

# **ALESSANDRO SOVERA**

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## **BROWN UNIVERSITY**

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### **References**

Professor **Emily Oster**  
Department of Economics, Box B  
Brown University  
Providence, Rhode Island 02912  
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Professor **John N. Friedman**  
Department of Economics, Box B  
Brown University  
Providence, Rhode Island 02912  
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Professor **Brian Knight**  
Department of Economics, Box B  
Brown University  
Providence, Rhode Island 02912  
[brian\\_knight@brown.edu](mailto:brian_knight@brown.edu)

### **EDUCATION**

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**Brown University**  
Ph.D. Candidate in Economics  
Expected Completion Date: May 2024

Providence, RI, USA  
2018 –present

**Universita' Bocconi**  
M.A. Economics

Milan, Italy  
2015 –2017

**Universita' Bocconi**  
B.A. Economics

Milan, Italy  
2012 –2015

### **TEACHING AND RESEARCH FIELDS**

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Public Finance, Public Economics and Political Economy

# JOB MARKET PAPER

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## Decoding Local Public Finance: The Interplay of the Legislature and the Executive

### *Abstract*

There has been a long debate in public finance about the factors that shape the size of government. One widely analyzed is the number of politicians. However, there is no clear evidence of the direction of its effect. This study aims at reconciling this contrast by introducing a new element: the role that politicians play in the government. Using unique administrative data from Italian municipalities and an instrumental variable strategy, I find that the role of local politicians matters. A larger executive board increases expenditure, through higher investments that are financed via capital transfers; a larger city council, instead, curbs investments. I explain these findings via a combination of career incentives and specialization for the executive and increased political fragmentation for the council. These findings are rationalized in a legislative bargaining model, where the executive and the legislature interact over the size of the local budget.

## RESEARCH PAPERS

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All for one, one for all: Inter-municipal cooperation and public good provision 2023

A Contributory System of Unemployment Insurance: The Italian Experience 2023

Let the Water Flow: The Impact of Electrification on Agriculture 2022  
with *Geetika Nagpal*

## RESEARCH EXPERIENCE AND OTHER EMPLOYMENT

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Brown University, Economics Department Providence, RI  
Research Assistant for Emily Oster and John Friedman 2019–2021

Action Institute Milan, Italy  
Research Associate 2017

Universita' Bocconi Milan, Italy  
Research Assistant for Selim Gulesci, Simon Goerlach and David Stuckler 2016–2018

## TEACHING

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### Teaching Assistant at Brown University

- Applied Research Methods for Economists (*Professors: Daniel Björkgren and Matthew Pecenco*) 2023
- Introduction to Econometrics (*Professor: Stelios Michalopoulos*) Spring 2020
- Theory of Behavioral Economics (*Professor: Geoffroy De Clippel*) Fall 2019

## SCHOLARSHIPS AND AWARDS

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- S4 Graduate Student Paper Prize - Honorable Mention, Brown University 2022
- Population Studies and Training Center Summer Fellowship, Brown University Department of Economics 2020
- Graduate Student Scholarship, Brown University 2016 - 2021

## OTHER

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- **Conferences Participations:** [SIEP 2023](#)
- **Languages:** Italian (native), English and French