. He too had probably been in Cyrus' service for some time, and like Xenias left a family at Tralles. Pasion arrived at Sardis leading 300 hoplites and 300 peltasts fresh from the siege of Miletus. He merged these troops into Xenias' contingent and remained, probably, as second-in-command (*hupostrategos*).<sup>16</sup> Another subordinate, Sosis the Syracusan, showed up at Celaenae just long enough to hand over 300 hoplites, perhaps from an outlying garrison, before disappearing.<sup>17</sup> All told, then, Xenias and Pasion's contingent numbered some 4,600 hoplites and 300 peltasts.

Xenias and Pasion had not been Cyrus' only recruiters in Asia Minor. His guest-friends (*xenoi*) Proxenus the Boeotian, Socrates the Achaean, and Sophagnetus of Stymphalus in Arcadia supervised the assembly of an additional 3,000 hoplites. Proxenus also managed to secure 500 peltasts.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>13</sup> For *strateuma* designating an individual contingent see *An.* 1.1.9–10, 1.2.1, 1.2.21, 1.2.25, 1.4.13, 1.5.11, and possibly the textually challenged 1.8.4. Before Cunaxa, all the contingents together are but thrice (1.2.18, 1.4.17, 1.5.6) referred to as a single *strateuma*. After Cunaxa, in contrast, Xenophon uses *strateuma* only to designate the entire army; see note 58 below.

<sup>14</sup> *An.* 1.2.1–3, Roy (1967) 298; see below for more on Parrhasia.

<sup>15</sup> On Xenias see *An.* 1.1.2, 1.1.6, 1.2.1, 1.4.8.

<sup>16</sup> This force (*An.* 1.2.3) may have included a smattering of Milesian exiles (1.2.2). Roy (1967) 289 posits that Xenias and Pasion united their troops in a single contingent, without considering when this happened. The outset of the expedition seems most likely, for although Xenias and Pasion appear together commanding a contingent (1.3.7), Xenias alone celebrated the Lycaean Games at Peltae (1.2.10). Furthermore, Xenias is specified as leading the city garrisons (1.2.1), while Pasion arrived with only a small detachment; perhaps he had been one of the garrison commanders (*phourarchoi*) mentioned in 1.1.6. For more on *hupostrategoi*, see below.

<sup>17</sup> *An.* 1.2.9; Roy (1967) 287 suggests Sosis subsequently served as a *lochagos*.

<sup>18</sup> *An.* 1.1.11, 1.2.3; cf. Parke (1933) 25–6.

Sophaenetus, perhaps in his fifties, was the eldest. Probably he was a veteran campaigner, with a prudence and cupidity born of many years' mercenary service. Socrates, in his mid-thirties, was also an experienced soldier. He made a brief but favorable impression on Xenophon. Proxenus, at age thirty the youngest of the three, was educated but untried. Even his friend Xenophon did not rate him highly as a commander.<sup>19</sup>

Exactly how this trio did their hiring is not known. Socrates perhaps mustered his contingent the earliest, for it was already participating in the siege of Miletus when Cyrus dispatched word to rendezvous at Sardis.<sup>20</sup> The troops of Proxenus and Sophaenetus, in contrast, may have been more recently recruited, for neither of their contingents appears to have seen combat before joining Cyrus.<sup>21</sup> While we cannot pin down where Socrates and Sophaenetus collected their men, Proxenus' 1,500 hoplites and 500 peltasts included a number of Boeotians and Athenians, perhaps suggesting his contingent assembled in central Greece.<sup>22</sup> Curiously, though, when Proxenus invited Xenophon to join him on the expedition, he did so by letter rather than in person. Had he been recruiting personally in his native Boeotia, or even in the Peloponnese, a stop in Athens would hardly have been out of the way. Perhaps, then, Proxenus remained in Asia Minor, enrolling some men there while dispatching agents back west to enlist others.<sup>23</sup> Whatever methods Proxenus and his colleagues used, probably their contingents sailed over from Greece as inconspicuously as possible. Cyrus wanted his preparations kept secret, and nothing was surer to attract unwanted attention than convoys of ships disgorging five hundred or a thousand fresh troops at a time.<sup>24</sup> At any rate, Proxenus' 2,000 men, along with Socrates' 500 hoplites and Sophaenetus' 1,000 hoplites, were already at Sardis when Xenias and Pasion arrived, Socrates having preceded Pasion in departing the siege lines around Miletus.<sup>25</sup>

Two other generals had assembled troops for Cyrus outside Ionia. One was Clearchus, a rogue Spartiate. Dispatched to the Hellespont in 411 BC,

<sup>19</sup> Sophaenetus: *An.* 5.3.1, 5.8.1, 6.5.13; Socrates: 2.6.30; Proxenus: 2.6.16–20.

<sup>20</sup> *An.* 1.2.3. <sup>21</sup> *An.* 1.1.11. <sup>22</sup> Roy (1967) 301.

<sup>23</sup> Despite Xenophon's assertion (*An.* 3.1.8–9) that he caught up with Proxenus and Cyrus just as they were leaving Sardis, Proxenus clearly sent his letter (3.1.4–5) well in advance: Xenophon had time not only to make a self-affirming pilgrimage to Delphi (3.1.5–7) but also to write back and tell Proxenus he was coming. Had Proxenus not received this reply, there would have been nobody waiting at Ephesus to greet Xenophon when he landed (6.1.23).

<sup>24</sup> Possibly some troops traveled in disguise; cf. *Aen. Tact.* 10.8–9, 24.6–7.

<sup>25</sup> Depending when the siege of Miletus began, Socrates too may have remained in Asia Minor while sending agents west. At Caÿstru-pedion in late March, two months out from Sardis, Cyrus owed the troops more than three months' wages (*An.* 1.2.12), suggesting the siege had lasted at least a month. The besiegers probably pulled out gradually to avoid attracting attention; this would explain why Socrates reached Sardis before Pasion (1.2.3).

Clearchus had initially performed heroically on Sparta's behalf, but by 403 had set himself up as brutal tyrant of Byzantium. Ejected from that city and under sentence of death from the Spartan government, Clearchus sought refuge with Cyrus. The two hit it off, and Clearchus was soon headed back north with 10,000 of the prince's darics.<sup>26</sup> The money bought him a private army, with which he proceeded to plunder the Thracian Chersonese until Cyrus summoned him early in 401 BC. Of all the generals, perhaps only he knew the true reason for the call.<sup>27</sup> At the head of 1,000 hoplites, 800 Thracian peltasts, 200 Cretan archers, and 40 Thracian cavalry, Clearchus caught up with his patron at Celaenae.<sup>28</sup>

While Clearchus roved the Chersonese, another ally had been maintaining a contingent for Cyrus in Thessaly. Pressed by his rivals, Aristippus of Larisa had requested assistance in the form of 2,000 troops and cash to pay them for three months. Cyrus responded with double measures of money and men, on the understanding that he could have them back when he needed them. When that time came in early 401 BC, Aristippus, locked in internecine struggle, could or would return only 1,000 hoplites.<sup>29</sup> Under the command of Aristippus' compatriot Menon – famous as the interlocutor in the Platonic dialogue bearing his name – these reached Cyrus at Colossae, about a week after his departure from Sardis. Despite Xenophon's biting portrayal of him, the youthful Menon was a competent commander and skilled orator.<sup>30</sup> Xenophon says nothing about Cyrus' reaction to getting back only a quarter of the force he had loaned, though any anger the prince felt may have been softened by the 500 Aenianian, Dolopian, and Olynthian peltasts Menon brought to Colossae.<sup>31</sup>

When Cyrus reviewed his forces at Celaenae, he could thus count six contingents of mercenaries, totaling 9,600 hoplites and 2,300 peltasts.<sup>32</sup> A hundred of Menon's hoplites fell victim to hostile tribesmen in the mountains above Tarsus, but two final reinforcements more than made good the loss.<sup>33</sup> The first of these appeared fortuitously. Abrocomas, satrap of Phoenicia, had been on his way to put down a revolt in Egypt when his forces were recalled to Mesopotamia to augment the army Artaxerxes was assembling to crush Cyrus. Somewhere along the road 400 of Abrocomas'

<sup>26</sup> *An.* 1.1.9, Bassett (2001), Braun (2004) 97–107; cf. Roisman (1985/8).

<sup>27</sup> *An.* 3.1.10, but see Bassett (2001) 12. <sup>28</sup> *An.* 1.2.1, 1.2.9, 2.2.7.

<sup>29</sup> *An.* 1.1.10, 1.2.1, 1.2.6, Lane Fox (2004a) 16–17.

<sup>30</sup> On Menon's capabilities see *An.* 1.4.13–17, Brown (1986) 391.

<sup>31</sup> The Aenianians inhabited the eastern borders of Aetolia, below Mount Oeta; see Launey (1949) 173–6, Launey (1950) 678, Scholten (2000) 51–2, 64. The Dolopians belonged to a tribal confederation living between Mounts Pindus and Thymphrestus; see Launey (1949) 122, 210, Launey (1950) 659, Scholten (2000) 47–9. The Olynthians came from the Chalcidice peninsula in northwest Greece.

<sup>32</sup> See Table 2. <sup>33</sup> *An.* 1.2.25; see Chapter Four for more about Menon's hoplites.

Greek mercenary hoplites slipped out of ranks and headed for Issus, where they presented themselves to Cyrus in late May.<sup>34</sup> The second reinforcement appeared at Issus within a day or so of the first. In the final years of the Peloponnesian War, Cyrus had furnished generous support to the Spartans. Now they repaid the favor: 700 mercenary hoplites under the Spartiate Cheirisophus splashed ashore from triremes onto the beach where Cyrus had pitched his tent.<sup>35</sup> These additions boosted the prince's total hoplite complement to 10,600. At some point before Cunaxa, 200 of these transferred to light infantry service, resulting in a final force of 10,400 hoplites and 2,500 peltasts.<sup>36</sup>

#### CONTINGENT LOYALTIES

At the outset of the campaign, each contingent possessed a more or less distinct identity rooted in the shared experiences of its men and the person of its commander. Clearchus' balanced mix of hoplites, light infantry, and cavalry, an army in miniature, probably possessed the strongest *esprit de corps*. Seasoned by extensive campaigning in the Chersonese, Clearchus' troopers were well drilled and highly disciplined. They shared a respectful fear of, though not affection for, their dour leader.<sup>37</sup> Not everyone could take Clearchus' harsh manner, particularly his readiness to lay into slackers with his swagger stick, but those who had decided he was not the general for them had probably left his employ well before he set out to join Cyrus.<sup>38</sup> Those who stuck with him appreciated his contagious confidence in battle, and the rations he always managed to supply.<sup>39</sup> They would level their spears in whatever direction he ordered, even against another contingent if ordered.<sup>40</sup>

Menon's men, likewise, could draw on their common experiences in Thessaly. Harm to one part of their contingent demanded vengeance from the rest, as the people of Tarsus discovered with dismay in early May, when Menon's troopers sacked the city as payback for the destruction of two

<sup>34</sup> *An.* 1.3.20, 1.4.3–5, Briant (2002) 619.

<sup>35</sup> On Cyrus and Sparta see *Hell.* 3.1.1, Cartledge (1987) 189–91; on Cheirisophus' contingent see *An.* 1.2.21, 1.4.3, Roy (2004) 266; cf. Diod. 14.21 and Stylianou (2004) 86–7. One wonders how well Cheirisophus the quasi-official Spartan representative got along with Clearchus the exile. The pair would have had much to discuss if, as Bassett (2001) 12 suggests, Cheirisophus too knew the expedition's real purpose. Even if the ephors appreciated the full extent of Cyrus' plans, however, and there is no evidence they did, they could simply have ordered Cheirisophus to report to and obey Cyrus rather than briefing him on the larger picture.

<sup>36</sup> For this transfer see Table 2. <sup>37</sup> *An.* 1.5.12–13, 2.6.5, 2.6.12–14.

<sup>38</sup> *An.* 2.3.1, 2.6.9–12; on Clearchus' swagger stick (*bakterian*) cf. Hornblower (2000).

<sup>39</sup> *An.* 1.5.12, 2.6.7–8. <sup>40</sup> *An.* 1.5.12–14; see below for details.

companies (*lochoi*) of their fellows in the Cilician mountains.<sup>41</sup> Despite Xenophon's portrait of Menon as a liar and scoundrel, the Thessalian's soldiers found their general skillful and persuasive. They must have taken pride in being granted the honored right wing of the line for the review at Tyriaeum, and in the important tasks Cyrus assigned them.<sup>42</sup> At Thapsacus in late June, Menon's men eagerly followed him across the Euphrates, before the troops of other contingents even got their feet wet.<sup>43</sup>

Matters were different within the largest contingent, that of Xenias and Pasion. To be sure, many of the Ionian garrison hoplites must have been hardened veterans, with much combat experience in Asia Minor.<sup>44</sup> Still, if detachments from some garrisons possessed shared memories of campaigns past, never before had men from every barracks up and down the coast mustered *en masse*.<sup>45</sup> When Xenias assembled them at Sardis, the majority would be setting eyes on each other for the first time. If they disdained the raw recruits, say those of Proxenus or Sophagnetus, who came directly from mainland Greece, the garrison veterans might have glanced enviously towards Clearchus' or Menon's contingents: *there* were men who had served together for a long time and really knew each other. The composite of mutually unfamiliar units constituting Xenias and Pasion's contingent also apparently did not find much inspiration in its leadership. Xenias was certainly an able organizer – he could hardly have gotten 4,000 men to Sardis otherwise, and Cyrus in any case did not pick incompetent administrators – but he seems to have lacked charisma. Aside from celebrating the Lycaean Games, Arcadia's national festival, at Peltae in March, Xenias seems hardly to have let out a peep after the departure from Sardis in February.<sup>46</sup>

During the first four months of the campaign, from Sardis to Tarsus, the mercenaries marched and camped in their original contingents. For the smaller or more recently assembled units, say those of Proxenus, Socrates, and Sophagnetus, this would have furnished ample opportunity for generals and men to develop a stronger corporate identity. If Xenias and Pasion tried to foster a similar spirit in their contingent, its numbers may have

<sup>41</sup> *An.* 1.2.25–6.

<sup>42</sup> Liar and scoundrel: *An.* 2.6.21–9; right wing: 1.2.15; important tasks: e.g. the flanking movement over the Taurus mountains, 1.2.19–20.

<sup>43</sup> *An.* 1.4.13–16. Xenophon uncharacteristically fails to disparage Menon's initiative in crossing the Euphrates; indeed he juxtaposes the episode with a description of Cyrus' delight (1.4.16) and the divine favor of the river itself (1.4.18).

<sup>44</sup> *An.* 1.1.7, 1.9.9, 1.9.14.

<sup>45</sup> That Cyrus had never stripped his garrisons before is suggested by the specificity with which he instructed Xenias to leave behind only enough troops to hold the *acropoleis* (*An.* 1.2.1).

<sup>46</sup> *An.* 1.2.10, 1.9.18–19. Notably, Diod. 14.19.7–9 entirely omits Xenias and Pasion.

worked against them. Whatever the reason, Xenias and Pasion's lack of success in creating a coherent contingent became evident at Tarsus, where the mercenaries, suspecting the true nature of the expedition, went on strike for twenty days. Clearchus exploited the situation with drama and guile, weeping before his own soldiers and proclaiming he would never choose Cyrus' interests over theirs while secretly assuring the prince that he would soon have matters under control. The performance won rave reviews even among those who only heard it second-hand. But while men in other contingents were content merely to praise Clearchus, more than 2,000 of Xenias and Pasion's troops – whether hoplites or peltasts is uncertain – actually abandoned their leaders to encamp by the Spartan's side. Xenias and Pasion made no attempt to recover their lost soldiers. They may simply have lacked the requisite magnetism for the job, though even a scintillating orator would have had a hard time competing with Clearchus' sound bite of a promise never to choose "the friendship of the barbarians."<sup>47</sup>

Clearchus soon had the rest of the mercenaries eating out of Cyrus' hand. Within days the army was moving again – just to the Euphrates, the prince promised this time.<sup>48</sup> As a reward, Cyrus let Clearchus keep Xenias' and Pasion's 2,000. At a stroke, his contingent had doubled in size.<sup>49</sup> Although the rump left to Xenias and Pasion was still the army's second largest contingent, the snub must have stung deeply. Little wonder, then, that when the two of them hired a ship and sailed away less than a fortnight later at Myriandrus, the story ran about that jealousy of Clearchus had driven them to desert.<sup>50</sup> To replace Xenias, Cyrus picked Agias, another Arcadian professional in his mid-thirties.<sup>51</sup> An additional, older Arcadian, Cleanor

<sup>47</sup> For events at Tarsus see *An.* 1.3.1–8, Roisman (1985/8) 34–8.

<sup>48</sup> *An.* 1.3.20–1; Xenophon claims that the promise of time-and-a-half pay (1.3.21) and the fear of looking cowardly (3.1.10) impelled the soldiers forward despite their suspicions.

<sup>49</sup> *An.* 1.4.7; Clearchus now had some 4,000 troops (originally 1,000 hoplites and 1,000 light troops, plus 2,000 newcomers), compared to Xenias and Pasion with around 2,900 troops (originally 4,600 hoplites and 300 peltasts, minus the 2,000 deserters).

<sup>50</sup> *An.* 1.4.7; this is probably not the whole truth. Clearchus' tears and Cyrus' vague assertions might persuade the others, but Xenias likely knew better. He had been in Cyrus' employ long enough to realize that the prince was aiming not at the Euphrates but at Babylon. Xenias had scouted that route personally in 405 BC. It was at least a month's journey from the upper Euphrates crossing to Babylon, whether by the northerly Royal Road or by the southerly path down the Euphrates valley; an invading army would face supply problems and steadily growing resistance along the way. Had Cyrus not exploited Xenias' loyalty by concealing his true plans, perhaps the Arcadian might have stayed. As it was, letting Clearchus retain troops he and Pasion had raised was no more than the last straw.

<sup>51</sup> *An.* 2.5.31, 2.6.30, 3.1.47. Possibly the *lochagoi* of the contingent nominated a successor, whom Cyrus then confirmed.



of Orchomenus, joined Agias. Probably he held a position as second-in-command, just as Pasion had done for Xenias.<sup>52</sup>

The week before Xenias and Pasion deserted had come another organizational challenge, in the form of those 400 deserters from Abrocomas. Cyrus must have appreciated the additional troops, not to mention the intelligence they brought about the strength and disposition of Abrocomas' force. Figuring out what to do with these hoplites, though, required finesse. There is no evidence they operated as a separate contingent, so they must have been incorporated into an existing one. Given recent events at Tarsus, the question of who got to keep extra troops must have been on everyone's mind. Although Xenophon does not specify what happened to the 400, a good neutral placement would have been with Cheirisophus, who arrived just about the same time. Alternatively, suspicion of the deserters may have prompted Cyrus to split them up over several contingents. This would reduce manpower squabbles amongst his generals and minimize the risk of opening a gap in the line should the 400 reconsider their allegiance at an inopportune moment.

With these changes to their contingents, the mercenaries marched inland from Myriandus to Thapsacus, then down along the Euphrates towards Babylon and the confrontation with Artaxerxes. In late July, at Charmande on the Euphrates, occurred an incident that revealed how tense the relationships between separate contingents could get.<sup>53</sup> At Charmande, one of Menon's men argued with Clearchus' troopers. The dispute drew the attention of Clearchus himself, who resolved it by striking Menon's soldier. When his fellows heard the story, they got angry. Probably it was not just the corporal punishment that rankled, but also the feeling that Clearchus was trying to stretch his power beyond the bounds of his own contingent. Not only had he disciplined their comrade without consulting Menon, he had the temerity later that same day to ride through their bivouac as if it, too, belonged to him. The disgruntled soldiers let Clearchus know how they felt as he passed through their encampment, with a hurled axe followed by a volley of stones. Escaping to his camp, Clearchus called his men to arms, and Menon's ran for theirs in response. Had it not been for Proxenus, who interposed his own just-arriving troops between them, the two contingents

<sup>52</sup> Although Xenophon implicitly includes Cleanor among the generals just after Cunaxa (*An.* 2.1.10), and explicitly calls him a general after the seizure of Clearchus and company (2.5.37), he subsequently describes Cleanor being chosen to replace Agias (3.1.47). Since Xenophon mentions surviving *hupostrategoi* (3.1.32), possibly Cleanor held this position under Agias and was confirmed as Agias' replacement after the seizure. Roy (1967) 293 drew a similar conclusion, although cf. Roy (1967) 277.

<sup>53</sup> For events at Charmande see *An.* 1.5.11–17.

would have traded blows. Eventually Cyrus arrived and got Clearchus to calm down. Xenophon makes it seem that everyone simply went back to quarters and forgot about the whole matter, but the day's events must have been a topic of heated conversation around many a campfire that evening.

Cyrus was lucky such an incident had not occurred earlier, when the troops would have had more time to stew over it. Possibly he took steps to keep Clearchus' and Menon's contingents as far apart as possible on the march and in bivouac, but even if he did not, the mercenaries soon had an impending battle to distract them.<sup>54</sup> Three days after departing Charmande, they were marching in battle order through Babylonia, and on the third day after that, forming phalanx against Artaxerxes.

Had Cyrus lived to see the end of that day, perhaps Menon's men would have continued to nurse their grudge. Indeed, it is fascinating to imagine the various contingents and their leaders jockeying for position in a Persian empire ruled by Great King Cyrus. In reality, the news of the prince's death, delivered the morning after the battle of Cunaxa, drove the preceding days out of everyone's minds. The precarious situation in which the mercenaries now found themselves brought out Clearchus at his best. Common danger led the other generals, Menon included, to acknowledge the Spartan's skill and experience.<sup>55</sup> The ordinary soldiers, too, acceded to his brand of discipline.<sup>56</sup> For the next two months, as the army followed Tissaphernes north up the Tigris valley, Clearchus would be the preeminent general. Yet, though he sometimes took it upon himself to issue orders to his colleagues and made a habit of inspecting the ranks of every contingent and checking up on sentries, Clearchus did not assume formal supreme command of the army.<sup>57</sup>

From Cunaxa onwards Xenophon describes the mercenaries as a single army (*strateuma*), reserving the term *taxis* for individual contingents.<sup>58</sup> Despite the change in terminology, each contingent's composition

<sup>54</sup> Cyrus may have separated the two by placing Clearchus at the head of the column and Menon at the rear, as implied by the arrangement of contingents at the review in Babylonia (*An.* 1.7.1) and at Cunaxa (1.8.4). His transfer from the honored right wing to the far left might suggest that Charmande cost Menon some standing with Cyrus. Still, Clearchus had participated more actively in the altercation (indeed, Cyrus chastised Clearchus and Proxenus by name, but not Menon; see 1.5.16), so it is curious that Cyrus demoted Menon rather than Clearchus. Brown (1986) 391–2 suggests Cyrus put Menon on the left to keep an eye on the Thessalian's guest-friend (*xenos*) Ariaeus and the satrapal levies (1.8.5–6). For Cyrus' relationship with Clearchus after Charmande, cf. Roisman (1985/8) 39–41.

<sup>55</sup> *An.* 2.2.5–6, 2.6.11, Roisman (1985/8) 41–2. Xenophon (2.5.28–9) alleges that Menon during this period was secretly colluding with Tissaphernes and Ariaeus against Clearchus, but these charges cannot be substantiated; see Brown (1986) 396–7, Roisman (1985/8) 48–9.

<sup>56</sup> *An.* 2.3.11–13.

<sup>57</sup> For Clearchus' leadership style see *An.* 2.2.4–5, 2.2.20–1, 2.3.2, 2.3.21, 2.5.27–30, Roisman (1985/8) 43.

<sup>58</sup> *Strateuma* for whole army: *An.* 1.8.12, 1.10.14 (the day of Cunaxa), and frequently thereafter. *Taxis* for contingent: 2.3.2, 3.1.32, 4.7.2, 7.3.15, Boucher (1913) 209.

remained stable until the army reached the Greater Zapatas River in late September, seven weeks after the battle.<sup>59</sup> At the Zapatas, Clearchus convinced four colleagues – Agias, Menon, Proxenus, and Socrates – and twenty captains (*lochagoi*) to attend a parley with Tissaphernes.<sup>60</sup> Two hundred soldiers went along, ostensibly to shop at the market Tissaphernes had set up, but perhaps also as covert bodyguards.<sup>61</sup> Either way, they were no protection to the officers. At a signal, Persian troops cut them down along with the *lochagoi*, who had been waiting outside Tissaphernes' tent. The generals within were clapped in irons and delivered to Artaxerxes before being beheaded.<sup>62</sup>

Though momentarily confounded by the sudden loss of so many leaders, the mercenaries soon recovered. In each of the five leaderless contingents *lochagoi* met to select a new general.<sup>63</sup> Where a designated second-in-command (*hupostrategos*) survived, the choice was probably straightforward. Cleanor, for example, stepped into the sandals of the dead Agias.<sup>64</sup> In other cases, a contingent's senior *lochagos* may have held the post of *hupostrategos*. If this man had been among the twenty killed outside Tissaphernes' tent, the remaining officers might require hours of discussion to pick their new chief.<sup>65</sup> In Proxenus' contingent, the *lochagoi* may even have preferred to elect Xenophon general rather than see one of their equals elevated above them. The Athenian after all had the stamp of Proxenus' friendship, and seven months in the field with him must have given the *lochagoi* a good sense

<sup>59</sup> Xenophon's narrative (*An.* 3.1.1–3.3.5, especially 3.1.32 and 3.1.47) of deliberations following the seizure of the generals gives no indication the army maintained anything but its original organization, and there are no reasons to infer changes that he neglected or suppressed. The light troops brigaded together at Cunaxa (1.8.5), but that was a temporary tactical arrangement. For the arrival at the Greater Zapatas see *An.* 2.5.1, Lendle (1995) 122–3.

<sup>60</sup> For more on *lochagoi*, see Chapter Four. <sup>61</sup> *An.* 2.5.30.

<sup>62</sup> *An.* 2.5.31, 2.6.1; Xenophon claims (2.6.29) Menon was not beheaded, but tortured for a year before dying. Plutarch (*Artax.* 18.2) mentions common soldiers in captivity with Clearchus before his execution.

<sup>63</sup> *An.* 3.1.4, 3.1.46–7, Roy (1967) 288.

<sup>64</sup> *An.* 3.1.32; it is not clear from this passage whether every contingent originally possessed a *hupostrategos*. At Trapezus (5.3.4) and Coryora (5.6.36), Neon of Asine acted as *hupostrategos* for Cheirisophus, but whether he had held this position throughout the march, or was appointed only at Trapezus when Cheirisophus set off in search of ships to carry the army (5.1.4–5) is unclear. Roy (1967) 289 contends that a *hupostrategos* did not automatically succeed his superior, but Cheirisophus' instructions limited the task of choosing new commanders only to those who needed to do so (*hoi deomenoi*, 3.1.46); the wording suggests that in some contingents succession to the generalship was fairly clear.

<sup>65</sup> Senior *lochagos*: in terms of experience, not necessarily age; Hieronymus of Elis, although the eldest of Proxenus' *lochagoi* (*An.* 3.1.34), was apparently not *hupostrategos* and was not chosen as Proxenus' successor. Hours of discussion: the surviving officers assembled during the middle of the night (3.1.34), but the selection of new commanders was not complete until nearly daybreak (3.2.1). With about twelve hours of darkness in late September, this indicates a lengthier process than Xenophon's brief notice (3.1.47) would suggest; in some contingents, time was needed to choose replacement *lochagoi*.

of his capabilities.<sup>66</sup> However the discussions went, by the dawn following the day of Tissaphernes' treachery, five replacement generals – Cleanor for Agias, Xenophon for Proxenus, Timasion of Dardanus for Clearchus, Xanthicles for his fellow Achaean Socrates, and another Achaean, Philesius, in place of Menon – stood ready to lead their contingents out of camp.

The new generals had been selected as leaders of the existing contingents, but preparing for the retreat up the Tigris demanded some changes in contingent organization. Facing superior Persian cavalry and without horsemen of their own, the mercenaries decided to adopt a hollow square (*plaision*) for marching (see below, p. 155, and Figs. 6.3, 6.4). Xenophon and Timasion took the rear of this formation, while Cheirisophus took the lead, and Cleanor, Philesius, Sophaenetos, and Xanthicles commanded the flanks in unspecified pairs.<sup>67</sup> Since the existing contingents were grossly unequal in hoplite strength, ranging from Timasion's 3,000 to Xanthicles' 500, there must have been some shifting about of *lochoi* amongst contingents in order to create the rectangular formation Xenophon describes.<sup>68</sup> The peltasts too departed their original contingents, some taking up positions at the front and rear while others remained as a central reserve within the square.<sup>69</sup>

Shifting men around had the potential to cause all manner of rancor; as the departures of Xenias and Pasion had shown, a general's pride and position were tied up in his contingent. Moreover, five of the army's seven generals – everyone save Cheirisophus and Sophaenetos – had just won their positions. Each newcomer needed to solidify his authority as contingent commander, and giving up troops to a colleague was no way to do that. For their part, the *lochagoi* who elected the replacement generals could hardly have been happy to see themselves and their *lochoi* transferred to another contingent, under a general they had not chosen and did not know.

Nonetheless, in the dire circumstances following Tissaphernes' treachery, the generals must have agreed that redistributing hoplite *lochoi* and consolidating peltasts were necessary for survival. After all, even the ordinary soldiers were community-minded enough at this point to share their extra equipment.<sup>70</sup> A general not inclined to buy Xenophon's rhetoric of unity might still hesitate to protest lest he be cut out of command altogether.<sup>71</sup>

<sup>66</sup> *An.* 3.1.15; apparently only one *lochagos* (3.1.26) spoke out against Xenophon. Anderson (1974a) 117 suggests the *lochagoi* trusted Xenophon because he had been "efficiently and tactfully" advising Proxenus from the outset. Does Xenophon's claim (3.1.4) to have been initially "neither general nor *lochagos* nor common soldier" belie the reality that he was Proxenus' *hupostrategos*?

<sup>67</sup> *An.* 3.2.36–8. <sup>68</sup> See Chapter Six for more about the *plaision* and contingent strengths.

<sup>69</sup> *An.* 3.3.7–8, 3.4.28–9, 3.4.39–43. <sup>70</sup> *An.* 3.3.1.

<sup>71</sup> Rhetoric of unity: *An.* 3.2.9, 3.2.29–31; cut out of command: cf. 3.1.26–31.

Or he might convert loss into opportunity, fobbing off his worst *lochoi* on colleagues while keeping the best. A newly elected general might also seize the moment to get rid of *lochagoi* in his contingent who had voted against him or had themselves sought the generalship. A *lochagos* who did not want to serve under a particular general might even volunteer to be transferred. If Xenophon does not mention such transfers, it may be that he hoped to gloss over any disputes the generals had in adopting the marching formation he had proposed.

Almost as soon as the army began its retreat, there were further transfers. The day after setting off, the generals enrolled as slingers 200 Rhodian volunteers from throughout the army. The next morning, fifty other soldiers left their contingents to become cavalymen. Most of these slingers and riders had previously been hoplites.<sup>72</sup> Within the week, 600 more hoplites departed their contingents, as the generals formed six highly maneuverable elite *lochoi* to help the marching square cross defiles more easily.<sup>73</sup> The creation of these new units, all drawing men from across the army, further softened the distinct contingent identities that had existed before Cunaxa.

As the retreat continued, the collection of volunteers from throughout the army for special missions accelerated this softening of contingent identities. During the third day of the passage through Carduchia, for example, the generals called for a detachment to capture an enemy-held height overlooking the main march route. Both hoplite and peltast officers volunteered, bringing with them about 2,000 men. One of the hoplite *lochagoi*, Callimachus of Parrhasia, even claimed that he was able to attract followers from across the army.<sup>74</sup> The detachment slogged through a late afternoon rainstorm, then climbed uphill in darkness to surprise Carduchian outposts on what it thought was the objective but which turned out to be only a subsidiary ridge. After spending a night out on this sodden spur, the volunteers attacked at daybreak through a thick mist, driving off a large body of the enemy. Eventually reuniting with the main army, the men of

<sup>72</sup> *An.* 3.3.16–20. Since some of the Rhodians did not possess slings (3.3.18), they must have been hoplites before becoming slingers. Rhodians who did have slings could not have been serving as peltasts in large numbers; if so, there would have been no need to create a new unit of slingers. The suggestion of Whitby (2004) 217–18 that the Rhodians had been servants or camp followers is implausible; the privileges (*ateleian*, 3.3.18) Xenophon mentions simply acknowledged slinging as hazardous duty. As for the cavalry, riding skills were perhaps more common amongst the hoplites, although there may have been a few experienced horsemen amongst the peltasts (this might explain why some horsemen needed armor; see 3.3.20).

<sup>73</sup> *An.* 3.4.19–23; see Chapter Four for more on the picked *lochoi*.

<sup>74</sup> *An.* 4.1.26–4.2.2, 4.2.27; see below for more on Callimachus.

the detachment returned to their own contingents.<sup>75</sup> Brief as their mission had been, it had shown them they could rely on fellow soldiers from other contingents even in the most dangerous circumstances.<sup>76</sup>

The Carduchian rains and Anatolian snow that followed prompted further changes in contingent composition. While Xenophon again offers no details, consider his description of the army's bivouacking practices in central Armenia. There, after several days struggling through a blizzard, the Cyreans reached a plain studded with underground villages. To distribute these for quartering, the generals drew lots, with each commander and his troops billeting separately according to the draw. Apparently, the generals had at some point taken steps to make their various contingents roughly equal in numbers. Otherwise, it would have been far more practical for them to choose villages in proportion to the strengths of their contingents.<sup>77</sup>

The cumulative effect of these developments was to dilute if not entirely dissolve the original contingent identities.<sup>78</sup> Perhaps each general retained at least some of the hoplite *lochoi* he had possessed when the fighting retreat began, but enough troops had been transferred about for fighting, marching, and quartering that no contingent could trace a wholly unbroken lineage back to the start of the campaign. Judging from the experience of the volunteers in Carduchia, even hoplites who remained with their original contingents all the way to Trapezus were no strangers to serving temporarily under the command of other generals. For peltasts, archers, and slingers, contingent distinctions had disappeared early on. Seeing how often they extricated the hoplites from difficult situations, the light troops must have come to feel a certain pride in shared accomplishments and prowess.<sup>79</sup> Indeed, had they not been constantly on the move from one part of the army to the other, or dispersed in packets with whichever set of hoplites needed their assistance, the light troops might have forged a new contingent identity of their own.

As their contingents' compositions gradually changed on the way to Trapezus, the function of generals too evolved. While Xenophon's focus on himself and Cheirisophus during this portion of the campaign sometimes makes discerning their five colleagues difficult, he provides sufficient evidence to show that each general normally exercised control over a more

<sup>75</sup> *An.* 4.2.5–9, 4.2.17; for tactical details see Lendle (1966) 218–24, Tuplin (1991) 45–7, and for another mission using volunteers cf. 4.6.20–4.

<sup>76</sup> On the combat effectiveness of such “instant units” cf. Ben-Shalom et al. (2005).

<sup>77</sup> *An.* 4.5.25–7; for more on quartering indoors, see Chapter Seven.

<sup>78</sup> Pace Roy (1967) 291, who places the dissolution of contingent identities in the period from Trapezus onward.

<sup>79</sup> *An.* 3.4.15, 3.4.28–9, 4.3.22, 4.8.19; cf. Best (1969) 56–67.

or less permanent contingent, whether in combat, on the march, or in bivouac.<sup>80</sup> There are brief hints that some generals were beginning to be less tied to the command of individual contingents and instead assigned specific duties that drew troops from across the army. In western Armenia, for example, Sophænetus took charge of a garrison that stayed behind to guard the army's bivouac and baggage while the remaining generals launched an attack on the camp of Tiribazus.<sup>81</sup>

Sophænetus' actions in Armenia presaged additional changes in the army's command structure from Trapezus onward. Although the generals continued to function as a group, making decisions by majority rule except for a week's stint by Cheirisophus as sole commander at Heracleia in mid-summer 401 and a day's command by the would-be *condottiere* Coeratadas at Byzantium that fall, some of them left their contingents temporarily or permanently.<sup>82</sup> Sophænetus and Philesius, for instance, were detailed to supervise the ships the Cyreans assembled at Trapezus, and remained in charge of these at least until reaching Cotyora in April or May.<sup>83</sup> Timasion went further, apparently giving up his contingent permanently in order to head the army's small cavalry squadron.<sup>84</sup>

What happened to the contingents of Philesius, Sophænetus, and Timasion? One possibility is that their troops were simply folded into the commands of their four colleagues – Cheirisophus, Cleanor, Xanthicles, and Xenophon.<sup>85</sup> Since Xenophon and Cheirisophus appear at Heracleia to have possessed more hoplites than they had at the outset of the retreat, this looks at first glance plausible.<sup>86</sup> Yet, the Cyreans had now returned to comparative safety, and just as in the period before Cunaxa, a general's status might depend at least partly on being associated with a defined contingent. Indeed, at Heracleia Xenophon was attacked for being a general despite having brought no troops to the army.<sup>87</sup> Youthful

<sup>80</sup> *An.* 4.2.8, 4.4.7–8, 4.5.22–4, 4.6.6, 4.7.2, Roy (1967) 290–1.

<sup>81</sup> *An.* 4.4.19–22; since this passage differentiates between garrison (*phulakes*) and general, rather than simply saying “Sophænetus and his men” (cf. 3.5.1, 4.1.6), possibly the camp guard was drawn from across the contingents. Perhaps the older men remained behind (cf. similar practice on the Black Sea coast, 6.4.25 and 6.5.4).

<sup>82</sup> Generals as a group: *An.* 5.3.4, 5.4.4–5, 5.4.16, 5.5.4, 5.6.1, 6.1.3, 6.4.20, 6.5.1, 6.5.4, 6.5.9; majority rule: 6.1.18; Cheirisophus: 6.1.17–33; Coeratadas: 7.1.33–41.

<sup>83</sup> *An.* 5.3.1; at Cotyora, enough ships became available to carry the whole army (6.1.14). Sophænetus soon reappears commanding on land (6.5.13), Philesius not until months later at Byzantium (7.1.32, 7.2.1).

<sup>84</sup> *An.* 6.3.17, 6.3.22, 6.5.28, 7.3.46. <sup>85</sup> Roy (1967) 292.

<sup>86</sup> After the Arcadians and Achaeans, all hoplites, seceded at Heracleia, Cheirisophus still had 1,400 hoplites (*An.* 6.2.16), twice his original 700 (1.4.2), while Xenophon had 1,700 hoplites, compared to the original 1,500 of Proxenus' contingent (1.2.3).

<sup>87</sup> *An.* 6.2.10.



Timasion may have been willing to trade his infantry, possibly to Cheirisophus and Xenophon, for the dash and prestige of leading the small but tactically vital cavalry.<sup>88</sup> Philesius and Sophaenetos, however, had no similar incentive to give up their commands permanently, even if supervising the ships did mean a chance to embezzle from their cargoes.<sup>89</sup> Perhaps, then, the two appointed trusted *hupostrategoí* to run their contingents in their absence, and retook command personally as soon as their maritime duties ended at Cotyora.<sup>90</sup> Since army and flotilla rendezvoused to set up camp at the end of each day, Philesius and Sophaenetos would have ample opportunities to check up on whomever they appointed to look after their contingents.<sup>91</sup>

One general who certainly entrusted his contingent to a *hupostrategos* was Cheirisophus, who left Neon of Asine in charge before departing Trapezus on a fruitless three-month quest for ships to carry the army.<sup>92</sup> The Spartan's prolonged absence enabled Neon to entrench himself firmly, and he was easily able to take over Cheirisophus' contingent following the latter's death at or near Heracleia, a week after rejoining the army at Sinope.<sup>93</sup> Indeed, Neon managed to tie his soldiers so closely to him that when he split from the army at Perinthus in winter 400–399, 800 men followed.<sup>94</sup>

If contingents remained important for each general's status, except in the case of Neon they no longer stimulated the kind of overriding loyalty that Clearchus' men had displayed the previous year at Charmande. Instead, frequent assemblies and debates about the army's purpose and direction made soldiers conscious of belonging to a greater, if often fractious, whole rather than of owing allegiance to a single general.<sup>95</sup>

<sup>88</sup> To Cheirisophus: perhaps implied by *An.* 6.1.32, see Roy (1967) 292; to Xenophon: since the cavalry were particularly associated with Xenophon (6.2.16), it may be that Timasion exchanged him infantry for cavalry.

<sup>89</sup> *An.* 5.8.1.

<sup>90</sup> This would explain the sudden appearance of Phryniscus, apparently Sophaenetos' replacement (*An.* 7.2.1); cf. Roy (1967) 289–90. The very fact of Phryniscus' appearance indicates that Sophaenetos' contingent was not permanently broken up while the latter was commanding the flotilla. Otherwise, there would have been no reason to select another general following Sophaenetos' departure from the army (probably at Calpe, 6.5.13).

<sup>91</sup> For more on army and flotilla moving together, see Chapter Six. <sup>92</sup> *An.* 5.3.4, 5.6.36, 6.1.16.

<sup>93</sup> *An.* 6.4.11; Xenophon states rather vaguely that Neon took over "the affairs" or "the things" (*ta d'ekainou*) of Cheirisophus. Later he specifies that Neon commanded the contingent, or division (*to meros*, 6.4.23) of Cheirisophus; cf. 6.5.4. For *meros* as a contingent of troops, cf. *Hell.* 4.6.3, 5.4.15, 6.1.11. Possibly Xenophon is playing on the multiple meanings of *meros* (cf. 5.3.4, 6.6.28, 7.8.11 for *meros* as booty or a prize).

<sup>94</sup> *An.* 7.2.11. Neon's retention of these troops' loyalty is remarkable considering his disastrous foraging expedition at Calpe (6.5.24); Stronk (1995) 180 suggests they preferred the certainty of Spartan service to the unknown perils of joining Seuthes in Thrace.

<sup>95</sup> For assemblies see *An.* 5.1.2, 5.4.19, 5.6.1, 6.1.25, 6.4.10, 6.4.17.



Still, contingent organization never entirely disappeared from the army.<sup>96</sup> Both along the Euxine shore and in Thrace, generals continued to deploy and encamp their troops by contingent (*taxis*).<sup>97</sup> And, although the increasing use of *lochoi* as the army's basic maneuver units attenuated the tactical control generals had in battle, they continued to supervise their contingent's portion of the line whenever the army formed phalanx.<sup>98</sup> True, there was a brief breakdown in contingent organization at Heracleia, when the Arcadians and Achaeans split from the rest of the army in a dispute over a failed attempt to extort cash and food from the Heracleots.<sup>99</sup> Tellingly, however, among the Cyreans' first acts upon reuniting was to reestablish the organization the army had possessed before the faction: contingents each under the command of a general.<sup>100</sup>

The Cyreans, then, always maintained some sort of contingent organization. The character of each contingent, though, changed as the campaign progressed. In particular, the military necessities of the retreat from Mesopotamia to the Euxine compelled the army to equalize the size of its contingents. This shuffling of troops, along with the selection of permanent elite units and temporary detachments, broke down the boundaries between the original contingents. By the time the mercenaries reached Trapezus, they had become a unified army rather than merely a collection of contingents. From Trapezus onward, contingents functioned more as an intermediate level of command – a way of brigading units for fighting, marching, and resting – than as an overarching source of identity. The departure of generals for special duties probably played an important role in reducing soldiers' loyalty to specific contingents, as did the increasing occurrence of army-wide assemblies and debates. Certainly some Cyreans displayed fierce devotion to individual generals, whether to Clearchus at Tarsus, Menon at Charmande, or Neon at Perinthus. For most, however, contingent loyalties became less and less important.

<sup>96</sup> Pace Roy (1967) 292. Roy's case rests on an episode from the campaign under Seuthes where Xenophon and Cleonor divided command of the hoplites (*An.* 7.3.44–6), but this must have been a temporary tactical arrangement; otherwise, it is impossible to explain the other generals' absence. Since Xenophon was leading the way with a detachment of young soldiers drawn from across the army (7.3.46), Cleonor is best understood as holding overall command of the remaining hoplites in line, with each contingent under its own general. At Cunaxa, similarly, each general formed his contingent in line (1.8.4–5) while Clearchus retained overall control of the phalanx (1.8.12).

<sup>97</sup> *An.* 5.4.14, 6.5.4, 7.3.15; cf. 5.4.16, 5.4.19–21.

<sup>98</sup> *An.* 6.5.8–10, 6.5.13, 6.5.25, 7.3.35; for the *lochos* as a tactical unit see Chapter Four. The hollow square formation used at Calpe (6.5.5–6) also required the generals' supervision, as it had in Mesopotamia (3.3.37).

<sup>99</sup> *An.* 6.2.4–5, 6.2.9–16.

<sup>100</sup> *An.* 6.4.11. The generals, too, returned to their previous contingents, for Xenophon soon notes Cleonor (6.4.22) and Sophanetus (6.5.13) back in command.

## ETHNICITY AND COMMUNITY

If contingent loyalties gradually waned over the course of the campaign, other kinds of allegiances came increasingly to the fore. Chief among these was ethnic identity.<sup>101</sup> While Xenophon often ascribes a uniform Greekness to the mercenaries in order to contrast them with the Persians and other “barbarians” they encountered during their march, his own narrative makes plain that the army from the outset was multiethnic.<sup>102</sup>

Xenophon names some sixty-nine individual Cyreans, about four-fifths of them officers, as well as numerous ethnic groups.<sup>103</sup> He did not intend a systematic survey of soldiers’ origins, and the distribution of named individuals and groups in his account surely reflects his personal situation as general and rearguard commander, the vagaries of his memory or records, and an affinity for his fellow Athenians.<sup>104</sup> Even so, Xenophon’s evidence does permit an appreciation of the extent of Cyrean ethnic diversity.

The picture is clearest for the generals. All seven original contingent commanders except Proxenus the Boeotian and Menon the Thessalian were Peloponnesians: Sophaenetos and Xenias were Arcadian, Socrates was Achaean, and Cheirisophus and Clearchus were Spartan. Six of the eight others who rose to generalships likewise came from the Peloponnesus, and five of them – Agias, Cleanor, Philesius, Phryniscus, and Xanthicles – were Arcadian or Achaean. Neon, the other Peloponnesian, was from Laconian Asine.<sup>105</sup> Only Timasion the Dardanian and Xenophon himself hailed from outside the Peloponnesus.<sup>106</sup>

The specialists who accompanied the generals may also have been predominantly Peloponnesian. The *mantis* Arexion, for example, came from Parrhasia in Arcadia, while his colleague Basias was Elean. So too was Tolmides, reputedly the greatest herald of the age, who arrived with Clearchus’ contingent. The exception was Silanus the Ambraciot, Cyrus’ personal *mantis*.<sup>107</sup> We are on less than certain ground here, however, for if

<sup>101</sup> I use the terms “ethnic identity” and “ethnicity” to describe all feelings of group loyalty and solidarity based on a sense of common ancestry; cf. Hall (1997).

<sup>102</sup> Uniform Greekness: Laforse (1998) 55–8.

<sup>103</sup> The valuable list of Roy (1967) 303–6 omits the *lochagoi* Cleaenetus (*An.* 5.1.17) and Clearetus (5.7.4–16), and the Elean *mantis* (soothsayer) Basias (7.8.10); the Macronian peltast (4.8.4–7), while never named, is treated as a distinct individual.

<sup>104</sup> Roy (1968a) 158–9, Roy (1968b) 41–3.

<sup>105</sup> In the fifth century there was a settlement named Asine south of Corone in Messenia, and another south of Gytheum in Laconia; see Hansen and Nielsen (2004) 559. Roy (1967) 303 and Lendle (1995) 350 consider Neon Laconian, but cf. Shipley (1997) 209.

<sup>106</sup> Dardanus was on the Asian side of the Hellespont, south of Abydus.

<sup>107</sup> Arexion: *An.* 6.4.13, Basias: 7.8.10; Tolmides: 2.2.20; Silanus: 1.7.18.

Tolmides was the army's sole herald, there were apparently more than three *manteis* in the ranks.<sup>108</sup>

The origins of the hoplites echoed those of the generals and their specialists. Cyrus had instructed his garrison commanders to fill their units with the best Peloponnesians they could find, and they apparently succeeded in carrying out his orders.<sup>109</sup> The majority of hoplites, some 6,000 out of 10,400 in ranks, were Arcadians and Achaeans – probably about 4,000 of the former and 2,000 of the latter.<sup>110</sup>

Arcadia, the mountainous heart of the Peloponnesus, was a hard land, nothing like the idylls of poetry. Today, mean January temperatures there fall as low as 1°–9.5° C (34°–49° F), with plentiful rain, snow, and frost during autumn and winter.<sup>111</sup> To this gloomy climate Polybius, a native Arcadian, attributed the harshness of his compatriots' character.<sup>112</sup> Yet, if arable ground was scarce and drainage sometimes poor, the region was by no means as impoverished as is sometimes supposed.<sup>113</sup> Rich in livestock and timber, classical Arcadia was wealthy enough to support the construction of several impressive temples, notably that of Apollo Epicurius ("The Helper" – also a euphemism for "mercenary") at Bassae.<sup>114</sup> Arcadians who left home, then, did not always go out of necessity. For many, mercenary service represented an investment, a chance to earn fortune and status abroad before returning to a better life at home.

Arcadia produced mercenaries as early as the Persian Wars, and by the mid-fourth century BC the Mantinean orator Lycomedes was proclaiming that when men needed tough professionals, they chose Arcadians first.<sup>115</sup> At the end of the fifth century, though, exactly who counted as Arcadian was still in the process of definition.<sup>116</sup> Consider the situation from the viewpoint of Silanus the Macistian, Xenophon's trumpeter in Thrace during winter 400–399. Silanus' hometown of Maciston lay in Triphylia, a border region in the western Peloponnesus claimed by Eleans, Arcadians, and others. Although they possessed some Arcadian traits, including a mythical genealogy linking them to the Arcadian hero Lycaon, not until the 360s would the Macistians be firmly part of Arcadia.<sup>117</sup> Outsiders might remark

<sup>108</sup> More than three: see e.g. *An.* 4.3.17 (*manteis* as a group), 4.5.4 (a single unnamed *mantis*).

<sup>109</sup> *An.* 1.1.6. <sup>110</sup> Roy (1967) 308–9, 319, Roy (2004) 272–3; see also Table 2.

<sup>111</sup> Roy (1999) 321–4. <sup>112</sup> Polyb. 4.21.2–4.

<sup>113</sup> Roy (1999) 323–4, Roy (2004) 275–6; cf. Roy (2001) 268–72.

<sup>114</sup> Livestock and timber: Roy (1999) 328–35; Apollo Epicurius: Fields (1994); euphemism: Parke (1933) 20–1.

<sup>115</sup> Persian Wars: Parke (1933) 14–15; Lycomedes: *Hell.* 7.1.23. <sup>116</sup> Nielsen (2002) 511–25.

<sup>117</sup> Silanus: *An.* 7.4.16. Maciston: Nielsen (1997) 133–44, Nielsen (1999) 50, Roy (1997) 290 n. 65, Roy (2000) 144–6. For mythical genealogies and identity construction, see Hall (1997) 40–51.

on the apparent ethnic unity of the region, but for Silanus, pan-Arcadian sentiment would hardly have come naturally at the outset of the expedition.<sup>118</sup> Much the same could be said of another “borderland” Arcadian, the *lochagos* Hieronymus. Variousy described as Elean, Arcadian, and Epitalian, Hieronymus seems to have been able to pass back and forth across ethnic boundaries, stressing one identity or another as the occasion demanded.<sup>119</sup>

Even those with homes deep inside Arcadia could have powerful local identities.<sup>120</sup> Consider for instance the Parrhasians. Parrhasia was no *polis* but a tenuously defined tribal region encompassing the northeastern slopes and foothills of Mount Lycaenum. Along its eastern border the Alpheius River flowed northward towards Olympia; south lay the sanctuary of Lycosura, and to the west the mountaintop shrine of Lycaean Zeus and the site of the Lycaean games. The Parrhasians had their own temple there, dedicated to Apollo and adjoining the shrine to Zeus.<sup>121</sup>

Parrhasia, the land of Xenias and Arexion, was also home to the *lochagos* Callimachus. Young, energetic, brave, and competitive, Callimachus was one of Xenophon’s trusted rearguard officers in Anatolia. On the Black Sea coast he would make a bid for leadership of his own, becoming a prime mover in the Arcado-Achaean faction at Heracleia in summer 400 BC.<sup>122</sup> Yet for all Callimachus’ virulent pan-Arcadian rhetoric at Heracleia, the Parrhasians in the fifth century BC had as often been enemies as allies of their Arcadian neighbors. Indeed, Parrhasia, subjected by Arcadian Mantinea in the 420s, had gained independence with Spartan aid in 421, and thereafter sided with Sparta against Mantinea.<sup>123</sup> Given this history, one wonders how well the Parrhasians and Mantineans in the army got along.<sup>124</sup> Nor was Parrhasia alone in standing apart from the rest of Arcadia; the largest

<sup>118</sup> On pan-Arcadianism cf. Nielsen (1999) 16–46, Nielsen (2002).

<sup>119</sup> Hieronymus was the eldest of Proxenus’ *lochagoi* (*An.* 3.1.34). Elean: 3.1.34, Arcadian: 6.4.10, Epitalian: 7.4.18; on the latter passage cf. Stronk (1995) 235–6. Epitalium, at the mouth of the Alpheius River, bounced back and forth between Elis and Arcadia in the late fifth century, even going over to Sparta in 402/1; see Krentz (1995) 174, *Hell.* 3.2.25. For “borderland” identities between Arcadia and Elis see Roy (2000) 134–7.

<sup>120</sup> Roy (1972c) 48, Nielsen (2002) 306–7.

<sup>121</sup> Paus. 8.27.4, 8.38.8, Meyer (1968) 1029–33, Jost (1985) 168–9.

<sup>122</sup> Young: implied by *An.* 4.1.27–8; energetic and brave: 4.2.5–9, 4.7.8–11; competitive: 4.7.12; trusted officer: 4.7.8; on Black Sea coast: 5.6.14, 6.2.5–12.

<sup>123</sup> Parrhasia and Mantinea: Thuc. 5.29–33, Forsén (2000) 52. Thucydides (5.33.1) speaks of *stasis* (civil strife) amongst the Parrhasians, but Forsén (2000) 53 concludes that only a minority of Parrhasians favored Mantinea over Sparta. Perhaps Callimachus’ anti-Spartanism (*An.* 6.2.9) was a relic of this *stasis*, although Callimachus must have been very young when the Spartans came in 421.

<sup>124</sup> For Mantineans in the army see *An.* 6.1.11.

Arcadian *polis*, Tegea, remained a loyal Spartan ally from the fifth century well into the fourth.<sup>125</sup>

Some Arcadians, including the general Sophaenetos and Xenophon's trusted *lochagos* and friend Agasias, came from well-known places like Stymphalus, a walled town perched above the marshy lake where according to legend Hercules once massacred a flock of man-eating birds.<sup>126</sup> That Agasias and Sophaenetos took pride in having a famous hometown is perhaps unsurprising. Yet even men from smaller Arcadian settlements made certain Xenophon knew exactly where they came from.<sup>127</sup> Consider Aristonymus of Methydrium, another of Xenophon's *lochagoi*. Of Methydrium we know little; aside from its temple of Poseidon, it was the kind of place armies and travelers passed by on their way to more important engagements.<sup>128</sup> Still, Aristonymus seems to have been as proud of his home as Agasias was of his. He might even have pointed out that Methydrium was important enough to warrant notice at Delphi.<sup>129</sup>

If the Arcadians were apt to stress local identities, the army's roughly 2,000 Achaeans possessed a more coherent sense of regional unity. This makes sense considering that Achaea, the rolling littoral of the northwest Peloponnese, had a defined federal organization in the fifth century, and fully developed federal citizenship by the early fourth century.<sup>130</sup> Still, several Achaean cities made a habit of going their own way during the classical period. Prominent amongst these was Pellene, on the Gulf of Corinth at the extreme eastern end of Achaea. Pellene allied with Sparta at the start of the Peloponnesian War, when the rest of Achaea remained neutral, and continued the alliance into the fourth century.<sup>131</sup> Notably, Xenophon records the local identity of only one of the seven Achaeans he names: Philoxenus of Pellene, who on the Black Sea shore put aside his arms to scale the ramparts of the fortress of the Drilae.<sup>132</sup>

<sup>125</sup> Forsén (2000) 52–3.

<sup>126</sup> See below for more on Agasias. On Stymphalus see Hansen and Nielsen (2004) 529–30. Paus. 8.22.3–5 tells the story of the Stymphalian birds.

<sup>127</sup> Roy (1972b) 133–4.

<sup>128</sup> Aristonymus: *An.* 4.1.27, 4.6.20, 4.7.9–12; Methydrium: Jost (1985) 213–16, Hansen and Nielsen (2004) 522–3; passed by: Thuc. 5.58.

<sup>129</sup> Methydrium appears in a list of Delphic *theorodokoi* dating ca. 400 BC; see Jost (1985) 211.

<sup>130</sup> Achaea: Koerner (1974), Rizakis (1995); federalism: Larsen (1968) 80–9, Lafond (2002) 73.

<sup>131</sup> Anderson (1954) 74, Larsen (1953) 802–3, Morgan and Hall (1996) 169–71, Hansen and Nielsen (2004) 484–5.

<sup>132</sup> *An.* 5.2.15, Roy (1967) 305. Philoxenus' climbing companion, intriguingly, was Agasias the Stymphalian; it was an easy road from Pellene to Stymphalus, and one wonders whether the two had struck up a comradeship based on the proximity of their hometowns.

Cyrus' remaining 4,400 hoplites had roots all around the Mediterranean.<sup>133</sup> From the far west came Leon of Thurii in southern Italy, who at Trapezus would agitate for sailing the rest of the way home, and Lycius the Syracusan, who at Cunaxa would go forward in the waning daylight to scout for Artaxerxes' retreating army.<sup>134</sup> From the east there were islanders – hundreds of Rhodians plus at least one Samian, the exile Gaulites – along with a handful of mainlanders, amongst them Milesian exiles and a few Dardanians including Clearchus' replacement Timasion.<sup>135</sup> Not all the easterners were Hellenes: a scattering of non-Greeks including a Mysian served as hoplites.<sup>136</sup> Northerners as well swelled the ranks; at Cotyora Xenophon would denounce one of them, the Thessalian boxer Boïscus, as an undisciplined coward.<sup>137</sup> As for central Greeks, there were Athenians, Boeotians, and at least one Locrian.<sup>138</sup> Finally, there were southerners besides the Arcadians and Achaeans: Argives, Sicyonians, Laconian *perioikoi* like the opportunist Dexippus, and Spartiates like the exile Dracontius, to name a few.<sup>139</sup> Westerner or easterner, islander or mainland, some men must have preferred the company of their compatriots, in whose familiar accents, traditions, and attitudes they could take comfort. Others, accustomed to the diversity of mercenary soldiery, paid little attention to their comrades' origins. For many, what counted was not where a man came from, but how well he fought and how skillfully he could forage.

At the start of the campaign, ethnicity was not a defining factor in Cyrean hoplite organization. While individual *lochoi* or their component *suskeniai* might form on an ethnic basis, all seven original contingents were apparently of mixed ethnic composition.<sup>140</sup> The situation of the Rhodians was probably typical: before coming together to form a troop of slingers, they had been dispersed in hoplite units throughout the army. Even so, the large overall proportion of Arcadian and Achaean hoplites probably gave many *lochoi* a central and northwest Peloponnesian flavor. The distribution

<sup>133</sup> See the tables in Parke (1933) 28 and Roy (1967) 302–6.

<sup>134</sup> Leon: *An.* 5.1.2; Lycius: 1.10.14–15.

<sup>135</sup> Rhodians: *An.* 3.4.17–20. Gaulites: 1.7.5; cf. Briant (2002) 626. Milesians: 1.1.11, 1.2.1; for the political situation in Miletus in 401 BC, see Andrewes (1971) 213–16, Hamilton (1994) 43, Gorman (2001) 239–41. Dardanians: 3.1.47, 5.6.21–4.

<sup>136</sup> Mysian: *An.* 5.2.29; for his personal name (Mysus), see Vickers and Jeffery (1974) 430.

<sup>137</sup> These included two men named Episthenes, one from Amphipolis (*An.* 1.10.7), the other from Olynthus (7.4.7–8); for Boïscus see 5.8.23.

<sup>138</sup> Boeotians: Apollonides (*An.* 3.1.26–32) is a special case; see further discussion below. Locrian: the *lochagos* Theogenes (7.4.18). Whether he came from west (Ozolian) or east (Opuntian) Locris is uncertain; cf. Nielsen (2000) 95–6.

<sup>139</sup> Argive: *An.* 4.2.13, 4.4.15; Sicyonian: 3.4.47; Laconian: 5.1.15; Spartiate: 4.8.25.

<sup>140</sup> See Chapter Four on the *lochos* and *suskenia*.

of Arcadians and Achaeans across the various contingents is impossible to ascertain, but a few simple calculations provide at least some idea of the strength of this flavor. Now, the Arcadians and Achaeans seem at the outset to have mustered mostly in the contingent of Xenias and Pasion.<sup>141</sup> If we estimate that around three-quarters of this contingent's 4,600 hoplites were Arcadian or Achaean, the remaining contingents would have contained roughly 40 percent Arcadians and Achaeans.<sup>142</sup>

There was as much ethnic diversity amongst Cyrus' 2,500 peltasts, archers, and cavalry as amongst his hoplites.<sup>143</sup> Consider just the light infantry commanders (*taxiarchoi*): Aeschines from Acarnania in the west, Stratocles the Cretan, Aristetas from Chios off the Ionian shore, Nicomachus of mountainous Oeta above Thermopylae, and Episthenes of Amphipolis in the far north.<sup>144</sup> There were non-Greek taxiarchs too: Miltocythes the Thracian led the forty horsemen of Clearchus' contingent.<sup>145</sup> The light infantry included central Greek mountaineers such as the Aenianians, Dolopians, and Magnetians, as well as northerners from Olynthus in the Chalcidice. Thracians dominated the peltast ranks, with Clearchus bringing 800 of them to Sardis. The Thracians were not the only non-Greek peltasts. Xenophon mentions a Macronian peltast, a former slave at Athens who recognized his native language in the shouts of tribesmen forming up to block the Cyreans' descent from Mount Theches to the sea.<sup>146</sup>

Ethnically based formations were more common amongst the light troops. Clearchus' 200 Cretan archers under their leader Stratocles, for instance, marched as a unit. So too did his 800 Thracian peltasts. Although Xenophon never specifies their exact organization, it is a good guess that Menon's Aenianian, Dolopian, and Olynthian peltasts formed in tribal or ethnic groups. Not all light troops were in homogeneous units, however. Clearchus' cavalry, for instance, contained enough non-Thracians that Xenophon remarked on its mixed composition at Charmande.<sup>147</sup> Of

<sup>141</sup> Roy (1967) 309.

<sup>142</sup> 75 percent of 4,600 makes for 3,450 Arcadians/Achaeans with 1,150 others. Subtracting 3,450 from the total Arcadian/Achaean strength of 6,000 leaves 2,550 men, or about 44 percent of the 5,800 total hoplites in the army's other contingents. If Xenias' contingent was 90 percent Arcadian/Achaean, the remainder of the army's hoplite units would be about 32 percent Arcadian/Achaean.

<sup>143</sup> For this number see Table 2.

<sup>144</sup> Aeschines: *An.* 4.8.18; Stratocles: 4.2.28; Aristetas: 4.1.28; Nicomachus: 4.6.20; Episthenes: 1.10.7, 4.6.1–3. There was another Episthenes, an Olynthian, in the army (7.4.6–8), but he was a hoplite rather than a light infantry taxiarch; *pace* Stronk (1995) 226.

<sup>145</sup> After Miltocythes' desertion (*An.* 2.2.7), the Athenian Lycius (3.3.20, 4.3.22–5) served as a cavalry commander.

<sup>146</sup> Aenianians, Dolopians, Olynthians: *An.* 1.2.6; Magnetians: 6.1.7; Thracians: 1.2.9, 1.5.13. Macronian: 4.8.4.

<sup>147</sup> *An.* 1.5.13; cf. 2.2.7.

Proxenus' 500 peltasts, we can say nothing for certain; if Proxenus or his officers had indeed done most of their recruiting in central Greece, possibly most of these light troops were Greek. Too, the origins and organization of the 300 peltasts that Pasion brought from Miletus to Sardis are impossible to recover.

#### ETHNIC SOLIDARITY?

Despite the large proportion of Arcadians and Achaeans amongst the hoplites and the tribal and ethnic formations of some light troops, feelings of ethnic solidarity exerted relatively little influence on the army's behavior between Sardis and Trapezus. This was despite at least one attempt early on in the campaign to promote such sentiment amongst the Arcadians.

Something like 8 percent of Arcadia's adult males may have been serving with Cyrus in spring 401 BC.<sup>148</sup> It was probably awareness of the Arcadian presence that spurred Xenias, with the prince's permission, to celebrate the Lycaea at Peltae in late March.<sup>149</sup> By observing this Arcadian national festival, Xenias may have hoped to gain the favor of Arcadians in other contingents and solidify his preeminence amongst the generals. The celebration, however, did little to foster pan-Arcadian consciousness, as events at Tarsus about a month later revealed. There, as we have seen, Clearchus' oratory won him the loyalty of more than 2,000 of Xenias and Pasion's troops. Given the preponderance of Arcadians in Xenias' contingent, a good proportion of those who went over to Clearchus must have been Arcadian. Early in the expedition, in other words, many Arcadians preferred to serve under a Spartan rather than under one of their own.

In the aftermath of Cunaxa occurred a rash of desertions that at first glance seem founded on ethnic solidarity. Two nights after the battle, Miltocythes the Thracian, along with his forty horsemen and about 300 Thracian peltasts, slipped away from the Cyrean camp to join Artaxerxes. Yet not all Miltocythes' riders were fellow Thracians; some were Greeks.<sup>150</sup> Furthermore, although 300 of the Thracian peltasts did desert, 500 of them stayed. These men fought valiantly throughout the retreat, with the survivors only taking their leave at Byzantium over a year later.<sup>151</sup> The troops who absconded with Miltocythes, then, did so not out of a sense of ethnic solidarity, but for more selfish and immediate reasons: Cyrus' cause looked lost, and they wanted to be on the winning side.

<sup>148</sup> Roy (1999) 348.

<sup>149</sup> *An.* 1.2.10, Jost (1985) 267–8, Lendle (1995) 18–19. Glombiowski (1994) 41–2 suggests the festival coincided with the vernal equinox (March 22–4 by our calendar).

<sup>150</sup> Slipped away: *An.* 2.2.7; some were Greeks: 1.5.13. <sup>151</sup> *An.* 1.2.9, 7.6.26; cf. Best (1969) 54–6.



During the withdrawal up the Tigris and the subsequent march across Anatolia, there are no indications that ethnic solidarity provided a basis for soldiers' or officers' actions. True, Xenophon's narrative of this period focuses on the unity of the army in the face of continuous danger, so it is possible he glossed over instances of ethnic tension. On the whole, however, it seems reasonable to accept his depiction of the march to the sea as unmarked by major episodes of ethnic particularism. The Cyreans were simply too busy trying to survive to have much time or energy for squabbling amongst themselves.

#### THE ARCADIAN-ACHAEAN SECESSION

Appeals to ethnic solidarity only had real effects after the army reached the Black Sea coast. At Cotyora in late March 400, for example, the soldiers organized a series of parades and athletic competitions. Xenophon relates that they paraded by ethnic groups; though he provides no further details, it is possible that these celebrations were timed to coincide with the Lycaea.<sup>152</sup> Since the troops would have had to leave their ethnically mixed units, at least temporarily, to organize and carry out these processions, perhaps the festivities spurred a greater sense of ethnic particularism in the ranks. One factor that might have encouraged this was the forty-five days the army spent at Cotyora, with little else to do but hassle the locals and plunder their estates.<sup>153</sup>

The processions at Cotyora presaged events a few weeks later at Harmene in Sinopean territory. There, the soldiers, believing a single commander would bring them more plunder, sought to appoint Xenophon supreme leader. Xenophon's suggestion that the army would best curry favor with Sparta by selecting a Lacedaemonian generalissimo – the obvious candidate being Cheirisophus, who had just rejoined the army – met ridicule.<sup>154</sup> As Agasias of Stymphalus put it, "Will the Lacedaemonians also get angry if dinner companions get together without choosing a Lacedaemonian drinks-master (*symposiarchos*)? If that's the way things are, it's not even possible for us to be *lochagoi*, it seems, since we're Arcadians."<sup>155</sup> Xenophon only got out of the job by citing divine signs forbidding him to accept it, leaving the troops to settle reluctantly for Cheirisophus.<sup>156</sup>

The shouts of approval with which the assembled soldiers greeted Agasias' sarcasm initially depended more on his anti-Spartan stance than his

<sup>152</sup> By ethnic groups (*kata ethnos*): *An.* 5.5.5. On the early chronology (explained in Chapter Two), the stay at Cotyora would coincide with the time of the Lycaea (late March?); cf. Lendle (1995) 334.

<sup>153</sup> *An.* 5.5.5, 5.5.11–12, 5.5.20–1.

<sup>154</sup> *An.* 6.1.17–18, 6.1.26–9.

<sup>155</sup> *An.* 6.1.30.

<sup>156</sup> *An.* 6.1.31–2.

evocation of a pan-Arcadian identity. Cheirisophus the Spartiate, after all, had been away for three months before reappearing at Harmene. Although he had taken his leave at Trapezus promising that his friend Anaxibius would provide ships enough to carry the troops westward, he brought back nothing from the Spartan admiral except empty praise and a vague offer of pay if the army made it out of the Euxine.<sup>157</sup> During Cheirisophus' absence the mercenaries had managed on their own to assemble a flotilla capable of transporting the entire army. The Cyreans, and not just the Arcadians, were in no mood to curry favor with Spartans.

Agasias' words, nonetheless, set the stage for further appeals to Arcadian solidarity. An ailing and discouraged Cheirisophus managed to get the army by sea to Heracleia, but once there proved unable to restrain the soldiers.<sup>158</sup> They pressured both Cheirisophus and Xenophon to extort provisions and bribes from the Heracleots. When the two refused, the troops sent a trio of *lochagoi* – Lycon the Achaean, Callimachus the Parrhasian, and Agasias the Stymphalian – into Heracleia to demand cash. The Heracleots waited no longer than it took these ambassadors to speak before evacuating their farms, barring their gates, and manning their walls.<sup>159</sup> At this, the Cyreans finally broke into open ethnic faction.

Callimachus and Lycon took the lead. Overturning Agasias' stance at Harmene, they began by appealing to both Peloponnesians and Lacedaemonians rather than solely to their fellow Arcadians and Achaeans, perhaps in an effort to peel support away from Xenophon.<sup>160</sup> Indeed, they took pains to point out that the Athenian had brought no troops with him and therefore deserved no loyalty. The wider appeal seems not to have succeeded, for almost immediately Callimachus and Lycon pursued a narrower axis of attack. The salvation of the army, they proclaimed, was thanks only to the Arcadians and Achaeans, who had borne every hardship while getting nothing in return; everyone else had been of no account.

While Xenophon acknowledged that more than half of the mercenaries were Arcadians and Achaeans, the truth was that Cyreans of all ethnicities had worked together to get from Cunaxa to Trapezus.<sup>161</sup> In the charged atmosphere at Heracleia, though, the troops were not looking for truth.<sup>162</sup> Xenophon had turned down supreme command at Harmene, and

<sup>157</sup> *An.* 5.1.4, 6.1.16.

<sup>158</sup> *An.* 6.1.33, 6.2.1, 6.2.15, 6.2.18–19.

<sup>159</sup> *An.* 6.2.6–8.

<sup>160</sup> *An.* 6.2.10.

<sup>161</sup> More than half: *An.* 6.2.10.

<sup>162</sup> Lycon, for example, claimed that the 3,000 *medimnoi* of barley meal, 2,000 jars of wine, 20 cattle, and 100 sheep the Heracleots presented (*An.* 6.2.3) would “not make three days’ rations” (6.2.4), but a closer look shows differently. At 48 *choenikes* per *medimnos*, the barley alone represented 144,000 daily rations, or eighteen days’ food for 8,000 people; the Cyreans at Heracleia mustered

Cheirisophus, the nominal generalissimo, was ill; both had refused to convey the soldiers' demands to the Heracleots. Callimachus and Lycon made the most of this situation. Attacking the failings of the current generals was easy.<sup>163</sup> To present themselves as a plausible alternative source of authority, however, they had to make a positive appeal, something that would bring the greatest number of troops quickly to their side. Raising the banner of Arcadian–Achaean unity was their solution.

The army's split played out rapidly. Any Arcadians and Achaeans with Cheirisophus and Xenophon left to join their compatriots; the new Arcadian–Achaean force of more than 4,000 hoplites then selected ten generals.<sup>164</sup> Cheirisophus retained about 1,400 hoplites and 700 peltasts, and Xenophon held onto 1,700 hoplites, 300 peltasts, and forty cavalry.<sup>165</sup> Obtaining vessels from the Heracleots, who were only too eager to help any and all Cyreans on their way, the Arcadians and Achaeans sailed west towards Calpe Harbor in Bithynia; Xenophon and his men went by ship to the borders of Bithynia, about halfway to Calpe, before proceeding west on foot, while Cheirisophus and his troops marched the whole way.<sup>166</sup> The Arcadians and Achaeans reached Calpe first, but after plundering some villages in the neighborhood found themselves surrounded by angry Bithynians. They managed to escape only after two nights under siege, the Bithynians having withdrawn in fear of Xenophon's approach.<sup>167</sup> Xenophon and his men finally caught up with the Arcadians and Achaeans on the road to Calpe, and the two forces greeted each other like long-lost brothers.<sup>168</sup> Perhaps that same day, they reunited with Cheirisophus and his contingent. The secession had lasted less than a week, but cost the Arcadians and Achaeans nearly 800 dead.<sup>169</sup>

Despite its drama, the most noteworthy aspect of the Arcadian–Achaean secession is its timing. Open ethnic faction occurred late in the expedition, at a point when the soldiers faced little external threat, had plenty of time on their hands, and were disposed to question their existing leadership. The secession, in other words, was the product not of long-simmering tensions,

just over 8,300 men in ranks (6.2.16). Indeed, having received an additional 3,000 *medimnoi* of barley meal just the week before at Harmene (6.1.15), they would seem to have been rolling in food. On the *choenix* as daily ration, see Chapter Eight.

<sup>163</sup> *An.* 6.2.9.

<sup>164</sup> *An.* 6.2.12; presumably there was also a flow of men in the opposite direction, as non-Arcadians/Achaeans moved to join Cheirisophus and Xenophon.

<sup>165</sup> *An.* 6.2.16. <sup>166</sup> For these movements see *An.* 6.2.17–19, Lendle (1995) 377–8.

<sup>167</sup> *An.* 6.3.1–9, 6.3.24. <sup>168</sup> *An.* 6.3.24–5.

<sup>169</sup> Xenophon does not specify when Cheirisophus rejoined the army, but it would have taken at least four full days to march 120 km (75 miles) overland from Heracleia to Calpe; cf. Lendle (1995) 379. 800 dead: *An.* 6.3.5.

but of a short-term chain of events beginning with Xenophon's refusal of supreme command at Harmene and ending with the appeal of Callimachus and Lycon at Heracleia a week later.

The uniqueness of the secession is also remarkable, for nowhere else does Xenophon explicitly link feelings of ethnic solidarity with Cyrean actions.<sup>170</sup> Admittedly, there is the possibility he omitted pan-ethnic sentiments of one sort or another that arose at other times during the campaign. This, however, seems unlikely in light of the constant attention his narrative gives to the importance of maintaining a unified and disciplined army. If in fact widespread ethnic particularism had appeared earlier in the campaign, Xenophon would likely have made some reference to it, either to foreshadow events at Heracleia or to provide another lesson on the dangers of disunity and indiscipline.<sup>171</sup> That he did not do so surely reflects the army's real situation and not simply his tendency toward selectivity. The absence of ethnic sentiment after Calpe has an easier explanation: the 800 casualties the Arcadians and Achaeans suffered meant that they were no longer a majority in the army.

Furthermore, not every Arcadian and Achaean unhesitatingly saluted the ethnic banner. Some must have preferred to remain with non-Arcadian/Achaean comrades they knew and trusted. Others, hectored into joining the exodus out of Cheirisophus' and Xenophon's units, may have gone along in hopes of regaining control from Callimachus and Lycon and reuniting the army. Here one wonders in particular about Agasias. Although part of the initial embassy to Heracleia, the Stymphalian is notably absent from the secession proper, reappearing only two days after its end to move a resolution threatening death to anyone who tried dividing the army again.<sup>172</sup> Since Agasias was Xenophon's friend to the very end of the campaign, it seems unlikely he actively supported a split that Xenophon opposed.<sup>173</sup> Indeed, he could hardly have been a credible proponent of the death-for-division resolution had he been one of the secession's ringleaders. Moreover, Agasias and Callimachus had been rivals throughout the march across Anatolia.<sup>174</sup> It is a good bet, then, that Xenophon suppressed his

<sup>170</sup> But cf. the discussion of Apollonides below.

<sup>171</sup> Diod. 14.30.3 notably omits any mention of an Arcadian–Achaean secession. If Diodorus ultimately depended for his version of events on Sophaenetos' *Anabasis*, through Ephorus and perhaps the Oxyrhynchus historian – on all this see Westlake (1987) 251–4 – it may be that Xenophon's description of events at Heracleia was intended to correct a biased account by the Arcadian Sophaenetos. For the latest views on Sophaenetos' *Anabasis* and the sources of Diodorus, see Cawkwell (2004) 60–2 and Stylianou (2004) 68–73.

<sup>172</sup> *An.* 6.4.11.

<sup>173</sup> Xenophon consistently portrays Agasias favorably; see *An.* 3.1.31, 4.7.12, 5.2.15, 6.6.7–21, 7.8.19.

<sup>174</sup> *An.* 4.1.27, 4.7.8–12.

friend Agasias' complicity in the secession, then gave him pride of place in the subsequent reconciliation. Callimachus, in contrast, drops suddenly and completely out of the story after Heracleia.

#### A CULTURE OF TOLERANCE

Ethnic particularism, then, did not provide a consistent foundation for Cyrean loyalties. Indeed, the troops displayed a pluralism perhaps scarcely imaginable amongst the respectable citizens of a *polis*. However proud of his individual heritage each man might be – for Xenophon's consistent use of ethnics in naming soldiers suggests they displayed that pride amply – and notwithstanding the few days of the Arcadian–Achaean secession, soldiers of diverse ethnicities marched, fought, ate, and slept alongside each other for two years.<sup>175</sup> Certainly there were times when Xenophon and his colleagues preferred fellow countrymen for important missions or embassies, but on just as many occasions men readily worked together on such tasks across ethnic lines.<sup>176</sup> In death, too, Cyreans were remembered for actions rather than origins. During the passage through Carduchia, for example, Cleonymus the Laconian and Basias the Arcadian were slain fighting side by side. Xenophon provided their ethnics as he typically did in naming soldiers, but in the end, what most mattered was their bravery.<sup>177</sup>

Not only did the Cyreans as a whole tolerate diversity, but the army's various groups were sometimes able to celebrate particular cultural affinities without these becoming grounds for hostility against other groups. Consider the banquet held at Cotyora in spring 400 BC for the ambassadors of the Paphlagonian ruler Corylas.<sup>178</sup> There, after libations and hymns, one group after another arose to display their native dances. Aenianians and Magnetians, for example, performed a traditional sowing dance, the *karpaia*, together.<sup>179</sup> Mantineans, joined by a number of other Arcadians, marched in time to a flute, after which the Arcadians “sang and danced,” Xenophon recalls, “just as they do in their processions to the gods.”<sup>180</sup>

<sup>175</sup> Close living in combat conditions has often tended to break down ethnic distinctions; cf. Moskos (1980) 78–9.

<sup>176</sup> Fellow countrymen: *An.* 4.2.13, 5.6.21; across ethnic lines: 5.6.19. <sup>177</sup> *An.* 4.1.18–19.

<sup>178</sup> *An.* 6.1.2–4. Like the Funeral Oration before the Plague in Thucydides, the Cotyora banquet stands just before the strife of Harmene and Heracleia; Xenophon may well have intended to juxtapose the norm of Cyrean tolerance with the special circumstances of the Arcadian–Achaean secession.

<sup>179</sup> *An.* 6.1.7–8. It is not clear whether the dancers were Magnetes (from the Pelion and Ossa regions of eastern Thessaly), or natives of the Magnetian colony of Magnesia-ad-Macandrum. Lendle (1995) 362 opts for the former, suggesting the men were part of Menon's peltast force; cf. Launey (1950) 659 and *IG IX<sup>2</sup>* 1228.

<sup>180</sup> *An.* 6.1.11–12.

