

Digital Forensics lab set-up

Location and physical security (I)

■ **secure facility**

- geographical location
 - remote or easily securable
 - free from vulnerabilities to natural disasters or interference
- implement defense in-depth multi-layered security
 - biometric access (fingerprints, iris scans)
 - keycard entry systems
 - video surveillance (CCTV) and 24/7 security personnel
 - alarm systems integrated with local law enforcement

Location and physical security (II)

- **air-gapped environment**

- physically isolated system (including the internet)
- prevent any external connection to workstations or network sections

- **faraday cage rooms**

- prevent external wireless signals from interfering or compromising data-processing area

- **environmental control**

- maintain appropriate temperature and humidity for electronic devices (servers, workstations)
- fire suppression systems to protect from fire
 - ...with no harm to electronic devices
 - e.g. based on Halon or FM-200

Data Protection (I)

■ **segregated networks**

- network segmentation (analysis, data storage, sensitive communication)
 - through VLAN and/or VPN
- encrypted communication
 - adopting high-grade encryption standard (AES-256, RSA-4096)

■ **least-privileged access control**

- role or attribute based
 - e.g. *admins* for system management
 - *analysts* for digital forensics analysis
 - *supervisors* for auditing and review

Data Protection (II)

■ disaster data recovery readiness

- (verified) back-up systems
- (verified) uninterruptible power supplies (UPS)

■ logging

- enable logging for all critical components
 - servers, workstations, databases
 - operating system logs (e.g. *login attemps*, *file access*, *administrative actions*)
 - network devices (e.g. *routers*, *firewalls*, *switches*)
 - logs on network activity, configurations changes, access attemps
 - end-user devices
 - app-specific logs, user activity, critical transactions

Data Protection (III)

■ auditing readiness

- availability of audit trails
 - user specific
 - e.g. login-logout times, executed commands, accessed files, configuration changes
 - application specific
 - e.g. database audit logs to track queries on sensitive information and administrative actions
- immutable trails storage
 - WORM (write-once- read many)
 - hashing and/or digital signatures
 - Policy-based access-restriction
 - e.g. based on separation-of-duty principle (different roles to r/w)

Hardware requirements (I)

- **high-performance workstations**

- fast multi-core processors
- consistent RAM (128GB or more)
- high-speed SSDs (many TBs)

- **storage forensic servers**

- large-scale storage for forensic images (tens of Terabytes organised in RAID HD and backup servers)

- **HW acceleration for specific tasks**

- e.g. GPU for password cracking

Hardware requirements (II)

- write-blockers
- imaging devices
 - e.g. tableau comprehensive imaging
- mobile device acquisition tools
 - e.g. Cellebrite UFED

IMAGING RESPONSE KIT TX1 (IRK TX1)



Source: <https://siliconforensics.com/products/forensic-hardware/tableau-instant-imaging-response-kits.html>



Source: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cellebrite_UFED#/media/File:Ufed_mobile_phone_imaging_device_\(8661348282\).jpg](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cellebrite_UFED#/media/File:Ufed_mobile_phone_imaging_device_(8661348282).jpg)

Hardware requirements (III) - UFED

■ Universal Forensic Extraction Device

- complete physical device storage image extraction
- bit-by-bit copy of flash memory
- access to hidden files and directory
- access to specific content (contacts, SMS, call logs, multimedia, ...)
- (with credential knowledge) can extract cloud data associated with the mobile
 - (e.g. iCloud, Google drive, social media like instagram and Facebook, ...)
- can extract data from many apps (e.g. *WhatsApp, FB messenger, Snapchat*)
- can support encryption/locking bypass
 - exploiting brute-forcing and mobile vulnerabilities

Software

■ Forensics lab must provide

- flexibility and scalability
 - due to different scenarios requirements
- provide safe environments
 - where evidences can be analysed with no system integrity compromise
- easy recovery after a "failure scenario"
 - because some tests might be pretty "invasive"...
- when possible, should have a "roaming soul" ...
 - ...to go, when possible, to the crime scene

Portable OS

- **create a trusted environment**
 - not related to the one under analysis
- **many solutions based on linux distros “live CDs” (often Debian or Ubuntu based)**
 - security general-purpose
 - GRML, Kali, ...
 - forensics special-purpose
 - CAINE, Helix, SIFT, DEFT, Tsurugi, ...
- **also in a virtual machine**
 - copy the evidences in the VM
 - create virtual disks
 - and attach them to the virtual environment

Mounting (I)

- **the process of making a file system accessible**
 - suitable to interact with
 - local file systems (e.g. ext4, NTFS, HFS, ...)
 - external physical devices (like usb drives, DVDs, SDs, ...)
 - network file systems (like NFS, SMB, ...)
- **at a specific "point" in the directory tree**
 - This is the root of the "new" file system
 - i.e. you can navigate it from that "point"
 - known as "*mount point*"
 - e.g. `/mnt/usb`

