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Towards a European History of the Discourse of Democracy: Discussing Democracy in Western Europe, 1945–60

Martin Conway and Volker Depkat

Introduction

Democracy was everywhere in Western Europe after 1945. In contrast to the deep crisis experienced by parliamentary regimes during the preceding decades, the ideas and institutions of democracy gained a sudden and unexpected hegemony following the Second World War. With the discrediting of the authoritarian ideologies that had formed such a prominent element of Europe's political culture during the years since the First World War and the enforced marginalization of Communist political forces that occurred in Western Europe by the end of the 1940s, a new and rather broad centre-ground had emerged in European politics that enabled the construction of largely similar democratic political regimes in much of Western Europe.[1] As Raymond Aron noted in a perceptive comparative essay written at the end of the 1950s, the events of the Second World War had rather unpredictably brought about a 'stabilisation démocratique', whereby most of the regimes in Western Europe (he was cautious about the cases of France and Italy) had achieved a real stability based on their political legitimacy and their effective government.[2] At the same time, 'parliamentary democracy' came to be presented by a great majority of political elites in Western Europe as one of the central elements of 'European civilization' and a distinguishing feature of a common European identity.[3]

But, if all Europeans were now democrats, what did they mean when they used the term? As the Cold War developed, so 'democracy' became a concept contested between east and west as well as within the individual European nation-states. Was democracy 'liberal democracy' or was it 'people's democracy'? And what exactly was 'liberal democracy' and how was it to be institutionalized? Was democracy defined solely by the (Anglo-)American model or did Europe have its own traditions of democracy? And, if so, was that European democracy only an ensemble of diverse national democratic

traditions or was there a distinctive European tradition? While a large majority of European political elites seemed eager to claim after 1945 that they were (and had always been) democrats, it is not at all clear whether they were actually speaking the same political language and meant the same things by 'democracy'.

This contribution, therefore, seeks to analyse the Western European discourses that surrounded democracy in the years from 1945 to 1960 as a site of Europeanization. It takes as its limited focus an exploration of the political rhetoric used by non-Communist European political leaders in the 15-year period following the end of the Second World War. By focusing on the level of political rhetoric, we are concerned to examine how far it is possible to identify a Europeanization of the concept of democracy in the post-war period; and, if so, to explore more exactly what might be meant by such a process. Does examination of the discourse on democracy demonstrate a convergence in the way in which political figures envisaged democracy or does it expose the continuing differences and cleavages between Western European countries and their ideological traditions? And, if there was convergence, does this imply simply that political leaders thought of democracy in broadly similar ways, or that a European identity became part of how these political leaders conceived of democracy? That European political leaders did indeed articulate common notions of democracy in this immediate post-war period appears to have long formed part of the rather tacit assumptions that historians have brought to the study of the period. However, despite the wealth of research that has been undertaken in recent years on post-1945 European history, it seems to us that there has been an absence of comparative empirical studies which have sought to analyse the discourses on democracy in the individual Western European nation-states in terms of convergence and divergence.[4]

This brief article has, of course, no pretension to arrive at definitive conclusions to these somewhat large questions. Our common interest in the subject arises out of our separate but overlapping interests in the democratic political culture of post-1945 Western Europe.[5] But we regard the conclusions that we draw in this chapter as no more than a tentative template: much remains to be done in terms of more systematic research on how democracy was understood in Europe during the immediate post-war era. For our part, in this chapter we have sought to draw upon a variety of primary material, which is intended to provide a survey of the ways in which European political leaders used the term and elucidated its guiding principles. In doing so, we have chosen largely to omit Communist statements and Soviet concepts of Europe's order. This should not be regarded as implying that European Communist thinking on democracy was no more than a pale reflection of Soviet-inspired propaganda. On the contrary, the nuances evident within the approaches to democracy adopted by European Communist parties provide an important alternative approach to understanding the

aspirations for democracy within post-war Europe.[6] Furthermore, by the way in which Communist concepts of democracy and of Europe challenged non-Communist parties to articulate their own responses, it is evident that Communist statements also structured the discourses of the Western European advocates of parliamentary democracy. Our reasons for omitting Communist statements are therefore merely pragmatic. Instead we have sought to concentrate on a variety of non-Communist political figures, preferring to emphasize the points of convergence between their ideas, rather than differentiating them into separate Christian Democrat, Socialist, agrarian or liberal movements. This approach too can be questioned. Much writing on post-1945 Europe has rightly emphasized the durability of ideologically-inspired political traditions, which in turn reflected the way in which the intellectual formation and careers of political figures in many areas of Europe continued to take place within distinctive and relatively closed political traditions.[7] The political leaders who came to the fore after 1945, especially in Central Europe, were different from those who had been in power, at least at a national level, before the war; but they were neither especially young nor devoid of experience. On the contrary, they were to a large degree the products of well-defined political and social milieux. To suggest, therefore, a fundamental similarity of views between non-Communist politicians risks occluding the very different backgrounds from which they came. However, there are also pitfalls in such an ideologically-defined approach. In particular, it neglects the degree to which the concrete practice of democracy within the predominantly multi-party political systems of post-war Europe and the experience of functioning democracy drew political actors not merely into the compromises inherent in coalition government, but also – and more intangibly – into the sense of common purpose that came to be celebrated as one of the key characteristics of a mature parliamentary system.[8]