Even the non-Greeks in the army partook in this celebration of diversity. First to arise at Cotyora, in fact, were not Hellenes but Thracians, a pair of whom danced so skillfully they elicited shouts from the watching Paphlagonians. The Thracians were not simply there as entertainers. Rather, like their Arcadian and Aenianian fellow soldiers, they had seemed among those best entitled to an invitation.<sup>181</sup> So too was a Mysian soldier, renowned for bravery and resourcefulness, who performed one of his people's dances along with a Persian number.<sup>182</sup> The Thracians and other non-Greeks must have been respected members of the Cyrean community all the way through the campaign, not just at this banquet. There is no indication that they did not participate fully in army assemblies and voting, and it seems inconceivable that non-Greek soldiers, especially the Thracian peltasts who contributed so vitally to the success of the retreat, would have remained in the army if they had possessed no say in communal decision-making. A good marker of their stake in Cyrean life was the choice of the majority of the Thracian peltasts to stay in ranks after Cunaxa.<sup>183</sup>

Given that so many of the mercenaries came from Cyrus' Ionian garrisons, such pluralism is perhaps no surprise. Western Asia Minor, after all, was a zone of regular cultural contact, where Persians, Greeks, and others mixed on an intimate, daily basis.<sup>184</sup> Possibly some of Cyrus' Greek mercenaries had left non-Greek wives back in the garrison cities; perhaps some of the soldiers themselves were of mixed parentage. These phenomena are well known among soldiers on foreign service during the Archaic and Hellenistic periods, and it would be surprising if similar developments did not occur in the Ionian city garrisons, where mercenaries had been fixtures since at least the 420s.<sup>185</sup>

#### APOLLONIDES' EARRINGS

It is against this background that we can best understand the one other significant instance of Cyrean ethnic particularism: the scapegoating of the *lochagos* Apollonides after the seizure of the generals at the Greater Zapatas. The loss of so many commanders at the Zapatas, as we have seen, threw the mercenaries momentarily into despair. Xenophon himself was only

<sup>181</sup> *An.* 6.1.3, 6.1.5–6.      <sup>182</sup> *An.* 5.2.29–31, 6.1.9–10.

<sup>183</sup> *An.* 2.2.7. Another hint of the acceptance of Thracians and other non-Greeks appears in Xenophon's attribution of what one might call "honorary" Greekness to the peltasts in his descriptions of them in battle: see e.g. 1.8.5, 6.5.26.

<sup>184</sup> Miller (1997), Briant (2002) 704; cf. Berlin and Lynch (2002).

<sup>185</sup> These phenomena: Porten (1968), Lewis (1986), Chaniotis (2002). Since at least the 420s: Thuc. 3.34.1, Roy (2004) 274.

shaken into action by a dream.<sup>186</sup> Calling together Proxenus' *lochagoi*, he proposed the course of action that would ultimately take the Cyreans to the Black Sea: reorganize and resist rather than surrender. As Xenophon tells the story, the *lochagoi* concurred, except for a certain Apollonides, who in a Boeotian accent insisted the only alternative was negotiation with Artaxerxes.<sup>187</sup> Xenophon quickly interrupted, asserting that Apollonides spoke nonsense; his colleagues should strip him of command and treat him like a baggage animal. "This man," Xenophon finished, "shames his native land and all of Greece, because although he is a Greek, he is someone of this sort."<sup>188</sup> Thereupon Agasias of Stymphalus chimed in: "For that matter, there is nothing of Boeotia or of any part of Greece in this one, since I myself see that he has pierced ears, just like a Lydian."<sup>189</sup> Xenophon and the *lochagoi* thereupon drove Apollonides away, and proceeded to reorganize the army.

The loaded rhetoric that cost Apollonides his captaincy occasions no surprise: in stressful times people often rely on oppositional conceptions of ethnic identity and appearance-based stereotypes to attack group members for failing to conform to group norms.<sup>190</sup> Indeed, so effective was Xenophon's negative portrayal of Apollonides that moderns have stretched his words to construct an image of the nay-saying *lochagos* as not merely un-Greek but servile. As early as the mid-nineteenth century, Apollonides' earrings had transformed into a sure marker of his heritage; he was "Lydian by birth."<sup>191</sup> By the early twentieth century he had become "a Lydian slave from Boeotia."<sup>192</sup> Virtually all subsequent commentators have taken much the same line.<sup>193</sup>

The most we can surely say, however, is that Apollonides had a Boeotian accent and ears pierced Lydian-style. Xenophon himself did not question the man's Greekness; even Agasias only insinuated that the hapless *lochagos* looked "just like a Lydian" rather than calling him a barbarian outright. That Apollonides wore earrings does not necessarily mean he was Lydian. Rather, it is equally possible he was in fact a Boeotian who during his time in Ionia had picked up a local custom or two. For a soldier to "go native" in this fashion is by no means unheard of.<sup>194</sup> Agasias might have harped on about

<sup>186</sup> *An.* 3.1.11–13, Dillery (1995) 72–3.

<sup>187</sup> *An.* 3.1.26.

<sup>188</sup> *An.* 3.1.30.

<sup>189</sup> *An.* 3.1.31.

<sup>190</sup> For oppositional conceptions of ethnicity see Hall (1997) 26–33.

<sup>191</sup> Crosby (1873) 16.

<sup>192</sup> Bonner (1914–15) 205.

<sup>193</sup> Parke (1933) 28, Roy (1967) 304, Perlman (1976/7) 277, Hunt (1998) 169. Lendle (1995) 155–6 considers earrings a sure sign of Lydian ancestry but not necessarily of slavery; only Hofstetter (1978) 19–20 stays within the bounds of Xenophon's evidence.

<sup>194</sup> Roman soldiers in Britain, for example, are said to have picked up tattooing from the Britons; cf. Haneveld (1970) 150–1, Jones (1987) 141.

what he considered a barbarian affectation, but more significant is that in all the months following the assembly of Proxenus' contingent, Apollonides' accent and appearance apparently bothered no one. His colleagues evidently accepted him, else he would not have shown up at the officers' council, and as a *lochagos* he must have commanded the loyalty of his men. His ethnic indeterminacy – Boeotian in accent, but Lydian in adornment – seems to have been less important than his performance as a soldier. It was only when Apollonides in essence volunteered himself as a scapegoat, by opposing Xenophon in a highly charged situation, that Agasias seized on the opportunity to berate him.<sup>195</sup> Before then, Apollonides' earrings were no more than a marker of the general Cyrean tolerance for diversity.

#### YOUNG AND OLD

The Cyreans were diverse in ages as well as in origins. At the green end was Silanus the Macistian, about eighteen in winter 400–399, and therefore only sixteen when he joined Cyrus in spring 401; judging from the attention Xenophon devotes to Silanus, he may have been one of the army's youngest.<sup>196</sup> At the grey end was Clearchus, a vigorous fifty-something when he met his end in Mesopotamia.<sup>197</sup> Determining the distribution of the soldiers between these poles is tricky. Although he gives figures for certain of the murdered generals – Proxenus was about thirty, Agias and Socrates around thirty-five – Xenophon does not systematically break down the army's demographics.<sup>198</sup> At any rate, it is unlikely the Cyreans began the campaign divided into formal age classes, along the lines of the contemporary Spartan army.<sup>199</sup> Instead, the soldiers seem to have been divided into a series of rough age brackets.

At the upper range were men over forty-five years old. At Calpe in summer 400 there were enough of these, perhaps several hundred out of

<sup>195</sup> On scapegoats see Bremmer (1983) 301–3, Burkert (1985) 82–4.

<sup>196</sup> *An.* 7.4.16, Masqueray (1931) 148.

<sup>197</sup> *An.* 2.6.15.

<sup>198</sup> *An.* 2.6.20, 2.6.30. Xenophon's spiteful obituary of Menon does not give his age, though he must have been quite young, perhaps under thirty; cf. Hoerber (1960) 78, Brown (1986) 387.

<sup>199</sup> On Spartan age groups see Singor (1999) and Singor (2002). The main tactical function of Spartan age groups was to structure the "running out" of younger hoplites as skirmishers or to counter peltasts: Anderson (1970) 110, 243–4, Lazenby (1985) 12–13. In normal circumstances the ten youngest classes (ages 20–9) were sent out (*Hell.* 2.4.32, 3.4.23, 4.3.22, 4.5.14, 5.4.40), though in desperate straits the fifteen youngest (ages 20–34) might go (*Hell.* 4.5.16, 4.6.10). There is no evidence the Cyreans possessed a similar system at the outset of the campaign; rather, Xenophon indicates that "running out" was a tactic developed during the course of the march (*An.* 3.3.8–10, 3.4.3, 3.4.27–8, 4.5.24, 7.3.46, 7.4.6); for "running out" learned by non-Spartans, cf. Thuc. 4.125.3 and *Hell.* 3.4.23 with Krentz (1995) 191. The Athenians did not develop military age classes until the mid-fourth century; see Christ (2001) 410–12.



the total army strength of around 7,500, to provide a minimum camp guard.<sup>200</sup> The forty-five-ups were part of a larger category, those over forty. At Trapezus in early 400, the over-forties, along with the army's camp followers and baggage, embarked on ships for the journey west. Given the scarcity of transport at the time, probably the over-forties constituted no more than 500–750 (or 5–8 percent) of the 9,000 or so troops under arms at Trapezus.<sup>201</sup> Possibly men aged forty and older had constituted a larger proportion, say 10 percent or even 15 percent, of the army at the outset of the campaign. They probably, however, had suffered disproportionately from the stresses of the march, especially the Anatolian winter.<sup>202</sup>

Soldiers up to thirty comprised another age category. This was numerous enough that Clearchus in Mesopotamia considered it sufficient to build bridges across a series of canals and trenches.<sup>203</sup> It also included enough men that the Cyreans eventually were able to develop their own version of the Spartan tactic of “running out” – sending forward the youngest men as skirmishers – and to detach groups of young troops for special missions.<sup>204</sup> While Xenophon repeatedly highlights the actions of young men (*neaniskoi*), it is unlikely that up-to-thirties constituted a majority.<sup>205</sup> If they had, an order for the youngest troops to move forward would have caused most of the army to break ranks, vitiating its tactical effectiveness.<sup>206</sup> Furthermore, Xenophon takes pains to stress his abilities despite his own youth.<sup>207</sup> It would be an odd emphasis if most of the soldiers were in fact around his age (mid- to late twenties in 401 BC). Certainly there was a substantial body of up-to-thirties, enough that Callimachus could specifically appeal to younger volunteers in Carduchia, but overall they may have comprised no more than 30 or 40 percent of the army.

Probably the majority of Cyreans were between these brackets of young and old. If we estimate that at the outset of the campaign over-forties comprised 10–15 percent of the army, and up-to-thirties some 30–40 percent,

<sup>200</sup> Over forty-five: *An.* 6.5.4, Boucher (1913) 292; about 7,500 total: Roy (1967) 319, Lendle (1995) 376–7. For older soldiers left to guard a camp, cf. *Thuc.* 5.72.3.

<sup>201</sup> Over forty: *An.* 5.3.1; the figure of about 9,000 at Trapezus is a rough estimate based on Cyrean strength in Colchia (4.8.15; about 9,800 men) and at Cerasus (5.3.3; 8,600 under arms).

<sup>202</sup> See Chapter Nine for more on age and environmental susceptibility.

<sup>203</sup> *An.* 2.3.12. <sup>204</sup> On “running out” see note 199 above. Special missions: *An.* 4.2.16, 4.5.21.

<sup>205</sup> *Neaniskoi*: *An.* 2.4.18, 4.3.11. Not a majority: *pace* Parke (1933) 29. Xenophon also speaks of *neotatoi* (e.g. 4.2.16), probably another term for under-thirties (cf. *Mem.* 1.2.35).

<sup>206</sup> In the Spartan army, the age groups (20–9) most often deployed as skirmishers constituted perhaps 30 percent of hoplite strength: Singor (2002) 269–70. Xenophon sometimes designates skirmishers as *euzonoi* (“active” or “nimble” troops; see *An.* 4.5.24, 6.3.18, 7.3.46). This may indicate they were drawn from the larger group of up-to-thirties, but *euzonos* itself does not seem to have delineated an age-based group (cf. 3.3.7, 4.2.8, 5.4.23).

<sup>207</sup> *An.* 3.1.14, 3.1.24–5, 3.3.37.

then the remaining 45–60 percent of the soldiers were between the ages of thirty and forty.<sup>208</sup> Because older men were likely more prone to succumb to weather, exhaustion, or hunger along the way, the proportion of younger soldiers probably increased as the march went on. Youth was not all, however: experience and skill probably gave some middle-aged troops a survival advantage over the youngest, untried recruits.

#### AGE-BASED AUTHORITY AND ALLEGIANCE

Except for Sparta, no classical Greek state had an elaborate military command structure. The way Thucydides put it, most of the Spartan army consisted of officers.<sup>209</sup> Yet even amongst the Spartans, age conferred informal authority. Before the battle of Mantinea in 418 BC, for instance, a shouted warning from an older soldier in the ranks dissuaded King Agis from unwisely assaulting a strong Argive position.<sup>210</sup>

Amongst the Cyreans too, age could command respect. The day after Cunaxa, when Artaxerxes' heralds approached to demand capitulation, it was Cleanor the Arcadian, Agias' older second-in-command, who replied that the mercenaries would die before surrendering. After the seizure of the generals, when the surviving officers convened to discuss their options, Hieronymus the Elean, eldest of Proxenus' *lochagoi*, spoke first.<sup>211</sup> On the first day of the retreat up the Tigris, when the older generals chided Xenophon for leading an incautious pursuit away from the main body, the younger man readily acknowledged his mistake. And, following the end of the Arcadian–Achaean secession, Hieronymus again, in company with several Arcadian elders, took the initiative to reconcile the army.<sup>212</sup>

While age conferred informal authority, the army also witnessed a countervailing emphasis on the vigor and decisiveness of youth. Xenophon might admit his errors to his older colleagues, but the hollow square formation still put them on the flanks, while he and his young colleague Timasion supervised the area of greatest danger, the rear. In Carduchia, Callimachus the Parrhasian claimed he was especially qualified to lead a dangerous mission because he could attract young volunteers from throughout the

<sup>208</sup> Because it represents a select group (mercenaries who chose to join Cyrus) rather than the entire male population of a society, this percentage distribution differs radically from those posited by Sallares (1991) 107–13 and Singer (2002) 270.

<sup>209</sup> Thuc. 5.66.4. <sup>210</sup> Thuc. 5.65.2.

<sup>211</sup> Death before surrender: *An.* 2.1.10 (although called the “eldest of the generals” here, Cleanor was not actually selected to replace Agias until a month and a half later; see 3.1.47); Hieronymus speaks first: 3.1.34.

<sup>212</sup> Xenophon's mistake: *An.* 3.3.11–12; after secession: 6.4.10, cf. Stronk (1995) 87.

army.<sup>213</sup> On the Black Sea coast, youth several times trumped age. At Trapezus, for example, Philesius and Sophaenetos, two of the eldest generals, were relegated to supervising the Cyrean flotilla; it would not have escaped anyone's notice that their new command consisted of baggage, women and children, the sick, and men over forty.<sup>214</sup> Most biting is Xenophon's portrayal of Sophaenetos at Calpe. When the older man hesitated to lead the army across a difficult ravine, Xenophon castigated him for lacking boldness and tactical foresight.<sup>215</sup> The criticism sticks all the more because Xenophon never mentions Sophaenetos again.

Conflict between young and old, however, was not ubiquitous. The older Cleanor, for one, apparently got along well with Xenophon all the way through the campaign. Nor did age similarity guarantee an unshakeable bond. Consider Xenophon and Timasion, the youngest of the generals. While they began together in the rearguard, Xenophon found little to praise in Timasion on the way across Anatolia. On the Euxine shore, the two were alternately rivals and allies. At Cotyora, for instance, Timasion sabotaged Xenophon's plans to found a city and even made a play for control of the army. Later that summer, though, the two stuck together all through the Arcadian–Achaean rift, and by winter 400–399 Timasion was declaring his wholehearted support for the Athenian.<sup>216</sup>

If age was not a constant basis for alliance or argument amongst the generals, neither was it amongst the ordinary soldiers. Certainly there was some consciousness of difference between young and old – otherwise Callimachus would not have boasted the way he did in Carduchia – but apparently nothing like the generational conflict that opened up rifts in late fifth-century Athens, nothing like the appeals to mature restraint and youthful vision that Nicias and Alcibiades famously deployed in the debates leading up to the Sicilian Expedition.<sup>217</sup>

#### RICH AND POOR

For every Cyrean, mercenary service meant opportunity. To exiles like Timasion, joining Cyrus promised the chance to build up a power base and return home. To those from the lowest rungs of Aegean society, such as the ex-slave Macronian peltast, it meant freedom to choose a personal

<sup>213</sup> On the flanks: *An.* 3.2.27–8; Callimachus: 4.1.27.

<sup>214</sup> At various points Cleanor (2.1.10), Sophaenetos (5.3.1, 6.5.13), and Philesius (5.3.1) are described as the oldest (*presbutatos*) of the generals.

<sup>215</sup> *An.* 6.5.13. <sup>216</sup> *An.* 5.6.19–24, 6.3.17, 6.3.22, 7.5.10.

<sup>217</sup> Generational conflict: Strauss (1993); Nicias and Alcibiades: Thuc. 6.13–18.

destiny rather than being led about in chains. To gentleman adventurers like Proxenus and Xenophon it was a way to acquire reputation and experience, and possibly to escape unpleasant circumstances at home. Yet for those not forced from home by politics, torn from their roots by slavery, or in search of adventure, economic opportunity was probably the greatest motivator.

Though the poor mercenary is a stereotype ancient and modern, most Cyreans were probably not as desperate as they have been portrayed. Poverty forced some to take the satrap's *daric*, but many trod the mercenary path as part of a conscious profit-making strategy.<sup>218</sup> Go abroad for a few years, come back laden with booty and tales of martial valor – what better way to enhance a man's standing at home? Not everyone struck it rich, of course, so there was always a pool of unemployed spears from which the Persians could choose. Others got used to the life and stayed even when they got the chance to go home. Still, the business had been going on so long and so profitably that in Arcadia at least, marriage and reproduction patterns had probably adapted to accommodate the constant outflow and inflow of men.<sup>219</sup>

The army, then, likely included men of varying economic statuses. Xenophon even claims that some men – most likely officers – were prosperous enough at the outset of the expedition to have spent their own money to bring others along with them.<sup>220</sup> Despite the occasional prominence of class-based faction in Greek *polis* life, however, there is little evidence that the Cyreans, whether officers or soldiers, paid much attention to class distinctions or organized themselves in economic categories. Rather, there are hints that troopers of different statuses mixed together rather than clumping in distinct groups. At the outset of the retreat up the Tigris, for instance, the generals drew volunteers for their new cavalry squadron from across the army.<sup>221</sup> Since experienced riders were probably more likely to have had a wealthy upbringing, it seems that up to this point the horsey set had been dispersed rather than concentrated in any single unit.

What economic conflict there was got expressed individually or between small groups rather than becoming grounds for wider allegiances.<sup>222</sup> On the Black Sea shore, for example, Xenophon defended himself against charges of *hubris* (willful malice) by recounting some of the ways men could come

<sup>218</sup> Stereotype: van Soesbergen (1982/3), Fields (2001), Roy (2004) 276. Profit-making: Roy (1999) 348, Morgan (2001) 35–7, Roy (2001) 264–72; cf. Perlman (1976–7) 254–62.

<sup>219</sup> Unemployed: *An.* 1.1.6; got used to the life: Roy (1967) 320; marriage and reproduction patterns: Roy (1999) 346–9.

<sup>220</sup> *An.* 6.4.8. <sup>221</sup> *An.* 3.3.20.

<sup>222</sup> For more about disputes between soldiers, see Chapter Four.

to blows with each other. In addition to drunkenness and quarrels over boy favorites, he mentions fights over personal property, perhaps loaned, borrowed, or bartered.<sup>223</sup> Such disputes may well have been commonplace, judging from the way Xenophon casually throws them out as normal reasons for conflict, but there is no indication that they ever worked their way higher up into the army's consciousness.

In the end, Cyreans of all socio-economic statuses found the common motivator of greed held them together more than it pulled them apart. On the way to Cunaxa, the promise of pay and bonuses from the coffers of Babylon kept the troops going. On the Black Sea shore, the prospect of booty performed much the same function. Those who were poorer stayed with the army through thick and thin, for it was only through unified action that they could hope to gain and keep pay or plunder. Those who struck it rich, like Silanus the Ambraciot – who got 3,000 darics from Cyrus early in the expedition and held onto them all the way to Heracleia – left the army as soon as they could manage it.<sup>224</sup>

#### COMRADES AND COMMUNITY

There were many paths to group definition and allegiance amongst the Cyreans. Loyalties to contingents and commanders were perhaps strongest at the beginning, but softened gradually as the campaign went on. Ethnic preferences and prejudices, in contrast, were probably always present, but with the major exception of the Arcadian–Achaean secession, seem not to have played an overarching role in shaping the army's behavior. Least influential were demographic or economic affiliations; while men were conscious of age and wealth distinctions, these never became the grounds for widespread faction, the way ethnicity did at Heracleia. Ultimately, however, loyalties based on contingents, ethnicity, age, or wealth paled beside allegiances to a much smaller set of communities, the ones with which soldiers had the closest and most constant connections, and which most shaped the patterns of their daily lives. To these communities – the formal unit structure of the hoplite *lochos* and its peltast equivalents, and the informal comradeship of the *suskenia* – we now turn.

<sup>223</sup> *An.* 5.8.5.

<sup>224</sup> See Chapter Five for more on Silanus and his 3,000 darics.

## CHAPTER 4

### *Unit organization and community*

For most of the mercenaries most of the time, the communities that counted were far smaller than the army assembly, almost 13,000 strong at its acme. They were smaller even than the various contingents of a thousand or more men apiece, although as we have seen contingent loyalties had their place in the life of the army. Instead, the communities that most mattered to the soldiers were those they interacted with on a constant and intimate basis, day in and day out for the nearly two years of the campaign. One of these communities, the *lochos*, was a formal tactical and administrative unit, mustering roughly 100 men.<sup>1</sup> The other, the *suskenia*, was an informal small group, numbering perhaps ten or fifteen comrades at most.

#### FORMAL STRUCTURE: THE *LOCHOS*

The *lochos*, or “company,” was a common building block of many classical Greek citizen armies. The Argives, Boeotians, Corinthians, and Megarians, for example, all mustered hoplites in *lochoi*.<sup>2</sup> The Athenians too had *lochoi*, an unknown number of which comprised each of their ten tribal regiments.<sup>3</sup> In hoplite militia forces, *lochoi* were probably temporary groupings of varying strength rather than permanently defined units. At Athens, for example, the size of each tribal regiment and its component *lochoi* seems to have depended on the manpower needs of any given expedition, and hoplites might not always take the field in the same *lochos*.<sup>4</sup> The tactical independence of *lochoi* in most hoplite militias was limited; they might

<sup>1</sup> Because much more evidence exists for hoplites than for light troops, I concentrate here on the hoplite *lochos*, although a section on non-hoplites is included below.

<sup>2</sup> Argives: Thuc. 5.72.4, *Hell.* 7.2.4; Boeotians: Thuc. 4.91.1, *Hell.* 6.4.13, 7.5.22; Corinthians: Thuc. 4.43; Megarians: Thuc. 4.74.3.

<sup>3</sup> Anderson (1970) 97–8, Jones (1987) 52–5, van Wees (2004) 100.

<sup>4</sup> Thompson (1964) 404, Whitehead (1986) 224–6.

march separately towards combat, but on the battlefield typically deployed as parts of a single unbroken phalanx.<sup>5</sup>

Spartan *lochoi* were different. Although the evidence is maddeningly abstruse, and Sparta's military organization went through a series of changes during the classical period, the Lacedaemonian *lochos* was clearly a durable tactical and administrative entity, some 600 strong in the late fifth and early fourth centuries.<sup>6</sup> Spartan *lochoi*, even parts of *lochoi*, could be detached for special missions or as garrisons.<sup>7</sup> They were also capable of independent movement on the battlefield. Probably the most notable instance of this occurred at the battle of Mantinea in 418 BC, where King Agis attempted to reinforce his left by shifting two *lochoi* over from his right wing.<sup>8</sup>

By the end of the fifth century BC, the *lochos* seems also to have become a standard unit amongst mercenary hoplites in the employ of various Persian officials and local dynasts in Asia Minor and the Levant. It may have been just one part of an overall systematization of mercenary service in the region during the last decades of the fifth century.<sup>9</sup> Into the fourth century, mercenary *lochoi* would remain a common sight, both in Ionia and mainland Greece.<sup>10</sup> No surprise, then, that Cyrus' hoplites too formed in *lochoi*. Despite sharing a name, though, Cyrean *lochoi* differed from their Athenian and Spartan cousins in many significant respects, including recruitment patterns, size, durability, and tactical function.<sup>11</sup>

### *Recruitment, size, and durability*

Cyrus, as we have seen, obtained his hoplite mercenaries from several sources. Along with mobilizing existing garrisons in western Asia Minor, he drew fresh contingents from Achaea, Arcadia, and Boeotia, and sponsored the forces of allies in Thessaly and the Chersonese. During the march toward Babylon, the prince added to his army Peloponnesian hoplites under Cheirisophus and Greek deserters from the bodyguard of the Persian Abrocomas.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>5</sup> For *lochoi* marching separately see e.g. Thuc. 4.43. During the final years of the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians experimented with the tactical maneuvering of *lochoi*; see Hell. 1.2.3–6.

<sup>6</sup> For three different interpretations of the evidence see Anderson (1970) 225–51, Singor (2002), Van Wees (2004) 97–99, 243–9.

<sup>7</sup> See Thuc. 4.8.9 for such a detachment.

<sup>8</sup> Thuc. 5.71.3–5.72.1; cf. Hell. 4.2.20, 6.2.20–1 for Spartan tactical flexibility.

<sup>9</sup> Roy (1967) 320, Roy (2004) 268. <sup>10</sup> Hell. 3.1.18, 3.1.28, 3.2.16, 4.1.26; Aen. Tact. 13.1.

<sup>11</sup> The following analysis supersedes Lee (2004a).

<sup>12</sup> On the origins and sizes of the various contingents see Chapter Three.

All these troops were formed into *lochoi* from the outset of the campaign.<sup>13</sup> To fill gaps in the ranks of existing *lochoi*, say those of the Ionian garrisons, commanders probably solicited individual recruits.<sup>14</sup> New *lochoi* were assembled in a variety of ways. Probably the usual method was for a would-be *lochagos* (“captain;” the plural is *lochagoi*) to gather a *lochos*, and then offer the unit to prospective employers. At least one Cyrean, Episthenes the Olynthian, had once done exactly this. While Xenophon alleges that Episthenes, who was well known as a lover of beautiful boys, enrolled his troops on the basis of good looks alone, probably the Olynthian had also kept an eye out for fit, well-equipped, preferably battle-tested men.<sup>15</sup> That recruiting by *lochos* was commonplace is suggested by the policy of the Spartan king Agesilaus, who before commencing his Asia Minor campaign of 394 BC “offered prizes . . . to the mercenary *lochagoi*, for the one who should join the expedition with the best-equipped *lochos*.”<sup>16</sup> Generals hoping to enroll large contingents likely also recruited by *lochos*, perhaps by engaging a number of *lochagoi* who then acted as mustering agents.<sup>17</sup> Cyrus may have had some control over the commissioning of *lochagoi*, and possibly appointed some officers to command units they had not personally recruited.<sup>18</sup>

Citizen hoplite forces were typically ethnically and regionally homogeneous. In the tribal regiments of Athens, for example, men could expect to stand in ranks surrounded by demesmen and relatives. At Sparta too, units may have mustered geographically.<sup>19</sup> The extent of ethnic or regional homogeneity within Cyrean *lochoi* is less clear. Certainly a *lochagos* might recruit men from a single neighborhood, town, or district.<sup>20</sup> The large overall proportion of Arcadian and Achaean hoplites – perhaps 75 percent of Xenias and Pasion’s contingent and 40 percent of troops in the other contingents – probably gave many *lochoi* a central and northwest Peloponnesian flavor.<sup>21</sup> Despite this tinge, it is likely that most or all Cyrean *lochoi* had at least some ethnic mixture from the beginning. Good evidence for this comes from the Arcadian–Achaean secession, where Xenophon describes the secessionists leaving their original units and creating new ad hoc ones.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>13</sup> For *lochoi* before the outset of the campaign see *An.* 1.4.15, 3.1.37.

<sup>14</sup> For individual recruiting see *An.* 1.1.6, Roy (1967) 297.

<sup>15</sup> *An.* 7.4.8; for more on this story see Dover (1989) 51, Hindley (1994) 347–8. <sup>16</sup> *Hell.* 4.2.5.

<sup>17</sup> *An.* 1.2.11; cf. Roy (1967) 296–301. Xenophon’s remark that some Cyreans “brought others with them” (6.4.8) to join Cyrus may reflect the activities of *lochagoi* as recruiters.

<sup>18</sup> At Thapsacus, Menon suggested (*An.* 1.4.15) Cyrus had the power to choose men for captaincies and garrison duty, but he may have been exaggerating.

<sup>19</sup> Lazenby (1985) 49–52.

<sup>20</sup> This would be another explanation for *An.* 6.4.8; compare note 17 above.

<sup>21</sup> See Chapter Three for details on these percentages. <sup>22</sup> *An.* 6.2.12, 6.3.2–5.



If many of the *lochoi* had already been wholly Arcadian or Achaean, there would have been no need for the secessionists to organize themselves anew. For less numerically preponderant groups, mixing with others in *lochoi* was probably a fact of life. The Rhodians who volunteered as slingers after Cunaxa, for instance, had previously been dispersed across the various contingents.<sup>23</sup>

Xenophon provides but a single figure for Cyrean *lochos* size before Cunaxa: two *lochoi* of Menon's contingent, part of the detail escorting queen Epyaxa back to Tarsus, were lost crossing the Taurus mountains; together they apparently numbered 100 hoplites, giving a strength of fifty men per *lochos*.<sup>24</sup> That these were not average-sized *lochoi*, though, is clear from events following the seizure of the generals.<sup>25</sup> Five generals and twenty *lochagoi* had gone to parley with Tissaphernes. Their deaths left the army about 100 surviving officers, including two generals and several *hupostrategoi* (lieutenant-generals), as well as *lochagoi* and *taxiarchoi* (light infantry officers).<sup>26</sup> Had fifty men per *lochos* been the standard, there would have been more than 200 *lochagoi* alone. On the other hand, initial *lochos* strengths could not have been anywhere near the 600 of the Spartan version; if they had, the army's original 10,400 hoplites would have required fewer than twenty *lochagoi*.<sup>27</sup>

Although it is a good bet there were proportionally many more *lochagoi* than *taxiarchoi*, Xenophon does not describe the relative proportion of the former to the latter.<sup>28</sup> Nor does he record how many *lochoi* the army originally had.<sup>29</sup> If we ignored light infantry officers entirely, a rough approximation of *lochos* size could be obtained by dividing the total hoplite strength of 10,400 by 120 officers (roughly 100 surviving *lochagoi* plus the twenty killed by Tissaphernes), for an average of about eighty-six hoplites per *lochos*. On the other hand, if there were, say, twenty light infantry officers,

<sup>23</sup> *An.* 3.3.16–20.      <sup>24</sup> *An.* 1.2.25.

<sup>25</sup> While all manuscripts of *An.* 1.2.25 agree (*ēsan d'oun boutoi hekaton hoplitai*, "these numbered a hundred hoplites"), another way around this anomalous figure is the attractive emendation of Mather and Hewitt (1910) 248: *ēsan d'oun boutoi <hekastos> hekaton hoplitai*, "these <each> numbered a hundred hoplites."

<sup>26</sup> *An.* 2.5.30, 3.1.32–3, 3.1.37. Since not all contingents had surviving *hupostrategoi* (3.1.32), the number of these cannot be determined precisely, *pace* Parke (1933) 27. Parke is also incorrect in stating that "we do not know whether or not there were representatives in place of the captured *lochagoi*," for the initial meeting of surviving officers (3.1.46) took place before the selection of replacement generals and *lochagoi*. For *hupostrategoi* see also Chapter Three notes 64 and 65. *Taxiarchoi* are discussed below.

<sup>27</sup> See Table 2 for Cyrean troop strengths.

<sup>28</sup> For the army's known *lochagoi* and *taxiarchoi* see Roy (1967) 303–6 and Chapter Three note 103.

<sup>29</sup> In Colchia (*An.* 4.8.15) there were eighty *lochoi*; by then the army had suffered nearly 25 percent hoplite casualties, so this is unlikely to have been the original number.

average *lochos* size would have been about 120 hoplites.<sup>30</sup> The mean of these estimates, about a hundred, serves well to approximate the initial strength of each Cyrean *lochos*.<sup>31</sup> The army's original 10,400 hoplites, then, likely constituted about a hundred *lochoi*.

While they did not have a fixed establishment strength, probably most Cyrean *lochoi* were of roughly similar size at the start of the campaign. For one thing, *lochoi* of widely disparate strengths would have caused numerous difficulties in march scheduling and bivouac distribution.<sup>32</sup> In addition, similar-sized units would have been easier for employers to count and pay (or promise to pay, at any rate). If the prince did not ask his recruiters to arrive with units already in *lochoi* of roughly a certain size, possibly minor differences in *lochos* strengths were evened out during the month-long stop at Celaenae, where Cyrus reviewed and enumerated the troops.<sup>33</sup> Most tellingly, all *lochagoi* received the same pay, suggesting they held similar responsibilities and prestige.<sup>34</sup> Had some *lochoi* in fact been radically larger than others, the commanders of heftier units would likely have resented being no better off in pay and authority than colleagues leading fewer troops.

Whatever its size, each *lochos* was a durable unit, not a temporary grouping. Hoplites joined a particular *lochos* at the outset of the campaign, with the expectation that they would continue serving in the same unit for the duration. While many a mercenary fought, marched, and camped as a member of the same *lochos* all the way from Sardis to Byzantium, there were some important developments in the overall composition of the *lochoi*.

To begin with, 200 hoplites seem to have transferred to peltast service somewhere between Celaenae and Babylonia.<sup>35</sup> Later, on the retreat up the Tigris, more than 800 hoplites departed their original *lochoi* to join several new formations. These included the corps of 200 Rhodian slingers and a fifty-man cavalry squadron, as well as six picked *lochoi*, each 100 strong.<sup>36</sup> Then too, there were casualties: Menon's *lochoi* above Tarsus, a few desertions, some killed, and many wounded in Mesopotamia, and increasing numbers of deaths from combat and weather on the way across Anatolia. By the time the Cyreans were in Colchia, ten months into the march, only about 8,000 of the original 10,400 hoplites were still in ranks.<sup>37</sup>

<sup>30</sup> This would result in about one *taxiarchos* (light infantry officer) per 125 light troops.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. Roy (1967) 301, Stronk (1995) 26.

<sup>32</sup> For marching see Chapter Six; for bivouacking see Chapter Seven. <sup>33</sup> *An.* 1.2.9.

<sup>34</sup> *An.* 1.2.11–12.

<sup>35</sup> See Table 2 for more on these troops.

<sup>36</sup> *An.* 3.3.16–20, 3.4.19–23.

<sup>37</sup> See Table 3 for details on Cyrean casualties.

Xenophon often emphasizes extremes in recording casualties: the troops in line at Cunaxa, for example, suffered no deaths, while in Carduchia the *lochoi* of Amphicrates, Archagoras, and Cephisodorus were virtually exterminated.<sup>38</sup> Probably this is because such occurrences were out of the ordinary. Most units, rather than being swept away at a single blow, melted slowly down as troopers succumbed to wounds, weather, or disease.

As long as a *lochos* remained combat-effective, it is unlikely that gaps in its ranks were regularly filled with replacements.<sup>39</sup> The only source of replacements would have been another *lochos*, and aside from the difficulty of convincing a *lochagos* to hand over warm bodies to a colleague, the arbitrary incorporation of new faces into an existing formation could stir up resentment between veterans and new arrivals.<sup>40</sup> More importantly, even a casualty-reduced *lochos* could keep fighting. In Taochia, for example, the *lochos* of Callimachus the Parrhasian spearheaded the assault on a seemingly impregnable native fortress, despite mustering only seventy of its original 100 hoplites.<sup>41</sup>

Eventually, though, some *lochoi* must have suffered enough losses that they were no longer viable fighting units. What happened then? By the time they reached Colchia, five months after Cunaxa, the Cyreans constituted “about eighty *lochoi* of hoplites, and each *lochos* was nearly 100 men.”<sup>42</sup> As we have seen, there were probably about 100 *lochoi* originally in the army. The difference of twenty or so *lochoi* could hardly all have been destroyed outright. More likely, the remnants of severely damaged formations, for instance the hoplites of Amphicrates, Archagoras, and Cephisodorus who escaped the destruction of their *lochoi* in Carduchia, were either folded into still-cohesive units or amalgamated into a single new unit.<sup>43</sup> In other circumstances such reorganization might have been balked at, but the men of mauled *lochoi* were hardly in a position to insist on their corporate integrity in the midst of a dangerous and difficult retreat. If their *lochagos* had been killed, there would be that much less reason for them to maintain a distinct formation.<sup>44</sup> Small groups of survivors integrated into another

<sup>38</sup> *An.* 1.8.19–20 (although some Cyreans were killed defending the camp at Cunaxa, 1.10.3), 4.2.17–18; cf. the Arcadian–Achaean losses at Calpe (6.3.5) and Neon’s foraging disaster (6.5.24–5).

<sup>39</sup> Parke (1933) 27, *pace* Boucher (1913) 232.

<sup>40</sup> For an example of such mutual resentment see *Hell.* 1.2.15, although cf. Krentz (1989) 116.

<sup>41</sup> *An.* 4.7.8–9; cf. 3.4.19–23 for the original strength of this *lochos*. Not all of the absent thirty were casualties, as some must have stayed out of ranks to supervise baggage, pack animals, and non-combatants; see the discussion of *suskeniai* below.

<sup>42</sup> *An.* 4.8.15. <sup>43</sup> For these *lochoi* see *An.* 4.2.17.

<sup>44</sup> The death of a *lochagos*, though, was not in itself sufficient reason to disband his *lochos*; see *An.* 3.1.38.

*lochos* might even fight harder in their eagerness to display their worth to their new unit.<sup>45</sup>

Hoplites, therefore, did sometimes move from unit to unit, whether as volunteers for special duties, or through folding-in or amalgamation. Otherwise, it is unlikely that men jumped repeatedly from *lochos* to *lochos* over the course of the campaign. Those soldiers who after Cunaxa became slingers or horsemen or joined a picked *lochos* had entered units scarcely less durable than their original ones, and probably served with the same comrades in their new formations for the remainder of the army's existence.

### *Tactical functions*

It is often assumed that Cyrus enlisted hoplite mercenaries solely to compensate for the Persian deficiency in heavy-armed infantry.<sup>46</sup> True, to many Persian officials and local dynasts in Asia Minor, possessing hoplites was shorthand for power.<sup>47</sup> When Cyrus wanted to display the capabilities of his Greek troops to the Cilician queen Epyaxa, for example, he formed them as an unbroken phalanx. And in fact, the one major combat in which the mercenaries participated as Cyrus' employees saw them fighting exactly in this manner, as a single unbroken line of hoplites composing the right wing of the prince's army at Cunaxa.<sup>48</sup>

Consider, though, the missions that hoplite mercenaries in Ionia performed before the outset of the campaign. Two of these are securely attested: garrisoning the coastal cities and besieging rebellious places like Miletus. Urban garrisons had to patrol the streets, suppress civic unrest, and when needed launch sorties against attackers.<sup>49</sup> During sieges, mercenaries might find themselves building field fortifications or scaling unguarded portions of city wall at night to overcome the defenders. Cyrus' initial pretense that the purpose of his expedition was to chastise the Pisidians suggests a third mission, what we might call anti-partisan operations.<sup>50</sup> Fighting in mountains meant climbing hills and outflanking loosely organized tribesmen. All such missions, in other words, required hoplites to do more than fight

<sup>45</sup> Similar behavior was often displayed by small groups of Second World War US soldiers when inducted into another formation; see Marshall (1947) 151–2 and cf. Ben-Shalom et al. (2005) on the combat-effectiveness of “instant units” made up of troops from different formations.

<sup>46</sup> Rahe (1980) 79–81, Georges (1994) 222.

<sup>47</sup> Couissin (1931) 42, Childs and Demargne (1989) 253–70, Lendle (1995) 32–3.

<sup>48</sup> *An.* 1.2.14–18, 1.8.14–20.

<sup>49</sup> For garrison activities cf. *Aen. Tact.* 1.5.2, 26.1.1–7. Independent *lochoi* would also have been appropriate for rural garrisons; on the latter see Tuplin (1987b) 213–14.

<sup>50</sup> *An.* 1.1.6–7, 1.2.1.

pitched battles. They also demanded tactically flexible *lochoi*, able to move independently outside the bounds of the phalanx.<sup>51</sup>

Many Cyrean hoplites, therefore, had a background in non-traditional combat. Mercenaries coming from elsewhere, say Menon's troops from Thessaly, may also have had similar experience.<sup>52</sup> This helps explain the increasing tactical independence the *lochoi* displayed from the start of the retreat up the Tigris. On the Mesopotamian plain, only the six picked *lochoi* maneuvered on their own, but already in Carduchia individual *lochagoi* were leading their units in separate attacks.<sup>53</sup> Detached *lochoi* were also employed as flank and rear guards.<sup>54</sup> By the time the army reached Colchia, every *lochos* was able to fight successfully on its own, advancing in individual *lochos* column. Xenophon outlined the advantages of this technique, especially when fighting in difficult terrain. "The phalanx," he said,<sup>55</sup>

will quickly be broken up, as we shall find [the terrain] hard to traverse at some points and easy at others. And this will quickly cause discouragement, whenever those formed up as a phalanx see it broken up. . . . It seems to me that, forming the *lochoi* in column and leaving spaces between them, we should cover enough ground that the outermost *lochoi* are beyond the wings of the enemy. In this way we shall outflank the enemy line, and fighting in column our strongest men will lead the way; for wherever there is an easy path, there each *lochagos* will lead [his men]. And it will not be easy for the enemy to get into the intervals, with *lochoi* on this side and that, and not easy for them to cut apart a *lochos* advancing in column. If any of the *lochoi* is hard-pressed, its neighbor can aid it, and if one of the *lochoi* is able to make it up to the summit, not a single enemy will remain there any longer.

Xenophon's contrast between the ineffectiveness of a single unarticulated phalanx and the advantages of numerous *lochoi* in column emphasizes the ability of each *lochos* to move independently.<sup>56</sup> Indeed, he stresses placing intervals between the *lochoi*, the opposite of the ideal unbroken hoplite phalanx. On the Black Sea shore, too, *lochoi* continued to function as independent tactical units.<sup>57</sup>

Even if Cyrus had been looking only for phalanx infantry, then, he got hoplites capable of much more. From the outset of the campaign many Cyrean *lochoi* had flexible tactical capabilities, and as the march went on

<sup>51</sup> For hoplites in non-phalanx operations cf. Rawlings (2000) 233–59.

<sup>52</sup> Menon's troops seem to have been used in civil (perhaps urban) strife; see *An.* 1.1.10.

<sup>53</sup> *An.* 4.2.4, 4.2.8, 4.2.11. <sup>54</sup> *An.* 4.2.4, 4.2.13.

<sup>55</sup> *An.* 4.8.9–13, Lendle (1995) 284–5. Note how Xenophon subtly implies that the technique was his own innovation.

<sup>56</sup> On *lochoi* in column see also *An.* 4.2.11, 4.3.17, 5.4.22; cf. Plut. *Dion* 45, Lammert and Lammert (1923) 453, Anderson (1970) 108–16.

<sup>57</sup> *An.* 5.2.11, 5.2.13, 5.2.21, 6.5.11, 6.5.22.

such skill spread throughout the army. In this respect too the Cyrean *lochos* had more in common with its Spartan cousins than with the *lochoi* of citizen militias. Indeed, the Cyreans probably surpassed the Spartans in their overall ability to employ independent hoplite *lochoi*, especially in difficult terrain.

*Tactical subdivisions: pentekostys and enomotia*

The *lochoi* of the fifth- and fourth-century Lacedaemonian system were divided into smaller subunits, each with its own officers, permitting greater precision in maneuver and better command and control. Similar tactical subdivisions appeared amongst the Cyreans only after Cunaxa, as the mercenaries entered the rolling hills of the upper Tigris valley. The army coped with Persian cavalry harassment by marching in hollow square (*plaision*), but this formation encountered problems at defiles and linear obstacles.<sup>58</sup> To reduce the disorder that ensued at the front and rear of the square whenever units hurried to be the first across a bridge or through a narrow spot in the road, the generals formed six picked *lochoi* of 100 men each. Each picked *lochos* was divided into two *pentekostyes* ("fifties," or platoons of fifty men each), each commanded by a *pentekonter*. Each *pentekostys* in turn comprised two *enomotiai* ("sworn bands," or sections of twenty-five apiece), with each *enomotia* under an *enotomarchos*.<sup>59</sup> These *lochoi*, Xenophon explains,<sup>60</sup>

whenever the corners of the square might draw together while marching, would remain behind, in order not to get entangled with the corners, and would move along behind the corners. When the sides of the square drew back apart, they would fill up the middle space [between the corners of the square], by *lochos* if this space were most narrow, by *pentekostys* (platoon), if it were wider, or if it were very wide, by *enomotia* (section). And if it were necessary to cross some defile or bridge, they were not confused, but the *lochoi* crossed over in turn; and if any part of the phalanx might be in need, these *lochoi* would go there.

Like all Cyrean hoplite *lochoi*, the six picked rearguard units could move as independent tactical units. Their *pentekostys* and *enomotia* subdivisions, however, allowed these elite companies to deploy with a precision other *lochoi* lacked. The picked *lochoi* also played a vital role at the Centrites River crossing, where Xenophon had them wheel into line by *enomotia*

<sup>58</sup> See Chapter Six for more on the *plaision*.

<sup>59</sup> *An.* 3.4.19–21, Lendle (1995) 179–81, Dillery (2001) 270–1. The Spartan army deployed subunits with the same names but different structures; see Lipka (2002) 194–7, van Wees (2004) 243–9.

<sup>60</sup> *An.* 3.4.21–3.

(that is, each *lochos* in a single line four *enomotiai* across) in order to cover the crossing of the army's non-combatants and baggage.<sup>61</sup>

The tactical details are not as important as is the recognition that these are the only passages where Xenophon mentions subdivisions of the *lochos*. The absence of evidence for similar subdivisions in the other *lochoi* likely reflects Cyrean reality. After all, if every *lochos* could maneuver as efficiently as the picked *lochoi*, then any *lochos* or group of *lochoi* could act as a rearguard. The army then would never in the first place have experienced difficulty moving through defiles and the generals would have had no reason at all to create special *lochoi*. The generals did not extend *pentekostys* and *enomotia* organization to every *lochos* in the army for the simple reason that such divisions were not essential to the smooth functioning of a *lochos*, but only enhanced the rapidity and precision of its maneuver. In most situations, ordinary Cyrean *lochoi* worked efficiently as tactical units. Indeed, while the officers and men of the picked *lochoi* continued to make their presence felt both in Anatolia and on the Black Sea coast, the increasing skill of ordinary *lochoi* meant the picked units gradually became less prominent in the army's success.

### *Administrative functions*

In addition to being an independent tactical unit, the Cyrean *lochos* also constituted the mercenaries' basic administrative formation. As we have seen, hoplites mustered into *lochoi* before the expedition began. Moreover, several essential non-combat functions, including marching, quartering, and supply, were undertaken by each *lochos* in a largely, though not entirely, self-contained manner.

No army can afford to march with its units in disarray.<sup>62</sup> In friendly territory, such laxness at best impedes the army's progress and confuses its leaders. In hostile territory, disorder invites ambush and catastrophe. The Cyrean hoplites fought as *lochoi*; they also marched as *lochoi*. Both before and after Cunaxa, the army normally marched in an extended column, *lochoi* strung out one behind another.<sup>63</sup> Depending on terrain, the generals could widen or narrow their columns, allowing two or more *lochoi* to march abreast. In open terrain, where the army's flanks were constantly threatened, the Cyreans adopted a hollow square (*plaision*), hoplites holding the sides of the square, light troops and non-combatants within it. In this formation as

<sup>61</sup> *An.* 4.3.26, Lendle (1995) 212–19.

<sup>62</sup> *Cyr.* 6.3.25–34, *Mem.* 3.17, *Oec.* 8.4–8.

<sup>63</sup> *An.* 1.8.14, 4.6.5–6; see Chapter Six for full discussion of march formations and routines.

well, the *lochos* remained the basic marching unit. In more difficult terrain, where hills dominating the army's route had to be secured, several columns of *lochoi* might march in parallel. Thus varying terrain might change the formations in which the army marched. The *lochos*, nevertheless, remained the building block for all these formations. When the day's march ended, *lochoi* also billeted as units.<sup>64</sup>

Finally, each *lochos* could also constitute a formal basis for logistical operations. That is, when Cyreans needed food or booty, they were able to undertake foraging expeditions formed in their *lochoi*. For example, on the Euxine coast, the *lochagos* Cleaenetus led forth his own *lochos*, as well as another, against a difficult stronghold.<sup>65</sup> This was for several reasons the weakest of the *lochos*' administrative functions. Before Cunaxa, when Cyrus furnished regular markets, the mercenaries seem to have gone shopping individually or with *suskenoi* rather than by unit.<sup>66</sup> After Cunaxa, soldiers were left largely to their own initiative when it came to obtaining the necessities of life. The army never developed a proper quartermaster corps, and aside from some half-hearted attempts on the Euxine coast to regulate foraging parties and the distribution of booty, the generals imposed little if any logistical supervision on their units.<sup>67</sup>

#### SOCIAL FUNCTIONS

Gerald Nussbaum argued that the *lochos* was "not a miniature self-contained unit parallel to the whole Army [sic]. Perhaps it might be compared to a factory workshop under its foreman."<sup>68</sup> A closer look, though, shows differently. Because most Cyrean hoplites remained with the same *lochos* throughout the campaign, the *lochos* represented the basic formal structure through which a man's social life in the army was mediated. In plainer words, it contained his closest friends and comrades, the men with whom he lived day and night. This constant coexistence fostered a strong sense of group identity and loyalty.

Xenophon himself highlighted the social functions of a *lochos*-sized unit in the *Cyropaedia*. Here, the fictional Cyrus the Great, having recruited an army, begins to organize his men:<sup>69</sup>

He prepared tents for them, as many as there were unit commanders; in size, each sufficient to accommodate a unit (*taxis*). The size of a unit was 100 men. Thus they quartered by unit; for in tenting together they seemed . . . to gain an advantage for

<sup>64</sup> For the role of the *lochos* in bivouacking see Chapter Seven.

<sup>65</sup> *An.* 5.1.17. <sup>66</sup> For markets see Chapter Eight.

<sup>67</sup> *An.* 5.1.5–8, 6.6.1–6. <sup>68</sup> Nussbaum (1959) 19. <sup>69</sup> *Cyr.* 2.1.25–8.



the coming struggle in this fashion: that seeing each other being fed equally, there existed no pretext of unfair treatment that would permit some to be less brave than others in the face of the enemy. They also seemed to him to benefit from quartering together in respect to knowing each other. And in knowing each other, he thought, a sense of honor was more likely to arise amongst all, for the unacquainted seem somehow more indifferent, like people in the dark. He thought also that their quartering together was a great aid to the sharpness of their formations. . . . And he considered precise formations exceedingly good both to prevent being thrown into disorder and to restore order sooner when in disorder. . . . He thought also that comradeship would be encouraged by their eating together; for he had often observed that even animals that fed together had a great yearning for each other if someone separated them.

Xenophon is here describing a fictional, perfect army, so it is worth remembering the respects in which Cyrean reality differed. For one thing, the soldiers of a Cyrean *lochos* did not actually all sleep in a single tent. In fact, the troops burned their tents before commencing the retreat up the Tigris.<sup>70</sup> More importantly, Xenophon gives the units of the *Cyropaedia* a well-organized logistical system including regulated messing by company, whereas few if any actual Cyrean *lochoi* enjoyed such a system. Finally, this passage represents the best of all possible worlds. In an army with some 100 different *lochoi*, social relations would necessarily differ from unit to unit.

These differences acknowledged, the passage suggests the essential social functions a Cyrean *lochos* performed. To begin with, it gave each hoplite an institutional identity, as a member of a distinct and self-contained formal unit.<sup>71</sup> Such an identity would have been stronger if each *lochos* possessed its own insignia. While there is no classical evidence for unit flags or banners, Greek *poleis* certainly had distinctive shield blazons, and possibly some or all *lochoi* had unit markers of this sort.<sup>72</sup> Another possibility is that each *lochos* had its own *salpinx* (trumpet) call.<sup>73</sup>

In identifying with their *lochos*, soldiers came to identify with the others in their unit. Indeed, studies of modern armies show that the mere fact of belonging to the same formal unit – what military sociologists call “propinquity” – predisposes soldiers to regard each other more favorably.<sup>74</sup> Cyreans belonging to the same *lochos*, therefore, likely came to understand

<sup>70</sup> For more about tents and shelters see Chapter Five.

<sup>71</sup> On the importance of institutional identity see Kellett (1982) 44.

<sup>72</sup> On banners and standards see Anderson (1970) 82–3, Pritchett (1994) 118; on blazons see Spier (1990) 125, Wheeler (1991) 140.

<sup>73</sup> On the *salpinx* see Krentz (1991) 117–18. Dale Dye, who trained the “Macedonian” and “Persian” armies for Oliver Stone’s *Alexander* film, tells me that he successfully conveyed orders to more than a thousand troops using trumpets and drums. Each unit learned to recognize its own trumpet or drum call, which was followed by standard signals for various maneuvers.

<sup>74</sup> MacCoun (1993) 299–300.

the value of shared action, and hence to identify their own interest with that of the group. Such feelings must have been dramatically enhanced by the close formations demanded of hoplite units; success on the battlefield, especially when maneuvering as an independent tactical unit, required the men of a *lochos* to stand literally shoulder to shoulder and to move in unison. Furthermore, the men of a *lochos* strove to follow a group code by proving their bravery to their comrades and their leaders.<sup>75</sup> Because they knew each other, the men of a *lochos* were also likely to have a sense of mutual honor and display greater consideration for each other, just as in the Elder Cyrus' fictional army. The Cyrean who identified with the comrades of his *lochos* might also heighten his sense of identity against outsiders, including hoplites in other *lochoi*, non-hoplites, non-combatants, and natives. Indeed, because the Cyrean hoplite spent the greater part of his time on the march or in camp with the rest of his *lochos*, his chances of having friends outside it were slim.

A single word, *lochitēs*, encapsulates the powerful social functions of the Cyrean *lochos*. *Lochitēs*, literally "*lochos*-mate," connotes a fellow soldier and comrade.<sup>76</sup> The power of the bond between *lochitai* emerges vividly from a dispute at Calpe in summer 400, where the Laconian *perioikos* Dexippus seized a soldier on specious charges of sheep rustling.<sup>77</sup> As Dexippus tried to drag the trooper away, he ran into the *lochagos* Agasias of Stymphalus. "Because Agasias happened to be there," Xenophon recalls, "he freed the man, for the one being led away was his *lochitēs*."<sup>78</sup> Called upon to justify his actions, Agasias denied that anyone else directed him to rescue the soldier, but that "when I saw a worthy man, one of my own *lochitai*, being led away by Dexippus . . . it seemed to be an outrage to me; and I rescued him, I admit it."<sup>79</sup> Agasias initially did not even know why the soldier was being arrested. What he did know, and what counted, was that the man was a member of his own *lochos*. The greatest social function of the *lochos*, then, was that it made *lochitai* of its members.

#### LEADERSHIP: THE *LOCHAGOS*

At the head of each *lochos* stood its commander, the *lochagos*.<sup>80</sup> Some *lochagoi* must have incarnated Archilochus' poetic vision of the stout, bandy-legged captain of mercenaries, feet and spear planted firmly on the

<sup>75</sup> *An.* 5.2.13, 5.2.21–2. <sup>76</sup> *LSJ* s.v. *lokhismos*, Vollbrecht (1899) 138; cf. *Plut. Mor.* 581e3.

<sup>77</sup> *An.* 6.6.5–6. <sup>78</sup> *An.* 6.6.7. <sup>79</sup> *An.* 6.6.17.

<sup>80</sup> On the *lochagos* see Lammert (1927), Nussbaum (1959).

ground.<sup>81</sup> Others, no doubt, were selfish poltroons or dandies; probably few of these lasted long after Cunaxa. At the outset of the campaign, many *lochagoi* were already veterans of long service in Ionia. If Cyrus had not personally granted these men commissions, he may at least have consulted with his garrison commanders over who held the position of *lochagos*.<sup>82</sup> Officers in contingents assembled outside Ionia had probably received their appointments from their commanding general. Others throughout the army began as common soldiers but rose to become officers during the course of the campaign.<sup>83</sup> Although in some instances the men of a *lochos* may have elected one of their number to fill a vacant captaincy, for the most part the generals seem to have been responsible for appointing replacement *lochagoi*.<sup>84</sup>

A *lochagos* stood in ranks with his men and led them personally in battle.<sup>85</sup> The best *lochagoi* knew the qualities of their troopers – who to rely on in combat, who to send off with the baggage, who was a good messenger, scout, scavenger – and could call each of them out by name.<sup>86</sup> Moreover, *lochagoi* competed with each other in valor. During an attack on a hilltop fortress in Taochia, for instance, Callimachus the Parrhasian and his *lochos* managed to find cover in a stand of trees below the stronghold's walls. Callimachus hit upon a way to get the defenders to deplete the store of rocks they were hurling down on the Cyreans. He dashed quickly back and forth from the safety of the trees, each time precipitating another shower of missiles from the defenders of the stronghold. "But when Agasias," writes Xenophon,<sup>87</sup>

saw that what Callimachus was doing was being seen by the entire army, he feared that the other would be the first to make the run across to the stronghold; so without asking Aristonymus of Methydrum or Eurylochus of Lusi, though the former was close by and both were his friends, or anyone else to join him, he dashed forward and proceeded to go past everybody. Callimachus, however, when he saw [Agasias] going by, seized the rim of his shield; and at that moment, Aristonymus of Methydrum ran past both of them, and after him Eurylochus of Lusi. For all these four were rivals in valor and continually striving with one another; and in thus contending they captured the stronghold, for once they rushed in not a stone came down from above.

Personal leadership of this sort helped an officer establish his reputation in the army. It also spurred his troops to emulate his example, and the mutual

<sup>81</sup> Archil. Fr. 114 West (Dio Chrys. 33.17).

<sup>82</sup> *An.* 1.4.15; see note 18 above.

<sup>83</sup> Eurylochus of Lusi may have been one of these; see *An.* 4.2.21, 4.7.11–12, 7.1.32, 7.6.40.

<sup>84</sup> *An.* 3.1.38, 3.2.1, 3.4.21.

<sup>85</sup> For more on personal leadership see Wood (1964), Woronoff (1993).

<sup>86</sup> *An.* 5.2.21, cf. *Cyr.* 5.3.46–50.

<sup>87</sup> *An.* 4.7.11–12.

rivalry amongst units that it fostered made the army more effective in battle.<sup>88</sup> By volunteering themselves and their units for hazardous missions, *lochagoi* could pull even their least willing *lochitai* along with them.<sup>89</sup>

The *lochagos* bulked large in his unit's life outside battle too. On the march, he tramped alongside his troopers, checking for proper intervals between ranks, watching for stragglers, and making sure to keep pace with the other *lochoi* in column. Some *lochagoi* had horses, which made their jobs easier; others acquired the stamina to trot back and forth constantly from head to tail of a *lochos*.<sup>90</sup> In camp, a good *lochagos* made sure his men had enough food, water, and firewood before tending to his own needs – although that Xenophon had to stress this characteristic of good officering perhaps suggests many *lochagoi* were not so attentive in this respect.<sup>91</sup> While there were markets, some of the most capable and well-organized *lochagoi* may have put together unit-wide shopping and distribution of supplies.<sup>92</sup> After Cunaxa, a few of them certainly organized and led *lochos* foraging expeditions.<sup>93</sup>

Whether in battle, on the march, or in camp, the army's lack of subalterns or non-commissioned officers rendered a *lochagos*' job more difficult.<sup>94</sup> Without sergeants or corporals to enforce commands and help with the myriad details of running their companies, Cyrean *lochagoi* had to be shrewd managers as well as tough fighters. Some officers must have relied on the assistance of informal leaders in the ranks, such as veterans who had served with them on previous campaigns or ordinary soldiers who through displays of courage and intelligence had gained the respect of the entire *lochos*.<sup>95</sup> Others counted on their soldiers' mutual loyalty to the unit and their willingness to exercise collective discipline.<sup>96</sup> Either way, the *lochagos* was no mere conduit between generals and soldiers but was vital to the proper

<sup>88</sup> *An.* 4.7.13, *Cyr.* 6.2.4; on leading by example cf. Goldsworthy (1996) 257–8. Despite Xenophon's approving portrayal of heroic action – for which see Tuplin (2003b) – probably not every common soldier admired such behavior. By way of comparison, Marshall (1947) 186–7 notes that some Second World War US soldiers disliked leaders who exposed themselves to danger in hopes of boosting morale; they wanted to see officers working with them, not grandstanding. Others, seeing officers repeatedly display extraordinary courage, became desensitized to the example.

<sup>89</sup> *An.* 4.1.26–8, 4.6.20. <sup>90</sup> For *lochagoi* with horses see *An.* 4.5.35–6.

<sup>91</sup> *Eq. mag.* 6.3, *Hell.* 4.5.4. <sup>92</sup> For examples of *lochagoi* buying food see Parke (1933) 109.

<sup>93</sup> *An.* 5.1.17.

<sup>94</sup> The *hupolochagoi* (“under-*lochagoi*”) Xenophon once mentions (*An.* 5.2.13) are best identified as the *pentekonteres* and *enotomarchoi* of the six picked *lochoi* rather than as lieutenants in regular *lochoi*; see Lendle (1995) 304. *Ouragoi* (“file-closers”) make a single appearance (4.3.26), but apparently existed only in the six picked *lochoi*.

<sup>95</sup> For reliance on veterans cf. *Eq. mag.* 2.2–3.

<sup>96</sup> Mutual loyalty: Parke (1933) 105–6, cf. Polyaeus *Strat.* 3.9.56; collective discipline: *An.* 3.2.31–2, 3.4.47–9, van Wees (2004) 112. For the limits of collective discipline, see 5.8.21–2.

functioning of the *lochos*.<sup>97</sup> As Arrian would later say, *lochagoi* were the yoke that held the whole phalanx together, providing the same effect as tempering does for iron.<sup>98</sup>

#### NON-HOPLITE ORGANIZATION AND LEADERSHIP

Not all Cyreans belonged to a *lochos*. Non-hoplites, including peltasts, archers, slingers, and cavalry, comprised almost a fifth of the army.<sup>99</sup> From the scant information Xenophon provides, these troops seem to have been organized in *taxeis* (singular *taxis*), roughly translatable as “battalions.” The scratch cavalry troop raised after Cunaxa, for instance, is regularly called a *taxis*.<sup>100</sup> Likewise, Cheirisophus had with him a *taxis* of peltasts during the Centrites crossing.<sup>101</sup> *Taxis* may also have been the designation for several units not specifically so named. For example, the Cretan archers under Stratocles, usually described simply as “the Cretans,” must have formed a permanent *taxis*.<sup>102</sup> The same was probably true of the corps of Rhodian slingers.<sup>103</sup>

While the existence of officers called *taxiarchoi* suggests *taxeis* were permanent organizations, as durable as hoplite *lochoi*, the exact size of a *taxis* is difficult to pin down.<sup>104</sup> There are some figures: the fifty riders of the cavalry *taxis*, the 200 Cretan archers, the 200 Rhodian slingers. For peltasts, though, Xenophon records only the total numbers in each contingent: 800 Thracians with Clearchus, 500 Aenianians, Dolopians, and Olynthians with Menon, and so on. For ease of marching and maneuver, these large peltast *taxeis* must have been broken down into smaller units or bands, perhaps along ethnic lines.<sup>105</sup> This might explain Nicomachus the Oetaean, described as “commanding light troops” but not specifically called a *taxiarchos*, possibly because he led only the Aenianian portion of Menon’s peltasts.<sup>106</sup>

Xenophon’s use of *taxis* to describe ad hoc tactical groupings makes matters fuzzier. In Colchia, for instance, the army’s light infantry formed three *taxeis*, one each at the left, right, and center of the hoplite body.<sup>107</sup> Each of

<sup>97</sup> For *lochagoi* as conduits between soldiers and generals see Nussbaum (1967) 32–9.

<sup>98</sup> Arr. *Tact.* 12.

<sup>99</sup> See Table 2 for hoplite and non-hoplite strengths throughout the campaign.

<sup>100</sup> An. 3.3.20, 4.3.22.

<sup>101</sup> An. 4.3.22.

<sup>102</sup> An. 1.2.9, 3.3.7, 3.3.15, 3.4.15–17, 4.2.28, 4.8.27, 5.2.29–32.

<sup>103</sup> An. 3.3.16–20.

<sup>104</sup> For *taxiarchoi* see An. 3.1.37, 4.1.28.

<sup>105</sup> Xenophon elsewhere (*Hell.* 6.4.5) writes of peltasts and archers organized in *lochoi*, suggesting the existence of smaller tactical units for light infantry.

<sup>106</sup> An. 4.6.20. Mount Oeta lies at the southern edge of Aeniania; see Kirsten (1937), Talbert (2000) 55. For Aenianians see also Chapter Three, note 31.

<sup>107</sup> An. 4.8.15.

these *taxeis* mustered 600 men, but given the context in which they appear, the figure can hardly be taken as the normal size of a *taxis*. Moreover, even hoplite *lochoi* could group temporarily as *taxeis* when the occasion demanded.<sup>108</sup> Before engaging enemy cavalry near Calpe, for example, the generals stationed reserve *lochoi* behind the main body of troops.<sup>109</sup> Subsequently Xenophon writes of three detached units, described as the “rearmost *taxeis*” of hoplites, each numbering 200 men. Since hoplite *lochoi* numbered roughly 100 men each, and these 200-man *taxeis* were the rearmost in the hoplite body, the best conclusion is that the reserve *lochoi* were formed in groups of two, each group for the moment being called a *taxis*.<sup>110</sup> The *taxeis* of Colchia and Calpe, because they existed only ephemerally on the battlefield, provide little help in understanding how non-hoplite Cyreans were organized.

Xenophon’s varied use of the term *taxis*, then, renders it impossible to retrieve the details of non-hoplite organization.<sup>111</sup> Nonetheless, it is a reasonable conclusion that non-hoplites also shared mutual identification with their unit and loyalty to their commander, that permanent *taxeis*, especially the Cretans, the cavalry, and the Rhodians, were consistently employed as independent tactical units, and that non-hoplites marched and camped together much as their hoplite brethren did.

#### INFORMAL GROUP: THE *SUSKENIA*

Given a competent *lochagos* and motivated men bound together as *lochitai*, the *lochos* was a cohesive, effective fighting force. Its importance as a social unit is also clear. Since soldiers lived night and day with the same *lochos* for the duration of the campaign, their social lives were largely contained within their *lochoi*. Yet, inside every formal unit existed another, tinier set of informally collected communities. These were the *suskeniai* (singular *suskenia*), as important to soldiers as was their *lochos*.

Literally, *suskenos* means “one who lives in the same tent.”<sup>112</sup> The word slipped into signifying a messmate and military comrade, a sharer of meals and quarters.<sup>113</sup> Indeed, it was often used interchangeably with *sussitos*,

<sup>108</sup> This is not the same as the use of *taxis* to designate a general’s contingent, for which see Chapter Three, note 58.

<sup>109</sup> *An.* 6.5.9–11.

<sup>110</sup> For temporary two-*lochos* groupings, cf. *Aen. Tact.* 15.3, 26.1.

<sup>111</sup> Tuplin (2004b) 22–3 wonders whether the anodyne term *taxis* for light infantry units symbolizes “the continuance of a traditional pecking order even in a military context where non-hoplite forces are tactically important.”

<sup>112</sup> *LSJ* s.v. *suskenos* and *suskenōs*; cf. Hesychius s.v. *skenotēs*.

<sup>113</sup> Gautier (1911) 39–40.

or “messmate.” Small, informally collected groups, whether their members called each other *suskenoi* or *sussitoi*, existed in many classical citizen hoplite armies.<sup>114</sup> Perhaps most famously, the Athenian politician Alcibiades “while still a youth went on campaign to Potidaea, and had Socrates as a *suskenos* and stood in rank next to him in battle.”<sup>115</sup> A more contemporary source has Alcibiades himself describe this partnership in similar fashion: “we went on campaign together to Potidaea and there we were messmates.”<sup>116</sup> Since Socrates and Alcibiades were not members of the same civic tribe and therefore did not belong to the same tribal regiment, their *suskenia* was likely not an official creation.<sup>117</sup> Further evidence for this emerges from several Athenian court cases, where speakers draw clear distinctions between informal suskenic comradeship and food sharing on the one hand and formal assignment to a company or tribal regiment on the other.<sup>118</sup>

Unlike Athenian *suskeniai*, the *sussitia* of Sparta and Crete were formal institutions, with regulated contributions and membership.<sup>119</sup> Indeed, at Sparta the *sussitia* stood at the center of civic and military life. A Spartiate joined a *sussition* when he came of age. He lived in barracks with his *sussitoi* until he was thirty and continued to dine with them throughout his adult life. Until his eligibility for military service ended at age sixty, he also fought, marched, and bivouacked with his *sussitoi* while on campaign.<sup>120</sup> Herodotus and others claimed that the mythical lawgiver Lycurgus had imported *sussitia* from Crete to Sparta, and that these groups were directly responsible for the efficiency of the Spartan army. Modern authors, pointing to the bonding effects of a shared in-group identity as well as to the *sussition* as a vehicle for maintaining and displaying homogeneity, tend to agree.<sup>121</sup> While the exact relationship between the *sussitia* and Spartan army organization remains debated, the Lacedaemonians unquestionably formalized the activities of the small mess group in a manner unparalleled at Athens.<sup>122</sup>

Both Plato and Aristotle expended much ink on the functions of small mess groups. Plato assumed that the normal condition of soldiers on campaign was to eat in common messes.<sup>123</sup> In *Laws*, he has Cleinias explain to a visiting Athenian that Cretan practices like archery and running are

<sup>114</sup> Poland (1932a), Poland (1932b), Cartledge (1987) 32, 427.

<sup>115</sup> Plut. *Alc.* 7.2; cf. Plut. *Alc.* 4.4. <sup>116</sup> Pl. *Symp.* 219e. <sup>117</sup> van Wees (2004) 107.

<sup>118</sup> Isaeus 4.18, Lysias 13.79; cf. Lys. 21.6, Jones (1987) 56–7, Jones (1999).

<sup>119</sup> Spartan mess groups went by a variety of names including *andreia*, *pheiditia*, *suskania*, and *sussitia*; see David (1978), Hodkinson (1983), Figueira (1984), Cartledge (1987) 427–8. For Crete see Morrow (1960), Toynbee (1969) 329–37.

<sup>120</sup> Polyaeus *Strat.* 2.3.11, Plut. *Lyc.* 15.3–4.

<sup>121</sup> David (1988) 7, Powell (1988) 181.

<sup>122</sup> Lazenby (1985) 13, 53. <sup>123</sup> Pl. *Resp.* 416e.



adapted for war and that “the lawgiver had this in view when he arranged them, since he also instituted eating in mess groups, seeing how all men, whenever they are on campaign, are compelled by the force of circumstances to mess in common . . . for the sake of their own security.”<sup>124</sup> Cleinias goes on to juxtapose common messes with taking turns on sentry duty. Both, he states, are essential in warfare; the implication is that a cohesive group of comrades allows some to forage, eat, and cook while others stand guard.<sup>125</sup>

Aristotle generally follows Plato’s line on *sussitia*.<sup>126</sup> He makes the additional observation that in such small groups, “familiarity creates greater trust in regard to others.”<sup>127</sup> This phrasing echoes Xenophon’s description in the *Cyropaedia* of the benefits accrued by troops who live together, a statement worth quoting again:<sup>128</sup>

They also seemed to him to benefit from quartering together in respect to knowing each other . . . for the unacquainted seem somehow more indifferent, like people in the dark. . . . He thought also that comradeship would be encouraged by their eating together; for he had often observed that even animals that fed together had a great yearning for each other if someone separated them.

Xenophon here refers specifically to a formal military unit of 100 men, and we have already seen the usefulness of this statement in understanding the social cohesion of the *lochos*. The benefits of close association Xenophon emphasizes here appear equally applicable to a group of messmates: the fewer the men in a group, the better the acquaintance, the more consideration, and the greater comradeship.

Both Athenians and Spartans, then, went to war as members of a *suskenia* or *sussition*. Whether informally collected or constitutionally regulated, these groups centered on the daily routine of cooking, eating, and sleeping. The precise nature of a mess group depended on its particular context. In the Athenian hoplite militia, *suskenoi* might be no more than friends who gathered to eat rations each had brought from home, or who pooled their money to buy rations on campaign.<sup>129</sup> Such a gathering would perhaps have not much differed from the pattern of everyday civilian life. Lacedaemonian *sussitōi*, in contrast, had to make regular ration contributions and even to dress alike. Those too poor to pay their share could be excluded from a Spartan *sussition*.<sup>130</sup> The intimate nature of suskenic and sussitic life both provided a sense of security and fostered a sort of group code. At Sparta,

<sup>124</sup> Pl. *Leg.* 625c–e; cf. 780b–c, 780e, 781c. <sup>125</sup> Pl. *Leg.* 625e–626a.

<sup>126</sup> Pl. 1265a5–10, 1271a25–1272b35, 1294b20–30, 1329b5; cf. *Eth. Nic.* 1160a.

<sup>127</sup> Arist. *Pol.* 1313b5. <sup>128</sup> *Cyr.* 2.1.25, 2.1.28.

<sup>129</sup> For group purchase of rations see Ar. *Vesp.* 556–7, and cf. Dem. 54.3–6 for the activities of Athenian *suskeniai*.

<sup>130</sup> Lazenby (1985) 17, 58, 60, 74, Hodkinson (2000) 190–9.



courage, moderation, and mutual trust were key elements of this code. Athenians probably expected their comrades to display the same qualities.<sup>131</sup> Finally, in both the Athenian and Spartan armies, slave or helot attendants played an important role.<sup>132</sup>

Informal or formal, *suskeniai* or *sussitia* had to be small enough “to allow of all the members being on terms of intimacy with each other.”<sup>133</sup> Athenian *suskeniai*, being unregulated, probably varied widely in size. Group membership might be determined by family ties, friendships, or erotic connections, or might depend on something as simple as the size of a campfire – so many spaces around the fire, so many *sussitai*. Although Spartan *sussitia* were formal institutions, the ancient evidence for their size is difficult to interpret. The best recent analyses give each *sussition* between ten and fifteen members.<sup>134</sup>

### *Formation, size, and function*

Mercenaries as well as citizen forces formed *suskeniai*, and the Cyreans were no exception.<sup>135</sup> Because the Cyreans began as a collection of separate contingents mustering troops from disparate backgrounds, their *suskeniai* must have followed a range of models. A few men probably brought communal traditions with them. Given the lasting importance of mess groups on Crete, for example, possibly Stratocles and his Cretan archers partook of formal *sussitia*.<sup>136</sup> It is also plausible to imagine an efficient *lochagos* who had served in or alongside the Lacedaemonian army recognizing the advantages of equal feeding and in-group loyalty conferred by Spartan-style *sussitia*, and instituting similar arrangements for his own command. Some of the Ionian garrisons, too, may have developed institutionalized mess groups, possibly with dedicated barracks and eating halls, as a result of their urban locations.<sup>137</sup>

Formally regulated Cyrean mess groups of any sort, though, were probably exceptional. The Cretans, after all, were a tiny minority, most mercenaries had a habit of resisting Spartan-style regimentation unless it was absolutely necessary, and there is no archaeological evidence for the

<sup>131</sup> Wheeler (1991) 138. <sup>132</sup> See Chapter Ten for more about attendants.

<sup>133</sup> Toynbee (1969) 323.

<sup>134</sup> Figueira (1984) 95 n. 24, Lazenby (1985) 13, Singor (1999) 71. Fisher (1988) 33, 52 n. 48 suggests a size of twenty at most.

<sup>135</sup> Isaeus 4.18, *An.* 5.7.15, 5.8.5; the latter two passages are discussed below.

<sup>136</sup> Military *sussitia* persisted on Crete until the end of the Hellenistic period; see Chaniotis (2005) 135–6.

<sup>137</sup> By the Hellenistic period associations of mercenary *suskenoi* and *sussitai* were common in urban garrisons; see Launey (1950) 1001–36, Chaniotis (2005) 94–5.

Ionian garrisons living in common barracks.<sup>138</sup> Indeed, each soldier may have lived separately in town – especially if he had a family, as some of them certainly did.<sup>139</sup> Even the twenty-five-strong *enomotiai* of the picked *lochoi* are likely to have comprised several separate *suskeniai* rather than functioning as de facto formal mess groups.<sup>140</sup> Most *suskeniai* formed fortuitously, as comrades came together for mutual support in garrison or developed ties with *lochos*-mates during the march. Small groups of friends or relatives who joined the army together might also constitute a *suskenia*.<sup>141</sup> *Suskeniai* operated within every hoplite *lochos*, and within every non-hoplite *taxis*; their composition was not a matter of official regulation, but of soldiers' own initiative. This also made them vary in durability. Over the course of two years friends could get killed or become estranged. Smaller groups could combine into a larger one, or a large group might break down into smaller teams.

Since Cyrean *suskeniai* varied widely in composition, depending on the inclinations and circumstances of the soldiers in a *lochos*, it is not really useful to speak of average size. Still, there may have been some practical limits. For instance, only a certain number can gather comfortably around a single fire. Fifteen or twenty would be stretching it; ten or so is more reasonable. A *suskenia* could of course light two separate fires, but then it was already on its way to becoming two separate groups. Too, the mechanics of group cooking and eating might have constrained *suskenic* size. Making and sharing a meal with five or ten *suskenoi* is one thing; everyone can pitch in one way or another, and when time comes to eat no one is too far away to talk to. Feeding fifteen or twenty, in contrast, requires mass preparation and makes for scattered dinner conversations. Again, a *suskenia* this large was already on its way to breaking up into smaller groups. Slave servants or attendants were one way around the size problem. The Spartans, for example, had plenty of helots to do the chores, making possible *sussitia* numbering fifteen or so. Most Cyreans, however, did not have personal attendants, and their *suskeniai* may consequently have been smaller.<sup>142</sup>

Whatever the size of a *suskenia*, its function was above all practical and logistical. Having begun as a collection of separate contingents, the Cyreans did not at the start of the campaign possess any sort of quartermaster corps, and did not develop one during the campaign. Before Cunaxa, Cyrus

<sup>138</sup> Habit of resisting: van Wees (2004) 110–11; archaeological evidence: Tuplin (1987b).

<sup>139</sup> *An.* 1.4.8; for separate quartering cf. *Hell.* 5.1.20.

<sup>140</sup> For mess groups within *enomotiai* cf. Singor (1999) 73–4.

<sup>141</sup> *An.* 6.4.8 possibly refers to groups of this sort.

<sup>142</sup> See Chapter Ten for more on attendants and servants in the army.

regularly provided markets where the troops could buy provisions; during the period of the truce Tissaphernes sometimes did the same, as did the Greek cities of the Euxine during spring and summer 400. On the Black Sea coast the generals made some attempts at regulating the army's foraging, but the regulations they proposed at Trapezus and Calpe were habitually disobeyed.<sup>143</sup> Otherwise the army had no supply officers, no company cooks or mess tents, no centralized stores or reserves. Neither were there medical officers and orderlies to care for the wounded, nor service and support personnel to repair and replace needed equipment.

This lack of formal logistical and medical support made the informal *suskenic* structure vital to survival. From the outset of the campaign, ordinary Cyreans had to work together to obtain food, water, and fuel, to set up camp, to start fires and to cook their meals. Some soldiers had slave servants or attendants to help, but for the majority there was no option but to pool their energies and divide up the chores of camp life. *Suskeniai* made for better security in camp, allowing some troops to forage or cook while others stood guard. Shopping too could have been a communal affair, with one or two *suskenoi* going to market while the rest gathered firewood or set up camp. On the march, a *suskenia* had to share the burden of equipment unless it had a pack animal or slave servant. A group with a mule or porter still needed a *suskenos* to supervise the transport of irreplaceable gear – with no ready source of spares, even cooking pots and cloaks were priceless.<sup>144</sup> And, without a medical service, wounded soldiers were reliant on *suskenoi* to tend and carry them.<sup>145</sup>

The importance of *suskenic* ties to a Cyrean's survival emerges vividly from one of the most striking incidents of the *Anabasis*. By spring 400 BC, the Cyreans were enjoying the comparative luxury of the Euxine shore. The sea enabled fast, comfortable travel, while the Greek coastal cities preferred to provide "gifts" of food, oil, and wine rather than see their territories ravaged. The non-Greek populations of the coastal plain were mostly easy prey for the army's hardened veterans. The circumstances provoked unrest amongst the soldiers. After an inquiry at Cotyora where three generals were censured and fined for allowing a riot in the marketplace and for not preventing the killing of some ambassadors from Cerasus, Xenophon too found his actions under scrutiny.<sup>146</sup> Soldiers began to accuse the Athenian of *hubris* ("intentionally dishonoring behavior"), claiming that he had struck

<sup>143</sup> *An.* 5.1.6–7, 5.6.32, 6.6.2–6.

<sup>144</sup> See Chapter Five for more about Cyrean equipment and pack transport.