Mounting (II)

- **mounting process involves**
 - checking of the file system on the storage medium for errors
 - loading the file system's metadata
 - how files and directories are organized
 - associating the "new" file system with a mount point in the existing directory hierarchy
- **once mounted, the operating system can read from and write to the mounted file system with usual operations**
- **linux example (shell commands):**
 - *mount /dev/sdb1 /mnt/usb*
 - *ls -la /mnt/usb*

Mounting (III)

■ unmounting is the reverse operation

- detaches the file system from the directory structure
- crucial for safely removing storage device due to caching and buffering techniques for performance improvement
 - ongoing I/O operation
 - write-behind cache
 - delayed writing changes to disk
 - open files in active processes
 - internal file system structures (e.g. file pointers) may become inconsistent if the file system is brutally removed
 - Inconsistent integrity information
 - metadata that track the state of the file system might not be updated

Mounting (IV)

■ unmounting steps are thus

- data buffers flushing
 - OS writes cached data from memory to drives
- closing of open file handles
 - OS closes any active file handles, ensuring no further file access
- updating file system metadata
 - OS update metadata and journal on the file system (e.g. changes on the directory structure, file permissions, ownership)
- file system detaching
 - OS detaches file system from the directory hierarchy, ensuring no more r/w possible operations on the drive

Command line tools for devices interactions

- **informations on connected (even not mounted) devices**
 - e.g. *dmesg, lsblk, fdisk, eventvwr, Get-WinEvent, device manager, Get-Disk, Get-Partition, wmic diskdrive, DiskPart, ...*
- **mounting in an integrity preserving way**
 - *mount -o ro /dev/sdb1 /mnt/usb*
- **mounting verification**
 - *mount | grep sdb1*
 - */dev/sdb1 on /mnt/usb type vfat (ro, noexec, nosuid, nodev)*
 - *ro*: read-only
 - *noexec*: prevents execution of binaries on the mounted file system
 - *nosuid*: disable the set-user ID bits on files on the mounted systems (cannot run with elevated privileges)
 - *nodev*: No special "device" files on the mounted system

Possible device types (I)

■ **block device**

- handle data in fixed size blocks
- allow for random access
 - *find /dev -type b*

■ **character device**

- handle data as continuous stream
 - e.g. terminals and consoles
 - *ls -l /dev |grep '^c'*

Possible device types (II)

■ network device

- handle packet-based data transfer
- use sockets and syscall to communicate
 - e.g. */dev/wlan0*

■ pseudo-device

- interface to software feature
- not directly related to actual HW
 - but can emulate HW features
 - e.g. */dev/null*, */dev/zero*, */dev/random*, */dev/loop*

■ special-purpose device

- very specific purpose for system function (managing system memory, interacting with the kernel, ...)
- e.g. */dev/mem* */dev/kmem*, */dev/console*

access to data at rest (Linux)

■ through the filesystem (after mounting process)

- access to device data from the mount point
- adopt usual file system metaphors
 - files, directories, metadata, ...
 - OS manage and update metadata
 - usual file operation (read, write, delete)
 - access control through file system rules (e.g. rwx) and usual operation (e.g. *ls*, *cp*, *mv*, *chmod*)

■ through direct access

- to the block device (e.g. */dev/sda1*)
- allow access to raw (unstructured) blocks of data
 - risk of data corruption (no file system validation, access through byte level commands like *dd* or *hexdump*)
 - fundamental for bit-by-bit copy

Linux distro interaction with devices

- **mount block devices as read-only**

- many times by default
- through command-line tool
 - *mount -o ro /dev/sdb1 /mnt/evidence1*

- **set the block device to read-only**

- e.g. through command line tool like *blockdev* ioctls
 - *blockdev --setro /dev/sdb1*

- **or through GUI**

- e.g. CAINE (11.x) provides *UnBlock* graphic tool
 - list of devices and write permission status
 - allow to change from/to Read-Only and Read-Write

disk image mounting

- **disk image = file containing bit-per-bit copy of an HD**
 - can be obtained through command-line tools like *dd*
- **manipulated as a normal physical device**
- **there are both GUIs and command line based tools**
 - *e.g. disk Image Mounter (CAINE 11.x)*
 - click and choose the file image
 - *imount* command line utility to mount volumes in *Encase* and *dd* format
 - *imount -v image.dd*

Write-protected set-up

■ attach the Device

- physically connect the storage device to your forensic workstation
- preferably use a hardware write blocker to ensure no writes occur physically.

■ set block device to Read-Only

■ mount Filesystem in Read-Only Mode

■ check the mount status

- e.g. `mount | grep /mnt/<yourforensicdir>`

■ verify Read-Only Status of the Block Device

- e.g. `blockdev --getro /dev/sdX`

■ Note: device level protection override filesystem requests

- ...but may cause errors and inconsistencies (journal/metadata)