True democracy

At first sight perhaps the most surprising element of Europe in the immediate context of 1945 was the relatively limited use that was made of the word democracy. 'Freedom', 'liberty' and 'justice' as well as the aspiration for a new and more just economic order were the slogans which predominated during the rather complex process whereby the populations of Occupied Europe regained forms of legitimate government at the national and especially local levels. Each liberation, or occupation, was different; but throughout this period attention focused not so much on democracy but on the restoration of a sense of legitimate order and normalcy.[9] In many respects, this was scarcely surprising. The collective euphoria of liberation as well as immediate demands for action against those guilty of collaboration and for an end to the material hardships of the war were uppermost in the minds

of Europeans in 1945; politics, and more especially the construction of the formal panoply of democratic government, necessarily seemed rather more distant, both temporally and geographically, from many people's concerns.[10] Even so, it is remarkable how relatively limited was the role that discussions of democracy played in the politics of liberation. In so far as 'democracy' did emerge, it tended to be less in its own right and more as the antithesis of fascist or other discredited authoritarian regimes: the defeat of fascism must be the victory of democracy.[11] This subordination of democracy within a wider rhetoric of patriotism was not without consequences. In particular, it tended to pre-empt the articulation of alternative definitions of democracy, and contributed to the way in which in those states that had not been allied to the Axis cause calls for radical political change after 1945 tended to lose out in the later-1940s to the re-establishment of modified forms of the pre-war political order. Elsewhere, too, democracy did not emerge as an effective oppositional tool. In post-fascist Germany and Italy, although the cause of 'democracy' was espoused by some radical voices, it was predominantly appropriated as a means of legitimizing a more 'top-down' stabilization of the post-war order.[12] Democracy in that respect, in Europe after the Second World War, never signified an entirely new beginning, and was more often a tool used by the powerful to legitimate their rule, rather than the means whereby the weak or marginal challenged the powerful.[13]

The relative absence of discussion of the content or structures of political democracy was reinforced by what one might describe as the tendency to invest the term with wider, and at times almost metaphorical, meanings. Democracy was often used in immediate post-war Europe less as a description of a specific political system, than as a means of describing an aspiration for a new civic culture characterized by mutual respect and a shared morality. In the words of one Belgian Catholic periodical, there was a need to establish a 'démocratie vraiment humaine'[14], while Konrad Adenauer was convinced that the reconstruction of Germany would have to be inspired by a 'Christian and democratic spirit'.[15] There was also much rather vague reference to a 'new democracy',[16] although quite exactly what this meant, beyond the fact that it would mark a break with both authoritarianism and the democracy of the past, was far from clear. In so far as such rhetoric had any meaning, it was that there should be 'more' democracy. Thus, in a characteristic example of such rhetoric, the founding charter of the French Socialist Party, the SFIO, declared in 1946 that there was a need for 'libertés démocratiques étendues et développées'.[17] In concrete terms, such statements implied not so much a widening of the democratic political process as the need for a wider democratization of society. Calls for 'economic democracy' and a 'soziale Marktwirtschaft' were widespread in Europe in the years following the Second World War, and often took precedence over discussion of political structures. Once again, the nature of such an economic democracy was often defined only vaguely and encompassed multiple meanings,

ranging from the radical ambition of some workers to take charge of their workplace, to the very different intentions of various employers and trade-union leaders to establish more structured forms of industrial corporatism.[18] Common to all of these ideas was, however, the sense that democracy should not be conceived in solely political terms, but as part of the wider social and economic framework of society. Land reform, full employment, decent housing and old-age pensions were in this respect more prominent elements of the post-1945 democratic agenda than the more fundamental issues of how a democracy might be organized.

With the consolidation of Western Europe during the later 1940s into a defined and inter-connected framework of nation-states, discussions of the content of democracy did, however, become both more prominent and more 'political'. This was especially so in France, Germany and Italy, where the highly contested debates surrounding the nature of the new constitutions to be introduced in each country necessarily focused attention on issues that were sometimes highly technical in nature (notably the relative merits of different voting systems) but also powerfully symbolic. Thus, the referendum in 1946 on the future of the monarchy in Italy, the parliamentary debates and referenda which eventually led to the establishment of the Fourth Republic in France in 1946 and the widely voiced calls for free and general elections to a national parliament in occupied Germany between 1945 and 1949 were all ways in which discussions of the form of democracy came to the fore in post-war Europe.[19] This was reinforced throughout Europe by the ritual (and self-congratulation) which accompanied the elections, both local and national, that served as symbols of the new democratic order. The enfranchisement of women in France, Italy and Belgium, as well as the return to a multi-party structure of elections in Italy, Austria and eventually Germany after a hiatus of more than a decade meant that by 1950 for the first time directly elected governments ruled all the states of Western Europe outside of the Iberian peninsula. As a consequence, the very concepts of 'Europe' and 'democracy' began to merge in political and intellectual discourse: Europe came to be seen as the 'home' of democracy, just as democracy was the expression of a shared European identity.

Once again, however, it would be wrong to exaggerate the extent of the debate provoked by this rather sudden democratic revolution. As historians have long remarked, the most tangible change in democracy – the introduction of female suffrage in those states which had not formerly adopted it – did not give rise to much public debate or celebration. It was perceived as little more than an adaptation to an unavoidable necessity, and one which on the political left was accompanied by ill-disguised unease at the electoral advantage that they assumed Christian Democrat parties would derive from female enfranchisement.[20] Moreover, in more general terms, the most distinctive element of the way in which the term 'democracy' was used by post-war political elites was the sense of unease

and even of nervousness with which they approached it. For many of Europe's political leaders, the operation of a stable democratic politics was a complex task, and one replete with potential dangers.