<sup>145</sup> For more about medical care see Chapter Nine. <sup>146</sup> *An.* 5.7.17–27, 5.8.1–2.

them unjustly during the march across Anatolia on the pretext of enforcing discipline.<sup>147</sup>

Xenophon cross-examined the first of his accusers, who alleged that he had been mistreated during the army's ordeal in the Armenian blizzard. The interrogation revealed a macabre story:<sup>148</sup>

[Xenophon] asked him if he fought as a hoplite. [The man] responded no. Did he fight as a peltast, then? No, not that either, he said, but being a free man he had been assigned by his *suskenoi* to lead a mule. Thereupon [Xenophon] recognized him and asked, "Are you the one who carried the sick man?" He replied, "Yes, by Zeus, for you compelled me, and you scattered about the possessions of my *suskenoi*."

With an Attic orator's skill, Xenophon spun out the remainder of the incident. While struggling through the cold and snow, he and the rearguard chanced upon an incapacitated straggler. Xenophon forced a passing mule driver – his accuser – to take charge of this sick man and prevent his falling into the hands of the pursuing enemy. The mule driver did so under protest. Later, Xenophon found him attempting to get rid of the unwanted burden:<sup>149</sup>

"Well," continued Xenophon, "after I had sent you on ahead, I overtook you again as I was going forward with the rearguard, and I found you digging a hole to bury the man, and stopping I praised you. But while we were standing around, the man drew up his leg, and we cried out that the man was alive. But you said, 'let him be however he wishes, because I for my part will not carry him.' Then I struck you, you speak the truth, for you seemed to me to recognize that he was alive." "So what," [his accuser] replied, "didn't he die anyway, after I showed him to you?" "All of us are going to die," replied Xenophon, "but is it necessary to bury us alive because of that?"

At that, the assembled troops shouted that Xenophon should have beaten the mule driver more severely. The remaining accusers, too timid to match rhetorical wits with the Athenian, withdrew their complaints, and the assembly turned to the recounting of good deeds done in Anatolia.<sup>150</sup>

While Xenophon's purpose in telling this story was to stress the importance of discipline, he unwittingly highlights several crucial aspects of Cyrean suskenic behavior. To begin with, consider the mule driver himself. He was a free man, not a slave.<sup>151</sup> He was also a soldier, not a servant. For Xenophon does not ask his accuser about his status – whether he *is* a hoplite

<sup>147</sup> On *hubris* see Fisher (1992) 1–2. <sup>148</sup> *An.* 5.8.4–7. <sup>149</sup> *An.* 5.8.8–11. <sup>150</sup> *An.* 5.8.26.

<sup>151</sup> I take *eleutheros on* (*An.* 5.8.6) as a circumstantial participle, i.e. "being a free man." The usual translation – for which see e.g. Hunt (1998) 168 and Dillery (2001) 457 – as a concessive participle, i.e. "although a free man," succumbs to Xenophon's elite bias. Free mule drivers were not uncommon; see for example *Hell.* 5.4.42, Pl. *Lysis* 208b.

or a peltast – but inquires about his *function*: “he asked him if he fought as a hoplite . . . or if he fought as a peltast.”<sup>152</sup> Most telling of all is the context in which the man made his accusation: in the army’s assembly, along with a number of other soldiers. It is difficult to believe the Cyreans would have permitted a mere servant, even a free one, to speak in their assembly, much less to charge a general with outrageous conduct like *hubris*. Indeed, Xenophon himself gives no indication that the mule drivers and his fellow accusers were anything other than soldiers.<sup>153</sup>

Next, note that the soldier was assigned to lead a mule by his *suskenoi*, not by an officer. The wording of his statement suggests the sharing of suskenic labor, rather than a command given to an inferior.<sup>154</sup> Indeed, while leading a mule might at first glance seem an unworthy or unimportant occupation, consider that the mule probably held the group’s food and fuel, extra clothing, and perhaps booty. Leading a mule, in other words, was an essential and valued suskenic task. The *suskenos* with the mule had his comrades’ survival in his hands; no wonder he complained so bitterly when Xenophon dispersed his group’s gear.<sup>155</sup>

Finally, there is the mule-driving soldier’s attitude toward the sick man. That it was more important to preserve suskenic equipment than it was to save a stranger seems to have been acknowledged amongst the Cyreans; otherwise the mule driver would hardly have brought up the scattering of the gear in defending his actions to the assembly. Only when he tried to bury the sick man alive did the mule driver exceed the bounds of acceptable behavior.<sup>156</sup> As for the sick man, we can only wonder how he got left behind. Was he abandoned by a *suskenia* that had to choose between lugging a dying comrade and carrying essential supplies? Or perhaps he bade his *suskenoi* to leave him, knowing their chances were better without him? In the end, the story poignantly reveals what must have happened all too often in an army lacking formal support mechanisms: without his *suskenoi*, a man was lost.

### *Suskenic cooperation and conflict*

Popular perceptions of small military communities like the *suskenia* are prone to romantic images of “bands of brothers,” held together by ties of

<sup>152</sup> *An.* 5.8.5, *LSJ* s.v. *hopliteuō* and *peltazō*; cf. *Thuc.* 6.91.4, 8.73.4. <sup>153</sup> *An.* 5.8.1–2.

<sup>154</sup> The participle used in *An.* 5.8.5–6 is *takhtheis* (*LSJ* s.v. *tassō* or *tattō*, “to station, to draw up in rank”), suggesting that leading a mule was a military function; cf. *Appian* 6.14.85.

<sup>155</sup> Xenophon claims (*An.* 5.8.7) that he distributed the gear amongst others and subsequently returned it intact to the mule driver.

<sup>156</sup> See Chapter [Nine](#) for more about the assembly’s reactions to this story.

friendship and camaraderie, who stick together through thick and thin.<sup>157</sup> In fact, research on modern armies has shown that interpersonal ties in small groups can be highly tenuous, forming as demanded by situations where getting along without buddies or friends is difficult or impossible.<sup>158</sup> Despite the stereotype of sincere soldiers' bonds that last a lifetime, many maintain no further contact with old squad-mates after leaving the military.<sup>159</sup> A better way to think about the *suskenia* is to adopt the distinction military sociologists make between "task cohesion," a group's shared commitment to a common goal, and "social cohesion," feelings of friendship, caring, and closeness amongst group members.<sup>160</sup> *Suskeniai* had to be task-cohesive to succeed, but not necessarily socially cohesive. This is not to say that *suskeniai* did not foster comradeship and mutual trust, nor to deny that Cyreans ever developed close emotional, and perhaps sexual, bonds with fellow soldiers, but simply to remind us not to idealize suskenic relationships.<sup>161</sup>

As long as *suskenoi* focused on the common goal of survival, their *suskenia* could remain task-cohesive. Still, disputes could arise within a group for numerous reasons. One potential source of conflict was unequal division of labor, for example if some *suskenoi* habitually avoided work while others found themselves doing more than their share.<sup>162</sup> Such conflicts might be mitigated if a group had several slaves, but a man who had the only personal servant in a *suskenia* might find himself pressured to share his attendant. At mealtimes, soldiers might fight over the distribution of portions.<sup>163</sup> They might also quarrel over booty, or simply out of drunkenness or boredom.<sup>164</sup> From the beginnings of the retreat up the Tigris, as troopers accumulated male and female companions, disputes perhaps arose about sexual access to these non-combatants.<sup>165</sup> If severe enough, conflicts could fission a *suskenia* into several splinters; otherwise, *suskenoi* must have reconciled their differences and returned to working together.

Possibly there were also rivalries between *suskeniai*. Disputes over turf in camp, for example, could spur fights.<sup>166</sup> Some poorer groups might have resented wealthier cliques who had fancier equipment, better food, and

<sup>157</sup> On the romanticization of small group ties see Kier (1998) 14, Ben-Shalom et al. (2005) 66, Lee (2005) 54.

<sup>158</sup> Gross (1956) 174–9, Lang (1972) 68. <sup>159</sup> MacCoun et al. (2005) 7.

<sup>160</sup> MacCoun (1993) 291, Kier (1998) 17–18.

<sup>161</sup> Cf. Moskos (1980) 73, Kier (1998) 21. On homoerotic or homosexual bonds between soldiers, see Ogden (1996), Hindley (1999), Laskaris (2000).

<sup>162</sup> On the problems of lazy *suskenoi* cf. *Cyr.* 2.2.22–5.

<sup>163</sup> For disputes over food portions cf. *Cyr.* 2.2.4.

<sup>164</sup> *An.* 5.8.4–5, 6.6.5, cf. 1.5.11–12; on petty quarrels in small military groups cf. Stouffer et al. (1949a) 87.

<sup>165</sup> See Chapter Ten for more about such disputes.

<sup>166</sup> Cf. *Dem.* 54.4.

several slave attendants.<sup>167</sup> Soldiers with extra food might hoard it rather than sharing with hungry neighbors.<sup>168</sup> As the campaign went on, however, major wealth disparities amongst *suskeniai* probably evened out. A crucial moment came after the seizure of the generals. Tossing tents and excess baggage on the fire put the Cyreans on a level with each other. Indeed, the soldiers now made a point of sharing extra equipment with those who needed it.<sup>169</sup> Furthermore, the breakdown of the truce allowed men without slave servants or pack animals to try to acquire them if they wanted them. Given the opportunity to plunder even poor *suskenoi* could rapidly change their circumstances.

If *suskenic* conflict rather than cooperation had been the Cyrean norm, however, the army would never have made it to Cunaxa, much less to Byzantium. For every lazy *suskenos*, probably there were several who did more than their share in order to help comrades or increase their stature.<sup>170</sup> Making an extra contribution might well mean a better seat at the fire, renown amongst and thanks from comrades, even informal leadership of the group.<sup>171</sup> Differences in wealth, too, were not always cause for conflict. Some men apparently spent money to help bring comrades along on the expedition.<sup>172</sup> There must have been many others who used their resources to help comrades during the campaign. Nor were all interactions between *suskeniai* hostile. There was certainly some inter-*suskenic* bartering of food for firewood, and likely trade in other goods as well.<sup>173</sup> Troops also probably bargained for services, including equipment repair, shoemaking, barbering, and dentistry.<sup>174</sup> And, as the campaign went on, successful inter-group cooperation perhaps led some *suskeniai* to fuse together for the long term.

#### DIVIDED LOYALTIES: *SUSKENIA* VS. *LOCHOS*

Plato considered military mess groups well suited to fostering courage and moderation amongst soldiers, and smoothly functioning Cyrean *suskeniai* must often have contributed to the morale and combat-effectiveness of

<sup>167</sup> For resentment over unequal feeding cf. *Cyr.* 2.1.25, Manning (1991) 459–60.

<sup>168</sup> That Xenophon in Anatolia (*An.* 4.5.7–9) had to raid soldiers' baggage for rations to feed the sick implies that some groups were hoarding food.

<sup>169</sup> *An.* 3.3.1. <sup>170</sup> For hard-working *suskenoi* cf. *Cyr.* 2.2.29.

<sup>171</sup> In Spartan *sussitia*, by way of comparison, despite an ethos of communal sharing and equality, the display of skill or use of wealth gave certain members higher status; see Hodkinson (1983) 253–4, Hodkinson (2000) 21–4.

<sup>172</sup> *An.* 6.4.8; cf. *Lys.* 16.14. <sup>173</sup> *An.* 4.5.5–6.

<sup>174</sup> For equipment repair and shoemaking see Chapter Five; on barbering and dentistry see Chapter Nine.

their companies.<sup>175</sup> There were times, though, when suskenic demands could compete with the military requirements of the *lochos*. Consider what happened in late October 401 at the Centrites River.<sup>176</sup> The Cyreans had just completed an arduous week-long trek through Carduchia; beyond the Centrites lay Armenia and safety from Carduchian pursuit. As they approached its banks, a new threat materialized on the far side: the levies of the Armenian satraps Orontas and Artuchas. The Cyreans tried the single visible ford, but its rushing chest-deep water and slippery rocks turned them back. On the hills behind the army, the Carduchians gathered, waiting for their opportunity.

In despair, the Cyreans camped for the night on the near bank of the Centrites. The next morning, two young men foraging for wood stumbled upon an easier ford less than four stades (about 800 meters) downstream.<sup>177</sup> Quickly the officers conferred while the troops ate breakfast and packed. Cheirisophus took the forward half of the army and Xenophon the rear, with pack animals and non-combatants safely between. The army proceeded to the new ford, where Cheirisophus advanced into the river while Xenophon with a nimble detachment feinted back toward the original crossing. Afraid of being trapped, the satrapal levies fled in disorder, with the Cyrean cavalry at their heels. Now Cheirisophus' force was across the Centrites, pack animals and non-combatants close behind, and Xenophon had rejoined the rear half of the army at the new ford. Seeing their prey slipping away, the Carduchians looming on the hills behind the army surged forward, singing a barbaric paean. Xenophon waited until the first enemy sling stones clattered against his men's shields, then ordered a charge. Predictably, the lightly-armed Carduchians turned about; they were not about to close with hoplites. Instead of pursuing, Xenophon faced his units about and raced them into the river; they were across before most of the tribesmen realized the trick.

In the final stages of the crossing, Xenophon reports, the Carduchians were spurred to attack more vigorously by the thinning of the Cyrean rearguard. As he writes, "many even of those assigned to stay had gone off, some to look after pack animals, others after baggage, others after companions."<sup>178</sup> In light of the mule-driver incident, a likely explanation is that the men who left ranks were *suskenoi* chosen by their groups to supervise the safe crossing of suskenic gear and companions. That men would leave ranks at this crucial moment reveals the importance of suskenic ties, and

<sup>175</sup> Pl. *Leg.* 636a.      <sup>176</sup> For events at the Centrites see *An.* 4.3.3–34.

<sup>177</sup> *An.* 4.3.10–12, 4.3.17, Lendle (1995) 208–12.

<sup>178</sup> *An.* 4.3.30; on this passage see also Chapter Ten note 82.



the danger they could pose to the military effectiveness of the *lochos*. As long as the majority of a *suskenia* kept fighting, though, the threat to *lochos* performance was not grave. Indeed, the *suskenoi* who stayed in ranks at the Centrites might have fought better knowing that their possessions and companions were safe in the hands of comrades.

Under other circumstances, the suskenic threat could be worse. Consider the story of the *lochagos* Clearetus. On the Euxine coast near Cerasus, Clearetus and his *suskenoi* hatched a plan to capture a lightly guarded, booty-rich native stronghold.<sup>179</sup>

He had it in mind, if he should capture this place, no longer to come back to the army, but boarding a vessel in which his comrades (*suskenoi*) happened to be sailing along the coast, to load up whatever he might take, and sailing away to depart from the Euxine. And his comrades from the vessel swore oaths with him about this. . . . Calling together whomever he had persuaded [to come along] he set off against the stronghold.

Unfortunately for the raiders, their intended victims discovered the plan beforehand. They ambushed the soldiers while they were still on the march to the stronghold, killing Clearetus and many of his followers.<sup>180</sup>

This incident dramatically reveals how suskenic cohesiveness could hinder not just a *lochos* but also the entire army.<sup>181</sup> Clearetus made a pact with his comrades and attempted to desert his *lochos* permanently. In doing so, he and his *suskenoi* cast aside their responsibilities to their *lochitai* in favor of their small group allegiance. Although Clearetus' raid was ultimately a failure, the consequences for the army were severe. Soon after, when ambassadors from the stronghold arrived at Cerasus to protest the attack, the only defense the Cyreans could offer was that the army had not sanctioned it.<sup>182</sup> After this affair, lamented Xenophon, not even the Greek cities on the coast would trust the Cyreans.<sup>183</sup>

#### THE COMMUNITIES THAT COUNTED

Both *lochos* and *suskenia* were necessary to Cyrean survival. The durable and cohesive *lochos* gave men a defined institutional place in the army, with a captain and *lochitai* they could rely on in battle. The tactical independence and flexibility of the *lochos* stemmed in no small part from the mutual loyalty and shared action of its members. On the march and in camp, too, the men of a *lochos* lived together as a relatively self-contained community.

<sup>179</sup> *An.* 5.7.15–16; for the dangers of small group plotting, cf. *Aen. Tact.* 10.5, Cartledge (1987) 131.

<sup>180</sup> *An.* 5.7.17.

<sup>181</sup> Dillery (1995) 81–2.

<sup>182</sup> *An.* 5.7.18.

<sup>183</sup> *An.* 5.7.30.

For all its importance, though, the *lochos* was only one part of the equation. To compensate for the army's lack of proper logistical support, soldiers had to rely on their *suskenoi*. Cohesive *suskeniai* enabled men to work together to perform the vital tasks of campaign life: foraging, cooking, transporting supplies, and tending the wounded.

In the ideal world of Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*, centralized supply and unit feeding minimized logistical worries. In Cyrean reality, though, suskenic demands sometimes clashed with the military requirements of the *lochos*. There must have been tremendous variation, of course, within the hundred or more hoplite *lochoi* and non-hoplite *taxeis*. Good officers kept the *suskeniai* in their units under control; others were not so able to reconcile the logistical needs of the *suskenia* with the demand for combat efficiency. The worst captains, like Clearetus, succumbed to selfish small group interests, abandoning all responsibility to their *lochitai*. A cohesive, well-organized *suskenia* that successfully balanced its combat and logistical responsibilities greatly enhanced the fighting power of its *lochos*. *Suskenoi* who consistently put small group comfort ahead of loyalty to their *lochitai*, on the other hand, were a drain. There was, then, always a tenuous balance between *lochos* and *suskenia*. Sometimes the needs of the *lochos* had to come first; other times the *suskenia* won out. This tension between formal unit structure and informal suskenic structure constituted the most important dynamic informing Cyrean social life, for the simple reason that it had to be negotiated and renegotiated every single day of the campaign.<sup>184</sup> The army assembly was important on occasion, but the communities that counted were the *lochos* and *suskenia*.

<sup>184</sup> Balancing the tension between small group ties and formal unit organization continues to exercise modern militaries; see e.g. Johns et al. (1984) 37, Kier (1998) 15–17.

## CHAPTER 5

### *The things they carried*

The Cyreans carried some things because they had to, other things because they wanted to.<sup>1</sup> They carried the tools of their trades – shields and spears, sling bullets, arrows, javelins. They carried the necessities of life – food, water, firewood, cooking pots, cloaks, tents. They carried plunder, anything that looked portable and valuable enough to haul over one hill after another. The things they carried were as heavy and unwieldy as hammered bronze breastplates, as light and tiny as flint and tinder. Only a few had animals or slaves to help with the carrying.

Examining what the mercenaries carried significantly enhances our appreciation of the arduousness of the march. The Cyreans shouldered not the light, waterproof synthetics we take for granted, but bronze, leather, wood, and wool. Their non-combat gear was not standardized military-grade, but a *mélange* of borrowed and adapted items neither designed nor built for years of continuous hard use. More importantly, understanding the characteristics and sources of Cyrean equipment is essential to assessing the troops' behavior. Reliance on *suskenoi*, reluctance to abandon equipment, vociferous protection of pack animals – all make more sense when placed against the practical context of the army's gear.

Recovering the details of Cyrean equipment means dealing with the difficulties of the textual, archaeological, and art-historical evidence. Xenophon, for example, mentions weapons and armor repeatedly but gives few specifics; on non-combat items such as cooking pots, he says almost nothing. Mainland Greek finds of metal arms and armor are often poorly preserved and date mostly from periods before the Cyrean campaign. Weapons like slings and bows are known only indirectly, through their projectiles. Moreover, real soldiers have never accoutered themselves as perfectly as artists depict them in vase paintings and sculpture.<sup>2</sup> Indeed, in a world

<sup>1</sup> With apologies to O'Brien (1990).

<sup>2</sup> Fuentes (1991) 65–6, 79–80, Hanson (1991b) 78.

where most things were hand-crafted, considerable variation existed even amongst objects of the same nominal type.

There are some bright spots in the archaeological evidence, amongst them the Nereid monument of Xanthus and the heroön of Trysa in Lycia. The soldiers on the Xanthus and Trysa reliefs, many of them apparently Greek mercenaries, are depicted in a way that reflects actual conditions of warfare in western Asia Minor during the first quarter of the fourth century.<sup>3</sup> The recently discovered Çan sarcophagus, from Hellespontine Phrygia, sheds new light on the equipment and clothing of peltasts around 400 BC.<sup>4</sup> Finally, figurines of travelers and soldiers, especially the unique terracotta of a late Classical or Hellenistic soldier from Myrina in Asia Minor, offer some idea of how troops on the march arranged their gear.<sup>5</sup>

Where the ancient evidence fails, experimental archaeology can help. While little such work has as yet been attempted on Greek warfare, Roman army studies in recent years have benefited greatly from the reconstruction and field-testing of legionary equipment.<sup>6</sup> The experimental method has provided significant new perspectives on Roman military behavior, clarifying the idealized representations of texts and monuments and suggesting how soldiers actually used equipment.<sup>7</sup> Amongst its pioneers has been Marcus Junkelmann, who in 1985 led an eight-man contingent carrying reconstructed Roman gear and trailing two mules loaned by the Bundeswehr on a three-week, 500-kilometer (310-mile) march from Verona to Augsburg.<sup>8</sup> Investigations like Junkelmann's provide invaluable comparative information on Cyrean non-combat gear, especially footwear and clothing.

With the limitations of the evidence in mind, we begin by examining the things the Cyreans carried, from arms and armor to clothing, shoes, and other gear. Next, we examine the sources of equipment and its maintenance, repair, and replacement during the campaign. Lastly, we look at the pack and draft animals that carried their share of the army's load.

<sup>3</sup> Nereid monument: Childs and Demargne (1989), Ridgway (1997) 78–88; Trysa heroön: Childs (1978), Ridgway (1997) 88–94. Actual conditions: Anderson (1970) 34–7, Childs and Demargne (1989) 268–9.

<sup>4</sup> Sevinç et al. (2001).

<sup>5</sup> On the Myrina figurine see Bieber (1920) 133–4, Bruns (1946) 35, Sekunda (1986) 63, Uhlenbrock (1990) 73–4.

<sup>6</sup> A rigorous program of archaeological experimentation, reconstruction, and testing focused on Aegean military equipment would be a boon for Greek warfare studies; perhaps someone will take up the challenge soon.

<sup>7</sup> Griffiths (2000) nicely lays out some of the issues involved in reconstruction and testing, especially the interaction between academics and non-academic re-enactors.

<sup>8</sup> Junkelmann (1986); cf. Fuentes (1991), Junkelmann (1997).

## WEAPONS AND ARMOR

When Cyrus reviewed his forces at Tyriaeum in May 401 BC, the mercenaries made an impressive show. Xenophon portrays the hoplites in ranks as the picture of uniformity, all with bronze helmets, red tunics, greaves, and uncovered shields.<sup>9</sup> The reality, however, was more varied.

One thing every Cyrean hoplite needed was a proper shield. The shallow saucer-shaped *aspis* (plural *aspides*) with its distinctive double grip was the heavy infantryman's trademark. Constructed of wood with a bronze facing, this was almost a meter in diameter and probably weighed about 7 kg (15 lb).<sup>10</sup> To minimize the strain of holding up the shield, officers typically waited until the last moment before having their men assume battle position. At Charmande, for instance, Clearchus let his hoplites rest their *aspides* against their knees after calling them to arms. When advancing into combat, troops often rested the upper lip of the shield rim on their shoulders until just before contact.<sup>11</sup> This stance was impractical when marching long distances. For that, a Cyrean slung his *aspis* over his back by a leather or fabric strap; he would do the same when scaling cliffs or walls.<sup>12</sup> To keep its metal arm grip from digging into his spine, he might tuck a blanket roll or pack between back and shield.<sup>13</sup> Even then, the burden of the *aspis* was a favorite subject for hoplite griping.<sup>14</sup>

In camp, the *aspis* was a pain to stow. Some mid-fifth-century BC Athenians favored wooden tripods for storing shields upright and out of the dirt, but probably few Cyreans lugged such accessories. Unless they used shields for pillows like Homer's heroes, the mercenaries probably just shoved the cumbersome discs into fabric covers, stacked them up with those of their *suskenoi*, and hoped some donkey didn't blunder by at night and knock the pile over.<sup>15</sup> As the campaign wore on, men likely stopped bothering with the covers. After months of incessant marching and fighting, most shields would have been so dinged and scratched that their owners cared little about how they looked as long as they still warded off arrows and spears.

<sup>9</sup> *An.* 1.2.16.

<sup>10</sup> Anderson (1970) 14–16, Jarva (1995) 134, Snodgrass (1999) 53–4; *An.* 1.5.13, 1.7.10, 3.4.47, 4.1.18, 4.2.28, 7.4.16.

<sup>11</sup> Fighting position: Anderson (1970) 16, van Wees (2004) 169; against their knees: *An.* 1.5.13, Hanson (2000) 60–1; upper lip: Hanson (1991b) 68–9, van Wees (2004) 168.

<sup>12</sup> Anderson (1970) 17, *pace* Snodgrass (1999) 53 and van Wees (2004) 295; for representations of slung shields see Childs and Demargne (1989) pl. 41 and Mollard-Besques (1954) pl. 30.

<sup>13</sup> *Ar. Ach.* 1136.

<sup>14</sup> *An.* 3.4.47, 5.1.2, 5.8.23.

<sup>15</sup> Shield stands: *Ar. Ach.* 1122, Sparkes (1975) 129. Shields for pillows: *Hom. Il.* 10.150–5; shield covers: *An.* 1.2.16, *Ar. Ach.* 574, Sparkes (1975) 129–30, Sekunda (1994) 175; stacking shields: cf. *Plu. Cat. Mai.* 20; donkey: *An.* 2.2.20.

If every hoplite had an *aspis*, not all wore identical armor. Xenophon omits armor from his description of the Tyriaeum review, perhaps because he wished to emphasize the uniformity of the soldiers' red tunics.<sup>16</sup> Elsewhere, however, he depicts clear variations in the army's defensive equipment.

Some men wore breastplates (*thorakes*), of several different patterns.<sup>17</sup> Probably rarest were all-bronze cuirasses with joining breast and back plates, not so different from those sported by the Cyreans' great-grandfathers. While affording ample defense, a bronze *thorax* was heavy, around 7–10 kg (15.4–22 lb). It was also expensive, being custom-made to fit its owner.<sup>18</sup> More common were composite corslets, built of fabric or leather with metal bands or plates affixed for additional strength.<sup>19</sup> These were lighter, perhaps 5–7 kg (11–15.4 lb), and more affordable, but probably also required individual fitting.<sup>20</sup> Like its all-bronze cousin, the composite *thorax* offered reliable protection, although both types would prove vulnerable to the long arrows of the Carduchians.<sup>21</sup> They were also inflexible, uncomfortable, and could take several minutes to don or remove.<sup>22</sup>

The weight and expense of *thorakes* led many to prefer the *spolas*.<sup>23</sup> *Spolades* were jerkins or corslets, of leather or laminated fabric. They came in a variety of designs, generally covering only the torso and upper thighs.<sup>24</sup> Whether a *spolas* demanded custom fitting is uncertain, but if so, it could probably be easily re-cut to suit a new wearer. At any rate, a leather or cloth jerkin of about 4.5 kg (9.9 lb) was lighter and more affordable than metal armor, while still offering comparable protection.<sup>25</sup> The finest models were linen. These too were light, perhaps 5–6 kg (11–13.2 lb), but could cost more than an all-bronze cuirass.<sup>26</sup> Whatever their prices, *spolades* had the advantage over *thorakes* in flexibility and comfort. Probably they were also easier to put on and remove.<sup>27</sup>

Some Cyreans may have worn neither *thorax* nor *spolas*. Over the course of the classical period, hoplite equipment had been getting lighter, and a few mercenaries may have gone to the extreme of relying solely on

<sup>16</sup> See below for more on the red tunics.

<sup>17</sup> *An.* 3.4.48, 4.2.28; cf. *Eq. mag.* 12.1 and Spence (1993) 34–120.

<sup>18</sup> Anderson (1970) 20–2, Jarva (1995) 20–39, 135. For custom fitting of armor see *Mem.* 3.10.9.

<sup>19</sup> Sekunda (1994) 169–70, Snodgrass (1999) 90–1; several soldiers on the Nereid Monument wear corslets of this type: Childs and Demargne (1989) 308–9.

<sup>20</sup> Jarva (1995) 135–6. <sup>21</sup> *An.* 4.2.28. <sup>22</sup> Anderson (1970) 24.

<sup>23</sup> On the cost of arms and armor see Jarva (1995) 152–3, Hanson (1999) 291–2.

<sup>24</sup> Poll. *Onom.* 7.70.7–10, Suda s.v. *spolas*, schol. *Ar. Aves* 933–5; Sekunda (1986) 13, Lendle (1995) 197, Snodgrass (1999) 109.

<sup>25</sup> Jarva (1995) 135–6. <sup>26</sup> Jarva (1995) 135–6, 142–3, Törnkvist (1969) 81–2; cf. Franz (2002) 345.

<sup>27</sup> *Ar. Aves* 933–5; pace Anderson (1970) 268 n. 44.

shields for protection.<sup>28</sup> Indeed, both the Nereid monument and several late fifth-century grave stelai depict hoplites without breastplate or corslet.<sup>29</sup> Although there is no clear evidence of this trend amongst the Cyreans, lack of armor might explain why 200 hoplites apparently transferred to peltast service somewhere between Celaenae and Babylonia.<sup>30</sup> Xenophon's description of the cuirasses and jerkins furnished to the small cavalry troop formed on the retreat up the Tigris might mean that some horsemen, possibly ex-hoplites, had not previously possessed armor.<sup>31</sup> The omission of armor from the Tyriaeum review, too, is sometimes taken to mean that most hoplites wore no armor. Cyreans wearing armor appear frequently enough, however, to suggest that the wholly armorless were a minority.

For Cyreans, the weight and comfort of armor were critically important. Citizen hoplites liked to delay arming until just before battle, but they had personal attendants to carry their panoplies plus the luxury of knowing, more or less, when fighting would occur.<sup>32</sup> Most Cyrean hoplites, in contrast, did not have attendants and so normally transported their own arms and armor.<sup>33</sup> Since corslets and jerkins could not very well be folded or compacted for travel, the best way to carry armor was to wear it. Furthermore, from Cunaxa onward, the mercenaries faced near-constant threat of combat, meaning they could hardly wait until just before battle to suit up. The result was that men put on their armor in the morning and wore it all day long, whether marching, fighting, climbing, or running. Sometimes they even slept in it.<sup>34</sup> Under such conditions, a light *spolas* was greatly preferable to the best bronze *thorax*.

For helmets and greaves, the evidence is scant after Tyriaeum.<sup>35</sup> As with armor, helmet choice depended on individual finances and preferences. Some picked the traditional: Corinthian or Chalcidian helmets that enclosed the head and face in bronze.<sup>36</sup> Surviving examples of such helmets

<sup>28</sup> Anderson (1970) 26–8, 41–2.

<sup>29</sup> Nereid monument: Childs and Demargne (1989) pl. 61; stelai: Anderson (1970) pls. 11–12, Sekunda (1994) 176–7.

<sup>30</sup> See Table 2. Possibly these troops included Achaeans who arrived carrying Achaean-style short spears and small shields rather than canonical hoplite equipment; see Anderson (1967) 104–6, Snodgrass (1999) 72.

<sup>31</sup> *An.* 3.3.20. <sup>32</sup> Hanson (2000) 60–3.

<sup>33</sup> For the paucity of attendants in the army see Chapter Ten. That some soldiers on the morning of Cunaxa loaded battle gear onto pack animals and wagons (*An.* 1.7.20) reflects a departure from normal practice occasioned by the day's careless advance; cf. 3.4.33 and 5.1.2.

<sup>34</sup> For wearing armor all day as a mark of hardened soldiers on campaign see *Hell.* 6.1.6; sleeping in armor is implicit in *An.* 4.2.5–7.

<sup>35</sup> Helmets appear once more (*An.* 7.4.16), greaves only when worn by enemies (4.7.16, 5.2.22).

<sup>36</sup> Anderson (1970) 28–9, Snodgrass (1999) 93–4.

vary widely in weight, but an average of 1.5 kg (3.3 lb) is reasonable.<sup>37</sup> Worn with sewn-in felt padding, closed helmets offered excellent protection but were stifling, especially in summer.<sup>38</sup> Wearers lifted their helmets up for air whenever possible – the pose is common on vases and in sculpture – though whether a man could march long distances with helmet perched on head seems doubtful. When pulled down, closed helmets also constrained sight and hearing, which was especially dangerous in rugged terrain with enemies all around. Officers in particular might have trouble making themselves heard, or, unless they wore a distinctive crest or insignia, being recognized. The newer Attic-style helmets, with open faces and hinged cheek-pieces, and sometimes with ear cut-outs, went a long way towards addressing these problems. Judging from their predominance in the Xanthus and Trysa reliefs, Attic helmets may have been a favorite amongst mercenaries in Asia Minor.<sup>39</sup>

Cheaper than any closed helmet was the conical bronze *pilos*. Copying the shape of a shepherd's or hunter's cap, this covered the head only above the ears. Spartan hoplites wore metal *piloi* throughout the Peloponnesian War, and by the end of the fifth century middle-class Athenians were adopting them. They were also popular amongst mercenaries in Asia Minor.<sup>40</sup> Detachable felt or leather liners provided padding under the bronze.<sup>41</sup> Sophisticated urbanites disdained the *pilos* for its rustic origins, but aside from being less expensive it was light (only a kilogram or so), easy to wear in battle and on the march, did not constrict vision or hearing and still adequately defended the head. A side benefit of the *pilos* was that in a pinch you could eat out of it: just turn it upside down, remove the liner, and spoon in the porridge.<sup>42</sup>

The Cyrean use of greaves (*knemides*) seems at first glance surprising, since moderns often depict these metal shin guards as awkward and chafing.<sup>43</sup> Bronze greaves, however, were light, perhaps only 1.5 kg (3.3 lb) per pair, and resilient.<sup>44</sup> For a proper fit, greaves probably had to be custom made. A good pair could be quickly snapped on for battle, and with interior padding could be comfortable enough to wear all day. Men could even

<sup>37</sup> Jarva (1995) 134, Franz (2002) 344.

<sup>38</sup> Anderson (1970) 28. <sup>39</sup> Childs and Demargne (1989) 311–13.

<sup>40</sup> *Pilos*: Anderson (1970) 29–37, Sekunda (1994) 175–8, Snodgrass (1999) 94. Spartan *piloi*: Thuc. 4.34.3. Athenians: Jones (2004) 170, Sekunda (2000) 58–9. *Piloi* are second only to Attic helmets on the Nereid monument; see Childs and Demargne (1989) 311–13.

<sup>41</sup> Lamb (1925–6) 134, Sekunda (1994) 175–6.

<sup>42</sup> Weight of *pilos*: Franz (2002) 344; rustic origins: Pipili (2000) 178–9; spoon in the porridge: Ar. *Lys.* 561.

<sup>43</sup> See e.g. Hanson (2000) 75–6, Snodgrass (1999) 110.

<sup>44</sup> Jarva (1995) 84–100, 136–7, Franz (2002) 346.



run and dance in greaves.<sup>45</sup> When no combat threatened, a soldier who preferred marching greaveless could stow them in a knapsack or tuck them into the hollow of his slung *aspis*. The additional leg protection greaves furnished was especially important when fighting missile-armed troops.<sup>46</sup> Despite the apparent uniformity of the Tyriaeum review, some soldiers may not have owned greaves at the start of the campaign. Others apparently lost or discarded theirs along the way, for the items do not appear in Xenophon's list of his troops' equipment during winter 400–399.<sup>47</sup>

The primary hoplite weapon was the thrusting spear (*doru*), perhaps about 2.5 m (8.2 ft) long inclusive of its leaf-shaped bronze tip and sharpened end spike, and weighing some 1.5 kg (3.3 lb).<sup>48</sup> Theoretically, the spike made for easy stowage in bivouac, but jabbing a *doru* end-first into the ground would have been impossible in Euphrates desert sand or on rocky Anatolian hillsides. In such cases, *suskenoi* might tie spears together into an upright sheaf, or rest them loose against stacked shields and armor. On the march, some men perhaps fashioned leather slings for their spears, but probably the majority just sloped *dorata* against a shoulder, occasionally shifting sides to keep from getting sore.<sup>49</sup> They employed the same position when advancing into battle, only leveling spears in the moments before contact.<sup>50</sup> In rugged terrain, spears could double as walking sticks.

As secondary weapons, the Cyreans carried swords, none more than 0.6 m (2 ft) long. There were straight two-edged versions and dagger-like Spartan types, but perhaps most common was the *machaira* or *kopis*, a curved machete-like blade.<sup>51</sup> Soldiers likely appreciated the *machaira*'s versatility: it could inflict wicked cuts on enemies, slash wicker shields to ribbons, chop kindling, strip reeds for sleeping mats, or butcher meat. Swords were slung on baldrics; the Myrina figurine carries his under his left arm, hilt forward for easy access. Weight naturally varied by type, but a good average is 1 kg for the blade and another 0.5 kg for the scabbard. Some troopers also had knives or *encheiridia*, of negligible weight.<sup>52</sup> In bivouac, men could easily wear swords even while cooking or chopping wood, and probably slept with them close by.<sup>53</sup>

<sup>45</sup> Snapped on: Shefton (1969–70) 55, Snodgrass (1999) 52–3. Run and dance: Sekunda (1994) 170–1, van Wees (2004) 51.

<sup>46</sup> *Cyr.* 2.3.18, Childs and Demargne (1989) 93–4, Jarva (1995) 141. <sup>47</sup> *An.* 7.4.16.

<sup>48</sup> *Doru*: Anderson (1991) 18–24; length: Markle (1977) 324–5; weight: Jarva (1995) 138.

<sup>49</sup> Anderson (1991) 31. <sup>50</sup> *An.* 6.5.26–8.

<sup>51</sup> Swords: Anderson (1991) 25–8, Snodgrass (1999) 84–5, 97; Spartan sword: Anderson (1970) 38, Anderson (1974b) 166, Hodkinson (2000) 226; *machaira*: *An.* 1.8.7, 4.6.25, 6.1.5, 7.2.30, 7.4.16, Baitinger (2001) 79.

<sup>52</sup> Sword weight: Jarva (1995) 138; *encheiridia*: *An.* 4.3.12.

<sup>53</sup> The Spartans were unusual in keeping their spears at hand while encamped; see *Lac.* 12.4.

Putting all this together affords a rough picture of hoplite battle burden. Minimum combat gear – shield, *pilos* helmet, spear, and sword – weighed about 11 kg (24.25 lb). At the other end of the scale, a bronze *thorax*, closed helmet, and greaves in addition to shield, spear, and sword, added up to about 23 kg (50.7 lb). The average Cyrean hoplite – with *aspis*, leather or fabric *spolas*, helmet, greaves, spear and sword – bore a total load of about 16 kg (35.3 lb).<sup>54</sup>

The combat burden of peltasts, archers, and slingers was far less. Though some light troops might wear felt or metal *piloi*, most wore little or no armor.<sup>55</sup> Peltasts did carry a light wicker or hide shield (*peltē*). Aside from sharing the features of a single grip, light construction, and small diameter, Cyrean *peltai* were probably not standardized. The crescent-shaped Thracian version is an icon of vase paintings, but round *peltai* appear on the Çan sarcophagus.<sup>56</sup> The Cretan archers once employed bronze-faced *peltai* in the hills above Trapezus, but these were probably hoplite shields borrowed for a special mission.<sup>57</sup> The weight of a *peltē* was around 1 kg (2.2 lb), making it easy to sling or hold on the march; indeed *peltai* were so light that dancers could move nimbly with one in each hand.<sup>58</sup> In camp, *peltai*, like hoplite shields, were probably stacked for storage.

Light troops also had it easier with their weaponry. The peltasts' javelin (*akōn*), for example, probably weighed only about a kilogram. A sling and a satchel of fifty lead sling bullets might weigh only 1.5 kilograms, as might a bow and a quiver of twenty arrows.<sup>59</sup> Even so, a peltast could manage no more than a handful of javelins while marching. For combat, three javelins was the limit: two in the *peltē* hand or wedged behind the *peltē* grip and another in the throwing hand, as depicted on the Çan sarcophagus.<sup>60</sup> Archers and slingers could carry an additional quiver of arrows or sack of bullets with less difficulty, but they too are unlikely to have lugged huge quantities of extra ammunition. For all three light infantry types, then, a total missile load of about 3 kg (6.6 lb) seems reasonable. To defend themselves at close quarters, pursue fugitives, or guard captives, light troops

<sup>54</sup> As evident from the notes, I have relied on the weight figures of Jarva (1995). Franz (2002) 339–49, working from a different and smaller data set, gives a slightly different weight range (10.3–21.3 kg) for hoplite combat equipment.

<sup>55</sup> *An.* 3.3.7; cf. Sekunda (1994) 173–4. One of the kneeling archers on the Nereid monument may sport a sleeveless leather jerkin; see Childs and Demargne (1989) pl. 41.

<sup>56</sup> Best (1969) 3–7, Sekunda (1994) 173–4, Sevinç et al. (2001) 399.

<sup>57</sup> *An.* 5.2.29–30, Lendle (1995) 308–9; cf. Sekunda (1994) 193. <sup>58</sup> *An.* 6.1.8, Blyth (1977) 171.

<sup>59</sup> Javelins: Snodgrass (1999) 136–9; javelin weight: Harris (1963) 36. Slings: Korfmann (1973); the 1.5 kg figure assumes 30 g lead bullets; see Robinson (1941) 418–33, Foss (1975) 25, Richardson (1998) 46–7. Satchel: *An.* 5.2.12.

<sup>60</sup> Sevinç et al. (2001) 398.

also needed melee weapons. As it was with the hoplites, the *machaira* seems to have been a favorite.<sup>61</sup> Together with scabbard, this would add another 1.5 kg (3.3 lb) to a light infantryman's load. The total light infantry battle load, then, ranged from about 4.5 kg (10 lb) for archers and slingers to about 5.5 kg (12.2 lb) for peltasts.

#### CLOTHING AND FOOTWEAR

All soldiers probably wore some version of the classical men's *chiton*, a sleeveless wool or linen tunic reaching to the mid-thigh and often secured with a leather belt.<sup>62</sup> Because men typically wore the *chiton* under their armor to prevent chafing, Xenophon's description of hoplites uniformly attired in red tunics (*chitonas phoinikas*) at Tyriaeum has provoked some discussion.<sup>63</sup> Since tunics might be hard to discern under armor, some argue that the troops were wearing cloaks, with armor underneath.<sup>64</sup> This interpretation, however, unreasonably stretches the meaning of the term *chiton*.<sup>65</sup> Others assert that the Cyreans, for the review at least, were not wearing armor.<sup>66</sup> While it might seem strange for hoplites to parade without a major component of their equipment, Cyrus wanted to impress onlookers, especially the visiting queen Epyaxa.<sup>67</sup> He may have preferred to display a uniform mass of red tunics rather than a mishmash of different *thorakes* and *spolades*.

Less attention has focused on where the troops obtained their red tunics. The best answer is from Cyrus. As we shall see, it is unlikely that the prince could afford to issue the troops arms and armor. The red tunics, however, were another matter. Such garments were inexpensive and did not require

<sup>61</sup> For peltasts with *machairai*, see *An.* 6.1.5; since the Rhodian slingers had begun as hoplites, they too must have had hoplite swords. The peltasts on the Çan sarcophagus also carry swords: Sevinç et al. (2001) 397–9.

<sup>62</sup> *Chiton*: Abrahams and Evans (1964) 45, 69; basic garment: *Mem.* 1.6.2; mid-thigh: implied by *An.* 7.4.4, where Xenophon contrasts the lengths of Cyrean and Thracian clothing. I include in the term “tunic” several variants, including the shorter *chitoniskos* (*An.* 5.4.13) and the *exomis*, which fastened over one shoulder; on these see Anderson (1970) 24–6, Sekunda (1994) 176–8.

<sup>63</sup> Under their armor: *Hell.* 2.4.19, *An.* 5.2.15, Anderson (1970) 24. Most likely the red tunics were colored with insect or vegetable dye rather than the famous and costly purple of the mollusc *Murex* and its cousins; I translate *phoinikis* as “red” rather than “purple” or “crimson” to avoid connotations of status and price. On varieties and costs of dye, see Barber (1991) 228–33 and Forbes (1956) 100–8.

<sup>64</sup> Whitby (2004) 219; cf. Lazenby (1985) 32.

<sup>65</sup> Xenophon's other references (*An.* 1.5.8, 5.2.15, 7.4.4, *Cyr.* 1.3.2, *Mem.* 2.7.5) to the *chiton* and its cousin the *chitoniskos* indicate an inner garment rather than a cloak. Cloaks would also be inappropriate for troops in battle order; cf. *An.* 4.3.17.

<sup>66</sup> Anderson (1970) 26–7.

<sup>67</sup> On Epyaxa see *An.* 1.2.12, 1.2.18, Lendle (1995) 19–20, Dillery (2001) 60–1.

individual fitting. Providing his soldiers with a uniform or livery would help Cyrus mark the soldiers as his. It might also instill a stronger sense of unity across contingents, and it had the great practical value of making the troops recognizable from a distance or in the dust of battle. There is even some direct evidence for provision of clothing by Persian officials in Asia Minor to Greek troops: in 410 BC, the satrap Pharnabazus distributed cloaks to the Peloponnesian survivors of the battle of Cyzicus.<sup>68</sup>

Since Cyrus' quartermasters made their purchases in Asia Minor, they may have issued tunics of Ionian pattern, like the "Oriental" types popular during the fifth and fourth centuries.<sup>69</sup> Long flowing garments of this sort, some of them sleeved, are worn by hoplites on the Xanthus and Trysa reliefs as well as by peltasts on the Çan sarcophagus; perhaps Cyrean tunics resembled these.<sup>70</sup> As for the red hue, some read it as an attempt to make the troops look like Spartans, but Xenophon says nothing of the sort.<sup>71</sup> He does associate Persian soldiers and nobles with the color, suggesting that Cyrus hoped to evoke not so much Lacedaemonian fashions as Achaemenid royal ones.<sup>72</sup>

Each mercenary, then, may have begun with at least two tunics: the new red one, and the one he had worn upon enlisting. Although tunics were light, perhaps less than 1 kg (2.2 lb) per garment, more than a few extras would have been bulky and inconvenient.<sup>73</sup> Officers with pack animals or servants were more likely to bring additional clothing. Xenophon, for instance, donned his finest raiment in preparation for his inspirational speech after the seizure of the generals, but he must have been atypical in having sets of clothes appropriate for different occasions.<sup>74</sup> If Cyrus had intended the red tunic as a parade uniform, for most soldiers it would also serve as campaign dress, as was the practice in many European armies into the twentieth century.

Tunics were not the only Cyrean clothing. Underwear, in the form of triangular fabric loincloths, was probably more widely worn than art or literature would suggest.<sup>75</sup> The men also had over-garments, like the *chlamys*, a wool traveler's cloak that pinned around the neck. There was no standard pattern to these, although some Arcadians perhaps preferred the wraparound, almost ankle-length types seen on Arcadian bronze statuettes

<sup>68</sup> *Hell.* 1.1.24. <sup>69</sup> Miller (1997) 165–6.

<sup>70</sup> Childs (1978) 13–14, Childs and Demargne (1989) 311–13, Sevinç et al. (2001) 398–9.

<sup>71</sup> Look like Spartans: Anderson (1970) 39, Hodkinson (2000) 233.

<sup>72</sup> *An.* 1.2.20, *Cyr.* 6.4.1; cf. *Hdt.* 7.6.1.

<sup>73</sup> Reconstructed Roman legionary tunics weigh about 0.5–0.6 kg in linen and 1.1–1.2 kg in wool; see Junkelmann (1986) 155.

<sup>74</sup> *An.* 3.2.7. <sup>75</sup> Granger-Taylor (2003) 497; cf. Webster (1998) 121.

of the sixth and fifth centuries.<sup>76</sup> Intriguingly, Clearchus' Thracian peltasts apparently did not wear the distinctive heavy cloak (*zeira*) of their homeland, for Xenophon would not have displayed such intense curiosity about the Thracian cloaks he saw during winter 400–399 if similar garments had all along been familiar sights in the army.<sup>77</sup>

Whatever their design, cloaks were large enough for a soldier to wrap up in for warmth, as well as capacious enough to serve as his burial shroud.<sup>78</sup> Reconstructions of the Roman legionary cloak weigh just over 2 kg (4.4 lb); this will do as an approximation for the roughly comparable Cyrean version.<sup>79</sup> Because cloaks restricted movement, soldiers usually removed them before battle. At the Centrites River, for example, Cheirisophus “removed his cloak and took up his arms, giving orders to everyone else to do likewise.”<sup>80</sup> Cheirisophus, of course, had an orderly present to take charge of his cloak. Ordinary soldiers had to leave them with *suskenoi* who stayed out of battle line.

Cloaks could also serve as bedding. Since the Cyreans initially expected a spring campaign in upland Pisidia, they may have set out with a modicum of extra blankets. Whatever they did not discard on the way into Mesopotamia probably got burnt with the excess baggage after the seizure of the generals.<sup>81</sup> Thereafter the soldiers relied on cloaks to keep warm while sleeping, though they might also use plaited mats (*stibades*) to cushion and insulate against bare ground.<sup>82</sup> These were light enough – a kilogram or so – to roll up and pack along. The Myrina figurine, for instance, carries a rolled mat or blanket, held together by two tightened cords and strapped to his back. Others may have preferred to make fresh mats at every camp.<sup>83</sup>

According to Lacedaemonian lore, Lycurgus decreed that Spartiates from youth go barefoot, the better to harden their feet.<sup>84</sup> Whether or not Clearchus, Cheirisophus, and their countrymen in the army followed this custom is unknown, but the majority of Cyreans at any rate probably sported footwear such as *krepides*, thick leather sandals with crisscross lacing. To reduce wear, these often boasted metal-plated or hobnailed soles.<sup>85</sup> Like the very similar Roman army *caligae*, such sandals were probably

<sup>76</sup> Lamb (1925–6) 134; cf. Richter (1944) 5. <sup>77</sup> *An.* 7.4.4. <sup>78</sup> *An.* 4.5.19, Plut. *Lyc.* 27.1.

<sup>79</sup> Junkelmann (1986) 157. <sup>80</sup> *An.* 4.3.17.

<sup>81</sup> Although the Cyreans could have used the extra bedding in Anatolia, Xenophon would later insist (*Cyr.* 6.2.30) that extra food is better than heavy blankets.

<sup>82</sup> Such mats were also useful as seats for dining: *An.* 6.1.4.

<sup>83</sup> For soldiers improvising *stibades* see *Hell.* 7.2.2. <sup>84</sup> *Lac.* 2.1–3.

<sup>85</sup> Pottier (1887) 157–60, Pritchett (1956) 208–9, Morrow (1985) 178–80, Jarva (1995) 106–9; cf. Bryant (1899) 57–102.

comfortable, light (about 1 kg a pair), and quick drying.<sup>86</sup> Like *caligae*, however, *krepides* required several minutes to lace up completely. The moisture of marching feet inevitably stretched the leather, so laces had to be pulled very tightly and periodically readjusted on the march.<sup>87</sup>

While vase paintings sometimes depict stockings worn under laced sandals, the Cyreans would have had little need for foot coverings until reaching Carduchia.<sup>88</sup> As they went deeper into Anatolia and temperatures dropped, they may have improvised foot wrappings, perhaps winding strips of cloth around their feet and up their legs like Soviet soldiers during the Second World War. If such wrappings could be worn over greaves, so much the better; otherwise, the need to wrap feet and legs for warmth may have compelled troops to discard their greaves.

A basic set of Cyrean clothing, then, might comprise two tunics, a cloak, sandals, and sleeping mat, for a total of some 5 kg (11 lb). This about doubled the burden of light troops, to around 9.5–10.5 kg (21–23 lb). For the average hoplite, adding clothing and footwear pushed the total load to around 21 kg (46.3 lb). Troops could shed weight before combat by entrusting cloaks and spare clothing to *suskenoi* who stayed out of battle line or by caching possessions in a safe place. They always, though, had to balance the desire to fight light against the danger that their baggage guardians might be overwhelmed or that they might not be able to retrieve dropped gear.

#### COOKING GEAR

The Spartans are sometimes alleged to have used a special campaign cup, the *kothon*, but the term probably connotes a general class of vessels rather than a specific shape.<sup>89</sup> Otherwise, there is no classical evidence for standardized military mess gear, and the Cyreans must have carried a wide range of cookware brought from home, bought in Ionia, or “liberated” along the way.<sup>90</sup>

Each soldier could easily carry a personal mess kit, perhaps no more than a drinking cup, spit, and small bowl.<sup>91</sup> About 1 kg (2.2 lb) is a generous estimate for these basics. Large cooking vessels included deep cauldrons

<sup>86</sup> Jarva (1995) 137, Junkelmann (1986) 161, 197.

<sup>87</sup> Junkelmann (1986) 159; for laces cf. Morrow (1985). <sup>88</sup> Jarva (1995) 109.

<sup>89</sup> Sparkes and Talcott (1970) 70, *pace* Davidson (1997) 66.

<sup>90</sup> For the types of cookware Cyreans might have carried see Sparkes (1962), Sparkes (1965), Sparkes and Talcott (1970), Rotroff and Oakley (1992), Berlin and Lynch (2002).

<sup>91</sup> Plates were rare in Greek households until the end of the fifth century BC, so soldiers probably ate with their hands, perhaps using bread in place of a plate: Sapouna Sakellarakis et al. (2002) 96. For basic mess kits, cf. Appian 6.85.

(*chytrai*) and shallower pans (*lopades*). Mostly these were coarse kitchen ceramics, tough, relatively watertight, and fire-resistant.<sup>92</sup> Bronze vessels would have been more durable, and wealthier *suskenoi* may have had them, but they were likely not commonplace.<sup>93</sup> *Chytrai* were widespread in the army, judging from Xenophon's description of the soldiers boiling meat the day after Cunaxa.<sup>94</sup> A *chytra* large enough to serve four to six people might weigh about 1.3 kg (nearly 3 lb).<sup>95</sup> With a diameter of about 25 cm (9.5 inches) and a height of about 20 cm (8.25 inches) it would have been awkward to carry. Wealthier *suskeniai* could hand over bulky cooking vessels to slave servants or load them onto pack animals, but for most the solution was probably to take turns lugging large items. Well-appointed groups at the outset might also have possessed other utensils, including portable braziers, griddles, ladles, strainers, graters, and mixing bowls. Most or all such extras went into the fire, along with the wagons and tents, before the army began its fighting retreat up the Tigris.

Mess equipment was useless without comestibles and fuel. "Report with three days' rations" – each ration comprising about a kilogram – was the instruction for Athenian citizen hoplites, but the amount the Cyreans carried varied depending on their circumstances.<sup>96</sup> On the way to Cunaxa, with markets or settlements readily available, the soldiers probably tried to keep their weight of foodstuffs low. Before difficult passages, for example on the Euphrates between Corsote and Pylae, they might load up with provisions for a week or more. After Cunaxa, and especially after the seizure of the generals, probably the usual pattern was for troops to carry as much food as they could, for they never knew when they might run across the next supply source. A daily water or wine ration of two liters would add an additional 2 kg (4.4 lb) to a soldier's burden. Because they traveled well-watered territory, probably the Cyreans carried no more than a single day's ration. An exception that shows normal practice appears in the Arcadian–Achaean secession episode. Surrounded by angry natives and cut off from nearby streams, the Arcadians and Achaeans ran low on water after a single day, suggesting that they had not carried any reserve.<sup>97</sup> Finally, each man needed at least a kilogram of firewood daily; as with food, the amount of fuel Cyreans carried depended on the situation.<sup>98</sup>

<sup>92</sup> Sparkes (1962) 123–6.

<sup>93</sup> Sparkes and Talcott (1970) 32, 38–9, 46. For bronze as a mark of prosperity see Ar. *Plut.* 812, Amyx (1958) 211–12.

<sup>94</sup> *An.* 2.1.7.

<sup>95</sup> Sparkes and Talcott (1970) 371 and pl. 93 (no. 1926); for more on this *chytra* see Chapter Eight.

<sup>96</sup> Ar. *Pax* 1183, Thuc. 1.48.1; Foxhall and Forbes (1982) 51–7. <sup>97</sup> *An.* 6.3.8.

<sup>98</sup> See Chapter Eight for more on cooking fuel.



## TENTS AND SHELTERS

Because the Cyreans initially believed they would be operating in Pisidia, where spring was rainy and cool, both officers and men started the expedition with tents (*skenai*).<sup>99</sup> The troops retained their tents even after the army swung toward Mesopotamia, both for warmth at night and to shade against the intense desert sun on the Euphrates passage.<sup>100</sup> They finally discarded them almost two months after Cunaxa, before commencing their fighting retreat up the Tigris.<sup>101</sup> Thereafter the army, except when able to quarter in native settlements, slept under open sky.

Xenophon criticizes the army's tents as a bother to carry, but otherwise gives no specifics on their construction; archaeology and art history are not much help.<sup>102</sup> One clue does emerge from events on the advance down the Euphrates valley. To obtain provisions from Charmande on the opposite bank of the river, troopers improvised rafts by stuffing leather panels (*stegasmata*) with hay and sewing the panel edges together.<sup>103</sup> The reference to *stegasmata* suggests that some Cyrean tents consisted of separate leather panels, perhaps along the lines of the Roman army's standard eight-man tent, the *papilio*. Panel construction made the *papilio* convenient to transport despite its weight – some 28–40 kg (62–88 lb) including ropes, iron poles, and stakes – as well as easy to set up and strike.<sup>104</sup>

Now, Roman tents were of regulation size because they were state issued and designed to fit the tight arrangement of a legionary camp. The Cyreans, in contrast, began as separate contingents without a uniform billeting protocol.<sup>105</sup> For his part, Cyrus is unlikely to have issued tents to troops whom he could barely afford to pay. The mercenaries, therefore, must have employed tents of diverse construction and dimensions. Along with leather-panel models, these likely included lighter canvas or linen versions.<sup>106</sup> For an extremely rough estimate of the per-soldier weight of tentage, consider that the 28–40 kg of the *papilio* sufficed for eight men, meaning 3.5–5 kg (7.7–11 lb) of tent per legionary. Since probably not all Cyreans had leather tents,

<sup>99</sup> *An.* 1.2.17–18, 1.5.12, 2.4.14, 3.2.27.

<sup>100</sup> See Chapter Two for environmental conditions during this portion of the march. <sup>101</sup> *An.* 3.3.1.

<sup>102</sup> While two Attic red-figure vases (*ARV* 1426.23 and *ARV* 406.1, 1451) portray tent-like structures with open sides and material bunched on their peaks in a manner suggestive of rolled flaps, neither appears in a military context.

<sup>103</sup> *An.* 1.5.10, reading *stegasmata* with the majority of the manuscripts; cf. Arr. *Anab.* 1.3.6 and *SIG* 1259.5. The suggestion of van Wees (2004) 107 that *stegasmata* were animal hides used as one-man shelters does not accord with the description (*An.* 3.2.27) of Cyrean tents as bulky and heavy.

<sup>104</sup> On the *papilio* see McIntyre and Richmond (1934), Junkelmann (1986) 207–11, Van Driel-Murray (1991).

<sup>105</sup> For more on bivouacking see Chapter Seven. <sup>106</sup> For linen tents cf. Junkelmann (1986) 208.



and since not all tents had iron poles and stakes, their per-soldier weight may have been perhaps in the neighborhood of 3 kg (6.6 lb). Depending on the construction of their tent, the members of a *suskenia* might split it up into packets for travel, or load it onto a cart or pack mule.

#### TOOLS AND OTHER EQUIPMENT

There were further essentials. The generals, perhaps the *lochagoi* too, needed writing instruments and wax tablets or papyrus for record keeping. Trumpeters had their instruments. Some toted the tools of secondary professions – barber’s shears, dentist’s forceps, cobbler’s awl, carpenter’s hammer and plane.<sup>107</sup> Everyone needed fire-starters, like flint and tinder or fire drill and bow.<sup>108</sup> Axes for chopping wood were apparently common; perhaps each *suskenia* shared one.<sup>109</sup> Although the soldiers conducted several engineering projects, including building bridges in Mesopotamia and constructing a palisade and ditch at Calpe, one suspects that Xenophon’s emphasis in *Cyropaedia* on equipping the perfect army with plentiful shovels, mattocks, axes, sickles, and lumber reflects a paucity of these items in Cyrean reality. Field engineering, anyway, was possible without tools, as the Athenians had demonstrated at Pylos in 425 BC.<sup>110</sup>

#### BOOTY

The Cyreans also carried things out of cupidity. Beautiful garments and drinking vessels, silver bowls (*phialai*), bronze rings, and expensive Persian carpets were amongst the booty the soldiers acquired along the way.<sup>111</sup> Small, valuable items that fit easily into a knapsack or basket were preferable. Larger prizes, like the silver-footed couches captured from Tiribazus in Armenia, were abandoned or put to more practical use – one imagines the couches becoming ornate firewood after being stripped of their fittings.

Cash too found its way into Cyrean packs, early on as pay and later as plunder. Small amounts of cash were no burden at all. The four months’ wages Cyrus paid at Caÿstru-pedion, for instance, whether disbursed as four Persian darics or in smaller denominations, were negligible additions

<sup>107</sup> Trumpeters: *An.* 1.2.17, 7.4.16; for barbering and dentistry see Chapter [Nine](#) and cf. *Cyr.* 6.2.37.

<sup>108</sup> For more on fire-making see Chapter [Eight](#).

<sup>109</sup> *An.* 1.5.10, 4.8.2, 7.1.17; for shared tools cf. *Cyr.* 6.2.34.

<sup>110</sup> Bridges: *An.* 2.3.10–11; palisade and ditch: 6.5.1; perfect army: *Cyr.* 6.2.34 and cf. *Lac.* 11.2–3; Pylos: *Thuc.* 4.4.2.

<sup>111</sup> *An.* 2.4.27, 4.3.25–6, 4.4.21, 4.7.27, 6.1.4, 7.3.18. Timasion is said (7.3.27) to have gotten his hands on a carpet worth ten minas.

to a man's load.<sup>112</sup> Larger amounts – such as the 10 minas (about three years' pay for a common soldier) that the generals Philesius, Sophaenetos, and Xanthicles were each fined at Cotyora – are more likely to have been carried on pack animals.<sup>113</sup> The experience of the Ambraciot *mantis* Silanus provides an extreme example of the carrying of cash. Two weeks before Cunaxa, Silanus foretold that Artaxerxes would not fight within ten days. Cyrus promised a reward of ten talents, or 3,000 gold darics, if the prediction came true, and on the eleventh day duly paid Silanus his money – as it turned out, the battle came to pass just three days after that. Xenophon recounts that Silanus made it to Trapezus with cash in hand, and that he eventually left the army at Heraclea, presumably still possessing his reward.<sup>114</sup> At about 8.35 grams a daric, Silanus' prize would have weighed some 25 kg (55 lb).<sup>115</sup>

#### PACKS, BAGS, AND CONTAINERS

Supplies, gear, and plunder required containers, but the Cyreans almost certainly possessed no standard load-bearing equipment. Rather, they made do with a *mélange* of containers adopted from domestic use or requisitioned along the way. Xenophon describes the soldiers using various bags and vessels, but never rucksacks or backpacks.<sup>116</sup> As in the Roman army, each soldier may have carried a cluster of smaller containers rather than a single large pack.<sup>117</sup> Baskets probably figured prominently amongst the Cyreans. Light and durable, these also cushioned fragile items like pottery. If they did not arrive in the army with baskets, soldiers could make them in the field, much as they plaited reed sleeping mats.<sup>118</sup> Though the typology of classical Greek basketry is often obscure, one wicker vessel that shows up regularly in military contexts is the *gylion*, a lidded pail about the size of a large modern lunchbox.<sup>119</sup> Such a container might fit a day or two's rations, plus cup and other small utensils. Suspended across the body on a leather strap, either under a slung shield or close to the chest, a *gylion* or its equivalent was convenient and comfortable to carry.<sup>120</sup>

<sup>112</sup> *An.* 1.2.12, 1.3.21.

<sup>113</sup> *An.* 5.8.10. At the time they were fined, Xanthicles and Sophaenetos were in charge of the army's ships (5.3.1), which would have greatly facilitated their transporting large sums of cash.

<sup>114</sup> *An.* 1.8.18–20, 5.6.18, 6.4.13.

<sup>115</sup> Pryce et al. (2003) 1621.

<sup>116</sup> *An.* 6.4.24.

<sup>117</sup> Fuentes (1991) 81.

<sup>118</sup> For soldiers making wickerwork see *Hell.* 2.4.25.

<sup>119</sup> *Ar. Ach.* 1097, 1138, *Ath.* 6.18.26, 11.47.9, Philemon fr. 35 Kock; for visual representations of the *gylion* see Cagnat (1911) 1063, Thompson (1952) 161. On basket typology see Amyx (1958) 264–75.

<sup>120</sup> Aristophanes (*Ach.* 1135–9) has the general Lamachus carry his own *gylion*, while handing off his shield and bedding to a servant. Terracottas of travelers and soldiers commonly carry baskets slung across the chest; see Thompson (1952) 161 and Webster (1960) 266, 280.

The ration pail's natural companion was a canteen.<sup>121</sup> The Myrina figurine apparently sports a round canteen or flask on his left hip, similar in shape to terracotta Hellenistic vessels from the Athenian Agora. Some of the latter may have held three liters (3.2 quarts) or more, a generous amount compared with modern US Army canteens of 0.95–1.9 liter (1–2 quart) capacity.<sup>122</sup> So far, however, there exists no clear evidence for classical ceramic or metal canteens.<sup>123</sup> Instead, the Cyreans seem commonly to have carried their beverages in leather skins (*askoi*) or possibly gourds.<sup>124</sup>

There were several carrying options for clothing and non-breakables. One was to roll items into a blanket or cloak, then fasten it around the body. Such rolls were familiar enough in late classical times to be rendered in terracotta miniature.<sup>125</sup> If slung across a shoulder, however, a blanket roll might overheat and overweigh one side of the body.<sup>126</sup> A better technique was to fit the roll with shoulder straps. The Myrina figurine seems to carry a roll or bag strapped high on his back in this fashion, with cooking bowls or perhaps a helmet fastened to one end. In cold weather, though, men had to wear their cloaks, so as the march progressed many must have turned to fitting cloth or leather bags with straps for use as backpacks.

Large cooking vessels like *chytrai* would not fit into a roll or sack, and may simply have hung around soldiers' bodies on straps. Indeed, in a world without zippers, buttons, or snaps, straps were the simplest and most reliable way for a soldier to secure just about anything to his person. Leather or fabric straps, perhaps twisted plant fiber too, could bundle everything from spears and javelins to foraged wood and extra clothing; leather straps could even hold pontoon bridges together. Little wonder Xenophon said an army could never have too many straps.<sup>127</sup>

Rather than festoon themselves with multiple straps, some Cyreans slung their baggage on shoulder sticks or poles, like the Roman army's forked

<sup>121</sup> Some fourth-century figurines show the canteen carried with a *gylion* on the chest; see Thompson (1952) 161.

<sup>122</sup> For the Agora canteens see Rotroff (1997) 183–7, 358–9.

<sup>123</sup> Freyer-Schauenberg (1988) 117–18 and Sekunda (2000) 19 identify a fourth-century BC round ceramic vessel, now in Kiel, as a canteen. Despite its striking resemblance to a modern canteen, this vessel probably held somewhat less than 210 ml (6.8 fl oz, or about half a modern soft drink can) and is unlikely to have been a water container. The pilgrim flask from the Thespian polyandron of 424 BC, suggested by Schilardi (1977) 422–3 as a water container, has a capacity of only about 100 ml (3.4 fl oz). Both these vessels were probably for oil. The flasks in Sapouna Sakellarakis et al. (2002) 95 are too fragmentary to allow any capacity estimates.

<sup>124</sup> *Askois*: An. 6.4.24; gourds: Rotroff (1997) 184. The Romans preferred wood containers, leather being considered prone to cracking: Roth (1999) 122.

<sup>125</sup> Thompson (1952) 151. <sup>126</sup> Farrow (2000) 131.

<sup>127</sup> An. 3.5.10–11; Cyr. 6.2.32–4; cf. Eq. mag. 8.4.

*furca*.<sup>128</sup> Xenophon describes troops using carrying poles (*doratia*) during Neon's foraging expedition at Calpe, and there is no reason they could not have done the same throughout the march.<sup>129</sup> Hoplites or peltasts could easily press spears or bundled javelins into carrying duty; other light troops no doubt found serviceable equivalents. Aside from greater ease in carrying, one advantage of slinging items this way was speed of removal: when danger threatened, it was far easier to let gear slide off your spear than to untangle a mass of straps.

#### TOTAL BURDEN OF EQUIPMENT

The average Cyrean, then, started the campaign with up to 10 kg (22 lb) of non-combat gear, including basic mess kit (1 kg), a couple days' rations (1–2 kg), a day's water (2 kg), a portion of tentage (3 kg), a shared *suskenia* item like an axe or *chytra* (1 kg), and miscellaneous personal effects (1 kg). For a light infantryman with 10 kg of clothing and weapons, this meant a total burden of up to 20 kg (44 lb); for a hoplite already bearing about 21 kg, the load was 31 kg (68 lb). The actual weight a man carried, of course, depended on his circumstances. Too, the range of gear carried changed over the course of the campaign. After discarding tents and non-essentials in Mesopotamia, for instance, troops probably carried more clothing, food, and booty instead. Overall, though, a typical hoplite burden of 31 kg is comparable to that carried by Alexander's Macedonians, Roman Imperial legionaries, and soldiers in several modern armies.<sup>130</sup>

#### SOURCES OF EQUIPMENT

Xenophon's emphasis on uniformity at the Tyriaeum review has prompted claims that Cyrus supplied his troops' equipment, but this seems unlikely.<sup>131</sup>

<sup>128</sup> Junkelmann (1986) 225, Fuentes (1991) 81–2. Field tests reveal that slung items travel best when placed directly on the shoulder rather than high in the air as depicted on Trajan's Column; only slight pressure on the front of the *furca* is then required to maintain balance.

<sup>129</sup> *An.* 6.4.23. By juxtaposing *doratia* with wineskins, bags, and other vessels, Xenophon highlights their carrying function; elsewhere (*Hell.* 4.5.52, *Eq.* 8.10) *doratia* are javelins.

<sup>130</sup> Engels (1978) 17 (80 lb or 36.3 kg for Macedonians); Junkelmann (1986) 199 (43 kg for Roman legionaries); Fuentes (1991) 89 (about 29 kg for legionaries and 27 kg for British Royal Marines); United States Army (1990) 5–4 (recommended load of 72 lb or 33 kg).

<sup>131</sup> McKechnie (1989) 81–2. That the Milesian exiles presented themselves under arms to Cyrus at Sardis (*An.* 1.2.2) cannot mean that they were the *only* ones to do so; on 2.5.38 see Whitehead (1991) 107. Roy (1967) assumed that Arcadia and Achaea were too poor to equip thousands of hoplites, but his recent research revises this assumption: see Roy (1999) 324–7, Roy (2001) 264–72, and cf. Morgan (2001) 35–7.

Arming thousands of hoplites would have posed a severe financial strain on Cyrus, who was chronically short of cash.<sup>132</sup> Even if he could have afforded it, he must have preferred to enlist men whose possession of the proper arms gave proof of their skills. Besides, it would have been difficult or impossible for a Persian prince to obtain appropriate arms for specialists like the Cretan archers and Thracian peltasts.<sup>133</sup> Finally, the thousands of mercenaries on active service elsewhere before joining Cyrus – Clearchus' men in Thrace and Menon's in Thessaly, for example – already had the tools of their trades.

Although Cyrus did not arm his hoplites, some issuance of weapons may have occurred at the *lochos* level. *Lochagoi* hoping to attract quality recruits and foster their loyalty, for example, might invest in a small stock of weapons to distribute as recruiting inducements.<sup>134</sup> Xenophon's assertion that some of the men who joined Cyrus spent their own money on the venture possibly reflects this practice.<sup>135</sup> During his time in Asia Minor, the Spartan king Agesilaus awarded prizes to mercenary commanders who furnished the best-equipped units, perhaps suggesting that officers had some influence on the quality of their men's arms.<sup>136</sup> Whatever low-level arms issue did occur, most Cyreans, like classical mercenaries generally, provided their own equipment.<sup>137</sup> For hoplites at the end of the fifth century, this meant spending 60–100 drachmas, or about two to three months' pay.<sup>138</sup>

#### MAINTENANCE, REPAIR, AND REPLACEMENT

While the troops looked splendid at Tyriaeum, things did not stay that way. In battle, spear shafts and sword blades were shattered or cracked, helmets and breastplates dented or gouged, leather corslets pierced or mangled. From Cunaxa onward, combat was so frequent that there must have been few hoplites who had not at some point broken or lost a weapon. Xenophon himself lost his shield in battle, and he was not the only one.<sup>139</sup> Light troops had other problems. Discharged arrows and sling bullets were usually impossible to recycle. Javelins were perhaps easier to recover, if their slender shafts did not break. Outside battle, terrain robbed men of their gear. The swift-flowing Centrites River, for instance, snatched away the shields of several hoplite scouts.<sup>140</sup> The gradual wear and tear of marching was equally

<sup>132</sup> For Cyrus' cash shortages, see e.g. *An.* 1.2.12. <sup>133</sup> Whitehead (1991) 111–12.

<sup>134</sup> For the purchase of weapons at recruiting points, cf. *Hell.* 3.4.17 and Morgan (2001) 26–7.

<sup>135</sup> *An.* 6.4.8. <sup>136</sup> *Hell.* 4.2.5; cf. 3.4.16.

<sup>137</sup> Whitehead (1991) 113.

<sup>138</sup> Jarva (1995) 152–3, Hanson (1999) 291–2.

<sup>139</sup> *An.* 4.2.20–1; cf. 4.2.17 and Thuc. 7.45.

<sup>140</sup> *An.* 4.3.6.

damaging. Judging from the experience of Roman re-enactment groups, rain, snow, and sweat would cause metal to corrode and rust.<sup>141</sup> Leather, wood, and fabric too would weaken and eventually fail under the stress of constant use and prolonged dampness.

Maintaining combat equipment was therefore a constant concern. Some things were amenable to field repair. Leather or fabric corslets, for example, could be patched and mended. With rawhide strips and ingenuity, cracked spear shafts could, temporarily at least, be lashed together. The Cretan archers certainly found ways to keep their bows in action, perhaps even fashioning arrows en route using foraged reeds and fletching.<sup>142</sup> Metal arms and armor were tougher to maintain. Regular cleaning and oiling kept blades sharp and rust-free, but it took a skilled smith with good tools and a forge to mend bronze or iron.<sup>143</sup> Probably some Cyreans had the skills, but they could not carry hammer and anvil along on the march. So damaged metal items must have remained in use as long as possible, being discarded only when completely unserviceable. The best craftsmen in the world, though, could not keep the Cyreans in fighting trim through repairs alone.

In a famous verse, the poet Archilochus shrugged off the battlefield loss of his shield by commenting that he could buy another. The Spartans, so the story goes, ran him out of town upon hearing the verse.<sup>144</sup> Most classical hoplites would have shared Archilochus' premise: that purchasing replacement equipment was easy. *Polis* soldiers typically had convenient access to marketplaces and arms bazaars.<sup>145</sup> The Cyreans, though, did not. The merchants who accompanied the army before Cunaxa may have included some arms amongst their wares, and on the Black Sea coast there were perhaps limited opportunities to purchase arms in the marketplaces of Greek cities. Otherwise, the army possessed no external source of battle gear. This left the Cyreans three options: carry replacement arms and armor from the outset, salvage it from comrades, or take it from the enemy.

The first option seems least likely. Someone had to pay for reserve equipment, and if Cyrus did not issue arms and armor in the first place, he is hardly likely to have provided spares. The generals could have laid in stocks for their contingents, but with everyone initially expecting a short campaign, it is doubtful they took the trouble. Furthermore, transporting centralized stores of combat equipment was difficult. While sheaves of arrows

<sup>141</sup> Croom (2000) 129, 132–3.

<sup>142</sup> McLeod (1984) 204–5, Hom. *Od.* 21.176–80; Miller et al. (1986) 88–9.

<sup>143</sup> Cleaning and oiling: *Cyr.* 6.2.32–3. Repairing armor: Shefton (1969–70) 54.

<sup>144</sup> Archil. 5, Plut. *Mor.* 239b. <sup>145</sup> *Hell.* 3.4.17, Aen. *Tact.* 30.1–2.

or bundles of javelins, spears, or swords might make manageable parcels, hoplite shields would not. A soldier might carry a few on his back, but then he was of no use for anything else; probably no more than eight or ten could be strapped unstably to a donkey or mule. While greaves were readily portable, corslets and helmets were not; again, perhaps a few sets of armor might fit onto a pack animal.

The ideal means of transporting arms and armor was on wheels, and whatever spares the army had before Cunaxa, it most likely carried them in wagons or carts. When the Cyreans burned these after the seizure of the generals, the bulk of the extra arms and armor likely also went into the fire.<sup>146</sup> Whatever got shared out among the troops could not have been enough to meet the army's needs for the next year and a half.

Salvage also had its problems. Since roughly half the Cyreans who began the expedition died or deserted along the way, it might seem there was a surplus of arms and armor for the survivors. Salvage, however, was no simple task. Sometimes weapons and shields lay strewn where fleeing or wounded soldiers dropped them.<sup>147</sup> Other times, the bodies of the fallen were either unrecoverable or were stripped by the enemy before the Cyreans could reach them.<sup>148</sup> Troops who left the army invariably took their arms along rather than stacking them neatly for reissue.<sup>149</sup>

When a man did fall in a manner that permitted recovery of his arms and armor, the items most likely remained with his *suskenoi* or whoever else had salvaged them.<sup>150</sup> Over time, this equipment would have accumulated haphazardly across the army, with the result that while the Cyreans probably did come to possess a certain amount of spare combat gear, it never took the form of a centralized reserve. It was much easier to transport spare arms and armor spread across the army's *suskeniai* in this fashion, a shield or two here, some spears there, and so on. Whatever the Cyreans could not carry, they probably buried, burned, or scattered – in the manner of retreating armies throughout history – to prevent enemy troops from capturing it.

Exacerbating the difficulties of salvage and transportation was the issue of proper sizing: a soldier could not simply pick up any helmet or cuirass and expect it to fit. While the Athenians in the third century BC produced helmets, corslets, and greaves in at least four standard sizes, no evidence of a similar practice exists for the classical period.<sup>151</sup> A Cyrean seeking new armor probably had to pick through a heap of cuirasses and corslets in hopes of finding one that more or less fit. Leather or linen *spolades* were

<sup>146</sup> *An.* 1.8.20, 3.3.1.

<sup>147</sup> *An.* 4.2.17; cf. Thuc. 7.45.

<sup>148</sup> *An.* 4.1.18–19, 6.4.9.

<sup>149</sup> *An.* 7.2.3, 7.2.11.

<sup>150</sup> *An.* 3.4.32–3.

<sup>151</sup> Kroll (1977) 143.

perhaps more sought after, as they could be field-modified to fit their new wearer. At least with hoplite shields pretty much one size fit all.<sup>152</sup>

The third option was captured battle gear. Here the light infantry had great success. The slingers, for instance, used the lead and gut they came upon early in the retreat up the Tigris valley to cast lead bullets and twine new slings. They exhausted this lead supply before reaching Trapezus, for Xenophon subsequently describes them employing stone projectiles.<sup>153</sup> Because Persian and Cretan bows were of similar design, the Cretan archers were able to collect and reuse Persian arrows.<sup>154</sup> In some cases, captured ammunition found creative reuse. The peltasts, for example, converted oversize Carduchian arrows into javelins, fitting them with thongs for greater throwing force.<sup>155</sup>

Xenophon says nothing about hoplites using captured weapons, but probably they emulated the light infantry. Spears, of all the diverse types the Cyreans encountered, could enter hoplite service without much trouble. Even the fifteen-cubit lances of the Chalybians could be cut down to manageable size.<sup>156</sup> Exotic weapons such as Persian axes probably found their way onto a few Cyrean belts more for trophy value than practicality, much as a modern soldier might brandish a “liberated” foreign pistol.<sup>157</sup> Enemy shields were less valuable, as a hoplite carrying a shield of non-hoplite pattern could not really fight effectively in phalanx formation. So the troops burned or slashed the wicker and hide shields they laid hands on, often to prevent their recapture by the enemy.<sup>158</sup>

Through salvage or capture, then, a very limited stock of replacement combat gear was available to the Cyreans. Under such conditions, unsurprisingly, soldiers tended to hold on to their arms and armor with uncommon tenacity. On the way up the Tigris, for example, men lugged the battle gear of wounded *suskenoi* and their stretcher-bearers even at the risk of succumbing to Tissaphernes’ pursuit.<sup>159</sup> During the Armenian blizzard, the exhausted Cyreans who refused Xenophon’s exhortations to resume moving continued to grip their weapons. When enemy troops approached, these invalids still mustered the energy to clash their shields and spears together – evidence that despite illness and desperation they had not forgotten the preciousness of their arms.<sup>160</sup>

<sup>152</sup> Strictly speaking, the size of a hoplite shield could be tailored to the length of its wearer’s arm; see Anderson (1970) 17.

<sup>153</sup> Lead and gut: *An.* 3.4.17; cf. Briant (2002) 1037–8, Tuplin (2004a) 171; stone projectiles: *An.* 5.2.12.

<sup>154</sup> *An.* 3.4.17.

<sup>155</sup> *An.* 4.2.28; for throwing thongs (*ankulai*) see Harris (1963) 30.

<sup>156</sup> *An.* 4.7.16.

<sup>157</sup> *An.* 4.4.16–17.

<sup>158</sup> *An.* 4.6.25, 4.7.23.

<sup>159</sup> *An.* 3.4.32–3.

<sup>160</sup> *An.* 4.5.18.



