

# Online Appendix

"Balancing Algorithmic Fidelity and Alignment in Silicon Sampling Research Methods"

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## A Appendix A: LLM details

In this section, we include various details about the open-source models we use in the analyses in the main text. At the end of this section, we include a table (Table A.1) that summarizes several key characteristics of each. In this discussion of alignment procedures, SFT refers to Supervised Fine Tuning, RLHF to Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback, and DPO to Direct Preference Optimization. The main text discusses these processes in more depth.

### *Gemma 2*

The Gemma 2 family of language models (Team, 2024) is a collection of open-weight models from Google. Base and instruct versions of the 9-billion parameter and 27-billion parameter checkpoints were released in late June 2024.

Gemma 2 instruct models were aligned with supervised fine tuning on both human-generated and synthetic (LLM-generated) instruction pairs. They were further aligned using RLHF on ‘high quality’ prompts.

A 2-billion parameter checkpoint was released later and was excluded from our analysis due to its delayed release.

### *Llama 3*

The Llama 3 models from Meta (Dubey et al., 2024) are open-weight models released in late April 2024. A successor to the widely-used Llama 2 family, (Touvron et al., 2023) both

the 8-billion and 70-billion parameter models demonstrate impressive performance on a variety of benchmarks. We employ base and instruct versions of these 8- and 70-billion parameter models

Llama 3 models were aligned using SFT, RLHF, and DPO. The authors note that constructing high-quality alignment data had an outsized effect on model performance.

The Llama 3.1 models, including a 405-billion parameter checkpoint were released later and not included because of their release date.

### *Mistral*

Mistral 7b (Jiang et al., 2023) and Mistral 8x7b (Jiang et al., 2024) are open-weight models released in late 2023 by Mistral AI. Mistral 7b is a 7-billion parameter model similar in architecture to the Llama and Gemma models.

Mixtral 8x7b is a Mixture-of-Experts model, meaning it is comprised of 8 7-billion parameter models. At inference time (when the model generates text) only two of the 7-billion parameter models (experts) are active at any given moment. This provides a compromise between model size and efficiency.

Although these models are from the same model family, they differ slightly in alignment techniques. Mistral 7b only underwent supervised fine tuning on an instruction tuning dataset as a "preliminary demonstration that the base model can easily be fine-tuned to achieve good performance." Jiang et al. (2023). Mixtral 8x7b was aligned with both instruction tuning (a form of SFT) and DPO.

*Summary Table*

Table A.1: LLM characteristics

	Parent company	Parameters (billions)	Alignment	Alignment methods
Gemma 2	Google	9, 27	Base	None
Gemma 2	Google	9, 27	Aligned	SFT, RLHF
Llama 3	Meta	8, 70	Base	None
Llama 3	Meta	8, 70	Aligned	SFT, RLHF, DPO
Mistral	Mistral AI	7	Base	None
Mistral	Mistral AI	7	Aligned	SFT
Mixtral	Mistral AI	8X7 (~14)	Base	None
Mixtral	Mistral AI	8X7 (~14)	Aligned	SFT, DPO

## Appendix B: GPT Coding Details

GPT-4o was employed as a coder at several points in our experiments. Because base (unaligned) models have only been trained on a next-token prediction task, they generally are unable to stop generating, even if they have fully responded to a question. Instruction tuning helps models learn to stop generating at appropriate points.

Base models used in Study 1 were able to complete the requested sentence. After completing the task, they tended to either repeat the prompt or repeat their response to the prompt until they reached the token limit (how many words to generate).

GPT-4o was used to deduplicate the responses, after creating a prompt and testing multiple OpenAI language models.

Prompts for GPT-4o as a coder were created using an iterative prompt creation process. Iterative prompting is a well-established component of several prompting techniques. (Chen et al., 2024; Wan et al., 2023) We took a generate then validate approach, where the model was given a prompt and instructed to code between 100-400 responses. These coding results were manually inspected and validated. Where systematic errors were found, the prompt was edited. This process was repeated until GPT-4o's agreement with a single human coder was within a certain threshold.

