



BLIZZARD.MONEY

Code Review



GEMZ
SECURITY
REPORT
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Table of Contents

Farm	2
The Blizzard Token	2
MasterChefV2	2
Timelock	2
ISSUES	4
BLZ-001: massUpdatePools() can be optional when modifying pool weightage	4
BLZ-002: Dust in MasterChefV2 due to division in fee calculation	4
BLZ-003: Deposit fee can be 0 even if depositFeeBP is non 0	5
BLZ-004: Inaccurate emission information in Medium post	6
RISK FACTORS	6
RECOMMENDATIONS	7

Report

Included below is a code security audit of the Blizzard.Money project. The information appearing in this report is for general and educational purposes only and is not intended to provide any legal security guarantees to any individual or entity. It is advisable to conduct more reviews or/and audits as just one review or audit may miss important issues.

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Farm

Blizzard Token (BLZD)



Address: [0x57067a6bd75c0e95a6a5f158455926e43e79beb0](https://etherscan.io/address/0x57067a6bd75c0e95a6a5f158455926e43e79beb0)

The Blizzard token is the reward/governance for Blizzard.Money. Users receive this for farming in liquidity pools and staking in specific pools.

The owner of BlzdToken is [0x2078f4a75c92a6918d13e3e2f14183443ebf55d3](https://etherscan.io/address/0x2078f4a75c92a6918d13e3e2f14183443ebf55d3) (MasterChefV2), and not an externally owned address (EOA). This ownership restricts the minting of more Blzd tokens to only MasterChefV2.

MasterChefV2

Address: [0x2078f4a75c92a6918d13e3e2f14183443ebf55d3](https://etherscan.io/address/0x2078f4a75c92a6918d13e3e2f14183443ebf55d3)

Owner

The owner of the MasterChefV2 contract is [0x82fdd95b4049c94f209ba68d5cb157cb3f2174da](https://etherscan.io/address/0x82fdd95b4049c94f209ba68d5cb157cb3f2174da), which is a Timelock contract.

The owner of this contract is able to call the following owner-only functions:

- add
- set
- renounceOwnership
- transferOwnership

Tokenomics

The specified emission per block is 1 BLZD, meaning that 1 BLZD is created per block on BSC. This value has been initialized in the constructor upon contract creation and there is no code with functionality to change this value.

BONUS_MULTIPLIER is hardcoded as a constant of 1, so it is not possible to change the rate of emission by modification of this multiplier using this value. In short, the emissions of BLZD will remain at 1 BLZD in perpetuity.

108.8% of the block emission is minted, with 100% (1) as the block rewards, and 8.8% (0.088) going to the dev address. The owner of the dev address has full discretion over the use of these funds.

As there is no cap to the supply of BLZD; it is an inflationary token.

Deposits and withdrawals

Farming pools are subject to deposit fees, in this case, up to 4%. This deposit fee is set at the time of adding a pool, and can be modified from any value between 0% to 4%. The maximum cap of the deposit fee is 4%.

When depositing into a pool with a deposit fee, the fee percentage will be subtracted from the deposit amount.

This fee will be divided by half and sent to 2 external addresses, feeAddBb and feeAddSt. The remaining amount after fee deduction will be added as the user's deposited amount into the pool.

The nonReentrant modifier is used for deposit, withdraw, and emergencyWithdraw.

Others

There is no migrator or similar migration function to transfer user deposited tokens from the contract to another address. In the past, the migrator function has been used to withdraw user funds or “rug” other projects on BSC.

Timelock

Address: [0x82fdd95b4049c94f209ba68d5cb157cb3f2174da](https://bscscan.com/address/0x82fdd95b4049c94f209ba68d5cb157cb3f2174da)

The timelock uses Compound Finance’s timelock contract, with the minimum delay set to 12 hours. At the time of this review, it was verified that the timelock is set to 24 hours delay (86400 seconds).

Issues

Rated on a scale of: **Infomational**, **Low**, **Medium**, **High**, **Critical**

BLZ-001: massUpdatePools() can be optional when modifying pool weightage

Severity: **Infomational**

In addPool and setPool, the owner can decide whether massUpdatePools() will be called by passing _withUpdate as true. This can affect other existing pools' distribution of yield if false is passed, causing existing pools to not be updated before a change to the pool weights are done.