Non-combat equipment too required maintenance, repair, and replacement. Cyreans could easily wash underwear, tunics, and cloaks in the many watercourses they encountered, using soapwort, wood ash, or urine as detergent.<sup>161</sup> In warm weather, especially when the army paused for several days, they could hang their clothes out to dry. Otherwise men might have to march with damp laundry draped around their necks or stretched over their slung shields.

Clean and dry garments became crucial to survival as the march progressed into Anatolia. Wearing damp or sweaty clothes in winter, for example, invited hypothermia.<sup>162</sup> The mercenaries, though, had expected only a brief spring campaign. By the time they reached rainy Carduchia, they were probably layering everything they owned for warmth. Not surprisingly, then, men scavenged extra garments wherever they could. The two soldiers who discovered the unguarded ford at the Centrites River, for example, made sure to take the cloaks they had witnessed natives caching nearby before reporting back to Xenophon.<sup>163</sup> Once acquired, the scavenging habit persisted even in warm weather: at Cotyora in summer 400, the Thessalian Boiscus gained notoriety for stripping the locals of their attire.<sup>164</sup> Conversely, the loss of clothing stood high enough in Xenophon's mind to warrant explicit mention. Describing a surprise Thynian night attack against a Cyrean detachment in winter 400–399, for example, he pointedly notes that while no one was killed, some lost clothes and other gear.<sup>165</sup>

With their mishmash of clothing acquired along the way from Cunaxa to the sea, the Cyrean survivors who stood in ranks for review at Cerasus in spring 400 must have looked a far cry from the previous year's uniformity at Tyriacum. One imagines that as the generals surveyed the ranks, their eyes met a patchwork of faded and tattered red tunics, supplemented by a wild assortment of Persian robes, Carduchian cloaks, and makeshift vests of hide and fur. If Xenophon again broke out his finest raiment for this review, it too must have been worn and threadbare.

The march took a severe toll on the Cyreans' footwear. While they lasted, sandals and boots could be cleaned with sponges and water.<sup>166</sup> Shoe polish had apparently not yet been invented, so at least the troops evaded that

<sup>161</sup> On detergents in antiquity see Forbes (1956) 82–4, Bradley (2002) 30–1. Soapwort (*Saponaria officinalis*) today grows wild throughout Turkey, where it was until recently much cultivated as a soap substitute: Davis et al. (1967) 141–2; for soapwort in Iraq see Rechingier (1964) 246.

<sup>162</sup> On spare clothing cf. *Cyr.* 6.2.30. For more on hypothermia and other cold injuries, see Chapter Nine.

<sup>163</sup> *An.* 4.3.12.

<sup>164</sup> *An.* 5.8.23.

<sup>165</sup> *An.* 7.4.19.

<sup>166</sup> Bryant (1899) 92.

bane of military existence, polishing shoes. What they could not avoid was the death of their footwear. Hobnailed sandals probably had an effective life of around 1,000 km (620 miles). Their existence could be prolonged by rotating the hobnails around the sole for more even wear, but eventually the nail heads would grind to nothing and the soles disintegrate. Roman legionaries received “nail money” (*clavarium*) to help maintain their sandals, but the Cyreans got no such stipend.<sup>167</sup> Indeed, Xenophon highlights the mercenaries’ footwear problems during the Armenian blizzard in one of the most physically evocative passages of the *Anabasis*. Whenever men slept with their shoes on, he recounts, “the straps bit into their feet and their shoes froze; and these, since their old footwear had given out, were *karbatinai* made from newly flayed hides.”<sup>168</sup>

*Karbatinai* were rough moccasins that encased the entire foot.<sup>169</sup> No more than awl and knife were required to produce them, although the Cyreans had to use untanned hides – stripped from animals slaughtered for food along the way – because they had no time to cure skins into leather.<sup>170</sup> There must have been men in the army who knew the cobbler’s skills, but even a non-specialist could trick out a pair of *karbatinai* if he had to. A Cyrean fashioning a new pair of shoes might even recall to himself a scene from the *Odyssey*, where Odysseus comes upon his faithful swineherd Eumaeus “fashioning footwear around his soles, cutting the well-colored oxhide.”<sup>171</sup> As with so much else, therefore, the provision of replacement footwear most likely took place at the *suskenia* or *lochos* level – soldiers made shoes for themselves and their comrades, or traded them with others for food or booty.

#### PACK AND DRAFT ANIMALS

The Cyreans did not carry all their gear themselves: hundreds of donkeys, mules, horses, and oxen took part in the campaign. They pulled wagons and carts, staggered under overloaded panniers, endured heat and cold, and in desperate times gave their lives as food. The men probably did their best to take care of their livestock, and close bonds likely developed between

<sup>167</sup> Junkelmann (1986) 158. Junkelmann’s re-enactors wore the nails off their *caligae* after about 650 km (400 miles), mostly on modern surfaced roads or rocky trails. Fuentes (1991) 89 suggests Roman soldiers carried spare pairs of *caligae*; some Cyreans may have done likewise.

<sup>168</sup> *An.* 4.5.14; cf. *Hell.* 2.1.1.

<sup>169</sup> Morrow (1985) 179, Hesychius s.v. *karpatinon*, Lucian *Alex.* 39, Longus 2.3.

<sup>170</sup> Shoemakers’ tools: Bryant (1899) 68–9; untanned hides: Humphrey et al. (1998) 367–9.

<sup>171</sup> Hom. *Od.* 14.23.

beasts and handlers.<sup>172</sup> Indeed, Xenophon displays a keen concern for the welfare of the army's animals. He pointedly notes their sufferings during the advance down the Euphrates, when many died for lack of fodder. He relates how animals, like men, succumbed to the cold or fell into enemy hands in Armenia. He even lets them participate in the joyful scene that heralded the arrival at the summit of Mount Theches, rushing forward with the rest of the army to catch sight of the sea.<sup>173</sup>

The primary Cyrean pack animals were donkeys or asses and mules. Stereotypically recalcitrant and stubborn, famed for endurance and hardiness, these loomed large enough in the army's consciousness that Xenophon sometimes resorted to comparing rivals or opponents unfavorably with equids.<sup>174</sup> Ancient and modern writers often fail to distinguish accurately between asses and mules.<sup>175</sup> Xenophon, however, was an experienced equid handler and breeder.<sup>176</sup> His mention of both donkeys and mules in the army, therefore, is no mere literary *variatio* but the assessment of an expert.<sup>177</sup>

The Roman army preferred mules, but that was a military institution with vast resources, able to breed and issue state-owned animals in quantity.<sup>178</sup> The Cyreans, in contrast, almost certainly had to bring their own. True, the Persians were famed animal breeders, but since Cyrus could not even pay the troops their wages on time, he was unlikely to have had money for animals.<sup>179</sup> If he went about requisitioning animals before the campaign began, as the Romans were wont to do, he would have run the double risk of alienating his Ionian subjects and telegraphing his preparations. It may even have been Persian military custom for troops to furnish their own mules.<sup>180</sup>

Equids could be expensive, perhaps forcing *suskenoi* to pool their resources to buy one. Donkeys seem to have been cheaper, and may have predominated over mules in a ratio of four to one or so.<sup>181</sup> Arcadia's donkeys were as renowned as its mercenaries, and some Arcadians may have brought donkeys with them from home.<sup>182</sup> The Cyreans did their best to feed, water,

<sup>172</sup> For Greek attitudes toward domestic animals see Bodson (1986) 244–9; for a literary attempt to convey the pack animal's experience see Apul. *Met.* 7.17–19.

<sup>173</sup> Keen concern: *An.* 7.8.6; along Euphrates: 1.5.5; in Armenia: 4.5.4, 4.5.12; at Theches: 4.7.24.

<sup>174</sup> Donkeys and mules: Savory (1979) 4–15; equid comparisons: *An.* 3.1.30, 5.8.3.

<sup>175</sup> Devereux (1965) 29; cf. Caskey and Beazley (1963) 42. <sup>176</sup> *Eq.* 5.6.6, 5.6.8.

<sup>177</sup> Donkeys or asses: *An.* 2.1.6, 2.2.20, 3.5.9, 5.8.3; mule: 5.8.5. The three yokes of mules presented to the Cyreans in Thrace (7.5.2) were probably larger animals bred for pulling wagons or ploughs.

<sup>178</sup> Haldon (1999) 141, Roth (1999) 206.

<sup>179</sup> Persian animal breeding: Hdt. 9.70, *Cyr.* 8.3.14, Briant (2002) 463–5.

<sup>180</sup> Roman requisition: Roth (1999) 205; Persian custom: Briant (2002) 405, 471.

<sup>181</sup> Donkey and mule prices: Segré (1922) 126–7, Dubberstein (1939) 32; four to one: Roth (1999) 205.

<sup>182</sup> Columella *Rust.* 7.1, Roy (1999) 330.

and groom the beasts daily, but starvation on the Euphrates passage, the army's need for food after Cunaxa, and the winter cold of Anatolia slowly whittled away at the ranks of pack animals.<sup>183</sup> To replace these losses troops made off with domestic animals wherever they could, especially in Taochia, where they managed to secure quantities of replacement asses.<sup>184</sup>

While some have judged ox-drawn wagons and carts too slow to keep up with fast-moving ancient armies, the Cyreans in the period before Cunaxa evidently possessed a number of such vehicles.<sup>185</sup> Their ability to match pace with the troops suggests light two-wheeled types rather than heavy four-wheelers. Some were broken up for firewood the day after Cunaxa, with the oxen that had drawn them being slaughtered and eaten. The soldiers burnt the remainder before commencing their fighting retreat up the Tigris.<sup>186</sup>

As with pack animals, Cyrus almost certainly did not issue wagons or carts. What vehicles the army had mostly belonged to generals and *lochagoi*, although a larger, wealthier *suskeniai* might possibly afford a cart and oxen.<sup>187</sup> The prince himself had a complement of wagons to transport his entourage and trappings, but the 400 wagons loaded with wheat flour and wine he is said to have set aside for emergencies were most likely the products of soldiers' wishful thinking.<sup>188</sup> Because animal-drawn vehicles were too cumbersome to manage the mountain tracks of Carduchia and the snows of Anatolia, they did not reappear in the ranks until after the Cyreans reached Trapezus.<sup>189</sup> Along the Euxine coast, however, wagons and carts again came into limited use. At Calpe, for instance, during a period when the army was not traveling long distances on foot, there was at least one ox-drawn wagon in camp.<sup>190</sup> In Thrace, three of the *lochagoi* received yoke oxen as booty.<sup>191</sup>

Finally, there were horses. The only horses accompanying the mercenaries at the outset of the campaign were those of Clearchus' Thracian cavalry, along with the mounts of officers and other individuals.<sup>192</sup> Xenophon

<sup>183</sup> *An.* 1.5.5, 4.5.4, 4.5.12, 2.1.6. <sup>184</sup> *An.* 4.7.14.

<sup>185</sup> Engels (1978) 15–16, Gabriel and Metz (1991) 24; *contra* Burford (1960) 7–11, Hammond (1982) 27–31; before Cunaxa: *An.* 1.7.20.

<sup>186</sup> *An.* 2.1.6–7, 3.2.27–8.

<sup>187</sup> For a general's baggage train see *An.* 1.3.1. For private ownership of a wagon and oxen see *An.* 6.4.22; cf. Pritchett (1956) 255–8 for the price of oxen. A resourceful *lochagos* might use a cart to carry extra rations and gear for his men; on *lochos* reserves of this sort cf. Parke (1933) 108–9 and Anderson (1970) 52.

<sup>188</sup> *An.* 1.5.7–9, 1.10.18, Roy (1967) 311, *pace* Gabrielli (1995); cf. Tuplin (1999) 344–7.

<sup>189</sup> The appearance of *hupozugia* ("animals under the yoke") in several passages (*An.* 3.3.1, 3.3.6, 4.3.15, 4.3.26) led Hammond (1982) to assert the Cyreans retained wheeled transport in Anatolia. Read in context, however, the *hupozugia* in these passages are clearly pack animals, not carts or wagons.

<sup>190</sup> *An.* 6.4.22.

<sup>191</sup> *An.* 7.5.4.

<sup>192</sup> *An.* 1.5.12–13, 1.10.14–15, 3.4.46.

himself brought several horses along, the oldest of which he gave away to a village chieftain in Armenia.<sup>193</sup> The Thracian cavalrymen, too, had arrived in the army with more than one horse apiece, for they abandoned some of their remounts in camp when they deserted after Cunaxa.<sup>194</sup>

The Cyreans acquired additional horses during their march. Already in Mesopotamia some men pressed captured horses into transport duty. There were enough of these that on the way up the Tigris the generals could afford to be picky in selecting horses for their improvised cavalry troop.<sup>195</sup> Later, in western Armenia, the troops seized some twenty horses from the camp of Tiribazus, and in eastern Armenia Xenophon and his officers appropriated for themselves seventeen spirited colts which were reportedly being raised as tribute for Artaxerxes. No mention is made of the fate of Tiribazus' horses – probably each went to whoever managed to grab it first – but of the Armenian colts Xenophon reports taking one for himself and sharing the others with the generals and the rear-guard *lochagoi*.<sup>196</sup>

#### NUMBERS OF ANIMALS AND TRANSPORT CAPACITIES

In the Roman army, each eight-man legionary squad (*contubernium*) was issued its own pack mule.<sup>197</sup> Because the Cyreans had to provide their own transport, their ratio of baggage animals to soldiers was likely much lower.<sup>198</sup> Telling evidence for this conclusion appears in the early stages of the withdrawal up the Tigris, when Tissaphernes' pursuers wounded many Cyreans. To carry these casualties, numerous soldiers had to be taken out of line, with still others leaving ranks to carry the stretcher-bearers' equipment.<sup>199</sup> Even though the army had pressed captured horses into pack service, there were still insufficient animals to carry casualties and gear. Also revealing is the army's apparent inability in Anatolia to carry large amounts of food, even after stopping in well-supplied villages. Two days after stumbling upon Carduchian settlements full of provisions, for example, the Cyreans were already running low on supplies.<sup>200</sup> Something similar happened in eastern Armenia.<sup>201</sup>

Most Cyreans, then, were not as fortunate as Roman legionaries when it came to transport. A plausible guess as to the ratio of animals to soldiers is in the area of one to twenty, and possibly as low as one to thirty. With about

<sup>193</sup> *An.* 3.3.19–20, 4.5.35.

<sup>194</sup> *An.* 2.2.7, 3.3.19–20.

<sup>195</sup> *An.* 3.4.19–20.

<sup>196</sup> *An.* 4.4.21, 4.5.24, 4.5.35.

<sup>197</sup> Junkelmann (1986) 211–12; Breeze (1986–7) 17–18.

<sup>198</sup> The surfeit of animals that slowed the army's progress in Carduchia (*An.* 4.1.12–14) consisted mostly of recently captured cattle, goats, and sheep (3.5.2, 3.5.9–12), rather than baggage animals.

<sup>199</sup> *An.* 3.4.19, 3.4.31–3.

<sup>200</sup> *An.* 4.1.8, 4.1.15.

<sup>201</sup> *An.* 4.6.2–3.

12,000 soldiers in the army at the start of the expedition, this works out to somewhere between 400 and 600 animals.<sup>202</sup> Such numbers would have rendered pack mules and ox carts by no means rare, but also not ubiquitous. *Suskenoi* who possessed a pack animal must have counted themselves fortunate, and like the mule-driving soldier who accused Xenophon, must have been furious when anyone, general or not, tried to commandeer their transport for other purposes.

Although Xenophon was no stranger to the sight of overloaded pack animals – in the *Cyropaedia* he poetically describes donkeys bending like palm trees under their burdens – the average Cyrean donkey or mule likely did not carry as heavy a load as its modern counterpart.<sup>203</sup> Nineteenth- and twentieth-century military manuals, the basis for many transport capacity estimates, deal with purpose-bred, well-fed, and trained animals, using proper saddles and expertly packed loads under ideal conditions.<sup>204</sup> More useful for comparative purposes are figures reflecting battlefield conditions or difficult agrarian circumstances. Mules used by Communist Chinese forces in Korea, for instance, without regular rations and with only the simplest of saddles, reportedly managed loads of about 60–90 kg (130–200 lb). For mules working in rugged terrain during the Greek Civil War of 1946–9, the average load was about 68 kg (150 lb). Studies of donkeys and mules in developing nations, likewise, suggest transport capacities of 80–90 kg (176–200 lb), markedly below those specified in military manuals.<sup>205</sup>

Classical Greeks were well acquainted with the arts of loading animals, and developed several types of wooden-frame packsaddles.<sup>206</sup> These let an animal comfortably carry more weight but were expensive and complicated.<sup>207</sup> A simpler technique was side loading, with twin panniers (*kantelia*) of wicker or leather balanced athwart of an animal and secured with under-belly strapping against sliding or tipping.<sup>208</sup> Although panniers reduced an animal's capacity and could irritate its flanks in rough country, they required only a modicum of skill to handle correctly. The method was so widespread in classical Greece that donkeys and mules were sometimes

<sup>202</sup> Lendle (1995) 203 gives an even lower figure of 250–300 animals in Carduchia.

<sup>203</sup> *Cyr.* 7.5.11.

<sup>204</sup> For estimates based on such manuals see Vigneron (1968) 134–7, Engels (1978) 14–15, Erdkamp (1998) 72–7, Roth (1999) 204–7.

<sup>205</sup> Korea: Shrader (1995) 135–6; Greek Civil War: Shrader (1999) 157 n. 166; developing nations: Goetz (1983) 3–5.

<sup>206</sup> Vigneron (1968) 130–4, 147–9; cf. Dusenbery (1978) 224.

<sup>207</sup> Daly (1917) 15–32, Parrino (1956) 36–44. <sup>208</sup> For belly straps (*desmoi*) see *An.* 3.5.10.

called *kanthelioi*, and was likely the usual Cyrean technique.<sup>209</sup> Panniers were easy to pack and unpack, and provided soldiers who had a donkey or mule a convenient way to transport a miscellany of small items.<sup>210</sup> Captured animals, of course, did not come conveniently fitted with the proper tackle; men wanting to load down a captured beast would have to improvise some means to avoid losing their baggage.<sup>211</sup>

The limits of panniers, plus the effects of harsh weather, rugged terrain, and poor nutrition, probably combined to limit transport capacity to perhaps 80 kg (176 lb) per pack animal. To put this figure in perspective, consider a mule-equipped *suskenia* of ten hoplites. Where food was readily available, the men could load their animal with all their non-combat gear, while they marched carrying only weapons, armor, clothing, and water. Doing so would reduce each hoplite's load by a full 25 percent.<sup>212</sup> Alternatively, a single animal could carry enough rations to sustain the *suskenia* for more than a week.<sup>213</sup> As the march went on, the jettisoning of tents and other non-essentials would allow the men to load more food, firewood, or booty onto their beast. For light carts and wagons, capacities of about 300 kg (660 lb) are probably realistic; this would be enough for a general's gear, or for a *lochos* to share.<sup>214</sup> *Suskenoi* with neither pack animal nor cart had to carry everything on their own backs; although not impossible, this would have been tiring.<sup>215</sup>

#### BAGGAGE ANIMAL ORGANIZATION

The fourth-century Spartan army grouped its baggage animals into a train commanded by special officers; the Macedonians and later the Romans

<sup>209</sup> Ar. *Lys.* 290, Ar. *Vesp.* 170, Xen. *Cyr.* 7.5.11; cf. Isager and Skydsgaard (1992) 88.

<sup>210</sup> In the US West during the nineteenth century, side loading was employed for items such as cooking utensils, food supplies, and bedding: Parrino (1956) 33–4.

<sup>211</sup> For the dangers of lost baggage cf. Thuc. 4.128.4.

<sup>212</sup> Assuming each hoplite divested himself of 8 kg of his 10 kg of non-combat gear (retaining only the 2 kg of water), for a total load of 23 kg rather than 31 kg. That pack animals did not usually carry weapons and armor is evident from the army's disorder the morning of Cunaxa (*An.* 1.7.20); Xenophon notes that men had left their battle gear on animals and carts precisely to highlight the lapse in normal practice.

<sup>213</sup> At 1 kg per man per day, the animal could carry 80 daily rations, or eight days' supply for a *suskenia* of ten.

<sup>214</sup> For a range of capacity estimates see Erdkamp (1998) 72–3, Goe (1983) 14–15, Roth (1999) 211–12. The vehicles Xenophon describes (*Cyr.* 6.1.54) as hauling twenty-five talents (646 kg/1425 lb on the Attic-Euboean standard, or a staggering 945 kg/2083 lb on the Aeginetan standard) apiece were heavy transports for a siege tower, not standard wagons as Gabrielli (1995) thinks.

<sup>215</sup> Physically fit men can carry up to 120 lb (54 kg) for several days at paces of 20 km/day: United States Army (1990) 5.10. A hoplite with 31 kg of equipment could therefore have managed a week's worth of additional provisions, especially since the weight of provisions would decline daily.

would do similarly.<sup>216</sup> The Romans certainly and the Spartans and Macedonians possibly had trained pack animal drivers. If these were as skilled as their modern counterparts, each could handle a pack line of some five donkeys or mules.<sup>217</sup>

The Cyreans too possessed rudimentary mechanisms for controlling their transport. There were, for instance, standard commands to ready the troops for movement: pack up, load baggage, prepare to move out.<sup>218</sup> In Mesopotamia, Clearchus was able to form the army in two parallel columns along a river, the troops marching on the outside and the baggage between them and the watercourse. In Carduchia, the generals several times grouped transport elements together to protect them from enemy assault or facilitate their passage through defiles.<sup>219</sup>

While the generals attempted to keep as many men as possible under arms and to control the quantity of the army's baggage, the soldiers had other ideas.<sup>220</sup> A permanent, centralized baggage system, therefore, seems never to have developed. This was perhaps a natural consequence of the mercenaries' initial recruitment in disparate contingents and of the uneven distribution of pack transport across *suskeniai*. Throughout the march, animal transport, even if sometimes temporarily assembled as a group, usually remained attached to specific units or individuals. An indication of this pattern surfaces in Xenophon's account of his heroics during the Armenian blizzard, when he had to run around amongst the baggage looking for food to distribute to hungry soldiers.<sup>221</sup> This would have been no great feat if the army's baggage had been grouped in a single train. Indeed, the low ratio of animals to men in the army meant that pack mules or donkeys could easily march next to or behind their owners' *lochos*. A *lochos* could probably even trail a light cart or two in this fashion. Moreover, individuals drawn from *suskeniai*, rather than a corps of specialist handlers, supervised baggage animals. This is clear from the situation of the mule-driving soldier, who had taken charge of his beast at the behest of his *suskenoi*, not by official command.<sup>222</sup>

<sup>216</sup> *Ages.* 1.30, *Hell.* 3.4.22, *Lac.* 13.4, Lipka (2002) 216. Macedonians: Arr. *Anab.* 1.5.9; Romans: Roth (1999) 113.

<sup>217</sup> Roman muleteers: Roth (1999) 113; modern muleteers: Daly (1917) 154, Parrino (1956) 40.

<sup>218</sup> *An.* 2.1.2, 2.2.4, 3.5.18, 7.3.6.

<sup>219</sup> Parallel columns: *An.* 2.2.4–5; protection against assault: 4.3.15; defiles: 4.2.11–13.

<sup>220</sup> *An.* 3.2.28, 4.1.12–13.

<sup>221</sup> *An.* 4.5.7–9. Even in the ideal army of the *Cyropedia*, baggage marched with its unit (*Cyr.* 6.3.2) rather than in a separate train.

<sup>222</sup> *An.* 5.8.6. Compare the situation in Cyrus the Elder's ideal army (*Cyr.* 4.2.34, 5.3.40, 6.2.35), where specialized baggage attendants handle all packing and transport.



## XENOPHON'S MULES

Probably no Cyrean ever totted up the weight of his burdens item by item in the manner we have here. What every mercenary did know was that he had to carry the necessities of battle and bivouac, however heavy they might be. He might complain about the weight of his arms, but the griping in the end only acknowledged that he meant to continue carrying them. He knew that he had to rely on his *suskenoi* to help carry some things, and that even a scrawny donkey was a real asset to a *suskenia*. After Cunaxa, he knew that replacement equipment, whether spears or cooking pots, would be difficult if not impossible to come by. That was why men clung to the weapons of their wounded *suskenoi* on the way up the Tigris and why the mule driver got so angry when Xenophon laid hands on his comrades' gear.

One wonders how many men, over the course of the campaign, settled into a morning ritual of packing and donning gear: left greave first, perhaps, then right, then armor, baldric over one shoulder and canteen over the other, shield and spear kept to the last. For *suskenoi* supervising pack animals there would have been further routine: saddles on and secured, items collected from comrades, panniers filled as carefully as possible. With sandal laces tightened, shields slung, animals loaded, the Cyreans were ready to march.

## CHAPTER 6

### *Marching*

The Cyreans did not walk from Sardis to Cunaxa, to the sea and Byzantium. They marched, and marching and walking are not the same. Walking means individuality and freedom. A solitary hiker, for example, determines her own route and sets her own pace. A hiker can stop for lunch, or just to admire the view, when and where she chooses. Confronted with an obstacle, say a fallen tree, she steps over or around it at her leisure. Marching, in contrast, demands obedience to the patterns of a larger organism. A soldier in column must follow the route his officers choose, keep pace with the others in his formation, stop and start only on command. That fallen tree may present only a moment's hindrance to an individual hiker, but for a unit of a hundred or a thousand, the cumulative effect of small deviations as each soldier passes an obstacle can build into a wave of disruptive motion, amplified all the way down the formation.<sup>1</sup>

For the Cyreans, then, marching meant loss of control, the submergence of self in a larger physical entity. Yet, this same submergence brought soldiers closer. The very act of moving together in formation hour after hour, day after day, month after month, fostered a rhythmic, emotional bond among the members of each *lochos*.<sup>2</sup> No drillmaster needed shout a cadence for them to fall naturally into step – not the artificial, measured pace of the parade ground but a synchronized shuffling tramp.<sup>3</sup> Officers learned to feel this rhythm, to anticipate how their units would react to obstacles, to judge when they needed a rest and when they could keep going. The generals' task was greater: moving the army. This was no simple matter of tracing a line from one point on a map to another, but required careful attention to formations and scheduling, to terrain and weather, and combat conditions.

<sup>1</sup> On marching vs. walking see Sweet (1953) 393.

<sup>2</sup> On this effect see McNeill (1995) 1–11, 101–21.

<sup>3</sup> For this route step cf. Johnson and Buel (1887–8) II.533.

## MARCH FORMATIONS AND ROUTINES

The army's marching posture depended on climate, terrain, and tactical circumstances. Focusing on a single *lochos*, its component *suskeniai*, and the contingent to which it belonged provides a clearer understanding of how Cyrean formations and routines developed over the course of the campaign and how these changes affected ordinary soldiers. Imagine it was the *lochos* of Arystas, a wisecracking Arcadian with an impressive appetite.<sup>4</sup> While Xenophon does not say whether Arystas began the campaign as a *lochagos* or won promotion along the way, let us assume that he joined the army already holding an officer's rank. Furthermore, let us assign him and his *lochos* to the contingent of Sophaenetus, 1,000 hoplites strong.<sup>5</sup>

The essentials of Cyrean marching routine emerged during the first period of the campaign, from Sardis to the Euphrates River. For Arystas, the day probably commenced in the pre-dawn twilight, as he roused his sleeping *lochitai*. For drowsy soldiers, the first task, perhaps following cursory splashes of water across their faces and discreet trips to relieve themselves, was not to breakfast but to break camp.<sup>6</sup> Men busied themselves packing: tents, cooking utensils, and other gear had to be bundled for travel. Those fortunate enough to share a pack mule or donkey with their *suskenoi* saddled and loaded their animals. Arystas, who probably regularly joined his fellow *lochagoi* and generals for a briefing around daybreak, either had a slave to do his packing or relied on his own group of *suskenoi* to take care of his equipment.<sup>7</sup> Before Arystas called his men to fall in, probably the last step soldiers took was to help each other gird on their armor and arms. The early morning light was probably already in their eyes, for it must have taken at least half an hour and perhaps close to an hour between waking and falling into ranks.<sup>8</sup>

For Arystas and his *lochos*, preparing to march meant forming column four abreast, shields slung and spears over shoulders (see [Figure 6.1](#)).<sup>9</sup>


<sup>4</sup> *An.* 7.3.21–3.    <sup>5</sup> *An.* 1.1.11.    <sup>6</sup> For waking activities cf. *Hell.* 2.4.6, 7.1.16.

<sup>7</sup> For officers' councils see e.g. *An.* 3.5.7.


<sup>8</sup> For packing times cf. Daly (1917) 137. On one occasion (*An.* 5.8.14), some Cyreans took so long to pack that Xenophon's legs got stiff as he sat waiting for them.

<sup>9</sup> At Opis (*An.* 2.4.26), Clearchus marched the army by twos to make it appear larger to the Persians, suggesting normal column width was wider than two abreast. Four abreast is a reasonable supposition, as it would allow a *lochos* in column to transit into line simply by turning to one flank; cf. 1.2.15, 4.6.6. Two abreast was more appropriate for entering city gates or traversing narrow roads; cf. *Hell.* 3.1.22, 7.4.22.

(a) march column



(b) battle line

Figure 6.1 Schematic diagram of *lochos* formations

*Suskenoi* probably fell in as close to each other as possible; if nothing else, it was good to have friends nearby to talk to.<sup>10</sup> Men supervising pack animals also stood close by, probably in a parallel file just next to the column.<sup>11</sup> The column formed in close order, soldiers perhaps only a meter apart, but when it started moving these intervals had to at least double, lest men bang themselves on each others' spears or tread on their heels.<sup>12</sup> A 100-man *lochos* in column of fours, then, would require some 50–75 meters of road space. There also had to be gaps between each *lochos*, say five meters or so; otherwise units could not maneuver in and out of a column of *lochoi*.<sup>13</sup> At a meter of lateral space per man, Arystas' *lochos* would be four meters wide, not counting about two more meters for the parallel file of pack animals.<sup>14</sup> Arystas would have stationed himself at the head of his unit, perhaps accompanied by his trumpeter (*salpinktes*) and, if he had one, his slave attendant.<sup>15</sup> At the rear of the formation, Arystas may have placed a

<sup>10</sup> In the Roman army, men from the same tent group (*contubernium*) stood next to each other in formation; see Goldsworthy (1996) 257.

<sup>11</sup> Pack animals close: *An.* 1.3.1, cf. *Cyr.* 6.3.3, Maurice *Strategikon* 1.9. Parallel file: *An.* 2.2.4–5, cf. Maurice (1930) 225, Goldsworthy (1996) 109.

<sup>12</sup> Close order: Pritchett (1971) 144–54; marching intervals: Sheldon (1904) 16–17, Maurice (1930) 229, Breeze (1986/7) 12, United States Army (1990) 3.10–13.

<sup>13</sup> The diagrams in Lendle (1995) 218, depicting a column of *lochoi* without intervals, unintentionally make this evident; according to these diagrams the men at the head of each *lochos* would have to march through the tail of the *lochos* ahead in order to change formation.

<sup>14</sup> Assuming a pack animal file one meter wide (Maurice *Strategikon* 9.5), with a meter between it and the *lochos* column.

<sup>15</sup> Trumpeter: Krentz (1991) 114–16.

trusted veteran to watch for stragglers and check that the *lochos* behind did not tailgate.

Preparing to march was relatively straightforward for Arystas and his *lochos*, but for Sophaenetos and the other generals, getting some 10,400 hoplites and 2,500 peltasts out of bivouac was a feat even without any threat of combat. If the hoplites alone formed a single column of about a hundred *lochoi*, and each rank of four men stepped off at one-second intervals, with a five-second pause between each *lochos*, the rearmost rank of the rearmost *lochos* would not begin moving until about fifty minutes after the head of the column had set off.<sup>16</sup> If hoplites and peltasts together marched in a single column at two-meter intervals, they would stretch at least 6.75 kilometers (4.2 miles).<sup>17</sup> At four kilometers an hour, it would take more than an hour and forty minutes for every Cyrean in the column to pass any given point.

Furthermore, the Cyreans were not the only ones on the road. From Tyriaeum onward, if not earlier, Cyrus also had his Persian levies, perhaps 20,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry.<sup>18</sup> These battalions and squadrons needed space too, more than 14 kilometers (8.7 miles) if drawn up in a single column; the prince's 600-strong horse guard alone filled 800 meters.<sup>19</sup> To this had to be added room for pack animals and for the wagons of Cyrus' retinue.

Putting mercenaries and native levies together in a single column more than twenty kilometers long was impracticable. Even if it did not take the whole morning just to assemble such a formation, at four kilometers an hour it would need five hours to pass a single spot. On shorter marches, the column's tail might not even have left camp by the time the vanguard was finishing its day's advance. Cyrus probably therefore tried to march his units on as broad a front as possible.<sup>20</sup> Possibly each general led his contingent out of bivouac on a pre-arranged schedule, with intervals between departures to prevent bunching at defiles or resting points en route. Spacing between contingents would also keep men from choking on the dust kicked up

<sup>16</sup> One-second intervals: Engels (1978) 155, Haldon (1999) 164. This assumes each *lochos* took 30 seconds to get under way (25 ranks of hoplites per unit plus a 5-second pause between units).

<sup>17</sup> Assuming about 100 *lochoi* at 55 meters each (5,500 meters), plus 625 ranks of peltasts two meters apart (1,250 meters), for a total of at least 6.75 km (4.2 miles).

<sup>18</sup> See Chapter Three, note 12.

<sup>19</sup> Battalions and squadrons: *An.* 1.2.16. Column length: assuming 20,000 infantry four abreast with two meters between ranks but no unit intervals (10 km), plus 3,000 cavalry three abreast with four meters between ranks but no unit intervals (4 km), for a total of at least 14 km (8.7 miles). Horse guard: *An.* 1.8.6 (200 ranks of three horsemen each, with each rank needing at least four meters of space); for cavalry intervals see Breeze (1986/87) 12, Haldon (1999) 164.

<sup>20</sup> For this technique cf. Engels (1978) 154–5.

by thousands of tramping feet and hooves directly ahead. Where terrain allowed, several contingents might set off simultaneously and march in parallel columns.<sup>21</sup> Depending on how effectively Cyrus and his generals coordinated their departures, and on the column width that the ground allowed, it might be an hour or more before the last contingents actually left their bivouacs.

While Cyrus and his Persian staff probably had some practice in military traffic control at the outset of the campaign, the same could not be said for the mercenary generals. Aside from Clearchus, few if any of them had much experience coordinating the long-distance movements of large bodies of troops.<sup>22</sup> Xenias, for example, had 4,000 hoplites to direct, but these had previously been scattered in the Ionian garrisons and it is unlikely he had ever seen all his troops in one place before 401 BC. The initial marches in western Anatolia, then, must have provided the Cyrean commanders a welcome opportunity to practice their traffic-management skills under Persian tutelage.

Breaking the army into separate contingents for marching saved time, but even a single contingent of moderate size could take considerable road space (see Figure 6.2). If Sophagenetus sat on his horse at the exit to camp and watched his 1,000 hoplites file by in column of fours, the last rank of his men would pass about five minutes after the first rank had.<sup>23</sup> On the march, Sophagenetus' column of ten or so *lochoi* in single file could stretch half a kilometer.<sup>24</sup> With pack animals marching parallel to the *lochos* column, the contingent would require six meters of lateral space. Terrain permitting, Sophagenetus could decrease his column's length by putting several *lochoi* abreast. If the road narrowed, though, he might have to fold the pack animals back into the gaps between *lochoi*, or, in especially tight spots such as the Cilician Gates, march his men two abreast.<sup>25</sup> Either maneuver could double or triple the distance from the head to the rear of his column.

Once underway, the Cyreans averaged about six parasangs, or roughly six marching hours, a day during the period from Sardis to Thapsacus, with longer marches on level ground or on roads.<sup>26</sup> This was no continuous

<sup>21</sup> For marching in parallel columns see *An.* 3.4.30.

<sup>22</sup> On Clearchus' experience see especially *An.* 2.2.6.

<sup>23</sup> Assuming each rank of a *lochos* stepped off at one-second intervals, with a 5-second wait between *lochoi*.

<sup>24</sup> Assuming ten 100-strong *lochoi* each taking up 55 meters of space (25 ranks of men at 2 m intervals, plus a 5 m gap between *lochoi*).

<sup>25</sup> *An.* 1.2.21–2; cf. Lendle (1995) 27–8.

<sup>26</sup> For march rates during this and other periods of the campaign see Table 1; on the parasang see Tuplin (1997a).

(a) single column of *lochoi* four men abreast, pack animals in parallel file



(b) column of several *lochoi* abreast, pack animals parallel



(c) single column of *lochoi* four men abreast, pack animals following



(d) single column of *lochoi* two men abreast, pack animals following




Figure 6.2 Contingent columns

advance; there must have been periodic halts, perhaps once every parasang. Such halts were brief, ten to fifteen minutes or so in modern reckoning, but provided necessary respite for men and animals.<sup>27</sup> Depending on the length of the day's journey, one halt might be longer, say thirty minutes, to let soldiers eat a quick morning meal (*ariston*).<sup>28</sup>

Stops like these sound simple enough, until considered from the perspective of Sophraenetes and his 1,000 hoplites marching four abreast. Before Sophraenetes could order a halt, he first had to look ahead for a suitable stopping place. Then he had to ensure there was sufficient distance behind his troops that the next contingent in line did not rear-end them as they sat down to rest. After that, he could give the order to halt, but if each rank took only a half second to comply, the last rank of his last *lochos* would not take its final step until at least two minutes following his command. If Sophraenetes' *lochagoi* were on the ball, they made sure their soldiers tightened up their two-meter marching intervals as they halted, and came

<sup>27</sup> Engels (1978) 154–5, United States Army (1990) 4.9, 4.15.

<sup>28</sup> See Chapter Eight for more on mealtimes.

to rest once again in close order. Otherwise the contingent would remain straggled out over a half kilometer. Sophaenetus then had to time the length of the halt carefully – without benefit of a watch, remember – and have his *lochagoi* get their units quickly back on their feet when the time came.<sup>29</sup> The men at the rear of the column, who would have just been sitting down when the head of the column was already several minutes into the break, would inevitably cry foul.<sup>30</sup> Perhaps Sophaenetus fair-mindedly rotated the march order daily so that *lochoi* varied their positions in column; if he played favorites, the same units always got the preferred spots at the head of the line.

After passing on Sophaenetus' orders and making sure their troops closed intervals as they halted, Arystas and his fellow *lochagoi* had other work. As his men plopped down to catch their breath or eat, Arystas probably reminded them to examine their feet for blisters and re-lace their sandals, to water their animals and tighten loose straps or fittings. If a stream or well was at hand, some soldiers might dash to refill skins or gourds for their *suskenoi*. Others perhaps gathered bits of wood by the roadside; extra cooking fuel was not to be passed up.<sup>31</sup> At a warning signal, either by trumpet (*salpinx*) or by a voice order passed down the column from *lochagos* to *lochagos*, Arystas would hustle his men back into ranks, giving them one last check as he waited for the command to resume marching.<sup>32</sup>

Depending on the length of the day's march, the army during the first period of the campaign usually approached its bivouac for the night by late morning or midday. Cyrus must have known the terrain from Sardis to Thapsacus well, and seems to have pre-selected campsites capacious and well supplied enough for both the Cyreans and his own native troops. On less familiar ground, he probably sent mounted scouts ahead to reconnoiter suitable stopping places.<sup>33</sup> Because they set out at different times, not all elements of the army arrived at camp simultaneously. If Arystas and his *lochitai* were lucky, their contingent was in the lead and could proceed directly to its bivouac. If Sophaenetus had been far back in the day's march order, though, they might have to slow or halt while the units ahead peeled off to find camping sites.<sup>34</sup> As his final tasks of the marching day, Arystas

<sup>29</sup> Contingents marching one after another could try to synchronize their halts, but this would have been tricky without watches or other timepieces.

<sup>30</sup> Theoretically, soldiers at the rear could grab a few more minutes of rest by staying seated until the men ahead of them got moving again, but this would leave them out of ranks when their turn to move arrived. To avoid the delays and gaps this would cause, probably Sophaenetus tried to get his contingent back on its feet all at once.

<sup>31</sup> For gathering wood during halts cf. United States Army (1896) 244.

<sup>32</sup> *An.* 2.2.4, 3.5.18; cf. *Aen. Tact.* 22.3, 22.22.

<sup>33</sup> For more on campsites see Chapter Seven.

<sup>34</sup> Sweet (1953) 389, Shrader (1995) 144.



probably supervised his men as they unloaded their gear and began to set up camp. If he was diligent, he made sure they stacked their arms properly, put up tents in neat rows, found adequate provisions, and perhaps even dug a latrine or two for common *lochos* use.<sup>35</sup> A less attentive *lochagos* might simply leave his soldiers to their own devices and turn to unpacking his own belongings.

#### MARCHING INTO MESOPOTAMIA

From Sardis to Thapsacus, moderate temperatures, ample daylight, and lack of combat permitted a relatively leisurely routine. During the second period of the campaign, from Thapsacus to Cunaxa, the hot summer weather, desert terrain, and increasing enemy threats had some significant effects. For one thing, the army, especially on the barren stretch between Corsote and Pylae, had to make longer daily stages in order to reach provisions and water. Setting out at sunrise would have meant completing these marches in the boiling noontime heat, with highs of 42° C (107.6° F) or more.<sup>36</sup> Cyrus, therefore, seems to have begun moving the army at night to take advantage of cooler temperatures. If they started around midnight, the Cyreans could be more than halfway through a seven-parasang stage, the average for this stretch, by the time the sun rose.<sup>37</sup> The lead elements could look forward to halting by early morning, and the rearmost elements would be in camp well before noon.

Marching at night meant less sweat but more work for Arystas. In addition to watching for stragglers and maintaining proper intervals, he also had to keep an eye on the *lochos* ahead of his, lest he take a wrong turn in the dark and get separated from the rest of the army. The presence of the Euphrates off to the right made it impossible to get lost in that direction, but there was still the danger of swinging inadvertently left into the desert. Carrying torches would have made things easier, but wood was scarce. Besides, a twinkling line of moving torches in the darkness was exactly the kind of advertisement Cyrus did not need. Probably, then, Arystas and his fellow *lochagoi* had nothing more than moonlight for illumination. The experience the army accrued in night marching during this period, however, would pay dividends later in the campaign.

Although the threat of combat loomed closer on the way down the Euphrates, the Cyrean contingents apparently continued to march separately, sometimes at sizeable intervals. At Charmande, for example,

<sup>35</sup> On these marks of the attentive commander cf. *Eq. mag.* 6.2–3.

<sup>36</sup> For these environmental conditions see Chapter Two.

<sup>37</sup> For midnight starts see *An.* 1.7.1; cf. *Onas.* 6.9.

Clearchus and Menon reached the day's stopping place far enough in advance of the others – perhaps an hour or two – that men from their contingents had time to get into a fight and Clearchus had been able to discipline one of the participants.<sup>38</sup> Both contingents had apparently already pitched their tents, at least one man was chopping wood, and Clearchus had been able to ride down from camp to the Euphrates River, where the locals had set up a market. By the time Menon's and Clearchus' troops were about to come to blows over Clearchus' harsh discipline, Proxenus was only just arriving, and Cyrus himself, presumably with his Persian troops, was still some way behind.<sup>39</sup> No mention is made of the other mercenary contingents, which were probably strung out along the route behind Proxenus and Cyrus.

As the army entered Babylonia, Cyrus shortened the daily marches to four parasangs apiece. This helped the troops rest in anticipation of impending battle and forestalled the army's columns from stringing out as they had before.<sup>40</sup> The army seems to have made one last night march, for Cyrus held a review at midnight of the third stage into Babylonia.<sup>41</sup> The next day, he proceeded with his troops in line of battle. They did not meet Artaxerxes, but did find the defensive trench he had built.<sup>42</sup> This was too long to detour around; the only way across was a narrow causeway some 20 feet (6 meters) wide, about the width of a single *lochos* in column. For all 13,000 mercenaries along with roughly 20,000 Persian infantry and 3,000 cavalry to get through this chokepoint likely took four hours or more.<sup>43</sup> The time required to complete the crossing explains why the army only advanced three parasangs in the course of the day.

#### THE DAY OF CUNAXA

Artaxerxes' failure to appear the day of the trench crossing, or the day after, lulled Cyrus and his men into the false hope that the Great King would not fight. The day after that, Cyrus relaxed enough to advance seated in his chariot, and the mercenaries neglected the march discipline they had honed

<sup>38</sup> Events at Charmande: *An.* 1.5.11–17.

<sup>39</sup> That Cyrus with his cavalry was not at the head of the column suggests this march stage had begun in the dark: cf. *An.* 7.3.37–9, *Cyr.* 5.3.37.

<sup>40</sup> On resting before battle cf. *Onas.* 6.9. <sup>41</sup> *An.* 1.7.2. <sup>42</sup> Artaxerxes' trench: *An.* 1.7.14–16.

<sup>43</sup> 33,000 infantry (13,000 Cyreans and 20,000 Persians) 6 abreast would stretch 11 km; 3,000 cavalry 5 abreast would stretch an additional 2.4 km. If the total 13.4-km (8.4-mile) column passed along the causeway at 4 km/hour without stopping, about  $3\frac{1}{2}$  hours would elapse before the last men reached the other side of the trench, not counting rest breaks or the time required to transit from battle line to single column and back again.

in the six months since leaving Sardis.<sup>44</sup> Although Clearchus took the lead as usual, the other generals seem to have been late getting out of camp and were probably lax with the timing of breaks.<sup>45</sup> The tardy start, after all, meant they were going to be marching in the mid-day heat.<sup>46</sup> If Artaxerxes was not going to show, the generals may have reasoned, there was no harm in letting the men rest a few more minutes at each halt to counteract the heat.<sup>47</sup> Lower down in the command hierarchy, Arystas was probably glad to let his *lochitai* sleep in that morning. Those last few Euphrates stages had been exhausting, and the men were now having to readjust to a daytime schedule after at least two weeks of night marching. When the army got under way, Arystas was less than careful about maintaining proper intervals or reforming his column after rest stops. He may even have turned a blind eye as some of his men strapped their weapons onto pack animals or threw them into carts rather than shouldering them as usual.<sup>48</sup>

At mid-morning, as Cyrus and his vanguard neared the day's campsite, the remainder of his force, mercenaries and levies alike, lay straggled out behind him for many kilometers. Depending on the position of Sophaeetus' contingent, Arystas and his *lochos* may have seen Cyrus' staff officer Pategyas, who had probably been out scouting the stopping place as well as looking for Artaxerxes, come galloping back with news of the approaching enemy.<sup>49</sup> If Sophaeetus had been closely following the lead contingents, those of Clearchus and Proxenus, Arystas would have been jolted into a flurry of activity, as trumpet calls from Sophaeetus directed his *lochagoi* to move from marching column into battle line.<sup>50</sup>

As he shouted orders to form line and his servant helped him arm, Arystas also had to keep an eye on the *suskeniai* of his unit. To his left, a group with a pack mule was entrusting its reins to a *suskenos*, admonishing him to keep the cooking pots safe while at the same time trying to extract their weapons from the saddlebags.<sup>51</sup> To his right, other *suskenoi*, who had never owned

<sup>44</sup> *An.* 1.7.19–20. <sup>45</sup> For Clearchus' position see *An.* 1.8.4, cf. 1.5.11–12.

<sup>46</sup> On the day of Cunaxa, in early August, the sun probably rose about 5.15 a.m. If the army's lead elements got under way a bit late, say at 7.00 a.m., for an intended four-parasang stage (*An.* 1.10.1), they would approach the day's stopping place by about 10 a.m. (mid-morning: 1.8.1); contingents further back would still be marching at mid-day (1.8.8).

<sup>47</sup> For longer rest breaks cf. United States Army (2000) 3.4. <sup>48</sup> *An.* 1.8.20. <sup>49</sup> *An.* 1.8.1.

<sup>50</sup> At Cunaxa, Clearchus held the right of the Cyrean phalanx line, with Proxenus to his left (*An.* 1.8.4), suggesting theirs were the lead contingents that day. This supposition gains strength from the position of the peltasts to Clearchus' right (1.8.5); 1,800 of the 2,500 Cyrean peltasts were in Clearchus' and Proxenus' contingents. In transiting from column to phalanx, each hoplite contingent probably filled out the line to the left of the contingent ahead; Menon, on the far left wing (1.8.4), was therefore probably last in column.

<sup>51</sup> See Chapter Four for more on the suskenic behaviors described here.

an animal, were dropping packs and rolled cloaks at the feet of their oldest comrade. The man must have been over forty-five; he had taken his first mercenary's daric the year Cyrus was born, and was happy enough to stay in the rear.<sup>52</sup> The members of yet another *suskenia*, this one just a trio of friends, left their knapsacks with the old man, promising him a share of the battle's loot in return. All told, about ten of Arystas' hundred-odd hoplites fell out of ranks to supervise animals and baggage; he sent his servant to join them. Arystas probably tried to control the number of *suskenoi* who fell out – after all, he wanted the most men possible in fighting line – but even men ordered to remain in ranks were prone to slipping away when he wasn't looking. At the moment, he had enough to do getting his men into formation and listening for Sophraenetes' trumpeted orders. Soon his *lochos* was advancing in battle order, each Cyrean bearing nothing but arms and armor and perhaps a skin full of water.

Ironically, being closer to the enemy on the day of Cunaxa meant less work, for the lead units had to wait several hours for the rest of the army to arrive. Even without tents, the soldiers of the lead contingents could have had a long siesta, perhaps napping with heads shaded under their shields.<sup>53</sup> The wait would have been a good time to eat breakfast, but the initial rush to form phalanx meant the troops had already sent off their *suskenoi* and baggage, including rations.<sup>54</sup> Still, those in the lead were fortunate compared to men further back in the Cyrean column, who faced two hours of frantic marching in the mid-day heat before they could begin handing off baggage to their *suskenoi*. Indeed, Cyrus' force had so dispersed that trailing elements were still joining the battle line in early afternoon.<sup>55</sup> These units probably arrived overheated and out of breath, perhaps occasioning a further pause from the time of their arrival until the battle actually commenced sometime in mid- or late afternoon.<sup>56</sup> Artaxerxes' troops, who themselves

<sup>52</sup> See Chapter Five for dropping gear before battle; over 45: 6.5.4; cf. Thuc. 5.72.3.

<sup>53</sup> Dale Dye, who trained the extras for Oliver Stone's *Alexander*, tells me his troops used their shields in this fashion to protect themselves from the Moroccan sun during breaks.

<sup>54</sup> Xenophon comments (*An.* 1.10.19) that the Cyreans went without breakfast the day of Cunaxa.

<sup>55</sup> Pategyas brought news of Artaxerxes at mid-morning (*An.* 1.8.1), 10 a.m. or so, at which time the army began forming battle line, but as afternoon was coming on (1.8.14), say about 1 p.m., the final Cyrean units were just getting into place.

<sup>56</sup> The last units of Cyrus' army were filing into line about 1 p.m.; sunset (1.10.16) in early August would have been about 6.55 p.m. This gives about 6 hours of daylight for the Cyreans to: (1) attack, rout Artaxerxes' left, and pursue it perhaps 15 stades or 2.5–3 km (half of the 30 stades that separated them from Artaxerxes at the end of the pursuit, 1.10.4); (2) countermarch back toward Artaxerxes (1.10.6–9); (3) pursue Artaxerxes towards the hill where they saw his standard (1.10.10–13); and (4) have a mounted patrol reconnoiter the hill and report back (1.10.14–15). Reckoning one hour for each of these phases leaves about two hours for an early afternoon pause.

had been marching much of the day, could have used the break too.<sup>57</sup> For both sides, an early afternoon pause would also permit fighting the battle in cooler mid- or late afternoon temperatures.<sup>58</sup>

While Arystas and his *lochos* were fighting the battle of Cunaxa, the *suskenoi* left behind with animals and gear proceeded to join similar groups from the other *lochoi* of Sophraenetus' contingent. By late afternoon, the baggage guards of all seven Cyrean contingents had apparently collected in a single train.<sup>59</sup> These men were setting up camp in anticipation of their comrades' return when Artaxerxes' cavalry descended upon them. The baggage guards, perhaps 500 or so, managed to form themselves into a hollow square and repel the enemy attack.<sup>60</sup> Even so, they could not prevent the Persians from plundering some valuable equipment. After sunset, when Arystas and his men finally reunited with their comrades and baggage, they found their *suskenoi* mostly intact, but not their gear. Smashed cooking pots and torn grain sacks must have been a disheartening sight for men who had gone all day without food.<sup>61</sup> Perhaps the *suskenos* left behind with the mule had at least managed to keep the infernal beast alive for his comrades. If they could not find anything else to eat, they would be slaughtering and boiling it in the morning.<sup>62</sup>

#### MARCHING WITHOUT CYRUS

The news that Cyrus was dead, delivered the morning after Cunaxa, brought with it new marching realities.<sup>63</sup> On the way to Cunaxa, the prince had regularly chosen the route to ensure rapid travel and adequate supplies, scouted campsites in advance, and paced the army in anticipation of coming environmental hardships or combat.<sup>64</sup> Indeed, aside from the shortages between Corsote and Pylae, and his overconfident carelessness on the morning of the battle, Cyrus had managed the advance with remarkable efficiency. His

<sup>57</sup> *An.* 1.8.1, 1.8.8.

<sup>58</sup> August averages in the Baghdad/Babylon area peak at 39°–46° C (102°–115° F) at 12 noon. By 3 p.m. they drop to 37°–45° C (99°–113° F), and by 6 p.m. to 29°–40° C (84°–104° F); see Republic of Iraq (1962) 115A.

<sup>59</sup> *An.* 1.10.3.

<sup>60</sup> That the camp was in the process of being set up is implied by the pillaging of much Cyrean property (*An.* 1.10.17–18); this would have been easier to protect if it had all remained packed together. If one *suskenos* in twenty fell out of ranks before battle, there would have been about 645 baggage guards, although some of these had to supervise animals and slave servants. The hollow square is implied by Xenophon's statement (1.10.3) that the baggage guards managed to save persons or property brought "within" their lines.

<sup>61</sup> *An.* 1.10.18–19.

<sup>62</sup> *An.* 2.1.6–7.

<sup>63</sup> *An.* 2.1.2–3.

<sup>64</sup> See Chapter Seven for Cyrus' alternation of hard marching and well-timed rest stops.

success in leading some 40,000 troops more than 1,500 kilometers from Sardis into Mesopotamia with only minor attrition and no significant loss of combat capability speaks well for his strategic and logistical acumen. His death deprived the mercenaries of a firm and well-informed guiding hand.

Now, the Cyreans were as determined to escape Mesopotamia as the prince had been in his purpose to reach it, but they lacked his familiarity with Near Eastern geography.<sup>65</sup> Perhaps a few had traveled to Mesopotamia before, probably by the Royal Road, but beyond that their knowledge of the region was limited at best.<sup>66</sup> In fact, aside from realizing that they could not simply retrace their steps, the soldiers and their generals possessed no clear notion of how to return to Greece.<sup>67</sup> So clueless were the Cyreans as to the way home that they accepted Tissaphernes' promise to guide them back to Greece without asking for specifics of the route. They continued following him for most of the third period of the campaign, from Cunaxa up the Tigris valley, even when they suspected he might be leading them astray.<sup>68</sup>

For August and most of September the Cyreans got by plodding after Tissaphernes, but during the three months following the massacre of the generals, they were in wholly foreign territory. Probably not one in ten thousand Cyreans had ever traveled the upper Tigris valley, much less set foot in central Anatolia; Xenophon's portrayal of the path home as a simple matter of following rivers to their sources reveals that much.<sup>69</sup> To fill the gaps in their knowledge, the Cyreans resorted to prying details of the road ahead from captured locals or shifty guides.<sup>70</sup> Where possible, they also dispatched scouts to reconnoiter in advance.<sup>71</sup> Neither method, though, could provide information about conditions more than a day or two ahead. If the march to Cunaxa had been a carefully orchestrated series of advances and pauses, the retreat to the sea would be a succession of stabs in the murk.

The lack of accurate intelligence played havoc with the army's marching routine. Without knowing in advance the approximate length of daily marches, the terrain along the route, or the location and condition of

<sup>65</sup> *An.* 2.2.13, 2.3.23, 2.4.26; although cf. 2.5.12–15 for Clearchus' attitude.

<sup>66</sup> Some of the 300 hoplites who had accompanied Cyrus to his father's deathbed (at Babylon?) in 404 BC (*An.* 1.1.2) may have been in Xenias and Pasion's contingent.

<sup>67</sup> *An.* 2.2.10–12. <sup>68</sup> *An.* 2.4.13–26, cf. 3.2.22.

<sup>69</sup> *An.* 3.2.22–3; notice how quickly Xenophon here diverts Cyrean attention from the unknown terrain ahead.

<sup>70</sup> *An.* 3.5.14–17, 4.1.23–5, 4.4.17–19, 4.6.1–3, 4.17.19–21; the only truly friendly guides were the Macro-nians (4.8.8).

<sup>71</sup> *An.* 2.2.15, 4.4.15–16, 6.3.10, 6.3.18–19.

campsites, Sophaenetos and his colleagues could not optimally arrange their contingents for marching and could not anticipate delays along the way. They could not count on their troops filing smoothly into quarters each evening, and could never be sure that the night's bivouac would contain sufficient provisions and fuel.<sup>72</sup>

At least the mercenaries had learned how to march as a team under Cyrus. With six months' practice under their belts, Sophaenetos and his colleagues were by now well able to coordinate the movements of their contingents. The departure of Cyrus' native levies made scheduling less stressful: there were now only the seven mercenary contingents to coordinate, requiring only a third of the space the combined army had occupied.<sup>73</sup> Moreover, the peltasts were now more frequently deployed as skirmishers, further cutting the road space needed.<sup>74</sup> While the truce lasted, the Cyreans continued to march in contingent columns, although suspicion of the Persians probably led them to close intervals between contingents to the minimum possible. For Arystas and his *lochitai*, the routine remained similar: on the move around daybreak, halts for rest and breakfast, and then a slow filing into camp after several parasangs.

#### MARCHING AT NIGHT

The mercenaries had learned something else under Cyrus' tutelage: how to move at night. For most ancient armies, night marches were risky gambits. Without proper organization, slower and faster elements might disperse in confusion. Passing commands in the darkness was a challenge, and limited visibility meant more risk not only of getting lost, but also of clashing with friendly units.<sup>75</sup> Even Alexander of Macedon preferred a daytime clash at Gaugamela to the hazards of a night march.<sup>76</sup> The Cyreans, however, developed great proficiency at night marching, and employed the technique with increasing effectiveness as the campaign went on.

As we have seen, Cyrus on the advance down the Euphrates valley began setting his force into motion during darkness or twilight to take advantage of cooler temperatures. This must have provided excellent training in night marching, for by the time the Cyreans reached Mesopotamia they were clearly well versed in the practice. The second night after Cunaxa, for instance, Clearchus marched the mercenaries in column back the way

<sup>72</sup> For food and fuel shortages at bivouacs see *An.* 2.4.9, 4.5.5.

<sup>73</sup> The native levies, now under Ariaeus' command (*An.* 2.4.9), began marching separately from the Cyreans about three weeks after Cunaxa.

<sup>74</sup> *An.* 3.4.28–9.      <sup>75</sup> *An.* 7.3.37–9; cf. *Cyr.* 5.3.35–44, Thuc. 7.43–4.      <sup>76</sup> Arr. *Anab.* 3.10.2–3.

they had come to link up with the remnant of Cyrus' native levies under Ariaeus.<sup>77</sup> Setting out after dark, the Cyreans covered about four parasangs before reaching Ariaeus' position about midnight, still in good order and with plenty of time left to rest.<sup>78</sup> The next day Clearchus kept his troops moving until after sunset, intending to get as far away from Artaxerxes' forces as possible.<sup>79</sup> The Cyreans again made the march in good order. Although the last units entering bivouac that evening made a lot of noise, they still found places to sleep.<sup>80</sup>

Clearchus' planning of the night rendezvous with Ariaeus earned him the respect of the other generals, but even without him the Cyreans displayed ample night marching skill.<sup>81</sup> For example, two weeks after the seizure of the generals, the troops stole a night march of no less than sixty stades (9–12 km) on Tissaphernes' pursuit forces, getting so far ahead that it took the Persians two days and a night countermarch of their own just to catch up.<sup>82</sup> Five days later, they conducted their initial advance into Carduchia during late night and early morning hours, enabling them to cross a plain without fearing that Tissaphernes' cavalry might jump them, and then to surprise the sleepy Carduchians in the mountains beyond.<sup>83</sup>

Throughout the remainder of the campaign, the Cyreans displayed their proficiency in night movement. During the army's temporary split, for instance, the Arcadians and Achaeans announced their presence at Calpe Harbor with a surprise night landing, followed by a march in darkness against villages in the area.<sup>84</sup> Some weeks later, after defeating the cavalry of Spithridates and Rhathines, the reunited army made another sixty-stade night march, starting at sunset, to its camp at Calpe.<sup>85</sup> While serving with Seuthes in Thrace, the Cyreans made at least two more night marches, both accomplished speedily and without hint of disorder.<sup>86</sup> By this point the troops felt so confident in their night marching ability that Xenophon depicts himself advising Seuthes on the best formation for moving troops in darkness.<sup>87</sup> Indeed, before handing over the army to Thibron at Pergamun,

<sup>77</sup> *An.* 2.2.4–8.      <sup>78</sup> For the distance traveled, see Lendle (1995) 98.

<sup>79</sup> *An.* 2.2.12, 2.2.16.      <sup>80</sup> *An.* 2.2.16–18.      <sup>81</sup> *An.* 2.2.5–6.

<sup>82</sup> *An.* 3.4.36–7; Tissaphernes' countermarch belies Xenophon's blanket dismissal of Persian troops as "useless at night" (3.4.35).

<sup>83</sup> This was mid-October, meaning there would have been about  $12\frac{1}{2}$  (modern) hours of night, or 4 watches of about 3 hours each; cf. Pattenden (1987) 165. When the Cyreans set out at the last watch (*An.* 4.1.5), they had about 3 standard hours of darkness ahead of them, not counting about 20 minutes of twilight.

<sup>84</sup> *An.* 6.3.2.      <sup>85</sup> *An.* 6.5.3–4, 6.5.32.

<sup>86</sup> *An.* 7.3.40–3, 7.4.6. Xenophon and a delegation of *lochagoi* also made a 120-stade (18–24-km) round trip on horseback in the darkness (7.2.16–7.3.1) to negotiate with Seuthes before joining him.

<sup>87</sup> *An.* 7.3.37–9; cf. *Cyr.* 5.3.37–45.



he and a small group of Cyreans made one final night trek, this time in an attempt to capture the Persian noble Asidates. The march itself went off without a hitch, although Xenophon and his friends proved unable to root Asidates out of his fortified tower.<sup>88</sup>

#### MARCHING IN HOLLOW SQUARE (*PLAISION*)

During the final twenty days of the journey out of Mesopotamia, from the seizure of the generals until the arrival at the southern boundaries of Carduchia, the Cyreans had to deal with determined pursuit by Ariaeus and Tissaphernes. If the mercenaries persisted in marching in widely spaced columns on the rolling plains of the upper Tigris valley, the Persian light infantry and cavalry would easily destroy them piecemeal. Proceeding in phalanx would permit the army to repel a frontal attack, but render flanks and rear tempting targets for enemy horsemen. Furthermore, the destruction wrought on their baggage the day of Cunaxa had made the Cyreans acutely aware of the vulnerability of their pack animals and equipment. Although they soon created a small cavalry force of their own, and mustered some 200 slingers to counter the far-shooting enemy bowmen, the mercenaries could not hope to withstand the superior Persian cavalry without devising a new marching formation.<sup>89</sup>

The solution the Cyreans settled on, marching in a hollow square with pack animals and gear gathered safely within, sounds elegantly simple and makes for pleasingly neat modern diagrams.<sup>90</sup> Although Xenophon does not recount its genealogy, the hollow rectangle was no novelty: both Spartan and Athenian forces had employed similar formations during the Peloponnesian War, with varying degrees of success.<sup>91</sup>

Xenophon initially speaks of the formation as a rectangle (*plaision*) with a front (*stoma*), rear (*oura*), and flanks (*pleurai*).<sup>92</sup> Later he employs geometric terminology to describe the arrangement, calling it an “equilateral rectangle” (*isopleuron plaision*).<sup>93</sup> The most recent reconstruction accordingly divides approximately 10,000 Cyrean hoplites along the four sides of a square, posting them in unbroken ranks eight deep.<sup>94</sup> At close order spacing, one meter per hoplite, this makes for a formation about 312 meters

<sup>88</sup> *An.* 7.8.11–15.      <sup>89</sup> *An.* 3.4.16–20.      <sup>90</sup> *An.* 3.2.36, Boucher (1913) 148, Lendle (1995) 180.

<sup>91</sup> *Thuc.* 4.125, 6.67, 7.78; cf. Ehrhardt (1994) 3–4.

<sup>92</sup> *An.* 3.2.36, 3.4.28, 3.4.42–3.      <sup>93</sup> *An.* 3.4.19; cf. *Arr. Tact.* 29.7–8.

<sup>94</sup> An original 10,400 (*An.* 1.7.10), less 100 lost crossing the Taurus (1.2.25), 200 killed with the generals (2.5.30), and at least 20 deserters (3.3.5). For the *plaision* with 8 ranks see Lendle (1995) 163; Boucher (1913) 148 reconstructs a formation 4 ranks deep.




Figure 6.3 Equilateral rectangle (*isopleuron plaision*)

on a side, with an internal area of 9.73 hectares (about 24 acres), plenty of room for pack animals, baggage, and non-combatants.

The soothing geometry of this modern reconstruction, however, belies the immense practical difficulties involved in creating such a formation. If we construe *isopleuron plaision* to mean each wall of the square was literally equal both in length and in numbers of troops, there was but a single way to create a perfect square. Adjacent walls would have to be aligned with only the far left and far right men of their rearmost ranks in contact with each other (see Figure 6.3a). This arrangement would necessitate gaps at the corners of the square, leaving the flanks of each wall open to enemy attack. If we take Xenophon to mean that each wall of the square was literally equal in length, but not necessarily in numbers, additional men would have to be assigned to each of two opposite walls, enabling these walls to extend across the eight-rank thickness of the adjacent walls (see Figure 6.3b). Both these readings have more in common with the parade ground than the battlefield.<sup>95</sup> There was no military reason for the formation to be precisely square, and it seems unlikely that the generals concerned themselves with making it so.

Even if the formation was not precisely square, the generals still had to put approximately equal numbers of troops on its opposite sides.<sup>96</sup>

<sup>95</sup> On parade ground formations cf. Asclep. II.6., Onas. 6.5.

<sup>96</sup> Hereafter I use *plaision* and “hollow square” interchangeably, without meaning to indicate the formation was literally square.

Cheirisophus, for instance, had arrived with only 700 hoplites, while Xenophon and Timasion across from him would together have mustered about 4,500 hoplites.<sup>97</sup> The numbers on the flanks, where Cleanor's roughly 2,300 hoplites constituted the largest contingent and Xanthicles' 500 the smallest, with Philesius' 900 and Sophaenetos' 1,000 between them, were similarly uneven.<sup>98</sup> There is no possible way opposite sides of equal strengths could have been created from these disparately sized contingents without some redistribution of hoplites. Probably, then, the generals transferred troops amongst themselves to equalize these disparities at the same time as they divided up their responsibilities for the *plaision* – Xenophon and Timasion at the rear, Cheirisophus in the lead, Cleanor, Philesius, Sophaenetos, and Xanthicles supervising the flanks in unspecified teams of two.<sup>99</sup> As we have seen, over the course of the campaign there was a gradual breakdown of the original contingent identities and generals became less associated with particular contingents.<sup>100</sup> These processes may have begun here, as the army reorganized to march in *plaision*. If Xenophon does not specifically mention any redistribution of hoplites among the contingents, it may well be that he wished to gloss over any disputes that arose amongst the generals at this point. In any case, this is not the only place where he lets a redistribution of troops amongst the generals pass unremarked.<sup>101</sup>

The generals likely endured some wrangling to equalize the sizes of their contingents, but this was nothing compared to the challenges of actually marching in the formation. Here again, the notion of an unbroken square eight ranks deep on every side is artificial. The Cyrean hoplites undoubtedly tried to keep as tight a formation as possible, especially when under direct enemy attack, but they did not abandon their *lochos* structure to do so.<sup>102</sup> After all, the soldiers had been marching in *lochos* and contingent columns for eight months. Sophaenetos and his colleagues were accustomed to moving contingents as *lochoi*; even the newly elected generals had to have


<sup>97</sup> Cheirisophus: *An.* 1.4.3; Xenophon took over Proxenos' 1,500 hoplites (1.2.3); Timasion had 3,000 hoplites (Clearchus' original 1,000 plus 2,000 from Xenias and Pasion; see 1.2.9, 1.3.7, 1.4.7).

<sup>98</sup> Cleanor: now commanding Agias' contingent (formerly Xenias and Pasion's), about 2,300 hoplites and 300 peltasts; see Chapter [Three](#) for further discussion. Xanthicles: now leading Socrates' 500 hoplites (1.2.3, 3.1.47). Philesius: commanding Menon's remaining 900 hoplites (1.2.6, 1.2.25). Sophaenetos: still leading his original contingent of 1,000 hoplites (1.2.3). These figures do not include Sosis' 300 hoplites (1.2.9) and the 400 hoplite deserters from Abrocomas (1.4.3).

<sup>99</sup> *An.* 3.3.37–8. <sup>100</sup> For more on contingents and generals see Chapter [Three](#).

<sup>101</sup> Cf. Roy (1967) 291–2.

<sup>102</sup> For the *plaision* made up of *lochoi*, see *An.* 3.4.23. By way of comparison, the *tercio*, a sixteenth-century Spanish cousin of the *plaision*, also formed from companies of 120–150 men; see B. Hall (1997) 178.

Figure 6.4 *Plaision* formation

been familiar with the practice. Likewise, *lochagoi* like Arystas, trained to maneuver by *lochos*, had neither time nor inclination to practice an entirely new way of marching.

For Sophaenetus and his colleagues on the flanks, marching in *plaision* may not have been too different from marching in contingent column. Depending how long the flanks of the formation had to be, Sophaenetus could put his *lochoi* in column two or more abreast. There were clearly gaps between *lochoi*, perhaps as wide as the five meters or so typical in a marching column, for Xenophon explicitly mentions archers and slingers stationed to cover them.<sup>103</sup> These gaps enabled peltasts to slip out to skirmish, and to withdraw back within the *plaision* when under pressure.<sup>104</sup>

More difficult to reconstruct is the arrangement of contingents at the front and rear. Cheirisophus, for instance, could technically have marched his twenty-five or so *lochoi* in column on a wide frontage just one *lochos* deep (Figure 6.4a).<sup>105</sup> Marching in column would have made alignments and intervals easier to maintain, tired the soldiers less, and allowed for

<sup>103</sup> *An.* 3.4.15; cf. 5.4.22.

<sup>104</sup> *An.* 3.3.7–8, 3.4.26–30. Peltasts might also have been able to run out between the ranks of hoplite *lochoi*, but only when the *plaision* was stationary; cf. Gomme (1956) 614.

<sup>105</sup> 25 *lochoi* in column, each 4 men abreast, would produce a frontage of 100 meters, not counting any lateral gaps between *lochoi*.

greater speeds.<sup>106</sup> Aside from rendering the front of the square excessively deep, however, it would mean that only the four men in the front rank of each *lochos* could use their weapons. The only way for Cheirisophus to get more men from each *lochos* into battle would have been to switch units from column to line. Doing so would have required intervals of more than twenty meters between each *lochos*.<sup>107</sup> Intervals this large, however, would have allowed the front of the square to contract or expand its frontage rapidly and without disorder. This is inconsistent with Xenophon's remark that men at the front of the square found themselves squeezed out of place and thrown into confusion whenever the formation had to narrow its frontage to traverse defiles.<sup>108</sup> Indeed, if the front and rear of the square could easily change frontage, there would have been no need for the generals to create six picked *lochoi* to protect the army as it made its way across bridges and through defiles.<sup>109</sup>

Probably, then, Cheirisophus deployed his *lochoi* in four-deep phalanx line rather than in column, so each *lochos* could have its maximum combat frontage facing the enemy without having to rearrange itself (Figure 6.4b).<sup>110</sup> Marching cross-country in line was slower and more tiring than going in column, but the Cyreans had previously shown themselves up to the task.<sup>111</sup> There must have been lateral intervals between these *lochoi*, but not enough to allow the line to avoid disorder when it tried to shorten its frontage.<sup>112</sup> To reduce the overall length of his line Cheirisophus could either station a second line of *lochoi* behind the first, or form *lochoi* eight rather than four deep. At the rear of the formation, Xenophon and Timasion probably mirrored Cheirisophus' deployment.

Not all Cyreans marched in the four walls of the *plaision*. To begin with, the *suskeniai* within each *lochos* detached comrades to supervise pack animals or baggage, guard captives, or carry the wounded.<sup>113</sup> These soldiers, perhaps up to 600 or so of them, marched within the formation, along with a small number of slave servants and an indeterminate number of captives.<sup>114</sup> Modern reconstructions, taking Xenophon's description of pack animals and non-combatants "in the middle" overly literally, group

<sup>106</sup> For the advantages of column see Goldsworthy (1996) 139.

<sup>107</sup> A 100-man *lochos* in line 4 ranks deep would require 25 meters of lateral space; in column 4 abreast it would occupy only 4 meters of lateral space, thus requiring 10 additional meters on either side to open up into line.

<sup>108</sup> *An.* 3.4.19–20. <sup>109</sup> See Chapter Four for more about the picked *lochoi*.

<sup>110</sup> Four-deep battle line was the Cyrean standard (*An.* 1.2.15), but cf. 7.1.23. <sup>111</sup> *An.* 1.7.14, 2.3.10.

<sup>112</sup> *An.* 3.4.15, 3.4.19–21, cf. Goldsworthy (1996) 139–40. <sup>113</sup> *An.* 3.2.28, 3.4.32–3.

<sup>114</sup> See note 60 above for the number of detached *suskenoi*. On servants and other non-combatants see Chapter Ten.

these personnel and animals into a single large mass at the exact center of the formation.<sup>115</sup> There are, though, reasons to suspect that soldiers and commanders preferred to keep non-combatants and animals closer by.

Stationing animals and gear close by, within a few meters of the inner edge of the square, had several advantages.<sup>116</sup> Ordinary soldiers would not have to run all the way to the center of the square and back every time they wanted something, and the *lochagoi* would not have to keep constant track of who had left the formation and how long it would take them to return. The peltasts, archers, and slingers especially would have found it much easier to replenish their ammunition if spare missiles were kept as close to the edge of the square as possible. As well, it would have been much easier for men to keep an eye on possessions only a few steps away. Indeed, the presence of their belongings might make them more likely to stand and fight.<sup>117</sup> Furthermore, a single large mass of animals, porters, captives, and so on would have required far more official supervision, perhaps even a general's attention.<sup>118</sup> The generals had enough to do just keeping the square itself in order, and they likely preferred to leave animals and non-combatants in the hands of the *lochagoi*. More likely, then, a contingent's train scattered in an irregular zone behind whatever portion of the *plaision* the contingent occupied.

The Cyrean light infantry and cavalry normally took positions outside the *plaision*, or in the gaps between *lochoi*. Their exact dispositions cannot be ascertained, but probably most were stationed at the front and the rear, where Persian attacks were most frequent. A central reserve of peltasts was also stationed inside the *plaision*, apparently close enough to the front that it could be quickly summoned when needed.<sup>119</sup> If enemy pressure grew too great, the light troops could withdraw within the hoplite lines of the square. The six picked *lochoi* created to enable the square to traverse defiles more easily also on occasion marched outside the rest of the hoplite line.<sup>120</sup>

Putting this assembly of hoplites, light troops, and baggage into motion required vastly more skill from Sophaenetus and his colleagues than did marching as separate contingents. For one thing, the entire formation had to start and stop as a body. If the flanks of the *plaision* were about 316 men long, the last rank of the rear face would not begin moving until at least five

<sup>115</sup> See *An.* 3.3.6 for "in the middle." <sup>116</sup> For baggage kept close to a unit cf. *Cyr.* 6.3.4.

<sup>117</sup> *An.* 7.8.16; cf. the Centrites River crossing (4.3.30), where separating troops from their baggage caused men designated to stay in ranks to go off looking for their animals and gear.

<sup>118</sup> For the weakness of official baggage supervision in the army see Chapter Five.

<sup>119</sup> *An.* 3.3.7–8, 3.4.28–9, 3.4.39–43. <sup>120</sup> *An.* 3.4.21–2.

minutes after the front of the square stepped off.<sup>121</sup> On the march, if the soldiers maintained their customary intervals of two meters between ranks and one meter of lateral space between files, the whole formation would be at a minimum some 650 meters long by 300 meters wide.<sup>122</sup> The Cyreans probably had to stop frequently to realign *lochos* ranks and files, especially after changing direction or crossing uneven ground. Moreover, these stops had to be longer than usual in order to give the rearmost troops at least some semblance of a proper rest.

As the army made its way past Nimrud and Nineveh (Xenophon, ignorant of their real names, called them Larisa and Mespila) and into the hill country of the upper Tigris, the generals must have gotten better at managing the formation's movement and halts. The gently rolling slopes of the Tigris' north bank let them march close to the river, ensuring a ready supply of water and guarding the left flank of the square from Persian attack. When the time came to peel off from the Tigris into the hill country, they could use the hills on their right to protect that flank.<sup>123</sup> The soldiers too probably became accustomed to the constricted formation. Still, Sophaneus and his colleagues might have tried to ease the strain of marching in a single block by opening the intervals between the square's component columns whenever no Persian forces threatened, while keeping all contingents close enough that they could quickly reassemble if the enemy hove into sight.<sup>124</sup>

When Persian forces appeared, the *plaision* saved the Cyreans from being outflanked, but at a cost. Hoplites on the front and left faces of the formation could cover themselves with their shields while marching, but not those on the right and rear.<sup>125</sup> If the square halted whenever enemy troops got close enough to launch missiles, so that the rear and right hoplites could turn to face the attack, the Cyreans would never have gotten anywhere.

<sup>121</sup> Assuming flanks 12 *lochoi* long, each *lochos* arranged in column 4 abreast and 25 deep, plus 8 ranks at each of the overlapping front and rear sides of the square, for a total of 316 ranks. At one second per rank, the whole square would be in motion after 5 minutes and 15 seconds, not including time for intervals between *lochoi*.

<sup>122</sup> Assuming 316 ranks at 2-meter intervals and a frontage of 12 *lochoi* each 25 men abreast, again without allowing for intervals between *lochoi*.

<sup>123</sup> Bennett (2001) 14 provides comparative examples of moving squares exploiting terrain in this fashion.

<sup>124</sup> This practice is perhaps implied by *An.* 3.4.42, where the front and rear were far enough apart that troops could not be speedily moved between them. Xenophon's narrative (3.3.6–3.4.43) does not list every formation change the army made on the way up the Tigris, but since marching in column was faster, less tiring, and easier to manage, it is reasonable to assume the Cyreans did not remain in *plaision* when they did not have to.

<sup>125</sup> It seems impossible the right or rear hoplites could march any appreciable distance walking backwards or sidestepping, but see note 133 below for a tactic available to small bodies of troops.

Probably, then, the soldiers on these sides of the formation had to continue marching without the protection of their shields. Recognizing this vulnerability, the Persians focused their efforts on the army's rear, as evident from the large number of casualties Tissaphernes' archers and slingers inflicted there.<sup>126</sup> The only solution was to keep the Persians out of missile range by launching sorties with light troops, cavalry, and the most agile of the hoplites. Even so, the army had to halt periodically lest it leave these rearguard forces too far behind the main body.<sup>127</sup> So successful were the Persians initially that a mere 600 men under Mithradates were able to keep the Cyreans from traveling more than twenty-five stades (3.75–5 km) in an entire day.<sup>128</sup> Later, the Cyreans warded off some enemy advances by deploying Rhodian slingers with superior range, but even these could not prevent every attack.<sup>129</sup>

Since Sophænetus' contingent held one of the flanks of the square, Arystas and his *lochitai* missed the worst of these attacks. If they were on the left, they were doubly lucky, with their shields and the Tigris to protect them, but if on the right, they marched bereft of the cover of their shields. A few might have ventured carrying the heavy discs on their right arms or rigging leather straps to sling them across their right sides.<sup>130</sup> Arystas did not have to deal with the larger complexities of the *plaision*, but the dense formation forced him to pay constant attention to his soldiers' alignment. When Persian cavalry got close to his sector, he also had to keep an eye out for anyone slipping away from ranks on the pretext of fetching something from the baggage. If one of his soldiers fell wounded, Arystas probably also tried to prevent more than the minimum number of *suskenoi* from dropping out of column to carry their incapacitated comrade. At least his casualties had friends close by; the peltasts out there skirmishing with the Persians had little chance of retrieval if they fell.<sup>131</sup> As he watched the peltasts come tumbling back, dust-covered and panting, from yet another sortie outside the square, Arystas must have been thankful that he was not amongst them.

Whatever its drawbacks, marching in *plaision* got the Cyreans out of Mesopotamia alive. They probably used it again on their way through Chalybia, where hostile locals continually harried the army's rear, just as Mithradates and Tissaphernes had done. On the plains of Bithynia, they employed a similar hollow phalanx formation to protect themselves against Pharnabazus' cavalry while they buried the dead of Neon's failed foraging

<sup>126</sup> *An.* 3.3.7, 3.4.18–19, 3.4.25–9, 3.4.40.

<sup>127</sup> *An.* 3.3.8–16.

