

Recap

→ Electric system

Generator
control

{ primary → proportional: to quench sudden SW variation
secondary → to bring $\Delta W = 0$, integral action
to steer back $W \rightarrow W_m$

(primary action): acts faster 10÷30s before pick

(secondary): some minutes to steer W

synthesis method $\sim 1, 2$ gen case control synthesis

■ Electric systems – generation optimisation

Generator cost modelling

An introductory problem

Optimisation background (constraint optimization)

Global cost minimisation → simplest object

Selfish utility maximisation → complementary

problem, when bounching gen.
maximize own quantity,

not global

↑
in conflict
with
global optimiz.

Wrap-up



A system-level model

with to reference the thermo case

most convenient thermocase easy to threat
(primary energy)

only automation costs...

- For simplicity we identify here cost and fuel consumption (i.e., we do not include plant maintenance, personnel and so on). (other cost not of our interest)
 - Combustion is not equally efficient at all plant loads, i.e. – looking at the thermal load – for all values of p_c . you can define a curve ↓ We can define a curve representing specific consumption
 - A specific consumption c_s ([kg of fuel per J], i.e., [kg/s of fuel per W]) is thus defined, which is typically a decreasing function of P_c in the admissible operation range, which normalised as done for p_c , in turn corresponds to an interval $(P_{c,min}, P_{c,max})$:
(NOT sustained by OEM)
 - $P_{c,min}$ is the minimum “technical” load below which the generator cannot be operated, and may be something like 0.2–0.25, even rarely 50%
 - while $P_{c,max}$ is the maximum “guaranteed” power for the generator to work safely, and can be slightly greater than the unity, say 1.05–1.10, to accommodate for transient “exceptional” power releases to the network.



A system-level model

with reference to the thermo case

- ference to the thermo case

Specific consumption
 (fuel to power)
 ratio
 |
 { normalized
combustion power }

 - Given the above, the fuel mass flowrate w_f and p_c are related by
$$w_f = c_s(p_c P_n) \quad || \quad p_c: \text{power produced by combustion}$$

which in our model we use to compute w_f while for this treatise considering p_c as the control input.

- In fact for control we consider the input to be θ_f and we assume this to be linearly related to p_c : as far as an estimate of $c_s(P)$ is available, however, the matter is no conceptual issue as the said estimated curve is invariantly smooth enough to be compensated for.



Generator cost models

- Most frequently, cost models are polynomial in the generated power and up to cubic. A typical form is \rightarrow total cost rate as function of power, P_{av}

$$c_i(P_{gi}) = \underbrace{(k_{g1}P_{gi} + k_{g2}P_{gi}^2 + k_{g3}P_{gi}^3)}_{\text{full consumption}} \underbrace{k_F}_{\text{cost}} + \underbrace{k_{om0}}_{\text{other cost}} + \underbrace{k_{om1}P_{gi}}_{\text{cost for mutation}}$$

where

c_i	[€/h]	is the cost rate,
P_{gi}	[W]	is the generated power,
$k_{gj}, j = 1 \dots 3$	[J/(hW ^j)]	are cost coefficients for pure generation,
k_F	[€/J]	is the fuel cost per unit of energy,
$k_{om\ell}, \ell = 0, 1$	[€/(hW ^{\ell})]	are cost coefficients for Operation & Maintenance.

- Note that, quite logically, the pure generation cost vanishes for $P_{gi} = 0$, while the O&M cost does not.



Generator cost models


- Why cubic? ↗
 - Because the fuel to generated power ratio $r_{fP}(P_g) = Q_f(P_g)/P_g$, where Q_f is the power yielded by fuel [W] and P_g the generated power, thus making r_{fP} adimensional, typically has a minimum at the *optimal operating point* → well approx
by a parabolic
behavior
 - A good way to synthetically model this is to describe function $r_{fP}(P_g)$ as a *parabola*, specifying
 - ↳ • the **optimal** (minimum) fuel to generated power ratio r_{fP}^o ,
 - the fraction p_g^o of $P_{g,max}$ corresponding to that optimal ratio, where p_g is defined as $P_g/P_{g,max}$,
 - and the fuel to generated power ratio r_{fP}^{ml} ($> r_{fP}^o$) at the **minimum sustainable load**, i.e., at $p_g^{ml} = P_{g,min}/P_{g,max}$,

You
speaks



Why cubic cost models?

defined as: (inverse of efficiency)



(DATA) →
(values highlighted)

(P_g^o) (OPTIMAL)
you would like to stay here where you have the min { r_{fp} }!

$$r_{fp} = r_{fp}^o + K(P_g - P_g^o)^2$$

fuel to power ratio. $r_{fp} = \frac{\text{Kg of fuel}}{\text{Joules produced}} > 1$

by definition something is lost, you need to burn more than how much you produce!

interval (P_g_{min}, P_g_{max})
 $P_g_{max} \approx 1.1 P_m$ typically

by experience we know from various data that the points of DATA are well interpolated by a PARABOLA

$$\downarrow r_{fp}(P_g)$$

typically in the form

$$r_{fp} = r_{fp}^o + K(P_g - P_g^o)^2$$

{optimal value of r_{fp} } (this "K" you compute from data coefficient)

You fit the data with offset r_{fp}^o and parameter P_g^o

Generator cost models

↳ to compute the coefficients in the polynomial $C_i(P_{gi})$ given by formulas $Kg_1, Kg_2, Kg_3 \Rightarrow$

- The above computations give

$$r_{fP}(p_g) = r_{fP}^o + \frac{r_{fP}^{ml} - r_{fP}^o}{(p_g^o - p_g^{ml})^2} (p_g - p_g^o)^2$$

thus

$$r_{fP}(P_g) = r_{fP}^o + \frac{r_{fP}^{ml} - r_{fP}^o}{(P_g^o - P_{g,min})^2} (P_g - P_g^o)^2$$



Generator cost models

- Alternatively, $r_{fP}(P_g)$ can be obtained by interpolating experimental points (and again, a *parabola* normally suffices).
 - Therefore, no matter how $r_{fP}(P_g)$ is obtained, $Q_f(P_g)$ can be expressed as

Cubic Polynomial \rightarrow **FUEL:** $Q_f(P_g)$ = $r_{fP}(P_g) P_g$ = $\left(r_{fP}^o + \frac{r_{fP}^{ml} - r_{fP}^o}{(P_g^o - P_{g,min})^2} (P_g - P_g^o)^2 \right) P_g$ multiplied by P_g become CUBIC POLINOMIAL!

$r_{fP}(P_g) \rightarrow$ PARABOLA

that apparently contains powers of P_g from one to three, like we just wrote for the term $k_{g1}P_{gi} + k_{g2}P_{gi}^2 + k_{g3}P_{gi}^3$.

