

# Malicious Software

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UT CS361S

FALL 2020

LECTURE NOTES

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# What is “Malicious Code”?

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“Software or firmware intended to perform an ***unauthorized*** process that will have ***adverse impacts*** on the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of a system. A virus, worm, Trojan horse, or other code-based entity that infects a host. Spyware and some forms of adware are also examples of malicious code.”

NIST Special Publication 800-53, Revision 5

# Common Malware Classes

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Malware can be classified by how it spreads or generically behaves

- Virus – typically has to be attached to another program (infection)
- Worm – typically spreads via network vulnerabilities
- Trojan Horse – typically appears benign but contains hostile operations

Malware can also be classified by its behavior

- Spyware – typically designed to steal information, observe behavior, etc.
- Adware – typically designed to “trap” a user into viewing certain ads
- Ransomware – typically locks data unless the user pays a ransom

# Two Primary Components

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Payload – The code that performs the (harmful) action

Attack Vector/Exploit/Delivery – The code that enables the payload

- May include a transmission component
- May include a stealth component
- May include a mechanism for bypassing security
- May be as simple as an email with an attachment

# Malware History

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Much of early computer security driven by military concerns

The biggest concern was an unauthorized user or program

Other concerns developed over time

The following slides are a very brief overview/highlight

# 1972 Government Report:

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The technical issue of multilevel computer security is concerned with the concept of malicious threat. By this we recognize that the nature of shared use multilevel computer systems present to a malicious user a unique opportunity for attempting to subvert through programming the mechanism upon which security depends (i. e., the control of the computer vested in the operating system). This threat, coupled with the concentration of the application (data, control system, etc. ) in one place (the computer system) makes computers a uniquely attractive target for malicious (hostile) action. Recognition of the implication of malicious threat is important to understanding the security limitations surrounding application of contemporary computer systems. The threat that a single user of a system operating as a hostile agent can simply modify an operating system to by-pass or suspend security controls, and the fact that the operating system controlling the computer application(s) is developed outside of USAF control, contribute strongly to the reluctance to certify (i. e., be convinced) that contemporary systems are secure or even can be secured.

<https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD0758206.pdf>

# 1987: Fred Cohen's Viruses

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“Computer Viruses: Theory and Experiments” Fred Cohen, 1987

Introduced the concept of a self-replicating, evil program

The program attaches to a “good” program infecting it

When the infected program is run, the virus runs

The virus does it's evil AND spreads itself to other programs

Concepts first proposed by Cohen in 1984

# 1988: Morris Worm

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Robert Morris wrote a self-spreading piece of code (worm)

Spread using exploits in:

- send mail,
- Finger
- rsh/rexec

Also guessed weak passwords

Copied code to new machine, compiled, and executed

Accidentally re-infected machines until machines became unusable

DOS attack brought down the Internet



# Impact of Early Viruses

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Amazingly, most early malware ***DID MINIMAL DAMAGE***

Often just a delivery system with a weak payload

Many viruses spread for the sake of spreading

Even the Morris worm was disruptive by accident

There were exceptions, but also plenty of hype

# 1995: Concept Macro Virus

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Microsoft Word and Excel have limited scripting (“Macros”)

Concept was the first virus written completely as a macro

It was a delivery system only with no payload

But was an important proof-of-concept

Users often open documents directly from email

# 2000: I Love You

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Visual Basic Script virus

Appears as email attachment:

- LOVE-LETTER-FOR-YOU.txt.vbs
- The .vbs often hidden on Windows

When executed:

- Damaged many office files
- Sent email out to email address book ***automatically***

Spread worldwide in hours

# 2004: MyDoom

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Fastest spreading mass mailer virus at the time

- Slows overall internet performance by about 10%
- Slows average web page load times by about 50% percent
- Responsible for approximately one in ten e-mail messages.

Appears as a delivery error, mail error, etc

Includes an attachment that, if clicked on, mails out copies

Also attempted to spread via P2P file sharing Kazaa

Opened a back door for remote control

Attempted to launch a DDOS against the SCO Group's website

# 2005: Sony Rootkit

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Sony CD's from the 2004-2005 era installed a “Rootkit”

- Rootkit, as name implies, usually installs with elevated access
- Using this elevated access, it can change the OS
- This bypasses usual security such as antivirus, etc
- Also usually very good at being undetectable

Installed at root with an EULA ***that did not mention the software***

In 2005, ***US-CERT ISSUED AN ADVISORY!!!***

Texas, ***under Greg Abbot***, was the first state to sue

# Why is the Sony Rootkit So Bad?

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In addition to violations of privacy, etc, caused:

- Slowing the system, consuming resources
- False alarms from antivirus

## ***OPENED HOLES FOR ADDITIONAL MALWARE***

- “Stinx-E trojan”

# 2013: Cryptolocker

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Modern Ransomware

(1980's had a ransomware called CyberAIDS)

Locks up system and uses public key crypto

In addition to fiat currency, accepted BitCoin

# 2016: Mirai

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Worm that finds vulnerabilities in IoT devices

Takes over the device (“Zombie”)


Coordinates all devices with a Command and Control

Launched a powerful DDOS against “krebs on security”



# Command and Control Concept

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# Zero-day Vulnerabilities

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What is a **ZERO DAY** exploit?