Nothing better conveyed this unease than the repeated use by political and intellectual figures of the phrase 'true democracy'. This adjectival qualification rapidly became and remained, for much of the 1950s, a key element of European political discourse. It was one which also had several meanings. Most obviously, it formed part of the arsenal of anti-Communist language by which the political parties and leaders of Western Europe defined their concept of democracy against what they regarded as the caricature of democracy that operated in the 'people's democracies' of Central and Eastern Europe. The visible spectacle in the East of mass crowds, crude propaganda techniques and show trials provided an almost daily demonstration of what democracy should *not* be, and in doing so helped to solidify a Western definition of a true democracy based around the individual citizen, pluralist intellectual debate and the rule of law. Socialist political figures in particular hastened to emphasize how their definitions of democracy should not be confused with those of the Communists. Indeed, a commitment to democratic practice and values became the means by which the Socialist parties of post-war Europe defined themselves against the false democrats of the Moscow-directed Communist Internationale.[21] The case of the Belgian Socialist Party (PSB-BSP), undoubtedly one of the most powerful Socialist parties in post-war Western Europe, was typical in this respect. Though in many respects, the party remained loyal to its nineteenth-century Marxist heritage, and eschewed attempts by some intellectual groups to make it adopt a new and more 'liberal' programme after the Liberation, the Socialist political leaders were at pains to demonstrate that they were 'socialistes de l'Occident' who had inherited the democratic values of West European culture.[22] At the same time, however, most European Socialist parties remained sensitive, as they long had been, to accusations that participation in democracy was in some sense a retreat from their Socialist ambitions. Thus, Socialist leaders often sought to present their commitment to democracy as part of their wider struggle for a Socialist transformation of society. As the banner held over the stage at the conference of the Belgian Socialist Party in June 1945 declared: 'La Victoire de la Démocratie sera celle du Socialisme'. Writing shortly before the collapse of the Fourth Republic, the French Socialist leader, Guy Mollet, adopted a very similar tone, declaring that the members of the SFIO were committed to what he termed a 'démocratie socialiste', in which the political liberties of the existing regime would be supplemented by a real material equality of conditions.[23] West Germany's Socialists of the SPD argued pretty much along the same lines. In 1946, Richard Löwenthal, a Social Democrat exiled in London during the Third Reich, published his book *Jenseits des Kapitalismus* (Beyond Capitalism), in which he developed the vision of a 'demokratischer Sozialismus' that combined the teachings of

Karl Marx, Rudolf Hilferding and John Maynard Keynes.[24] Three years later, Willy Brandt argued at the annual convention of the SPD that the party's agenda of 'democratic socialism' was founded on a shared commitment to 'humanism, the rule of law, and social justice'.[25]

As such statements demonstrate, it would be wrong to exaggerate the degree of common ground among non-Communist political forces. Statements of faith in democracy on the part of many political leaders tended to be coupled with phrases whereby each political tradition sought to claim the mantle of being the 'true' defenders of democracy, of 'une vraie et saine démocratie'.[26] This competition for 'ownership' of democracy was perhaps most evident in France, where De Gaulle's decision to set himself up against the ethos and practice of the Fourth Republic obliged him to present himself and the party which he inspired, the RPF, as the advocates of a presidential (or, as de Gaulle preferred to term it, 'true') definition of democracy by which the will of 'la Nation dans ses profondeurs' would find its direct expression rather than being corrupted through the distorting prism of parliamentary politics.[27] Such tensions were, however, also present elsewhere, most notably in Germany, where two new states competed to be regarded as the 'true' embodiment of democracy, as well as in the Netherlands and Belgium, where the concept of the monarch as the personal embodiment of the will of the nation co-existed somewhat uncomfortably alongside the more impersonal language of parliamentary government. This tension between monarchical and parliamentary rule was most acute in Belgium where the attempts by Leopold III to return to Belgium as monarch between 1945 and 1950 in effect became a conflict between competing definitions of democracy. On the one hand, the principal non-Catholic political parties based their opposition to the king's attempts to resume his constitutional powers on the fact that there was no majority in the Parliament for him to do so. On the other hand, Leopold and his supporters spoke a more monarchical and at times sentimental language of the personal bond between the monarch and his people and denounced (with some justification) the refusal of the parliamentary politicians to test the will of the people by holding a referendum.[28]

Undoubtedly the most durable fault line was, however, that between Catholic and secular definitions of democracy. The rapid emergence after the war of powerful Christian Democratic parties in many of the states of Western Europe in effect brought forms of Catholic thought more to the fore in European political culture than had been the case at any point since at least the end of the nineteenth century. Consciously reinforced by the statements of the papacy during the pontificate of Pius XII, this distinctive Catholic approach to democracy was one that placed emphasis on the 'natural' communities of family and region, as well as on the need to construct a social order that respected Christian values of charity and solidarity. 'A true and healthy democracy', as Pius XII termed it, was one in which

the power of the modern state was confined by respect for the dignity of the individual, and for the teachings of God.[29] This was also a definition of democracy which, by heritage and instinct, was distrustful of the individualist and liberal tradition that derived from the Enlightenment and the French Revolution of 1789 and which had led remorselessly to the capitalist materialism of the modern world, two world wars and, through the secular cult of the nation-state, ultimately to fascism.[30] Christian democracy did not, therefore, imply so much a Catholic acceptance of secular democracy, as a continuation of the efforts made by progressive Catholic activists since the end of the nineteenth century to make democracy Christian.[31] As the German Catholic intellectual Romano Giardini declared in 1946, in a phrase which was expressive of the militant mood of the moment, 'I am a proponent of democracy – but [I must] immediately add, [I am] a Catholic proponent who acknowledges absolute values and objective authorities as givens'.[32]

Such statements did not fundamentally undermine Catholic participation in the democratic political system. Claims of a distinctive Catholic definition of democracy tended to be more rhetorical than substantive; and, more so than within Europe's other political traditions, the events of the Second World War had brought about a fundamental realignment of Catholic political attitudes away from the inter-war infatuation with authoritarian and corporatist political models in favour of the acceptance of democracy. Almost perhaps because of the extent of this change, Christian Democrat leaders felt concerned to emphasize the distinctly Catholic inspiration that underlay their actions: their actions would be the means by which Christian values of civilization would finally permeate modern society or indeed, in a more maximalist formulation, of bringing about a Christian revolution.[33] This attitude was rooted too in a distinctly Catholic attitude to the concept of Europe. Behind Konrad Adenauer's oft-cited concept of a European *Abendland* lay a much broader sense of a Christian European civilization which, in contrast to the liberal primacy of the nation-state, would bring about a new era of European cooperation. To cite Romano Guardini once again: 'Either Europe becomes Christian or Europe will no longer exist'.[34]

Notwithstanding these differences of ideological definition, one of the central changes that emerged after the war was undoubtedly the sense that the 'building of democracy' was a shared task. Reinforced by the logic of Cold War polarization, the non-Communist political forces of Western Europe believed in the need to collaborate in order to bring about a stable democratic order. This disabused and rather pragmatic approach to the construction of a 'true democracy' took a number of largely inter-related forms. Above all, it was based on a vision of channelling the will of the people through a number of intermediate institutions, which – rather in the manner of a series of dykes constructed to break the force of a sudden flood – were primarily intended to blunt the impact of majoritarian will.