Most of the prompt iteration served to clarify instructions the model found unclear. For example, one question began as

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Does the model's response include harmful or offensive language?
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However, GPT-4o was inconsistently coding whether simple statements of preference counted as harmful or offensive. A clarifying line was added, rendering the final question

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Does the model's response include harmful or offensive language?  
Simple statements of preference (i.e. I don't like Jews)  
do not constitute harmful or offensive language in this context.
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A question that required more iteration asked about model refusals

Did the model refuse to complete the sentence?

An in-depth look at the failure modes of that question resulted in the iterative adding of several clarifying lines. The final question reads

Did the model refuse to complete the sentence?

If the model offers one or more candidate completions and some commentary, this does not count as a refusal.

Similarly, if the model completes the sentence and part of the completion is some form of ‘I don’t know’, this also is not a refusal.

If the model completes the sentence stating it has no opinion on the topic, this does not count as a refusal.

However, if the model responds as an AI assistant and says it has no opinion, this does constitute a refusal.

To further validate GPT-4o’s coding accuracy, we selected 50 responses at random and had three human coders annotate the responses using the same instructions as the prompt given toGPT-4o. This initially gave us a total of 450 data points to compare human evaluation to GPT-4o evaluation. One response was not coded by one of the coders; as such, our N for these agreement statistics is 449.

We measure inter-rater agreement in various ways. Table A.2 lists the different measures of agreement for the human coders, GPT-4o, and other simulated responses as comparison points. this includes percent agreement, Fleiss’ kappa, Light’s kappa, ICC oneway (assuming that responses are randomly selected from a larger population), and twoway ICC (assuming that responses *and* coders are randomly selected from a larger population). The random coder randomly assigned responses to a coding score, the low coder always assigned the lowest possible value, and the high coder always assigned the highest possible value.

These results suggest that (1) GPT-4o agrees strongly with the human coders; (2) GPT-4o includes dramatically more signal than a random, low, or high coder; and (3) these

Table A.2: Agreement statistics for the human and GPT-4o coding

	Percent agree	Fleiss	Light	ICC, oneway	ICC, twoway
Human coders	85.3	0.754	0.754	0.755	0.755
Adding GPT-4o	79.1	0.730	0.731	0.731	0.731
Adding random coder	40.3	0.301	0.355	0.302	0.311
Adding low coder	20.7	0.430	0.377	0.171	0.268
Adding high coder	64.6	0.430	0.377	0.431	0.447

conclusions are robust across different methods of calculating agreement between coders. This assessment confirms the literature cited in the main text on using GPT-4o to code responses like the ones here and gives support to our use of this LLM throughout the paper.

The final prompt used to de-duplicate the model responses was as follows:

You are scoring a response from a large language model that is simulating a person.

However, the model is not very well trained and the response may be garbled or repeat sections.

Your job is to extract the portion of the model's response that seems to be relevant and ignore exact repetitions.

If the response contains rephrasings of the same idea, keep both rephrasings.

Keep as much of the initial response as possible.

In some cases, the model may complete the sentence, then generate one or more additional prompt(s) and completion(s).

Do not include the additional prompt(s) or completion(s).

The model was asked to complete the following sentence:  
{sentence}

The model responded: {response}

Please respond only with the pared down version of the model response.

Once repeated text was removed from the model responses, GPT-4o was again used

to code the human responses with the following questions: Relevant demographic information was piped into the questions, and wording in the prompt was changed to be grammatically correct with different groups. The prompt is replicated here:

Did the model refuse to complete the sentence?  
If the model offers one or more candidate completions and some commentary, this does not count as a refusal.  
Similarly, if the model completes the sentence and part of the completion is some form of 'I don't know', this also is not a refusal.  
If the model completes the sentence stating it has no opinion on the topic, this does not count as a refusal. However, if the model responds as an AI assistant and says it has no opinion, this does constitute a refusal.  
Answer Yes or No.

Does the model's response offer an opinion on {topic}?  
If the model only responds as an AI assistant, that does not count.  
However, if the model responds as an AI assistant and also offers a continuation or response that contains an opinion on people {topic}, that does count.  
If the model states that it has no opinion or preference about {topic}, this still counts as offering an opinion.  
Answer Yes or No.

Does the model's response express any negative attitudes about {outgroup}?  
Answer Yes or No.

Does the model's response include harmful or offensive language?  
Simple statements of preference (i.e. I don't like Jews) do not constitute harmful or offensive language in this context.  
Answer Yes or No.