- In detail,

$$\hookrightarrow \quad k_{g1} = \frac{r_{fP}^{ml} P_g^o - r_{fP}^o P_{g,min}}{(P_g^o - P_{g,min})^2}, \quad k_{g2} = \frac{2P_g^o (r_{fP}^o - r_{fP}^{ml})}{(P_g^o - P_{g,min})^2},$$

$k_{g3} = \frac{r_{fP}^{ml} - r_{fP}^o}{(P_g^o - P_{g,min})^2}.$

{ to compute the polynomial expression }



since

can be viewed as:

$$r_{fp} = \frac{\text{kg/s of fuel}}{\text{Watts produced}} = \frac{W_f}{P_g} \Rightarrow W_f = r_{fp} (P_g) \cdot P_g$$

Parabola $\cdot P_g$

so $W_f(P_g)$ is CUBIC !



(flow rate of fuel)

r (generated power)

Generator cost models

An example

- The above cost model with $r_{fP}^o = 2.5$, $r_{fP}^{ml} = 5$, $P_g^o = 85$, $P_{g,min} = 20$ (supposing $P_{g,max} = 100$ for the plots) produces



and, for completeness,

$$k_{g1} = 6.775, \quad k_{g2} = -0.101, \quad k_{g3} = 5.917 \cdot 10^{-4}.$$

- Note: r_{fP} can be interpreted as the *inverse* of the fuel-to-power efficiency $\eta_{fP}(P_g) = P_g/Q_f(P_g)$, ranging in this case from 0.4 (optimal point) to 0.2 (minimum sustainable load).



Problem statement


Preliminaries

- To understand, better *not* to reason with normalised quantities.
- Consider a network with N generators: at any given moment, the total generated power must equal the electric power demand, i.e.,

$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{to provide} \\ \text{this...} \end{array} \right\} \quad \downarrow \quad \sum_{i=1}^N P_{gi} = P_e$
total generated
network demand!

- Primary and secondary control can ensure this, and also keep frequency to the set point (if the power request is feasible, of course). → keeping $\omega = \omega_m$
- But as said, what about cost? →
- Knowing the efficiency curve of each generator, one can write N functions to relate each P_{gi} [W] to a “cost rate” c_i [€/s] or [€/h].
- Of course each $c_i(P_{gi})$ is a monotonically increasing function and each generator has limits, i.e., $P_{gi,min} \leq P_{gi} \leq P_{gi,max}$.

from $Q_f: [\text{kg/s}] / [\text{J}]$
 fuel consumption,
 multiplied by cost of
 fuel → cost rate



from $W_f = \left[\frac{kg}{s} \right]$

fuel flow rate

(multiply by fuel cost [€/kg])

$$\frac{kg}{s} \cdot \frac{\text{€}}{kg}$$

K_f

$\frac{\text{€}}{s}$ cost rate

$$C = W_f \cdot K_f$$

how much spent
↑ per second to
produce!

still cubic
cubic

= cost rate

:= cost of
some unit/
of fuel

still cubic
cubic!

Problem statement

Cost function

mimimizing the derivative $\frac{d}{dt}$!
 ↗ to min of integral
 = min fuel consumption = min total fuel flowrate

- Supposing for this first case that the purpose is to minimise the overall cost, it can be stated as that of minimising the overall cost rate, hence as

↳ min overall flowrate!

constrained
optimiz
problem

← constraints

$$\min \sum_{i=1}^N c_i(P_{gi})$$

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{(s.t.) } \sum_{i=1}^N P_{gi} = P_e, \\ P_{gi,min} \leq P_{gi} \leq P_{gi,max}, i = 1 \dots N. \end{array} \right.$$

equality constraint (respect demand)

inequality constraints
on gen power range

- Note: the problem can be much more complex as sets of generators may aim for example at minimising their cost while together generating a stipulated total power or a given share of P_e , or at maximising their revenue irrespectively of the rest, and so forth.
- We shall face some additional complexity later on, compatibly with the available space.
- For the moment, let us understand the principles.



An introductory case principles



Two generators

Given 2 generators:

- Generator data:

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{ll} P_{g1,max} = 100 & P_{g1,min} = 20 \\ P_{g2,max} = 50 & P_{g2,min} = 5 \end{array} \right. \quad \begin{array}{ll} P_g^o = 80 & r_{fP1}^o = 3 \\ P_g^o = 35 & r_{fP2}^o = 3.5 \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{ll} r_{fP1}^{ml} = 5 & r_{fP2}^{ml} = 8 \end{array}$$

{ cost curves
 $C_i(P_g)$



- Network power demand: $P_{e,max} = 130, P_{e,min} = 10. \quad P_e \in 10 \div 130$

- We suppose that generators can be activated/deactivated at any time (this impacts operation scheduling, not in our scope). *(not always)
sometimes NOT available gen...*

An introductory case

Two generators



to determine the forecast \hat{P}_e
is determined by trend on
↑ daily data etc..

→ typically over next 30min

- Basic idea (which is general w.r.t. the example):

① take the forecast power demand (\hat{P}_e) for the next "period" (day, hour,...),

② determine the optimal generation distribution $\{P_{gi}^{opt}\}$ yielding \hat{P}_e

at minimum cost, → solve the optimiz. problem

③ send each of the so obtained generation requests P_{gi}^{opt} to the corresponding generator

as a bias value, ↳ result is: P_g : request of each gen (tertiary control)

④ and let primary and secondary control act as usual.

↳ to match the real request respect the forecast (error)

- Let us now concentrate on the $\hat{P}_e \mapsto \{P_{gi}^{opt}\}$ problem, other aspects (to the feasible extent) later on.

↑ how to find the BIAS to use as input for the gen.

↓ how to send the BIAS to give target for next period \hat{P}_e !



An introductory case

Example

Two generators

- Consider all the generator combinations, and determine the minimum and maximum power that can be generated by each of them:

POSSIBLE COMBINATIONS:


$$G1 \rightarrow [20, 100], \quad G2 \rightarrow [5, 50], \quad G1 + G2 \rightarrow [25, 150].$$

only G_1

only G_2


$\Sigma_{\min}, \Sigma_{\max}$

- Consequently, divide the \hat{P}_e range in intervals I_i and determine the feasible combinations for each of the said intervals (easier to show than to explain):



We know that $P_c \leq 10 \div 130$ from EXAMPLE DATA

you divide power interval into blocks and check
identify which G_i combination is feasible!



There are three possible combinations where only one Gen. is enough \rightarrow NOT usual in real cases! \Rightarrow in other case when more Gen acts together

$G_1 \& G_2 \downarrow$

value an
optimize
problem!

{ you have to decide how
much of G_1 and G_2 you use!