Majorities had a poor reputation in post-war Europe, which reflected a wider distrust of forms of mass mobilization. The better, and more mature, approach was therefore to construct a democracy where crowds would (or could) not emerge. In Germany, intellectuals such as Theodor Steltzer, Eugen Kogon, Jürgen von Kempski and Karl Jaspers warned against a 'centralized democracy of the masses' in the immediate aftermath of the catastrophe of the Second World War. They were sceptical of political parties, regarded national elections as plebiscatory, and embraced indirect forms of delegating power and authority to ensure the rule of democratic elites.[35] In contrast to them, Konrad Adenauer, Kurt Schumacher, Thomas Dehler and other West German party politicians were all for channelling democratic energies into political parties; but even they were doubtful as to whether the German people would cast their votes 'correctly'. In the autumn of 1949, Adenauer told the Allied High Commissioners for Germany that 'the political thinking of the Germans was still extremely disorderly'.[36]

The danger posed by what J.L. Talmon in his influential polemic *The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy* (published in 1952) termed 'the seemingly ultra-democratic ideal of unlimited popular sovereignty' led European politicians to perceive the making of a stable democracy as one in which an 'ordered' political liberty prevailed.[37] In electoral terms, this was to be achieved through well-organized elections, which would be contested by modern and disciplined political parties that accepted the laws of parliamentary democracy. The central institution of what Jean-Pierre Rioux rightly terms (with regard to the French Fourth Republic) this *gouvernement d'assemblée* was incontestably national parliaments.[38] It was in the privileged space of parliament that deputies would debate issues of national interest; as the elected representatives of the people, but also at a necessary distance from the people. This new parliamentary culture, memorably satirized by Wolfgang Koeppen in his 1953 novel *Das Treibhaus*,[39] was based on the widespread belief that the pace of modern social and economic change had rendered obsolete the amateur parliamentarism of the nineteenth century. The preparation of legislation was a complex and technical task, to which parliamentary deputies brought their particular forms of expertise and acted in collaboration with a wider range of 'experts', including civil servants, professional specialists and representatives of socio-economic groups such as trade unions, farmers' associations and employers' organizations. This somewhat opaque decision-making process operated at the national level, but also increasingly at the level of the international and European structures of decision-making, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Coal and Steel Community, as well as from the end of the 1950s the European Economic Community. Indeed, it was in those West European structures of decision-making that the new ethos of democratic decision-making reached its fullest expression in the construction of complex legislation, devised in the interests of the people but not by the people.

The privileging of this new technocratic democratic culture contributed to the widespread sense, increasingly voiced during the 1950s, of 'an end of ideology'.[40] The practice of democracy appeared to have moved beyond the clash of ideas, which had been displaced to the higher level of the struggle against Soviet Russia and, from the end of the 1950s onwards, an increasing awareness of the struggles for national liberation within the non-European world.[41] Within Europe, however, politics had become a more technical and inclusive process that was reflected in the more positive perception that developed of coalition government: it was by members of responsible political parties working together that the right solutions to contemporary problems would be developed. Conversely, this 'true democracy' eschewed personalized or direct forms of decision-making. Presidents were, as in the new French, Italian and German republics, to be elected by the deputies in parliament, rather than directly by the people, and their roles were deliberately intended to be non-partisan and consensual.

Similarly, referenda were distrusted as crude and unpredictable tools, which should largely be avoided. De Gaulle was, of course, an emphatic and influential defender of the tool of the referendum, which he used very deliberately as a means of challenging the much more widely accepted concept of parliamentary democracy. Indeed, in an almost unconscious reflection of the assumptions of the time, Jean Touchard, the author of a perceptive study of Gaullist ideology, commented that De Gaulle's advocacy of referenda placed him beyond the bounds of what was conventionally regarded as a democrat.[42] The 1950 referendum in Belgium on the future status of King Leopold III was held in response to pressure from the king and his supporters; but even among Leopold's supporters there was a recognition that its role could only be consultative and could not replace the sovereign will of parliament.[43] Similarly, in Sweden during the 1950s, two referenda were held, in 1955 on switching from driving on the left to driving on the right, and in 1957 on pension reform. The former resulted in a large majority in favour of maintaining driving on the left, which was overruled by parliament a few years later; while the latter was a highly complex proposal, involving three possible options, and had only a limited impact on the legislation subsequently enacted by parliament. As the long-serving Swedish social-democrat Prime Minister Tage Erlander commented, 'it is obvious that referendums are a strongly conservative force. It becomes much harder to pursue an effective reform policy if reactionaries are offered the opportunity to appeal to people's natural conservatism and natural resistance to change.'[44]

The presence of the past

The muted terms in which many post-war politicians couched their espousal of democracy reflected the sense that democracy was less of a conscious choice than the consequence of the exhaustion or, in the case

of Communism, the unacceptability of the alternatives. As Albert Camus, writing in *Combat* in 1947, commented, 'There may be no good political regime, but democracy is surely the least bad of the alternatives'.[45] This sense of 'two cheers for democracy' reflected the disabused nature of the mood in much of Europe in the post-war years.[46] Not merely in the defeated states but also among the victor states, there was a pervasive sense that the bitter conflicts and personal suffering of the preceding decades were too proximate for it to be possible to celebrate the making of a new democratic era.