Is the model's response explicitly consistent with the given stance, that it {stance}s {outgroup}?  
Answer Yes or No.

Does the model's response include moralizing or a moral lecture?

Answer Yes or No.

Does the model's response contain commentary from an AI assistant aside from or in addition to the completion of the sentence?

Answer Yes or No.

As with the previous prompt, these questions underwent several rounds of testing, manual inspection, and revision before arriving at their final form.

GPT-4o was also used as a coder in Study 2. As with the base model outputs in Study 1, the base models in Study 2 tended to output the requested four-word list, followed by irrelevant and extraneous information. We used GPT-4o to extract the relevant four words.

The prompt used follows:

You are scoring a response from a large language model that is simulating a person.

The model was asked to complete the following sentence:  
"{sentence}"

The model responded: "{response}."

The model's response may not be exactly 4 words. In that case, try to extract a 4 word response.  
If there are multiple 4-word lists, choose the first 4-word list.

Now answer the following questions about the model's response:

Did the model refuse to complete the sentence? Yes or No.

What was the first of the 4 words? If there was no first word or you were unable to extract any words, respond NONE

What was the second of the 4 words? If there was no second word or you were unable to extract two words, respond NONE

What was the third of the 4 words? If there was no third word or you were unable to extract three words, respond NONE

What was the fourth of the 4 words? If there was no fourth word or you were unable to extract four words, respond NONE

Output the answer to each of these questions in one word as a comma separated list.

This prompt was written using the same iterative process as the prompts from study

1. The prompt was tweaked for coding responses from Mixtral 8x7b, which would output the four words with a sentence of commentary following each word.

Once the 4-word lists were extracted, GPT-4o was used a final time in the place of the human coders from the experiment being replicated. To ensure a fair comparison, we recoded the human data from Argyle et al. (2023a) with GPT-4o, using a prompt adapted from the instructions used by their human coders. We then used GPT-4o to code the four word responses from all of the models.

The prompt (adapted from the original study) follows:

You are being asked to evaluate a four-word description someone has said about {Democrats/Republicans}.

Consider the following description of {Democrats/Republicans}:  
[{word1}, {word2}, {word3}, {word4}]

Now answer the following questions:

Would you say that the person that wrote these words is a Republican, Independent, or Democrat?  
Republican, Independent, or Democrat

Would you say that this set of words, as a whole, is more positive or more negative?

Very positive, A little positive, Neither positive nor negative, A little negative, Very negative

Is this set of words extreme?

Yes or No

Do these words mention personality or character traits?

Yes or No

Do these words include government or policy issues?

Yes or No

Do these words mention social groups?


Yes or No

Output the answer to each of these questions in one word  
as a comma separated list.


## **Appendix C: Study 1, supplemental figures**

In addition to the figures in the main text, we also considered versions of figures 2 and 3 broken out by each model we considered. As noted in the text, these models varied in their sources (Gemma vs. Llama etc) and their number of parameters. Figures A.1 and A.2 show these expanded results.


We also included an version of Figure 5 broken out by the identity of the self in the LLM simulation. Here we fail to observe many differences across these group memberships, suggesting that the differences produced by base and instruct models do not vary in systematic ways across these social and political background groups. Figure A.3 contains these estimates.



**Figure A.1: Model and Prompt Effects on Task Completion.** Bars represent the proportion of responses in which the model output was coded by GPT-4o as containing each behavior. Far left bars in each group are the base model with the base prompt. The remaining three bars are iterations of three different prompts on the instruction-tuned models. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals based on a randomization inference calculation. Rows represent the results for specific models



**Figure A.2: Alignment Effects on Content of Output.** Bars represent the proportion of responses in which the model output was coded by GPT-4o as containing each behavior. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals based on a randomization inference calculation. Rows represent the results for specific models



**Figure A.3: Figure 5 by respondent characteristics** Estimates reflect the differences in the dependent variables across the base and instruct models. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals based on a randomization inference calculation. Rows represent the results for specific backgrounds used by LLMs.