It is a vulnerability to a system for which a fix/defense is not yet available

Notice this isn't a very technical term

Could be in any form

- Virus
- Worm
- Trojan

Typically, the context is *serious* vulnerability

- Privilege escalation
- Login bypassing

# Simultaneously New and Old

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Obviously, by definition, zero day vulnerabilities are not new

- Every vulnerability starts out as a zero-day

But the *CONTEXT* has changed so drastically in recent years

- Political shifts (Drones, “Smart Power”)
- Ubiquity of Computing
- Reliance on Computing
- Automation
- Speed of information dissemination
- Broader knowledge of computing among the masses
- Tools

# Zero Days from 2005 until Now

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In the last ten years, a true “market” has emerged for buying zero-day’s

December 2005 – Fearwall tried to sell an exploit on Ebay

2006 – Unnamed security firm began selling exploits to US defense firms

2006 – Unnamed security firm had Charlie Miller selling exploits to U.S.

- I was there at the time but wasn’t involved
- Didn’t really know what was going on
- My current knowledge is from the book “Countdown to Zero Day”

2011 – “Middlemen” that broker deals

Currently, companies like VUPEN, etc

# What are Zero-Days used for?

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## Defensive testing

- Some companies/agencies/groups buy zero-days for advanced penetration testing
- If one system is compromised, how do the others do?
- Why don't they report these?

## Bug bounties

## Private Black Market

- Anonymous
- Russian Mafia

## Military

# Militarization of Cyberspace

## Why Cyberweapons are seductive

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- Plausible deniability
- Secrecy
- Potential to minimize casualties on both sides
- Cost effectiveness
- Political convenience
- CURRENTLY, ambiguity of law and regulation

# Risks of Cyberweapons

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
**ONE:** Everything is interconnected

**TWO:** Humanity is reliant on automation

**THREE:** Law of Unintended Consequences

# Early DOS Viruses

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# Early “Anti Virus”

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“Virus Bulletin” started in 1989

Still available at [www.virusbulletin.com](http://www.virusbulletin.com)

Used to print **BYTE SEQUENCES** of known viruses

**8 Tunes** - CER: The virus probably originates in Germany and infects COM and EXE files. The length of the virus code is 1971 bytes. When triggered, it will play one out of eight different tunes. The virus attempts to deactivate two anti-virus programs: Bombsquad and Flushot+.

8 Tunes

33F6 B9DA 03F3 A550 BB23 0353 CB8E D0BC ; Offset variable

Virus Bulletin, January 1991

# Virus Advancements

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Antivirus scanners emerged with “libraries” of virus signatures

In response, viruses became “polymorphic”

- Each infection encrypts virus under a different key
- Decryption engine decrypts virus for operations
- Encryption means that each infection has unique bytes

# Polymorphic Virus Diagram

may soon make this approach unattractive.




Figure 1. Polymorphic virus infection process

**“Automated extraction of polymorphic virus signatures using abstract interpretation” by Chaumette and Tabary**

# Antivirus Solution Classes

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## Static Analysis

- Analyze the actual code of the virus

## Dynamic Analysis

# Solutions

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## Advanced Signatures

- Signature is not just a byte sequence
- Each “signature” is a mini-program of detection instructions

## Partial Interpreter

- Virus usually takes control early
- Interpret the first bytes to see if its decrypting

## Heuristics

- Look for “telltale” signs
- Minimally effective; too many false positives

# Virus Delivery vs Payload

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Much of the focus on Viruses is the delivery

How does it spread?

How does it bypass security?

Payload can be deleting

# 1984: Thompson's Reflections

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“Reflections on Trusting Trust” by Ken Thompson, 1984

Demonstrated creating an evil compiler

Would compile a login program with a backdoor

BUT! Compiler code is compiled ***by a compiler***

“Clean” compiler source code compiled by an evil compiler ***is evil!***

Proved that a “source code review” can’t catch all evil

***SUPPLY CHAIN***