Against this backdrop, the concept of 'true democracy' was therefore also used to contrast the present and the expected future with the immediate past of the 1920s and 1930s. During these decades, the experiences of democracy had been far from universally positive in Western and Central Europe. The Weimar Republic had collapsed under the onslaught of National Socialism and the Great Depression between 1930 and 1933. In 1938, the Austrians had all too willingly accepted the destructive integration of their First Republic into the Third Reich. Finally, the short-lived Spanish Second Republic had ended in a bloody civil war between anti-democratic nationalists and Popular Front republicans, which saw General Franco establish his military dictatorship supported by conservative forces. Moreover, the authoritarian regimes that had emerged in Europe during the inter-war years were perceived to have not been so much a negation of democracy as the corruption of democracy to serve radically different ends. In Italy, Mussolini and his Fascist colleagues had established a plebiscatory and charismatic democracy; in Germany, the National Socialists and their *Führer* Adolf Hitler had claimed to express the will of the *Volksgemeinschaft*; while in France Vichy's *Etat Français* had embarked on an experiment in authoritarian wartime democracy intended to establish a system of corporate representation which claimed to be more democratic than the corrupt parliamentarism of the Third Republic.

This highly problematic past allowed Western European discourses of 'true democracy' to unfold to a very large extent as a critique of the prior mistakes made by twentieth-century democracies in Europe. Governmental instability and executive weakness, class-based politics emerging from the unsolved social antagonisms that had divided European societies in the 1920s and 1930s, the abandonment of rational argumentation and the resort to passion, populist demagogy and the rule by extremes, violence and civil war – all these aspects of past experiences were discussed by Western European political leaders as problems and dangers inherent to a democratic form of government. Inseparably connected to this critique of the immediate past was therefore a willingness to learn from its mistakes.

Criticisms of the imperfect democratic past were widely voiced throughout post-war Europe. In France, for example, the electoral success of the Christian Democrat MRP in the immediate post-war years rested strongly

on its espousal of a new democracy that would break with the failings of the pre-war Third Republic.[47] Unsurprisingly, however, it was in central Europe, and more especially in Germany, that such critiques were voiced most strongly. Not merely had democracy failed in Germany but by giving rise to the NSDAP it had led to the antithesis of the values upon which European civilization had been constructed. The writings of German intellectuals and political figures in the post-war decades were dominated by analysis of the causes of this catastrophe. For a figure such as Marie Baum (1874–1964), a social reformer, lecturer at the University of Heidelberg and a short-time member of the liberal *Deutsche Demokratische Partei* in the 1920s, the development of the Weimar Republic marked the destruction of European core values such as individual liberty, freedom of thought, Christian compassion and civic responsibility. This 'incurable apostasy from all old ideals' provided the explanation as to why the younger generations of Germans 'went off on peculiarly wrong tracks' during the 1920s leading ultimately to the destruction of democracy.[48]

In West Germany, political elites carefully distinguished between Germany's first democracy and its second, which was established after 1945. The slogan 'Bonn ist nicht Weimar' accompanied the history of the Federal Republic of Germany from the start, and political elites in West Germany were determined that 'Bonn' should not become 'Weimar' ever again. Two themes figured prominently in the debates on the Weimar Republic's fate: the lack of democrats among the German population and the class-based politics of the political parties which had given allegiance to class a higher priority than loyalty to the democratic order. Adenauer was convinced that the NSDAP had managed to acquire a mass following only because 'the political interest and sense of responsibility' had been very weak in large parts of Germany's society. In his memoirs, he explicitly denied that the National Socialists' rise to power was the result of the machinations of a small circle of business and military elites. Rather, he argued that a vast majority of Germans from the most diverse backgrounds did not have the 'right attitude of mind' with respect to democracy and liberalism.[49] This underlying cultural problem was, according to Adenauer and many other German intellectuals and political figures of the post-war years, exacerbated by the way in which political parties of the 1920s had failed to overcome their sectional perspectives. In their self-understanding these parties had been the representatives and agents of a particular social milieu (the working class, the bourgeoisie, the Catholics, etc.), and they understood their task to be to pursue the particular interests of their constituency even at the price of the common good. Thus, they had used the democratic state to push their narrow agenda but they had not been sufficiently concerned to act as the guardians of democracy.[50]

These critical and self-critical discussions about the immediate past were rooted in the very particular German context of a coming to terms with the

Nazi catastrophe. But they also reflected a wider post-war nervousness about Europe's democratic heritage. The French Revolution of 1789 had formed a central element of the means by which opponents of the Vichy Regime and of wartime German rule had legitimized their resistance actions in France.[51] But, once the war had ended, it was the relative absence of references to the events of 1789 and indeed the subsequent revolutions of 1848 and 1871 that, at least outside of Communist ranks, was the more remarkable in France. This was evident too in the highly contrasting approaches to the centenary of 1848 in Germany. While political and intellectual elites of the German Democratic Republic heralded '1848' as the birth of the Communist Manifesto and the historical awakening of the working class, the Federal Republic of Germany could only refer to 1848 as a first failed attempt to create a German nation-state on the basis of democratic and liberal principles.[52] Rather than such awkward modern history, there was unsurprisingly a tendency throughout post-war Europe to seek usable precedents in local democratic traditions or in the invocation of a largely imaginary democratic medieval past.