An introductory case

Two generators

- For combinations with more than one generator, the optimal distribution (minimum total cost) has to be found.
- With only two generators the only case to consider is G1+G2, and we can proceed by substitution (we shall see something more general later on):

$$P_{g1} + P_{g2} = \hat{P}_e \quad \text{since } P_{g1} + P_{g2} = \hat{P}_e \quad \hookrightarrow \quad \text{by definition}$$

must manage overall request only free var. ↗

$$P_{g2} = \hat{P}_e - P_{g1} \Rightarrow c_{12}(P_{g1}) = c_1(P_{g1}) + c_2(\hat{P}_e - P_{g1})$$

GEN1 cost GEN2 cost

cost of the combination G1&G2
 depends only on P_{g1}


- Then we take the first and second derivative of $c_{12}(P_{g1})$ w.r.t. the only remaining independent variable P_{g1} , ↓
- find a possible minimum cost $c_{12}^{opt}(\hat{P}_e)$ inside the power range of both generators (otherwise the minimum is at one of the two distribution extrema),
- determine the power distribution – i.e., $P_{g1}^{opt}(\hat{P}_e)$ – corresponding to the minimum.



An introductory case

Two generators


- Graphical interpretation for the G1+G2 combination:



dome here for
different values of
power demand
 \hat{P}_e

2 demands
↓
 $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \hat{P}_e = 70 \\ \hat{P}_p = 100 \end{array} \right.$

the curves on the plane parallel
to \mathbf{p}_1 !




- As can be seen, for a given \hat{P}_e , the optimal distribution can be inside the segment of the $P_{g1} + P_{g2} = \hat{P}_e$ straight line, or at one of its extrema.



An introductory case


Two generators

- Graphical interpretation for the G1+G2 combination:




- As can be seen, for a given \hat{P}_e , the optimal distribution can be inside the segment of the $P_{g1} + P_{g2} = \hat{P}_e$ straight line, or at one of its extrema.

The min can be NOT a stationary point! (cutted by feasibility interval!)




GRAPHICAL interpretation

Graphically



||
redraw
↓

real plane to consider with constraints min, max
↓
Vertical plane cutting the surface with a curve
surface (cubic polynomial)



An introductory case

Two generators

↓ all together...


In each case when you have more than one gen. you have a ranking...

- As illustrated by the previous graphical interpretation, for each value of \hat{P}_e , the combination can now be chosen that provides the minimum cost; this is shown below:

G_1
 G_2
 G_1+G_2

} feasible combination

You check.. what is min achievable by G_1+G_2 ? What Cost by G_1 or G_2 alone → take min possible



for each possible combination you determine min cost ↓

and the one with smallest min cost WIN



- Finally, based on the choice just made, the bias (or "tertiary control") values $P_{b1,2}$ for $P_{g1,2}$ are determined.
- Let us now quit this introductory example and naïve technique, and move toward establishing a methodology. ↴ easy with 2 Gen, but with more possible combinations of G_i you need math methodology!
- Before, however, we need to review some mathematics.

you choose the combination with min feasible cost



choose the one with min optimal cost → through
methodology

- ① intervals I_i of G_i combination feasible
- ② H intervals feasible combination (knowing forecast)
- ③ optimize each combin.
- ④ choose the one with smallest optimum!

Optimisation background

Constrained optimisation – Lagrange multipliers – Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) equations

Problem statement

- We want to minimise a real function f of N_x real variables x_i , i.e.,

$$f(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_{N_x}), \quad f(\cdot, \cdot, \dots, \cdot) \in \Re, \quad x_i \in \Re, \quad i = 1 \dots N_x,$$

subject to N_e equality constraints in the form ($\Sigma p_{g_i} = p_e$)

$$g_i(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_{N_x}) = 0, \quad g_i(\cdot, \cdot, \dots, \cdot) \in \Re, \quad i = 1 \dots N_e,$$

and to N_i inequality constraints in the form ($p_{g_{i,\min}} \leq p_{g_i} \leq p_{g_{i,\max}}$)

$$h_i(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_{N_x}) \geq 0, \quad h_i(\cdot, \cdot, \dots, \cdot) \in \Re, \quad i = 1 \dots N_i.$$

- Caveat: this is *not* a math lecture. We shall assume that “everything is regular enough”, and not even mention several hypotheses that would be necessary for a rigorous treatise. \sim derivable ecc.. integrals exists... necessary hyp! regularity



Optimisation background

Only equality constraints – Lagrange multipliers

- Form the problem's *Lagrangian* as

$\overline{g_i(\dots)=0}$ | constraint!

$$L = f(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_{N_x}) + \sum_{i=1}^{N_e} \lambda_i g_i(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_{N_x})$$

(constraint function) "g_i(.)"

introducing N_e additional real unknowns λ_i , named the *Lagrange multipliers*.

- Compute the gradients of L w.r.t. vectors $x = [x_1 \dots x_{N_x}]' \in \Re^{N_x}$ and

$$\lambda = [\lambda_1 \dots \lambda_{N_e}]' \in \Re^{N_e}, \text{ i.e.,}$$

GRADIENT
 $\nabla :=$ vector with
 scalar derivative

$$\nabla_x L(x, \lambda) = \left[\frac{\partial L}{\partial x_1} \frac{\partial L}{\partial x_2} \cdots \frac{\partial L}{\partial x_{N_x}} \right], \quad \nabla_\lambda L(x, \lambda) = \left[\frac{\partial L}{\partial \lambda_1} \frac{\partial L}{\partial \lambda_2} \cdots \frac{\partial L}{\partial \lambda_{N_e}} \right],$$

having respectively N_x and N_e (function) components.

$$\nabla_{\mathbf{x}} L \in (\mathbb{R}^{N_x})^T \quad \nabla_{\lambda} L \in (\mathbb{R}^{N_\lambda})^T$$



Optimisation background

Only equality constraints – Lagrange multipliers

Remark!

- Observe that the k-th component of $\nabla_x L$ is $\frac{\partial L}{\partial x_k}$ where x_k appear of $f(\cdot)$ and also inside all $g_i(\cdot)$ constraint functions

$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial x_k} = \frac{\partial f}{\partial x_k} + \sum_{i=1}^{N_e} \lambda_i \frac{\partial g_i}{\partial x_k} = \frac{\partial f}{\partial x_k} + \lambda' \cdot \begin{bmatrix} \frac{\partial g_1}{\partial x_k} \\ \vdots \\ \frac{\partial g_{N_e}}{\partial x_k} \end{bmatrix}$$

x_k is on $f(\cdot)$ and all the $g_i(\cdot)$ constraint functions

$$\lambda' = (\lambda_1, \lambda_2, \dots, \lambda_{N_e})$$

where " \cdot " denotes the scalar product. Therefore

Overall..

$$\nabla_x L = \nabla_x f + \lambda' \cdot \begin{bmatrix} \frac{\partial g_1}{\partial x_1} & \dots & \frac{\partial g_1}{\partial x_{N_x}} \\ \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ \frac{\partial g_{N_e}}{\partial x_1} & \dots & \frac{\partial g_{N_e}}{\partial x_{N_x}} \end{bmatrix} = \nabla_x f + \lambda' \cdot J_{xg}$$

