## Intro to Cybersecurity

**UT LAW 379M** 

Spring 2021

Lecture Notes

#### About the Instructor











#### What about You?

- Why did you take this course?
- What is your technology background like?
- O What has been your favorite course so far? Why?
- What is your learning style?
- What is your favorite teaching style?

## The 5 Orders of Ignorance

- Oth Order: Known Knowns
- 1st Order: Known Unknowns
- 2<sup>nd</sup> Order: Unknown Unknowns
- 3<sup>rd</sup> Order: Unknown methods for discovering unknown unknowns
- 4<sup>th</sup> Order: Unknown methods for exploring the orders of ignorance

(Adapted from Phillip Armour, "The Five Orders of Ignorance")

## The 5 Orders of Ignorance

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EDUCATION

SKILL

(Adapted from Phillip Armour, "The Five Orders of Ignorance")

## A Few Introductory Notes

- This course is still a little new for me
- I'm still developing the materials
- Please feel free to make suggestions or raise concerns

# Schedule Part 1 Basics and Background

	<b>y</b>	
1/25	Introduction to the class and cybersecurity	Assigned: reading 1
2/1	computer background	Assigned: reading 2
		Due: reading 1
2/8	Networking and Internet:	Assigned: reading 3
		Due: reading 2
2/15	In-class Networking Examples	Assigned: reading 4, lab 1
		Due: reading 3
2/22	Introduction to Cyber Security	Assigned: reading 5
		Due: reading 4
3/1	lecture: Authentication, Authorization	Assigned: reading 6, lab 2
		Due: reading 5, lab 1
3/8	Symmetric Cryptography	Assigned: reading 7
		Due: reading 6

## Schedule Part 2 Threats and Defences

3/22	Asymmetric Crypto	Assigned: reading 8, lab 3
		Due: reading 7, lab 2
3/29	Malware - Viruses, Trojans, Ransomware	Assigned: reading 9
		Due: reading 8
4/5	Host Security and Vulnerabilities	Assigned: reading 10
		Due: reading 9
4/12	Perimeter Security Technologies	Assigned: reading 11
		Due: reading 10
4/19	Web Threats and Defenses	Assigned: reading 12
		Due: reading 11, lab 3
4/26	Overlay Network Threats - Email, Social Media	Assigned: lab 4
		Due: reading 12

#### Class Discussions

- I hate slides and I hate "lectures"
- I only use them because I haven't found something better
- Please read before class, come prepared to discuss
- You will be assigned to discuss out-of-class as well

## Grading

- 60% labs (15% each)
- 10% participation
- 30% Exams
  - 1 Midterm
  - 1 "floating" Final
  - 0 15% each

## Readings

- O I've tried a bunch of books. I hate them all
- All free materials available online
- Ross Anderson's "Security Engineering"
  - This IS a great book
  - Second edition is free online

## Reading Policies

- Read before class for class discussion
- Each week, in groups, discuss previous week's reading
- Discuss via text-based system and submit transcript

#### Clarification about Reading

- O Difference between "reading" and "reading discussion"
- Syllabus says "reading due". This just means read before class
- Reading discussions are different
  - In your group, discuss previous week's reading
  - Submit discussion transcript (may use Canvas)

#### Labwork

- lab 1 Wireshark and Browsing
- lab 2 Password Cracking
- lab 3 Certificates and Public Keys
- lab 4 Phishing Contest

#### Labwork Policies

- PASS/FAIL Not worth it to do part
- You may talk to other students about the labs
- But you must do your own work
- I also will provide help sections as needed

#### Exams

- Essay based thought questions
- Open book, open note
- I hate memorization/regurgitation
- Usually involve a hypothetical

## Exam Sample Question

Every one complains about passwords and that they need to be replaced. Although every now and then someone comes up with a new replacement but they never seem to get much traction, so the search continues. Regardless of whatever new technology comes along to replace passwords, there are certain fundamental problems that will have to be solved. Write an essay explaining what kinds of evaluations YOU would do for a password-replacement technology.

Do not speculate about how this imaginary technology works, just imagine it to be some kind of "black box" authentication mechanism. Instead, focus your essay on the psychological, technical, and perhaps even mathematical problems that you would require it to solve or address before you believed it to be a "good" replacement. Because this is hypothetical, you can address this from a number of different angles. Your score for this essay will be based on how well you understand user authentication including principles related to "something you know", "something you have", and "something you are." You may also get score for applying Anderson's concepts on user psychology and security engineering.