The future of democracy

The legacy of past experience emphasized that democracy was not something that could simply be decreed, but a form of government, and more broadly a form of political culture, that had to be nurtured, protected and built in an incremental manner. Notions of the 'building' of democracy were widespread in Western Europe after the Second World War, mirroring the way in which so much of the material landscape of Europe had to be rebuilt after the destruction of the war years. This task of construction was inseparably tied to a determination to establish a more managed structure of democracy. Western European debates about 'true democracy' revolved to a very large extent around the problem of how democracy's potential for self-destruction could be minimized if not entirely eliminated. The question of how liberty and self-determination could be 'ordered' to perpetuate the democratic system, and how in practical terms Europeans could be educated to become democrats capable of governing themselves after all their political failures in the twentieth century, lay at the heart of much of the Western European discourse on democracy during the post-war decade. 'True democracy', therefore, was not a current reality, but a term of expectation that was structurally linked to both the self-critical assessment of the errors of the past *and* the diagnosis that the present did not yet live up to the ideal. There was no complacency about the challenge of rebuilding democracy after 1945; 'true democracy' would only materialize in the future.

Central to understanding the debates about the future of democracy is the fact that a majority of political elites, especially but not exclusively in those

states such as Germany, which had succumbed to authoritarian rule over the preceding decades, were inclined to perceive the present in post-1945 Europe in terms of a deep crisis.[53] The latter seemed to be essentially driven by three factors, namely the decline of Europe's standing in the international system, the Soviet threat and the hegemony of the United States over Western Europe. Against the backdrop of this perception, the achievement of a stable form of democracy was thus seen as a means of mitigating if not entirely overcoming this sense of pervasive crisis.

This sense of crisis had its basis in the widespread perception that Europe had lost its position as the centre of the world during the period from 1914 to 1945.[54] European elites saw a weakened 'old world' dwarfed between two new superpowers that were systematically building global empires antagonistically opposed to each other. The urgent task for the leaders of the present generation was to protect the remaining influence that European states still had on world affairs and, if possible, to increase it in order to regain some of Europe's former status and power. In this context, the democratization of Europe and the projection of a European identity based on its liberal values appeared as a means of reasserting Europe's political pre-eminence.

Most immediately, the sense of European weakness had its origins in the threat posed by Communism and the expansionist policies of the Soviet Union.[55] In the eyes of many Western European politicians one half of Europe was already under Soviet domination, and they feared that the Soviet Union was preparing to bring the whole of Europe under its control in the near future. In this context, the realization of 'true democracy' was seen as a means of containing if not rolling back Communism. By binding their people to the model of a democratic society, Western European leaders would not only counter the appeal of Communism but would also prevent Europe from being subjugated to an essentially 'non-European' culture. The perception that the Soviet Union, and with it Communism, was a fundamentally alien and Asiatic force was widely held among post-war West European elites. As early as March 1946 Adenauer referred to 'Asia' beginning at the Elbe River in a letter written to the Social Democrat Wilhelm Sollmann, and in a conversation with de Gaulle in 1958, he similarly declared that the Soviet Union was an 'Asian dictatorship'.[56]

However, European discourses about 'true democracy' was not exclusively focused on the Soviet Union as the sole 'significant other' that generated notions of a Western European identity centring on democratic values. In many respects, the USA also served a similar function, as many European elites believed that they not only had to prevent Europe from being 'Sovietized' but also from being 'Americanized'.[57] European attitudes towards the 'friend in the West' were highly ambivalent. On the one hand, Western European elites accepted US-American hegemony, and even invited American intervention to reconstruct Europe, to spread democracy

and prosperity, and to protect her from Communism.[58] At the same time, however, many European elites continued to feel culturally superior to the USA, which is why they strenuously looked for genuinely European traditions of democracy. They were fully aware that the USA was the dominant power in Western Europe and that the USA would not allow them to opt for any regime other than liberal democracy. Within this broader framework of liberal democracy, however, there were many options and there was a considerable range of choice and diversity. This helps to explain why throughout Western Europe, politicians were so concerned to strive to realize models of democracy that were in keeping with the respective national democratic traditions. There was no general and unqualified admiration of American democracy – and to a considerable extent European discourses on 'true democracy' were about realizing democracies that were 'true' because they differed from the American model.

All in all, the task of constructing a stable European form of democracy was therefore one to be accomplished by Europeans, working together across nation-state frontiers. In doing so, European political leaders built on the contacts that many had developed during their war years in exile, notably in London, but also on pre-existing networks such as those between Catholic political figures, which had been established during the inter-war years.[59] But they were also aided by the establishment of what one might term democratic-front organizations, such as the Congress for Cultural Freedom which, whatever the fact of their American funding and patronage, emerged as forums in which European intellectuals from a variety of national and ideological backgrounds came together to defend, though not uncritically, Western values of democracy and freedom.[60] In addition, the early assemblies of the European integration process (the Europarat, Montanunion, the WEU, and other ad hoc assemblies dealing with specific issues) served as sites of debate about the traditions and meanings of democracy in the European context.[61]

A similar rationale underlay European projects of colonial development in the non-European world. Although the efforts of the European imperial powers to assert their authority in territories such as Indochina, Malaya, and Palestine implicated them in highly authoritarian actions of repression, these same actions were often legitimized by the need to defend European values of democracy. This was most strikingly the case in Algeria, where the war that developed during the 1950s was for many French politicians one to defend Republican and European notions of legality and order against the agents of terrorist violence.[62] More generally, too, the justification of continued European colonial rule in areas such as sub-Saharan Africa, rested not only on the material benefits of 'development' but on how the colonial rulers were inculcating an understanding of European values of justice and democracy, in the subject populations. To grant them independence

'prematurely' would merely cause a repetition in Africa of the past failures of democracy in Europe.[63]

Democracy therefore, both in Europe and beyond, was to be built gradually over the course of a couple of generations by educating its citizens, and integrating democratic values into the fabric of society. 'True democracy' needed 'true democrats', and it was necessary to root the public rituals of democracy – elections, parliamentary debates, the passing of legislation – and its wider framework of legal institutions in a pervasive democratic culture. When Ralf Dahrendorf critically scrutinized the state of West Germany's democracy in his landmark book *Gesellschaft und Demokratie* in the 1960s, he found the rule of law as well as a liberal economic order to be firmly established in West Germany but he heavily criticized the persistence of an illiberal, even authoritarian, mentality in large parts of Germany's population, and demanded that the democratization of the minds of the Germans be pushed further.[64] The task of building 'true democracy', therefore, was an ongoing process and a continuous task, and in their self-understanding Europe's democratic elites were responsible for initiating and guiding this process of putting the democratic reconstruction of Western Europe on a sound footing.