N_x columns
 N_e rows

where J_{xg} is the Jacobian of the constraints g w.r.t. x . (Jacobian matrix of g) respect x

- Also, observe that the k-th component of $\nabla_{\lambda} L$ is g_k . (by construction)



Kth component of $\nabla_{\lambda} L = g_K \rightsquigarrow$ in fact

$$\text{from } \nabla_{\lambda} L = \frac{\partial L}{\partial \lambda} = \left[\frac{\partial L}{\partial \lambda_1} \dots \frac{\partial L}{\partial \lambda_N} \right]$$

with λ_i only on

$$L = f(x) + \sum g_i(x) \lambda_i \rightsquigarrow \frac{\partial L}{\partial \lambda_K} = g_K(x)!$$

Optimisation background

Only equality constraints – Lagrange multipliers

$$\nabla_{\lambda} L = \Theta \Leftrightarrow g_k = 0 \forall k$$

so respected constraints!

- Now, suppose that (x^0, λ^0) is a solution for the system of $N_x + N_e$ equations

↓ set to 0 all the components

$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{that } x^0, \lambda^0 \\ \text{solve these} \\ \text{eqs.} \end{array} \right.$

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{lcl} \nabla_x L(x, \lambda) & = & 0_{1 \times N_x} \\ (\nabla_{\lambda} L(x, \lambda)) & = & 0_{1 \times N_e} \end{array} \right.$$

$\frac{\partial L}{\partial \lambda}$ are the equality constraint function → if $= 0$ OK satisfied

in the $N_x + N_e$ unknowns (x, λ) , termed the Lagrangian Multipliers (LM) equations.

- (The second equation says that x^0 fulfils $g(x)$) (For the first we have two cases)

- Case 1: $\nabla_x f$ in x^0 is a zero vector. → equations become $\lambda^T J_{xg} = 0$

①

- In this case x^0 is a stationary point for $f(x)$ independently of the constraints $g(x)$.

2 cases for the 1st equation

{ meaning that there are redundant constraints. }

- In addition, given the expression of $\nabla_x L$, the equation reduces to $\lambda^T J_{xg} = 0$; since (x^0, λ^0) fulfils it, either λ^0 is a zero vector, or the gradients $\nabla_x g_i$, $i = 1 \dots N_e$ evaluated in x^0 are linearly dependent. If the $\nabla_x g_i$ are linearly dependent in x^0 we shall then say that x^0 may not be a regular point for the constraints g ; we do not further discuss this matter.

lm comb of gradient is 0 → so dependent!

meaning that redundant constraints

to solve $\nabla_x L(x, \lambda) = \underbrace{\mathbb{0}_{1 \times N_x}}_{\text{we have 2 cases..}}$

remembering →

$$\nabla_x L = \nabla_x f + \lambda^T J x g$$

gradient + matrix vector product



Case 1:

IF $\nabla_x f = \mathbb{0}$ → simply the equation becomes

↓

$$\lambda^T J x g = \underbrace{\mathbb{0}_{1 \times N_x}}$$

that x is a stationary point

independently of constraints

↳ for example: to minimize:


here that constraint line is useless!

because that point is min

independently from constraints...

While of the line of constraint is another! ↴

new min NOT of global surface!
But of constraint




If linearly dependent $R_{gi} \rightsquigarrow$ redundant constraints

constraint line for example



for example to minimize



Curve min
but NOT
of the real
system → STATIONARY point

Optimisation background

Only equality constraints – Lagrange multipliers

- Case 2: $\nabla_x f$ in x^o is not a zero vector.

(2)

- In this case λ^o cannot be a zero vector either, or the considered equation $\nabla_x f + \lambda' J_x g = 0$ cannot be satisfied (contrary to the hypothesis).
- Also, rewritten as $\nabla_x f = -\lambda' J_x g$, the same equation says that the gradients of $f(x)$ and $g(x)$ w.r.t. x are parallel in x^o . (parallel gradients of f and g)!
- Let now $z^o = f(x^o)$, and consider the hypercurve in \mathbb{R}^{N_x+1} obtained by intersecting the hypersurfaces $z = f(x)$ and $g(x) = 0$. Moving on that hypercurve away from (x^o, z^o) , that apparently belongs to it, locally produces no variation of z . Therefore, x^o is a (local) stationary point for $f(x)$ constrained by $g(x) = 0$.
- Since this may be hard to grasp, let us see an example with Maxima:

```

f : x1^2+x2^2; func to min
g : x1-1; constraint
L : f+lam*g; LAGRANGIAN
solve([diff(L,x1),diff(L,x2),
       diff(L,1am)], [x1,x2,1am]); } solve the syst of eq → x1=1, x2=0, λ = -2
/* grad_x g = [1 0] */
```

```


plot3d([f,g,0, [x1,0,2], [x2,-1,1]]); → plotting in 3D (f, g, 0 for x1, x2) =>
subst([x1=1,x2=0], jacobian([f],[x1,x2])); /* grad_x f || grad_x g in x0 */
subst([x1=1,x2=1], jacobian([f],[x1,x2])); /* and not e.g. here */
```

↳ simulating that in maxima =>

meaning that ($\nabla_x f$ is not a zero vector!)
 $(\lambda' J_x g \neq 0$ also!) \downarrow lag. equaz.!
more interesting case...
When $(\nabla_x f \neq 0)$, in x^o




When our x^o min is not a stationary point of the surface but only a curve



$$\nabla f = -\lambda' Jx g \Rightarrow \text{the GRADIENT are PARALLEL}$$

f to be minimized s.t. $g(x_1, x_2) = 0$ with $g = x_1 + x_2 - \bar{x}$



When parallel gradient you get the min!


When the gradients of the ball and of the plane are parallel \rightarrow we get the MIN

more since

orthogonally

to gradient \rightarrow When no more improvement possible... (no variation)

Since the gradient of the constraint function and of the ball f to min are parallel \rightarrow moving orthogonally to the position where ∇ parallel I get no improvement! (no variation)



$g(x) = 0$ VIEWED IN 3D \rightarrow become a plane! ($\forall z$)

\hookrightarrow and this plane in 3D $\rightarrow g(x)$ cuts an hypercurve with
the surface! (*) \hookrightarrow (3D CURVE) (by plane and
solid intersection)

plane gradient lays in 2D ORTHOGONAL

to plane $\frac{\partial}{\partial x_1}, \frac{\partial}{\partial x_2}$ always parallel

\hookrightarrow lays on
 $x_1 + x_2$ plane

\downarrow
direction where
the plane Grow!

\hookrightarrow blue vectors are
the max Growth
of $f(x_1, x_2)$ radially directed!