<sup>128</sup> *An.* 3.3.11.

<sup>129</sup> *An.* 3.4.16–20.

<sup>130</sup> Lendle (1995) 484.

<sup>131</sup> See Chapter Nine for more on the retrieval and carrying of wounded.



expedition and collected provisions.<sup>132</sup> And on the way back from their foiled attempt to capture Asidates in Mysia, Xenophon and a small band of plunderers formed *plaision* one last time; they even found a way to keep shields facing the enemy on all sides as they marched.<sup>133</sup> Brasidas may have been the first to use the hollow square formation, but later military writers associated it with Xenophon above all others.<sup>134</sup>

#### MARCHING THROUGH ANATOLIA

On the trek across Anatolia, the Cyreans continued to employ the marching formations they had developed earlier in the campaign. Terrain and the enemy exerted the most influence on the generals' choice of formation, but in snowbound Armenia, the weather became an increasingly important factor.

The first effect of rugged terrain was to force the Cyreans to narrow and lengthen their march column. The road into Carduchia, for instance, was so narrow and winding that it took the army all day, perhaps twelve hours, just to cross a single mountain pass.<sup>135</sup> In such terrain, *lochoi* had to march two men abreast or even single file, and there was no room for a parallel file of pack animals. That was why Sophænetus and his colleagues were so eager to strip the soldiers of the livestock and captives they had taken in Mesopotamia. True, this human and animal booty required too much attention and consumed too much food, but the key problem in Carduchia was how it lengthened the column.<sup>136</sup>

Even after this reduction of excess baggage, the terrain caused problems, for some roads were impassable to pack trains.<sup>137</sup> In response the generals sometimes assembled the army's remaining transport into a group,

<sup>132</sup> Chalybia: *An.* 4.7.17–18; Bithynia: 6.5.4–7, cf. Lendle (1995) 397. The formation adopted for the Centrites River crossing (4.3.13–34), with baggage and non-combatants protected by a van and rearguard, represents a modified version of the *plaision*, the river itself taking the place of flank contingents.

<sup>133</sup> *An.* 7.8.16–18. How exactly the troops managed to retreat, moving in a circle (*poreuomenoi kuklō*) with shields facing the enemy (7.8.18), is difficult to imagine; Lendle (1998) envisages a complicated caracole, each side of the *plaision* alternately taking the lead as the others marched around clockwise behind it.

<sup>134</sup> Brasidas: Thuc. 4.125; later writers: Arr. *Anab.* 1.4.2, 4.5.6, Arr. *Tact.* 29.7–8. Xenophon perhaps taught Agesilaus the tactic; see *Hell.* 4.3.4.

<sup>135</sup> *An.* 4.1.10; despite about 11½ hours of mid-October daylight, the rearguard did not reach bivouac until dark.

<sup>136</sup> *An.* 4.1.13; on open ground (3.4.36–37, 4.2.13) the Cyreans could march rapidly even with captives and livestock.

<sup>137</sup> *An.* 4.2.10–12. Since the army by this point had no wagons or carts (3.3.1), the Carduchian paths must have been truly terrible.

protecting it with troops at front and rear. For *suskeniai* with pack animals, this could not have been a welcome step; it meant separation from valuable gear, clothing, and food for the entire marching day. That being so, *suskenoi* must have entrusted supervision of their mule or donkey to a tough, capable comrade, with the reminder that the group's survival might depend on the preservation of the animal and its precious cargo.<sup>138</sup> *Suskeniai* without pack animals either tossed away all non-essentials, or attempted to strike deals with more fortunate neighbors ("carry my gear on your donkey and I'll pay you back in firewood," for example). Probably each *suskenia* tried to get its transport and non-combatants back under its own supervision as soon as the terrain allowed. Indeed, Xenophon makes no mention of a single large train after the departure from Carduchia, probably because the more open terrain from Armenia northward again allowed *lochoi* to retain animals and non-combatants close at hand.<sup>139</sup>

Constricted terrain compelled fewer and longer halts. Given room enough by the roadside, a contingent could pull over for an hourly rest without impeding the movement of troops behind it.<sup>140</sup> If so, the army could maintain steady progress, some units resting while others leapfrogged past. Without room to pull over, though, the entire army would have to start and stop as a body. In this situation, many minutes could elapse before the last men in the last *lochos* of the column took their final steps. By then the men of the lead *lochoi* would already be back on their feet. So the army might have to advance in a series of peristaltic pulses, some units just sitting down while others were just getting up. The generals could open the intervals between contingents to compensate for the narrow road, but with hostile Carduchians all around, spreading out too widely could be fatal.

In rough terrain, Sophaenetes and his colleagues also had to pay closer attention to their speed. Imagine, for example, the Cyrean column marching up and over a ridge. The column would slow on the upward slope, but as men crested the ridge and began to descend, they would inevitably accelerate.<sup>141</sup> This small change in velocity could resonate its way back through the entire army, growing in magnitude as it went, and forcing the last men in the column into a run to catch up with the units ahead. If the generals were paying attention, they modulated the pace at the head of column to

<sup>138</sup> This helps explain the vehemence with which the mule-driving soldier (*An.* 5.8.6–7) protested Xenophon's commandeering of his animal.

<sup>139</sup> See Chapter Five for more on this pattern.

<sup>140</sup> Sheldon (1904) 17, United States Army (1990) 4.9.

<sup>141</sup> On this "accordion effect" see United States Army (1990) 4.9–10; cf. Onas. 6.5.

prevent this effect.<sup>142</sup> They could also order units to slow down in order to preserve proper marching intervals.<sup>143</sup>

Rough terrain when combined with enemy threats presented additional challenges. In the Carduchian mountains, for instance, it was impossible to form line of battle against hostile troops. The Cyreans therefore resorted to advancing with *lochoi* still in march columns (*orthioi lochoi*).<sup>144</sup> *Lochos* columns could move more quickly and with less disorder than a single unbroken line, each *lochos* clambering uphill individually where the terrain allowed. Furthermore, if gaps were left between *lochoi*, the army could extend its frontage to outflank or surround any opposing force; enemies who tried to take advantage of a gap to catch a *lochos* in the side would themselves be vulnerable to a flanking attack from the next *lochos* over.<sup>145</sup> The *lochagoi*, who probably had a better feel for how their units took the terrain than did the generals, seem to have taken the lead in using marching formations for combat movement, but the advantages of the technique quickly became clear to the generals and soon the whole army was maneuvering in battle still formed in *orthioi lochoi*.<sup>146</sup>

Although every *lochos* in the army saw its share of combat along the way to the sea, the van and rearguard often bore the brunt of the fighting. In constricted terrain, this was because hostile forces were either blocking the route ahead, or snapping at the heels of the army as it passed.<sup>147</sup> Once the Cyreans left Carduchia, the more open landscape of Armenia and northern Anatolia allowed the whole army space to deploy when enemy troops appeared ahead, so the vanguard rarely fought on its own.<sup>148</sup> The rearguard, in contrast, probably continued to see combat more frequently, as locals sought to hurry the army on its way.<sup>149</sup> Sometimes rearguard units marched at a considerable distance behind the main body, to set ambushes and capture guides.<sup>150</sup> Fortunately, none of the peoples the Cyreans encountered between Armenia and the sea possessed cavalry, so the main body of the army was usually able to continue marching in contingent columns, protected by the rearguard screen of hoplites and peltasts, rather than being forced to form a *plaision*.<sup>151</sup>

The prominent position of the van and rearguard in the *Anabasis* stems at least partly from Xenophon's command of the rear and his favorable

<sup>142</sup> *An.* 4.1.17, *Cyr.* 4.2.28.      <sup>143</sup> *An.* 4.2.16.

<sup>144</sup> *An.* 4.2.4, 4.2.8–9, 4.2.11–12; for *orthioi lochoi* as marching columns, see 4.6.6.

<sup>145</sup> *An.* 4.8.10–13; see Chapter Four for more details.      <sup>146</sup> *An.* 4.2.4, 4.2.8–9, 4.3.17, 4.8.10–15.

<sup>147</sup> *An.* 4.1.10, 4.1.16–18, 4.2.20–1, 4.2.24–5.      <sup>148</sup> *An.* 4.6.6, 4.8.9.

<sup>149</sup> *An.* 4.5.16–18, 4.7.17, 4.7.22; cf. 4.5.16–18.      <sup>150</sup> *An.* 4.6.17, 4.7.22, 5.2.29.

<sup>151</sup> In western Armenia Tiribazus initially met the Cyreans with a small troop of horse (*An.* 4.4.4), but these never reappear.

presentation of Cheirisophus, commander of the van.<sup>152</sup> Even so, it seems unlikely that Xenophon glossed over substantial fighting on the part of the army's main body. If the Carduchians, for example, had mustered sufficient warriors to assail the Cyreans all along the flanks of their marching column, the army would have been exterminated.<sup>153</sup> Certainly there were moments when small bands of Carduchians approached the flanks of the main body to discharge their missiles, but this scattered harassment was far less intense than the pressure put on the rearguard.<sup>154</sup> Likewise, an enemy assault against the flanks of the scattered Cyrean column on the Armenian plain would have chopped the army to bits. Xenophon may exaggerate his own performance, but his overall depiction of the rearguard's prominence cannot be completely false.

While Cheirisophus, Timasion, and Xenophon with the van and rearguard covered the Cyrean march across central Anatolia, the open landscape probably allowed the other generals to resume marching in contingent columns. In order to facilitate march scheduling, the generals may have tried to maintain columns of roughly equal size, perhaps by redistributing *lochoi* as needed. As on the way to Cunaxa, they preferred to march on as broad a front as possible to reduce the overall length of the column, although as the soldiers' numbers dwindled, this became less and less of a concern. Weather conditions, for example the deep snows of western and central Armenia, sometimes compelled a narrower, longer column.<sup>155</sup> It was easier to tramp down a single route through the snow, successive *lochoi* flattening and widening the path, than for each unit to blaze its own trail.<sup>156</sup> To prevent exhaustion, well-trained modern armies rotate their units in and out of the lead when marching in deep snow, but the Cyreans, being unused to winter conditions, may not have done likewise.<sup>157</sup> In any case, cold and snow clearly took their toll on the army's marching cohesion. At one point, units spread out so much that the lead elements had time to bivouac, unpack, and build large fires before the rest of the army arrived.<sup>158</sup> Elsewhere, soldiers simply quit marching, rolled up in their cloaks, and collapsed into the white drifts.<sup>159</sup>

Sophaenetes and the other generals had to deal with the effects of terrain, enemies, and weather on the army as a whole, but the concerns of Arystas

<sup>152</sup> Roy (1968a) 158–9.      <sup>153</sup> *An.* 4.1.11.      <sup>154</sup> *An.* 4.1.16.

<sup>155</sup> Xenophon mentions snow (*An.* 4.5.4) a fathom (*orgua*: the length of a man's outstretched arms) deep, but its full extent was only visible where fires had melted holes down to the ground (4.5.6).

<sup>156</sup> *An.* 4.5.19–20 implies a tramped path perhaps several *lochoi* wide, for Xenophon in moving along the column was able to bypass units whose men had collapsed in the snow.

<sup>157</sup> United States Army (1968) III.      <sup>158</sup> *An.* 4.5.5–6.      <sup>159</sup> *An.* 4.5.19–21.

and his *lochitai* were far more immediate. Each day, Arystas had to kick his men out of their exhausted slumbers, prod them to pack, get them in ranks, keep them moving, make sure they rested enough but not too much, lead them into bivouac. He tried – probably not always successfully – to ensure his soldiers paid as much attention to his orders as they did to injured comrades, to pack animals and gear, or to companions they might have picked up along the way. The generals, with access to scouts' reports and prisoner interrogations, might have an idea of what lay over the next hill, and they might brief the *lochagoi*, but unless the officers passed on the information to their units, the average soldier knew nothing more than the same routine, an average of five parasangs a day, day after seemingly endless day. All the while the ranks of Arystas' *lochos* thinned – a man or two felled by Carduchian arrows, several frozen to death in Armenia, others brought down and beheaded by the Chalybians. *Suskenoi* still fell into ranks next to each other, but probably they marched in silence, heads down against the cold, thinking of home and wondering how long it might be before their tattered sandals finally gave out. Xenophon remembered the names of tribes fought, rivers crossed, mountains climbed. Perhaps Arystas and his soldiers shared his interest in these geographical details; more likely, though, the only name they wanted to hear was that of the Euxine, the "hospitable sea."

#### MARCHING AND SAILING

Once the Cyreans reached the Black Sea coast in January 400, the speed and comfort of sailing beckoned. From the moment they reached Trapezus, the soldiers became intent on sailing rather than walking the rest of the way home.<sup>160</sup> To do so, however, they had to collect ships to carry themselves, their non-combatants, and their gear. Cheirisophus volunteered to go west in search of his compatriot Anaxibius, commander of the Spartan fleet, who he hoped would dispatch triremes and merchanters enough to carry the army. He would not rejoin the army until many months later at Cotyora, having failed to secure anything beyond vague promises from Anaxibius.<sup>161</sup>

While they waited, the Cyreans set about acquiring ships after their own fashion. Having obtained (Xenophon does not say how) two war galleys from the Trapezuntians, the soldiers turned to piracy.<sup>162</sup> Dexippus the Laconian *perioikos*, assigned to captain the larger of the two warships,

<sup>160</sup> *An.* 5.1.2–3.

<sup>161</sup> *An.* 5.1.4, 6.1.16.

<sup>162</sup> *An.* 5.1.15–16.

immediately absconded, leaving Xenophon fuming. The remaining galley, under the command of the evocatively named Athenian Polycrates, set about seizing merchant ships in the waters around Trapezus; the Cyreans commandeered the cargos and pressed the vessels into their own service.<sup>163</sup>

Polycrates' net dragged in a variety of vessels, from small coastal packets able to carry no more than a dozen men and their gear, to seagoing freighters with cargo capacities of a hundred metric tons or more.<sup>164</sup> The largest ships may have accommodated hundreds of passengers each; these could also take the army's hundred or so horses, and perhaps some of the fittest pack animals.<sup>165</sup> Soldiers and animals, however, could not be stacked in holds like amphorae, and some refitting must have been required to make freighters suitable as troop transports. The number of passengers each vessel could carry also depended on the length of any intended voyage: on a short day hop many men might cram together on deck, but if there was going to be any overnight sailing, each ship had to embark fewer people in order to leave room for eating and sleeping.<sup>166</sup> There were probably enough Cyreans with nautical experience that crewing ships was no problem; any shortfall could be made up with captured local mariners, who were also invaluable informants on Black Sea winds, currents, shoals, and anchorages.<sup>167</sup>

After more than a month, Polycrates had still not collected enough ships to transport the entire army. Nonetheless, the Cyreans, having stripped the region around Trapezus, had to depart westward in search of provisions. While Sophænetus and Philesius took charge of the ships, embarking on them the sick and injured, other non-combatants, soldiers over forty, and non-essential baggage, the army's main body advanced towards Cerasus, some fifty kilometers away. After rendezvousing at Cerasus, ships and troops

<sup>163</sup> *An.* 5.1.16–17; the sixth-century Samian tyrant Polycrates (*Hdt.* 3.39, *Thuc.* 3.104) was notorious as a pirate.

<sup>164</sup> Packets: perhaps about the size of the fourth-century Kyrenia ship, 14 m long and 4.2 m abeam; see Katzev and Katzev (1989) 174, Casson (1995) 335–8, 455–9. The boat Clearetus and his *suskenoi* acquired (5.7.15) was probably of this sort. Freighters: similar to the fifth-century wreck from Alonnesos, with an estimated cargo of 120 metric tons; see Casson (1995) 171–2, Hadjidaki (1997) 132.

<sup>165</sup> Saint Paul, by way of comparison, traveled to Rome on a grain freighter carrying 276 passengers; see Casson (1995) 172 n. 26. The Cyreans had 40 cavalry at Heracleia (6.2.16), which the army reached by ship; each cavalryman may have had more than one mount, and there were additional horses distributed throughout the army (4.5.35–6). Though Xenophon does not mention seaborne transport of pack animals, *Diod.* 14.31.1 does. On horse transports cf. Morrison et al. (2000) 156–7.

<sup>166</sup> Casson (1995) 178–81; cf. *Oec.* 8.11–16.

<sup>167</sup> Xenophon's use of nautical imagery in his speech at Cotyora (*An.* 5.8.20–21) suggests many of the mercenaries knew the basics of sea travel.

again proceeded westward in tandem for about 130 kilometers, passing Mossynoecia, coastal Chalybia, and Tibarenia on their way to Cotyora.<sup>168</sup>

Organizing the seaborne portion of the army presented a new set of challenges. First, vessels had to be crewed and loaded. Trapezus had quays and harbor facilities, but even so, embarking perhaps a thousand or more soldiers and non-combatants, along with baggage and booty, could have required hours.<sup>169</sup> Next, there was the question of sailing formation. Dexippus' desertion evidently inspired similar thoughts throughout the army, and if ships, especially smaller and faster ones, were permitted to weigh anchor individually, there was little to stop them from following his example.<sup>170</sup> Philesius and Sophaenetos therefore had an interest in keeping the flotilla together and under their thumbs. They may have organized ships in columns, perhaps putting slower vessels in the lead to force everyone to sail at the same speed and hinder individual attempts at desertion.<sup>171</sup> Not all ships needed to depart simultaneously for this tactic to work, and just as the army marched by contingents on land, perhaps the two generals divided the available ships between themselves for easier handling.<sup>172</sup>

Loading ships and forming convoys, then, could consume much of a morning. Once Sophaenetos and Philesius got under way, though, they could proceed far more quickly than their colleagues on land. Sailing speed depended on the wind and on the flotilla's formation, but even at only 4 knots (7.4 km per hour), Sophaenetos and company could have reached Cerasus – several day's march away – in less than seven hours of continuous sailing; from Cerasus to Cotyora was only about eighteen hours more.<sup>173</sup> Rather than sailing full speed, however, the seaborne portion of the army kept pace with the marching contingents, much as the Persian

<sup>168</sup> *An.* 5.3.1–2. Cerasus is probably modern Vakfikebir; see Naval Intelligence Division (1943) II.54, Lendle (1995) 311. Cotyora is modern Ordu; see Naval Intelligence Division (1943) II.44–6, Lendle (1995) 311.

<sup>169</sup> Assuming about 500 sick and injured (*An.* 7.2.6–7), about 500 slaves, servants, and companions (see Chapter Ten), and perhaps 500–750 soldiers over 40 (see Chapter Three). For cargo loading see Casson (1995) 361–3, Cariolou (1997) 96.

<sup>170</sup> Note the plan of Clearetos and his *suskenoi* (*An.* 5.7.15), discussed in Chapter Four. Fear of desertion also explains why the Cyreans did not simply shuttle entire contingents westward one after another: there was nothing to prevent those on the first trip from sailing off into the sunset, abandoning the troops still waiting their turn.

<sup>171</sup> For a similar arrangement on land cf. *An.* 7.3.38.

<sup>172</sup> At Cerasus (*An.* 5.7.17), for example, some ships were still waiting to set out, while others had already departed.

<sup>173</sup> Sailing speed: Lendle (1995) 311, Manfredi (1986), and Casson (1995) 288 give average speeds between 4 and 6 knots (7.4–11.1 km/h) for individual ships; a lower figure is probably better given the need to keep formation and the dangers of coastal waters. For speed of fleets under sail, see Casson (1995) 292–6.

fleet and army cooperated during their advance into northern Greece in 480 BC.<sup>174</sup> Sophaenetus and Philesius then rendezvoused with their colleagues each evening and set up a beachside camp.<sup>175</sup> This explains why the Mossynoecians were able to see the Cyreans' female companions (*hetairai*), even though these women had embarked on ships at Trapezus.<sup>176</sup> Without proper port facilities, it would have been difficult to unload ships completely at these intermediate stops, but soldiers could still bring gear and rations ashore across the beach, perhaps using skiffs or lighters to ferry equipment in from ships anchored offshore.<sup>177</sup> The next morning, the main body could start marching early while the flotilla stayed behind to reload; with their superior speed, the ships could easily catch up with the marching troops in time for the evening's bivouac.

#### CONVEYING THE WHOLE ARMY BY SEA

After a month and a half at Cotyora, the Cyreans finally got their hands on sufficient ships to transport themselves, their gear, and their companions entirely by sea. The army at this point mustered over 8,000 in ranks, and Xenophon avers at least 100 vessels were required to carry it.<sup>178</sup> This was many times the number of ships Sophaenetus and Philesius had commanded from Trapezus to Cotyora, and the challenges of organizing and loading such an armada were commensurately greater. Each ship also had to be stocked with several days' worth of water, firewood, and food, for the Cyreans did not intend to stop on their way westward from Cotyora.<sup>179</sup> Finding sailors for the many new vessels was no problem: both the Sinopeans and Heracleots were eager to get rid of the army as quickly as possible, and the ships they furnished must have arrived already crewed.<sup>180</sup>

Once out of harbor, the Cyreans traveled enormous distances. From Cotyora to Harmene in Sinopean territory, for example, was about 300 kilometers, yet with favorable winds at their backs the Cyreans reached harbor in less than forty-eight hours.<sup>181</sup> There was a five-day stop at

<sup>174</sup> For the Persian fleet and army see Hdt. 7.121.

<sup>175</sup> At one point (*An.* 5.4.11–15) friendly Mossynoecians arrived by canoe then marched straight through the Cyrean camp, indicating its proximity to the shore.

<sup>176</sup> *An.* 5.3.2, 5.4.33.

<sup>177</sup> Much ancient coastal traffic worked across beaches in this fashion; see Casson (1995) 361–3.

<sup>178</sup> *An.* 5.7.8, 6.1.14.

<sup>179</sup> Planning to travel without stops was a corollary of the soldiers' resistance to any suggestion of founding a colony; see *An.* 5.7.7–9 and cf. 5.6.6–10.

<sup>180</sup> *An.* 5.6.31, 5.7.35.

<sup>181</sup> *An.* 6.1.14–15, Lendle (1995) 364–5. An easterly coastal current in this region may have delayed Cyrean progress; see Manfredi (1986) 239.



Harmene, occasioned by poor weather and Cheirisophus' reappearance.<sup>182</sup> Soon, though, the Cyreans put out to sea again, covering the 400 kilometers from Harmene to Heracleia in about two days and nights.<sup>183</sup> Leon of Thurii, who at Trapezus had stirred the army with his evocation of Odysseus sailing home stretched out on deck, must have thought his wish had finally come true.<sup>184</sup>

The abundance of ships during this period was a boon for anyone wanting to escape from the squabbling that began at Cotyora and intensified at Heracleia. Men with cash to spare, notably the soothsayer Silanus, hired passage home and sailed off in defiance of the army's ban on desertion.<sup>185</sup> Others, fortunate enough to acquire a boat of their own, gathered *suskenoi* and belongings and slipped away from the fleet at night.<sup>186</sup> As squabbling turned into open faction, the ships the Cyreans had so painstakingly collected were scattered.<sup>187</sup> Indeed, during the Arcadian–Achaean secession, both Xenophon's force of some 2,000 men and the Arcadian–Achaean force of about 4,000 hoplites had to procure new ships in order to sail westward from Heracleia.<sup>188</sup> Probably the Heracleots themselves furnished these transports. They were, after all, eager to get the various factions out of their territory, and therefore more than happy to provide ferry service. One flotilla landed the Arcadians and Achaeans near Calpe Harbor, while another carried Xenophon and his men to Heracleia's boundary with Bithynian Thrace. Having discharged their passengers, the Heracleots headed for home, leaving the Cyreans without any ships at all.<sup>189</sup>

As things turned out, the Cyreans still had two water passages ahead: from Chrysopolis to Byzantium in winter 400–399, and then back across

<sup>182</sup> *An.* 6.1.16, 6.1.33.

<sup>183</sup> *An.* 6.2.1, Naval Intelligence Division (1943) II.38–9, Manfredi (1986) 240.

<sup>184</sup> *An.* 5.1.2. <sup>185</sup> *An.* 5.6.32–4, 6.4.13.

<sup>186</sup> See *An.* 5.7.15 for an unsuccessful attempt of this sort.

<sup>187</sup> Xenophon is clearly not telling the whole story of the army's ships. Although he castigates Dexippus for appropriating one of the Cyrean galleys, he says nothing about what Polycrates did with the other galley after Trapezus (*An.* 5.1.15–16). Polycrates conveniently disappears for the duration of the journey west to Byzantium, only to reappear in Thrace during the initial negotiations with Seuthes (7.2.17). Now, Xenophon needed some way to carry the tithe (*dekateōn*) he received at Cerasus (5.3.6). This was a sizeable sum, enough to buy a tripod at Delphi and to pay for land, a temple, and an altar at Scillus (5.3.5–9). What better way for Xenophon to safeguard this cash than to load it onto a warship captained by Polycrates, who aside from being a fellow Athenian (4.5.24) was his most trusted *lochagos* (7.2.29–30) and willing mouthpiece (7.6.41)? With a swift galley, Polycrates could easily have taken the money to Ephesus, where Xenophon claims to have later deposited the *dekateōn* (5.3.6), and returned to the Propontis in time to participate in the negotiations with Seuthes. Polycrates' absence on such a mission would also explain why the Cyreans at Calpe did not again collect ships through piracy, even though there were merchanters aplenty plying the waters in the area (6.4.18, 6.5.1).

<sup>188</sup> *An.* 6.2.17–19. For details of the secession see Chapter [Three](#).

<sup>189</sup> *An.* 6.3.14, 6.4.12.

the Propontis to Lampsacus in spring 399.<sup>190</sup> Otherwise the army marched. There was nothing new in the way of formation or routine during this last period of the campaign. Rather, the army displayed how well it had learned its previous lessons, especially in night movement and in the use of *plaision* formation.

#### MARCHING AND THE *LOCHOS*

Marching belonged to the *lochos*. Throughout the campaign, in good weather or bad, on plains or in mountains, the generals maneuvered the army not in a disorganized mass but as formed *lochoi*. They organized their contingents, scheduled their daily departures, and timed their halts in terms of *lochoi*. The *lochos* was the basis of every Cyrean hoplite formation, whether phalanx line, marching column, or *plaision*. Van, rearguard, and main body all moved in blocks of *lochoi*. Only the army's light troops escaped the dominance of *lochos* structure, although they too sometimes marched in column and always had to take account of the limits of the *lochos*.

For Arystas and his fellow *lochagoi*, the *lochos* meant control. With his hoplites assembled in column or line, Arystas controlled the very direction and pace of their marching lives. Certainly there were times on the march when soldiers escaped his supervision, but by and large they had no choice but to acquiesce to submergence into the ranks and files of their unit. Even the most vocal and independent-minded group of *suskenoi* had to submit to Arystas' orders, if only because remaining in formation enhanced its chances of survival. The generals had to worry about the overall progress of the army, but the vision of each *lochos* was far narrower. Beyond the faces of comrades to left and right, the familiar outline of the man ahead, the clank and creak of equipment, and the tramping of *lochitai* behind, the average hoplite saw and heard little of the bigger picture. On the march, a man's *lochos* was his world.

<sup>190</sup> *An.* 7.1.7, 7.8.1.

## CHAPTER 7

### *Resting*

When the marching day ended, the Cyreans had to make camp. Whether they stopped for a night or for several months, they expected their camps to provide shelter and safety, a refuge from the grind of marching and fighting. In camp, the soldiers did most or all of their cooking, cleaned and maintained their equipment, groomed and fed their animals. Camps were also the bases from which troops set out to forage for water, fuel, or food. It was in camp, not on the march, that the Cyreans carried on most of their social and political life.

Anyone interested in Roman army camps will find plenty to satisfy their curiosity, from literary descriptions to visual representations to the remains of camps permanent and temporary. In contrast, archaeological evidence for classical Greek military camps is virtually non-existent and literary testimony scarce at best. What little evidence ancient texts provide, moreover, refers not to the unified doctrine of a single military institution, but to a diversity of *poleis*, each with its own customs. Xenophon furnishes more information than most – his *Cyropaedia* briefly describes the layout of an ideal Persian camp, and the *Constitution of the Lacedaemonians* outlines some of the fourth-century Spartan army's camp organization. If the *Anabasis* brims with stories set against the backdrop of bivouac, though, it never explicitly describes how the Cyreans arranged their halting places. Only by comparing Xenophon's fragmentary evidence with the practices of other ancient armies and by making some practical calculations can we reconstruct the outlines and evolution of the mercenaries' bivouacking behavior.

#### CAMPING WITH CYRUS

During the first two periods of the campaign, from Sardis to Thapsacus, and thence to Cunaxa, the mercenaries made camp where Cyrus told them. The prince knew the terrain well – he had after all traveled repeatedly between

Sardis and Babylon – and wherever he had not chosen bivouacs in advance he could easily send riders ahead to reconnoiter suitable sites for his army to pass the night.

The best *stathmos*, or halting place, was accessible, level, and healthy.<sup>1</sup> It had to be large enough to accommodate more than 30,000 troops and perhaps 5,000 animals, with sufficient water, fuel, and fodder nearby.<sup>2</sup> Except in hostile Lycaonia, security did not rank high on the list of *stathmos* criteria until the army began its advance down the Euphrates. The prince's Persian troops perhaps entrenched or palisaded their camp, but there is no indication the mercenaries did likewise.<sup>3</sup> Since Cyrus had a strong cavalry, probably they relied on his mounted vedettes to warn of any approaching foe.

Every few days Cyrus brought his troops to a town, an estate, or villages, where they could replenish food supplies through purchase or requisition, rest feet and hooves, and perhaps patronize the local taverns and prostitutes.<sup>4</sup> Up to Myriandus, Cyrus normally rested his forces after two to six days of marching. These pauses lasted at least three days, although substantially longer halts occurred when the army was waiting to rendezvous with approaching contingents or emissaries, or when his mercenaries were riven by internal dissension.<sup>5</sup> In hostile regions like Lycaonia, the army could go over a week without halting more than a night at a time. From Myriandus onward, Cyrus continued periodically to rest his army for at least three days at a time, while dramatically increasing the number of days of continuous marching between halts. Only once in four march segments before Cunaxa did the troops go less than a week before pausing, and the final sprint into Babylonia involved no fewer than eighteen days without a multi-day rest.<sup>6</sup> Cyrus' desire to get into Babylonia quickly, as well as the scarcity of suitable settlements for resting, drove this increase in intervals between rests.<sup>7</sup>

In friendly country, Cyrus typically encamped his forces adjacent to rather than actually within settlements.<sup>8</sup> His men had tents, and keeping them out of cities and towns minimized the chances of antagonizing the locals.<sup>9</sup> Exceptions to this policy occurred where Cyrus passed through settlements belonging to him or his allies. At Celaenae, for example, he

<sup>1</sup> *An.* 1.2.14, 1.2.21, *Cyr.* 6.1.23.

<sup>2</sup> Assuming 13,000 mercenaries plus 20,000 Persian infantry and 3,000 cavalry plus transport animals; see Lendle (1966) 436, Anderson (1974a) 99–100, Bigwood (1983) 341. On water, fuel, and fodder cf. Veg. *Mil.* 1.22.

<sup>3</sup> For Persian camp fortifications see *Cyr.* 3.3.26–7, Hdt. 4.124, 9.65, 9.70.

<sup>4</sup> See Table 1 for the locations and durations of halts.

<sup>5</sup> For more on the logistical purposes of these halts see Chapter Eight.

<sup>6</sup> Unless there was a multi-day pause at Charmande or Pylae; on this see Lendle (1995) 61.

<sup>7</sup> *An.* 1.5.9.

<sup>8</sup> *An.* 1.2.14.

<sup>9</sup> For such antagonism cf. Launey (1950) II.695–712.

treated the troops to a stay in one of his personal estates, and at the Chalus River he housed them in villages owned by his mother Parysatis.<sup>10</sup> In actually or potentially hostile territory, Cyrus changed habits. He probably had no qualms about quartering in captured Lycaonian strongholds, and he certainly occupied Tarsus to preclude any opposition from its ruler Syennesis.<sup>11</sup> He also made a point of pillaging the estate of the Syrian satrap Belesys, perhaps after overnighing there.<sup>12</sup> Whether Cyrus occupied Thapsacus and Corsote on the advance down the Euphrates, Xenophon does not say. Given the scarcity of food in this region, though, possibly he quartered some men in these towns to preclude any attempt by the inhabitants to hide or destroy vital supplies. He may have done likewise with the villages at the confluence of the Araxes and the Euphrates. Charmande at least did not suffer occupation, being on the opposite bank of the Euphrates.<sup>13</sup>

During the first two periods of the campaign, then, the army regularly camped outdoors. If Cyrus' 13,000 mercenaries and 23,000 levies camped together at each *stathmos*, at a density comparable to the roughly 475 men per hectare of a Roman Republican legionary camp, they would cover nearly 76 hectares (about 188 acres), the equivalent of a square about 875 meters on a side or a circle about a kilometer across.<sup>14</sup>

Each stopping place, however, comprised not a single undifferentiated site, but a conglomeration of bivouacs, each some distance from its neighbors. Mercenaries and levies encamped separately, close enough that the mercenaries could readily go shopping at the market accompanying the native force, but still far enough apart that Clearchus at Tarsus could talk as if he did not know the exact location of the Persian camp.<sup>15</sup> The mercenaries themselves rested not en masse, but by contingents. At Tarsus, for instance, more than 2,000 of Xenias and Pasion's hoplites, hearing of Clearchus' apparent refusal to follow Cyrus, packed their bags and joined the Spartan at his encampment.<sup>16</sup> They could hardly have moved in this fashion had their original bivouac not been some distance from Clearchus. Moreover, there must have been sufficient open ground near Clearchus' bivouac for the men to set up their new camp. Likewise, at Charmande, Clearchus' and Menon's troops camped in distinct areas, with Menon closer to the Euphrates. Between their bivouacs lay a sizeable gap, for when Clearchus, after being

<sup>10</sup> *An.* 1.2.8–9, 1.4.9–10.      <sup>11</sup> *An.* 1.2.19, 1.2.23–1.3.1, 3.2.23.      <sup>12</sup> *An.* 1.4.10; cf. Tuplin (2004a) 163.

<sup>13</sup> *An.* 1.4.11, 1.4.19, 1.5.4, 1.5.10. Corsote too had a river barrier, that of the Mascas (Khabor), for protection, but unlike the Euphrates this was fordable.

<sup>14</sup> Roman Republican camps put the 19,200 men of two legions, two *alae* of allies, and associated cavalry, into a square about 636 meters (2,150 Roman feet) on a side, covering about 40.5 hectares (100 acres); see Polyb. 6.27–42, Walbank (1957) 714–15, and cf. Kardulias (1992) 283 for a similar density in Imperial camps.

<sup>15</sup> *An.* 1.2.17–18, 1.3.12, 1.3.14, 1.5.6.      <sup>16</sup> *An.* 1.3.7.

assaulted on his way through Menon's camp, called his troops to arms and actually advanced on Menon with cavalry and peltasts, the two contingents did not immediately come to blows. Indeed, there remained room enough for Proxenus to interpose his column of 1,500 hoplites between them.<sup>17</sup>

While the *Anabasis* says nothing more about the arrangement of contingents at any *stathmos*, the distribution must have been less tidy than that Xenophon ascribes to the ideal encampment of Cyrus the Elder in the *Cyropaedia*, where troops billeted in neat concentric rings surrounding the king's tent; it would hardly make sense to praise the elder Cyrus for his bivouacking acumen if such intricate organization was a familiar sight in fifth-century Greek armies.<sup>18</sup> Still, if the younger Cyrus was as efficient at resting his forces as he was at marching them, it is not impossible that he at least assigned each contingent to a specific location within a larger bivouac area of perhaps several kilometers in diameter. He could easily detail mounted retainers or staff officers to conduct each contingent to its designated spot, and may even have sent a quarterming party ahead to mark out water sources and pastures.<sup>19</sup> Alternatively, contingents simply filed into quarters in the order they arrived at the stopping place. Either way, since Clearchus tended to lead the mercenaries' march order and enjoyed Cyrus' favor, his contingent probably often had first pick.<sup>20</sup> Cyrus himself may have followed the practice imputed to his famous namesake and set up his tents in the center of the *stathmos*, between native and mercenary contingents.<sup>21</sup> Wherever its exact location, there was evidently substantial open space surrounding his headquarters. When Cyrus put his relative Orontas on trial for treachery in Babylonia, for instance, he commanded his mercenary generals to guard the proceedings. They responded by placing some 3,000 hoplites around his tent.<sup>22</sup> Arranged in a hollow square about seven *lochoi* on a side, with each *lochos* four ranks deep, these troops would have occupied an area almost 200 meters across.

#### CONTINGENT ENCAMPMENTS

Once generals and units had proceeded to their assigned bivouacs, they next had to settle in for the night. Just as in marching, each contingent camp constituted not a single mass of soldiers, but a collection of *lochoi*.

<sup>17</sup> *An.* 1.5.11–17.      <sup>18</sup> *Cyr.* 8.5.1–16, cf. van Wees (2004) 107.

<sup>19</sup> For quarterming parties cf. Webster (1998) 170–1.

<sup>20</sup> *An.* 1.3.1, 1.5.11–12, 1.8.12; cf. Roy (1967) 292–3, Roisman (1985/8) 31–41.

<sup>21</sup> *Cyr.* 8.5.8. At Myriandus (*An.* 1.4.3), Cyrus apparently placed his headquarters on or near the beach.

<sup>22</sup> *An.* 1.6.4.

Here again, focusing on a single contingent and one of its *lochoi* – those of Sophaenetus and Arystas – makes it easier to visualize the structure of a Cyrean encampment.

First, consider its shape. Xenophon comments that Greek camps were sometimes irregularly shaped to take advantage of defensible terrain.<sup>23</sup> On open ground, the Spartans preferred roughly circular encampments while other Hellenes may have favored rectangular setups.<sup>24</sup> The Persians, too, possibly used circular bivouacs.<sup>25</sup> The Cyreans, for their part, almost certainly had no standard pattern at the campaign's outset. The Ionian garrison troops, with long experience alongside Achaemenid forces, may have emulated Persian practice. Clearchus possibly imposed a Spartan mold on his contingent's encampment, while the other generals probably had their own formats. Whether circular, rectangular, or irregular, all contingent camps shared some characteristics. In order to create a schematic model of camp layout, and for ease in calculating camp areas and densities, let us treat Cyrean contingent camps as roughly circular, while acknowledging we cannot be certain of their exact form.

As he led his contingent into the day's *stathmos*, Sophaenetus had several options. He could assign a particular area to each *lochos* as it entered, distribute spots amongst the *lochagoi* by lot, or simply point out the approximate limits of the bivouac and let the first arriving units in column have first choice.<sup>26</sup> Since Xenophon several times speaks of stacked arms (*ta hopla*) as defining the edge of the camp, possibly each *lochos* took responsibility for a section of the camp's perimeter, stacking arms along the perimeter for ready access and stationing pickets (*prophulakes*) beyond them.<sup>27</sup> If each of his ten *lochoi* took responsibility for about fifty meters of perimeter, Sophaenetus' camp would have covered some two hectares (about five acres), giving it an overall density of twenty square meters per man, approximately equivalent to that of a Roman Republican

<sup>23</sup> *Lac.* 12.1. Polyb. 6.42 exaggerates the irregularity of (Hellenistic) Greek camps in order to compare them unfavorably with Roman ones.

<sup>24</sup> That some classical Greeks used rectangular encampments is implicit in Xenophon's critique (*Lac.* 12.1) of the uselessness of the corners of such rectangles.

<sup>25</sup> *Cyr.* 8.5.11. <sup>26</sup> For distribution by lot see *An.* 4.5.24.

<sup>27</sup> Although *ta hopla* can stand metonymically for camp or quarters (*An.* 3.1.3, *Cyr.* 7.2.5, *Lys.* 13.12), Xenophon frequently uses the term in contexts that indicate a specific physical component of the camp (*An.* 2.2.20, 2.4.15, 3.1.3, 4.4.11, 5.4.14, 5.7.21, 6.4.27). In *Lac.* 12.1–6, *ta hopla* clearly means a boundary (along which sentries stand, beyond which soldiers go to relieve themselves, and from which slaves are kept away) rather than "the camp as a whole" or "a central arms depot." For a similar perimeter arrangement in early Byzantine armies, see Dennis (1985) 89, and cf. Sweet (1953) 392 for a modern analogue. Pickets (*prophulakes*): 2.3.2–3, 2.4.15, 6.4.26.

camp.<sup>28</sup> This would be a compact arrangement, only about 160 meters across and 500 meters in circumference, or roughly the area of 3.75 American football fields. If his soldiers demanded more room, say forty square meters per man, Sophaenetus could fit them into a circle about 226 meters across and 710 meters around; each *lochos* would then have held about seventy meters of perimeter.<sup>29</sup>

Somewhere amongst his *lochoi*, Sophaenetus set up headquarters. A convenient and well-protected location would have been near the center of camp.<sup>30</sup> Here might stand accommodations for the general, his personal attendants, a trumpeter (*salpinktēs*), perhaps a soothsayer (*mantis*) or doctor, and any gentleman hangers-on, along with space for the general's horse and pack animals.<sup>31</sup> The center of the camp was also a meeting place, possibly spacious enough for Sophaenetus to assemble his entire contingent.<sup>32</sup> If he left around his tent an open area only eighty meters across, the remainder of the bivouac would still offer about fifteen square meters of room per man.<sup>33</sup> Sophaenetus could easily draw up his ten *lochoi* in close order for inspection on a parade ground of these dimensions.<sup>34</sup> This central open area would also provide ample room for individual *lochos* drilling, and a protected place for pack animals to graze.

A camp laid out along these lines would have worked well for a contingent the size of Sophaenetus', with only 1,000 hoplites (see Figure 7.1).<sup>35</sup> In the largest contingents, though, assigning every *lochos* a fifty-meter sector might create an excessively spacious bivouac. If Xenias, for instance, billeted his roughly forty *lochoi* in this fashion, the resulting encampment would be

<sup>28</sup> Walbank (1957) 714–15. This overall density figure for a Roman camp includes streets and other open areas; see below for actual per-legionary living space.

<sup>29</sup> Forty square meters per person is a relatively luxurious allotment; see Kardulias (1992) 278–9. Delmas and Courvallet (1994) 11 suggest a norm of 30 square meters for camps with little formal organization.

<sup>30</sup> For this location cf. Moretti (1976) 108–14.

<sup>31</sup> Attendants: *An.* 2.1.9; trumpeter: 1.2.17, 7.4.16, cf. *Aen. Tact.* 22.3; *mantis*: 6.1.23; hanger-on: e.g. Xenophon himself, 3.1.4. Cf. *Lac.* 13.7 for the situation in the Spartan army. Sophaenetus' second-in-command (*hupostrategos*: 3.1.32), probably the contingent's senior *lochagos*, likely camped with his own *lochos*; see Lendle (1995) 156.

<sup>32</sup> For the center of camp as a meeting place see *An.* 1.3.2, 3.1.15; cf. Moretti (1975) 109.

<sup>33</sup> An assembly space 80 meters across would have an area of some 5,026 square meters, about one quarter of the total contingent area of 20,000 square meters.

<sup>34</sup> Each *lochos* in 4-deep line at one-meter rank and file intervals would occupy about 100 square meters; ten *lochoi* together would fit a square about 32 meters on a side. This would give each man a square meter of space, plenty enough to sit down if Sophaenetus let them; by comparison, fifth-century Athenians assembling on the Pnyx possibly had as little as 0.4 square meters of sitting space; see Hansen (1999) 131.

<sup>35</sup> Figure 7.1 shows a schematically circular camp for clarity. Although the shape of Cyrean camps is uncertain, the essential components and layout of a contingent bivouac would remain the same whatever its exact shape.






Figure 7.1 Schematic diagram of a contingent encampment

two kilometers around and more than half a kilometer across, affording each man about eighty square meters of room. Generals commanding larger contingents, therefore, may have arranged their encampments several *lochoi* deep. Xenias, in fact, could give his men twenty square meters apiece if he put only half his *lochoi* on the perimeter, arranging the rest within. This would make for a much more manageable camp, only 320 meters across and just over a kilometer around.

Finally, what about light troops and cavalry? In the ideal encampment of Cyrus the Elder, hoplites formed the outer ring while peltasts, archers, and horsemen were held in the center. This disposition allowed cavalry to saddle and mount unhindered, and permitted missile infantry to shoot over the heads of the protective ring of hoplites.<sup>36</sup> A similar arrangement would have been possible in Cyrean contingents with a high proportion of hoplites to light troops. Proxenus, for instance, with 1,500 hoplites and 500 peltasts, could put fourteen *lochoi* on his perimeter and billet his peltasts within, thus retaining an overall density of twenty square meters per man. With a lower ratio of hoplites to other troops, even putting all the hoplites on the perimeter would not provide sufficient internal space for the other troops. Clearchus, for example, had 1,000 hoplites, but also 1,000 light infantry and forty cavalry. If he put all ten *lochoi* on his perimeter, his encampment would be no larger than that of Sophænetus, but would have to contain twice as many troops. One possibility is that Clearchus increased the length of perimeter each of his *lochoi* held to create a larger camp, but more likely

<sup>36</sup> *Cyr.* 8.5.8–12; cf. 4.2.28.

he dealt with the space problem by stationing peltasts as well as hoplites on his perimeter.<sup>37</sup> After Tarsus, where Clearchus acquired some 2,000 of Xenias and Pasion's troops, he could form the outer edge of his bivouac entirely of hoplites.

#### LOCHOS BIVOUACS

Within his contingent camp, Sophaenetus may have tried to leave gaps or lanes between the *lochoi*, both to allow movement through the camp and so that each *lochos* could claim a defined territory.<sup>38</sup> These need not have been broad, straight avenues, just irregular open spaces between *lochoi*. Their layout may have resembled that found in Roman temporary camps in Britain, whose hastily laid internal streets do not form regular grids.<sup>39</sup> Sophaenetus, however, probably imposed relatively little control over how his *lochagoi* arranged their individual areas. In this, as in other activities, the *lochagoi* often displayed a high degree of independence.<sup>40</sup>

Arystas' first step in arranging his bivouac was probably to have his hoplites stack arms along their sector of the contingent perimeter (see Figure 7.2).<sup>41</sup> Stacking arms helped Arystas define his *lochos*' domain, ensured shields and spears were readily accessible in case of sudden attack, and kept men and animals from stumbling over them.<sup>42</sup> Arms were certainly not held in any sort of centralized depot, and they need not have literally lined the borders of the encampment, but they do seem to have occupied some sort of clearly defined zone closely associated with the sentries patrolling the edges of camp. Xenophon, for example, describes himself and Proxenus taking an after-dinner stroll around their camp's perimeter, just beyond the arms but still within the line of pickets.<sup>43</sup> Hoplites could

<sup>37</sup> For a similar solution in tenth-century Byzantine military camps, see Dennis (1985) 269.

<sup>38</sup> Movement through camp: *An.* 1.5.11–12, cf. 5.4.14; defined space: cf. Spartan practice, *Lac.* 12.5, and for some modern comparanda cf. Parkes (1869) 325–6, Solano (1915) 122, Fawcett (1968) 163–5.

<sup>39</sup> Welfare and Swan (1995) 22.

<sup>40</sup> *An.* 4.2.4, 5.2.11, 5.2.21–2. By way of comparison, recent excavations reveal that even in the strictly organized Roman legionary camps of the early Principate, centurions apparently possessed great freedom in organizing the space allocated to their centuries; see Morel (1991) 381.

<sup>41</sup> For clarity, Figure 7.2 depicts a *lochos* bivouac as part of a schematically circular contingent encampment. Whatever its exact shape, each *lochos* bivouac would retain the same basic elements and layout.

<sup>42</sup> *An.* 1.5.13, 2.5.34; contrast the situation in the Spartan army, *Lac.* 12.3. Xenophon highlights the fiction of “the ass let loose amongst the arms” (2.2.20) to show how Clearchus calmed a night panic, but the story also reveals that unless someone made a point of disturbing them, the arms were considered out of everyone's way. For stacking arms at the edge of an assigned bivouac sector, cf. Veg. *Mil.* 3.8.13.

<sup>43</sup> *An.* 2.4.14–16.




Figure 7.2 Schematic reconstruction of a *lochos* bivouac

store their spears upright simply by jabbing the spiked butt-ends into the earth. On rocky or sandy ground, they could use rawhide strips to tie several spears together in the form of a tripod or sheaf. Shields were tougher to stack, although a group of comrades could pile their shields neatly together, or lean them against a row of upright spears.<sup>44</sup>

Behind the limits set by the zone of stacked arms, Arystas and his men next turned to pitching their tents. Now, a Roman imperial centurion could in theory squeeze his century's eighty legionaries, ten pack animals, and assorted equipment into a neat rectangle measuring some 35.5 by 8.9 meters, at a density of about four square meters per man. This area included space for nine tents – one for each eight-man *contubernium* plus a larger structure for the centurion – along with room for gear and animals and open areas for cooking and other activities.<sup>45</sup> At a similar density, Arystas' hundred-man *lochos* could have fit a twenty- by twenty-meter square, or a circle less than twenty-four meters across. The close arrangement of a Roman century's bivouac, however, was possible only because of the equal sizes of each *contubernium* and the uniformity of their state-supplied shelters. Arystas' *lochos*, in contrast, comprised *suskeniai* of varying sizes equipped with tents of different designs and dimensions. Probably the best Arystas could do, then, might be to arrange his unit into rough rows or clusters, with varying

<sup>44</sup> On storing spears and shields cf. Dennis (1985) 85.

<sup>45</sup> [Hyg.] 57; Lenoir (1979) 38–41.

intervals between *suskeniai*.<sup>46</sup> His own tent would fit somewhere into this layout, perhaps close to the arms at the edge of camp.<sup>47</sup> If every *suskenia* scrambled to get the best spot for its tent, Arystas might have been unable to exert even this modicum of control. His overall *lochos* density, then, may have been half or less than that of a Roman century bivouac. Supposing a relatively spacious arrangement, say ten square meters per soldier, Arystas' unit would cover a circle about thirty-six meters across, an area equivalent to five singles tennis courts. Billeted in this fashion, all ten *lochoi* of Sophaenetos' contingent would cover about 10,000 square meters. Of the total 20,000 square meters of Sophaenetos' camp, then, half would be taken up by *lochos* bivouacs, and perhaps a quarter by the open area around the general's tent, leaving about 5,000 square meters for passages between units, latrines, garbage dumps, and grazing. Since not all *stathmoi* could have been perfectly level, some of this space could be sloping or rocky ground, unsuitable for any use.<sup>48</sup>

#### SUSKENIAI IN CAMP

Within the limits Sophaenetos and Arystas set, or tried to set, the *suskeniai* of Arystas' *lochos* established their quarters. Each group's arrangement depended on its size, the characteristics of its shelter, and its possession (or lack thereof) of animals and attendants. The trio of friends we imagined as part of Arystas' *lochos* at Cunaxa, for instance, might make do for shelter by stretching leather tarps over a frame of branches, and for a kitchen boast but a single cooking pot balanced atop a ring of stones.<sup>49</sup> Ten men with a fancy tent, a mule, and plenty of gear, on the other hand, could set up a comfortable billet. At ten square meters per soldier, such a group could occupy a space ten meters on a side. This would afford plenty of room for a ten-man tent, with a total footprint of perhaps four meters by four meters.<sup>50</sup> A structure of these dimensions would provide each of its

<sup>46</sup> Aeneas Tacticus (27.12) writes of the flanks and center of a *lochos* encampment, suggesting some sort of row-like arrangement. The lack of organization may have produced a layout similar to that of modern displaced-persons camps, where small community units tend to form clusters; see Delmas and Courvallet (1994) 10.

<sup>47</sup> Lendle (1995) 227 suggests officers who knew each other quartered together, but doing so would have left their *lochoi* unsupervised; without NCOs, a *lochagos* had to keep an eye on his men himself.

<sup>48</sup> Unsuitable ground: Onas. 8.16–17. <sup>49</sup> For simple shelters of this type see Polyaeus *Strat.* 3.9.19.

<sup>50</sup> The Roman *papilio* had a 3.55-meter square (12 × 12 Roman feet) footprint, including external area for support ropes and pegs; McIntyre and Richmond (1934) 62–4. Assuming for simplicity's sake that the area required for ropes and pegs increases in linear proportion to the size of the tent, and that the same amount of sleeping space per soldier is maintained, a hypothetical ten-man Cyrenean tent would cover an area about 4 meters on a side.

occupants a bit more than a square meter to sleep in, roughly the length of a twin mattress and about two-thirds its width.<sup>51</sup> Although uncomfortably narrow to modern tastes, this would be sufficient room for Cyreans who stood on average perhaps 1.6 meters (5.3 feet) tall.<sup>52</sup> If there was room, slave attendants accompanying the *suskenia* may have slept indoors alongside their masters; otherwise, they were relegated to pallets outside.<sup>53</sup> Personal gear not in use could be piled just outside the tent's entrance to leave more room for sleeping.

Along with sleeping quarters, each *suskenia* needed cooking facilities. The soldiers probably built fire pits in front of their tents, arranging stones in a ring or scooping out hollows in the earth to contain and shield the flames.<sup>54</sup> Around this they might set folding stools or makeshift benches, although some men just sat on the ground.<sup>55</sup> The group's fire pit, like the hearth in a mainland Greek household, represented the focus of its communal life, around which *suskenoi* cooked, ate, and socialized; other chores such as chopping wood and cleaning weapons likely also took place close by. At night the heat of the suskenic fire warmed chilled bodies and provided light for working or talking, while the smoke deterred insects.<sup>56</sup> Finally, just as they preferred to keep baggage and transport close by on the march, so too did *suskenoi* with a mule or donkey likely hobble it near their tent rather than sending it to a central stable. On stops of a night or three, animals could graze on the open ground at the center of camp; a longer sojourn probably required handlers to lead them beyond the line of pickets.<sup>57</sup>

In Roman camps, the standardization of unit bivouacs meant each *contubernium* had an officially regulated space for its gear, animals, and activities.<sup>58</sup> Arystas, as we have seen, was unlikely to enforce strict space discipline of this sort. Indeed, at ten square meters per man, each *suskenia* could well be several meters distant from its neighbors. Each *suskenia*, nonetheless, probably sought to define the ground immediately surrounding its tent and

<sup>51</sup> The internal area of the *papilio* was only 2.96 meters square (10 × 10 Roman feet), giving each legionary about 1.1 square meters of sleeping space (a modern twin mattress measures about 1 by 1.9 meters, or some 1.88 square meters).

<sup>52</sup> Foxhall and Forbes (1982) 47–8; cf. Roth (1999) 10. <sup>53</sup> Cf. Sapouna Sakellarakis et al. (2002) 43.

<sup>54</sup> Richmond (1962) 146, Pitts and St. Joseph (1985) 227; for more on fire pits see Chapter Eight.

<sup>55</sup> For folding stools see Richter (1926) 39–43.

<sup>56</sup> On fire as the focus of group life cf. Jones (1993) 104.

<sup>57</sup> Assuming a pack animal required 80 square meters of pasture per day, the central area of the camp would suffice to graze about 60 beasts for one day. For grazing space per animal, see Roth (1999) 128; his figures are for horses, which consume far more than mules or donkeys, so 80 square meters is a generous estimate. Beyond the pickets: cf. *An.* 2.2.15.

<sup>58</sup> Webster (1998) 171.

fire pit as “home,” territory upon which uninvited outsiders encroached at risk.<sup>59</sup> Intervals between groups created paths for men and animals to pass between individual *suskenia* sites, without having to walk through other people’s space.<sup>60</sup> They also minimized the chances of adjacent groups getting in each other’s way, or complaining about the smoke thrown out by a neighboring cooking fire.<sup>61</sup>

In addition to helping each *suskenia* mark its territory, gaps between groups in a *lochos* encampment provided handy places to discard garbage.<sup>62</sup> At night, soldiers too lazy to walk more than a few paces from their tents might find such intervals a convenient place to relieve themselves.<sup>63</sup> The less scrupulous sneaked close to their neighbors’ encampments to defecate or urinate, thereby keeping the mess that much further away from their own quarters.<sup>64</sup> Such practices were tolerable if the army remained in place only briefly, but as time went on, scattered dung and garbage would create a fly-plagued, noisome bivouac. During lengthier halts, these sanitation problems could be ameliorated by depositing excrement in pits along with cooking refuse, by having men walk beyond the bounds of camp to urinate or defecate, or by having each *suskenia* organize some form of rudimentary waste collection and removal.<sup>65</sup> These changes in behavior could stem as much from a group’s self-interest and social pressure from its neighbors as from official supervision.

#### BIVOUAC LIFE

Setting up camp for the night did not occur instantaneously. As his contingent arrived at the *stathmos*, each general had to receive his bivouac assignment from Cyrus, and in turn distribute his *lochoi* within the designated location. Once units halted and soldiers fell out of ranks in their *lochos* area, each *suskenia* might spend a few minutes looking around for a

<sup>59</sup> For territoriality about campfires see *An.* 4.5.5.

<sup>60</sup> On separations between small groups in a camp cf. Jones (1993) 102–4. A cramped bivouac could lead to complaints; cf. *Thuc.* 4.26.3.

<sup>61</sup> For complaints about smoke cf. *Dem.* 54.4.

<sup>62</sup> Aché hunter-gatherers, by way of comparison, throw out nearly all debris within a meter of their campfires; see Jones (1993) 104. Eighteenth-century Prussian soldiers may have done similarly; see Fawcett (1968) 165.

<sup>63</sup> Tendency to urinate close to tent at night: Keefer (1914) 224; cf. *Ar. Eccl.* 320–2. Defecating in public areas was familiar practice to classical Athenians: Owens (1983) 45–6.

<sup>64</sup> Sneaking over to neighbors: *Ar. Vesp.* 394; for surreptitious defecation on others’ property, cf. Oikonomides (1988) 56.

<sup>65</sup> Refuse pits: Pitts and St. Joseph (1985) 227–39, Ault (1994); for more about sanitation see Chapter Nine.

suitable spot, perhaps even competing with other groups that coveted the same space. After that, men had to stack arms, unload gear, unsaddle pack animals, set up tents, and construct fire pits. On level, unobstructed ground the entire process could consume an hour.<sup>66</sup> More time would be required if soldiers had to clear brush or rocks to make room for their tents. A well-organized *suskenia* could divide its labor power, some comrades heading out in search of water and firewood or to shop at the traveling market while others remained to set up camp. From Sardis to Cunaxa there was plenty of light for all these tasks: the mercenaries generally enjoyed more than twelve hours of sun daily, only about half of which they spent marching.<sup>67</sup> Even more daylight was available when the army marched at night and arrived at camp in early morning, as on the advance down the Euphrates valley.

While the soldiers preferred to turn their undivided attention to making themselves comfortable once the army halted, their officers might still have some demands. For one thing, generals and *lochagoi* may have spent some time in camp drilling their units.<sup>68</sup> At an overnight bivouac, *lochoi* might train individually on the contingent's central open area. During longer halts, the entire army seems to have practiced maneuvering in battle formation on a suitable spot away from the various contingent camps. The thirty-day pause at Celaenae, in particular, would have afforded the newly assembled contingents needed practice in moving as a single cohesive phalanx.<sup>69</sup> That both *lochos* drilling and army-wide maneuvers were features of camp life on the way to Cunaxa is suggested by the proficiency the Cyreans displayed when reviewed at Thymbrium.<sup>70</sup> Some generals, though, were clearly more demanding of their contingents. At Charmande, for instance, Clearchus' troops responded instantly and uniformly to his orders, while Menon's did not.<sup>71</sup>

It is also possible some generals or *lochagoi* assigned their troops sentry duty. Sentries would have been useful for controlling access to a bivouac, guarding stacked arms, discouraging deserters, and watching for uncontrolled fires. Stationing daytime guards, however, was unusual in most Greek armies, although night watchmen may have been more common.<sup>72</sup>

<sup>66</sup> In comparison, a Roman marching camp took at least three hours to construct, though much of this time was spent on fortifications; see Goldsworthy (1996) 112.

<sup>67</sup> For daylight hours see Table 1.

<sup>68</sup> On drill and training see Anderson (1970) 98–102, Pritchett (1974) 208–21.

<sup>69</sup> *An.* 1.2.9. <sup>70</sup> *An.* 1.2.14–18. <sup>71</sup> *An.* 1.5.13.

<sup>72</sup> In *Lac.* 12.2, Xenophon stresses two Spartan peculiarities: they station daytime sentries, and their night sentries patrol from forward positions outside of camp. This seems to imply that other Greeks did not station daytime sentries, but did have night sentries close to or within camp.

Moreover, the mercenaries had little worry of enemy attack for most of the way to Cunaxa, and Xenophon at one point implies that in times of perceived safety the Cyreans did not automatically station sentries.<sup>73</sup> Sentry practices, therefore, likely varied from contingent to contingent. Here again one suspects Clearchus demanded more, perhaps by imposing a Spartan watch protocol on his troops. The other generals, especially in a period where combat did not loom, appreciated any activity that kept soldiers focused on their military responsibilities, but might not always have been able to compel their troops to stand guard.<sup>74</sup> If they could, it was probably only for night watches.<sup>75</sup>

There were also less-structured activities for the soldiers. *Suskenoi* with a shared ethnic heritage, for instance, might run through traditional dances and war songs.<sup>76</sup> Many troops probably took time to exercise – a common Greek practice – although surely not as methodically as the Spartans were wont to do.<sup>77</sup> Socializing and gambling were probably also popular. Even the Spartans, after all, included diversions and relaxation in their camp routine.<sup>78</sup> The soldiers, however, were probably not free to spend their off-duty hours drinking and getting into fights, in the manner of the Athenian militiamen Demosthenes excoriates in one of his speeches.<sup>79</sup> To be sure, drunkenness and personal disputes were not unheard of in the army, but each *suskenia* had several hours of work on its hands every day just foraging and cooking, to say nothing of maintaining gear and looking after animals.<sup>80</sup> Only once these chores were done could *suskenoi* sit back and relax.

Modeling contingent, *lochos*, and *suskenia* bivouacs in this manner provides a feeling for the spatial and organizational challenges the Cyreans faced at every halting place. It is important to stress again that the mercenaries did not begin the campaign with a unified bivouacking doctrine. The arrangement of *lochos* cantonments must have varied from contingent to contingent, and perhaps from *stathmos* to *stathmos*. The conflicting interests of officers and men may often have made setting up camp a balancing

<sup>73</sup> *An.* 5.1.9.      <sup>74</sup> For keeping soldiers focused cf. *Onas.* 9.2–3.

<sup>75</sup> Xenophon (*An.* 4.1.5) describes night as divided into watches, without specifying their number; four may have been a standard (*Aen. Tact.* 18.21). Judging from 4.1.5, the fourth watch began before daybreak but extended into the morning twilight. *Diod.* 14.23.4 speaks of the army on the day of Cunaxa reaching camp around the second watch, when it was already night (Xenophon says it was after sunset, 1.10.17), implying that the first watch began in evening twilight and extended into full darkness; cf. Whitehead (1990) 159–60.

<sup>76</sup> *An.* 6.1.6–12; cf. Pritchett (1974) 215–17.

<sup>77</sup> For gymnastics and exercise see Pritchett (1974) 213–20. On Spartan calisthenics see *Lac.* 12.5–7; cf. *Cyr.* 1.6.17 and *Hell.* 4.8.18, although the text of the latter is vexed.

<sup>78</sup> *Lac.* 12.6.      <sup>79</sup> *Dem.* 54.3–6.      <sup>80</sup> *An.* 1.5.11, 5.8.4–5.



act: generals and *lochagoi* trying to maintain compact, orderly bivouacs, each *suskenia* trying to stretch out for comfort. Clearchus, schooled in the Lacedaemonian military tradition, may well have enforced a Spartan camp regime, as did perhaps his compatriot Cheirisophus. The other generals probably had their own preferences. The first weeks of the campaign must have involved a certain amount of trial and error in figuring out camping arrangements and adjusting to life in a moving community of many thousands. In addition, those who shifted from one contingent to another – notably, Xenias and Pasion's 2,000 who went over to Clearchus – might have to learn a new bivouac protocol. During the march from Sardis to Cunaxa, therefore, camping practices at all levels probably evolved, as generals became proficient at controlling their contingents, *lochagoi* worked out an acceptable arrangement for their unit's tents, and ordinary soldiers acclimated to life outdoors.

Camp practices must also have varied depending on the length of any particular stop. It is unclear whether Cyrus informed his generals how long halts would last, although even if he did not the three-day halt pattern would soon have become evident. Sometimes Cyrus himself did not know how long a halt would last: he apparently planned the month-long stop at Celaenae to enable his contingents to rendezvous, but could not have predicted the twenty-day delay at Tarsus.<sup>81</sup> If the mercenaries expected a short stay and ended up sitting still for much longer, contingents might have to shift encampments in order to maintain access to sufficient fodder and firewood, occasioning some disorder. If the troops knew a long stay was in the offing, probably they created larger and more comfortable billets wherever possible, perhaps piling up stone socles for their tents, erecting wood and thatch huts, and building more efficient ovens or hearths.<sup>82</sup> Finally, as the army entered Babylonia and combat began to appear imminent, Cyrus probably drew his contingents more closely together at each *stathmos*, both to forestall their being surprised and destroyed piecemeal, and to enable him to form up more quickly for the next day's advance.<sup>83</sup>

#### CAMPING WITHOUT CYRUS

By the time they reached Babylonia, the mercenaries had spent six months on the road together, and must have developed a regular procedure for

<sup>81</sup> *An.* 1.2.9, 1.3.1.

<sup>82</sup> Larger and more comfortable: Launey (1950) 694–5, Jones (1993) 104; huts: Anderson (1970) 61–2; socles and ovens: Webster (1998) 172.

<sup>83</sup> *An.* 1.7.1–2, 1.7.14.




Figure 7.3 Schematic diagram of army encamped by contingents

entering and setting up camp. If a shared camping standard for all contingents had not appeared, every general was at least well aware of how his colleagues arranged their bivouacs. Each *lochagos* too would by now have established a characteristic approach to organizing his *lochos* billet, some trying to exert as much control as possible over *suskenic* activities while others left their men pretty much free reign. And, for the members of each *suskenia*, arriving in and making camp had probably become second nature. The battle of Cunaxa and the death of Cyrus, however, dramatically upset what had become a familiar daily routine.

The immediate effect of Cunaxa was to compel the Cyrean generals to cluster their troops together in a single concentrated bivouac, with little or no separation between contingents (see Figure 7.3). This must have been the case as early as the evening following the battle, when the mercenaries finally reunited with their baggage sometime after sunset.<sup>84</sup> Indeed, the uncertainty of the situation and the presence of enemy forces nearby make it almost certain the generals clustered together for mutual security. Even had they wanted to disperse into scattered contingent encampments, they had not had the opportunity during the day of the battle to reconnoiter suitable locations, and could hardly have done so in the dark.

The Cyreans, then, probably ended up in a compact bivouac. If the generals laagered together, with troops packed into each contingent's encampment at about ten square meters per man – twice the overall density

<sup>84</sup> *An.* 1.10.17–18.

postulated earlier for contingent camps before Cunaxa, remember – the whole army would have covered an area only about 400 meters across and 1.25 kilometers around. Possibly the camp backed up against the nearby Euphrates, whose banks in this region were gently sloping; doing so would have enhanced the army's security as well as giving easy access to water.<sup>85</sup> Alternatively, the generals may have arranged their units for the night in a hollow square, like the *plaision* later employed on the way up the Tigris.<sup>86</sup> At any rate, the troops were still in phalanx the next morning, suggesting the men had slept very nearly in battle order, each *lochos* perhaps bedding down as a single tight group.<sup>87</sup> Exhausted by the day's events, probably few soldiers bothered to erect tents in the darkness, and with food supplies pillaged, there was not much reason to build fire pits or kindle fires.<sup>88</sup> There must have been some confusion that night as the men of each *suskenia* looked for their comrades who had been left behind to supervise animals and gear, tried to get comfortable, and took stock of their remaining possessions.

Uncertain about the location of Artaxerxes' forces, the generals during the first few nights following the battle continued to bivouac closely together for security. Some idea of the density of the Cyrean camp during this time emerges from Xenophon's account of the panic that seized the army on the third of these nights. To quell the confusion, Clearchus sounded a trumpet call for silence and then had Tolmides, reputedly the best herald of the age, proclaim a silver talent's reward for whoever pointed out "the man who let loose the donkey amongst the arms."<sup>89</sup> However magnificent a voice Tolmides possessed, the significance of this story lies in its implication that the troops were so close together, perhaps within a few hundred meters' radius of the herald, that an oral announcement could reach all of them.<sup>90</sup> By way of comparison, at Tarsus the various contingents had been camped so far apart that most of the soldiers only learned secondhand of Clearchus' stirring speech to the men of his contingent.<sup>91</sup>

To protect the camp, the Cyreans now began mounting both day and night watches, perhaps keeping a proportion of each *lochos* constantly on

<sup>85</sup> Euphrates banks: Boucher (1913) 78, Naval Intelligence Division (1944) 29–32. The river appears only (*An.* 1.8.4, 1.10.7, 1.10.9) in Xenophon's narrative of the battle proper.

<sup>86</sup> See Chapter Six for details on *plaision* formation. <sup>87</sup> *An.* 2.1.6.

<sup>88</sup> *An.* 1.10.18. Xenophon does not mention water shortages, suggesting the mercenaries retained access to the Euphrates.

<sup>89</sup> *An.* 2.2.19–21; for Tolmides see 3.1.46, 5.2.18, 6.4.15. At a drachma per day, one talent of silver represented more than sixteen months' pay; Xenophon does not say whether anyone collected.

<sup>90</sup> On heralds' voices and the audibility of shouted orders see Crowther (1994) 141, 147–8; cf. *Lac.* 13.9.

<sup>91</sup> *An.* 1.3.3.

guard.<sup>92</sup> Doing so in a concentrated encampment required the generals to coordinate across contingents. At a minimum, they might issue a common password, with due allowance for the range of dialects spoken across the army.<sup>93</sup> The generals also had to check that adjacent units clearly defined their sectors, especially at the junctions between contingents. Any new guard measures the generals implemented, though, may at first have functioned imperfectly, for two nights after Cunaxa 40 horsemen and 300 peltasts slipped away from the army, apparently without raising an alarm.<sup>94</sup> Their departure left the Cyreans without cavalry and therefore especially vulnerable to a swift mounted attack.<sup>95</sup> In response, Clearchus at least once instituted a morning “stand-to,” where all units formed up in battle order at sunrise.<sup>96</sup>

To compensate for the lack of cavalry, the generals may have stationed infantry pickets further from the edge of their bivouac.<sup>97</sup> An indication of this appears on the third day after Cunaxa, when Artaxerxes’ heralds approached the Cyrean camp.<sup>98</sup> Clearchus ordered the pickets to keep the Persian emissaries away until he had finished arranging the troops into a beautifully compact phalanx. The spectacle could not have made much of an impression on the heralds had they been standing by watching the whole time while Clearchus smoothed out the imperfections in his formation; possibly then the picket line was several hundred meters from the edge of camp. On another occasion the generals clearly did station a detachment of sentries some distance from the camp, in order to guard a bridge over the Tigris.<sup>99</sup>

The dangerous circumstances the army faced make it reasonable to think each general now undertook at least some coordination of sentry procedures within his contingent. Sophænetus, for example, might specify the number of sentries his *lochoi* should deploy, or at least inform his *lochagoi* of the degree of alertness he expected. He probably devised some means of inspecting the outposts, either making the rounds periodically himself, sharing the task with his second-in-command (*hupostrategos*), or assigning *lochagoi* to

<sup>92</sup> *An.* 2.3.2–3, 2.6.10, 3.1.40, *Aen. Tact.* 22.5a. Nicarchus and the 20 men who deserted the night following the seizure of the generals (3.3.5) may have been able to slip away precisely because they were on guard duty together.

<sup>93</sup> Common password: *An.* 6.5.25, 7.3.34; for the difficulties of issuing passwords to a multi-ethnic force, see *Aen. Tact.* 24.1–3.

<sup>94</sup> *An.* 2.2.7. Another explanation is that these troops, stationed as forward pickets by Clearchus (cf. *Lac.* 12.3), simply abandoned their posts for the Persian side.

<sup>95</sup> There were still individual mounted scouts (*An.* 2.2.15), but these could not have been numerous enough to cover the army’s entire perimeter.

<sup>96</sup> *An.* 2.2.21.

<sup>97</sup> Pickets further out: cf. *Lac.* 12.3.

<sup>98</sup> *An.* 2.3.3.

<sup>99</sup> *An.* 2.4.16–17, 2.4.23.

take turns as officer of the day.<sup>100</sup> Whatever arrangements Sophaenetus actually made, organizing sentry duty at the contingent level both helped protect the army and reduced friction amongst his *lochoi* by promoting fair distribution of guard responsibilities.<sup>101</sup>

The amount of sentry responsibility Arystas carried depended on how organized his superior Sophaenetus was. If there was a contingent-wide system in place, with a watch officer and periodic inspections, Arystas could simply select the requisite number of guards, and leave the rest to the officer of the watch. If each *lochagos* had to maintain the outposts in his own sector, though, Arystas' job would become much tougher. Checking periodically on sentries was not so difficult in daytime, but a *lochagos* could not stay up night after night supervising the watch without collapsing from exhaustion.<sup>102</sup> Unless he could rely on the assistance of veteran *lochitai*, Arystas' best alternative may have been to assign guard duty as a collective responsibility to his unit's *suskeniai*, each of whose members could then take a turn on watch; this would let Arystas, and everyone else in the *lochos*, get sufficient sleep.<sup>103</sup>

Five days after the battle, the Cyreans concluded their truce with Artaxerxes.<sup>104</sup> Even so, ongoing suspicion of Persian motives and the danger of piecemeal destruction kept them from scattering their bivouacs. Indeed, Xenophon from the beginning of the truce until the seizure of the generals consistently treats the Cyrean camp as a single unified entity, with no mention of dispersed billeting.<sup>105</sup> Distinctions between individual contingent bivouacs, however, did not completely disappear, for each general apparently maintained a separate headquarters, with the troops of his contingent surrounding him.<sup>106</sup> In effect, each contingent now constituted a neighborhood or district within the larger settlement of the camp. Although his colleagues soon recognized Clearchus as de facto generalissimo, the Spartan seems to have exercised this role from his contingent headquarters, rather than creating a new main headquarters for the

<sup>100</sup> Making the rounds: this might explain Proxenus' walk around the camp in *An.* 2.4.15, as well as Clearchus' inspection tour in 2.3.2; *hupostrategos*: 3.1.32; officer of the day: cf. the position of Callimachus, 4.7.8.

<sup>101</sup> Fair distribution: *Aen. Tact.* 22.8, 22.27.

<sup>102</sup> For more on sleep requirements for leaders see Chapter Nine.

<sup>103</sup> For guard duty as a collective suskenic responsibility see Chapter Four.

<sup>104</sup> The provisional truce with Tissaphernes came two days after the battle (*An.* 2.3.8–9), the King confirming it three days later (2.3.25–9).

<sup>105</sup> *An.* 2.4.1, 2.4.10, 2.5.33–4, 3.1.3.

<sup>106</sup> Separate headquarters are implied by *An.* 3.1.15, where Xenophon calls together Proxenus' *lochagoi* for a meeting, and 3.1.32, where these men canvass the contingents looking for the highest-ranking surviving officer; cf. 4.4.8 and 4.5.23–4.

army.<sup>107</sup> The absence of a designated central headquarters also seems evident from the aftermath of the seizure of the generals, when the surviving officers assembled not in the middle of the army, but somewhere near its edge.<sup>108</sup>

While they did not set up a single joint headquarters, the generals evidently preserved an open space of some sort within their shared perimeter. This need not have been extraordinarily spacious, as Xenophon reveals in describing events the night following the seizure of the generals. After the surviving generals and *lochagoi* discussed the situation and chose replacements for the lost officers, they directed the army to assemble in the middle of the camp.<sup>109</sup> At this point there were about 12,000 Cyreans in ranks. Assuming that a good 1,000 had to remain on picket duty, the area in the middle of camp had to have been large enough to accommodate 11,000 or so soldiers. If the men stood or sat in a single solid block, each trooper taking up only a square meter, this open space need have measured just over 100 meters on a side.<sup>110</sup>

Bivouacking the whole army together meant less room and more hassle. At the contingent level, Sophaenetus had to dispense with any open ground at the center of his bivouac, instead pulling his *lochoi* in tightly and giving each of them a shorter sector. Any lanes or gaps between *lochoi* consequently had to narrow, although Sophaenetus could not eliminate these without making it difficult to walk through camp. With defensibility now paramount on the list of camping criteria, Sophaenetus was more likely to mold the shape of his bivouac to the Mesopotamian landscape, perhaps employing irrigation canals, walls, or orchards to define the edges of his turf. Despite the close presence of adjacent contingents, he may have continued posting sentries all around the boundaries of his encampment, rather than only on the portions not covered by neighboring contingents. Doing so enabled Sophaenetus to control access to his bivouac from any direction; there was no need to let men from neighboring contingents wander about at will, nor to let deserters sneak off unchallenged. Moreover, if Sophaenetus did not have all *lochoi* undertake a share of sentry duty, those who did have to pull guard shifts would surely resent the unequal treatment.

For Arystas and his *lochos*, any inequalities in sentry assignment only increased the stresses of occupying a smaller encampment. Less room for latrines and garbage meant men either had to spend the extra time to

<sup>107</sup> *An.* 2.2.3–6, 2.4.18, cf. 2.1.9.

<sup>108</sup> *An.* 3.1.33. The officers sat down somewhere “in front of the arms,” perhaps suggesting they assembled beyond the army’s lines to discuss the situation out of the soldiers’ earshot.

<sup>109</sup> *An.* 3.1.32–6, 3.2.1; cf. van Wees (2004) 107.

<sup>110</sup> For standing and sitting room in assemblies, see note 34 above.

make trips beyond the pickets to relieve themselves (an uncomfortable proposition at night, even with a truce in effect), or put up with the smell and unpleasantness of waste in their midst. In the absence of grassy space within the arms, soldiers had to lead their animals out of camp to graze and to guard them while they fed. Crowded conditions also meant more danger that some oaf from another *suskenia* would trip over your tent ropes, accidentally upend your cooking pot as he threaded his way out to relieve himself, or otherwise encroach on your space.

The difficulties of denser, closely spaced encampments thus became quickly apparent to both soldiers and commanders. The absence of Cyrus' guiding hand, moreover, forced the generals to assume new responsibilities. Just as they had to cope with every dimension of march scheduling, so too did they now have to select halting places, decide the length of pauses, and distribute camping spots to the various contingents. Although they speedily adopted some of Cyrus' practices, in particular the three-day logistical halt, learning how to supervise the entirety of an army's camp planning must have taken some time.<sup>111</sup> Even Clearchus, whose colleagues esteemed him as the most competent, bungled the entry into one of the army's first post-Cunaxa encampments. Having kept the troops on the march until late in the day, Clearchus encamped with the van at sunset, without making arrangements to guide the following contingents into bivouac. The result was a fair amount of noise and confusion, as soldiers blundered about in the dark looking for places to settle down for the night.<sup>112</sup> Clearchus was a quick learner, though, and soon set his hand to unifying and disciplining the army. He certainly instituted daily inspections, and perhaps even tried to introduce a uniform camp protocol across the contingents.<sup>113</sup>

While the truce lasted, from mid-August to late September, the Persians made things easier for the generals by pointing out suitable *stathmoi*.<sup>114</sup> The conditions of the truce, under which the mercenaries agreed to follow Tissaphernes' lead and leave the countryside undamaged, suggest there were some restrictions on where they could camp.<sup>115</sup> Yet there are a few indications that the Cyreans maintained a degree of independence in situating their quarters. For instance, despite the pledges they had made, suspicion of Tissaphernes prompted the generals almost immediately to begin trusting their own reconnaissance rather than simply following the Persian force. Indeed, the two armies encamped at least a parasang apart, with the Persians sometimes so distant that they were completely out of sight.<sup>116</sup> Further evidence of their independence emerges from events at Sittace in early

<sup>111</sup> Three-day halts: *An.* 2.3.17, 2.5.1. <sup>112</sup> *An.* 2.2.16–17. <sup>113</sup> *An.* 3.3.2; cf. 1.5.12.

<sup>114</sup> *An.* 2.3.14, 2.3.17, 2.5.27. <sup>115</sup> *An.* 2.4.26–8. <sup>116</sup> *An.* 2.4.10, 2.4.13–14.

September. There, Tissaphernes, allegedly fearing the mercenaries might ensconce themselves on a nearby island betwixt the Tigris and one of its subsidiary canals, dispatched a false messenger to the generals, purportedly to dissuade them from destroying the Tigris bridge that gave access to the island.<sup>117</sup> The story suggests that the Cyreans were actively choosing their bivouacs: if Tissaphernes had indeed been directing them where to camp, the last thing he would have done was to place them next to a fertile and defensible stronghold while bivouacking his own force inconveniently on the far bank of the Tigris.