This emphasis on the social and civic underpinnings of democracy was a strong element of political rhetoric in the decade following the Second World War, and it reflected the influence that notions of planning and of social welfare had on European political culture in this period. Building democracy in the eyes of many Western European political elites was a collaborative act that required the cooperation of all social forces and classes. This meant that after 1945, in contrast to what was perceived to have occurred in the inter-war decades, all social groups were partners in a political process, the wider purpose of which was to stabilize democracy. This understanding of a common responsibility in upholding the democratic form of government blurred ideological and partisan antipathies and overcame a class-based perception of political action. At the same time, it also placed obligations on citizens to perform their duties within the democratic system. Democracy was a serious process, which required its citizens to reject demagogic options, to take an interest in political affairs and to place the general interest above their individual interests.[65]

This sense of the duties of democratic citizens helps to explain the preoccupation in post-war political rhetoric with the 'health' of democracy, which needed to be measured in terms of the effectiveness of its operation and, most especially, the engagement of citizens with the democratic process. This was of course especially so in the post-fascist states of Italy and Germany, where the processes of Allied-imposed and internally generated re-education that occurred after the war were intended to purge the societies of the forms of behaviour and thinking that had rendered them vulnerable to the demagogic manipulation and seduction that had

underpinned fascist rule.[66] However, the 'strengthening' of the republican body's health was important not only with respect to the lessons of the past, it was also crucial in the current competition with the Communist bloc. When Adenauer stated that for him Asia began at the Elbe River, he continued to explain that only an 'economically and spiritually healthy Western Europe led by Great Britain and France' would be able to block the further advance of Asia.[67] Adenauer left no doubt that for him a 'healthy Western Europe' was one based on 'true democracy', and that the realization of 'true democracy' was a way of perpetuating Western Europe's 'health'.

But this quasi-medical preoccupation with the health of democracy was not confined to the post-fascist states; it was evident in many other West European states, reflecting not only historical lessons about the vulnerability of democracy but also more present-minded concerns about how processes of social modernization were leading to more isolated and privatized lives.[68] The consequent distance, and mutual suspicion, that existed between the individual and the state was the central burden of the critique voiced during the 1950s by Pierre Mendès-France of the failings of the Fourth Republic. There was, in his words, an urgent need to re-engage citizens with the political process: 'Aujourd'hui, le citoyen et l'Etat sont devenus étrangers l'un à l'autre'.[69]

The 'health' of democracy rested not only on the solidarity between the state and its citizens, but also on material well-being. A strong democracy could only exist in a 'strong society', in which the state acted to protect its citizens from the dangers of unemployment, destitution and slum housing, and in which in return the citizens would act to protect democracy from authoritarian and totalitarian threats. This is why debates about 'true democracy' were inseparably tied to concepts of social welfare.[70] The seemingly logical consequence of the focus on the citizens' duties and obligations vis-à-vis the state was the state's obligation to promote and protect the prosperity of its citizens by keeping capitalism in check. This provided the basis of the emphasis on social democracy as the 'true democracy', since social democracy promised to tame free-market capitalism, to spread prosperity more widely, and to justify democracy through prosperity – the antithesis of for example the experience of the Weimar Republic.[71] The reformed free-market capitalism of a social democracy also seemed to be the best way to counter the Communist notion of prosperity for all. Building democracy, therefore, meant creating the right material conditions for the prosperity of the many, an idea which was well personified in Germany by Ludwig Erhard and his idea of a 'Soziale Marktwirtschaft' producing 'Wohlstand für alle', or by Tage Erlander and his notion of 'A Strong Society' in 1950s Sweden.[72] Many other post-war politicians, especially those on the European socialist or social-democratic left, articulated similar concepts. This was a future-oriented concept: it focused minds on how things were getting better, and

would continue to get better in the future, thereby distracting Europeans from the divisive legacies of the past.

Conclusion: Democratization and Europeanization

By emphasizing the ways in which similar attitudes to democracy were voiced by non-Communist political figures in Western Europe during the 15 years following the Second World War, this chapter has in some respects presented a distinctly one-sided account of politics in this period. It is emphatically not our intention to suggest that the themes highlighted here were universally accepted among political elites, and still less among the populations of post-war Europe. The sense of disillusionment that was widespread in much of Europe after the war reflected the way in which the new or re-established political regimes failed, often in some rather intangible way, to reflect the aspirations of their populations for a more responsive political system.[73] The democracy that the people experienced was not so much the one that they chose, as the one that was constructed for them; and the consequent distance between the governments and the governed was a durable feature of the politics of post-war Europe. 'They', the rulers, who did not understand 'us', the real people, rapidly established itself as a prominent theme not merely of oppositional movements such as *Uomo Qualunque* in Italy or subsequently Poujadism in France, but also more generally of popular attitudes to the political process.[74] Moreover, what one might describe as the only case of 'regime breakdown' in this period, the collapse of the Fourth Republic in France in 1958 and its replacement by the Gaullist Fifth Republic (emphatically endorsed by a referendum), demonstrated the durable tension within French post-war political culture between democracy as rule by an assembly and the more personalized democracy of a strong president, directly elected by the people and responsible to them without the intermediary role of political parties.[75]