\hookrightarrow so when reached the min point...

plane and ball has parallel gradient
(as equations says)

\hookrightarrow point where the two are parallel \rightarrow min!


(*) (*)

ZOOM

on that

area... \Rightarrow

● ZOOM... here we notice part of f surface



considering the tangent due to constraint plane

ball gradient at that point // to constraint gradient

on that direction along constraint I move \perp to gradient
↳ Locally NO VARIATION!

here the gradient of the blue surface is \perp to magenta line tangent on red plane...

← { because the product of my motion to gradient is \neq scalar
(moving along \neq line)

$\nabla_x f, \nabla_x g$ parallel in x^0

$$z^0 = f(x^0)$$

hypercurve in $\mathbb{R}^{N_{x+1}}$
↑ intersection of

$$\begin{cases} z = f(x) \\ g(x) = 0 \end{cases}$$

moving on that curve \rightarrow Locally NO VARIATION.. I move \perp to gradient

↓
STATIONARY POINT!

Optimisation background

Only equality constraints – Lagrange multipliers

v

- Conclusion: x^o fulfills the LM equations
⇒ it is a candidate constrained optimal point.
 - We have then found a set of necessary, first-order conditions for local constrained optimality.
 - Further studies could e.g. study via Hessian analysis whether x^o is a minimum, a maximum, or neither.
↳ to check if min/max... studying hessian matrix (II derivative) → max/min etc..
 - For our purposes we can stop here, however we need to address inequality constraints.

} 5. get candidates of optimal point constrained

} 4. solve problem

} 3. set up L(x)

↳ how to deal
with it !


to deal with inequality we move from Lagrangian Multiplier to KKT equations! \Rightarrow



Optimisation background

Equality and inequality constraints – Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) equations

- Major difference w.r.t. the equality-only (LM) case: a solution may *not* be a stationary point, as some inequality constraints may bind it. (the inequality can bind stationary solution)
 - Observe that we have already found such a case in the introductory example with two generators:



- Hence the LM equations cannot be used here (i.e., the Lagrange rationale still works, but we need to introduce some modifications).



Optimisation background

Equality and inequality constraints – Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) equations

- We form again the Lagrangian, this time however in the form

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{inequality constraint} \\ \text{function: } h_j(x) \end{array} \right\} \\
 & \text{inequality constraints} \\
 & \text{defined by } h_j(x) \geq 0
 \end{aligned}
 \quad \downarrow \text{Extendend Lagrangian, --- add the part} \\
 L(x, \lambda, \mu) = f(x) + \sum_{i=1}^{N_e} \lambda_i g_i(x) + \sum_{j=1}^{N_i} \mu_j h_j(x) \quad \text{related to inequality constraint by } \mu_j$$

where another multiplier vector $\mu = [\mu_1 \dots \mu_{N_i}]' \in \mathbb{R}^{N_i}$ is introduced w.r.t. the case with equalities only, and $h \in \mathbb{R}^{N_i}$ is the vector of functions h_j ,

- and give the following simple definitions:

- if at a certain point x^o a certain inequality constraint h_j is satisfied with equality – i.e., if $h_j(x^o) = 0$ – we shall say that the constraint h_j is active (or binding) in x^o ; \leftarrow hit boundary
- if the constraint is satisfied with the $>$ sign – i.e., if $h_j(x^o) > 0$ – we shall say that it is inactive (or nonbinding) in x^o ; \leftarrow not hit boundaries
- otherwise (obviously) the constraint is violated in x^o .

Outside valid region



Optimisation background

Equality and inequality constraints – Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) equations

(nothing bind or violated)

means that x^o would be solution without inequality constr!

- Now (we again look for necessary conditions) suppose that x^o is a solution (i.e., an optimal point) with neither binding nor violated inequality constraint, i.e., that $h_j(x^o) > 0 \forall j$.
*SOLUTION for the problem! inside valid region
NOT on boundary*
- In this case x^o is also a solution for the LM problem, as setting $\mu = 0$ makes the term $\mu \cdot h(x^o)$ contribute zero to L .
But setting $\mu=0$, we catch also sol with violated constraint $\rightarrow h \geq 0$ need to check
- Note that also a solution for the LM problem violating some inequality constraint would fall in the same case, but it is not difficult to see if said constraints are violated or nonbinding. In the following we assume that such a *feasibility check* is always performed.
- The most interesting case is when at least one inequality constraint is binding. Let us expand a bit on this.

→ trick...



Optimisation background

Equality and inequality constraints – Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) equations

- By adopting the same notation introduced in the LM problem, consider the system

+ trick: of $N_x + N_e + N_i$ equations → form a syst of eq...

multiply each equation by μ ,

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{lcl} \nabla_x L(x, \lambda, \mu) & = & \nabla_x f(x) + \lambda' J_x g(x) + \mu' J_x h(x) = 0 \\ \nabla_\lambda L(x, \lambda, \mu) & = & g(x) = 0 \\ \mu' \circ \nabla_\mu L(x, \lambda, \mu) & = & \mu' \circ h(x) = 0 \end{array} \right. \quad \begin{array}{l} (N_x) \\ (N_e) \\ (N_i) \end{array}$$

↑ element by element multiplication

in the $N_x + N_e + N_i$ unknowns (x, λ, μ) , where “ \circ ” denotes the Schur (element by element) product. → *With the trick of multiply each equation by μ !* → treat ineq. constr as eq. constr only when binding

- Roughly speaking, a solution bound by some inequality constraints will satisfy an LM problem where the said constraints are fictitiously treated as equality ones (whence the last term in the first equation) provided that only those (binding) constraints are actually accounted for, which is ensured by the third equation (of course s.t. the necessary feasibility checks).

IF NOT BINDING, $h(x) \neq 0$ so fix $\mu' = 0$ {OK}
 IF BINDING, $h(x) = 0$, μ' whatever value {OK}

TRICK: treat inequality constraints as equality when binding

$$(\bar{\mu}) \circ (\bar{h}(x)) = 0$$

This can

be $\neq 0$

even when

binding

$\uparrow = 0$ when
binding ✓

\uparrow
only binding as equality constraints
constraints

Optimisation background

Equality and inequality constraints – Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) equations ↴

- The system above is composed of the so-called KKT equations.
- We observe that if a constraint $h_i(x) \geq 0$ is inactive at optimality, i.e. in x^o , then the corresponding μ_i zero.
- In the opposite case, the sign of μ_i dictates whether f increases or decreases when entering or exiting the admissible region as dictated by the inequality constraints.
- Assuming that we want to *minimise* $f(x)$ and the sign in the $h(x)$ equality constraints is \geq , requiring that $f(x)$ increase when x enters the feasibility region for all binding h_i – i.e., that a KKT solution with at least one binding inequality constraint be a candidate *bound minimum* – corresponds to requiring that all nonzero μ_i be *negative* in it. Of course all the other combinations are possible (we may want to maximise $f(x)$ and inequality constraints may have the \leq sign).

