@Web Conference1 Sep 2021

FAPI-SIG Community 26th Meeting

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Major Topics

Proposal:

PII returned from Token Introspection


Working Items Status

Major Topics

Major Topics

It seems that nothing special happens.


Proposal: PII returned from Token Introspection



Keycloak allows us to select which data is put onto an access token.


In some case, it is not preferable for the access token to include PII.

However, a resource server receiving the access token needs to know who is authenticated to make access control decision.



One way for resource server to know who is authenticated without revealing PII between client and resource server is to encrypt the access token in JWE.

However, JWE/JWA does not cover encryption among multi parties.




Other way for resource server to know who is authenticated without revealing PII between client and resource server is to use UserInfo endpoint.

username=jane_doe

However, it seems that UserInfo endpoint might not be not so secure because it does not require the client authentication. Therefore, everybody holding the access token other than the resource server can get the authenticated user information

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On the contrary, Token Introspection endpoint requires the client authentication so that it might be good if the resource server could get the authentication user information from it.

Unfortunately, the current Token Introspection endpoint only returns the contents of the access token it receives so that it does not include other claims onto its response.

Authorization Server 15 PIITokenIntrospection Provider Response Client **Token Introspection** 2=13 TLS username=jane_doe 200 OK Resource Server

My proposal is to make Token Introspection endpoint include other claims onto its response.

The same way for the access token, ID token and UserInfo response, protocol mappers extending *AbstractOIDCProtocolMapper* can determine whether its claim is included in Token Introspection response.

It is preferable to realize it by TokenIntrospectionProvider because the proposed feature needs to access DB or cache layer to retrieve data, which leads to degrade performance.

Working Items Status

Working Items

[Security Features]

<Common>

In Progress OIDC Client's Public Key Management

1st phase -> 2nd phase

In Progress Client Policies Revised





[Security Features]

<SPA/Native App>

In Progress OAuth 2.0 Demonstration of

Proof-of-Possession (DPoP)





Working Items

[Security Features]

<High Level Security>


FAPI 2.0 (baseline/advanced)

In Progress Rich Authorization Request (RAR)

In Progress Grant Management API


In Progress Other requirements support





Working Items

[Market Specific Features]



Following eIDAS regulations





Consent Management



- Onboarding
 - Software Statement Support
 - Software Statement Assertion (SSA) Verification



Roadmap

	2020	2021
Security	Sep -	\rightarrow Apr
Common Client Policies	'	 Migrate Client Registration Policy ted as Preview Move Preview to Official Support -> leads to FAPI 1.0 Official Support
High Level Security	У	
FAPI 1.0	SupportedPassed ID2	 ID2 ver Support Final ver conformance test Pass Final ver conformance test
FAPI 2.0		Start design and implementation PAR, RAR, Grant Management API
FAPI-CIBA	 Supported as Preview 	 Pure CIBA (poll mode) Pass conformance test
SPA/Native App DPoP		Start design and implementation

Roadmap

