


Software Verification

CS162: Programming Languages



Software Verification

Overview



Software Verification

Overview

	
Java	Will my program ever dereference a null pointer?
C/C++	Is there going to be memory leaks?
Smart contracts	Is someone else be able to to transfer money out of my account?
Self-driving cars	Will the system crash into pedestrians?
Rocket control	Are there potential integer overflows?

Software Verification

Overview



Ariane 5 rocket (June 4, 1996)

Exploded due to an overflow
conversion from 64-bit to 16-bit int.

Rocket control


Are there potential integer overflows?

Type Checking

“Featherweight verification”



λ^+ program +
type annotations




Type Checking

“Featherweight verification”



λ^+ program +
type annotations



Will the program get stuck?

How to verify more interesting properties?

Formal Proofs

“Heavyweight verification”

- Treat programs and properties as *mathematical objects*
- *Prove* those properties as you would prove a mathematical theorem.
- Have a program to *check* the proofs for you.

Formal Proofs

The Coq proof assistant

23. Formula for Pythagorean Triples

David Delahaye (in [coq-contribs/fermat4](#)):

```
Lemma pytha_thm3 : forall a b c : Z,  
  is_pytha a b c -> Zodd a ->  
  exists p : Z, exists q : Z, exists m : Z,  
    a = m * (q * q - p * p) /\ b = 2 * m * (p * q) /\  
    c = m * (p * p + q * q) /\ m >= 0 /\  
    p >= 0 /\ q > 0 /\ p <= q /\ (rel_prime p q) /\  
    (distinct_parity p q).
```

Formal Proofs


The Coq proof assistant

Coq has been used to certify many *safety-critical* systems:

- **CompCert**: certified C language compiler
- **CertiKOS**: certified concurrent OS kernel
- **Verifiable C**: program logic for C language

Formal Proofs

Problem 1: Development effort




Implementation Tests

...Previously

Formal Proofs


Problem 1: Development effort



Need to write 10x more code.


Formal Proofs

Problem 2: Maintenance effort



New code breaks proofs!





Dafny

Verification via pre- and post-conditions

```
method Abs(x: int) returns (y: int)
  ensures 0 <= y
{
  if x < 0
  { return -x; }
  else
  { return x; }
}
```


Dafny

Hoare logic (aka Floyd–Hoare logic)



Robert W. Floyd



Tony Hoare

Dafny

Hoare logic: The good

- Given a pre-condition P and a statement s , we can infer what effect s has on P , i.e., we infer a post-condition Q .
 - E.g., if P is $x > 0$, after executing $x := x + 1$, we know Q is $x > 1$.
- To check if a function satisfies some P and Q :
 - Propagate P from the beginning to the end of the function, obtaining Q_0 .
 - Check if Q_0 implies Q .

Dafny

Hoare logic: The bad

- Caveat: Cannot propagate conditions through a loop!

```
 $P = \{x = 0\}$   
while  $\langle condition \rangle$   
   $x := x + 1;$   
 $Q = \{?\}$ 
```

- Need to manually provide *loop invariants* — formulas that summarize a loop's behavior.
- Loop invariants can be extremely tricky. \exists tons of work that try to infer them automatically.

Refinement Types


```
average  :: [Int] -> Int  
average xs = sum xs `div` length xs
```

```
average  :: {v:[Int] | length(v) > 0} -> Int  
average xs = sum xs `div` length xs
```

Refinement Types

= base type + refinement

- Encode *refined* information in the type system.
- **Expressivity:** Along with datatypes, allow us to express data structures whose invariants are enforced *statically*.
- **Automation:** A variant (called liquid types) admits *decidable* type inference.
- Successful in:
 - Verifying low-level C programs
 - Verifying deep learning models
 - Proving arithmetic overflow safety in smart contracts (from Prof. Feng's group!)
 - ...



Further Reading

- Formal verification in Coq:
 - The Software Foundations series
- Dafny:
 - Tutorial
- Refinement/liquid types:
 - Patrick Rondon's PhD thesis
 - Tutorial on liquid types
- SMT solvers: Take 292C in spring!