## Grading

- Standard Scale
- Last semester, average was about 93%
- This semester, targeting 87%

## Introducing Cybersecurity

- This is a very broad concept
- Includes concepts of technology, psychology, etc etc.
- Where to start?
- Let's start with Ross Anderson's "Security Engineering"

## What is "Security Engineering"?

- "[It] is about building systems to remain dependable in the face of ..."
  - Malice
  - Error
  - Mischance.
- "As a discipline, it focuses on the..."
  - O Tools
  - O Processes
  - Methods

#### The Goal

- Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability (CIA Triad)
- For new systems:
  - Design security
  - Implement security
  - Test security
- For existing systems:
  - Adapt them for increased security
  - Adapt them as their environment evolves

## "Having" Security

- Everyone wants "security". But how?
- "Whoever thinks his problem can be solved using cryptography, doesn't understand his problem and doesn't understand cryptography."
  - Attributed by Roger Needham and Butler Lampson to Each Other


## **Key Observation**

and covertness. But many systems fail because their designers protect the wrong things, or protect the right things but in the wrong way.

Anderson, Ch 1, p. 4

#### A Framework

- O Policy
- Mechanism
- Assurance
- O Incentives



**Figure 1.1:** Security Engineering Analysis Framework

#### Some Definitions

- System Tech + Auxiliary Tech + Staff + Users + etc.
- Subject Physical "person"
- Principal Entity in the system
- Identity Unique label attached to a unique principal
- Trusted Failure results in compromise
- Trustworthy Failure is unlikely

## CIA (Not the Spies)

- Confidentiality Cannot be read
- Integrity Cannot be altered
- Availability Cannot be interrupted

#### **Understand This**

So if you're the owner of the company, don't fall into the trap of believing that the only possible response to a vulnerability is to fix it, and distrust the sort of consultant who can only talk about 'tightening security'. Often it's too tight already, and what you really need to do is just focus it slightly differently.

Anderson, Ch 25, p. 816

## **Anderson's Examples**

- O Bank
- Military
- Hospital
- O Home

#### IAAA

- Identity Unique label for a unique principal
- Authentication Validation of the principal's identity
- Authorization Permissions granted the prinicpal
- Accountability Metering and auditing of principal
- (Message Authenticity Integrity + Freshness)

#### Grasp the Context

- SECURITY IS ABOUT CONTEXT (Repeat after me)
- What does it mean when you say "system X is secure"?
  - Secure against whom?
  - Secure under what conditions?
  - Are we even protecting what matters?!
- Take voting security
  - O Who are the potential attackers?
  - How does the context change if a nation decides to be the attacker?

## Start with Policy

- "...a succinct statement of a system's protection strategy"
   (Anderson ch1 p. 15)
- Examples:
  - Each credit must be matched by an equal and opposite debit
  - All transactions over \$1,000 must be authorized by two managers.
- O Practice:
  - What are the security policies for TLS?

## Then figure out mechanism

- This is where most security people like to start
- But really we only need mechanism to enforce policy
- Some mechanisms aren't even technical (e.g., legal)
- MUST understand threat model


#### Assurance

- O Just how strong/resilient/comprehensive is the mechanism?
- Requires a solid understanding of the threat model
- Applications at every stage!
  - Design solid security engineering principles
  - Implementation coding practices, development processes
  - Testing adversarial, comprehensive assessment

#### Incentives

- Anderson's example of airport security
- What motivates the behavior?
- What is "Security Theater?"
- Everyone should learn a little game theory
  - O Read up on Prisoner's dilemma
  - Understand "mechanism design"
  - Anderson's "Moral Hazard" (Chapter 25)

#### Illustrations



## **Psychology**

- Much of computer security rests on psychology
- Phishing, email scams, etc all depend on user psych.
- Security mechanisms avoided because they clash with psych.

#### **Understanding Human Bias**

- Humans are not rational
- Humans are designed with a bias toward action
  - If we thought about everything we'd never do anything
  - We're programmed to act without thinking
- Examples of bias:
  - We're more afraid of dying in a plane crash than a car crash

#### When Emotion Takes Over

- When human logic/thinking ends, emotions take over
- If we don't know explicitly what to do, we respond emotionally
- So, sometimes education has limited value
  - Bad guys will always learn how to exploit what the users dont know
- One solution is safe defaults (FAIL SAFE/FAIL SECURE!)
  - "Our bank will never, ever send email"

#### CAPTCHAS

- Good case study!
  - Combine psychology, usability, and system design nicely
  - Designed around what humans do well that computers do not
  - "Completely Automated Public Turing Test to Tell Computers and Humans Apart"
  - Thanks Alan Turing!



## Important Security Principles

- Least privilege
- Minimize attack surface
- Defense in depth
- Separation of duties and responsibilities
- Crowdsourcing
- Open systems
- Fail Safe/Fail Secure

#### Course Goals

- Understand how secure systems are constructed
  - Underlying concepts, such as policy and mechanism
  - Tools, such as cryptography
  - Systems, such as perimeter defense
- Understand how "secure" systems are deconstructed (attacked)
  - Underlying concepts, such as "halting problem"
  - Tools, such as vulnerabilities
  - "Systems" such as Advanced Persistent Threats