(*)
- Let us now go for an elementary example.



(*) this can be proven, valid in general
this facts!

Example 1 We want to minimize

$$f(x_1, x_2) = x_1^2 + 2x_2^3$$

s.t. $x_1 \geq 0, x_2 \geq 0$

$$(x_1 - 2)^2 + (x_2 - 2)^2 = 1$$

→ Interpret Geometrically
and write KKT equations.

KKT)

• FIRST: LAGRANGIAN... (L)

$$g = x_1^2 + 2x_2^3$$

$$g = (x_1 - 2)^2 + (x_2 - 2)^2 - 1$$

$$h_1 = x_1$$

$$h_2 = x_2$$



$$L = f + \lambda g + \mu h$$

• KKT equations:

$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial x_1} = L_{x_1} = 0 \Rightarrow 2x_1 + 2\lambda(x_1 - 2) + \mu_1 = 0$$

$$L_{x_2} = 0 \Rightarrow 6x_2^2 + 2\lambda(x_2 - 2) + \mu_2 = 0$$

$$L_\lambda = 0 \Rightarrow (x_1 - 2)^2 + (x_2 - 2)^2 - 1 = 0$$

$$\mu_1 \cdot L_{x_1} = 0 \Rightarrow \mu_1 x_1 = 0$$

$$\mu_2 \cdot L_{x_2} = 0 \Rightarrow \mu_2 \cdot x_2 = 0$$

solve on MAXIMA:

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} [x1=0, x2=-\sqrt{3} \%i, lambda=-\sqrt{3} \%i-12, mu1=-4\sqrt{3} \%i-48, mu2=0], \\ [x1=\sqrt{3} \%i+2, x2=0, lambda=\frac{2\sqrt{3} \%i-3}{3}, mu1=0, mu2=\frac{8\sqrt{3} \%i-12}{3}], \\ [x1=2-\sqrt{3} \%i+3, x2=0, lambda=-\frac{2\sqrt{3} \%i+3}{3}, mu1=0, mu2=-\frac{8\sqrt{3} \%i+12}{3}]] \end{array} \right\}$$

...
numerical solution!



We get 10 solutions

maxima...

```

(%o1) KKT:[x1^2+lambda*(x1-2)+mu1,
6*x2^2+2*lambda*(x2-2)+mu2,
(x1-2)^2+(x2-2)^2-1,
mu1*x1,
mu2*x2]
vars:[x1,x2,lambda,mu1,mu2]


(%o2) [2 (x1-2) lambda + 2 x1 + mu1, 2 (x2-2) lambda + 6 x2^2 + mu2 (x2-2)^2 + (x1-2)^2 - 1, mu1 x1, mu2 x2]

(%o3) [x1, x2, lambda, mu1, mu2]

(%o4) solve(KKT,vars);
(%o5) [[x1=2.076844262295082, x2=2.997043169722058, lambda=-0.207617575725191, mu1=0.0, mu2=-
1.4210854715202 10^-14], [x1=1.59087204563971, x2=1.087522935779816, lambda=3.888446875517984,
mu1=0.0, mu2=7.105473757601002 10^-15], [x1=3.120680126813771-1.234494068252646 \% , x2=0.5317145073742694-0.9422370349012739 \% , lambda=-0.8881573204512628 \% -1.806273928373064,
mu1=0.0, mu2=-2.220446049250913 10^-16], [x1=0.9422370349012741 10^0+0.5317145073742705, lambda=-0.8881573204512628 \% -3.120680126813772, x2=0.8703665827167425 10^-14], [x1=1.234494068252645 \% +1.806273828373064, mu1=0.0, mu2=-1.28785870865181 10^-14 \% -7.105427357601002 10^-15], [x1=1.045461766356466-2.043081338075073 10^-14, x2=0.8703665827167425 \% -0.2406642101870896, lambda=0.0]

```

GRAPHICALLY



candidates solutions

x_1

2.07

1.59

x_2

2.99 \leftarrow max!


1.08 \leftarrow min!

! all the others

are complex solutions x_1, x_2
to discard

2 stationary points

INTERPRETATION - Geometry



$$f = x_1^2 + 2x_2^3 \text{ cubic}$$

quadratic on $f x_2$ plane

grow more
on x_2

$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{float}(\text{subst}([x_1=2.07, x_2=2.99], f)); \\ \textcircled{57} \text{ max} \\ \text{float}(\text{subst}([x_1=1.59, x_2=1.08], f)); \\ \textcircled{5} \text{ min!} \end{array} \right\}$

$(x_1-2)^2 + (x_2-2)^2 - 1 = 0$ is a circle centered on (2,2) with radius 1
 ↳ and cutting through → circular blade through the hole

Optimisation background

Equality and inequality constraints – KKT equations – elementary example

f \downarrow $h_1(x)$ $h_2(x)$ (No $g(x)$ here!)

$$f : x^2;$$

h1 : x-1;

h2 : 2-x;

L : f+mu1*h1+mu2*h2;

$$\mu_2 \frac{\partial L}{\partial \mu_1}$$

KKTEqs : [diff(L,x),mu1*diff(L,mu1),mu2*diff(L,mu2)];=0

`solve(KKTeqs,[x,mu1,mu2]);` ← solve equation!

$$\text{diff}(L, x) = \frac{\partial L}{\partial x}$$




Optimisation background

Equality and inequality constraints – KKT equations – elementary example

- Solutions found: (3 solutions possible)

	x	μ_1	μ_2	$f(x)$	$h_1(x)$	$h_2(x)$	
S1	0	0	0	0	-1	2	← NO NEG h! constraint violated!
S2	1	-2	0	1	0	1	← Feasible! here h_2 ^{NON} BINDING because $\mu_2 = 0$
S3	2	0	4	4	1	0	← Feasible! while h_1 BIND! $\mu_1 \neq 0$

- S1: infeasible.
 - S2: feasible, h_2 nonbinding, h_1 binding and entering the feasible region increases $f \Rightarrow$ can be a bound minimum.
 - S3: feasible, h_1 nonbinding, h_2 binding and entering the feasible region decreases $f \Rightarrow$ cannot be a bound minimum.
 - Hence, the solution is S2.




Optimisation background

Equality and inequality constraints – KKT equations – elementary example

$h=0$ identify a point

- This was *really* elementary, so let us have a **visual look**:



here on S_2 , h_2 is BINDING! While h_1 NOT... and entering the region, f increases!
 feasible also S_3 , on frontier of h_2 and entry feasible region $f \downarrow$ NO MIN!