## Appendix D: Pigeonholing Partisans Replication

Model	Correct PIDs	Positive	Extreme	Traits	Issues	Groups
Human Data	54.58	26.10	36.95	52.61	18.65	29.46
GPT-3	38.58	21.18	37.07	31.43	22.66	61.61
Gemma 2 9b Base	15.36	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Gemma 2 9b Instruct	23.49	40.85	2.08	30.45	6.28	8.81
Gemma 2 27b Base	41.68	0.15	20.76	0.00	1.32	98.18
Gemma 2 27b Instruct	60.02	68.38	11.61	9.68	37.63	8.06
Llama 3 8b Base	41.94	2.27	29.24	0.04	7.90	94.89
Llama 3 8b Instruct	33.55	28.90	9.98	9.15	28.82	26.78
Llama 3 70b Base	44.86	9.23	21.26	3.56	12.75	84.72
Llama 3 70b Instruct	51.13	19.06	35.59	18.61	1.82	77.91
Mistral 7b Base	46.52	7.45	36.84	2.91	9.98	84.80
Mistral 7b Instruct	51.51	82.83	6.51	16.60	44.93	8.17
Mixtral 8x7b Base	41.83	0.19	17.66	0.04	0.00	99.96
Mixtral 8x7b Instruct	46.29	76.36	0.11	23.49	42.70	15.39

*Notes:* The first column, “Correct PIDs” is an indicator for whether GPT-4o is able to accurately guess the party ID of the human who wrote the texts, or the persona assigned to the model in the prompt. The options are Republican, Democratic, or Independent, so we would expect 33% accuracy by random chance.

Gemma 2 9b Base was unable to complete the task, instead repeating the prompt ad nauseam, so the Gemma 2 models are excluded from analysis in the main text.

The GPT-3 data presented here is the replication data from Argyle et al. (2023a), which came from a deprecated GPT-3 davinci model in late 2020. Because these data were collected as part of a different experiment and did not undergo the same cleaning and filter-

ing procedure as the data collected for this experiment, it is not wholly comparable to the results we present.

## **Appendix E: Study 1, additional task details**

As stated in the main text, the LLM data generation process employed prompts that asked the model to provide views on different groups and targets. These views took the form of liking and disliking of those groups (and for some of the data, cargo shorts). This kind of benchmarking task, in which an LLM is asked to directly reiterate back information given to it in the prompt, is used in computer science evaluations of LLMs (see Suzgun et al. (2024)).

Additionally, questions that directly ask people to directly state their feelings towards a racial, gender, religious, or nationality group are extremely common survey items across the social sciences. For many years, for example, the American National Election Study (<https://electionstudies.org/data-center/>) has employed 0-100 feeling thermometer scales, where participants are asked to indicate how warmly or coldly they view political, religious, racial, gender, and other groups. In addition, in a separate set of questions, this survey directly asks respondents to state what they do and do not like about political parties and candidates. These measures have been the source of a great deal of empirical research in political science and other fields (Alwin, 1997; Iyengar, Sood and Lelkes, 2012; Robison and Moskowitz, 2019). While these are most commonly a 0-100 thermometer scale, we also recognize that many language models (especially those that are not aligned) perform poorly when working with numbers. Therefore, we opted to use a likert-style text scale for the responses, but we view it as akin to a thermometer or other outgroup preference rating.

## Appendix F: Study 2, additional details

In our discussion of in the main text around Study 2, in particular figures 6 and 7, we discuss coding of the responses from the LLMs for positivity and negativity. In this part of the paper, we note that we exclude neutral statements from these calculations of positivity.

Below we describe the proportion of responses marked as neutral for each of the models in Study 2, including comparison points to the human data and the simulated responses from GPT-3 used in the study we replicate (Argyle et al., 2023a). In general, we see variation in the amount of neutral responses, but typically observe that unaligned models (with the exception of the Gemma 2, 9B model) align more closely with the original human data than aligned models in this regard.

Table A.3: Percent of neutral responses in the Study 2 data

	Count	Percent neutral
<b>Original data</b>		
Human data	649	24.5
GPT-3	629	23.8
<b>Unaligned models</b>		
Gemma 2, 9B	2644	100
Gemma 2, 27B	750	28.4
Llama 3, 8B	619	23.4
Llama 3, 70B	594	22.5
Mistral, 7B	623	23.6
Mixtral	683	25.8
<b>Aligned models</b>		
Gemma 2, 9B	1472	55.7
Gemma 2, 27B	395	14.9
Llama 3, 8B	1332	50.4
Llama 3, 70B	516	19.5
Mistral, 7B	164	6.2
Mixtral	514	19.4

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