Midterm Study Guide

Sunday, October 22, 2017 6:58 PM

CS363 Information Assurance and Security

-- Midterm Exam Study Guide

(I reserve the right to interpret if a question is covered by this guide. Still, only about 90% of questions are covered by this guide.)

Overview:

- 1. CIA.
- Can rephrase it.
- Can give application examples.

Buffer overflow:

- $\sqrt{1}$. Can explain what it is, the cause of it, how to implement it
- 2. Know stack-based, heap-based, and in other segments
- 3. Can identify buffer overflow in the source code

Shellcoding:

- *J*. Can explain how to use shellcode to exploit buffer overflow attacks
- 2. Know the process to write shellcode

// Format string:

- $\sqrt{}$. Know how to use format string to exploit buffer overflow attacks
- 2., Can identify format string security issues in the source code

Countermeasures:

- Know defenses and countermeasures: canary, shadow stack, non-executable bit, ISR, ASR
- 2. Can use defenses and countermeasures to analyze scenarios.

Overview:

i) CIA

Confidentiality Integrity Availability


Buffer Over flow:


1) Definition: an interface under which more input can be placed into a buffer or data holding area than the capacity allocated, overwriting other information. Attackers exploit such a condition to crash a system or to insert specially crafted cute that allows them to opin control of the system.

2) Stack Buffer Overflows: occurs when the targeted buffer is located on the Stack, usually as a local variable in a function's stack frame.

AKA Stack smashing

Stack frame: P calling Q (Pop-up, grow Down)
P: Return Address
Old frame pointer





Global Data Overflow: bruffers located in the program's static/global data area

```
Stach

Stach

Stach

Stach

Stach

Stach

Stach

Stach

Stach

Int main (int argc, char *argue)

Setbuf (St2in, Null);

Chunh. process = Showlen;

Printf ("Enter trainet.");

gets (chunh.inp);

Chunh. process (chunk.inp);

Chunh. process (chunk.inp);

Printf ("buffer6 done \n");

Printf ("buffer6 done \n");
```

3) Common Buffer Overflow weak points in Source Code:

gets (char *str) >> readline from standard input into str


sprints (char *str, char *format, ...) >> create str according to supplied format and vars

streat (char * dest, char *src) >> append contents of string src to string dest

Shell Colding:

i) Shell code > used to transfor execution to code supplied by the attacker > Assembly

Not sled >> code placed near end of buffer and padded with wor instructions



NOP Sle 2:

memset (buffer, 0×90, 60); //Buiz wor sled (60 bytes)

Shell code:


char shellcode IJ=

"\x31\xc0\x31\xdb\x81\xc9\x99\...";

mem cpog (buffer +60; Shell code; size of (shell code)-1);

Repealed ADDR:

ret = (unsignée int) &i - offset; // set return Addr



will to to evaluate the fug. port -e 'print "%08x." ×40' \ this will print ADDRS (Stack)

if bad prints user

don't forget little entiren (backverso Aler)

bytes 0x25, 0x30, 0x38, 0x78, and 0x2e repeats

Prints "x25 \x30 \x38 \x38 \x78 \x2e \n" -> %80x. % of Can hear Strings from mon Arrosses
% of Can ourwrite men Address
Larger 40DR perl-e 'print " AAAA" + "\x?\x?" + "BBBB" + "%x\n" x\27 + "%n

Le palding lo 10

Janger ADDR

OFFSEL

OFFSEL

exploit e exercises.com
« Some practice

Conter mensures:

Canary:

Stoo () not in heap or stack

Static int canary = rand();

my Secret = canasy

Cannot protect against format string affack (Arb. ADDR => Arb. Value)

Shadow Stack:

Separate Stack to hell return addresses for comparison no protection for other sata

W DX / DEP:

Make all writable memory as non-Executable

Show Der (Date Execution Prevantion)

Blocks all code inject exploits

Hardware Support: Am) "NX" 15;+, Intel "XD" bit (post 2004 ODU)
Widely deployed: Windows (since xp spl), Linux (via Pax patches),
Open BSD, GS X (since 10.5)

Problems:

we can do return-to-libe [ib functions loaded before

Overwhee return address us/ address of libe function · Setup take return address and arguments · ret with "call" libe function

No Injeded Code

Defense Sum mary

· No Defense method against all atths

15R -> Instruction Set Random-Lation

Randownizeds IS locardons

Can't protect adainst libe affack in less the libe funct address are also Randomized (ASR-) Address spaces Randomized wy

ASR

Randomte memory appresses

Attracts to ASR
Address Greating for ISBC (probe for ADDR)
Probe for Offset
libc Attack

Befler ASR:

64-bit arch. (larger mem space)

(5) increase kandomness

Randomization Frequency (Rome. Inside > vars) Grandlasety · permate stack vars · permute code + lib functions · permute Static Lafa combine of other approaches. (ISR + ASR) 1) compile so can use gdb on code Los gcc [ofur flags] (g) (source code) -0 (output file) 2) GDB commanes Break Point: break (source) (Line) break (function name) Confinne/Step1 continue Step print code: list print assembly: disassemble (func) Run Cose: run

GDB:

show content in info register (register) show content in info register

examine monosy: X <ader)

: i-instruction

example: x/2; \$eip

3) Registers

General Purpose:

(EAX > Accumulator

Temp

Variables | ECX > Counter

Variables | EDX > Doctor

EBX > Base

Pointers | ESP > Stack Pointer

Index | ESI > Source Index

EDI > Destination Index

EIP -> Instruction Pointer

EFLAGS: bit flags

by for comparisons and a memory segmentation