- S1: infeasible.
- S2: feasible, h_2 nonbinding, h_1 binding and entering the feasible region increases $f \Rightarrow$ can be a bound minimum.
- S3: feasible, h_1 nonbinding, h_2 binding and entering the feasible region decreases $f \Rightarrow$ cannot be a bound minimum.

Operationally very simple to compute! Discard solution and

Choose the Best



Mathヘルムド defined...



Global cost minimisation

The previous two-generator case revisited with the KKT equations respect the 2 gen case

- We are of course looking at the G1+G2 combination, thus the problem is

minimise $f(P_{g1}, P_{g2}) = c_1(P_{g1}) + c_2(P_{g2})$

s.t. $P_{g1} + P_{g2} = \hat{P}_e$, $P_{g1,min} \leq P_{g1} \leq P_{g1,max}$, $P_{g2,min} \leq P_{g2} \leq P_{g2,max}$.

- Maxima (preliminaries):

```
Pg1min : 20;  
Pg1max : 100;  
Pgo1   : 80;  
ro1    : 3;  
rml1   : 5;
```

```
Pg2min : 5;  
Pg2max : 50;  
Pgo2   : 35;  
ro2    : 3.5;  
rml2   : 8;
```

```
k11   : (rml1*Pgo1^2-ro1*Pg1min*(2*Pgo1-Pg1min))/(Pgo1-Pg1min)^2;  
k21   : 2*Pgo1*(ro1-rml1)/(Pgo1-Pg1min)^2;  
k31   : (rml1-ro1)/(Pgo1-Pg1min)^2;  
k12   : (rml2*Pgo2^2-ro2*Pg2min*(2*Pgo2-Pg2min))/(Pgo2-Pg2min)^2;  
k22   : 2*Pgo2*(ro2-rml2)/(Pgo2-Pg2min)^2;  
k32   : (rml2-ro2)/(Pgo2-Pg2min)^2;
```

```
c1   : k11*Pg1+k21*Pg1^2+k31*Pg1^3;  
c2   : k12*Pg2+k22*Pg2^2+k32*Pg2^3;  
f    : c1+c2;
```



Global cost minimisation

The previous two-generator case revisited with the KKT equations

- Maxima (we consider the two cases with \hat{P}_e equal to 70 and 100):

```
/* Set Pe to the desired value, 70 or 100 for the two cases shown */
Pe      : 70;

g      : Pg1+Pg2-Pe;
h1     : Pg1-Pg1min;
h2     : Pg1max-Pg1;
h3     : Pg2-Pg2min;
h4     : Pg2max-Pg2;

L      : f+lambda*g+mu1*h1+mu2*h2+mu3*h3+mu4*h4;
KKTeqs : [diff(L,Pg1),diff(L,Pg2),
           diff(L,lambda),
           mu1*diff(L,mu1),mu2*diff(L,mu2),
           mu3*diff(L,mu3),mu4*diff(L,mu4)];
S      : solve(KKTeqs,[Pg1,Pg2,lambda,mu1,mu2,mu3,mu4]);

for i:1 thru length(%rnum_list) do S:subst(t[i],%rnum_list[i],S);
float(S);
fvals : float(makelist(subst(S[i],f),i,1,length(S)));
```




Global cost minimisation

The previous two-generator case revisited with the KKT equations

- Results for $\hat{P}_e = 70$:

solving for $\hat{P}_e = 70$

P_{g1}	P_{g2}	λ	μ_1	μ_2	μ_3	μ_4	f	
20.00	50.00	any	$-\lambda - \frac{11}{3}$	0.00	0.00	$\lambda + \frac{97}{8}$	331.25	left extremum
51.58	18.42	-1.82	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	267.67	local max
40.09	29.91	-2.11	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	264.30	S1
100.00	-30.00	-44.12	0.00	-38.68	0.00	0.00	-416.52	infeasible
65.00	5.00	-2.04	0.00	0.00	-4.46	0.00	243.13	Sopt



- Note that the left extremum cannot be a bound minimum, while the right one actually is.


Global cost minimisation

The previous two-generator case revisited with the KKT equations

- Results for $\hat{P}_e = 100$: ↴

P_{g1}	P_{g2}	λ	μ_1	μ_2	μ_3	μ_4	f	
89.75	10.25	-4.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	341.26	local max
69.42	30.58	-2.25	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	322.59	Sopt
20.00	80.00	-49.63	45.95	0.00	0.00	0.00	1190.00	infeasible
100.00	0.00	-9.63	0.00	-4.18	0.00	0.00	322.22	infeasible
95.00	5.00	-4.71	0.00	0.00	-1.79	0.00	336.88	right extremum
50.00	50.00	-1.83	0.00	0.00	0.00	10.29	406.25	left extremum

check the best possible solution!
using our procedure we find possible candidates and compare function values!



- Note that the left extremum cannot be a bound minimum, while the right one could but is not.
- Recall that the KKT equations not only are necessary conditions, but just provide *candidate optima*: always check the solutions!

RECAP \rightsquigarrow for electrical syst:

- we can set up primary and secondary control given response speed and max freq error requirements
- compute tertiary control balances by using KKT equations
- single objective (min cost)
OR I can do this with partial objectives
 - ↳ only min cost of some gen while others @ default

In this case partial obj:

it changes the problem structure with \leftarrow problem structure is the same

another viewpoint: totally selfish utility

Viewpoint



respect Generators or Utilizers

Preliminaries

The generator viewpoint

there are no means
of influencing the price
(energy price fixed!)

- Assume you run a generator (or pool of) and that you are a price taker.
- Let π_σ – say [€/MWh] – be the energy selling price.
- Let $c(P_g)$ [€/h] be your cost rate as function of your generated power P_g [MW].
overtime "rate"
- To maximise your revenue (rate) you state the problem

(derivative of revenue)

$$\max_{P_g} (\pi_\sigma P_g - c(P_g))$$

what you get!
 [€/J] * [J/s] = [€/s]
 what you spend!
 cost rate!

and readily get the production you desire by solving for P_g the equation

$$\frac{dc(P_g)}{dP_g} = \pi_\sigma.$$

↑ so overall derivative of

$$\frac{d}{dP_g} (\pi_\sigma P_g - c(P_g)) = Q$$



Preliminaries → Graphical View:

The generator viewpoint – example


- Maxima:

$c = 6*Pg - 0.01*Pg^2 + 0.002*Pg^3$

$\text{sol} : \text{solve}(\text{diff}(c, Pg) = psigma, Pg); \rightarrow \text{sol}[1] < 0$
 $Pgo := (\text{rhs})(\text{sol}[2]); \rightarrow \text{just take the numb.} \leftarrow \text{take}$
 right hand side of the solution, so the value of ($x = -1$)


(invented)

- The obtained optimum P_g is 87.32.
- Let us now plot $dc(P_g)/dP_g$ versus P_g and check the crossing with π_σ .
- NOTE: should the optimum P_g be above the generator capacity, the desired generation and the surplus would be bound to that maximum capacity.