For the ordinary soldiers, the proximity of the Persians during the period of the truce was a bother. The clustering together of the army and the increased density of contingent bivouacs meant problems with crowding, waste disposal, and pasturing. These would have been especially pressing during the twenty days the Cyreans spent encamped alongside Ariaeus, waiting for Tissaphernes.<sup>118</sup> There was also no let up in sentry duty.<sup>119</sup> Once the army got moving again, up the Tigris valley in tandem with Tissaphernes, there were additional complaints. Walking through his *lochos* after the evening meal, Arystas might have heard a pair of competing arguments rise from *suskenoi* as they sat fireside. Some agreed with Clearchus' line: the King would not make a truce and swear oaths if he really intended to destroy them.<sup>120</sup> That being so, the army should stay nearer the Persian camp, where Tissaphernes had set up the market; nobody appreciated the hour's walk each way it took to buy provisions.<sup>121</sup> For others, the further away the Persians camped, the better. Not only would the distance forestall the barbarians from launching a surprise attack – which everyone knew they were planning – but more space between camps meant less competition for firewood and fodder. After all, some men from the next *lochos* over had traded blows with a Persian foraging party just the other day, and it wasn't the first time something like that had happened.<sup>122</sup>

#### FROM MESOPOTAMIA TO TRAPEZUS

The Persians may not have provided much assistance during the truce, but at least it was something. Once the truce collapsed in late September, the mercenaries were entirely on their own. Effective bivouac planning

<sup>117</sup> *An.* 2.4.13–15, 2.4.21–2. <sup>118</sup> *An.* 2.4.1. <sup>119</sup> *An.* 2.4.15. <sup>120</sup> *An.* 2.4.6–7.

<sup>121</sup> Market: *An.* 2.4.9, 2.5.30; hour's walk: assuming a separation between camps of one parasang, as described in 2.4.10.

<sup>122</sup> Danger of surprise attack: *An.* 2.4.3, 2.4.10, 2.4.16, 2.4.24; for fights between Persian and Cyrean foragers see 2.4.10.



required accurate advance knowledge about suitable *stathmoi*, but the generals rarely if ever possessed such information during the march to the sea. Prisoners or friendly locals could offer intelligence about potential halting spots, and on occasion mounted scouts could ride forward, as they had in Mesopotamia, to reconnoiter campsites.<sup>123</sup> Even so, these methods could reveal little about conditions more than a day or two ahead. All too frequently, the generals had to decide where to camp without knowing in advance whether the selected location could furnish sufficient food and fuel, or whether it would be roomy enough to accommodate every contingent comfortably.<sup>124</sup>

The concern with defense that so influenced the army's camping behavior during the truce only intensified after the massacre of the generals. Indeed, from September 401 until their arrival at Trapezus in January 400, the Cyreans were always under actual or potential threat; they could not let their guard down even when they stopped to rest. This became clear as soon as the retreat up the Tigris valley commenced. Marching in hollow square (*plaision*) helped ward off Persian pursuit, but as each day ended, the troops had to transition from march to bivouac. If it was late enough in the afternoon, they might count on the Persians withdrawing to camp.<sup>125</sup> Several times, though, enemy harassment forced them to halt with hours of daylight remaining.<sup>126</sup> With hostile cavalry nearby, the army's only choice may have been to find a level and well-watered spot, and bivouac there still in *plaision*.<sup>127</sup> Each general could then rotate his *lochoi* in turn within the square, allowing at least some men to cook and rest in comparative safety.<sup>128</sup> The *lochoi* left holding the walls of the square could either wait their turn, or permit some *suskenoi* to break out their cooking gear and prepare meals just behind the lines. Men could easily discard food waste beyond the lines, and as long as the army did not stay more than one night at each *stathmos*, the square's internal space would afford a protected area for latrines and pasturing.<sup>129</sup> When night fell, it would have been possible for men to sleep without leaving their unit positions, after stacking arms

<sup>123</sup> *An.* 2.2.15, 4.6.2–3, 4.7.19, 4.8.8.

<sup>124</sup> For insufficient resources at a *stathmos* see e.g. *An.* 4.5.5.

<sup>125</sup> *An.* 3.4.34–5.

<sup>126</sup> *An.* 3.4.32–3.

<sup>127</sup> Boucher (1913) 148; cf. Bennett (2001) 8–9 for some comparative Byzantine and medieval examples. For streams or canals on the plain of Mosul (*An.* 3.3.6–3.4.13), see Naval Intelligence Division (1944) 96. As the army was close enough to the Tigris to see the ruins of Nimrud (3.4.7) and Nineveh (3.4.10), the generals when possible might have backed the *plaision* up against the river for access to water.

<sup>128</sup> For taking turns, cf. Cheirisophus' rotating of units during the attack on the Taochian fortress, *An.* 4.7.2.

<sup>129</sup> A hollow square (*plaision*) about 300 meters on a side would have an internal area of 85,000–90,000 square meters; for the dimensions of the *plaision* see Chapter Six.

and stationing sentries.<sup>130</sup> This would have made for cramped quarters, but had the advantage of minimizing confusion in case of a night-time alarm. Furthermore, such an arrangement would have enabled the army to awake the next morning already more or less in marching formation. The Cyreans may have followed a similar routine during the slog through Chalybia, where vigorous local resistance and fortified strongholds forced them to fight their way through each day's march, with no possibility of camping in villages at nightfall.<sup>131</sup>

Such was their concern with defensibility during the march to the sea that the generals displayed extreme reluctance to disperse the army into separate contingent camps. Sometimes the terrain itself – the narrow gorges and precipitous mountains of Carduchia, for example – rendered it physically impossible for all contingents to encamp en masse in a single locale.<sup>132</sup> At least in these cases the terrain also inhibited attackers, who often experienced difficulties concentrating their forces against a single portion of the army.<sup>133</sup>

Even when the ground was open, though, the army maintained its concentrated bivouac. In western Armenia, for instance, the mercenaries continued to bivouac outdoors as a group under the cold November sky after negotiating a ceasefire with Tiribazus, even though his force was some ten stades (1.5–2 km) away, and despite the availability of many well-stocked villages in the plain around them.<sup>134</sup> Only after Tiribazus withdrew out of sight and a heavy snowfall blanketed the plain did the generals permit their contingents to billet in these villages. They remained so anxious about piecemeal destruction that a few unsubstantiated reports of nearby enemy campfires prompted them immediately to re-concentrate the army outdoors.<sup>135</sup> The cold weather soon drove the generals and their contingents back to separate village billets, but following another report of potential attack by Tiribazus, this time from a reliable scout, they again abandoned the villages for a unified laager.<sup>136</sup> Not satisfied with this defensive measure, the generals organized a preemptive strike, sending part of the army against Tiribazus while leaving a garrison to defend their laager. Catching

<sup>130</sup> Considering the amount of effort demanded from them each day, probably the light troops and cavalry were exempt from sentry duty, and spent their nights protected within the square. When the army formed its unit of Rhodian slingers, Xenophon suggested some sort of exemption (*ateleian*) to draw in volunteers for slinging duty (3.4.18); not having to stand watch would have been an attractive inducement.

<sup>131</sup> *An.* 4.7.17–18.

<sup>132</sup> This may be the implication of *An.* 4.2.8, where the generals commenced their movements “from wherever they happened to be.”

<sup>133</sup> *An.* 4.1.10–11.

<sup>134</sup> *An.* 4.4.4–9.

<sup>135</sup> *An.* 4.4.8, 4.4.10.

<sup>136</sup> *An.* 4.4.14–16; although Xenophon does not specify why the generals decided to return to the villages, cold and snow must have been a major factor.

Tiribazus by surprise and scattering his troops, the Cyreans nonetheless rushed straight back to rejoin the remainder of their comrades, yet again out of concern for the security of their camp.<sup>137</sup>

While Sophænetus and his colleagues decided where and how to camp, Arystas and his men had to adjust to a drastic change in the arrangement of *lochos* and *suskenia* bivouacs: the absence of shelters. The Cyreans had burnt their tents and excess baggage before departing on the retreat up the Tigris.<sup>138</sup> Dumping this bulky gear hastened the pace, and meant less setup time at each halting place. It also enabled denser *lochos* and contingent bivouacs, for without tent pegs and ropes in the way, *suskeniai* could camp more closely together. Initially the soldiers perhaps enjoyed the freedom from tents that Xenophon promised; the comfortable fall temperatures of the upper Tigris may have made sleeping outdoors under no more than a wool cloak tolerable. As fall turned to winter and temperatures dropped, though, many a Cyrean forced to spend a tentless night in the rain or snow must have cursed himself for listening to that Athenian and his bright ideas.<sup>139</sup> Furthermore, the slowly decreasing length of the days – less than eleven hours' light daily by the time the army got into Carduchia – ate up what time the soldiers saved by not having to set up tents.

*Suskeniai* bivouacking outdoors without tents were dependent on fires to keep warm, so much so that they could strip a stopping place bare of wood in less than a single night.<sup>140</sup> Each group's fire, now the sole focus of its communal life, assumed greater and greater importance. Gone were the days of spreading out for comfort; what mattered was staying close enough to the fire to keep warm. *Suskenoi* grew jealously possessive of the space around their fire, and outsiders approached only if they had something to trade.<sup>141</sup> When fuel was unavailable, the soldiers wrapped themselves in their cloaks and huddled together to share bodily heat.<sup>142</sup> If they lay down to sleep this way, the hundred men of Arystas' *lochos* might fit into an area of 100 square meters or so, just about what they occupied when formed into a marching column.<sup>143</sup> Although units continued to post sentries, at least once officers and men fell together exhausted onto the snow without

<sup>137</sup> *An.* 4.4.19–22.      <sup>138</sup> *An.* 3.2.27–8, 3.3.1.

<sup>139</sup> For sleeping in rain or snow see *An.* 4.2.6, 4.4.11, 4.5.11, 4.5.19–20; cf. Chapter Nine on the health effects of these conditions.

<sup>140</sup> *An.* 4.5.5.      <sup>141</sup> *An.* 4.5.5–6.

<sup>142</sup> *An.* 4.5.11, 4.5.19. Huddling together is a common feature of descriptions of military retreat in winter; see e.g. Macrory (1969) 107, Sajer (1990) 306, Corti (1997) 35–6.

<sup>143</sup> Assuming less than the 1.1 square meters of sleeping space per man (see note 51 above) posited for the pre-Cunaxa period.

taking the care to station guards.<sup>144</sup> If there was sufficient fuel, pickets might be able to light watch fires, both to keep warm and to illuminate approaches to the bivouac; otherwise their only recourse was to stamp their feet and keep moving continuously.<sup>145</sup> As before Cunaxa, pickets were probably posted just beyond the edges of the encampment, along which troops apparently continued to stack their arms.<sup>146</sup> The generals sometimes required additional guards, to stand watch over prisoners and unwilling guides.<sup>147</sup>

As *suskeniai* huddled closer together in the cold, the area their *lochos* occupied inevitably shrank; so too did the area each contingent covered. Gaps between *lochoi* may have dwindled to mere footpaths, just wide enough for men or animals to snake their way through the bivouac single file. In a tightly packed camp, pits for refuse and excrement were luxuries. Food was chronically short anyway, so probably less got thrown out. As for latrines, a man either had to risk a trip beyond the sentries or foul the ground near his own fire.<sup>148</sup> At least the cold weather kept the flies down and froze away the stink of human waste. There was one last macabre factor to the camp size equation: casualties. The day after the seizure of the generals, there were still some 12,000 mercenaries under arms. By the time the army reached Trapezus, though, its numbers had dropped more than 20 percent, to 9,800 or so. As death and disease slowly ate their way into the Cyrean ranks, each *lochos* and contingent required less and less space. This was not an effect the generals welcomed, but the decrease in numbers helped their camp planning nonetheless.

#### QUARTERING INDOORS

On the march to Cunaxa, the Cyreans had occasionally billeted in villages or other settlements, but as we have seen, their normal pattern was to quarter outdoors. From Cunaxa onward, however, built-up areas, particularly villages, gradually became more significant to the mercenaries' camping life.

<sup>144</sup> *An.* 4.5.19, 4.5.21.

<sup>145</sup> *An.* 4.5.13, 7.2.17–18. In the latter passage Xenophon describes Seuthes' method of stationing pickets behind rather than in front of watch fires as a novelty, suggesting that normal Cyrean practice was for pickets to stand in front of their fires.

<sup>146</sup> *An.* 4.4.11.

<sup>147</sup> *An.* 4.1.21–2; cf. 3.5.15–16, 6.3.11. An alternative means of preventing escape was to bind prisoners; see 4.6.3.

<sup>148</sup> The troops Xenophon describes straggling away from quarters in western Armenia (*An.* 4.4.9) may have been on their way to the toilet.

It is easy to speak abstractly of the army quartering indoors. Figuring out how the process might actually have worked, especially at the *lochos* and *suskenia* levels, is another matter entirely, not least because of Xenophon's cursory descriptions of the settlements the army encountered. Though he mentions villages (*komai*) more than eighty times, he provides no solid information on their size, layout, or population.<sup>149</sup> Indeed, he uses the term *komē* to encompass settlements of widely disparate characters: sometimes a single village sufficed to hold the entire army, while elsewhere several villages were required. In heavily settled Babylonia, each day's march could bring the army to a new set of villages, but further north villages tended to cluster in patches, several days apart.<sup>150</sup> Xenophon also implies a range of spatial distribution within particular groups of villages, most groups lying close enough together that the army could quarter in them without unduly dispersing, but a few far enough apart that a conscious decision to scatter had to be made.<sup>151</sup> Although palaces (*basileia*) several times appear in conjunction with villages, Xenophon never recounts troops quartering within the palaces, only in the surrounding villages.<sup>152</sup>

In the immediate aftermath of Cunaxa, villages were more important for provisioning than housing.<sup>153</sup> Xenophon recounts the army arriving at two sets of villages during this time, but in neither case did the troops quarter entirely indoors.<sup>154</sup> Indeed, his narrative of the third night after Cunaxa contrasts the leading elements under Clearchus, who were able to quarter in villages at sunset, with the remaining troops, who had to improvise what shelter they could outdoors in the dark.<sup>155</sup> The episode indicates how unused the army was to billeting indoors. For *suskeniai* in Clearchus' contingent, quartering may well have been first come, first served, as men went crashing about looking for the roomiest, cleanest, and best-appointed accommodations. Since the houses in these villages had been stripped down to their wood fittings, the troops who did find shelter there could not

<sup>149</sup> On *komai* see Woronoff (1987), Tuplin (1991); occasionally (e.g. *An.* 4.2.22) Xenophon also speaks of houses (*oikiai*).

<sup>150</sup> The limited archaeological survey data for northern Mesopotamia accords with this patchy settlement pattern; see Wilkinson (1995) 242.

<sup>151</sup> Single village: *An.* 3.4.32–3; compact village groups: 2.2.16, 2.3.14, 3.3.11, 3.4.18, 3.4.24; widely separated villages: 3.5.1–2, 4.4.7–8, 4.5.23–4.

<sup>152</sup> *An.* 3.4.24, 4.4.7; a different layout appears in 4.4.2, where a single village includes a *basileion* amongst its buildings.

<sup>153</sup> See Chapter Eight for more on provisioning.

<sup>154</sup> *An.* 2.2.16, 2.3.14; contrast the explicit mention (1.4.9–10) of encamping in Parysatis' villages.

<sup>155</sup> *An.* 2.2.16–17. The verb *aulizomai* ("bivouac, encamp"), which Xenophon uses to describe the following elements of the army, does not help much in elucidating this passage, for he later (4.1.11) uses the same verb in writing of the army camping indoors.

have been much more comfortable than their comrades bivouacking in the open.<sup>156</sup>

Villages and towns remained important supply points throughout the month and a half of the truce.<sup>157</sup> Indeed, the day it ended, Cheirisophus was away from camp foraging in a nearby village.<sup>158</sup> But, while the mercenaries drew rations from these settlements, they seem to have continued for the most part to bivouac outdoors. This is clearly what happened at Sittace and in desert Media, and is implied elsewhere.<sup>159</sup>

For ordinary Cyreans, lodging in native houses was a great way of avoiding the time and effort of setting up camp. If a *suskenia* could help itself to a household's larder, woodpile, and cistern, so much the better. Sophaenetus and his colleagues, however, had good reasons to keep the army bivouacked together and away from settlements. For one thing, the conditions of the truce may have constrained the generals from quartering their troops in villages, where they might damage property, unless at Tissaphernes' specific invitation.<sup>160</sup> Furthermore, the generals must have worried about surprise attacks. With hostile forces in close proximity, dispersing indoors for comfort was foolhardy. As Xenophon later observed, sometimes it was better to occupy a strong camp in the open than to bivouac in unfamiliar villages under close enemy observation.<sup>161</sup> Anyway, the men still had their tents and the late summer weather remained warm, so being outdoors meant no undue hardship.

Following the massacre of the generals, as the Cyreans began their fighting retreat up the Tigris valley, villages remained prime supply sources.<sup>162</sup> Although the troops had burnt their tents before commencing the retreat, the weather during this phase of the march was probably fairly comfortable, giving the generals little incentive to seek inhabited areas solely for shelter.<sup>163</sup> As the Persian pursuit intensified, however, settlements assumed

<sup>156</sup> According to Xenophon (*An.* 2.2.16), Persian forces had plundered the fittings, but the villagers themselves could have removed them for safekeeping; cf. Thuc. 2.14.

<sup>157</sup> *An.* 2.4.13–14, 2.4.25, 2.4.27, 2.4.28. <sup>158</sup> *An.* 2.5.38.

<sup>159</sup> Sittace: *An.* 2.4.13; Media: 2.4.26; implied elsewhere: 2.4.12, 2.4.25, 2.4.27. Possibly the Cyreans spent 23 days (2.3.17, 2.4.1) in the villages where they found dates and palm hearts (2.3.15–16). Xenophon, however, does not specify that the troops actually quartered in these villages, as he does elsewhere (cf. e.g. 2.2.16).

<sup>160</sup> *An.* 2.3.27–8. Tissaphernes allowed the Cyreans to plunder the villages of Parysatis (2.4.27), although it is notable that he turned these over to the Cyreans specifically for the purpose of plunder rather than for quartering. Xenophon implies that Persian troops were both billeting in villages (2.2.15) and plundering them rather thoroughly (2.2.16).

<sup>161</sup> *An.* 7.4.12.

<sup>162</sup> *An.* 3.2.34–5, 3.3.11, 3.4.18, 3.4.31, 3.5.1–2.

<sup>163</sup> In *An.* 3.5.2, for example, the soldiers' main reaction to Tissaphernes' burning of villages is to worry about lack of supplies; compare 4.4.14, where the burning of buildings is seen as causing a loss of shelter.

new importance as refuges. After a series of running battles in the Tigris foothills, for example, the army had to pause for three days at a set of villages surrounding a palace, both to collect provisions and tend the many casualties Tissaphernes' force had inflicted.<sup>164</sup> Attempts to maintain the pace of the march on subsequent days repeatedly faltered under pressure from Tissaphernes and the burden of carrying the wounded, compelling the Cyreans to camp each time they sighted a new set of villages.<sup>165</sup>

Because Xenophon juxtaposes reaching these villages with relief from Persian attack, it is tempting to assume that the villages themselves now became vital for defense.<sup>166</sup> A closer look, though, tells otherwise. First, Xenophon makes no mention of static defense based on house walls and narrow streets, but focuses instead on active sorties launched from a stationary position.<sup>167</sup> The villages in this region – perhaps simple huddles of mud huts, built on the lowlands rather than on mounds or tells – may not have possessed much defensive potential to begin with.<sup>168</sup> Troops sent on sorties had an easier time fending off Persian thrusts simply because they did not have to run back to catch up with a still-moving hollow square.<sup>169</sup> The lack of references to the protection that built-up areas could furnish against cavalry attack feels doubly striking in this section of the text, which focuses so closely on tactical innovations. If the Cyreans had in fact turned villages into fortresses, surely Xenophon would have commented explicitly on the technique.<sup>170</sup>

Another common notion – that the entire army literally quartered *in* the villages it reached during this part of the march – also fails under scrutiny.<sup>171</sup> It would have required a very large agglomeration of houses indeed, a town rather than a village, to accommodate 12,000 mercenaries along with animals and non-combatants. Imagining that the various contingents, in the face of Tissaphernes' pursuit, left the hollow square and dispersed into villages makes no sense considering the worry over separate encampments the generals displayed in Armenia. A better explanation is that the army quartered only partially in villages, perhaps enclosing a settlement

<sup>164</sup> *An.* 3.4.24, 3.4.31.      <sup>165</sup> *An.* 3.4.32.      <sup>166</sup> *An.* 3.4.1, 3.4.18.

<sup>167</sup> *An.* 3.4.33; notably, Xenophon writes of counterattacking not from the villages, but from a station or position (*khōra*).

<sup>168</sup> For traditional architecture in this region see Naval Intelligence Division (1944) 347–8. Although many mounds or tells dot the left (north) bank of the Tigris above Mosul, these were apparently not the locations of first millennium BC settlements; see Wilkinson (1995) 236.

<sup>169</sup> Compare the difficulties of counterattacking on the move: *An.* 3.3.9–11, 3.4.27–8.

<sup>170</sup> In contrast, note his detailed description (*An.* 6.5.1) of the fortification of Calpe.

<sup>171</sup> For this notion see Masqueray (1930) 152, Dillery (2001) 275.

or two within its hollow square, as it would later do on the Black Sea coast.<sup>172</sup> Villages within the *plaision* could then safely be plundered for provisions and used to house the wounded.

Only in Anatolia, with the arrival of bad weather, did the Cyreans finally begin seeking out settlements for shelter as much as for provisions. In rainy and misty Carduchia, for example, the generals tried to put their men in houses whenever possible, probably so they could kindle fires, dry clothes, and cook. Tellingly, Xenophon now becomes much more explicit in stating that the troops cantoned in villages, and for the first time even provides details about house architecture.<sup>173</sup> The scattered mountain hamlets of Carduchia, consisting of perhaps ten or twenty houses apiece, could hardly have made comfortable quarters, but probably the mercenaries crammed themselves under every available roof, whether designed for human habitation or not.<sup>174</sup> Some idea of the density that might obtain under these conditions is reflected in the experience of Communist Chinese soldiers during the Korean winter of 1950–1, who routinely fit forty to sixty men into a single one-room thatched hut.<sup>175</sup> Even so, it is difficult to imagine such a sparsely settled region providing a concentration of dwellings large enough to ensure every Cyrean a place indoors. Possibly the rugged terrain hindered Carduchian assaults enough to allow the army to spread out in several neighboring hamlets; or it may be that some *lochoi*, especially those further back in the march column, had to bivouac outdoors, while others enjoyed the warmth and comfort of native houses.<sup>176</sup> Indoor billets, at any rate, were not yet indispensable: men might spend a night out shivering under the open sky and still be fit to fight the next morning.<sup>177</sup>

Further on in Anatolia, things were different. In western Armenia, for example, fear of Tiribazus and his cavalry initially prompted the generals to keep the army outdoors despite the proximity of numerous villages, but the first snowfalls of winter soon forced them to choose warmth over security. As the march progressed into central Armenia, freezing temperatures, snow,

<sup>172</sup> This might explain *An.* 3.5.1, where the majority of the army under Cheirisophus sets up camp in a single village on the banks of the Tigris. For this technique on the Black Sea coast see 6.5.7.

<sup>173</sup> *An.* 4.1.10–11, 4.2.22–3, 4.3.1.

<sup>174</sup> For scattered hamlets see *An.* 4.1.7–8; hamlets are perhaps also implied by the use of *oikias* rather than *komas* in 4.2.22. The 10–20 house estimate is based on data for nineteenth- and twentieth-century hamlets in this region; see Beaumont et al. (1988) 145–6, Galloway (1958) 361, Helburn (1955) 375, Villa and Matossian (1982) 30. Archaeological survey of the Bohtan Su (Centrites River, 4.3.1) valley, although not specifically focused on the Achaemenid period, suggests an Iron Age settlement pattern of scattered small villages (less than one hectare in area); see Parker (2001) 114–24.

<sup>175</sup> Hopkins (1986) 250–2, Shrader (1995) 144.

<sup>176</sup> *An.* 4.1.10.

<sup>177</sup> *An.* 4.2.5–7.



and wind made finding shelter the difference between life and death.<sup>178</sup> In northern Anatolia, there was less snow, although freezing temperatures persisted. Here the Cyreans again probably sought villages as much for the shelter they offered as for provisions.<sup>179</sup>

The two instances of quartering in villages that Xenophon relates at length – first in Tiribazus' territory, and then in the underground houses after the blizzard – provide the clearest picture of Cyrean indoor billeting in Anatolia. Both episodes make clear that troops were dispersed into scattered villages only when the generals felt confident that enemies would not attack.<sup>180</sup> They also indicate that normal procedure was for each contingent to occupy a single village.<sup>181</sup> In the case of the underground villages, the generals drew lots to distribute the villages amongst themselves; possibly they had previously employed the same method in Tiribazus' territory.<sup>182</sup> This episode provides suggestive evidence that the contingents by now were relatively similar in size.<sup>183</sup> Otherwise, distribution by lot would have been highly impractical: a large contingent that drew a small village would be impossibly crowded, while a small contingent in a large village would enjoy extravagant accommodations at the expense of the rest of the army.

Let us follow Sophaenetes and his contingent as they make their way into one of these villages. For security reasons, Sophaenetes by now was probably able to exert some control over the arrangement of his *lochoi*, perhaps assigning clumps or blocks of houses to each unit or letting *lochagoi* draw lots for their sectors while he appropriated the village headman's house for his headquarters.<sup>184</sup> Instead of stacking arms, soldiers now kept them indoors.<sup>185</sup> Each *lochos*, though, still posted sentries, sometimes as much to keep an eye on its native hosts as on the horizon.<sup>186</sup> Sentries could watch from windows or doorways rather than walking a beat in the snow and cold, although in the Armenian underground villages, some pickets had to be posted above ground. For sanitation, each contingent could start by using whatever permanent facilities its village boasted, but these would soon clog

<sup>178</sup> *An.* 4.5.11.

<sup>179</sup> *An.* 4.7.18, 4.7.27, 4.8.19–20, and possibly also 4.7.22, where the Cyreans ravage territory hostile to Gymnias.

<sup>180</sup> *An.* 4.4.8, 4.5.23.

<sup>181</sup> Single contingent (*taxis*) per village: *An.* 4.4.8–9, 4.5.23–4. For use of the term *taxis* to indicate a single contingent, see Chapter Three.

<sup>182</sup> *An.* 4.5.23.

<sup>183</sup> Probably some redistribution of *lochoi* amongst contingents occurred before the retreat up the Tigris commenced; see Chapter Six for details.

<sup>184</sup> For a chief's house used as headquarters cf. *An.* 4.5.28–9.

<sup>185</sup> See *An.* 7.4.16 for weapons kept indoors. <sup>186</sup> *An.* 4.5.29.

under the weight of so many visitors, forcing men to make trips outdoors to relieve themselves.<sup>187</sup>

Sophaenetus' contingent probably filled every available indoor space in its village. Judging from their prosperity, the Armenian villages were far more populous than the hamlets of Carduchia.<sup>188</sup> Unless a village was large enough to furnish every *suskenia* its own house, though, quartering indoors could challenge each group's attempt to claim its own defined space.<sup>189</sup> Had it been warm, several groups could have spread out in and around a house – one *suskenia* claiming the courtyard, another the main room, another the stables, for example – and have cooked outdoors. In Anatolia, however, several different *suskeniai* might have to crowd into a single house. Moreover, kindling separate indoor suskenic fires, even in large dwellings, would have been impracticable. More likely, men shared the household hearth, perhaps prompting some inter-suskenic cooperation in building and maintaining the fire, in sharing foodstuffs, and in preparing meals.<sup>190</sup> And, while *suskenoi* might stake out a corner of a shared room for themselves, they could hardly complain if someone from another group had to step over them on his way through the house.

#### THE BLACK SEA COAST AND BEYOND

Cyrean camping behavior did not change much after the army reached the sea in January 400. On open ground, contingents still bivouacked together, *lochoi* still stacked arms, and pickets still formed a protective fringe at the edge of camp, while *suskenoi* settled in around their fires.<sup>191</sup> As they made their way west along the Black Sea shore through the spring and summer, the mercenaries often helped themselves to provisions or booty from native villages, but rarely billeted in them. Indeed, at Calpe the men initially insisted on sleeping on the beach, despite the many prosperous villages in the neighborhood.<sup>192</sup> The moderate Euxine climate made sleeping

<sup>187</sup> This would explain why some Cyreans (*An.* 4.4.9) straggled away from their indoor quarters in western Armenia.

<sup>188</sup> *An.* 4.4.9–10, 4.4.13, 4.5.24–33.

<sup>189</sup> Late nineteenth-century Armenian villages, by way of comparison, could count up to 200 homes; see Villa and Matossian (1982) 30. Villages of such size might have enabled the *suskeniai* of a contingent to claim individual houses.

<sup>190</sup> Note the emphasis on fellowship and sharing of food in Xenophon's narrative (*An.* 4.5.30–3) of the underground villages.

<sup>191</sup> Contingents: *An.* 5.4.14; stacked arms: 5.4.14, 5.7.21, 6.4.27; pickets: 6.3.11, 6.3.21, 6.4.26; fires: 6.3.21, 6.5.26.

<sup>192</sup> Provisions or booty: *An.* 5.1.5–8, 5.1.17, 6.1.1, 6.3.2–4, 6.4.6, 6.4.23–4, 6.5.7, 6.6.1, 7.1.13; on the beach: 6.4.7; prosperous villages: 6.4.6.

outdoors all summer long entirely feasible; houses were only for the sick and injured.<sup>193</sup> Only near Byzantium and in Thrace, with the return of cold and damp weather, did units again seek indoor cantonments.<sup>194</sup> Here again, the pattern of quartering by contingents persisted, as did the generals' wariness about sleeping indoors with enemy forces close by.<sup>195</sup>

Alongside these continuities, there were several interrelated changes in Cyrean camping behavior. First, the average time the army spent halted between movements increased dramatically. In the eleven months between Sardis and Trapezus, there had only been three halts lasting longer than a week.<sup>196</sup> From Trapezus to Byzantium, in contrast, halts of a month or more were the rule rather than the exception. Furthermore, once the Cyreans had gathered a flotilla of transports, their choice of campsites narrowed, for they could not stray far from the beaches or harbors where they moored their ships.<sup>197</sup> Even after getting rid of their ships at Calpe, the troops continued to camp hard by the water, in hopes of receiving at least some seaborne supplies.<sup>198</sup>

Extended halts turned camps into semi-permanent bases, rather than just stopping places between marches. Although the army apparently continued to maintain a unified bivouac during these sojourns, the longer halts probably spurred *suskeniai* to construct larger, more comfortable dwellings and better kitchen facilities.<sup>199</sup> Longer stays also increased sanitation and foraging problems. The need to keep close to the sea meant the generals could not very well change bivouac locations frequently to escape fouled and over-foraged ground. An ideal solution would have been organized garbage collection, on the lines of the systems found in Athens and other Greek cities, but one suspects the army pursued the easiest alternative: depositing refuse and excrement into the sea.<sup>200</sup> As for foraging, the longer the army remained stationary, the farther men had to go each day for food and firewood. After about a month at Trapezus, for example, the army

<sup>193</sup> Sick troops were quartered indoors at Cotyora, but under mysterious circumstances. Xenophon begins by claiming the Cotyorites would not house sick Cyreans within their walls (*An.* 5.5.6), but in response to assertions (5.5.10–12) that the army had forced its way into the city and was quartering indoors he almost immediately backpedals, admitting that there were indeed some sick troops in Cotyora (5.5.20). His claim that “the place itself invited them” is probably a disingenuous way of saying that Cyreans had climbed the walls at a vulnerable point and seized some part of the city; for the soldiers’ skill in climbing see 4.2.8–9, 5.2.15, 7.1.17. For sick troops housed indoors at Byzantium see 7.2.6.

<sup>194</sup> *An.* 7.2.1, 7.3.48, 7.4.11, 7.7.1. <sup>195</sup> *An.* 7.3.15, 7.4.12.

<sup>196</sup> See Table 1 for details on halt locations and lengths.

<sup>197</sup> *An.* 5.1.15–17, 5.3.1, 5.4.11–15, 5.7.21–5, 6.4.7. <sup>198</sup> *An.* 6.5.1.

<sup>199</sup> On semi-permanent dwellings and facilities see note 82 above.

<sup>200</sup> Another possibility is that the army allowed local inhabitants to remove dung; what was a problem for the soldiers was rich fertilizer for the locals. For more on sanitation, see Chapter Nine.

had consumed everything within a day's march.<sup>201</sup> With hostile Colchians assembled on the hills above them, the mercenaries could not very well disperse by contingents for better foraging; ultimately they were forced to raid the neighboring Drilae for supplies.<sup>202</sup> Elsewhere, as at Cotyora and Calpe, the countryside was rich enough to support the Cyreans for stays of a month and longer.<sup>203</sup>

A final development in Cyrean camping behavior was increased attention to camp defense. Leaving a garrison to protect camp was not unprecedented – already in Armenia Sophraenetus had commanded a detachment for just that purpose – but on the Black Sea coast the generals employed the technique more systematically.<sup>204</sup> At Trapezus, for instance, they left half the army behind to guard the camp while going off to attack the Drilae with the other half.<sup>205</sup> At Calpe, likewise, garrisons several times stayed behind to protect quarters and gear while the majority of the army marched out to battle.<sup>206</sup> At Calpe, too, the Cyreans for the first time constructed a fortified camp.<sup>207</sup> There, after a series of setbacks including Neon's disastrous foraging expedition and a subsequent Bithynian attack on the camp at sunset, the mercenaries retreated to the rocky promontory above the harbor, digging a trench across the approach and backing it with a three-gated palisade. Behind this they may have constructed barracks, sheds for booty, and perhaps even market facilities. At any rate the site became permanent-looking enough that people along the Black Sea coast began to assume it was a city on the verge of being founded.<sup>208</sup>

#### RESTING AND THE *SUSKENIA*

From Sardis to Cunaxa, to the sea, and west to Byzantium and Thrace, no two stopping places were the same. The army encamped in an extraordinary range of conditions, from the shady trees and brooks of Cyrus' Celaenae estate to the desert heat and dust of the Euphrates valley, the freezing cold

<sup>201</sup> *An.* 5.2.1.      <sup>202</sup> *An.* 5.2.1–2.

<sup>203</sup> *An.* 5.5.5–6, 6.6.1–3. At Cotyora, some troops may have encamped at a distance from the rest of the army (6.1.1), perhaps for better foraging.

<sup>204</sup> Xenophon calls the troops left with Sophraenetus *phulakas* (*An.* 4.4.19), but the job probably demanded more than a handful of pickets.

<sup>205</sup> *An.* 5.2.1.      <sup>206</sup> *An.* 6.4.25, 6.5.4–5.

<sup>207</sup> It is unlikely Xenophon omitted any other instance where the Cyreans engaged in field fortification. If, for example, the army had ever protected its perimeter with abatis (barriers of felled trees), certainly he would have paraded the fact. That he credits this tactic to the Thebans (*Hell.* 6.5.30), his least favorite people, is telling. He does mention the Cyreans using hills as rallying points and campsites (6.3.6, 6.3.20) during the Arcadian–Achaean secession.

<sup>208</sup> *An.* 6.5.1, 6.6.3–4, Lendle (1995) 402.

of Anatolia and the long halts along the Euxine shore. It quartered in tents, without tents, in separate contingents, as a unified whole, in huts and villages, in hollow square. Some *stathmoi* were spacious and pleasant, others cramped and dingy, a few no more than hollows scratched out by the sides of snow-covered roads. Nonetheless, probably one memory remained etched in the mind of every Cyrean who survived the campaign: the heat of his campfire and the faces of his comrades around it. Generals might pick stopping places and distribute units to their areas, *lochagoi* might dole out sentry shifts and latrine duty, but officers' power dimmed at the edges of every campfire and the flaps of every tent. In camp, each group of ordinary Cyreans could claim a space uniquely theirs. The area around a soldier's fire and tent was his territory, as important as any house he had left in mainland Greece or Ionia. He might walk over to another *suskenia*, or even to an adjacent *lochos*, as a man back home might go to visit neighbors, but it was to his own comrades and his own space that he always returned. If marching belonged to the *lochos*, then, resting was the domain of the *suskenia*. Yet the most neatly arranged bivouac meant nothing without a fire, a meal, and something to drink. For the men of each *suskenia*, setting up camp was only a beginning.

## CHAPTER 8

### *Eating and drinking*

Though moderns like to portray cooking in ancient Greece as women's work, a closer look at the literary sources reveals men preparing food themselves both at home and in the fields.<sup>1</sup> True, some wealthy Athenian hoplites in the fourth century had slaves to cook for them, but archaeological evidence from Euboea suggests that other Greek soldiers were cooking together in small groups as early as the Archaic period.<sup>2</sup> Indeed, it was no shame even for Homeric heroes to do their own cooking. In an intimate scene from the *Iliad*, for example, Achilles and Patroclus in camp outside Troy prepare a repast for their comrades: Achilles with the aid of Automedon carving and spitting a medley of sheep, goat, and pork, Patroclus mixing drinks and stoking the fire, then serving out bread while Achilles lays roast meat on platters.<sup>3</sup>

Like Achilles and Patroclus, the Cyreans did their own cooking in small groups, as members of a *suskenia*. The chow line and mess tent may be icons of modern military life, and professional chefs were familiar figures to sophisticated Athenian gourmets, but no evidence of centralized food preparation appears anywhere in the *Anabasis*.<sup>4</sup> This absence strikes all the more considering the idealized Persian army of the *Cyropaedia*. There, Cyrus the Elder's troops enjoy the benefits of full-time quartermasters, company cooks, full-time servers, and organized group feeding.<sup>5</sup> It seems unlikely Xenophon would have devoted so much attention to this perfect mess system if he had already seen something similar amongst the Cyreans.

#### MEALTIMES

The Cyreans normally looked forward to two main meals, what we might call breakfast (*ariston*) and dinner (*deipnon*).<sup>6</sup> Mealtimes were not always

<sup>1</sup> Women's work: Wilkins (2000a); at home: Lysias 1.22; in the fields: Theophr. *Char.* 14.11.

<sup>2</sup> Wealthy hoplites: Dem. 54.3–5; Euboea: Sapouna Sakellarakı et al. (2002).

<sup>3</sup> Hom. *Il.* 190–220.

<sup>4</sup> Professional chefs: Wilkins (2000b) 369–82.

<sup>5</sup> *Cyr.* 2.1.21, 2.2.2–5, 2.3.21, 4.2.34, 5.2.6. <sup>6</sup> *An.* 4.3.10; cf. *Eq. mag.* 7.12.

regular. On the march or when under attack, the troops sometimes had little opportunity to stop for a meal, even if they had food. Xenophon's rear guard, particularly in Carduchia, frequently went without stopping to eat, either from lack of supplies or of time.<sup>7</sup> Possibly they snatched quick bites of parched grain or bread crust, or nibbled on other scraps to keep themselves going through the day.<sup>8</sup>

Breakfast (*ariston*) was not necessarily the first order of the day. On the day of Cunaxa, for instance, the Cyreans had still not eaten breakfast when Artaxerxes' army made its appearance at mid-morning.<sup>9</sup> That this was common practice and not simply a peculiarity of the army's disordered advance that day is clear from several other passages that describe the soldiers marching before breakfast.<sup>10</sup> On one occasion, Xenophon even portrays a march before breakfast as a pleasant way to stimulate the appetite.<sup>11</sup> There were other significant pre-breakfast activities. In Mesopotamia, after resolving to keep going despite the massacre of their generals, the Cyreans destroyed their excess gear before breakfast. In Carduchia, when the generals and *lochagoi* met at daybreak to discuss the army's proliferation of captured animals and people, they published their decision to strip the army of these before breakfast. At Calpe Harbor, the troops moved camp, dug a trench, and put up a palisade and three gates, all before breakfast.<sup>12</sup>

Breakfast could be quick or leisurely depending on circumstances. When the army began the day by marching and halted to eat before resuming its progress, kindling fires and cooking was too time-consuming.<sup>13</sup> In these cases, the Cyreans probably relied on previously prepared food or leftovers, and a meal break might last only half an hour. When the army sat still, or on the occasions when a day's march did not begin until after breakfast, there was time for soldiers to build fires and prepare fresh food. The day after Cunaxa, for instance, the troops spent the morning foraging for wood, building fires, and slaughtering, dressing, and cooking baggage animals.<sup>14</sup>

Dinner (*deipnon*) was generally eaten in the afternoon or early evening, before sunset. On the day of Cunaxa, for instance, the Cyreans spent until sunset fighting and maneuvering, and so missed dinner. There was not

<sup>7</sup> *An.* 4.1.15, 4.2.4.

<sup>8</sup> US Army nutritionists recommend this sort of snacking for troops unable to eat regular meals; see Marriott (1995) 27–9. My colleague Frank Frost, a Korean War veteran, recalls that after once missing a meal in combat he thereafter always carried food scraps in his pockets, just in case.

<sup>9</sup> *An.* 1.8.1, 1.10.19.

<sup>10</sup> *An.* 4.6.5–9, 5.4.22, 6.3.24. At 5.4.22, the reading *anastesantes* ("having arisen") in manuscript M is preferable to the generally accepted (Hude/Peters, Masqueray, Dillery) *aristesantes* ("having breakfasted"); otherwise the troops will have had a hobbit-like "second breakfast" at 5.4.30.

<sup>11</sup> *An.* 7.3.9–10. <sup>12</sup> Mesopotamia: *An.* 3.3.1–6; Carduchia: 4.1.12–14; Calpe: 6.5.1.

<sup>13</sup> *An.* 4.6.21, 5.4.30, 6.3.24. <sup>14</sup> *An.* 2.1.6–7.

even the means for a late supper, Homeric style, as Artaxerxes' forces had pillaged the army's supplies.<sup>15</sup> In Mesopotamia, Xenophon and Proxenus were enjoying a post-*deipnon* stroll at the edge of camp when an emissary allegedly from Ariaeus approached the pickets.<sup>16</sup> There are no indications of a sentry fire, meaning that it was still daylight. In Carduchia, a picked volunteer force ate dinner in late afternoon before setting out on its mission.<sup>17</sup> Elsewhere, the soldiers repeatedly dine before nightfall, and indeed Xenophon depicts eating dinner at sunset as the mark of an especially long or arduous day.<sup>18</sup>

Because rest and nightfall normally followed dinner, *deipnon* could often be a more elaborate affair. Once the army had halted and troops had dispersed to their encampments, each *suskenia* could turn its attention to preparing food. While some *suskenoi* went out foraging, and others took care of animals or looked after equipment, one or two men in each group tackled the first task of cooking: making fire.

#### FIRES AND FUEL

Nowadays we conjure reliable, controlled cooking heat so effortlessly – the US Army even packages combat rations in self-heating pouches – that it is difficult to appreciate the magnitude of the task in antiquity. In Xenophon's day, the easiest way to kindle a new fire was to borrow flame or embers from an existing one; hence the preeminence of the hearth in classical religion, for practical as much as symbolic reasons.<sup>19</sup> This worked fine for the Cyreans as long as they camped in or near settlements from whose hearths they could draw. When on the move and bivouacking outdoors, however, the men had either to carry along their home fires or create them anew each day.

That armies could carry open flame on campaign is suggested by the custom of the Spartans, who according to Xenophon took into the field a sacred fire that was never extinguished.<sup>20</sup> Along with furnishing an essential ingredient for sacrifice, this would be a convenient and ritually pure source for cooking fires.<sup>21</sup> Xenophon never claims the practice as peculiarly

<sup>15</sup> *An.* 1.10.15–19. Xenophon uses the Homeric *dorpeston* (“at supper time”; for *dorpos* normally eaten at sunset see *Hom. Il.* 19.208 and *Od.* 4.429) to underscore how late the Cyreans finally reached camp.

<sup>16</sup> *An.* 2.4.15. <sup>17</sup> *An.* 4.2.1.

<sup>18</sup> *An.* 3.1.3, 3.5.18, 4.6.22, 6.3.21, 6.4.10, 6.4.26. For *deipnon* by daylight, cf. *Cyr.* 3.3.25, 3.3.33 and *Thuc.* 4.90, 7.81.

<sup>19</sup> Hearth: Humphrey et al. (1998) 38–9; in religion: Burkert (1985) 60–4.

<sup>20</sup> *Lac.* 13.2–3; Lipka (2002) 212–14. Xenophon may be exaggerating for effect: “eternal flames” have a habit of going out when no one is watching.

<sup>21</sup> Ritual purity: Lipka (2002) 214, Burkert (1985) 61.



Spartan, and since the Cyreans needed fire for sacrifice too, possibly some of the generals or their soothsayers (*manteis*) began the expedition toting their own sacred fires. Any mobile open flame, though, surely could not have been kept going continuously for the entire march, especially through the rain, snow, and wind of Anatolia.

If the Cyreans did carry fire, it was probably as embers rather than open flame. The Spartans employed this technique during operations near Perachora in 390 BC, when King Agesilaus dispatched ten men carrying “fire in clay pots” – probably containing smoldering charcoal or tinder – to help revive a battalion (*mora*) posted on a cold, wet ridge.<sup>22</sup> The arrival of the fire pots enabled the shivering troops quickly to kindle numerous blazes. That ten fire pots could provide plentiful fire, even with damp wood, for a detachment probably mustering at least 500 men suggests their relative efficiency.<sup>23</sup>

At Perachora the main Spartan camp was at the base of the heights below the detachment’s position, so Agesilaus’ fire-bearers probably needed less than an hour to deliver their cargo. On longer trips, though, pots or boxes full of glowing embers would have been extremely unwieldy. They might balance precariously on an unfortunate pack mule, or jounce around on a wagon or cart, but even two men who minimized the load by slinging a fire pot on a pole could not expect to carry much else. The Spartans on the ridge, indeed, had not brought fire pots along themselves precisely because they were traveling light. Furthermore, fire pots demanded attention, but the constant checking and stoking needed to sustain one was probably beyond the capabilities of any single *suskenia*. Only for generals with servants and pack trains might carrying and maintaining live embers have been feasible.

Theoretically, a general could pass such fire on to his contingent, with each *lochos* or *taxis* distributing flame to its component *suskeniai*, but there is no clear evidence for such a system. Instead, Xenophon relates that during the Armenian blizzard some men survived only by trading food for fire.<sup>24</sup> This suggests that individual groups kindled their own fires rather than relying on a central source.

Most *suskeniai*, then, made rather than carried fire. The most common fire-starting options were friction drills and bows, or flint and iron pyrites.<sup>25</sup> While portable and durable, these were neither weatherproof nor

<sup>22</sup> *Hell.* 4.5.3–4; Harrison (1954) 230.

<sup>23</sup> For the size of a *mora* see Singor (2002), Lipka (2002) 257–68, and van Wees (2004).

<sup>24</sup> *An.* 4.5.5.

<sup>25</sup> Theophr. *Hist. pl.* 5.9.6–7, Theophr. *Concerning Fire* 63, Plin. *HN* 16.207–8; Harrison (1954) 218–26.

convenient. Drills in particular were proverbially difficult to use.<sup>26</sup> In calm, dry conditions, a skilled operator with a drill or flint and pyrites might coax fire from tinder in a few minutes.<sup>27</sup> Things were easier, especially with fire drills, if two *suskenoi* worked together.<sup>28</sup> The few Cyreans who could bring themselves to kindle fires the night following the seizure of the generals likely used one of these techniques.<sup>29</sup> On cold but dry winter mornings, such as after the first snowfall in western Armenia, friction methods still worked as long as dry tinder was available. On the way into Taochia, likewise, a swift detachment sent to occupy heights ahead of the army with instructions to light signal fires after reaching its objective probably took along drills or flint.<sup>30</sup>

In wet and windy conditions, making fire got much tougher. At best, a man with numbed hands might strike flint against knuckles for some time before realizing the mistake; at the worst, soldiers unable to kindle fires succumbed to hypothermia and frostbite.<sup>31</sup> Still, the Cyreans succeeded in building fires during the Armenian blizzard, despite high winds and deep snow, revealing that at least a few had exceptional skill with drills and flint.<sup>32</sup> One way to circumvent rain and wind was for *suskenoi* to form a tight circle covered by a cloak or leather tarp. Such a windbreak could enable a group to nourish a fire until it grew enough to survive uncovered.<sup>33</sup>

To sustain their fires, the Cyreans needed tons of fuel every day. Most of this would have been wood, perhaps supplemented by plundered charcoal or dried dung.<sup>34</sup> While no ancient figures for cooking fuel consumption survive, valuable comparative data comes from recent studies of family cooking in developing nations, often undertaken as part of programs to reduce the deforestation and pollution caused by wood-fueled fires.<sup>35</sup> Researchers have found that per capita daily consumption varies widely depending on wood type, climate, diet, and cooking patterns. Even seemingly identical groups can burn vastly different amounts of fuel. A study in Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), for instance, found two neighboring families of the same size and circumstances, one burning almost 36 kilograms of wood daily, the other only 4 kilograms.<sup>36</sup>

<sup>26</sup> *Cyr.* 2.2.15.      <sup>27</sup> Harrison (1954) 220.      <sup>28</sup> Watson (1939) 16–17; cf. *An.* 4.3.11.

<sup>29</sup> *An.* 3.1.3.      <sup>30</sup> After snowfall: *An.* 4.4.13; into Taochia: 4.6.21–3.      <sup>31</sup> *An.* 4.5.11.

<sup>32</sup> *An.* 4.5.5–6. This episode reveals that some Cyreans had learned how to build fires atop snow, possibly by laying down a bed of green wood as a fire platform; cf. Watson (1939) 71.

<sup>33</sup> GIs in Korea used much the same method, although they had the advantage of Zippo lighters and sometimes gasoline (personal communication, Frank Frost).

<sup>34</sup> Smith (1998), Olson (1991), Villa and Matossian (1982) 34–5, United States Army (1896) 244; cf. Cass. Dio 52.25.7 and Livy 38.18.4.

<sup>35</sup> Evans (1984), Foley et al. (1984), Foley and Moss (1985).      <sup>36</sup> Foley et al. (1984) 76–7.

Nonetheless, it is possible to extrapolate from the modern data an approximation of Cyrean wood consumption. Households in a variety of climates, cooking porridge or bread on open fires, were observed using about 1.5–3 kilograms (3.3–6.6 pounds) of air-dried wood per person daily for cooking alone.<sup>37</sup> Since the households studied generally cooked two meals a day, while the Cyreans did not always kindle breakfast fires, these totals may be halved to around 0.75–1.5 kilograms (1.65–3.3 pounds). An approximate minimum wood consumption of one kilogram of wood per Cyrean per day, therefore, does not seem unreasonable.<sup>38</sup> That this is an absolute minimum figure needs emphasis, for people tend to use more wood than necessary when it is plentiful. Also, green or damp wood, which the Cyreans frequently had to use in Anatolia, burns poorly compared to air-dried wood.<sup>39</sup> Lastly, because the troops sometimes used fires for heating as well as cooking, actual fuel consumption could rise significantly in wet or cold weather. Even the minimum figure, though, reminds us that the Cyreans burned through some ten metric tons (22,000 pounds) of fuel each day of the campaign.

The next prerequisite for cooking was a hearth or fire pit. In native settlements the Cyreans could use indoor built hearths, but when bivouacking outdoors each *suskenia* needed another way to protect its fire while keeping it accessible for cooking. At home in Greece portable terracotta braziers or cooking stands were well known, and some groups may have brought them along.<sup>40</sup> Most *suskeniai*, though, probably preferred fire pits, simple rings of stones or mud much like those still used today in developing nations. Any three stones or other props placed closely together would provide a solid base for round-bottomed vessels.<sup>41</sup> By placing pots next to rather than over their fire, soldiers could even eliminate the need for cooking stands while still taking advantage of the fire's radiant heat.<sup>42</sup>

Atop or alongside their fires, the Cyreans set a bewildering assortment of vessels: familiar shapes from home, imitation Attic wares purchased in Ionia, "liberated" pots of all sorts, even bronze helmets pressed into culinary service.<sup>43</sup> A crucial factor in using any of these was capacity. Plato once

<sup>37</sup> This range is based on data from Fiji, Mexico, and Upper Volta; see Evans (1984) 23–4, Foley et al. (1984) 39–43, 76–9.

<sup>38</sup> About 600 kilograms of wood makes up a cubic meter: Perjés (1970) 8. The volume of wood depends on its type, for hard woods such as oak and ash weigh more than softer woods like pine: Foley and Moss (1985) 67.

<sup>39</sup> Foley et al. (1984) 39–43, Foley and Moss (1985) 68. <sup>40</sup> Sparkes and Talcott (1970) 232–3.

<sup>41</sup> Foley et al. (1984) 16–20. For classical Greek ceramic cooking props (*lasana*) see Morris (1985) and Papadopoulos (1992).

<sup>42</sup> Rubel (2002) 264–5. <sup>43</sup> For more on mess gear see Chapter Five.

wrote of a cauldron (*chytra*) holding some six *choes* (about eighteen liters), but nobody carried something that huge on campaign.<sup>44</sup> Three excavated *chytrai* from the Athenian Agora, ranging in volume from less than a liter to just over five liters, give an idea of the sizes of pots the Cyreans may have used.<sup>45</sup> The largest of these would contain three full daily rations of porridge.<sup>46</sup> Since the entire day's ration was not consumed at once, a *suskenia* of four to six could cook a meal using a single such *chytra*. A larger *suskenia* would require multiple vessels.

Constructing a pit, kindling a fire, and nursing it to readiness required time. With plentiful fuel at hand, a fire in optimum conditions might be ready to boil water or porridge in fifteen to thirty minutes. In an hour or so it would generate enough embers for parching or roasting grain. Bread could also be baked at this point, but the best conditions for baking came with a mature fire that had burned for several hours.<sup>47</sup> Igniting and tending the fire could be managed by one or two *suskenoi*, while other comrades foraged for additional fuel or readied ingredients for cooking.

#### GRAIN

Cereals, mainly barley and wheat, were the Cyrean staple. A *choenix* (0.84 kilograms) measure of grain per man daily would have provided some 2,800 calories, enough for even exceptionally active soldiers if combined with a small amount of relishes (*opsa*).<sup>48</sup> Before Cunaxa, the soldiers regularly purchased milled flour from the merchants accompanying the army. They also bought bread from enterprising locals, as at Charmande on the Euphrates.<sup>49</sup> As the army closed on Babylon, Cyrus gave the troops a freer hand to requisition grain from native settlements.<sup>50</sup> After the battle, the Cyreans still sought grain through purchase, and many of their negotiations with the Persians focused on the provision of markets.<sup>51</sup> The seizure of the generals put a stop to any hope of buying provisions, and from

<sup>44</sup> Pl. *Hp. mai.* 288d–e.

<sup>45</sup> Agora P23189, intact, volume 750 ml, weight 340 g; Agora P28247, missing small fragments and reassembled with heavy glue, 1,300 ml, 375 g; Agora P20813, heavily restored, 5,200 ml, 1,285 g. Volumes were measured with small Styrofoam beads, and weights taken on a pan balance. The difficulties of measuring vessel volumes and weights, especially for items restored using modern plaster heavier than an equivalent thickness of the original fabric, render all figures approximate (personal communication, Kathleen Lynch).

<sup>46</sup> Assuming three rations of 1 *choenix* (total volume roughly 3 liters), with the rest of the vessel filled with water; see Foxhall and Forbes (1982) 86.

<sup>47</sup> Rubel (2002) 17–18. <sup>48</sup> Forbes and Foxhall (1982); for more on nutrition see Chapter Nine.

<sup>49</sup> *An.* 1.5.6, 1.4.19; cf. 2.4.28. <sup>50</sup> *An.* 1.5.19; cf. 1.2.19.

<sup>51</sup> *An.* 2.3.24, 2.3.27–8, 2.4.9. Requisition was allowed when no market was provided: 2.3.28; cf. 2.3.10.

then on the Cyreans habitually plundered every larder they came across. Sometimes they chanced upon prepared loaves, but usually they found milled or unmilled barley and wheat.<sup>52</sup> On the Euxine coast, the soldiers supplemented their foraging with gifts or bribes of barley meal from local cities.<sup>53</sup>

In the Roman army, each eight-man mess group (*contubernium*) of legionaries ground its own grain using a portable rotary mill, then baked its flour into bread; each legion also included trained milling specialists.<sup>54</sup> While the image of a group of *suskenoi* grinding grain together is enticing, the Cyreans did not possess similar hand mills. True, Xenophon in the *Cyropaedia* recommends that an army have hand mills (*cheiromulai*) to prepare grain, but light rotary mills of the type Roman legionaries used do not seem to have appeared until the Hellenistic period.<sup>55</sup> Rather, the most advanced hand mills of Xenophon's time had to be mounted on a table or stand.<sup>56</sup> They were "hand" mills in the sense that they worked by human rather than animal power. The simple saddle quern would fit Xenophon's description of *cheiromulai* as "the lightest of bread-making equipment," but still could weigh 10–20 kilograms.<sup>57</sup> In the unlikely case that some *suskeniai* set out from Sardis lugging querns, they almost certainly discarded them, along with other impedimenta, before beginning the march into Carduchia. It is best, then, to take the *Cyropaedia* passage as reflecting Xenophontic ideal rather than Cyrean reality.<sup>58</sup>

Even if rotary mills had existed, the Cyreans might have eschewed them. Before Cunaxa they could normally buy grain already milled. During the advance down the Euphrates, for example, Xenophon notes the exorbitant prices Lydian sutlers charged for small measures of wheat flour (*aleuron*) and barley meal (*alphita*). That the sale of milled flour was standard practice is suggested by his detailed quantification of the non-Attic measure, the *capithe* (about two liters), which the merchants employed.<sup>59</sup> When rumors about the emergency provisions Cyrus had supposedly laid in swept the army on the evening after Cunaxa, the soldiers imagined wagons full of *aleuron*, of milled wheat flour rather than unmilled grain.<sup>60</sup> The cities of

<sup>52</sup> *An.* 3.4.31, 4.5.26, 3.4.31. For bread, perhaps of hazelnut or filbert meal, see *An.* 5.4.29 and Dillery (2001) 415.

<sup>53</sup> See Chapter Two for conditions on the Euxine.

<sup>54</sup> Junkelmann (1986) 125, Junkelmann (1997); cf. Webster (1998) 118–20.

<sup>55</sup> *Cyr.* 6.2.31; Moritz (1958) 17, Runnels and Murray (1983) 62, Amouretti (1986) 146–7, 245–6.

<sup>56</sup> Cahill (2002) 163–4.

<sup>57</sup> Moritz (1958) 24, Sparkes (1962) 125–6, Runnels and Murray (1983) 62.

<sup>58</sup> Cf. Thuc. 6.22, which suggests that Athenian troops in the field did not grind their own grain.

<sup>59</sup> *An.* 1.5.6.

<sup>60</sup> *An.* 1.10.18; cf. Roy (1967) 311 note 93 and Lendle (1995) 90.

the Black Sea coast, too, distributed grain in the form of pre-ground barley.<sup>61</sup> Finally, Coeratadas the Theban, the erstwhile *condottiere* who attempted to take command of the army at Byzantium in fall 400, presented the troops with barley meal, not raw grain, as a symbol – an inadequate one, in the event – of his logistical prowess.<sup>62</sup> Grinding grain, then, was probably not a usual Cyrean chore. The soldiers certainly did not miss the tedious labor: modern experiments with a Roman rotary mill indicate that converting four kilograms of wheat into flour requires an hour of diligent grinding, plus additional time for hulling, winnowing, and sifting.<sup>63</sup>

#### COOKING METHODS

Though spared long hours at the mill, the Cyreans still had to cook their cereals. Their choice of methods depended on ingredients, on the time available for cooking, and on their equipment. For unmilled barley (*krithē*) or wheat (*puros*), the quickest and simplest technique was parching or roasting.<sup>64</sup> Although Greeks at home used special shallow roasting pans, really no more was required than a fire and some flat stones. In a few minutes, any soldier could parch a plate of kernels, enough for his own sustenance.<sup>65</sup> Aside from being reasonably palatable, parched grain keeps well and transports easily. During the more desperate portions of the march, in the Armenian blizzard for example, parching or roasting might thus have been the best choice.<sup>66</sup>

A step upward from parched or roasted whole grain was *maza*, a simple cake of roasted barley meal. Kneaded with water or oil, such a cake could be served without further baking.<sup>67</sup> It was stereotypical warrior's food: Archilochus the soldier-poet, affecting a mercenary's stance, claimed to eat it. The roasted barley that Nicias advised the Athenians to take along on their ill-fated expedition to Sicily, likewise, was probably intended for *maza*.<sup>68</sup> Similar cakes could also be made from acorn or nut meal. The former grow widely in Anatolia, and the Arcadians, famous acorn eaters, may have introduced to their Cyrean comrades this form of *maza*.<sup>69</sup>

<sup>61</sup> *An.* 4.8.24, 6.1.15, 6.2.3; cf. 6.5.2.      <sup>62</sup> *An.* 7.1.31.

<sup>63</sup> Experiments: Junkelmann (1986) 211; cf. Moritz and Jones (1950) 594–5, Coles (1979) 122; additional time: Foxhall and Forbes (1982) 75–81.

<sup>64</sup> Aykroyd and Doughty (1970) 52, Braun (1995) 27–8.

<sup>65</sup> A handful of store-bought hulled whole barley takes about five minutes to prepare using a metal frying pan over a gas flame. Parched barley has a not-unpleasant flavor reminiscent of incompletely popped popcorn and is quite filling, although it is best helped down with a lot of water.

<sup>66</sup> For Cyreans eating unground wheat (*puros*) in the Armenian blizzard see *An.* 4.5.5.

<sup>67</sup> Braun (1995) 28–9, Sapouna Sakellarakis et al. (2002) 95; cf. Thuc. 3.49.

<sup>68</sup> Archil. fr. 2 West, Thuc. 6.22.

<sup>69</sup> Blondel and Aronson (1999) 231, Hdt. 1.66; cf. Mason (1995).

Beyond *maza* was porridge, the food of field workers, travelers, soldiers, and others without access to built hearths.<sup>70</sup> At its most basic, Cyrean porridge was nothing more than equal portions of grain and water boiled in a deep pot or an upturned helmet. A moderately burning fire could simmer this mixture to edible softness in an hour or so.<sup>71</sup> Fancier variations, such as barley groats (*chondra*) or gruel (*ptisanē*), demanded additional preparation, including pounding of the grain to remove hulls.<sup>72</sup> While palatable and digestible, porridge and its cousins would have been tough to transport and prone to spoil. In contrast to parching, which a man could do individually, porridge favored group preparation and consumption. *Suskenoi* could take turns supervising the pot, and consume its contents with less likelihood of leftovers.

Milled barley or wheat flour, bought from Lydian merchants or plundered from Persian stores, could also be boiled into porridge or gruel. A more appetizing alternative, however, was baking. Bread at its simplest was no more than a barley cake (*maza*), speedily kneaded with chaff and baked in hot ashes for twenty minutes or so.<sup>73</sup> Given more time, say thirty to forty minutes, soldiers could transform wheat or barley flour into unleavened dough pancakes. These could be baked rapidly on glowing embers, with a final toss onto hot embers or an open flame puffing up the resulting flatbread or pita to create its characteristic pocket.<sup>74</sup> This method required little more than a suitable bowl to mix and knead the dough. Ceramic or metal griddles made baking easier, but were by no means essential. Even without utensils, soldiers could make small field ovens, either by piling dirt and clay over an enclosure of flat rocks, or by digging into an earthen bank or slope. As with porridge making, some members of a *suskenia* could share the work of baking while their comrades cleaned gear, looked after pack animals, went for water and wood, or stood guard.

Unleavened bread, especially of barley meal, becomes extremely hard to chew unless made very thin.<sup>75</sup> Leavening, in the form of fermented starters retained from earlier batches of dough, would make for lighter and more edible bread. Leavened dough, however, had to rise before baking, perhaps more than doubling preparation time. There was also the hassle of

<sup>70</sup> Gal. *On Digestible and Indigestible Foods* (*Corpus Medicorum Graecorum* = CMG 5.4.2), Theophr. *Char.* 14.11, Dalby (1996) 91–2; cf. Sallares (1991) 321.

<sup>71</sup> Moritz (1958) xix, 147, Rubel (2002) 95.

<sup>72</sup> For *chondra* and other porridge variants see Moritz (1958) 145–50, Ar. fragment 203 Kock, fragment 412 Kock, Ar. *Vesp.* 737, Pherecrates 108.18; cf. Aykroyd and Doughty (1970) 64–6 and United States Army (1896) 146.

<sup>73</sup> Barley cakes: Moritz (1958) 150; chaff: Poliochus fr. 2. Kock, Antiphanes fr. 225.1–6; baking in ash: Rubel (2002) 158–9, United States Army (1896) 272–3.

<sup>74</sup> Foxhall and Forbes (1982) 79, Junkelmann (1986) 125–6, Rubel (2002) 162–4.

<sup>75</sup> Eliasson and Larsson (1993) 348.



maintaining the necessary moist starter.<sup>76</sup> Xenophon only once mentions leavened bread in the *Anabasis*, huge loaves of it being served by Seuthes at his first banquet with the Cyrean officers.<sup>77</sup> The attention Xenophon gives this bread suggests he and his fellows normally ate the unleavened version.

No single cooking method was ever employed by all Cyreans at any one time. There are, though, some significant distinctions between porridge and bread. The former did not demand milled ingredients, was simple to prepare, and could be boiled over a roaring young fire, say within fifteen to thirty minutes of its ignition.<sup>78</sup> Porridge, therefore, was likely more common during periods when the army was moving rapidly, had no ready-ground flour, was bivouacking outdoors in bad weather, or when soldiers needed to eat quickly. The difficulties of transporting and preserving porridge, however, probably meant that fresh helpings had to be boiled daily or near daily. In contrast, the Cyreans tended to bake more bread when the army was moving slowly or was stationary for several days, especially in native villages. This was not so much on account of the time required to prepare the bread itself, which was about half that of porridge, but because proper baking necessitated a mature fire. It could take five or six hours to produce appropriate cinders and ash for field baking.<sup>79</sup> This kind of mellow fire was easy to manage on an indoor hearth or outdoors on a calm night, but impossible to sustain in wet or windy weather when the army had to camp in the open.

Although it required more preparation, bread had a significant advantage over porridge in transportability and durability. Depending on its water content and packaging, bread might remain edible for many days. Biscuits and crispbreads, produced from doughs with very low water content, exploit this characteristic.<sup>80</sup> Roman legionaries, for example, double baked their bread to produce *bucellatum*, a type of light, storable hardtack that could last months. Legionaries about to head into hostile territory sometimes prepared quantities of these iron rations in order to avoid having to cook in combat conditions.<sup>81</sup>

While the Cyreans did not have biscuit or hardtack – double baking was a Hellenistic invention – they could have used the army's periodic halts to

<sup>76</sup> Leavening agents: Aykroyd and Doughty (1970) 56–7, Moritz (1958) xx; cf. Dalby (1996) 91. Leavening time: Foxhall and Forbes (1982) 81; cf. Ath. 3.113c. Starter: Plin. *HN* 18.12.

<sup>77</sup> *An.* 7.3.21. <sup>78</sup> Rubel (2002) 17–18.

<sup>79</sup> United States Army (1896) 272–3. Foxhall and Forbes (1982) 79 do not specify time factors for the fires used in their baking experiments.

<sup>80</sup> Eliasson and Larsson (1993) 349; Aykroyd and Doughty (1970) 71.

<sup>81</sup> Junkelmann (1986) 125–6; Roth (1999) 51–3.



bake several days' worth of bread in advance.<sup>82</sup> The army's march segments from Sardis to Myriandus, for instance, were generally two to five days long, punctuated by a series of halts lasting at least three days apiece.<sup>83</sup> Xenophon gives reasons for all the longer halts and most of the three-day pauses: waits for new contingents or emissaries to arrive, the celebration of the Lycaean festival at Peltae, unrest among the troops at Tarsus, confusion caused by the desertion of Xenias and Pasion at Myriandus. After resting themselves and maintaining their equipment, *suskeniai* could make the most of the last day or two of such halts by baking bread for the coming march, much as troops in early modern European armies would do.<sup>84</sup> Examining two instances where Xenophon does not explain the reasons for short halts strengthens this hypothesis. First, the army remained at Iconium for three days before advancing through hostile Lycaonia; less than a fortnight later there was a pause at Dana before the army set out to attempt what was feared might be an opposed crossing of the Cilician Gates. In both cases, the Cyreans would have benefited from preparing rations in advance. Similar three-day halts occur throughout the rest of the army's itinerary.<sup>85</sup>

Bundles of pita or loaves would have been more practical to pack along than bowls of porridge, but soldiers of course could not bake an infinite supply in advance. If a *suskenia* spent a full day kneading and baking, perhaps a five-day supply per *suskenos*, weighing five to six kilograms per man, could have been readied.<sup>86</sup> More than that might spoil before it could be eaten, and, more importantly, would be difficult to carry.<sup>87</sup> It seems unlikely that officers mandated exactly how troops prepared their rations, so probably each *suskenia* made its own decisions.<sup>88</sup> Some groups might consider the additional weight of bread a small inconvenience compared to the benefits of ready-made rations. Others might prefer fresh pita or barley cakes daily, in exchange for the reduced burden of carrying flour or meal rather than bread.<sup>89</sup> Between these extremes, there must have been almost

<sup>82</sup> Dalby (1996) 164–5; we might know more about Greek hardtack if Aeneas Tacticus' treatise on military provisioning had survived.

<sup>83</sup> See Table 1.

<sup>84</sup> Perjés (1970) 7–8. <sup>85</sup> *An.* 2.3.14–17, 2.5.1, 3.4.31, 4.7.18.

<sup>86</sup> Assuming a ration of 1 *choenix* (0.84 kg) per man, baked into bread weighing 1.12 kg per day's ration (about 25 percent more than the flour from which it came); see Foxhall and Forbes (1982) 80, 86–7.

<sup>87</sup> Foxhall and Forbes (1982) 81; cf. Engels (1978) 18–22.

<sup>88</sup> This does not exclude the possibility that a good *lochagos* might organize *lochos* baking runs. Something similar apparently went on in the Roman camp below Masada, where archaeologists have discovered remains of both unit baking ovens and individual *contubernium* hearths: Webster (1998) 172.

<sup>89</sup> A given measure of flour weighs about 75 percent of its equivalent in bread; see Foxhall and Forbes (1982) 80.

as many different baking and transport strategies as there were *suskeniai* in the army: some baked as little as possible, some as often as they could, some carried both flour and bread.

From Myriandus onward, the army's pace accelerated: twelve days of constant marching between Myriandus and Thapsacus, nine between Thapsacus and the Araxes River. There were a few more periodic pauses for provisioning, but in the final three weeks before Cunaxa the troops did not stay in one place for more than a single night. After the battle, and until the Cyreans reached Trapezus, halts became far more irregular and troops may have been less willing or able to bake bread in advance. Often, they were so exhausted from marching, fighting, and enduring the elements that they could do little more during their halts than rest and recuperate.

If porridge marked periods of rapid travel and insecurity, bread signified rest and safety. To appreciate how powerfully symbolic bread making was for the Cyreans, consider the army's experience in eastern Armenia. After several days and nights struggling through snow and cold, the soldiers finally reached shelter in several underground villages.<sup>90</sup> Warm and spacious, the houses were filled with all manner of provisions, including unmilled wheat (*puros*) and barley (*krithē*). The Cyreans quickly made themselves at home, and by the next day, when Xenophon made an inspection, he found that the troops had already converted the raw provisions they had found the previous day into cooked food: the wheat and barley in particular now appeared on tables as baked bread.<sup>91</sup> After more than a week of daily marching, when at times parched kernels or *maza* had to have been the only sustenance, baking bread served to mark, at least temporarily, a return to stability and civilization.<sup>92</sup> One imagines Cyreans, snug in their underground quarters, commandeering household mills or querns, sharing the labor of hulling, grinding, and sieving while others prepared the fire, mixing dough, baking their loaves or pita, and then at last sharing the products of their labor, helpings of fresh, warm, bread passed from hand to weary hand in a celebration of survival.

#### THINGS EATEN WITH GRAIN

Bread and porridge were nutritious, but for flavor the Cyreans rounded out their meals with a variety of relishes (*opsa*).<sup>93</sup> In mainland Greece, the traditional accompaniments were cheese, olives, garlic, and onions. As

<sup>90</sup> *An.* 4.5.25; cf. Lendle (1995) 242–3. <sup>91</sup> *An.* 4.5.31.

<sup>92</sup> For bread as civilization see Dalby (1996) 91–2; cf. Messer (1984) 228.

<sup>93</sup> Sapouna Sakellarakis et al. (2002) 96.

they traveled farther away from Aegean coastal climes, the soldiers still found some of these – cheese at Caenae on the Tigris, for instance – but also experimented with new *opsa* including dates and palm hearts.<sup>94</sup> In Anatolia, with provisions chronically short, men supplemented their cereals by foraging for legumes or winter bulbs or by plundering native stores of beans and lentils.<sup>95</sup> Like poor Athenians, the Cyreans probably ate everything they could find: vetches and bitter greens, berries and nuts.<sup>96</sup> Arcadians accustomed to gathering edible wild mountain plants might have had a head start, but even Athenian citizen hoplites knew how to gather wild vegetables on campaign.<sup>97</sup> Anatolia even boasted a species of edible lizard, said to be tasty with vinegar.<sup>98</sup> The soldiers might also have drawn on the foraging knowledge of their captives and companions. Local knowledge meant there were always foraging possibilities, even in deep snow: edible lichen scraped from tree branches, for instance.<sup>99</sup> On the Black Sea, the army was back in familiar agricultural territory, and could again expect olives, garlic, and onions. Indeed, at Byzantium the would-be *condottiere* Coeratadas brought along loads of all three of these in his bid to win the army's loyalty.<sup>100</sup>

Tellingly, one item Coeratadas did not bring was olive oil. The supplies that Trapezus, Sinope, and Heraclea proffered likewise included no oil. While the modern image of Mediterranean cuisine is bound inseparably with olive oil, the evidence suggests oil consumption was substantially lower in antiquity than it is today. Oil was too valuable – as lamp fuel, cleanser, lubricant, and protectant – to be squandered in cooking.<sup>101</sup> Many of the Arcadians, at any rate, would have grown up in a land that was not good olive country, and probably neither expected nor missed olive cooking oil.<sup>102</sup>

*Opsa* of whatever sort could simply be thrown in to boil along with a *suskenia*'s porridge. Greens and bulbs could even be eaten raw if necessary. With more time, soldiers could make bean and lentil soups to dip their bread into. All these relishes furnished necessary variety, not just to keep soldiers from being bored with their meals, but also to help prevent the under-eating that often accompanies a monotonous diet.<sup>103</sup>

<sup>94</sup> *An.* 2.3.15–16, 2.4.28.

<sup>95</sup> *An.* 4.5.26; Flint-Hamilton (1999) 375–8, Wilkins (2000b) 13–14; cf. Foxhall and Forbes (1982) 44–5, Sallares (1991) 30.

<sup>96</sup> *Ar. Phut.* 1004–5; Mitchell (1993) I.169.

<sup>97</sup> Roy (1999) 335; Thuc. 3.11.

<sup>98</sup> *Gal. de alim. fac.* 2.39.1–2.

<sup>99</sup> Nineteenth-century Armenian villagers collected *manana* or cup moss from oak branches for winter food: Villa and Matossian (1982) 47.

<sup>100</sup> *An.* 7.1.37.

<sup>101</sup> Foxhall and Forbes (1982) 69; cf. *An.* 4.4.13.

<sup>102</sup> Roy (1999) 329.

<sup>103</sup> Marriott (1995) 25–7, Rappoport (2003) 176–7.

## MEAT

Meat was perhaps the most desirable *opson*, but the classical Greek diet normally contained relatively little of it.<sup>104</sup> Fourth-century Athenians, for example, ate most of theirs at public sacrifices, where fresh meat was cooked and distributed on the spot. Analysis of Athenian sacrificial calendars suggests an average per capita consumption of less than two kilograms of meat per year.<sup>105</sup> To meat from sacrifices could be added small amounts of home-raised poultry, hunted game, fish, and snails. Even so, the average classical Greek's annual meat consumption probably did not approach the level of Crete in 1947, whose inhabitants each got about eleven kilograms yearly from a roughly similar mix of meats.<sup>106</sup>

The Cyrean diet, unlike normal *polis* fare, often included large amounts of meat. Because meat eating appears prominently in the *Anabasis* during periods of logistical difficulty, some have concluded the Cyreans did not like meat and that they consumed it only when grain, the presumed "civilized" preference, was unavailable.<sup>107</sup> On the advance down the Euphrates valley, for example, supplies ran so short that men subsisted on meat – some of it probably from baggage animals – rather than pay extortionate prices for grain.<sup>108</sup> When the army found itself foodless the day after Cunaxa, the soldiers made do by slaughtering baggage oxen and donkeys.<sup>109</sup> Marching through Chalybia, the Cyreans, unable to breach the fortified native settlements, had to maintain themselves on herds they had captured in neighboring Taochia.<sup>110</sup>

True, Greek cultural prejudices associated meat eating with barbarism and nomadism, and the Cyreans were sometimes reduced to consuming anything available, including their pack animals, in order to survive.<sup>111</sup> That, however, is not the whole story. A closer look reveals that the army sought out meat even when it did not have to. On the Arabian plains, for instance, the soldiers hunted a variety of wildlife, including asses, bustards, and ostriches.<sup>112</sup> While the ostriches totally evaded capture, and only a few of the swift asses were taken – a "Persian grandee" in 1931 was to declare to a visiting American party that "the wild ass must be hunted with automobiles" – the Cyreans bagged a full share of bustards, whose

<sup>104</sup> Dalby (1996) 58–65, Garnsey (1999) 16–17, 123–6.

<sup>105</sup> Rosivach (1994) 2–3, 67; cf. Jameson (1988) 87–8 and van Straten (1995) 116.

<sup>106</sup> Jameson (1988) 105; by way of comparison, US per capita consumption in 1947 was more than 33 kilograms.

<sup>107</sup> Dalby (1992) 28–9, Dillery (2001) 93.

<sup>108</sup> *An.* 1.5.5–7.

<sup>109</sup> *An.* 2.1.6.

<sup>110</sup> *An.* 4.7.17–18.

<sup>111</sup> Shaw (1982/3).

<sup>112</sup> *An.* 1.5.1–3.

flesh Xenophon judged delicious.<sup>113</sup> Even earlier, at the Chalus River, some Cyreans apparently made a go at fishing and birding. Telling evidence of the Cyrean desire for meat here appears in Xenophon's remark that the locals would not allow anyone to harm either the large, slow fish that filled the Chalus or the doves that fluttered on its banks. It is an observation he would hardly have made if *someone* in the army had not been trying to harm, that is, eat them.<sup>114</sup>

There were fewer opportunities for hunting after Cunaxa, although small game was likely obtainable across Anatolia.<sup>115</sup> There were, though, other ways to acquire meat. Baggage animals made easy targets, but aside from the logistical problem involved in eating their own transport, the Cyreans probably did not relish work-toughened oxen and donkey flesh.<sup>116</sup> The flocks and herds of the fertile upper Tigris were more tempting, and as the army made its way northward, the soldiers took every opportunity they could to snatch livestock.<sup>117</sup> Eventually the army accumulated so many sheep, goats, and cattle that a Rhodian soldier proposed building a pontoon bridge across the Tigris using animal hides.<sup>118</sup>

Much of this livestock was abandoned in Carduchia, but the soldiers resumed rustling as soon as they could. In western Armenia, for example, they commandeered whatever animals they found.<sup>119</sup> The same was true in Taochia, in the land of the Drilae on the Black Sea shore, on the borders of Paphlagonia, and at Calpe.<sup>120</sup> The crowning instance of the Cyreans' taste for meat comes from Xenophon's description of the feasting that followed salvation from the Armenian blizzard. As he toured the men's quarters, writes Xenophon, "there was no place where [the soldiers] did not set before them on the same table lamb, kid, pork, veal, poultry, along with many loaves of bread, some of wheat and others of barley."<sup>121</sup>

This last episode sheds the most light on the Cyrean perception of meat. Note the emphasis Xenophon places on the banquet's variety: many meats and breads together, not one type of meat alone. Eating nothing but tough strips of ox or mule on the Euphrates passage or after Cunaxa; nothing but meat, meat, meat for seven days through Chalybia – those were hardships

<sup>113</sup> Persian grandee: Johnston (1933) 118; bustards: *An.* 1.3.3.

<sup>114</sup> *An.* 1.4.9; cf. *Hell.* 4.1.16–19. Fishing may also have been an option along the Black Sea shore; see Bekker-Nielsen (2005).

<sup>115</sup> *An.* 4.5.24; Blondel and Aronson (1999) 80. Xenophon, of course, knew many hunting and trapping techniques: see e.g. *Cyn.* 9.8–20.

<sup>116</sup> The Athenians allegedly prohibited the sacrifice and consumption of work animals because they shared their owners' labor: Ael. *VH* 5.14, Rosivach (1994) 161–3. This does not seem to have stopped the Athenians in the army, Xenophon included, from eating baggage animal flesh when necessary.

<sup>117</sup> *An.* 2.4.27, 3.5.2, 3.5.9. <sup>118</sup> *An.* 3.5.9–11. <sup>119</sup> *An.* 4.4.9.