Recommendations:

If _allocPoint is greater than 0, massUpdatePools() should be mandatory. The if statement can be change to the following

```
if (_withUpdate || _allocPoint > 0)
```

Alternatively, the owner needs to always have _withUpdate set to true in the following cases:

- If _allocPoint is non 0 for add
- Every call of set

BLZ-002: Dust in MasterChefV2 due to division in fee calculation**Severity: Infomational**

The depositFee is divided by 2 when and sent to 2 addresses. This can result in a value of 1 remaining in the contract, if the depositFee is an odd number.

```

    if (_amount > 0) {
        pool.lpToken.safeTransferFrom(address(msg.sender), address(this), _amount);
        if (pool.depositFeeBP > 0) {
            uint256 depositFee = _amount.mul(pool.depositFeeBP).div(10000);
            uint256 depositFeeHalf = depositFee.div(2);
            pool.lpToken.safeTransfer(feeAddBb, depositFeeHalf);
            pool.lpToken.safeTransfer(feeAddSt, depositFeeHalf);
            user.amount = user.amount.add(_amount).sub(depositFee);
        } else {
            user.amount = user.amount.add(_amount);
        }
    }

```

Example:

User deposits 10130

$10130 * 400 / 10000 = 405$

As solidity does not handle floating points, the result of the deposit fee deposited by 2 will be

$405 / 2 = 202$

feeAddBb and FeeAddSt will each receive 202, leaving a balance of 1 in the contract that is not accounted for. This does not affect any user deposits or withdrawals, or affect the user experience.

Recommendations:

Subtract depositFeeHalf from depositFee to obtain the amount to be sent to the second fee address (feeAddSt).

BLZ-003: Deposit fee can be 0 even if depositFeeBP is non 0**Severity: Informational**

If the deposited amount is smaller than 50, even if the depositFeeBP is non 0, there will be no fees deducted from the user's deposit amount.

Recommendations:

Based on the price of LPs and tokens for the various pools, the gas fee will be more expensive than the amount saved by depositing such a small amount over multiple transactions to avoid the deposit fee. As such, no change needs to be made.

BLZ-004: Inaccurate emission information in Medium post**Severity: Informational**

In the medium post, the emission and distribution information is stated to be the following:

Emission Rate: Reward per block — 1 Blizzard

Daily Emissions: 28.8k Blizzard

Distribution: Farmers get 0.9112 Blizzard rewards per block, team Yeti gets 0.0888 reward per block.

However, in `updatePool()`, the code shows the following:

```
uint256 multiplier = getMultiplier(pool.lastRewardBlock, block.number);
uint256 blzdReward = multiplier.mul(blzdPerBlock).mul(pool.allocPoint).div(totalAllocPoint);
blzd.mint(devaddr, blzdReward.mul(888).div(10000));
blzd.mint(address(this), blzdReward);
pool.accBlzdPerShare = pool.accBlzdPerShare.add(blzdReward.mul(1e12).div(lpSupply));
pool.lastRewardBlock = block.number;
```

The minted amount of `blzdPerBlock` is 108.8% instead of 100%, which is greater than the information stated in the medium post.

Recommendations:

Update the information in the medium post to reflect the actual calculations in the code.

Note: The team has updated the Medium post to reflect this.

Smart Contract Risk Factors

As the deposit fee for a pool can be increased up to 4%, it is recommended that users verify the deposit fee of the pool they would like to enter before depositing into it.

The owner of the pool can change the pool weightages, but such a transaction to change it has a 24 hour delay. Users can monitor the contract for any queued transactions to add a new pool, or set the pointAlloc for an existing pool.

RECOMMENDATIONS

As it is mentioned in the Medium post that buybacks and funding of special pools will be done with the deposit fees, it is recommended to communicate the use of those funds in a transparent manner.

Overall, we find no issues with the Blizzard.Money smart contracts that are inherent risks with deposits, or detract from the user experience. The issues that are present can be rectified with relatively simple code updates, or changes to the Medium articles.