Preliminaries

The generator viewpoint – **peculiar cases**



Bound optimum.



High-inflection cost rate curve.
↑ in some cases...



Preliminaries

The utiliser viewpoint

- Assume now you are an **energy utiliser** — and again, a **price taker**.
- Let π_σ — say again [€/MWh] — be the energy selling price.
- Assume your **utility function** $U(P_t)$ — [€/h], where P_t is the taken power — to be “well-behaved” in economic jargon, that is, **monotonically increasing and (quasi-)concave**; a typical form can be cubic without constant term and with negative second derivative in the range of interest. ↗ for example
- To maximise your utility (rate) you state the problem

$$300P_t - 3.6 P_t^2 + 0.015 P_t^3$$

“quasi-concave
because little
concavity
change”

and get your **optimal consumption** by solving for P_t the equation

↓
monotonically
increase but am
that range not so much

$$\max_{P_t} (U(P_t) - \pi_\sigma P_t)$$

maximize the
earnings

↗ max diff of
utility for
consumption and
how much I
spent

$$\frac{dU(P_t)}{dP_t} = \pi_\sigma.$$



Preliminaries

The utiliser viewpoint – example

- Maxima:


```

U : 300*Pt-3.6*Pt^2+0.015*Pt^3;
sol : solve(diff(U,Pt)=psigma,Pt);
Pto : rhs(sol[1]);
float(subst(psigma=50,Pto));
plot2d([diff(U,Pt),50],[Pt,20,100]);
    ↑ plot  $dU/dPt$  →
  
```

- The obtained optimum P_t is 50.94.
- Let us now plot $dU(P_t)/dP_t$ versus P_t and check the crossing with π_σ .
- NOTE: should the optimum P_g be above the utilser capacity, the desired utilisation and the surplus would be bound to that maximum capacity.




For high consumption, an increase on consumption Pt cause less ΔU (almost SATURATED) → "QUASI" COMARE



↓
IF you consume
more than this P_t
choice → the additional
utility is NOT compensated
by how much you spent!





IF someone propose a price \sim I can propose a consumption

OR viceversa...

IF I come the producer... give

offering a production of 70 \Rightarrow IF you pay 20 to be convenient!

\downarrow
dually for Gem. P0V

usefull to make offers



Knowing the price 50

next point I can offer 24 .. less...

OR selling price 50

\hookrightarrow next point I can offer the rest...

} obtained optimum }
 P_g

\downarrow
respect surplus

Relating the two viewpoints

→ this allows you to make offers! If I know a certain price, I can look
But on next period

(complicated bidding mechanism)

- Given a time slot in the future, generators and utilisers can bid for a certain amount of produced/consumed energy at a certain price in that slot. In a nutshell, this is how energy is traded. → fixing the price on that slot!
- The matter is extremely complicated, in fact, involving auctions at various space and time scales.
- However this is a course on automation, hence we are not interested in the details of the bidding process – which is more a matter of economic management – but rather on how this process reflects on the control layers for the network.
- As such, we are now going for a wrap-up from our perspective.



Ingredients of the optimisation problem

- Every generator has a cost model providing the cost rate [€/h] as a function of the produced power [MW].
- Such cost (rate) functions are well represented, in general, by polynomials up to cubic.
- Utilisers of a certain size have – more or less explicitly – a utility function relating some KPI (for example an income rate) to the consumed power.
- Apparently the last idea makes little sense for a single house...
- ...but it could, no matter the KPI, e.g. for a district or a municipality.
- Such utility (rate) functions are, or at least in general are assumed to be, “well-behaved” (monotonic, increasing, concave).



Actors of the optimisation problem

Actors { Generators (large)
prosumers
TSO

- In the traditional scenario, generators control the network.
- Recently, utilisers can participate
 - by reducing (shaving) the load,
 - by shifting their utilisation in time, often combined to shaving, - and with similar manoeuvres.
- In the presence of distributed generation, a compound of utilisers can also play the role of a generator of relevant size: the term “prosumer” was introduced to indicate this double utiliser role (producer and consumer).
- The third class of actors comprehends national/regional Grid Managers or TSOs (Transmission System Operators) with the role of
 - maintaining continuous production/consumption balance (therefore controlling frequency), *ensure that @any time there is a way to increase production*
 - ensuring the “rotating reserve” provision (some words on this later),
 - selecting the optimal generation distribution for each trading period,
 - consequently instructing generators about how much they have to produce, trading period per trading period.



The optimisation problem



- We know how a TSO can optimise a cost function network-wide (we did this for total cost via the KKT equations). → solved by dedicated SOFTWARE
- We shall see later on (talking about load flow) that additional constraints can be introduced to not overload transmission lines — but the concept does not change. (still optimiz. problem)
- We know how a generator/utiliser can determine its optimal operating conditions in a selfish manner. → {like to produce/consume some given the price!
like to have a certain price given consume/production! }
- Determining the TSO decision is an extremely complicated procedure (and in fact, not strictly “automation”). ↳ determining price and devices
- We provide a high-level overview, and then come back to control.



The optimisation problem

in a simplified world for clarity

- The TSO – or some other entity, either part of the TSO or coordinated, called in general the “electricity market” or “power exchange” or PX – comes to setting the energy price based on the bids to buy and the offers to sell (this is called short-term trading, we do not talk here about long-term operations).
→ economic aspect... financial stuff
- The TSO operates on a future trading period, knowing
 - a forecast of the demand (e.g., from historical data, meteo, and so forth),
 - the trading results for the period under question,
 - the generator characteristics (e.g., base load or available for slow or fast variations),
 - possible global requirements (cost, pollution, use of renewables, and so on).
- The TSO determines for each generator
 - the production (constant) for the period, which is tertiary control,
 - and possibly the amount of additional production (rotating reserve) that the generator has to guarantee, via primary/secondary control, if needed to keep frequency at the set point; there is in general some remuneration for providing reserve, we omit details.




The resulting overall scheme


- Tertiary control results are sent to the generator controls as bias values, resulting in the scheme below (where we show that the secondary control distribution can be more complex than just a β_i , as we write for practical reasons in our exercises).

→ "Modelica": ERecsys_

talking about...




the
same



+ other models on \rightarrow Elec Sys - generator models



running system with same input signal (possible response)



+ \rightarrow Elec Sys - power - frequency - control

+ \rightarrow Elec Sys - case - studies


Primary - secondary - tertiary

{
● primary
● secondary
● tertiary } \rightarrow

tertiary is a bias added as constant

value := command

from the optimization procedure, not decided by control law scheme!



\downarrow
the road changes from
80 to 120
@ 1ks

-- running this...



on summation mode...

total
request from

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{ll} p & (u_3) \\ s & (u_2) \\ t & (u_1) \end{array} \right.$$

control