<sup>120</sup> *An.* 4.7.14, 5.2.3, 6.1.4, 6.6.5. <sup>121</sup> *An.* 4.5.30–2.

a man could do without. Yet they were hardships not solely because of the food, but because of the conditions: desert heat, uncertainty, constant enemy attacks. When the soldiers had the choice, as in Armenia, they continued to eat meat as part of a larger meal, not because they had to, but because they liked it.<sup>122</sup> They ate it whenever they could, with gusto, and they offered it to guests at banquets.<sup>123</sup>

#### TRANSPORTING AND PREPARING MEAT

A taste for meat had its costs. Livestock, unless slaughtered and consumed on the spot, had to be driven along with the army. Before the army enacted new – and in the event, immediately disobeyed – foraging regulations at Calpe that made plunder taken on army-wide forays public property, probably all captured animals became the responsibility of the men who had acquired them.<sup>124</sup> Before Calpe, the men of a *suskenia* might detach one of their number to supervise any livestock they possessed, much as the mule-driving soldier was assigned by his *suskenoi* to supervise the group's pack transport. After Calpe, perhaps the generals assigned men to look after captured public herds, for Xenophon once mentions the army possessing a communal flock of sheep.<sup>125</sup> Either way, Cyreans would have left ranks to work as shepherds and herdsmen. Here at least the literary stereotype of Arcadia as bucolic paradise finds some resonance. With their pastoral backgrounds, many Arcadians would have known how to drive and graze captured animals.<sup>126</sup>

Given the problems of long-distance herding, the Cyreans probably tried to avoid driving livestock any farther than necessary.<sup>127</sup> When the time came to slaughter, converting live animals to butchered meat was no easy task. Butchering know-how may have been relatively common amongst the soldiers, but without proper tools, they would have had to use sabers or swords to kill and dismember animals.<sup>128</sup> Most likely each *suskenia* did its own butchering. It was dirty, messy work to strip an animal of hide and flesh, with innards, offal, blood and bone spattering in volume everywhere.<sup>129</sup>

<sup>122</sup> For a similar outlook amongst Roman soldiers see Davies (1971) 138–40.

<sup>123</sup> *An.* 6.1.4, 7.3.23; cf. Plutarch's story (*Artax.* 18.3) that Clearchus in captivity received both ham and cereal.

<sup>124</sup> *An.* 6.4.22, 6.6.2–5. <sup>125</sup> *An.* 6.6.37. <sup>126</sup> Roy (1999) 329–30.

<sup>127</sup> For long-distance herding by armies see Sharpe (1909) 90–3. The cattle drive through Chalybia (*An.* 4.7.17–18) resulted from the army's total lack of other provisions.

<sup>128</sup> For butchering see Rosivach (1994) 85–7 and Wilkins (2000b) 369–82.

<sup>129</sup> Slaughtering a 500-kg head of cattle, for instance, can produce more than 15 kg of liquid blood plus some 30 kg of ruminal contents: Mann (1984) 12, 57–8.

Without surfaced abattoirs, soldiers also risked contamination by parasites and bacteria picked up from the ground or from the dirt floors of village bivouacs.<sup>130</sup>

Butchering could take considerable time. A small sheep or goat, say twenty kilograms or so, might be taken apart by a pair of Cyreans in half an hour.<sup>131</sup> Anything larger, such as a 200-kilogram pack mule or medium-sized cow, or a 450-kilogram ox, might demand several hours of labor. Ethnographic studies of hunter-gatherers using iron tools suggest an extremely slow butchering rate: in one case, six hours for five people to fillet and pack only ninety kilograms of meat for long-distance transport.<sup>132</sup> Cyreans too might sometimes work this slowly, especially if they were removing animal hides in pieces large enough for shoes or leather tarps.<sup>133</sup> Otherwise troops could quickly butcher a large animal simply by surrounding it and hacking off chunks with their sabers. According to Pausanias, the Arcadian custom was to chop animals apart in exactly this manner.<sup>134</sup>

The actual meat yield of any animal was far less than its total weight. Skilled processors in a variety of cultures can convert somewhat less than half of the live weight of an animal into edible meat.<sup>135</sup> For the Cyreans, poor field conditions, lack of time, and improper tools must have made actual yields somewhat less, perhaps about 35 percent of total animal weight. We can put this figure into context by returning to the day after Cunaxa, when the soldiers slaughtered baggage oxen and asses for food. Each medium-sized ass of some 200 kilograms would have yielded 70 kilograms of butchered raw meat, while a 450-kilogram yoke ox would have produced about 155 kilograms. If three-quarters of the animals slaughtered were asses, and the rest oxen, more than 100 donkeys and about 25 oxen would have been slaughtered that day, providing about one kilogram of meat for each of the 12,000 or so men in the army.<sup>136</sup>

Raw flesh had to be cooked. We get an idea of the process by returning to the day after Cunaxa. Imagine that a *suskenia* slaughters its 200-kilogram pack ass, producing about 70 kilograms of meat. The Cyreans boiled their meat that day, so the soldiers next had to chop sufficient portions – about a

<sup>130</sup> Abattoir conditions for the Cyreans would likely have been worse than those common today in developing nations, for which see Mann (1984) 5–9.

<sup>131</sup> For the time required to butcher an animal this size see K. T. Jones (1993) 106–7; for sheep or goat weight see Chaplin (1971) 134.

<sup>132</sup> Kornfeld (2003) 48–9. <sup>133</sup> Mann (1984) 39–42, 62–6; cf. *An.* 4.5.14.

<sup>134</sup> Paus. 8.37.8, cf. Jost (2003) 162.

<sup>135</sup> Kornfeld (2003) 48–9 (Aché hunter-gatherers); Sharpe (1909) 81–2 (nineteenth-century US Army butchers); cf. Jameson (1988) 95 and Rosivach (1994) 157–8.

<sup>136</sup> This ratio of donkeys to oxen reflects the dominance of pack transport in the army; see Chapter Five.

kilogram per man, say – into chunks small enough to fit their cooking pot.<sup>137</sup> Since even a large cauldron might hold only five liters of water and meat, a *suskenia* numbering more than five would have either to cook smaller portions or use multiple vessels.<sup>138</sup> With fire prepared and water boiling, the *suskenoi* could get cooking. How well done the Cyreans preferred their meat is uncertain, but US Army cooks at the end of the nineteenth century estimated that 10 pounds (about 4.5 kilograms) of beef required two and a half hours to boil, with fresh meat taking somewhat longer.<sup>139</sup> Our *suskenia*, then, could have its boiled donkey ready in about three hours.

Each kilogram of meat thrown into the pot would lose some weight, perhaps 20 percent, in cooking.<sup>140</sup> In addition, some 15–20 percent of the cooked weight of the meat might be inedible bone or gristle.<sup>141</sup> From the original kilogram of raw flesh, then, each *suskenos* might receive only 600 grams (about 1.3 pounds) of cooked meat. Still, this would provide about 2,400 calories, quite close to the 2,800 calories Foxhall and Forbes postulate for a standard daily ration.<sup>142</sup> Probably no *suskenos* ate his 600 grams all at once. Indeed, since the army spent most of the day after Cunaxa nervously waiting while its officers dickered with Persian emissaries, our *suskenia* had plenty of time to sit around the cooking pot and chew on its erstwhile pack transport.<sup>143</sup>

Boiling probably remained a common treatment for meat until the non-essential baggage was abandoned on the way up the Tigris valley. After that, the soldiers may have switched to roasting or grilling meat on skewers. Aside from not requiring bulky *chytrai*, roasting let soldiers cook their meat more quickly and flexibly. A man could probably grill thin strips of meat sufficient for a single modest appetite in less than ten minutes. A larger piece, such as a 450 g (1 pound) lamb shank, might take twenty minutes or so over gentle flames; more sizeable cuts could require several hours.<sup>144</sup> Since meat roasts more quickly on a hotter fire, it is possible that the Cyreans cooked their meat first, and later, as the fire died down, baked bread or parched grain on the embers.

There was a final challenge with meat: storage and transportation. Even if the *suskenoi* we examined above ate double rations of boiled donkey, they

<sup>137</sup> *An.* 2.1.7; for boiling in Greek cookery cf. *Ar. Eccl.* 845, *Vesp.* 239, *Pl. Hp. mi.* 290d.

<sup>138</sup> See above for the volumes of cauldrons (*chytrai*).

<sup>139</sup> United States Army (1896) 20, 80–6; cf. Farrow (2000) 185.

<sup>140</sup> Alexander and Clark (1939), California Beef Council (2004).

<sup>141</sup> United States Army (1896) 27.

<sup>142</sup> Assuming that boiled meat has roughly similar caloric value to roasted meat; for the latter see Roth (1999) 43.

<sup>143</sup> *An.* 2.1.7–2.2.2.

<sup>144</sup> For these times see Rubel (2002) 63–4, 120–7; cf. *Hom. Il.* 210–15.



would still be left with some 50 kilograms of raw meat. In mainland Greece, the first storage option would have been sausage. Sausages were convenient, easy to carry, and lasted forever, but sausage making would only have been possible when the army spent more than a month in place.<sup>145</sup> The soldiers could transform some of the carcass into rudimentary jerky by salting it, smoking it, or drying it in the Mesopotamian sun, but probably the best option was to share the meat as widely as possible, whether by sale, barter, or gift.<sup>146</sup> Whatever could not be eaten that day or carried for the next must have been abandoned to rot as the army continued on its way, for just a day after slaughtering their animals, the troops were again short of food.<sup>147</sup> This pattern likely repeated itself during other periods, for instance during the march through Chalybia, where the army subsisted on meat while on the move. Where there was more leisure, as in the villages of Armenia, soldiers could live off a butchered animal for several days; the meat might get a little rancid, but the winter cold would help preserve it.

Meat, like porridge and bread, had symbolic value for the Cyreans. For classical Greeks, every slaughter was in some sense a religious occasion, a sacrifice.<sup>148</sup> Indeed, the shared rituals of animal bloodletting and the subsequent common meal were in the *polis* world a way of marking community membership.<sup>149</sup> Amongst the Cyreans, too, the slaughter of animals for food could also be an occasion for religious sacrifice: the day after Cunaxa, Clearchus himself was engaged in sacrificing when the Great King's heralds came to see him.<sup>150</sup> As for the ordinary soldiers, one wonders whether they took the time to follow the traditions of roasting and eating the *splanchna* (organs) immediately after slaughtering their animal, or to place a portion of bones wrapped in fat on the fire as an offering to the gods.<sup>151</sup> Xenophon makes no mention of these suskenic activities, but his naming of meat animals as *hiereia* suggests that the Cyreans did perform some of these customary rituals, if nothing more than a cursory burnt offering thrown on the fire, whenever they ate meat.<sup>152</sup>

#### WATER AND WINE

The two liters of water that a man needed daily were readily available along most of the army's route, but it was alcohol, not water, that the Cyreans

<sup>145</sup> Frost (2001) 246–7, 251.

<sup>146</sup> For jerky see Farrow (2000) 195, United States Army (1992) 7.44–7.45; the spicy or salty relishes Xenophon recommends (*Cyr.* 6.2.31) for eating with bread might include meats preserved as jerky. Sale: *An.* 6.4.22, Plut. *Vit. Artax.* 24.2; barter: *An.* 4.5.5; gift: 3.3.1.

<sup>147</sup> *An.* 2.2.16. <sup>148</sup> Isager and Skydsgaard (1992) 174–5. <sup>149</sup> Burkert (1985) 55–9.

<sup>150</sup> *An.* 2.1.9. <sup>151</sup> van Straten (1995) 131–3, 144–5. <sup>152</sup> *Hiereia*: *An.* 4.4.9; cf. Hom. *Il.* 9.215–20.

really wanted.<sup>153</sup> Wine was the beverage of choice throughout the ancient Mediterranean world, at home and abroad, and the soldiers drank it whenever possible.<sup>154</sup> Before Cunaxa, men purchased wine from enterprising natives or requisitioned it from settlements they passed through; possibly they could also buy it from the merchants accompanying the army.<sup>155</sup> After Cunaxa, as long as the truce with the Persians held, there was Mesopotamian grape and palm wine.<sup>156</sup> On the retreat to the Black Sea, the troops drained every reserve they found: Persian stockpiles in the Tigris valley, cisterns of wine in Carduchia, fine aged wines in western Armenia, barley wine or beer after the Armenian blizzard.<sup>157</sup> Often, however, the soldiers had to go without. Indeed, in a speech on the Euxine coast, Xenophon vividly recalled the privations of Armenia as a place where “it was not possible even to get a sniff of wine.”<sup>158</sup> At least on the coast there was plentiful wine, especially in the form of gifts or bribes from Trapezus, Heraclea, and Sinope.<sup>159</sup>

At a kilogram per liter, liquid is a pain to transport. Like Alexander’s soldiers seventy years later, therefore, when the Cyreans found wine they probably consumed as much as they could on the spot rather than trying to lug it along.<sup>160</sup> Although the men drank both wine and water with their meals, it is unclear whether they followed the mainland Greek practice of mixing the two before consumption.<sup>161</sup> Symptotic knowledge was widespread enough that Agasias could rile up the soldiers by claiming that to require the army have a Spartan commander was tantamount to insisting Spartans be put in charge of every drinking party, but proper mixing in symposium style necessitated an array of vessels that most Cyreans probably did not have.<sup>162</sup> Generals and officers with servants to carry their baggage might enjoy the luxury of proper symptotic ware. Timasion, for one, amassed a nice collection of captured cups.<sup>163</sup> Most *suskeniai*, though, probably had only a basic complement of drinking cups.<sup>164</sup> The abandonment or destruction of gear might even have compelled some *suskenoi* to share drinking cups.

Alcohol has nutritional value, but the Cyreans likely prized it more for its intoxicating power.<sup>165</sup> Now, Plato in his *Laws* expounds at some length on the opposition between virtuous and improper drinking. Correctly used, Plato asserts, wine should inspire courage rather than merely

<sup>153</sup> *An.* 7.1.37; cf. 1.10.18.

<sup>154</sup> Hanson (2000) 126–31.

<sup>155</sup> *An.* 1.4.19, 1.5.10.

<sup>156</sup> *An.* 2.3.14–15, 2.4.28.

<sup>157</sup> *An.* 3.4.31, 4.2.22, 4.4.9, 4.5.26–9.

<sup>158</sup> *An.* 5.8.3.

<sup>159</sup> *An.* 4.8.24, 5.4.29, 6.1.15, 6.2.3, 6.5.2, 6.6.1.

<sup>160</sup> Borza (1995) 164.

<sup>161</sup> *An.* 7.4.3; cf. *Athen.* 10.426b–10.427f.

<sup>162</sup> *An.* 6.1.30.

<sup>163</sup> *An.* 7.3.18.

<sup>164</sup> For more on drinking cups, see Chapter Five.

<sup>165</sup> One liter of wine with 12 percent alcohol content contains 700 calories; see Roth (1999) 35.

fueling pleasure.<sup>166</sup> While there are certainly examples of Greek armies inspired by liquid courage, the *Anabasis* contains no instance where troops drink immediately before battle.<sup>167</sup> Rather, Cyrean drinking seems to have occurred mostly when the troops were in quarters. It was a way of forgetting past trials and celebrating community and survival. For his part, Xenophon's ideal might be that soldiers get used to drinking water on campaign, but he also made a point of boasting to the Cyreans that he too could drink.<sup>168</sup> Indeed, because wine was only sporadically available, episodic bingeing became characteristic of the army's drinking culture. A Cyrean never knew when he might see wine again. Thus, he would drink whenever he could find alcohol of whatever sort, and drink as much as he could. Perhaps this is why Xenophon so casually mentions drunkenness as a reason why soldiers might come to blows.<sup>169</sup>

Understanding the Cyrean attitude towards drinking sheds new light on one of the most curious episodes of the campaign. In Colchia, just before reaching Trapezus, the army happened upon a district full of beehives. "All of the soldiers who ate this honey," Xenophon writes, "acted foolish and were vomiting and having diarrhea, and none of them was able to stand up; those who had eaten a little bit seemed as if they were extremely drunk, while those who had eaten a lot seemed as if they were crazy or even dying."<sup>170</sup> So many partook of the honey, Xenophon continues, that the army lay about as if it had been routed in battle. The effects began to wear off after a day, but it was two or three days more until the Cyreans were on their feet again. Now, the Cyreans were certainly hungry at this point, so it makes sense that the first few of them would have pounced on the honey for food.<sup>171</sup> Given the effects these pioneers experienced, however, Xenophon does not explain why so many others followed their lead. The possibility cannot be excluded that there was a deliberate attempt on the soldiers' part to take advantage of the drug effects of the honey, some of them even ingesting copious amounts, much as they had earlier slurped up barley wine in Armenia. After all, the army had just put its Colchian opponents to flight, it had secured villages to rest in, and with the sea in sight, journey's end must have seemed at hand. Why not celebrate, if not with wine, then with a readily available substitute? The Cyreans, it seems,

<sup>166</sup> Pl. *Laws* 637d–639d; see Murray (1991) 87–94.

<sup>167</sup> For examples of pre-battle drinking see Plut. *Dion* 30.3–4, *Hell.* 6.4.8–9.

<sup>168</sup> Drinking water: *Cyr.* 6.2.26–9, cf. *Athen.* 10.428a; boasting: *An.* 5.8.19.

<sup>169</sup> *An.* 5.8.4–5. <sup>170</sup> *An.* 4.8.20–1; for more about this honey see Chapter Two, note 72.

<sup>171</sup> Since Arcadians knew how to handle bees, perhaps it was an Arcadian soldier who first put his hand in the honey jar; see Roy (1999) 333.

acted little differently from soldiers throughout the ages who have done *anything* to get intoxicated.<sup>172</sup>

#### FOOD AND THE *SUSKENIA*

Foraging, cooking, and eating were central acts of Cyrean life. Because the army possessed no developed logistical system, *suskenoi* had to work together to find and prepare their sustenance. Even had he wanted to, there was no way an individual could have hauled his own grain, gathered his own firewood, built his own fire, butchered his own meat, and so on. To be sure, there were occasions when meals were used for wider military or political purposes. In Armenia, for example, Xenophon conducted a sort of business dinner with the chief of the underground village where his troops were quartered, guaranteeing the chief safety and provisions in return for advice on the route ahead.<sup>173</sup> At Cotyora, similarly, the generals hosted a banquet for the ambassadors of the Paphlagonian ruler Corylas in hopes of fostering friendly relations.<sup>174</sup> For both officers and soldiers, however, the normal pattern throughout the campaign was to mess with a small group of comrades, a *suskenia*.

Though the Cyreans probably did not consciously recognize it, there were practical physiological benefits to shared small group meals. US Army nutritionists, for instance, have discovered that troops who eat in groups, especially those composed of individuals who know each other, typically consume more food.<sup>175</sup> The verbal interaction that small group feeding promotes, furthermore, tends to increase meal durations. Even a few additional minutes together gives troops added time to relax, lessens the incidence of gastro-intestinal distress stemming from rapid eating, and promotes metabolic efficiency.<sup>176</sup> All these benefits are particularly important in battlefield conditions, where combat and weather stress combined often keep soldiers from eating enough even when sufficient rations are available.

Perhaps more important than any physiological benefits were the symbolic dimensions of suskenic eating and drinking. Shared fires and meals, of course, had a place in religious and civic practice back home in Greece.<sup>177</sup> For the Cyreans, though, group meals were not an occasional ritual but a constant condition. Just as the bounds of their tent and campfire allowed

<sup>172</sup> Holmes (1985) 251 relates how two American soldiers "obliterated pre-battle tension on their voyage to Normandy by draining the alcohol from the compass in their tank, mixing it with powdered orange-juice, and drinking it."

<sup>173</sup> *An.* 4.5.28–9.

<sup>174</sup> *An.* 6.1.2–4.

<sup>175</sup> de Castro (1995) 387–8, Kramer (1995) 331.

<sup>176</sup> Kramer (1995) 326–7, Marriott (1995) 21–3.

<sup>177</sup> Detienne (1979) 3, Schmitt-Pantel (1992).

the men of a *suskenia* to claim a space that was uniquely theirs, common messing helped create and maintain group solidarity. The shared labor of foraging and preparation, the act of passing portions from hand to hand, the very fact that *suskenoi* who huddled together to cook and eat literally turned their backs on the rest of the world powerfully emphasized the cohesiveness of the *suskenia* and the interdependence of its members.

## CHAPTER 9

### *The soldier's body*

Food and drink were not the Cyreans' only bodily concerns. From the outset of the expedition, they had to attend to the mundane chores of bodily maintenance, as well as to the task of disposing the tons of waste the army produced every day. Moreover, the soldiers faced a range of physiological and environmental challenges, from march-related foot injuries to heat stroke in the Mesopotamian desert. After Cunaxa, wounds and injuries became omnipresent threats, and there was further danger from Anatolia's rain, snow, and cold. The soldier's body was assailed from every direction; to cope, he had to rely on his *suskenoi*.

#### INITIAL HEALTH AND FITNESS

The Cyreans likely began the march in excellent health. Their environment was free of several serious diseases, including sexually transmitted gonorrhea and chlamydia.<sup>1</sup> Their diet probably provided plenty of vitamins and minerals.<sup>2</sup> They were also highly fit. Some contingents, such as that of Clearchus in Thrace and those of Socrates and Pasion besieging Miletus, were already on combat operations when Cyrus summoned them and therefore accustomed to the demands of active campaigning. Other contingents used marches to the army's assembly points at Sardis and Celaenae for conditioning; only Cheirisophus' men reached Cyrus directly by sea.<sup>3</sup> Even Xenias' Ionian garrison troops apparently stayed in excellent shape. Along with the other contingents, they began the campaign by marching some 112 km (almost 70 miles) from Sardis to the Maeander River in only three days.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Sallares (1991) 241, 281–3.

<sup>2</sup> Foxhall and Forbes (1982) 44.

<sup>3</sup> *An.* 1.1.9, 1.2.3, 1.4.3.

<sup>4</sup> *An.* 1.2.5, Manfredi (1986) 25, Lendle (1995) 14–15.

NUTRITION AND SLEEP

To sustain themselves the Cyreans needed food and water. One *choenix* (0.84 kilograms) of grain, combined with small amounts of vegetables, proteins, and relishes, more than sufficed even for exceptionally active soldiers.<sup>5</sup> As for water, about eight *kotylae* (about two liters) a day was usually enough.<sup>6</sup> During the six months between leaving Sardis and the battle of Cunaxa the Cyreans had only occasional supply problems. Just after the battle, the army experienced temporary provisioning difficulties, but as long as the truce with Artaxerxes lasted, the Cyreans seem to have eaten fairly well.<sup>7</sup>

Nutritionally speaking, the worst part of the campaign was between the massacre of the generals and the arrival at Trapezus. The hostile landscape of central Anatolia only sporadically yielded provisions and the soldiers had difficulties transporting what rations they found.<sup>8</sup> They were never, though, as badly off as the Persians retreating from Salamis in 480 BC, who survived on grass and tree bark.<sup>9</sup> Instead, the army cycled between need and plenty: march for days until reaching well-stocked villages, gorge and rest, march again only to be hungry a few days later.<sup>10</sup> Enemy attacks sometimes prevented soldiers from preparing food even when they had it.<sup>11</sup> The increased caloric demands of physical exertion in cold temperatures, often through deep snow drifts, compounded these challenges.<sup>12</sup>

Yet for the most part the Cyreans did not noticeably diminish in battle effectiveness, perhaps because they were able to sustain themselves by snacking.<sup>13</sup> Xenophon does report that during the blizzard in Armenia soldiers suffering what he calls “hunger-sickness” (*boulimia*) were unable to keep in ranks. Probably, though, it was a combination of cold injury, fatigue, and irregular feeding, rather than malnutrition alone, that caused these men to fall ill.<sup>14</sup> Some confirmation that the Cyreans could have kept going even on short rations appears in accounts of the Korean Conflict. Subsisting on about a *choenix* of millet and rice a day, Communist Chinese and North Korean infantrymen in winter 1950–1 habitually made night marches of up to 29 kilometers (18 miles) in far worse weather

<sup>5</sup> Foxhall and Forbes (1982) 51–7; see Chapter Eight for more on food and drink.

<sup>6</sup> Engels (1978) 125, Roth (1999) 37.

<sup>7</sup> For more on environmental conditions of the march, see Chapter Two.

<sup>8</sup> For more on transporting rations, see Chapter Five.

<sup>9</sup> Hdt. 8.115.

<sup>10</sup> *An.* 3.4.31, 4.1.8–15, 4.4.7–4.5.7, 4.6.27–4.7.1.

<sup>11</sup> *An.* 4.1.15, 4.2.4–21.

<sup>12</sup> King (1996) 102–3.

<sup>13</sup> For more on snacking in combat see Chapter Eight.

<sup>14</sup> *An.* 4.5.7, Lendle (1995) 235–6, Teodorsson (1990); cf. Plut. *Brut.* 25–6.

than the Cyreans experienced. United Nations interrogators observed that Communist prisoners seldom appeared emaciated despite their supply shortages.<sup>15</sup>

Along the Euxine coast, the Cyreans experienced further food shortages, particularly at Calpe, and at Perinthus before joining Seuthes.<sup>16</sup> Xenophon occasionally seems to exaggerate the army's privations during this period in order to take jabs at rivals. At Calpe, for instance, he portrays the Cyreans in such straits that Neon, out of a misguided desire to please the hungry soldiers, and ignoring unfavorable omens, embarked on a poorly disciplined foraging expedition that resulted in some 500 dead. Yet, in framing the story of Neon's foray, Xenophon takes pains to emphasize the fertility of the surrounding countryside. It was only after Xenophon, having of course secured auspicious sacrifices, led out a properly ordered formation that the soldiers were able to reap the bounty of Calpe's fields.<sup>17</sup>

Unlike food, potable water presented few problems; there were rivers, streams, wells, and springs all along the route. Tainted water was a danger, as Alexander the Great would discover to his dismay in Central Asia, but Xenophon recounts no instance where a water source sickened men.<sup>18</sup> Even on the desert leg through upper Mesopotamia, the troops could draw sufficient water at points along the Euphrates River.<sup>19</sup> In fact, Xenophon only once describes soldiers being short of water, during the brief Arcadian and Achaean secession.<sup>20</sup>

Despite ready water supplies, certain factors might prevent Cyreans from staying properly hydrated. In Anatolia during winter 401–400 and again in Thrace during 400–399, for example, soldiers would have needed more water to compensate for the dehydration that cold temperatures promote. Excessive sweating prompted by hard fighting and marching would also have contributed to fluid loss. The Cyreans' water intake, like that of modern soldiers operating in similar conditions, might not have matched the increased demand.<sup>21</sup> For one thing, the winter cold reduced sensations of thirst. Men might also be reluctant to drink sufficient water if it meant having to urinate more frequently – especially as this entailed falling out of ranks and removing clothing or armor. Lastly, when water supplies froze, as

<sup>15</sup> Shrader (1995) 94–5, 189. US intelligence estimated the standard Communist ration at 1–1.83 kilograms/day (2.2–4 pounds/day), although some prisoners reported much smaller allotments; average winter temperatures in Korea in 1950–1 ranged from about  $-17^{\circ}$  to  $-23^{\circ}$  C ( $1.4^{\circ}$  to  $-9.4^{\circ}$  F), with extremes down to  $-42^{\circ}$  C ( $-43.6^{\circ}$  F).

<sup>16</sup> *An.* 6.4.16–19, 7.4.13–14, 7.6.24–6.

<sup>17</sup> *An.* 6.4.4–6, 6.4.18–25, 6.5.2–32, 6.6.1–2.

<sup>18</sup> *Arr. Anab.* 4.4.8–9.

<sup>19</sup> Barnett (1963) 5.

<sup>20</sup> *An.* 6.3.8.

<sup>21</sup> Freund and Sawka (1996) 161, 170–5.



in Thrace during winter 400–399, substantial time and effort were needed to thaw jars and canteens.<sup>22</sup>

Finally, the soldiers needed rest. Three or four hours' sleep every twenty-four hours would have kept most men going, although leaders needed more sleep in order to retain their decision-making faculties.<sup>23</sup> For Xenophon, sleep also meant the opportunity to dream; he presents several important command decisions as divinely brought to him while he slept.<sup>24</sup> Conditions on the retreat to the sea, though, were not always conducive to sleep. When they bivouacked outdoors on exposed mountainsides or windswept plains soldiers made do with short catnaps.<sup>25</sup> The severe cold of Armenia, though, sometimes made it necessary to keep moving continuously for warmth; there was little opportunity for sleep then.<sup>26</sup> In contrast, quartering in villages, even if it meant sharing bed space with household animals, represented luxury accommodation.<sup>27</sup> Whenever the army could quarter indoors, soldiers likely spent as much time as possible sleeping. Built-up sleep debt coupled with the security of being under a roof probably let most drop quickly into slumber.<sup>28</sup> Xenophon, in fact, associates stress-induced insomnia only with the most extreme circumstances. For example, the soldiers seem to have been able to sleep the night after Cunaxa, where the prevailing mood in camp was more bewilderment than distress. It was only following the seizure of their generals that they sprawled about the camp in despair, weary to the point of collapse but still unable to sleep.<sup>29</sup>

The army's officers clearly recognized the value of well-rested troops, for they sometimes allotted additional rest periods before commencing night marches or in expectation of battle. In preparation for the night march into Carduchia, for example, the generals ordered the soldiers to take a long evening rest.<sup>30</sup> In Bithynia during the Arcadian–Achaean secession, Xenophon and Timasion, expecting a hard fight the next day, employed a stratagem – extinguishing cooking fires at dusk to create the illusion they had broken camp – to ensure their men an uninterrupted night's sleep.<sup>31</sup>

<sup>22</sup> *An.* 7.4.3. Thawing an 18.8-liter (5-gallon) container, even using a gasoline flame, can take several hours; see Freund and Sawka (1996) 170.

<sup>23</sup> Haslam and Abraham (1987) 168–9, United States Army (2000) 3.27; on the dangers of sleep loss, see *Cyr.* 5.3.44, Onas. 4.10–11.

<sup>24</sup> *An.* 3.1.11–14, 4.3.8. For sleep as part of a general's routine see 4.3.10.

<sup>25</sup> British Army sleep deprivation experiments indicate that even short naps can help maintain soldiers' performance; see Haslam and Abraham (1987) 175 and cf. Krueger (1991) 266–7.

<sup>26</sup> *An.* 4.5.13. <sup>27</sup> *An.* 4.5.25. <sup>28</sup> On sleep debt see Krueger (1991) 264.

<sup>29</sup> *An.* 1.10.17–19, 3.1.3.

<sup>30</sup> *An.* 3.5.18; this rest lasted several hours, as the generals issued their orders around the end of the day (3.5.13–14), but the army did not begin marching until after midnight (4.1.5).

<sup>31</sup> *An.* 6.3.21.

## SANITATION AND HYGIENE

"Armies need food," Victor Hanson once wrote.<sup>32</sup> Often overlooked is the other half of this equation: armies produce waste. The Cyreans, their companions, and their animals created an immense amount of solid and liquid waste daily. Given an average solid waste production of 0.2 kilograms (about half a pound) per person, an army of some 10,000 would dot the landscape with more than 2,000 kilograms (4,400 pounds) of feces daily.<sup>33</sup> Although the Cyrean staples of porridge and bread encouraged bulkier stools, cold weather, insufficient water, and poor diet could reduce the army's daily total.<sup>34</sup> Cold weather especially increased the threat of constipation, as soldiers tried to avoid the discomfort of relieving themselves under adverse conditions.<sup>35</sup> In addition to solid waste, each Cyrean produced perhaps 0.6–1.1 liters (0.16–0.3 gallons) of urine daily, depending on water consumption, climate, and physical exertion.<sup>36</sup> As for animals, a figure of 40 kilograms (88 pounds) of solid waste per day has been offered for cattle, based on the calculated weight of one cubic meter of manure mixed with straw.<sup>37</sup> The army did not prepare stables for its animals, so about one quarter that amount, or 10 kilograms (22 pounds) per day, seems a passable estimate for each of its horses, donkeys, and mules. With some 500 beasts accompanying the army, around 5,000 kilograms of dung would have been added to the daily waste load. The army's overall solid waste output, then, was in the neighborhood of 7,000 kilograms, or more than 15,000 pounds, per day.<sup>38</sup>

Not all of this waste appeared at once. Horses and other equids, because of their digestive systems, can emit solid waste six to ten times daily even while moving.<sup>39</sup> Perhaps, then, half the daily animal waste load was dispersed along the march route rather than accumulating in or near camp. The troops, too, may have deposited some waste along the way. Nonetheless, the army faced waste disposal problems whenever it camped. Settled Greeks employed a variety of solutions. Fourth-century Athens, for example, boasted officially supervised dung collection, probably in combination with backyard pits. Toilets with water flushes may have appeared elsewhere

<sup>32</sup> Hanson (1998) 1.

<sup>33</sup> For waste production figures see Alcock et al. (1994) 154. On mostly vegetarian diets in warm climates, individual daily feces production can rise to 0.4 kg; see Franceys et al. (1992) 31.

<sup>34</sup> Aykroyd and Dougherty (1970) 32, 94. <sup>35</sup> United States Army (1968) 49.

<sup>36</sup> Franceys et al. (1992) 31. <sup>37</sup> Alcock et al. (1994) 154.

<sup>38</sup> I have not been able to obtain figures for average daily urine production by animals.

<sup>39</sup> Personal communication, Melissa Carlson, DVM.

in Greece around the same time.<sup>40</sup> There is, however, no evidence for systematic Greek military sanitation. Though this silence is partly a result of Xenophon's marked reticence to discuss bodily functions, there is little reason to believe that any Greek army employed skillfully engineered latrines and pits in the Roman fashion.<sup>41</sup>

For the Cyreans, then, going to the latrine often involved nothing more than walking beyond the farthest line of tents or quarters. This may explain why Xenophon describes soldiers in Armenia straggling away from camp at night; they were almost certainly not wandering about in the dark foraging, since the army had just entered villages full of provisions.<sup>42</sup> Roman Britons cosseted themselves with sponges for toilet paper, but for the mercenaries there was probably nothing gentler than leaves and husks.<sup>43</sup> If the army did not remain stationary too long, such a non-system would have been tolerable. After a few days, however, even a small detachment of soldiers would deposit enough filth to foul the area, possibly contaminating nearby rivers and springs. In warm weather, unburied waste would attract flies and soon cast a stench over the camp.<sup>44</sup> Cold weather kept the flies away, although the danger of fecal water contamination persisted. These challenges may well explain Xenophon's elliptical remark that the Spartans preferred to "change camps frequently both to injure their enemies and benefit their friends."<sup>45</sup>

Most of the time, the Cyreans simply left their waste strewn behind them as they proceeded onward. Occasionally, though, the army remained stationary for extended periods: a month at Celaenae, twenty days near Sittace after Cunaxa, forty-five at Cotyora on the Black Sea coast.<sup>46</sup> These locations required longer-term sanitation solutions. Ideally, the generals might task their *lochagoi* with digging pit latrines or enacting other measures to prevent soldiers from indiscriminately fouling the landscape. Prussian infantry regulations in the eighteenth century, as a comparison, prescribed three "necessaries" for every company of 130 men, located 200 paces from the company tent line. Sentries had orders to keep men from defecating anywhere else. In warm weather, the pits were supposed to be closed and

<sup>40</sup> On waste disposal see Vatin (1976), Owen (1983); for a possible water flush toilet at Eretria, dating circa 370 BC, see Ducrey et al. (1993).

<sup>41</sup> Xenophon's reticence: see e.g. *Cyr.* 1.2.16; latrines and pits: Webster (1998) 259–60.

<sup>42</sup> *An.* 4.4.9; elsewhere (*Lac.* 12.4) Xenophon euphemistically praises the Spartans for not wandering too far from camp for "necessary purposes."

<sup>43</sup> Boon (1983) 12.

<sup>44</sup> United States Army (2000) 3.25; *Ar. Pax* 164–7, *Sall. Iug.* 44.4, Maurice *Strategikon* 12.B.22. Modern armies try to avoid these problems by training their soldiers to dig individual "cat holes" for waste disposal.

<sup>45</sup> *Lac.* 12.5. <sup>46</sup> *An.* 1.2.7, 2.4.1, 5.5.5.

replaced daily.<sup>47</sup> Another alternative might have been to disperse units into smaller, separate encampments. This may have occurred during the army's sojourn in the territory of Cotyora, where the neighboring Paphlagonians attempted night raids on several scattered Cyrean bivouacs.<sup>48</sup>

Given the the overall weakness of the army's logistical structures, though, it seems equally likely that each *suskenia* had to bury or dump its own waste. Indirect evidence of small group waste management shows up in a fourth-century Athenian court case involving bickering citizen soldiers at the fortress of Panactum, in which the defendant and his friends were accused of emptying chamber pots onto the servants of a rival group.<sup>49</sup> Presumably the contents of these chamber pots had been collected for removal outside the fortress. If the Cyreans developed rudimentary suskenic waste collection, the soldiers themselves would often have to gather and transport dung, for relatively few *suskeniai* had slaves.<sup>50</sup>

As with latrines, the Romans are renowned for their bath complexes. Bathing, however, was not a Roman invention. Classical Greek houses at Olynthus and elsewhere in mainland Greece, for instance, contain both bathrooms and tubs.<sup>51</sup> Hand washing before meals, which had religious and social as well as hygienic purposes, was also well established.<sup>52</sup> Athletes in the gymnasium rubbed down with oil before exercise, employing metal strigils, or curved scrapers, to remove dust and sweat afterwards.

Bathing was certainly part of the routine of Greek citizen troops in the fourth century BC, and it is likely that the Cyreans too bathed when they could.<sup>53</sup> As long as enemies or weather did not stand in the way, there was plentiful water all along the route for bathing. Men could combine bath time with laundry, rinsing and wringing out linen chitons, wiping dust from sandals and other gear. Someone with a slave attendant or solicitous *suskenoi* to heat water might even indulge in a hot bath, perhaps recalling, as he splashed water over himself, Circe's spa treatment of Odysseus on the island of Aeaea.<sup>54</sup> On the way into Mesopotamia, the Cyreans could easily dip themselves into the broad, shallow course of the summertime Euphrates, enjoying the cool of the spring snowmelt from distant mountains that still flowed in the river.<sup>55</sup> Along the Black Sea coast, soldiers could take salt-water baths, although non-swimmers – and Xenophon makes clear there were some in the ranks – might prefer to cleanse themselves on land with

<sup>47</sup> Fawcett (1968) 165–6.

<sup>48</sup> *An.* 6.1.1–2.

<sup>49</sup> *Dem.* 54.4.

<sup>50</sup> For slaves and servants see Chapter Ten.

<sup>51</sup> Ginouvès (1962) 151–6, Bookidis and Stroud (1997) 402–5, Cahill (2002).

<sup>52</sup> Corvisier (1985) 49–50.

<sup>53</sup> *Hell.* 7.2.23; cf. *Pl. Symp.* 175a.

<sup>54</sup> *Hom. Od.* 10.358–66.

<sup>55</sup> For more on the Euphrates River, see Chapter Two.

a pitcher or water-filled helmet.<sup>56</sup> Had he lived to see the sight of Cyreans disporting themselves in the Black Sea, the dour Clearchus might not have approved, but one wonders whether even hardened Spartiates would not have become converts to warmer water after enduring the frozen plains of Armenia.

Where weather or enemies intervened, as often in Anatolia, men stopped bathing. The sweat of days on the march, dirt from scrambling up and down hillsides, soot from sitting too close to the fire, all began to accumulate. Unwashed Cyreans, like soldiers in other wars, probably suffered infestations of lice, picked up in village bivouacs or from each other.<sup>57</sup> Even the bitter cold could not distract from their itching. Much as he might have wanted to burn his lice-infested clothes, a man needed every garment he had to ward off the cold. At best, he might shake or beat his clothes in hopes of dislodging the insects and their eggs.<sup>58</sup> One cleansing alternative the Cyreans found in Armenia harkened back to the gymnasium. Discovering ointment and fragrant oil in some villages, they anointed themselves like athletes.<sup>59</sup> The unguents made unwashed bodies smell better, but had another, more practical benefit: the greasy layer of fat and oil probably insulated against the cold.

Hair cutting and shaving were other essentials of personal hygiene. Long hair might be the proper sign of militarism for Spartans and their imitators, but one suspects many Cyreans tried to keep their hair cut fairly close.<sup>60</sup> A flowing mane was a bother. Not only did it have to be plastered down to fit under a helmet, it demanded regular washing and combing, easy enough with helots at your beck and call, but a chore otherwise.<sup>61</sup> If nothing else, "hair sheared down to the lice," as the saying went, made it easier to detect and remove bloodsucking vermin.<sup>62</sup> With so many Arcadians and Achaeans in the army, not all of them favorably disposed towards Spartans, short hair might also have been a visual statement, a way of setting, say, pan-Arcadians off from Laconizers.

If a Cyrean was lucky, he had a *suskenos* with barbering skills and proper tools, the "twin blades." Not quite scissors, these were separate iron or bronze cutters, wielded in one hand like chopsticks; a fourth-century

<sup>56</sup> *An.* 5.7.25–6. <sup>57</sup> United States Army (1968) 50, United States Army (2000) A.3, 3.27.

<sup>58</sup> For burning and shaking see Appian 1.101. <sup>59</sup> *An.* 4.4.13, Lendle (1995) 228.

<sup>60</sup> *Lac.* 11.3, Hanson (2000) 73, Hodkinson (2000) 226. For haircuts and shaving see Nicolson (1891) 52–6, Boon (1991) 21–32.

<sup>61</sup> For Spartan grooming see Hdt. 7.208. According to Plutarch (*Artax.* 18.1), Artaxerxes' personal physician Ctesias provided a comb for Clearchus while the latter was in Persian captivity; grateful for the favor, the Spartan gave Ctesias his signet ring.

<sup>62</sup> Euboulus fr. 32.

terracotta from Tanagra shows them in action.<sup>63</sup> An enterprising man with good cutting skills – and somewhere amongst more than 10,000 soldiers of fortune surely there was at least one former barber – could even strike out beyond his *suskenia*, perhaps setting up shop in camp and advertising his abilities. Such an establishment would have provided soldiers from different units a welcome opportunity to gather and talk, much as the barbershop in everyday *polis* life was a vital social locus as well as a provider of bodily services.<sup>64</sup>

While modern soldiers prize the close shave as a marker of discipline and military bearing, there is no evidence the same held true for the Cyreans. To the contrary, the figures on the Nereid Monument, whose attire and appearance may well reflect that of early fourth-century mercenaries in Asia Minor, display a mixture of clean shaves and beards.<sup>65</sup> If a man did want a shave, he sought out a specialist, or at least a willing *suskenos*; in a world without shaving cream, mirrors, or fancy multiple blades, self-shaving was only for the brave or the poor. Experiments using a reconstructed bronze razor of Roman pattern combined with hot towels produced satisfactorily close results in some forty-five minutes.<sup>66</sup> For those who preferred not to use their own knives, barbers could have offered nail paring along with haircuts and shaves.<sup>67</sup>

Camp barbering in this relaxed mode was possible only when the army was moving leisurely and not under threat. A fastidious Cyrean might have gotten two or three haircuts plus semiweekly shaves in the six months leading up to Cunaxa. During the uneasy lull between Cunaxa and the massacre of the generals, when the army once sat in place for twenty days, going to the barber might have been a welcome distraction. During the march through Anatolia, though, there was often little time for anything but survival, and some of the Cyreans must have emerged in the hills above Trapezus looking rather shaggy. In Anatolia, fingernails, those that did not break painfully on rocks or fall off from frostbite, were more likely nervously gnawed than artfully pared. One form of bodily care that was possible for *suskenoi* on difficult marches was mutual grooming for lice and other vermin hidden in the folds of clothing or affixed to comrades' scalps. Like soldiers throughout history, the Cyreans undoubtedly hated lice and waged war on them relentlessly.<sup>68</sup>

<sup>63</sup> Boon (1991) 24–6.      <sup>64</sup> Lewis (1995) 435.      <sup>65</sup> Childs and Demargne (1989) 267–8, 307.

<sup>66</sup> No shaving cream or soap: Nicolson (1891) 52; self-shaving a mark of debtors: Artem. 1.22; Roman shaving experiment: Boon (1991) 27–8.

<sup>67</sup> Theophr. *Char.* 19.2, Boon (1991) 22–3.

<sup>68</sup> Archilochus fr. 236 West, Ar. *Pax* 740, Plato *Sophist* 227b.

A final element in maintaining the soldier's body was oral hygiene, or rather the lack thereof. Diocles of Carystus, perhaps a contemporary of Aristotle, recommended morning tooth cleansings using a finger dipped in mint juice, but the Cyreans were probably like most people until the twentieth century in that they did not follow a daily regime of tooth cleaning.<sup>69</sup> If a soldier came down with a toothache, there was no army dental service; he could either endure continual pain or seek the aid of comrades in pulling the tooth. Tooth extraction with forceps was practiced during the classical period, being in fact considered relatively unskilled work, so perhaps it would not have been so difficult to find someone with a modicum of dental experience in the army.<sup>70</sup> As with barbers, one wonders if there was not amongst the Cyreans at least one mercenary who started up a side business in dentistry with no more in the way of credentials than the requisite pair of forceps. Along with dental caries, tooth abrasion caused by eating stone-ground cereal products is evident in many ancient Greek skeletons, and was likely a problem for the Cyreans.<sup>71</sup> The eating of tough meat or the habitual use of teeth for biting or gripping objects would only exacerbate the effects of tooth abrasion. At least the mercenaries had no access to refined sugar, the major cause of cavities in the modern world.

#### INJURIES, WOUNDS, AND ILLNESS

It was a good thing the Cyreans began healthy and fit, for the campaign presented them one physiological challenge after another. To begin with, the very act of marching could become a source of injury. There were probably few if any tender feet amongst the mercenaries at the outset of the expedition. No amount of conditioning, however, could have prepared soldiers for the physiological impact of trekking some 3,000 kilometers. Even in sunny spring weather on the way out from Sardis, blisters and abrasions were likely common annoyances.<sup>72</sup> Matters were only made worse by the Cyreans' poor footwear, especially the rawhide brogues they improvised after their original shoes gave out; these would have constricted circulation and trapped moisture next to soldiers' feet.

As the march continued month after month, the repetitive shocks caused by hours of daily marching probably began to cause stress fractures, torn

<sup>69</sup> Hoffmann-Axthelm (1981) 66, von Staden (1989) 44–6. In the United States, incidentally, daily toothbrushing did not become common practice until after the Second World War; many Americans were issued their first toothbrush in the military.

<sup>70</sup> Hoffmann-Axthelm (1981) 62–6.

<sup>71</sup> Sallares (1991) 277, Roberts and Manchester (1995) 52–4.

<sup>72</sup> United States Army (1990) C.1–C.5.

ligaments, and muscle damage.<sup>73</sup> Such injuries may seem minor, but for a Cyrean the ability to walk was often a matter of life or death. Even without modern medical knowledge, the soldiers themselves probably had sufficient practical experience to realize that foot and leg injuries of this sort took weeks of rest to heal.<sup>74</sup> Such time, however, was rarely available during the campaign. Indeed, during the eleven months from Sardis to Trapezus the army made only three stops of longer than a week's duration. Without time to recover, a soldier, if not completely immobilized by pain, had no choice but to hobble onward. At their worst, foot and leg injuries would make walking excruciating and preclude running. The high march rates Cyrus enforced at the beginning of the campaign may have caused an initial spike in marching injuries, especially for men used to garrison life.<sup>75</sup> After that, rates probably leveled off as the army became accustomed to long marches over relatively flat terrain, only to increase again in the rugged terrain of Anatolia.<sup>76</sup> Older troopers, above age thirty or so, as well as young soldiers in their teens, may have suffered a higher rate of stress fractures.<sup>77</sup>

Although Xenophon never explicitly mentions march stress injuries, a subtle suggestion of their prevalence amongst the Cyreans appears in his description of the army's reaction at catching sight of the sea. Spontaneously piling up a great heap of stones, the troops placed upon this makeshift altar their walking sticks or staffs (*bakteriai*), expecting they would never need them again.<sup>78</sup> Healthy men had little use for *bakteriai*; their spears could double as walking sticks. Soldiers with foot and leg injuries, though, might need the assistance of *bakteria* and spear together, like a pair of crutches, to walk at all.<sup>79</sup> Xenophon paints a stirring picture of the final rush to the top of Mount Theches, soldiers shouting and pack animals breaking into a gallop.<sup>80</sup> In truth, some in the ranks may have hobbled forward those last uphill steps, barely able to support themselves on spear and *bakteria*.

The pain of stress injuries paled beside the damage of battle wounds. Penetrating wounds were probably most common: spear thrusts and sword cuts in melee, javelin or arrow strikes from afar. Sometimes men died instantly,

<sup>73</sup> Brukner et al. (1999) ix–x, 16–27; Jones et al. (2002). Although today mostly associated with sports, stress or march fractures were identified in military populations more than a century before they were recognized in athletes.

<sup>74</sup> Brukner et al. (1999) 36–8.

<sup>75</sup> For such an initial spike cf. Brukner et al. (1999) ix; Jones et al. (2002) 235–6.

<sup>76</sup> Jones et al. (2002) 238–9. <sup>77</sup> Brukner et al. (1999) 28–30. <sup>78</sup> *An.* 4.7.26.

<sup>79</sup> An instructive comparison appears in *Lys.* 24.12, where the crippled speaker says he requires a pair of *bakteriai* to get around; cf. *Ar. Ach.* 682.

<sup>80</sup> *An.* 4.7.24.



as in the case of Basias the Arcadian, his head transfixed by a Carduchian arrow.<sup>81</sup> Others survived the initial trauma, but quickly succumbed to blood loss and shock.<sup>82</sup> Nicarchus the Arcadian, who escaped the seizure of the generals and managed to stagger back to camp "holding his intestines in his hands," was amongst these.<sup>83</sup>

The proportion of immediately or quickly fatal penetrating wounds to non-fatal ones, however, was probably relatively low. Cyrean hoplites, for instance, had the advantage of their panoply. While armor did not guarantee survival – Cleonymus the hoplite was felled by an arrow that went through his shield and pierced his leather corslet – it generally formed an effective bulwark against enemy blows at both close and long range.<sup>84</sup> The light troops wore no armor, but had mobility as their protection, and could seek cover behind the shielded hoplite line if need be.<sup>85</sup> Lastly, because melee offered the greatest opportunity to land a killing blow, the tendency of their enemies to avoid coming to close quarters reduced the Cyrean dead-to-wounded ratio.<sup>86</sup>

More often, then, the Cyreans faced missiles thrown from a distance.<sup>87</sup> Missile attacks could be deadly at close range, as they were for Basias and Cleonymus, both of whom perished when the rear guard was under attack in a narrow defile. At greater distances, though, the penetrating power and lethality of arrows and javelins dropped markedly. During Mithradates and Tissaphernes' pursuit of the Cyreans up the Tigris valley, for example, long-range archery and slinging inflicted numerous wounds, but apparently not many outright deaths.<sup>88</sup>

For the wounded, the first challenge was getting out of harm's way. Hoplites who fell in the ranks or while the army was stationary had the best chances, for *suskenoi* could carry or drag them to safety. Hoplites moving quickly or under severe enemy pressure, though, might have to leave wounded comrades behind. Had Basias and Cleonymus, for instance, been wounded rather than killed, they still could not have been rescued, given that their unit was in full retreat at the time. For light troops, prospects were consistently grimmer. If hit while skirmishing, a man might fall close

<sup>81</sup> *An.* 4.1.18. <sup>82</sup> Gabriel and Metz (1991) 98–9.

<sup>83</sup> *An.* 2.5.33. With such a severe wound, Nicarchus must have died soon after reaching camp; he cannot be identified with an Arcadian *lochagos* of the same name (3.3.5) who deserted several days after the massacre.

<sup>84</sup> *An.* 4.1.18; cf. Blyth (1977). <sup>85</sup> *An.* 3.3.8, 3.4.26.

<sup>86</sup> *An.* 1.8.18–19, 3.4.4–5, 4.2.7; the Chalybians (4.7.15–16), bravest of the tribes the Cyreans encountered, were unusual in seeking melee.

<sup>87</sup> *An.* 3.3.3–11, 3.4.4, 3.4.14, 4.1.18, 4.3.17–34, 6.3.7–8, 7.4.18, 7.8.17–18.

<sup>88</sup> *An.* 3.3.7–10, 3.4.26, 3.4.30.

to the enemy ranks where he could not easily be retrieved; his comrades might not even know where to look. With a minor wound, he might limp his way back to the main body, but someone seriously injured had little chance.

Once a casualty, on his own or with the help of comrades, found his way to safety, he faced the challenge of obtaining proper medical attention. In the ideal world of the *Cyropaedia*, Cyrus the Elder made sure to bring along doctors for his men.<sup>89</sup> In real life, while the Persian army at Cunaxa boasted the services of Ctesias of Cnidus, personal doctor to Artaxerxes II, physicians for common soldiers were rare.<sup>90</sup> Fourth-century Spartan armies had doctors (*iatroi*), but there is no hint of a Cyrean medical service.<sup>91</sup> Indeed, Xenophon only once refers to an attempt at organized medical care. In the foothills above the Tigris, after several days under persistent harassment by Tissaphernes' forces, the Cyreans were compelled to bivouac in villages for several days, where they appointed eight *iatroi* to look after the many wounded.<sup>92</sup> Though veterans might possess some practical surgical knowledge, picked up over years of soldiering, probably these surgeons had neither formal training nor proper equipment.<sup>93</sup> They might extract missiles, and cauterize, clean, and bind wounds, but beyond that could render little aid.<sup>94</sup> Even these limited capabilities might have been stretched, for if there were only a hundred casualties – a low estimate, given the severity of the fighting that prompted their appointment – each *iatros* would have been charged with a dozen or more patients. For the most part, then, wounded soldiers had to rely on their *suskenoi* for rudimentary care and comfort.

Neither surgeons nor attentive friends could do much to avert the next threat: infection. Perhaps one in twenty casualties contracted tetanus, which in the era before immunizations had an 80 percent death rate. Septicemia or blood poisoning, resulting from wounds to major arteries and veins, might afflict a similar number; this was almost inevitably fatal until the introduction of antibiotics during the 1940s.<sup>95</sup> Most horrifying was gangrene, tissue death caused by the clostridium bacteria. Without proper antiseptics, even minor wounds could become gangrenous, especially in dirty field

<sup>89</sup> *Cyr.* 1.6.15. <sup>90</sup> *FGrH* 3c.688, Hofstetter (1978) III–13. <sup>91</sup> *Lac.* 13.7.

<sup>92</sup> *An.* 3.4.30; Xenophon's experience here perhaps inspired his later insistence (*Cyr.* 6.2.32) on the value of medical supplies.

<sup>93</sup> Salazar (2000) 92, *pace* Lendle (1995) 235.

<sup>94</sup> Salazar (2000) 66–74. Not all missiles could be extracted, and soldiers might carry projectile points embedded in their flesh for years – the ancient equivalent of shrapnel – until these slowly worked their way to the surface; see Salazar (2000) 16 and cf. *Hom. Il.* 8.513–16.

<sup>95</sup> Sallares (1991) 288, Kiple (1993) 1043–6, Gabriel and Metz (1991) 96–8.

conditions. Within a few days, the infection could eat away the whole of an injured calf or the wall of an abdomen, leaving, in a modern doctor's words, "a great hollow or hiatus of the most destructive character, exhaling a peculiar stench which can never be mistaken, and spreading with a rapidity quite awful to contemplate."<sup>96</sup> Unless an infected limb could be amputated, gangrene was usually lethal. All told, perhaps 15 percent of men who suffered penetrating wounds might die of post-injury infections within a week.<sup>97</sup>

Bone fractures and crushing injuries, though less common than penetrating wounds, were also serious. While some Cyreans suffered parry fractures from attempting to deflect enemy blows in melee, probably most bone injuries were inflicted from afar.<sup>98</sup> In Carduchia, for instance, a hurled rock snapped the leg of a man fighting beside Xenophon; in Taochia, some Cyreans had limbs and ribs crushed by stones the defenders of a native fortress rolled down upon them.<sup>99</sup> Such injuries varied greatly in lethality. A man with a broken arm or cracked rib might get back on his feet, even stay in ranks despite the pain. Since setting and splinting were familiar techniques to classical Greeks, with luck a simple break might heal uneventfully in a month or two. If a broken limb was incorrectly set, though, there was the danger of soft tissue damage, as well as of misalignment or shortening.<sup>100</sup> Far worse were fractures involving multiple ribs or the sternum, which have 35–45 percent mortality rates even in modern emergency rooms.<sup>101</sup> At least infections were less likely to complicate fractures and crushing injuries.

Those who escaped infections or had bones properly set might require weeks or months to recuperate fully. The Cyreans in retreat, though, did not have such luxury. Between the massacre of the generals in late September 401 and the arrival at Trapezus in early January 400, only once did they halt for longer than a few days. These short rests provided little opportunity for the wounded to rest; broken bones especially had to sit still to knit correctly. Only along the Euxine coast, where sea transport was available and the army sometimes remained stationary for a month or more, did wounded men have the time they needed to heal.<sup>102</sup>

When the army had to move, what happened to the wounded? Those able to walk probably got back into ranks; a Cyrean with a minor arrow

<sup>96</sup> Kiple (1993) 741–4; cf. Salazar (2000) 32–4.

<sup>97</sup> Gabriel and Metz (1991) 99.

<sup>98</sup> Kiple (1993) 249, Gabriel and Metz (1991) 95–6.

<sup>99</sup> *An.* 4.2.20, 4.7.4–5.

<sup>100</sup> Harwood-Nuss and Luten (1995) 249–51, Roberts and Manchester (1995) 68–72, 94–6.

<sup>101</sup> Harwood-Nuss and Luten (1995) 234–6.

<sup>102</sup> One of these was Mysus the Mysian, wounded in the hills above Trapezus (*An.* 5.2.29–31) but back in action at Cotyora (6.1.9–12).

wound or sword cut could still fight, after all.<sup>103</sup> Someone with a broken arm or rib might take over less strenuous duties – leading a mule, say – from his *suskenoi*. Incapacitated or immobilized soldiers, however, had to be transported on stretchers or litters, and with no formal medical service in the army, a wounded man had to rely on his *suskenoi* to carry him.<sup>104</sup>

At first the Cyreans apparently tried to carry their wounded no matter what. Doing so, as they discovered to their dismay on the way up the Tigris, required pulling several men out of line: two at least to carry the casualty, and another to shoulder the equipment of the carriers.<sup>105</sup> For the wounded, being transported over rough terrain was excruciating. Aside from the pain of wounds and injuries, some would be feverish from infections, and there were no drugs available to ease either pain or fever.<sup>106</sup>

After a day or two of slow progress, the difficulties of carrying casualties, especially those on the way to dying from infection anyway, may have impelled some Cyreans to leave their wounded behind. Xenophon elides this unpleasant possibility, but look again at his narrative of the retreat up the Tigris.<sup>107</sup> As he tells things, one day the army is struggling forward under the burden of many wounded, unable to escape harassment by Tissaphernes. Yet, two days later the Cyreans break camp after dark and accomplish a night march of “no less than sixty stades,” or some 9–12 kilometers (5.5–7.5 miles). They continue to march rapidly over the next few days, so that Tissaphernes can only reestablish contact by undertaking a night march of his own. The wounded never reappear; in fact there are no further references to the carrying of wounded men in the *Anabasis*. This silence speaks volumes. As the army entered Carduchia and conditions got worse, more and more *suskeniai* must have faced an agonizing choice: expend the effort to carry a severely wounded comrade, or abandon him to give the group a better chance of survival. If they chose to leave him behind, it was no sign of the weakness of suskenic ties, simply a mark of the desperateness of the situation. A dying *suskenos*, knowing the dilemma confronting his friends, might even urge them to go on without him.

Understanding that Cyreans sometimes had to abandon their wounded lends additional meaning to the incident of the mule driver and the sick man.<sup>108</sup> As Xenophon recounted his version of events, his insistence on carrying the sick man must have struck a range of chords in his audience.

<sup>103</sup> Agasias of Stymphalus, for instance, continued fighting despite being wounded; see *An.* 7.8.19.

<sup>104</sup> For stretchers and litters see Sternberg (1999) 193; there is no classical evidence for the stereotypical use of shields as makeshift stretchers.

<sup>105</sup> *An.* 3.4.32–3.

<sup>106</sup> Salazar (2000) 59.

<sup>107</sup> *An.* 3.4.33–7.

<sup>108</sup> *An.* 5.8.1–12; for more on this incident, see Chapter Four.

Certainly some were furious at the mule-driving soldier because of his callous behavior. As Xenophon said, nobody deserved to be buried alive. Others were stirred because they recognized themselves in the mule driver: willing to help *suskenoi*, but unhesitating to abandon strangers to their deaths. Still others, though, were moved by the remembrance of having, out of necessity, left friends behind. At that moment in the assembly, the mule-driving soldier became a scapegoat for the entire army, for every time it had marched off from an encampment, leaving wounded and sick men on the ground behind.<sup>109</sup>

Along with marching injuries and combat wounds, the Cyreans had to contend with disease and sickness. Serious communicable diseases, fortunately, were not amongst these. While an epidemiologically opportune moment for a disease such as cholera or typhoid fever to hit the Cyreans would have been near the beginning of the march, when the different contingents first made contact with each other, no such outbreak occurred. Lice-borne typhus, notorious for striking groups living at close quarters with few clean clothes and little opportunity to wash, had the potential to flourish in Anatolia, but the troops escaped this too.<sup>110</sup> Here the Cyreans followed a wider trend, for aside from the plague that devastated the Athenians during the Peloponnesian War mass outbreaks of acute illness seldom impeded classical Greek armies.<sup>111</sup>

Less serious ailments, though not directly attested, probably afflicted the Cyreans: chronic intestinal pain from nutritional irregularity and stress, diarrhea and dysentery from tainted rations or poor mealtime sanitation.<sup>112</sup> Since soldiers usually ate with their hands, often from common plates, intestinal parasites and bacteria had easy routes of transmission within a *suskenia*.<sup>113</sup> Here the absence of a centralized mess system actually helped the Cyreans, for it reduced the chances of bugs spreading widely. As long as *suskeniai* all drew upon the same local food supply, though, there were other ways for disease to spread. Everyone who slaughtered and consumed cattle from the same herd, for instance, would have been vulnerable to animal-borne maladies like tularemia. Giardiasis, contracted from drinking water contaminated with feces, could sicken men across the army.<sup>114</sup>

<sup>109</sup> For the emotional effect of abandoning casualties, cf. Thucydides' description (7.75.2–5) of the Athenians abandoning their wounded at Syracuse in 413 BC.

<sup>110</sup> Kiple (1993) 1080–2. Since typhus has a mortality rate of up to 40 percent, Xenophon would surely have noted its appearance.

<sup>111</sup> Sallares (1991) 242–3.

<sup>112</sup> Corvisier (1985) 57–9, Kiple (1993) 676–80.

<sup>113</sup> Corvisier (1985) 57, Sapouna Sakellarakis et al. (2002) 96; cf. *An.* 7.3.23, *Cyr.* 2.2.2.

<sup>114</sup> Kiple (1993) 745, 1068–70.

In the end, relatively few Cyreans died from communicable disease.<sup>115</sup> Environmental illnesses induced by extreme heat and cold were another matter.<sup>116</sup> Heat was the lesser threat. Although the army traversed regions – the upper Euphrates valley in July and August, for instance – where maximum daily temperatures can reach 40°–45° C (104°–113° F), Xenophon offers no suggestion that heat exhaustion or heat stroke affected masses of soldiers. Since modern studies show that humans can get used to high temperatures within ten days, probably the Cyreans had successfully acclimated to the hotter weather as they proceeded from Tarsus towards the Euphrates.<sup>117</sup> The army also reduced its risks of heat illness during this period by marching at night or in the early morning.<sup>118</sup> On the day of Cunaxa, both armies may have minimized the danger of acute heat stroke, brought on by extreme exertion in high temperatures while wearing heavy arms and armor, by waiting until late afternoon to commence battle.<sup>119</sup> While heat illnesses could be fatal, once diagnosed they were easily treatable with rehydration and rest.<sup>120</sup>

The wet and cold of Anatolia hurt the Cyreans far more than had the Mesopotamian heat. To begin with, they had little experience of severe winter weather. True, Arcadia in winter saw heavy rains and occasional snows, so Arcadians may have been better prepared than most; the Tegeans in particular were supposed to be inured to cold.<sup>121</sup> Still, Anatolia's average winter was far harsher than Arcadia's worst, so the Arcadians might have been no more able to cope than lowland Achaeans, Athenians, or Boeotians.

Crucially, the soldiers lacked proper shelter and clothing, having burnt their tents and extra gear before setting off into the mountains. Furthermore, the army in Anatolia was under frequent enemy pressure, and therefore less able to schedule its marches and halts to minimize environmental effects. Lastly, cold casualties were difficult to treat. A closer examination of the march through Carduchia and Armenia, where the army suffered the majority of its non-battle casualties, reveals how severely the cold and wet afflicted the Cyreans.

The first heavy rains of autumn hit the Cyreans on their third day in Carduchia. Judging by the mist that cloaked the army's advance the next day, conditions stayed wet for several days straight. This was mid-October,

<sup>115</sup> *An.* 5.3.3.

<sup>116</sup> For an overview of heat and cold effects on military performance see Kobrick and Johnson (1991).

<sup>117</sup> McElroy and Auerbach (1983) 70–2, Harwood-Nuss and Luten (1995) 365–9.

<sup>118</sup> See Chapter Six for this marching pattern.

<sup>119</sup> For more on the timeline of Cunaxa, see Chapter Six.

<sup>120</sup> United States Army (2000) 3.4–5. <sup>121</sup> Roy (1999) 321–2; Paus. 8.53.10.

when it was probably chilly, but not freezing.<sup>122</sup> The soldiers had to spend that night in the open, though the next day they found quarters in native houses. Several days later the Cyreans got their feet wet again crossing the Centrites River, and followed that with a day's march before reaching shelter in the first villages of Armenia. Over the next week, the soldiers crossed one river after another and the temperature continued to drop.<sup>123</sup>

Marching in such conditions, aside from being generally miserable, rendered the Cyreans susceptible to immersion foot, once known as trench foot. Its name notwithstanding, immersion foot, characterized by reduced circulation, swelling, blisters, pain and nerve damage in the extremities, does not require actual prolonged immersion in water, just sustained exposure to cold, wet weather.<sup>124</sup> These symptoms may have appeared amongst the Cyreans soon after the rains began. British troops during the Falklands War, by way of comparison, began to report foot pain and swelling within two days of their amphibious landing at San Carlos Water. Researchers later found that 98 percent of British frontline soldiers, many of them trained for cold weather operations and all equipped with modern combat boots, had suffered non-freezing cold injuries such as immersion foot during only four weeks of combat.<sup>125</sup>

The Cyreans did not need a formal diagnosis to recognize the importance of maintaining their bodies, perhaps drying and massaging their feet whenever they could. Fortunately, they were able find indoor quarters for several nights in Carduchia, as well as for the night following the Centrites crossing. With no central supply system, though, dry clothing and spare foot wrappings, essential for preventing immersion foot, were hard to come by.<sup>126</sup> The poor quality of Cyrean footwear did not help either; a man who left wet leather sandals or moccasins to dry overnight by the fire was liable to find them cracked and unwearable in the morning.

As the army trekked deeper into Armenia, rain turned to snow, with the first heavy snowfall blanketing the ground about ten days after the Centrites crossing. The Cyreans took this storm in their stride, but that was because they had shelter close by.<sup>127</sup> Soon the army was moving again, into mountainous terrain covered by deep snow and then into the plain

<sup>122</sup> *An.* 4.1.15, 4.2.4, 4.2.7; cf. Tuplin (1991) 37–57, Lendle (1995) 206. For temperatures and precipitation during this period see Table 1.

<sup>123</sup> *An.* 4.2.4–7, 4.2.22, 4.3.4–34, 4.4.1–3.

<sup>124</sup> Bangs and Hamlet (1983) 46–7, Wilkerson (1986b) 97–9.

<sup>125</sup> Wilkerson (1986b) 100, Thomas and Oakley (2001) 485.

<sup>126</sup> For the importance of dry foot wrappings or socks, see Thomas and Oakley (2001) 485–6.

<sup>127</sup> *An.* 4.4.7–14. While Lendle (1995) 228 reads the Cyrean reluctance to get up from under this snowfall as the lethargy of incipient hypothermia, such drifts in fact offer a measure of insulation,

beyond and across a large river – Xenophon calls it the upper Euphrates – in which the Cyreans were soaked to the navel. Enemy pursuit, for the moment at least, had been evaded, but the worst was yet to come: three days and nights struggling across a snow-covered plain, in the face of a howling north wind.

The Cyreans now encountered a trio of winter threats. First, there was hypothermia. Wet or damp clothing, deep snow, and wind chill together could have quickly produced hypothermia amongst the troops.<sup>128</sup> While men marched, they could keep up their body warmth, but nobody could slog forever without resting, and shivering probably crept rapidly through the ranks whenever the army halted to catch its breath.<sup>129</sup> At night, with no shelter in sight, the only relief was for *suskenoi* to pile on what extra cloaks they had and huddle together around the warmth of a fire – if one could be kindled.<sup>130</sup>

To modern clinicians, slurred speech, apathy, fatigue, lethargy, and withdrawal are classic indications of severe hypothermia.<sup>131</sup> Victims sometimes refuse to shield themselves from the cold, even remove their clothing; the flattened affect of a hypothermic patient can seem willfully uncooperative.<sup>132</sup> This may explain the behavior of some Cyreans in Armenia, possibly suffering from severe hypothermia, who collapsed in a dell beside the march route and refused to proceed. Encountering the men, Xenophon tried but failed to get them moving. When he became angry at what he mistook as their intransigence, the soldiers responded by bidding him “to kill them, for they were not able to go on.”<sup>133</sup>

With hypothermia came frostbite. Xenophon’s remark that some lost toes and others their lives to the cold largely passes over the grim details of what happened.<sup>134</sup> A man might not even notice the initial stages of frostbite, unless he caught sight of the waxy white complexion of a *suskenos* or looked down to find his own unprotected hands turning a mottled blue.<sup>135</sup> Those who did not keep their circulation going during long halts or at night were far more prone to frostbite. Two-thirds of US Army frostbite cases in the Korean Conflict, for example, consisted

so the men may simply have been reluctant to give up the warmth the snow blanket provided; see United States Army (1968) 32–4.

<sup>128</sup> Bangs and Hamlet (1983) 29, United States Army (2000) 3.11. <sup>129</sup> Young et al. (1996) 131–3.

<sup>130</sup> *An.* 4.5.11, 4.5.19. <sup>131</sup> Harwood-Nuss and Luten (1995) 362–5.

<sup>132</sup> Bangs and Hamlet (1983) 31–5.

<sup>133</sup> *An.* 4.5.15–17. Here and elsewhere, Xenophon interprets physical symptoms in moral terms. For example, after realizing (5.8.15–16) that sitting still in cold weather was bad, while standing and stretching created warmth and flexibility, he places the discovery in a moralizing framework: staying still is not just unhealthy, but also weak and unmanly.

<sup>134</sup> *An.* 4.5.4, 4.5.11–12. <sup>135</sup> Bangs and Hamlet (1983) 47, Harwood-Nuss and Luten (1995) 360–1.



of men who had been sitting in trucks or pinned down in foxholes for hours.<sup>136</sup> Cyreans who left their footwear on overnight in misguided attempts to keep warm only multiplied the dangers of staying still. Xenophon relates that these men's shoes froze on their feet, but omits the gruesome sight of what happened when the shoes were finally removed, as toes and strips of flesh peeled off still attached to frozen hide.<sup>137</sup> At least the ancients were not smokers: many US soldiers in Korea were apparently more susceptible to frostbite because of the decreased blood flow caused by the nicotine in their systems.<sup>138</sup>

The Cyreans could do little to treat hypothermia and frostbite. Passive re-warming using blankets and shared bodily heat would have been the best therapy available in antiquity, but few if any of the soldiers had experience of treating cold casualties; even the accumulated wisdom of veterans was of little assistance. Untutored attempts to treat frostbite with re-warming next to a fire would actually accelerate tissue damage, and could cause further injury: men unable to feel their frozen feet also could not sense that they were receiving first- and second-degree burns from the fire.<sup>139</sup>

As if immersion foot, hypothermia, and frostbite were not enough, Armenia also brought the Cyreans snow blindness, eye trauma caused by ultra-violet rays reflecting off snow or ice.<sup>140</sup> Snow blindness can occur even in mist or fog; a gritty, painful sensation accompanies vision loss. Blinded Cyreans were not in mortal danger unless simultaneously afflicted by other cold injuries, but unless guided by their comrades they risked separation from the army. For this malady at least the soldiers devised an effective preventative, marching with something black in front of the eyes to reduce glare.<sup>141</sup>

For cold-injured Cyreans who made it safely to the underground villages of Armenia, prospects varied. Snow blindness was the least serious. With eyes bandaged and a day or two of rest, a man's vision would be back to normal. Soldiers with hypothermia, if they managed to survive the re-warming process, had a relatively good prognosis as well. Frostbite victims had it worst. In a week or so, their frostbitten tissues formed a hard eschar, with damaged extremities going black and falling off.<sup>142</sup> Accompanying infections, especially frostbite-triggered gangrene, were big killers. For those

<sup>136</sup> Cowdrey (1987) 116–19.

<sup>137</sup> *An.* 4.5.13–14; Bangs and Hamlet (1983) 48–50.

<sup>138</sup> Wilkerson (1986a) 85–6.

<sup>139</sup> Wilkerson (1986a) 90.

<sup>140</sup> *An.* 4.5.12, United States Army (1968) 48–9.

<sup>141</sup> *An.* 4.5.13; cf. United States Army (1968) 49.

<sup>142</sup> Wilkerson (1986a) 94. Xenophon's description of men during the Armenian blizzard falling behind "with toes rotted off by the cold" (*An.* 4.5.12–13) suggests that the army started incurring frostbite casualties several days before the blizzard.

who escaped infection, full recovery could take weeks.<sup>143</sup> But the Cyreans did not have weeks. Instead, the army spent little more than seven days in the underground villages before moving on.<sup>144</sup> Frostbitten Cyreans strong enough to hobble and shoulder their weapons must have fallen into ranks. Those who had lost feet had to be carried. Some may have had *suskenoi* willing and able to make the effort. Others would be left behind with the dead and the dying.

Upon departing the underground villages, the Cyreans still had roughly a month's march through Anatolia ahead of them. Although there was less snow during this period, temperatures may have been the lowest the army experienced.<sup>145</sup> Xenophon, however, mentions no further cold casualties, perhaps an indication that the surviving Cyreans had successfully acclimated to winter conditions. Indeed, if modern studies are any guide, after their weeks in Carduchia and Armenia, the troops had adjusted to the point of being able to sleep soundly on frozen ground.<sup>146</sup> Moreover, with the benefit of hard-earned Armenian experience, they must have become experts at diagnosing and treating cold injuries.

Even after the Cyreans reached the Black Sea coast, the Anatolian winter lingered on their bodies. Some were in such poor condition that they were embarked on ships at Trapezus.<sup>147</sup> Even soldiers who remained fit for combat may have suffered permanent effects from cold exposure. Studies of veterans of Korea and the Falklands, for example, reveal that many who sustain cold injuries in combat still experience heightened sensitivity to cold decades later.<sup>148</sup> Xenophon may just catch a hint of this aftereffect in his description of the Cyreans' second winter together, in Thrace during 400–399. There, he writes, temperatures fell so low that soldiers lost the tips of their noses and ears to frostbite.<sup>149</sup> Yet modern meteorological records indicate that extreme winter temperatures in European Thrace are typically warmer than those of eastern Anatolia.<sup>150</sup> Modern averages, of course, cannot be an exact guide to the weather in any particular year in antiquity, and winter 400–399 may simply have been unusually severe. Still, another possibility merits consideration. That second winter in Thrace may not really have been as bad as Xenophon thought; it may just have felt colder because the soldiers had become more sensitive.

<sup>143</sup> Kiple (1993) 741–4, Harwood-Nuss and Luten (1995) 361.

<sup>144</sup> *An.* 4.5.11, 4.6.1.

<sup>145</sup> For these environmental conditions, see Chapter Two and Table 1.

<sup>146</sup> Pozos et al. (1996) 155–6, Young et al. (1996) 140–3.

<sup>147</sup> *An.* 5.3.1; see Chapter Six for more on sea travel.

<sup>148</sup> Bangs and Hamlet (1983) 50, Thomas and Oakley (2001) 469, 472.

<sup>149</sup> *An.* 7.4.2–4, Stronk (1995) 224.

<sup>150</sup> See Table 1 for details on these temperatures.

BURIAL AND COMMEMORATION

Death came to the Cyreans in many forms, from the quickness of a spear thrust or sword cut, to the agony of gangrene, to the slow numbing of hypothermia and frostbite. To the survivors remained one final care of the body: the collection and interment of fallen comrades. Proper burial and commemoration was essential, both to speed the dead into the afterlife and to reassure the living that they could expect the same treatment. So concerned were the mercenaries with proper funeral rites that in Carduchia they negotiated a truce with otherwise implacably hostile natives to secure the return of their fallen. At Calpe they twice undertook special missions to gather casualties. At Cerasus, when it was impossible for the troops to pick up dead comrades, they requested help from the locals to accomplish the task.<sup>151</sup> Leaving men unburied was hard to countenance even in dire situations. Xenophon made this clear in Carduchia, when he complained to Cheirisophus that the army had moved so rapidly there had been no time to retrieve the fallen hoplites Cleonymus and Basias: "two fine and worthy men have died, and we weren't able to recover their bodies or bury them."<sup>152</sup> Cheirisophus answered that speed had been necessary to capture a vital pass ahead, but the abandonment stung nonetheless. Even the mule-driving soldier, whatever his disregard for the sick man he was forced to carry, took time to dig the stranger a grave.<sup>153</sup>

Back in Greece, laying out and interring the dead was the responsibility of relatives.<sup>154</sup> Without a Graves Registration service, the Cyreans too relied on those closest to them – their *suskenoi* – to perform these duties. In an army without dog tags or identification cards, *suskenoi* were probably the only ones who could identify the dead anyway, although after a few days in the sun even a close friend's corpse might bloat unrecognizably.<sup>155</sup> As for interment, the mercenaries did not have the luxury of cremating the fallen for transport home, as was the practice in the Athenian army and navy.<sup>156</sup> Cremation required fuel and time, both often in short supply. Even when the army sat for a long period at a place with abundant timber, as at Calpe in summer 400, cremation and transportation was not a realistic option; it was hardly possible to lug around the ashes of over a thousand men.<sup>157</sup>

Instead, soldiers were laid to rest whenever the army reached a convenient stopping point. Sometimes *suskenoi* scraped together enough wood for a

<sup>151</sup> *An.* 4.2.23, 6.4.9–11, 6.5.5–6, 5.7.30. <sup>152</sup> *An.* 4.1.18–19.

<sup>153</sup> *An.* 5.8.9; see Chapter Four for the story of the mule driver and the sick man.

<sup>154</sup> Burkert (1985) 191–2.

<sup>155</sup> On the identification of Greek war dead see Vaughn (1991).

<sup>156</sup> Burkert (1985) 192–4, Pritchett (1985) 254–7.

<sup>157</sup> For casualties at Calpe see Table 3.

comrade's funeral pyre, but inhumation, being quicker and easier, was likely more common. Given warm weather and suitable soil, digging graves was feasible, but in the Carduchian mountains or on the frozen Anatolian plains, soldiers might settle for piling rock cairns over their dead friends in hopes of deterring scavengers and looters. If no one needed replacements for lost equipment, a warrior's weapons and armor might join him in the earth; or they might be destroyed to keep them out of enemy hands. To complete the burial, a rude headstone scratched on a tile or burnt onto wood, a quick libation and a few quiet words, and the survivors would have to be on their way.<sup>158</sup> Only at Calpe do the Cyreans seem to have been able to construct a more durable memorial, including a cenotaph adorned with wreaths.<sup>159</sup>

#### THE BODY AND COMMUNITY

The 5,000 or so Cyreans who survived to join Thibron in spring 399 BC bore ample evidence of their experience on their bodies. Those sporting the scars of healed wounds would perhaps not have stood out amongst any group of professional soldiers, but others, with noses and earlobes disfigured by frostbite, must have occasioned some comment in sunny coastal Ionia. One wonders whether some took pride in these distinctive injuries, which marked them as men who had undergone extraordinary suffering together. What every Cyrean must have recognized, at any rate, was that the maintenance of his body over the course of the campaign had depended on the aid of his *suskenoi*. Soldiers relied on their comrades to cut their hair and help delouse them, to tend and carry them if they were wounded or injured, and, if they fell, to give them proper burial. It was not a mystical bond that made *suskenoi* take care of each others' bodies, but simple practicality; nobody could do all these things for himself.

<sup>158</sup> Basic funeral rituals in Greece required only earthenware vessels with food and drink for a funeral banquet (*perideipnon*), and it is possible *suskenoi* performed these rituals when they had time; see Burkert (1985) 193. Pierre Schoendoerffer's 1965 film, *La 317ième Section*, offers a poignant scene depicting the burial of a Cambodian mercenary by his comrades during a retreat across Indochina in May 1954.

<sup>159</sup> *An.* 6.4.9.

## CHAPTER 10

### *Slaves, servants, and companions*

That the structures of *lochos* and *suskenia* were central to the lives of the Cyreans should by now be quite clear. So far, our focus has been on the mercenaries themselves, but they were not the only people who made the trek from Mesopotamia to the sea. It is time to examine the place of non-combatants, including slaves, servants, and male and female companions, in the army.

#### A CYREAN'S WORK IS NEVER DONE

Sometime in January 400 BC the Cyreans reached the Black Sea coast at Trapezus. Having celebrated their arrival with athletic games, they assembled to deliberate their future. First to stand was Leon of Thurii, an ordinary soldier, who had this to say:<sup>1</sup>

Well, men, as far as I'm concerned I've had enough of packing up and marching and running and carrying my weapons and advancing in formation and standing guard and fighting; I now desire to put a stop to all these toils, since we have reached the sea, and to sail the rest of the way and so arrive in Greece stretched out on my back like Odysseus.

The assembly roared in approval. A second Cyrean rose to voice similar sentiments, followed by another, then another. Indeed, every man who stood up to speak reiterated what Leon said. The troops' reaction was hardly surprising. Nearly a year, after all, had elapsed since Cyrus had led them out from Sardis. In that time they had marched deep into Persian territory, survived Cunaxa and its aftermath in Mesopotamia, and then fought their way across Anatolia through one hostile tribe after another. They had suffered from burning heat and blasting cold, rainstorms and blizzards, hunger and privation. Of course the Cyreans were tired of marching. With the sea at hand, sailing home must have seemed the reasonable thing to everyone.

<sup>1</sup> *An.* 5.1.2–3; Leon alludes to *Hom. Od.* 5.75–118.

What is surprising, at least to those accustomed to hoplite warfare in mainland Greece, is Leon's complaint about having to pack his own baggage and carry his own arms. In classical citizen armies, these chores would normally have been the responsibility of others. At Athens, for example, the custom was for each hoplite to employ an attendant, usually a slave but occasionally a free relative. These were variously called *paides* (literally "boys" and thus a patronizing name for slaves) or *hyperetai* ("servants"), but most commonly *skeuophoroi* ("baggage-carriers").<sup>2</sup> In the Spartan army, attendants were typically helots, and each Spartiate might possess up to seven of them.<sup>3</sup>

Now, recent research has suggested that average Athenian hoplite farmers were not as likely to employ personal attendants on campaign as was previously thought.<sup>4</sup> Similar scrutiny has not so far been accorded the Cyreans, who are generally assumed to have employed large numbers of slave servants; some estimates run into the thousands.<sup>5</sup> Yet a closer look at the evidence strongly supports the opposite conclusion: that very few mercenaries had attendants. There are two paths to this conclusion. The first is to delineate the functions that hoplite attendants usually undertook for their masters on campaign, and then see who actually performed these activities amongst the Cyreans. The second is to examine the terms Xenophon attaches to the non-fighting elements of the army – *ochlos*, *skeuophora*, and *andrapoda* in particular – in order to see to whom or what these terms actually refer.

#### THE FUNCTIONS OF HOPLITE ATTENDANTS

Pritchett lists the tasks assigned to attendants in Greek citizen armies: carrying weapons and armor, removing wounded from the battlefield, hauling provisions, and acting as general servants in war.<sup>6</sup> To this we may add: helping to procure and prepare food, gathering and chopping wood, loading and leading baggage animals. Turning to the *Anabasis*, we see that Xenophon specifically and repeatedly attests Cyreans themselves carrying out each of these functions.

<sup>2</sup> Pritchett (1971) 50–1, van Wees (2004) 68–71; free relative: Isae. 5.11, Garland (1988) 163, Jameson (1992) 141; *paides*: Dem. 54.4, Golden (1985); *hyperetai*: Thuc. 3.17.3; *skeuophoroi*: Ar. *Vesp.* 497, Thuc. 2.79.5, 4.101.2, 6.67.1, 7.75.2, 7.78.2, cf. Ducrey (1968) 157 and Welwei (1977) 58–61.

<sup>3</sup> Chrimes (1949) 382–4, Pritchett (1971) 51, van Wees (2004) 68.

<sup>4</sup> van Wees (2001) 60, van Wees (2004) 68–9.

<sup>5</sup> Cousin (1905) 213, Lendle (1984) 207–9, Lang (1992) 25–6, Stronk (1995) 106.

<sup>6</sup> Pritchett (1971) 51, cf. Sargent (1927) 203.

To begin with, the speeches of Leon of Thurii and his fellows clearly indicate that a Cyrean normally packed his own equipment and carried his own arms – Leon would not have received such a thunderous response otherwise. Eleven other distinct passages describe soldiers packing up their own gear, and either carrying it themselves or loading it onto pack animals.<sup>7</sup> Although it might be objected that Xenophon could write of soldiers “packing up” when in actuality they were relying on attendants, the context of these passages makes it clear that the men themselves did the work. The evening before entering Carduchia, for instance, the generals commanded the troops to pack and then rest in preparation for the march ahead.<sup>8</sup> Had abundant servants in fact been present, the generals would hardly have failed to take advantage of the labor power by letting the soldiers rest while their attendants did the packing. To cite another example, on the morning of Cunaxa the army advanced in disorder, with many of the soldiers placing their weapons on pack animals or carts.<sup>9</sup> Xenophon describes this as a departure from normal practice; there would have been no reason for him to point it out at all had there been plentiful attendants available to carry weapons and armor. As for the driving of pack animals, we have already seen how a *suskenia* might choose one of its *suskenoi* to lead the group’s mule, and this must not have been a rare sight amongst the Cyreans.<sup>10</sup> In contrast, there exists not a hint of slave muleteers.

Xenophon himself acknowledged that the army normally included a proportion of soldiers carrying equipment or leading baggage animals and thus unavailable for combat. Before the retreat up the Tigris valley, as we have seen, he suggested the Cyreans burn their tents, wagons, and other non-essential equipment, “in order that we may have as many as possible of us under arms, and that as few [of us] as possible may carry baggage.”<sup>11</sup> A recent study of the role of slaves in Greek warfare claims that Xenophon’s goal could only have been accomplished by transforming slave baggage-carriers into fighters.<sup>12</sup> This interpretation, however, rests on the assumption that large numbers of *skeuophoroi* had accompanied the Cyreans from the outset of the expedition. Yet Xenophon says nothing about slaves here. Rather he emphasizes “us”: the single body of soldiers faced with two sets of tasks – fighting on the one hand, looking after equipment on the

<sup>7</sup> *An.* 1.3.14, 2.1.2, 2.2.4, 3.4.36, 3.5.18, 4.3.14, 4.5.1, 5.8.14, 6.3.24, 7.1.7, 7.3.6; *LSJ* s.v. *suskeuazo*: “make ready by putting together, pack up;” also in the abstract sense “prepare, make ready,” for which see e.g. 2.3.29.

<sup>8</sup> *An.* 3.5.18.      <sup>9</sup> *An.* 1.7.20.

<sup>10</sup> *An.* 4.1.13, 5.8.5; for the mule-driving soldier and his *suskenia*, see Chapter Four.

<sup>11</sup> *An.* 3.2.27–8.      <sup>12</sup> Hunt (1998) 166.

other.<sup>13</sup> While using slaves in combat was not unknown in classical antiquity, this passage provides no evidence for such practice amongst the Cyreans.

The Cyreans also carried their own casualties.<sup>14</sup> During the first week of the retreat up the Tigris, for example, Tissaphernes' pursuing archers and slingers wounded so many troopers that numerous others had to be taken out of line to serve as stretcher-bearers. As Xenophon recounts, "many were unfit for service, both the wounded and those carrying them, and those who took the arms of the men carrying the wounded."<sup>15</sup> Once again, we find no mention of slave attendants. In Armenia as well, the Cyreans themselves looked after exhausted, frostbitten, snow-blinded comrades in the marching column. Cheirisophus, having reached shelter earlier than the rest of the army, even sent back troops to help Xenophon's rear guard convey the injured men to safety.<sup>16</sup> By way of contrast, the Spartans at Lechaeum in 390 BC, under attack by Iphicrates' Athenian peltasts, relied on helot or slave attendants to carry their casualties. As Xenophon points out, "when the Lacedaemonians were attacked with javelins and some men were wounded and others slain, they commanded the shield-bearers to pick these up and carry them back to Lechaeum; and these men alone out of the regiment (*mora*), in truth, were saved."<sup>17</sup>

The mercenaries themselves, not slave attendants, took care of the other daily tasks of life in the field. The members of each *suskenia*, for example, gathered their own cooking fuel and when necessary split the wood themselves.<sup>18</sup> This was the practice even on the relatively leisurely march to Cunaxa, as Clearchus discovered at Charmande. There, it will be remembered, Clearchus had angered Menon's contingent by flogging one of Menon's soldiers. As he rode back to his own quarters through the bivouacs of Menon's force, "one of Menon's men who was splitting wood threw his axe at Clearchus when he saw him riding through the camp."<sup>19</sup> The soldiers themselves, moreover, bought or foraged for their own food, built their own fires, and did their own cooking, again along with their *suskenoi*.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>13</sup> Note the parallel construction *hōs pleistoī men hēmōn . . . hōs elachistoi de* (ὥς πλεῖστοι μὲν ἡμῶν . . . ὥς ἐλάχιστοι δὲ), as well as the use of verbs (ῶσιν . . . σκευοφορῶσι) to indicate functions undertaken by soldiers rather than nouns to delineate two groups of different status. Xenophon is manifestly *not* saying "let us have as many soldiers as possible, and as few servants as possible."

<sup>14</sup> See Chapter [Nine](#) for more on the transport of casualties.

<sup>15</sup> *An.* 3.4.32–3.

<sup>16</sup> *An.* 4.5.12–14, 4.5.22.

<sup>17</sup> *Hell.* 4.5.14.

<sup>18</sup> Gathering fuel: *An.* 2.4.10–11, 4.3.11, 4.5.5–6; splitting wood: 1.5.12–13, 4.4.12.

<sup>19</sup> *An.* 1.5.12.

<sup>20</sup> Buying food: e.g. *An.* 1.5.6–7; foraging: e.g. 3.4.18; building fires: 4.4.12–13, 4.5.5–6, 6.3.20–1; cooking: 3.5.7, 3.5.14. See Chapter [Eight](#) for more on these activities.



In sum, we find the Cyreans themselves, not slaves or servants, repeatedly performing every sort of task stereotypically considered the responsibility of hoplite attendants. Those who assume that the mercenaries possessed large numbers of attendants, therefore, will have to explain exactly what such attendants were doing, if not taking care of their masters' daily needs.

#### INEFFECTIVES, PACK ANIMALS, CAPTIVES

While Xenophon never mentions *skeuophoroi* serving with the Cyreans, he does employ three terms – *ochlos* (literally a “crowd” or “throng”), *skeuophora* (“pack animals”), and *andrapoda* (literally “man-footed creatures,” signifying captives) – that have been used to argue for the presence in the army of large numbers of non-combatant followers including soldiers' attendants. A closer look, however, reveals differently.

Thucydides gave *ochlos* a bad name. Thanks to him, the term carries political connotations of vulgar “mob” and “undisciplined mass” which are difficult to escape. Xenophon too sometimes uses the word negatively. Describing the return from exile in 407 BC of the notorious Athenian politician Alcibiades, for example, he comments that “the common crowd (*ochlos*) from Piraeus and from the city gathered by the ships, being amazed and wanting to see *the* Alcibiades.”<sup>21</sup> In the *Anabasis*, though, Xenophon uses *ochlos* more neutrally, to refer to all personnel not formed up and ready to fight. The *ochlos* could include wounded and sick men and those carrying or assisting them, soldiers transporting arms or equipment, personal attendants, prisoners, and other non-combatants. It apparently did not include pack animals and the soldiers leading them, judging from Xenophon's recommendation before the start of the retreat up the Tigris that the army march in hollow rectangle (*plaision*) formation, “in order that the pack animals and the large *ochlos* may be in a safer location.”<sup>22</sup> Xenophon repeatedly uses the formulation “pack animals and non-combatants” to designate all elements of the army out of ranks and unable to fight.<sup>23</sup>

At times, even soldiers could become part of the *ochlos*. For instance, as Tissaphernes pursued the mercenaries into the Tigris foothills, his light troops bested their Cyrean opposites and drove them within the protective

<sup>21</sup> *Hell.* 1.4.13; cf. 3.4.8.

<sup>22</sup> *An.* 3.2.36; cf. *Thuc.* 7.78.2 for a similar distinction between animals and *ochlos*.

<sup>23</sup> Pack animals (*hupozeugia* or *skeuophora*) and non-combatants: *An.* 3.3.6, 4.3.15, 4.3.26. Since all these episodes occurred after the Cyreans destroyed their wagons (3.3.1), both *skeuophora* and *hupozeugia* must be pack animals, not animals yoked to wagons, *pace* Hammond (1982). One passage (4.3.27) displays *ochlos* alone; cf. *Hell.* 6.2.23 for a similar usage.

square of hoplites, “so that for the entire day both slingers and archers were altogether useless, being mingled with the rest of the *ochlos*.”<sup>24</sup> At one point, Xenophon describes the whole army as an *ochlos*, meaning it was entirely disordered, out of ranks, and combat-ineffective. This was at Byzantium in late 400 BC, when the Spartan admiral Anaxibius tried to eject the mercenaries from the city. Desperate to get back inside, the Cyreans hammered at the gates and attempted to climb the walls, until a few of their comrades who happened to be within cut through the bars securing the gates, letting in a flood of soldiers. When Xenophon saw what was happening, “fearing that the army might turn itself to plundering and that irreparable evils might fall upon the city, upon himself, and upon the soldiers, he ran and rushed in through the gates along with the disordered mass (*ochlos*).”<sup>25</sup>

Certainly there were some slave attendants within the *ochlos*, but they were by no means the majority, nor perhaps even one of its larger constituent groups. Indeed, if attendants were supposed to carry baggage or control pack animals, they should have been found along with the *skeuophora*. Yet we have already seen that most Cyreans carried their own equipment and led their own transport. Xenophon’s use of *ochlos* therefore cannot be considered good evidence for the presence of large numbers of attendants in the army.

The meaning of *skeuophora* in the *Anabasis* seems plain: “pack animals,” including donkeys, mules, horses, and oxen.<sup>26</sup> Thus, for example, when at Tarsus the troops of Xenias and Pasion switched their allegiance to Clearchus, “they took along their arms and their *skeuophora*.”<sup>27</sup> *Skeuophora* and *skeuophoroi* are not the same thing. The former, a neuter plural, refers to animals; the latter, a masculine plural, to baggage-carrying people.<sup>28</sup> Yet it remains essential to distinguish clearly the two terms, particularly since their dative plural forms (*tois skeuophorois*) are identical.

Xenophon uses this dative form twice in recounting events during the battle of Cunaxa. Context makes clear that he means animals, not human porters. While the mercenaries pushed forward against Artaxerxes’ left wing, the Great King’s forces broke Cyrus’ left and pursued the rebel remnants back to their camp. There the Persians ran headlong into “those Greeks who happened to be amongst the baggage animals (*en tois skeuophorois*); being armed, and having formed themselves up against [the Persians] they killed

<sup>24</sup> *An.* 3.4.26.      <sup>25</sup> *An.* 7.1.16–18, Roisman (1988); cf. *Hell.* 4.4.11.

<sup>26</sup> *An.* 3.3.19, 5.8.6; cf. *Oec.* 18.4.      <sup>27</sup> *An.* 1.3.7, cf. 6.5.1.

<sup>28</sup> *LSJ* s.v. *skeuophoros*, -on: “carrying baggage”; *hoi skeuophoroi*: “camp-followers, baggage-carriers, porters”; *ta skeuophora*: “beasts of burden.”

many of the plunderers.”<sup>29</sup> Moments later, the Cyreans, who had routed Artaxerxes’ right, broke off their pursuit when news arrived that “the King and his army were amongst the baggage animals (*en tois skeuophoroi*).”<sup>30</sup> Were these two passages examined in isolation, the ambiguity of the noun form might make it possible to argue that Xenophon meant to describe human porters, not pack animals, in the Cyrean camp. On this reading, the armed Greeks the Persians encountered would have to have been troops held in reserve alongside the porters.<sup>31</sup> Since, however, we have seen that the Cyreans themselves normally carried their own equipment and led their pack animals, there exists a better interpretation: the armed Greeks in the camp were mercenaries. Like the mule-driving soldier who accused Xenophon at Cotyora, and like the men of the rearguard at the Centrites crossing, they had been selected by their comrades to remain out of ranks and look after valuable equipment.<sup>32</sup>

One might argue that *skeuophora* represents a generic category, “baggage-carrying entities,” rather than animals specifically.<sup>33</sup> Xenophon, however, tends to employ his technical terms precisely.<sup>34</sup> When he wanted to talk about human porters, he wrote *skeuophoroi*, as he does several times in *Cyropaedia*. When he meant pack animals, he wrote *skeuophora*, in both *Cyropaedia* and *Anabasis*.<sup>35</sup> Xenophon does not use *skeuophoroi* in the *Anabasis*, and his use of *skeuophora* in that text must therefore refer to animals, not human carriers.

Finally, there are the *andrapoda*. Pritchett notes that the term *andrapodon* “in military contexts . . . may indicate all human beings taken captive, in other words those destined for slavery by their captors, regardless of their former status, whether free or slave.”<sup>36</sup> Although often translated “slaves,” *andrapoda* therefore is better rendered as “captives.” This is the sense in which Xenophon usually deploys the word in the *Anabasis*. In most cases, *andrapoda* are clearly captives acquired in the course of the march.<sup>37</sup> Especially in the latter part of the campaign, on the Euxine coast and in Thrace, the Cyreans generally sold their *andrapoda* soon after acquiring

<sup>29</sup> *An.* 1.10.3; cf. the translation of Dillery (2001): “some Greeks who had chanced to be standing guard amid the baggage train . . . forming themselves into line against the enemy, had killed many of the plunderers.”

<sup>30</sup> *An.* 1.10.5. <sup>31</sup> For reserves of this sort cf. Thuc. 2.79.5, 6.67.1.

<sup>32</sup> Compare Thucydides’ account (5.72.3) of the battle of Mantinea in 418 BC, where older Spartans remained in camp for exactly the same reason.

<sup>33</sup> Hammond (1982) 31. <sup>34</sup> Higgins (1977) 8.

<sup>35</sup> *Skeuophoroi*: e.g. *Cyr.* 3.40–1, 6.2.35, 6.3.8, 6.3.29, cf. Gautier (1911) 150–1; *skeuophora*: *Cyr.* 6.3.3–4, *An.* 1.3.7.

<sup>36</sup> Pritchett (1991) 170; cf. Ducrey (1968) 23–6.

<sup>37</sup> *An.* 1.2.27, 2.4.27, 6.3.3, 6.6.38, 7.3.48, 7.6.26–8, 7.7.53, 7.8.19.

them. Most of the time, Xenophon assimilates *andrapoda* into the *ochlos* after first mentioning their capture. Only once does he explicitly distinguish “captives” from the other “non-combatants” attached to the army. At Calpe, the generals ordered part of the army under Neon to remain in camp in order to guard “the *ochlos* and the *andrapoda*” while the remaining troops marched out to recover their unburied dead.<sup>38</sup>

Two episodes where *andrapoda* might at first glance be taken for soldiers’ servants appear differently upon closer scrutiny. First, Xenophon relates that a number of captives and pack animals were lost in the Armenian blizzard.<sup>39</sup> The juxtaposition of *andrapoda* and *hupozeugia* here might seem to imply that both were engaged in the same task, that of carrying baggage. It is impossible, however, to extract from this episode definite evidence for the presence of numerous attendants in the army. Rather, the *andrapoda* here are more likely to have been Persian prisoners, a number of whom the Cyreans had captured in the days preceding the blizzard.<sup>40</sup> Second, during their long sojourn at Calpe, the Cyreans made a series of foraging expeditions, using baggage animals and *andrapoda* to carry back to camp the abundant provisions they gathered.<sup>41</sup> The *andrapoda* in this passage certainly functioned as porters. Still, investigation reveals no other attested instances in Greek literature where *andrapodon* signifies a soldier’s servant. It seems plausible to conclude instead that the Cyreans’ use of *andrapoda* on these expeditions resulted from the richness of the land. With so much of everything good to carry off, one might say, extra hands were needed. Probably the troops could temporarily employ captives as porters here because the land was rich in humans as well as crops. Indeed, the locals took special pains to remove their slaves from the neighborhood of Calpe in an attempt, apparently unsuccessful, to keep them out of Cyrean hands.<sup>42</sup>

Xenophon, then, provides abundant evidence that the Cyreans themselves performed all the functions that were delegated to slave servants in the Athenian and Spartan armies. As well, he uses the terms *ochlos*, *skeuophora*, and *andrapoda* manifestly to refer to groups that either included few or no attendants, or that were at most only temporarily deployed as porters before being sold for profit. There are, then, no solid grounds for the prevailing assumption that the Cyreans possessed large numbers of slave attendants from the outset of the campaign. The Cyreans, thus, not only

<sup>38</sup> *An.* 6.5.3; cf. Stronk (1995) 105.

<sup>39</sup> *An.* 4.5.4.

<sup>40</sup> *An.* 4.4.16–17, 4.4.21–2.

<sup>41</sup> *An.* 6.6.1.

<sup>42</sup> *An.* 6.6.1.

fought their way out of the Persian empire, but also cooked, cleaned, and cared for themselves while doing so. Little wonder that they wanted to sail home stretched out on their backs like Odysseus. Leon of Thurii was not exaggerating when he said that he had taken his fill of the soldier's toils.

#### ATTENDANTS AND THE *SUSKENIA*

That there were some slaves accompanying the Cyreans is implicit in Xenophon's brief mention that just after the seizure of the generals, Persian horsemen "rode about the plain and killed every Greek they happened upon, whether slave or free."<sup>43</sup> Most personal slaves or servants probably belonged to officers. Xenophon, for example, enjoyed the services of several attendants, including a *hupaspistēs* ("shield-bearer") who absconded at a critical moment in Carduchia.<sup>44</sup> As Xenophon's troops descended from a hill they had just captured, a fierce Carduchian counterattack hit them. Separated from his men, and abandoned by his shield-bearer, Xenophon survived thanks to the hoplite Eurylochus of Lusi, who ran forward to protect the Athenian. Xenophon does not relate the ultimate fate of his *hupaspistēs* but given that the Cyreans were at the time surrounded by implacably hostile natives the shield-bearer may have fled only momentarily. Indeed, he might well have preferred punishment from Xenophon to certain death at Carduchian hands. At any rate, when Xenophon a year later decided to leave the Cyreans and make his way home alone, he was embarrassed to admit that he had only a single slave and a little money for traveling expenses.<sup>45</sup> The implication is that as a general he should possess multiple attendants, as Clearchus certainly did.<sup>46</sup> The other generals too probably had at least a servant apiece. Some *lochagoi* as well may have been wealthy enough to maintain a personal attendant.

For most ordinary soldiers, a *skeuophoros* was a luxury. True, a number of hoplites might have been able to afford personal attendants. Such a batman might make for easier campaign life, but also brought liabilities. A hoplite with an attendant might find himself pressured to share the slave with his *suskenia* or be cut out of group life. If his attendant ran off with his equipment, he was in trouble. There may also have been instances where a *suskenia* pooled its money to purchase a slave for group use before the start of the campaign. Byzantine military writers, in fact, would later

<sup>43</sup> *An.* 2.5.32; cf. van Wees (2004) 69.

<sup>44</sup> *An.* 4.2.20–1; for officers and shield-bearers cf. *Hell.* 4.8.39, Diod. 15.87.6.

<sup>45</sup> *An.* 7.3.20. <sup>46</sup> *An.* 2.1.9.

recommend a similar arrangement for troops too poor to afford individual servants.<sup>47</sup> Unless the ratio of slaves to soldiers was quite high, though, such attendants could only supplement, rather than replace, the soldier labor needed to keep a *suskenia* going. At least with more eyes to watch him, a suskenic slave could be kept under tighter control.

While slaves were probably not rarities, their relatively small presence in the army tended to strengthen the importance and intensity of suskenic ties. Without slaves to rely on for the performance of daily tasks, the Cyreans had to depend that much more on each other. Furthermore, the paucity of attendants made soldiers' groups more homogeneous, and rendered soldiers willing to undertake tasks, such as leading mules or carrying the wounded, which in mainland Greece might have been derided as banausic or servile. Mercenaries who did possess an attendant probably would not have considered the slaves their *suskenoi*. They would, though, likely have recognized such slaves as the valuable instruments they were, and perhaps have gone to some lengths to protect them. The relationship between masters and slaves must have varied widely depending on individual temperaments and situations. Some Cyreans who had slaves may have trusted and cared for them well. Others might have abused, abandoned, or sold them along the way. That Xenophon's shield-bearer deserted him in Carduchia does not tell us too much about the normal relation between soldier and slave attendant, for many of Xenophon's own men were at that moment running away in disorder themselves.

According to Thucydides, the attendants accompanying Athens' hoplites in Sicily during 415–413 had deserted all throughout the campaign, suggesting that under the right conditions, if a slave found a chance for freedom, he would take it.<sup>48</sup> The particular circumstances of the Cyreans, however, might have decreased the chances of slave attendant desertion. After Cunaxa especially, with the army marching through hostile and utterly unfamiliar territory, surrounded by natives who would not discriminate between free soldier and escaped attendant, a slave, even one with an abusive master, might prefer to remain where he was, in essence choosing the evil he knew over the complete uncertainty and danger of fleeing alone into the mountains.<sup>49</sup> Indeed, the shared danger might well contribute to heightened mutual solidarity between master and slave.<sup>50</sup>

<sup>47</sup> As van Wees (2001) demonstrates, not every man who could afford hoplite equipment could also afford a servant. For Byzantine practice see Maurice, *Strategikon* 1.2.11 and George (1984) 14.

<sup>48</sup> Thuc. 7.74.5. <sup>49</sup> For this attitude amongst slave attendants see van Wees (2004) 69–70.

<sup>50</sup> On master–slave solidarity cf. Garland (1988) 173.

## CAPTIVES AND COMPANIONS

Although most Cyreans did not possess personal attendants at the outset, many must have wanted them. The thirty kilograms or so of equipment and supplies each hoplite carried was no easy burden, after all. Pack animals and carts made things easier for some, but as we have seen, not everyone had access to such transport assets.<sup>51</sup> While men without transport might relish the fantasy of letting discredited officers or enemy captives lug the baggage, having an attendant was by no means an unqualified advantage.<sup>52</sup> For one thing, servants had to be fed properly if they were going to carry sizeable loads for long distances. That required extra money for food or extra time spent foraging, both of which meant headaches for soldiers who from the start of the campaign were often short of cash and provisions. Furthermore, there was always the risk that an enslaved porter might run off, taking with him irreplaceable equipment. Troopers willing to cope with these drawbacks faced a final obstacle: there were few opportunities to take captives on the way to Cunaxa. Except for Lycaonia, the army traversed territory that Cyrus either owned or wanted to keep friendly, and sparsely populated Lycaonia could not have offered much in the way of human plunder.<sup>53</sup> True, Menon's contingent did sack Tarsus, apparently taking slaves in the process, but Cyrus made a point of ordering these returned.<sup>54</sup> After Cunaxa as well, there was little room for slaving as long as the truce with Tissaphernes lasted.

Matters were different following the seizure of the generals. If the soldiers had once feared to ravage the countryside lest they antagonize the Persians, they now began to see the people and property of Mesopotamia as theirs for the taking.<sup>55</sup> Xenophon himself, his exhortations to dump excess baggage notwithstanding, glorified the enslaving of captives as the prerogative of victors.<sup>56</sup> Even allowing for Xenophon's panhellenist big-talk, the shift in attitude rings true.<sup>57</sup> There were going to be no further negotiations, so the Cyreans had nothing to lose and much to gain from plundering. While some captives probably saw service as porters during this period, obtaining *skeuophoroi* was probably not the soldiers' priority. Rather, thoughts of slave markets ahead must have danced in their minds. With Cyrus dead, the mercenaries were never going to see the pay and bonuses he had promised them from the coffers of Babylon. Taking slaves

<sup>51</sup> For more on equipment, pack animals, and carts, see Chapter Five.

<sup>52</sup> *An.* 3.1.30, 3.2.28.

<sup>53</sup> *An.* 1.2.19.

<sup>54</sup> *An.* 1.2.27.

<sup>55</sup> *An.* 3.2.20–1.

<sup>56</sup> *An.* 3.1.19, 3.2.28, 3.3.39.

<sup>57</sup> On panhellenist big-talk see Dillery (1995) 61.

and property, therefore, represented to the soldiers a last resort for turning a profit from the expedition.

As the army moved north up the fertile and settled Tigris valley, then, the soldiers began accumulating substantial numbers of human captives, along with livestock and other loot. Sometimes the inhabitants of settlements in their path fled, but more often they were not so lucky.<sup>58</sup> Over the next few weeks, the captives and animals grew into a substantial crowd (*ochlos*).<sup>59</sup> Xenophon, having persuaded the Cyreans to jettison their tents and wagons, had intended a swift and mobile army. The soldiers, though, were paying more attention to his rhetoric of plunder.

As long as the army traveled the plains and low foothills of the Tigris valley, this mass of captives and animals was not an insuperable difficulty, for the hoplites could march in hollow square (*plaision*), protecting the *skeuophora* and *ochlos* within.<sup>60</sup> In rugged Carduchia, though, Mesopotamia's prizes presented major difficulties. During the first day of their passage through the mountains, the generals and *lochagoi* realized that something had to be done about the captives and animals the soldiers had taken. Aside from slowing the march and distracting troops from combat, they represented just too many mouths to feed. The next morning, the officers decreed that only the fittest, most necessary pack transport could stay. The rest, humans and livestock, would have to go.<sup>61</sup>

As the army ate breakfast and formed up for the second day's march, the generals stationed themselves in a narrow place, through which the troops had to pass. Each unit was inspected as it filed by for excess animals and captives. These were removed, Xenophon reports, without fuss, "except where a man hid something, for example if he desired [to hang on to] a good-looking boy or woman."<sup>62</sup> After this the army continued on its way, sometimes fighting, sometimes resting, for the remainder of the day.

<sup>58</sup> *An.* 3.4-9, 3.5.14.

<sup>59</sup> The first appearance of *ochlos* (*An.* 3.2.26) actually comes before the army burns its excess baggage (3.3.1) and before specific mention of captives. This is better interpreted as confusion and telescoping of events by Xenophon (perhaps deliberate, if he wanted to claim credit for creating the hollow *plaision* formation at the outset of the fighting retreat) rather than as evidence for many non-combatants in the army before the seizure of the generals. Descriptions of the army before and at Cunaxa (1.7.10, 1.10.1), and from Cunaxa until the Greater Zapatas (1.10.18, 2.2.4-5), tellingly, make no reference to *ochlos*.

<sup>60</sup> For *plaision* formation, see Chapter Six.

<sup>61</sup> *An.* 4.1.10-13; as Lendle (1995) 194 notes, Xenophon's remark (4.1.13) that the army at this point required twice the provisions need not be taken literally.

<sup>62</sup> *An.* 4.1.14-15.



Xenophon does not say how many beautiful boys and women escaped this inspection. Regardless of the exact numbers involved, the episode signals a marked change in the Cyrean attitude towards captives. In the weeks following the massacre of the generals, they had begun plundering enthusiastically with the goal of selling prisoners for profit. Now, however, soldiers were choosing to retain male and female captives for themselves.<sup>63</sup> Indeed, those who chose to flout the scrutiny willfully disobeyed their superior officers to do so. They may even have had the assistance of comrades, for it would have been easier for a man to smuggle someone past the generals with the complicity of his *lochitai* and *suskenoi*. The ferocious Carduchian resistance, the lack of provisions, and the difficult terrain, moreover, already sign-posted the arduous trek ahead. A soldier who persisted in retaining a captive under these conditions was almost certainly not looking to future profit, or even for a slave porter. Instead, he was assuming an individual responsibility to protect and feed someone whom it would have been more practical and convenient to leave behind. The boys and women who eluded the scrutiny in Carduchia, therefore, may have begun their life in the army as “spear-won” captives, but they had now become soldiers’ companions.<sup>64</sup>

#### MALE COMPANIONS

The male companions seem for the most part to have been the type of adolescents “just coming into the bloom of youth” that Greek *paiderastai* preferred.<sup>65</sup> How many male companions remained with the army for the duration of the campaign is uncertain, though it might perhaps be more appropriate to think in terms of many dozens rather than hundreds. The shared trials of the march to the sea evidently created affective bonds between the young captives and their *erastai*. For example, a number of them were allowed to participate in the athletic events held to celebrate the arrival at Trapezus. As Xenophon notes, many of the participants in the stadium race were “spear-won” *paides*.<sup>66</sup> Further evidence for the ties between soldiers and their male companions appeared at Trapezus. Tired of waiting for Cheirisophus to return with ships enough to transport the entire force, the Cyreans embarked upon their available vessels sick, injured, and older soldiers, along with “their boys (*paidas*) and women, and whatever

<sup>63</sup> Note the emphasis on individual desire (*epithumēsas*) in *An.* 4.1.14.

<sup>64</sup> For the term “spear-won” see Pritchett (1991) 169.

<sup>65</sup> *An.* 4.6.1–3, 7.4.7; cf. Dover (1989) 79–81, Reinsberg (1993) 163, Halperin (2003) 721–3.

<sup>66</sup> *An.* 4.8.27.

equipment they did not immediately require.”<sup>67</sup> The inclusion of boys with wounded and older soldiers suggests that male captives, however they first joined the army, were now in some way considered part of it. Soldiers put their injured and sick aboard ship because they cared for them and wanted them safe; they evidently felt likewise for their boys.

Several Cyreans procured young male companions after the scrutiny in Carduchia. For example, upon the army’s departure from the underground villages in Armenia, Xenophon handed over a boy just coming into the prime of youth to Pleisthenes of Amphipolis, with orders to keep him as a hostage.<sup>68</sup> The boy’s father, chief of the village where Xenophon had quartered, had agreed to act as a guide for the army, and the Athenian wanted insurance against the man’s desertion. As it happened, the chief was unable to lead the Cyreans to shelter and provisions. An angry Cheirisophus struck him, but then neglected to tie him up or guard him, so that the chief escaped during the night, leaving behind his son. As an aside to his comment that this incident was the sole cause of conflict between himself and Cheirisophus during the campaign, Xenophon notes that “Pleisthenes became a lover of the boy, and taking him homeward found him most trustworthy.”<sup>69</sup>

Similarly, the Olynthian Episthenes, whom Xenophon knew particularly as a *paiderastēs*, took considerable risks to save a handsome boy and keep him as a companion. This was during winter 400–399, when the Cyreans had taken service under Seuthes in Thrace and were in the process of massacring the inhabitants of several Thynian villages. Episthenes, seeing<sup>70</sup>

a beautiful boy, just in the bloom of youth and holding a peltast shield, about to be killed, ran forth to Xenophon and entreated him to bring aid to the beautiful boy. So Xenophon himself approached Seuthes and asked him not to kill the boy, and explained Episthenes’ feelings. . . . Seuthes asked, “Would you be willing, Episthenes, to die in his place?” [Episthenes] offered his throat and replied, “strike, if the boy commands you and will be grateful.” Seuthes asked the boy if he should kill Episthenes in his place. The boy would not allow it, but entreated that he kill neither of them. Thereupon Episthenes, embracing the boy, said: “It is time for you, Seuthes, to fight it out with me over this one, for I shall not let him go.” And Seuthes, laughing, allowed [the boy to live].

<sup>67</sup> *An.* 5.3.1. Lang (1992) 74–5 improbably construes *paidas* here as children conceived and born during the march; cf. Hutchinson (2000) 58, Dillery (2001) 399. Xenophon, however, consistently uses *paides* to mean soldiers’ adolescent companions; cf. 1.4.9, where it is certainly Xenias’ and Pasion’s children (*tekna*) who are meant.

<sup>68</sup> *An.* 4.6.1–3.

<sup>69</sup> *An.* 4.6.3. One wonders if Xenophon, on his way back from Greece with Agesilaus in 394, found time to stop at Amphipolis for a visit with Pleisthenes and his Armenian companion.

<sup>70</sup> *An.* 7.4.7–11; cf. Dover (1989) 51–4.

The experiences of Pleisthenes and Episthenes make charming stories, at least the way Xenophon tells them.<sup>71</sup> Indeed, his narrative makes it easy to forget that the boys both men acquired were not Greek. While their foreignness does not seem to have bothered the soldiers, it bears remembering that neither of the boys had much of a choice in accepting the affections of their *erastai*.<sup>72</sup>

If some youths unwillingly became soldiers' companions, others may have found something appealing or adventurous about the Cyreans. For the Armenian chief's son or for the young Thynian, the army's march into their native lands must have been the kind of exciting event that far surpassed anything else that had ever happened in their remote corners of the world. Perhaps given the choice they would have stayed home with their own people. But they did not have a choice. The Armenian had been left behind by his father. He was in unfamiliar territory and may not have known the route home. Given this, he apparently preferred the relative security of staying with a Cyrean who seemed fond of him over the uncertainty of trying to make his way back to his own village. The Thynian had even fewer options. He was either going to die or accept Episthenes' affections, and he did not want to die.

Boys whom the Cyreans acquired most likely were in some fashion included in soldiers' groups of comrades. Probably they marched, ate, and slept with "their" soldier and his *suskenoi*. If they were trusted, they might become helpers in the daily tasks of a *suskenia*, as well as sexual partners for the men who acquired them.<sup>73</sup> Over time, such youths could come to be seen as valued members of a group, perhaps even to the point of being provided weapons. Male companions, however, might also become sources of conflict between soldiers, as the dispute at Cotyora between Xenophon and the mule-driving soldier suggests. Accused of unjustly striking this trooper, Xenophon began his rebuttal with these words:<sup>74</sup>

"So tell us," he said, "for what reason were you struck. Did I ask you for something and strike you when you did not give it to me? Or did I ask for something back? Or maybe I was fighting [with you] over a favorite boy? Or was I drunk?"

<sup>71</sup> Variant manuscript readings for the names of these soldiers in *An.* 4.6.1–3 and 7.4.8 led Stronk (1995) 226–8 to identify the two as the same man. If Pleisthenes/Episthenes had already picked up a faithful companion in Armenia, however, it seems unlikely he would have gone out of his way in Thynia to acquire another. Masqueray (1931) 146 is more on the mark in suggesting that the similarity of the two men's names and the proximity of their hometowns confused Xenophon or a later copyist.

<sup>72</sup> Notably, Xenophon castigates Menon for having an older barbarian as an *erastēs* (*An.* 2.6.28–9), but approvingly narrates Greek liaisons with younger barbarians; cf. Lane Fox (2004b) 197–9.

<sup>73</sup> For this process cf. Demos (1994) 33–6. <sup>74</sup> *An.* 5.8.4.

While drunkenness and fights over property are the common currency of soldiers across the ages, disputes over boy favorites are not, and it is noteworthy that Xenophon mentions them as merely another item in a list of common altercations. Xenophon does not seem to be describing fights over newly captured *andrapoda*, for the word he uses in this passage is *paidika*, a common term for a boy-toy or favorite.<sup>75</sup> Rather, he appears to be talking about boys brought into a *suskenia* as companions of one *suskenos* or another. Whether fights over these boys occurred amongst *suskenoi*, or between men belonging to different *suskeniai* Xenophon does not specify. His casual mention of such disputes, however, perhaps indicates how common they were.

#### FEMALE COMPANIONS

Most of the women accompanying the army were initially captured on the Mesopotamian plain; “the beautiful and tall women and girls of the Medes and Persians,” Xenophon calls them.<sup>76</sup> As with male companions, the Cyreans first seized female captives as *andrapoda*, to be sold as slaves or exploited as sexual objects. The scrutiny in Carduchia, however, marked the start of a new relationship between the troops and their women; no longer simply captives, the women now became companions attached to individual soldiers.<sup>77</sup>

The week-long slog through the mountains that followed the scrutiny only intensified this new relationship. The soldiers, on the one hand, had contravened orders to smuggle their favorites. The captives, on the other, realized that their captors had saved them from death at Carduchian hands.<sup>78</sup> The women were lowlanders; they had no more in common with the mountaineers than did the Cyreans.<sup>79</sup> Indeed, soldiers and women now shared the goal of escape and survival. They may well have become physically reliant on each other, men and women huddling together in the pouring winter rain or in cramped Carduchian hovels. If they had not already been doing so in Mesopotamia, women may now have begun assisting in the performance of daily suskenic chores: foraging for food and firewood, cooking, and looking after the sick and injured.

<sup>75</sup> For *paidika* see *LSJ* s.v. *paideuma* III.2. <sup>76</sup> *An.* 3.2.25.

<sup>77</sup> This section expands on arguments presented in Lee (2004b).

<sup>78</sup> On the fate of the captives abandoned in Carduchia see Lendle (1995) 195.

<sup>79</sup> Lane Fox (2004b) 200 is mistaken in claiming these women were “local girls, acquired by the troops on their approach to the [Centrites] river,” for Xenophon specifies (*An.* 4.1.8) that the Carduchians and their families fled at the Cyrean approach.

For seven days the mercenaries struggled through Carduchia, during which time, Xenophon relates, “they were continually fighting, and suffered evils such as they never had from the Great King and Tissaphernes together.”<sup>80</sup> The final test came at the Centrites River, which separated Carduchia from neighboring Armenia. Threatened not only by the pursuing Carduchians, but also by the cavalry and infantry of the Armenian satrap Orontas on the opposite bank of the river, the mercenaries nonetheless managed to find an unguarded ford and to plan a surprise crossing. The army split into halves, with non-combatants safely between them. As the Cyrean advance guard moved for the ford and the battle commenced, Xenophon remembers,<sup>81</sup>

the diviners were sacrificing to the river and the enemy was shooting arrows and slinging but not yet hitting; and when the pre-battle sacrifices turned out right, all the soldiers chanted the paean and raised a war-cry. Thereupon the women all raised a loud cry together with them; for there were many *hetairai* in the army.

The Centrites, the final military obstacle on the way out of Carduchia, was also where the army’s women underwent a decisive step in their transformation from passive captives to active participants and companions (*hetairai*). The women, realizing their personal stake in a successful crossing, openly and vocally took sides with the soldiers. In fact, the relationships between soldiers and women were now so strong that, while the crossing was under way, some of Xenophon’s rear guard broke ranks to look after their *hetairai*.<sup>82</sup>

In the three months between the Centrites crossing in late October 401 and the arrival at Trapezus in January 400, the constant, prolonged, and above all shared dangers of the march could only have reinforced the bonds forged in Carduchia between the mercenaries and their women companions. As a matter of survival, soldiers and women would have had to communicate, and living together day and night must have fostered their fluency in each others’ languages.<sup>83</sup> Nor did any influx of new captives attenuate these ties. The soldiers may have acquired a smattering of additional

<sup>80</sup> *An.* 4.3.2.

<sup>81</sup> *An.* 4.3.18–19.

<sup>82</sup> While most manuscripts here (*An.* 4.3.30) read *hetairōn* (ἑταίρων) or female companions, some give the masculine *hetairōn* (ἑταίρων); cf. 4.8.27. For more on Xenophon’s portrayal of Cyrean *hetairai*, see Lee (2004b) 154–5.

<sup>83</sup> Although Xenophon never learned Persian, other Cyreans spoke Persian and other non-Greek tongues; see *An.* 4.5.10, 4.8.4 and Mosley (1971). Some of the Ionian garrison troops may have picked up Persian during their dealings with imperial officials. One also wonders about Cyrus’ Milesian concubine (1.10.3), who probably spoke considerable Persian in addition to her native Greek. The Milesian is never mentioned after her rescue at Cunaxa, but if she remained with the army, she could have acted as an intermediary between Greek soldiers and Persian women.

women – as we have seen, some boys certainly did join the army during this period – but for the most part the land was sparsely populated and the inhabitants either quick to escape or unwilling to be taken alive.<sup>84</sup>

Now, a soldier who regretted smuggling a woman through the general's scrutiny would have had no difficulty abandoning her anywhere along the way from Carduchia to Trapezus. In fact, it would have made things easier not to have to share what little food there was with a companion. Nevertheless, when the Cyreans reached the sea, the women were still there. Probably they looked on and cheered as the soldiers held athletic games to celebrate the successful journey.<sup>85</sup> Hoping to coast Greeceward along the Black Sea shore, the army then spent a month at Trapezus assembling a flotilla of sailing vessels. Since there was not enough space for everyone, women were embarked on ship along with boys, the sick and injured, and older soldiers. Like the *paides*, the women had become valued members of the Cyrean community.

As the Cyreans proceeded along the Euxine shore, women continued to make their presence felt. The Mossynoecians they befriended, for example, “wanted to have sexual intercourse in public with the *hetairai* whom the Greeks had with them; for that was their custom.”<sup>86</sup> At Cotyora, too, the army's *hetairai* made an impression. Hoping to foster good relations with the neighboring Paphlagonians, the Cyreans invited the ambassadors of the Paphlagonian ruler Corylas to a banquet. Following the meal several groups of soldiers stood up to perform their traditional dances. Corylas' emissaries acted suitably impressed:<sup>87</sup>

The Paphlagonians . . . considered it marvelous that all the dances were under arms. The Mysian [one of the Cyreans], seeing that they were struck by this, persuaded one of the Arcadians who had acquired a dancing-girl (*orchestris*) to bring her in, equipping her as finely as he was able and giving her a light shield. And she danced the Pyrrhic with grace. Thereupon there was much applause, and the Paphlagonians asked whether women also fought alongside them. The Cyreans replied that these very women were the ones who had turned aside the King from their camp. That was how things turned out on that night.

The feast with the Paphlagonians marks the last appearance in the *Anabasis* of women companions. It is a remarkable finale. Consider what the event reveals about the place of women in the army and Cyrean attitudes towards them. To begin with, women were not only present but clearly visible as a group, as the demonstrative “these very women” (*hautai*) implies. It is

<sup>84</sup> *An.* 4.5.9–10, 4.7.13–14.      <sup>85</sup> *An.* 4.8.27; cf. note 81 above.

<sup>86</sup> *An.* 5.4.33, following the text of Masqueray (1931).      <sup>87</sup> *An.* 6.1.11–13.

plausible to conclude that they had come as companions of the officers and men invited to attend the feast. Second, the Cyreans presented their female companions as not only warlike but also masculine. The armed dancers, after all, were no mere spectacle but a subtle display of power aimed at the Paphlagonians: if we move this well with our weapons, the soldiers hinted, imagine how we fight. By including a female dancer and by responding as they did to the ambassadors' query, the Cyreans pushed the message home: look, our women can fight too; they even defeated the Great King.<sup>88</sup>

Even in mainland Greece, it was not unknown for women to perform armed dances such as the Pyrrhic.<sup>89</sup> What was unheard of was for women to fight. Xenophon himself elsewhere claimed that a woman's place was in the house, while men were better suited to endure the physical stresses of war.<sup>90</sup> The Cyrean response to the ambassadors' question, of course, reveals nothing about whether women actually fought. What it does reveal is that the Cyreans were comfortable enough with women in the army, and held them in high enough regard, that they could make a comment of this nature. Xenophon seems to have carried this attitude over into his *Symposium*, where he has Socrates, having observed another dancing-girl, comment that even women can learn courage.<sup>91</sup>

#### NON-COMBATANTS AND THE ARMY

The Cyreans, then, began the campaign possessing few slave attendants or baggage carriers. After Cunaxa, they picked up many captives, a small percentage of whom escaped the scrutiny in Carduchia and thereafter became companions, participants in the social life of the army.<sup>92</sup> The shared hardships of the march fostered affective relationships between soldiers and their male and female companions; they were cared for, protected, and accorded a certain measure of respect even when it would have been easier or more practical to abandon them. In return, male and female companions might contribute to the daily work of a *suskenia*. Even so, the relative paucity of non-soldier non-combatants of any type in the army probably contributed

<sup>88</sup> As Demetrius of Phalerum (*De Elocutione* 131) observed, the Cyrean response either makes their women Amazonian or makes the Great King exceedingly effeminate.

<sup>89</sup> Women and armed dances: Ceccarelli (1998), Wheeler (1982). That the *orchestris* knew the Pyrrhic does not necessarily indicate she was Greek. The Arcadian who acquired her almost certainly did so, as we have seen, after the expedition began. It is not impossible he found time to teach this woman the Pyrrhic during the delay at Cotyora, or elsewhere during the army's slow progress westward from Trapezus.

<sup>90</sup> *Oec.* 7.22–3. <sup>91</sup> *Symp.* 2.8–13.

<sup>92</sup> For more on this process see Lee (2004b); cf. Demos (1994) and Brooks (2002).

to stronger ties between comrades. There were, to put it another way, fewer outsiders to confuse the equation. Soldiers typically had to carry out the everyday chores of life themselves, tasks that in the Athenian or Spartan armies were generally delegated to servile attendants. Because of this, the soldiers were even more conscious of their dependence on their *suskenoi*. If they themselves did not gather and split wood, find food, cook, carry equipment, take care of the wounded, and look after their pack transport, no one else would do these things for them.

Male and female companions attached to a particular *suskenia* also became part of the *lochos* to which their *suskenia* belonged. They, along with attendants and porters, must have normally have marched with or near “their” soldiers.<sup>93</sup> Indeed, it is difficult to imagine where else such personnel would have marched, if not with the soldiers who possessed them. At other times, when enemy forces threatened, all these followers could be coalesced into one group, the *ochlos*, along with wounded soldiers and others carrying equipment or leading mules. The remainder of the army could then surround and protect this group. In open territory, this could be accomplished by enclosing it in *plaision* formation. When crossing a linear barrier such as a range of hills or the Centrites River, the *ochlos* could be screened by soldiers in front and behind.

In camp too, male and female companions remained with the *suskenoi* who possessed them. Judging from Xenophon’s limited evidence, which focuses on the beauty of companions and soldiers’ desire for them, the function of both male and female companions in the Cyrean force may well have been primarily sexual. Probably, however, these companions also contributed to performing the daily logistical chores of each *suskenia*. Individual Cyreans benefited from possessing companions, if only insofar as they provided a venue for sexual pleasure. Disputes between soldiers over boys (and possibly over women) were recognized by Xenophon as in the normal course of events. Such disputes, however common they were, apparently had only limited consequences.

A final point deserves consideration. The Cyreans have sometimes been judged the prototype of a new kind of army, the sort of wandering rootless mercenary force that would become endemic in the late Classical and early Hellenistic worlds.<sup>94</sup> The boys and women who accompanied the Cyreans were pioneers too. The hoplite phalanx of the Classical *polis* had no room for soldiers’ companions. Women in particular were supposed to stay home,

<sup>93</sup> For the marching position of non-combatants and baggage cf. *Cyr.* 6.3.3–4.

<sup>94</sup> Parke (1933), Perlman (1976/7).



safe in the confines of domesticity. Later armies, though, especially from the time of Alexander onward, took their cues elsewhere. By the second century BC, at least in Ptolemaic Egypt, soldiers' families and attendants were formally recognized as being "amongst the baggage," and entitled to legal protection as military dependents.<sup>95</sup> If the Cyreans set the pattern for the new armies of the fourth century and after, they did so in social as well as military terms.

<sup>95</sup> Holleaux (1926).

## CHAPTER II

### *Beyond the battlefield*

In concluding let us return to the triple threads of lived experience, logistics, and community. The blood and violence of combat are more exciting and immediate – probably one reason why the face of battle approach is so popular – but only by examining their campaign in its totality can we fully grasp the Cyreans’ experience. Reconstructing what it might have been like to march in *lochos* column or set up a *suskenia* encampment enables us to imagine the physical and spatial dimensions of ordinary soldiers’ worlds. In doing so we comprehend the range of challenges they endured and the kinds of decisions they had to make. We can see, for example, why men would stay loyal to *lochos* and captain, but also sympathize with the dilemma of the mule driver, forced to choose between carrying a dying stranger and safeguarding irreplaceable supplies and gear. We discover not only the agonizing dangers – stress fractures, gangrene, and hypothermia – but also the mundane tasks – shaving, bathing, going to the latrine – that comprised the army’s life.

Combining the personal angle of vision with an emphasis on supply and feeding offers a visceral handle on Cyrean reality. We prosperous modern urban-dwellers, safe at home, can perform our logistical routines, from turning up the heat to reaching into the refrigerator, almost effortlessly. Understanding the skill and energy it took the mercenaries simply to build a fire highlights how much more difficult mere daily survival was for them. Moreover, a soldier’s-eye view brings human scale to the calculations of grain rations, water consumption, and transport capacities that dominate most studies of military supply. Cyrean logistics was not a matter of thousands of kilos of abstract “rations,” but of a *suskenia* with some handfuls of barley, a basket of foraged vegetables, a few hunks of donkey meat. The army constituted not a single consuming machine, but hundreds of small groups, each making its own logistical decisions: what to carry, where to forage, who was going to fetch water and who was going to set up the tent, when and how to cook.

Understanding the army as a collection of small groups also complicates the old notion of Cyrean community. To be sure, investigating the army's ethnic, age, and socio-economic composition throws new light on its political affairs, especially the Arcadian–Achaean secession and the rivalries amongst generals. Even so, an analysis of *lochos* and *suskenia* reveals that the Cyreans formed not one large imagined community, but a multiplicity of small and distinct societies focused on practicalities rather than politics. Furthermore, although the widespread assumption that the mercenaries possessed numerous slave attendants turns out to be false, it is likely that what slaves there were, along with male and female companions originally taken as captives, had a place in suskenic society and contributed to the army's survival. This is an essential corrective to portraits of the army as a community of nothing but soldiers, and helps remedy longstanding stereotypes of “camp followers” as useless distractions or impediments.<sup>1</sup>

A larger issue emerges from recognizing the centrality of *lochos* and *suskenia*. Those familiar with modern armies may well wonder why the Cyreans' institutional structures and logistical mechanisms were overall so primitive. Why was there no organized unit feeding, no quartermaster corps, no medical service, not to mention no sergeants or platoon leaders, no daytime sentries (at least in the beginning), and so on? As strange as it may seem today, from a classical Greek perspective the mercenaries' situation was hardly unusual. The weakness of state authority and the notion of discipline as a communal affair rather than an officer's prerogative made for rudimentary military institutions throughout Hellas.<sup>2</sup> It is no surprise that the Spartans, who made a virtue of obedience, were considered unique in their time for possessing what we would consider military necessities: formal subunits and officers, centralized baggage trains and supply officers, doctors, and mandatory physical training. Even armies with strong command hierarchies and disciplinary traditions, though, needed a lot of field experience to discover what support mechanisms worked and what did not. If Sparta's armies had not spent so much time in the fifth and fourth centuries marching all over Ionia and Greece, Lacedaemonian logistical competence would likely have been much lower. The vaunted logistics of the Macedonian army, likewise, did not develop overnight. It took two decades of campaigning by Philip to hone the system that enabled Alexander's conquests.

The Cyreans at the outset, in contrast, had no institutional framework, poorly defined command structures, and not much in the way of relevant

<sup>1</sup> On these stereotypes see Hacker (1981) 643–4; cf. Mayer (1996).

<sup>2</sup> State authority: van Wees (2004) 233–5; discipline: van Wees (2004) 108–13, Lendon (2005) 74–7.

experience. The garrison hoplites who constituted almost half the initial force had previously been split in packets up and down the Aegean coast. Accustomed to campaigns of relatively short range and duration, they could expect to return to base after each mission to rest and recuperate. With the markets and services of Ionia's cities readily available, there was little need for these troops to develop support capabilities. The newly recruited mercenaries, arriving as separate contingents from disparate regions, possessed little or no institutional unity at the outset. This was true both at the most basic physical level – no standard tents, for example – as well as at the command level. There was no clear hierarchy amongst the original generals, and aside from Clearchus probably few if any of them had much practice moving large bodies of troops.

As the campaign went on, the mercenaries gained experience and perhaps something more in the way of unified logistical practice. Cyrus probably exercised some control over bivouacking, and certainly the officers learned a lot about traffic control in the six months leading to Cunaxa. Still, the competition amongst generals (think of Xenias and Pasion at Tarsus, or Clearchus and Menon at Charmande), as well as the boundaries between contingents ensured that the development of common procedures proceeded slowly. The necessities of the retreat up the Tigris and across Anatolia probably prompted some degree of greater standardization, but on the Black Sea coast additional efforts to systematize the army's logistics met only limited success; it was just too easy for troops to disobey or circumvent regulations.<sup>3</sup> The generals had limited means for arresting and punishing offenders, and the soldiers sometimes retaliated by throwing stones.<sup>4</sup> The most disgruntled, rather than enduring official control, could always desert. Having a single supreme commander might have helped, but the attempt to appoint one foundered at Calpe in the face of personal rivalries for power.

Ultimately the generals were able to exert some measure of top-down control over foraging, but they never formally regulated the army's *suskeniai*. Here again the Cyreans were hardly atypical. For logistics to work smoothly, orders from above were not enough. Small mess groups like the *suskenia* had to be institutionalized and depersonalized, made parts of the formal military hierarchy. Xenophon recognized this, for he furnishes the ideal army of the *Cyropaedia* with ten-man *dekades* (singular *dekas*) and five-man *pempades* (singular *pempas*), as useful in lining men up for meals as for forming them on the battlefield.<sup>5</sup> In a similar vein, his treatise *The Cavalry Commander*

<sup>3</sup> For circumventing regulations see e.g. *An.* 6.6.5–6.

<sup>4</sup> Throwing stones: *An.* 5.7.28, 6.6.7. <sup>5</sup> *Cyr.* 2.1.22–4, 2.3.21–2.

advocates the formation of ten-man *dekades* within Athens' tribal cavalry regiments.<sup>6</sup> In reality, though, few classical Greek armies outside of Sparta's had anything resembling squad-size formal units.<sup>7</sup> As the fourth century went on the idea diffused slowly beyond Sparta.<sup>8</sup> Notably, among Philip of Macedon's crucial military reforms was to divide his infantry into squads (*dekades* again, although now numbering sixteen men), with regulated equipment and attendants.<sup>9</sup> These became widespread in Hellenistic armies. The Romans, with their flair for organization, took the process to its conclusion by formalizing the tent group (*contubernium*) of eight legionaries as a basic logistical unit with state-issued tents, grain mills, and pack transport.<sup>10</sup>

Studying small-group dynamics amongst the Cyreans helps understand more than just Greek warfare. For instance, the *suskenia* presents an extreme example of the overall importance of small friendship and kinship groups in classical Greece. In a world where formal institutions generally were weak, Greeks everywhere often relied on personal networks for everything from entertainment to loans to political support.<sup>11</sup> Indeed, the model of the *suskenia* offered in this book shares something with popular Greek conceptions of friendship. Classical Greeks considered friends useful and advantageous; they helped friends in the expectation of getting something back, but also (ideally at any rate) because it would be shameful not to.<sup>12</sup> Cyrean *suskeniai*, then, represented just one variation on the many kinds of friendship tie that permeated classical life.

The *suskenia* also provides a fitting counterpoint to the emphasis on the aristocratic *symposion* ("drinking party") that has long dominated studies of commensality, or communal eating and drinking, in ancient Greece.<sup>13</sup> The *symposion*, with its ritualized progression of eating, drinking, discourse, and entertainment, was an event, a place to which people went. When they got too drunk or tired, they could go home. Indeed, the *symposion* was but one of the social loci available to *polis* citizens. An Athenian, for example, could also go to the assembly, the marketplace, or the local hangout of his demesmen; or he could stay home with family and relatives.<sup>14</sup> The *suskenia*, in contrast, was omnipresent in its members' lives. A man might visit friends in other *suskeniai* or *lochoi*, and of course participate in the army assembly,

<sup>6</sup> *Eq. mag.* 2.2–6.      <sup>7</sup> van Wees (2004) 98.

<sup>8</sup> The city of Phliasia in the Peloponnese apparently deployed five-man *pempades* in the 360s BC; see *Hell.* 7.2.6.

<sup>9</sup> Engels (1978) 12, Lloyd (1996) 171–2; cf. *Arr. An.* 7.23.3–4.      <sup>10</sup> Junkelmann (1986) 93–4.

<sup>11</sup> Konstan (1997), especially 57, 60–3, 78–9; cf. Millett (1991) for loans and banking.

<sup>12</sup> Konstan (1997) 53–9.      <sup>13</sup> On the *symposion* see especially Murray (1990).

<sup>14</sup> For deme hangouts and other social loci see Lewis (1995) 435–6.

but that was about it; there was no lasting substitute for *suskenic* ties. Furthermore, the *suskenia*, unlike the *symposion*, was predicated on scarcity. The conditions of the march meant that *suskenoi* were often not just men who ate and drank together, but men who went *without* together. Too, the ritual aspects of Cyrean commensality must often have been minimized, for the tired and hungry have little time for ceremony. Perhaps the major *suskenic* ritual was making fire; again one imagines a *suskenia* huddled close around a pile of half-dry sticks and twigs, shielding against wind or rain as one of its number wrestles with flint and tinder. It was only when they could halt indoors in security, as in Carduchia and in the underground villages of Armenia, that the mercenaries had time to sing, recite poetry, and recount tales of trials passed. In these celebrations we see echoes of the Homeric and Archaic warrior band that lay at the root of the classical *symposion*: by eating together in an egalitarian atmosphere men reinforced and celebrated the group ties necessary for survival.<sup>15</sup>

Some final notes. First, consider this a beginning rather than an end. There is much more to be understood about the Cyreans, for lack of space has prevented me from pursuing several fascinating questions. The relationship between small groups and the army assembly, the ordinary soldier's experience of religion, and the practical workings of traveling markets are just a few of the topics that would repay further investigation. Furthermore, for all the evidence I have been able to gather, some of the conclusions made here about Cyrean behavior must remain plausible reconstructions, not absolute facts. Anyone who has noticed how often the words "possibly," "perhaps," and "may have" show up in the preceding chapters will already be well aware of this. I have no doubt that further research and better comparative data will modify or disprove some of my interpretations. Even so, the picture of the Cyreans presented here solidly reflects the existing evidence. I have stressed the need to read under Xenophon, and I hope it will be considered a mark of my success that probably nobody perusing the *Anabasis* for the first time would think of the mercenaries in the terms presented here. That is simply because Xenophon himself does not foreground the daily rhythms of the army. Instead, they emerge from careful interrogation of his text.

I hope my analysis has demonstrated the value of examining the totality of ancient soldiers' lives, of looking at logistics in terms of small group behaviors rather than mechanical consumption models, and of investigating

<sup>15</sup> On warrior bands see Murray (1983) 259–63, van Wees (1992) 43–8, van Wees (2004) 94–7.

all components of an army, not just its soldiers but also non-combatants. Although the Cyreans' experience was shaped by their particular characteristics and circumstances, these methods may prove helpful in examining other ancient armies and campaigns. The study of battle will always remain an essential part of the history of warfare, but battle alone is no longer enough. We must extend our vision beyond the battlefield.

## *Tables*



Table 1 *Chronology and conditions of the march*

No.	<i>Anabasis</i> reference	From	To	March days ( <i>stathmoi</i> )	March hours (parasangs)	Parasangs per <i>stathmos</i>	Terrain and weather	Halt days	Reason for halt	Approximate modern date	Monthly average temps. (C)	Appr. lat. (N)	Appr. daylight (hours)	Notes
1	1.2.5	Sardis	Maeander	3	2.2	7.33	<road>			Feb 4–6	8–12	38	10:30	
2	1.2.6	Maeander	Colossae	1	8	8.00	<road>			Feb 7				
3	1.2.6	HALT	HALT					7	Menon arrives	Feb 8–14				
4	1.2.7	Colossae	Celaenae	3	2.0	6.67	<road>			Feb 15–17				
5	1.2.7	HALT	HALT					30	Clearchus et al. arrive	Feb 18–Mar 19	4–8			
6	1.2.10	Celaenae	Peltae	2	10	5.00				Mar 20–1			12:00	
7	1.2.10	HALT	HALT					3	Lycæan Games	Mar 22–4				
8	1.2.11	Peltae	Ceramón-Agora	2	12	6.00	<level>			Mar 25–6				
9	1.2.11	Ceramón-Agora	Cajstru-pedion	3	30	10.00	<level>			Mar 27–9				1
10	1.2.11	HALT	HALT					5	Epyaxa arrives	Mar 30–Apr 3	8–12			
11	1.2.13	Cajstru-pedion	Thymbrium	2	10	5.00				Apr 4–5				
12	1.2.14	Thymbrium	Tyriaeum	2	10	5.00				Apr 6–7				
13	1.2.14	HALT	HALT					3	army review	Apr 8–10			13:00	
14	1.2.19	Tyriaeum	Iconium	3	2.0	6.67	<level>			Apr 11–13				
15	1.2.19	HALT	HALT					3	none given	Apr 14–16				
16	1.2.19	Iconium	through Lycæonia	5	30	6.00	hostile			Apr 17–21				
17	1.2.20	Lycæonia	Dana	4	2.5	6.25				Apr 22–5				
18	1.2.20	HALT	HALT					3	none given	Apr 26–8				
19	1.2.21	Dana	Cilician Gates	1	?					Apr 29				2
20	1.2.21–2	crossing Cilician Gates		1	?		pass			Apr 30				3
21	1.2.23	Cilician Gates	Tarsus	4	2.5	6.25	plain			May 1–4	20–24			
22	1.3.1	HALT	HALT					20	army mutinies	May 5–24		37	14:00	4 (cont.)

Table 1 (*cont.*)

No.	<i>Anabasis</i> reference	From	To	March days ( <i>stathmoi</i> )	March hours (parasangs)	Parasangs per <i>stathmos</i>	Terrain and weather	Halt days	Reason for halt	Approximate modern date	Monthly average temps. (C)	Appr. lat. (N)	Appr. daylight (hours)	Notes
23	1.4.1	Tarsus	Parus River	2	10	5.00				May 25–6				
24	1.4.1	Parus River	Pyramus River	1	5	5.00				May 27				
25	1.4.1	Pyramus River	Issus	2	15	7.50				May 28–9				
26	1.4.2	HALT	HALT					3	Cherisophus arrives	May 30–Jun 1	24–8			
27	1.4.4	Issus	Syrian Gates	1	5	5.00	pass			Jun 2				
28	1.4.6	Syrian Gates	Myriandus	1	5	5.00				Jun 3				
29	1.4.7	HALT	HALT					7	Xenias and Pasion desert	Jun 4–10			14:30	
30	1.4.9	Myriandus	Chalus River	4	20	5.00				Jun 11–14				
31	1.4.10	Chalus River	Dardas River	5	30	6.00				Jun 15–19		36		
32	1.4.11	Dardas River	Euphrates/Thapsacus	3	15	5.00				Jun 20–2			14:40	
33	1.4.11	HALT	HALT					5	prosperous city	Jun 23–7				
34	1.4.19	Euphrates/ Thapsacus	Araxes River	9	50	5.56				Jun 28–Jul 6	20–42*		14:30	
35	1.4.19	HALT	HALT					3	provisioning	Jul 7–9				
36	1.5.1	Araxes River	Mascas R./Corsoire	5	35	7.00	desert			Jul 10–14				
37	1.5.4	HALT	HALT					3	provisioning	Jul 15–17				
38	1.5.5	Mascas R./Corsoire	Pylae	13	90	6.92	desert			Jul 18–30		34	14:00	5
39	1.7.1	Pylae	through Babylonia	3	12	4.00				Jul 31–Aug 2	24–42*			
40	1.7.14	Babylonia	(in battle order)	1	3	3.00				Aug 3				
41	1.7.17–20	(in battle order)	(in battle order)	1	?					Aug 4				
42	1.7.20– 1.10.19	battle of Cunaxa		1	ca. 3					Aug 5		33	13:30	
43	2.1.2–2.2.8	HALT	HALT					<1	waiting and negotiating	Aug 6				

44	2.2.8	battlefield	previous camp	<1	ca. 4	night march			
45	2.2.13–18	previous camp	plundered villages	1	?			Aug 7	6
46	2.3.14	plundered villages	palm heart villages	1	?	canals		Aug 8	
47	2.3.17	HALT	HALT				3 provisioning	Aug 9–11	
48	2.4.1	HALT	HALT				20 truce with Tisaphernes	Aug 12–31	
49	2.4.12	palm heart villages	Wall of Media	3	?			Sep 1–3	16–38*
50	2.4.13	Wall of Media	Tigris River/Sitace	2	8	bridges		Sep 4–5	
51	2.4.25	Tigris River/Sitace	Physcus River/Opis	4	20	bridge		Sep 6–9	
52	2.4.27	Physcus River/Opis	Parysatis' villages	6	30	desert		Sep 10–15	
53	2.4.28	Parysatis' villages	[lesser] Zapatas R.	4	20	desert		Sep 16–19	
54	[correction]	[lesser] Zapatas R.	[greater] Zapatas	[4]	[?]			Sep 20–3	7
55	2.5.1–3.3.5	HALT	HALT				3 generals seized	Sep 24–6	
56	3.3.6	[greater] Zapatas	villages	1	25 stades			Sep 27	8
57	3.4.1	HALT	HALT				1 slingers/cavalry organized	Sep 28	
58	3.4.1	villages	Larisa (Nimrud)	1	?			Sep 29	
59	3.4.10	Larisa (Nimrud)	Mespila (Nineveh)	1	6	6.00		Sep 30	
60	3.4.13–18	Mespila (Nineveh)	villages with gut	1	4	4.00		Oct 1	12–30
61	3.4.18	HALT	HALT				1 provisioning	Oct 2	
62	3.4.23–4	villages with gut	basileion/villages	5	?	plain/hills		Oct 3–7	9
63	3.4.31	HALT	HALT				3 wounded/provisioning	Oct 8–10	
64	3.4.32–5	basileion/villages	villages	1	?	hills		Oct 11	10
65	3.4.36	villages	night march	1	60 stades			Oct 12	
66	3.4.37	?	spur	2	?	hills		Oct 13–14	
67	3.5.1	spur	Tigris villages	1	?	plain		Oct 15	8–16
68	3.5.13	Tigris villages	unburned villages	1	?	plain		Oct 16	

(cont.)

Table 1 (*cont.*)

No.	<i>Anabasis</i> reference	From	To	March days ( <i>stathmoi</i> )	March hours (parasangs)	Parasangs per <i>stathmos</i>	Terrain and weather	Halt days	Reason for halt	Approximate modern date	Monthly average temps. (C)	Appr. lat. (N)	Appr. daylight (hours)	Notes
69	4.1.5–11	unburned villages	night march/Carduchia	1	?		mountains			Oct 17				
70	4.1.12–14	Carduchia	Carduchia	1	?		mountains			Oct 18				
71	4.1.15–19	Carduchia	Carduchia	1	?		rain/mist**			Oct 19				
72	4.2.7–22	Carduchia	Carduchia	1	?		mountains			Oct 20				
73	4.3.2	Carduchia	Carduchia	[2]			[mountains]			Oct 21–2				11
74	4.2.24–4.3.1	Carduchia	Centrites River	1	?					Oct 23		38	11:00	
75	4.3.3–8	HALT	HALT					1	despair	Oct 24				
76	4.4.1	Centrites River	sarap's palace	1	5	5.00	level			Oct 25				
77	4.4.3	sarap's palace	Tigris headwaters	2	10	5.00				Oct 26–7				
78	4.4.3	Tigris headwaters	Teleboas River	3	15	5.00				Oct 28–30				
79	4.4.7	Teleboas River	Armenian plain	3	15	5.00	level			Oct 31–Nov 2	0–8			
80	4.4.8–22	HALT	HALT				snow***	2	provisioning/ first snowfall	Nov 3–4				
81	4.5.1	Armenian plain	Tiribazus summit	1	?		pass/snow			Nov 5		39		
82	4.5.2	Tiribazus summit	Euphrates River	3	15	5.00	barren			Nov 6–8				
83	4.5.3	Euphrates River	blizzard	3	13	4.33	deep snow			Nov 9–11				12
84	4.5.22	blizzard	Armenian villages	1	20+ stades					Nov 12				13
85	4.6.1	HALT	HALT					7	rest/ provisioning	Nov 13–19			10:00	14
86	4.6.1–3	Armenian villages	no villages	3	?					Nov 20–2				
87	4.6.4	no villages	Phasis River	7	35	5.00	<snow>****			Nov 23–9				15
88	4.6.5	Phasis River	pass	2	10	5.00				Nov 30–Dec 1	–8–0			
89	4.6.22–7	pass	plain below pass	1	?		pass			Dec 2				16



Table 1 (*cont.*)

No.	<i>Anabasis</i> reference	From	To	March days ( <i>stathmoi</i> )	March hours (parasangs)	Parasangs per <i>stathmos</i>	Terrain and weather	Halt days	Reason for halt	Approximate modern date	Monthly average temps. (C)	Appr. lat. (N)	Appr. daylight (hours)	Notes
113	6.6,38	Calpe Harbor	Chrysopolis	6	?									
114	7.1.7	Chrysopolis	Byzantium	?	?		by sea							
115	7.1.7	HALT	HALT					?	waiting	fall	12–16			
116	7.2.11	Byzantium	Perinthus	?	?									27
117	7.6.24	HALT	HALT					?	winter quarters	winter	N: 12–16 D: 4–8 J: 0–4 F: 4–8			28
118	7.3.7–16	Perinthus	Thracian villages	1	30 stades									
119	7.3.34–48	Thracian villages	more villages	1	?		night march							
120	7.4.1–5	more villages	Thynia	1	?									
121	7.4.6–24	HALT	HALT					?	plundering Thynia					
122	7.5.1	Thynia	Thracian Delta	?	?									29
123	7.5.12	Thracian Delta	Salmydessus	?	?									
124	7.5.15–7.6.1	HALT	HALT					?	waiting for Scutheas to pay					30
125	7.7.1–2	Selymbria	Medosades' villages	?	?									
126	7.8.1	villages	Lampsacus	?	?		by sea			spring 399				
127	7.8.7	Lampsacus	Pergamum	?	?							39		31
128	7.8.8–23	Pergamum	plain of Pergamum	2	?		plain							32
			average no. of parasangs per <i>stathmos</i> :			5.48								
			average for period Sardis–Thapsacus:			6.38								
			average for period Thapsacus–Cunaxa:			5.51								
			average for period Cunaxa–Carduchia:			4.77								
			Cunaxa–Greater Zapatas			4.75								
			Greater Zapatas–Carduchia			?								
			average for period Carduchia–Trapezus:			5.23								

# NOTES:

<> indicates terrain or weather conditions not explicitly mentioned by Xenophon.

[] indicates disputed or uncertain march segments.

Temperature and precipitation data from Tanoglu et al. (1961), Republic of Iraq (1962), Republic of Turkey (1977), Republic of Turkey (2004).

Approximate latitudes calculated using maps in Talbert (2000). Daylight hours calculated from United States Naval Observatory (2004).

\* In July, 2–5 days per month exceed 45° C; in August 5 or more days per month; in September less than 1 day per month.

\*\* Rain in area of Siirt: 40–80 mm in October, 90–125 mm in November.

\*\*\* Snow in area of Mus–Bitlis–Malazgirt: 90–125 mm in November, 100–150 mm in December.

\*\*\*\* Snow in area of Erzurum–Gümüşhane: 20–50 mm in November, 20–50 mm in December.

\*\*\*\*\* Snow on Theches: 50–125 mm in November, 50–125 mm in December (some as rain).

1. Lendle (1995) 19.
2. Stopped in plain before Gates.
3. Lendle (1995) 35–6.
4. Diod. 14.20.4: 20-day halt.
5. Cf. Lendle (1995) 61.
6. Panic in evening: 2.2.17–20.
7. Lendle (1995) 122–3; *pace* Manfredi (1986) 150–2, 160.
8. Marching in *plaision* commences.
9. Picked *lachoi* formed: 3.4.19–23.
10. Tissaphernes in pursuit: 3.4.32.
11. Lendle (1995) 206; Breitenbach (1967) 1604.
12. Cf. Lendle (1995) 233–4.
13. Lendle (1995) 238; *pace* Breitenbach (1967) 1608.
14. Diod. 14.29.1.1: 8 days resting, 4 days at the Phasis.
15. Cf. Lendle (1995) 248–9.
16. Overnight attack on pass.
17. Diod. 14.29.1: 15-day halt in Taochia.
18. Through Chalybrian territory.
19. Diod. 14.29.2: 4 days from Scytheni to Gymnias.
20. Diod. 14.29.3: 15 days from Gymnias to Theches.
21. Through Macronia.
22. *Pace* Breitenbach (1967) 1612.
23. Through Mossynoecia.
24. Through Tibarenia.
25. Cf. 6.2.1, 6.2.12.
26. Three separate forces: 6.2.17–19.
27. Neon and 800 men split off: 7.2.11.
28. Winter: 7.3.13.
29. One month after leaving Perinthus: 7.5.4.
30. Two months after leaving Perinthus: 7.6.1.
31. Via Mount Ida, Atandrus, Mysian Thebe, Adramyrtium, Certonium, Atarneus, Caicus plain.
32. Attack on Asidates: 7.8.8–23.

Table 2 *Cyrene troop strengths*

Date	Place	Hoplites	Light troops	Cavalry	Context	Note
Feb 401	Celaenae	9,600	2,300	40+	initial assembly of contingents	1
May 401	Tarsus	9,500	2,300	40+	two <i>lochoi</i> lost in mountains	2
Jun 401	Myriandrus	10,600	2,300	40+	arrival of Cheirisophus and deserters from Abrocomas	3
Aug 401	Babylonia	10,400	2,500	40+	review at midnight	4
Jan 400	Colchia	ca. 8,000	ca. 1,800	50	battle with the Colchians	5
?Mar 400	Cerasus	total of 8,600		50?	review under arms at Cerasus	6
?Jun 400	Heraclaea	ca. 7,300	ca. 1,000	ca. 40	just before Arcadian–Achaean secession	7
?Jun 400	Calpe	6,500	1,000	ca. 40	just after Arcadian–Achaean secession	8
fall 400	Byzantium	ca. 6,000?	?	?	following many desertions	9
winter 400	Perinthus	ca. 5,000?	0	?	following departure of Neon and sale of sick soldiers	10
spring 399	Pergamum	ca. 5,000?	0	?	entering service with Thibron	11

1. Based on the figures given in *An.* 1.2.3, 1.2.6, 1.2.9, 1.5.13; cf. Roy (1967) 301–2.

2. *An.* 1.2.25.

3. *An.* 1.4.3.

4. *An.* 1.7.10. The discrepancy in numbers of hoplites and peltasts between this and previous accountings may indicate that some hoplites transferred to peltast service; see Parke (1933) 42 and Roy (1967) 302. Another possibility is that Xenophon prematurely subtracted from the hoplite total the Rhodians who became slingers on the retreat up the Tigris (3.3.20).

5. *An.* 4.8.15 and Lendle (1995) 312; for the cavalry see 3.3.20.

6. *An.* 5.3.3; it is unclear whether this figure includes sick and injured men, who at Byzantium numbered more than 400 (7.2.6–7).

7. *An.* 6.2.16; for varying estimates of the army's strength here, cf. Roy (1967) 320 and Lendle (1995) 376–7.

8. *An.* 6.3.5.

9. *An.* 7.2.3–4.

10. *An.* 7.2.6–7 and 7.2.11.

11. Diod. 14.37.1 and Roy (1967) 320.



Table 3 *Recorded Cyrean casualties*

<i>Anabasis</i>		KILLED					WOUNDED					DESERTED, ETC.					
Reference	Context	off	hop	pelt	cav	unk	off	hop	pelt	cav	unk	off	hop	pelt	cav	unk	Notes
1.2.25	Menon's two <i>lochoi</i>					100											
1.4.8	Xenias and Pasion desert																
1.8.20	man wounded by arrow at Cunaxa							1									
1.10.3	soldiers guarding baggage at Cunaxa					?											
2.2.7-8	Miltocythes and Thracians desert																
2.5.30	treachery and massacre	25				200									300	40	
2.5.32	cavalry kill Greeks on plain after massacre					?											
3.1.32	Apollonides driven away																
3.3.5	Nicarchus and comrades desert																
3.3.7-II	Mithradates attacks with slingers and archers																
3.4.26	many wounded by missile attacks																
3.5.2	Persian cavalry surprise plunderers					?											
4.1.10	Carduchian stones and arrows					?											
4.1.18	Cleonymus and Basias in Carduchia																
4.2.17	Cephisodorus and Amphicrates	2															
4.2.17	men of three <i>lochoi</i>					300											
4.2.20	man has leg broken by rocks																
4.3.33-4	men wounded by arrows at Centrites River							1			?						
4.5.4	soldiers die in deep snow					30											Cf. 5.3.3.
4.5.11	soldiers die from exposure					?											Cf. 5.8.10-II.
4.5.12-13	men lose toes from frostbite																
4.7.4	men with crushed ribs and legs in Taochia										?						
4.7.14	Aeneas dragged over cliff																
4.7.16	Chalybians behead defeated Cyreans					?											
5.1.15	Dexippus and his crew steal the <i>pentekonter</i>																
																	50
																</	

Cf. 5.3.3.  
Cf. 5.8.10–11.

(*cont.*)

Table 3 (cont.)

Anabasis		KILLED			WOUNDED			DESERTED, ETC.								
Reference	Context	off	hop	pelt	cav	unk	off	hop	pelt	cav	unk	Notes				
5.1.17	Cleaneus and many men of his <i>lochos</i>	1	?													
5.2.17	men wounded at Drilae town															
5.2.31-2	Mysian soldier wounded															
5.3.1	sick embarked on ships at Trapezus															
5.3.3	deaths from snow, disease mentioned					?										
5.4.16	Mossynoecians kill some Cyreans					?										
5.6.33	decree against deserting passed															
5.7.16	Cleareus and his followers killed	1				?										
5.7.25	a few men drowned at Cerasus					?										
6.3.5	Smicres and his <i>lochos</i> wiped out	1	400													
6.3.5	Arcadian/Achaean <i>lochos</i> of Hegesander		392													
6.3.8	Arcadians and Achaeans surrounded															
6.4.24	cavalry attack Neon's foragers					500										
6.4.11	Cheirisophus dies of fever medicine	1														
6.4.13	Silanus deserts															
6.4.26	Bithynians attack sentries															
7.2.3-4	many men desert at Byzantium					?										
7.2.6-7	sick men sold at Byzantium															
7.2.11	Neon and his men leave															
7.4.34	some men have minor frostbite															
7.4.18	<i>lachagoi</i> Hieronymus and Theogenes					2										
7.8.14	man wounded in thigh															
7.8.18	"almost half" of 600 men wounded															
7.8.18	Agasias wounded															
	Totals:	32	1,394	?	0	530	3	303	?	0	1	8	820	300	40	450

off=officers hop=hoplites cav=cavalry pelt=pelasts unk=type unknown

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