Moreover, as the case of France well demonstrates, the convergence of the formerly somewhat diverse definitions of democracy around what became almost a 'standard' model in post-war Western Europe did not efface national ways of thinking about democracy. These had in many respects been reinforced, especially at an emotional level, by the events of the Second World War. In the Scandinavian states and the Low Countries, patriotic celebration of liberation from German rule encouraged the development of national narratives of democracy, whereby the struggle against German rule was perceived as only the latest stage in the centuries-long struggle of these states for self-determination and resistance to foreign rule.[76] Nor did the revivification of these national democratic traditions supplant more local and long-standing forms of democratic identity. Traditions of community self-government, of municipal freedoms and of regional identities had also been reinforced by the events of the Second

World War. In the absence of legitimate national government, the populations of occupied Europe had turned instead to alternative, and somewhat suppressed, traditions of local self-government. Similarly, in Germany after 1945, concepts of *Heimat* once again re-emerged as an alternative location for a democratic tradition. The local democratic movements of the nineteenth century were celebrated in western and southern Germany as proof that these territories were, in the words of one writer in the Pfalz, 'the land of origin of German democracy'.[77]

The inter-connectedness of democracy and Europe that emerged after 1945 did not therefore take place at the expense of the nation. As Alan Milward famously argued, the institutions of European cooperation that emerged in the post-war period often worked to reinforce the power of the nation-state.[78] Much the same, it could be argued, occurred at the level of political rhetoric. The tendency of European political leaders to conceive of democracy in broadly similar terms encouraged the development of an association between democracy and Europe which buttressed national discourses of democracy. This was evident in the way in which Europe itself became an identity, and a cause, that was conceived of in emphatically democratic terms. The cause of 'Europeanism' largely shed after 1945 the idealistic and occasionally somewhat reactionary political connotations it had acquired in the inter-war years.[79] Instead, the language of post-war European unification became a centrist and inclusive form of political rhetoric which passed, almost obligatorily, through a celebration of Europe's democratic traditions. That this highly selective account of Europe's modern history required a conscious politics of forgetting about more recent events has of course been well demonstrated by historians.[80] But what mattered more to the political leaders of post-war Europe was less the need to come to terms with the horrors of the immediate past than the construction of the democratic Europe of the present and the future.[81]

In these various ways, therefore, democracy and Europe became more closely associated in the immediate post-war period. Democracy was the symbol of West European identity in the face of the Soviet Union, especially after the blatant repression of the will of the Hungarian people in 1956 and the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961, but so too was Europe the historic 'home' of democracy, which is why the orientation of Western European elites towards the United States remained somewhat uneasy throughout the 1950s. This inter-relationship of democracy and Europe did not, however, prove to be unchanging. The social and cultural changes that occurred in the 1960s generated radical critiques of the limits of democracy, and more especially of the way in which the construction of democratic regimes after 1945 had failed to address the sources of inequality in society.[82] Added to that was a growing disappointment about the state and the pace of European integration, which from the perspective of the later 1960s did not appear to have lived up to the expectations of the late

1940s and early 1950s. Looking back on the dreams of the immediate post-war period in his memoirs written in 1968, the Rhineland Christian Democrat politician Herman Pünder could not help articulating his sense of deep disappointment. Very little of the great visions formulated in the immediate post-war era had been realized; only 'revolutionary times', he concluded, gave birth to 'great deeds, (…) and revolutionary times are what the free European states are apparently no longer experiencing today.'[83]

The transformations of the 1960s also gave a new momentum to alternative democratic traditions, including ones that derived their inspiration from revolutions (such as those in China, Latin America and Africa) located outside the borders of Europe. As a consequence the association of democracy and Europe became much more problematic. What had appeared to be a common European democratic culture was replaced by a much more contested political environment, in which different and conflicting definitions of democracy were advanced by a wide range of new social and political movements of the left and the right, by women's organizations, by separatist regional movements and indeed by some of those within the Catholic and Socialist movements which had formerly participated in the construction of the post-1945 political order.[84]

Placed in this longer perspective, the inter-relationship of democracy and Europe that occurred in the immediate post-war era appears less as a remorseless process related to long-term processes of modernization, than as a historically contingent phenomenon defined by the radical changes in the international environment brought about by the war and by the structures of social and political power that emerged in post-war Western Europe. This also perhaps points to a larger conclusion about the historical nature of Europeanization. As this volume seeks to demonstrate, Europeanization needs to be approached, not as a homogeneous or long-term process, but as an evolving and contingent phenomenon, which has taken different forms in different periods. Seen in this way, this chapter provides one example or 'site' of a process of Europeanization, characterized not merely by the emergence of a common political discourse among European political figures but also by the way in which that discourse became associated with the identity of Europe. Located in the material circumstances of the immediate post-war years, and the attitudes shared by many of the European political figures who came to the fore at this time, this instance of Europeanization flourished, but also ultimately came to an end.

Notes

1. This is argued with reference to France in R. Vinen, *Bourgeois Politics in France, 1945–1951* (Cambridge and New York, 1995), pp. 1–7.
2. R. Aron, 'Les institutions politiques et l'occident dans le monde au xxe siècle' in R. Aron et al. *La démocratie à l'épreuve du xxe siècle* (Paris, 1960), pp. 11–15.

3. A. Trunk, *Europa, ein Ausweg? Politische Eliten und europäische Identität in den 1950er Jahren* (Munich, 2007), pp. 75 and 132.
4. See, for example, the essays in 'The Politics of Democracy in Twentieth-Century Europe', *European History Quarterly* XXXII (2002).
5. M. Conway, 'Democracy in Postwar Western Europe. The Triumph of a Political Model', *European History Quarterly,* XXXII (2002), 59–84. M. Conway, 'The Rise and Fall of Western Europe's Democratic Age 1945–73', *Contemporary European History,* XIII (2004), 67–88. V. Depkat, *Lebenswenden und Zeitenwenden. Deutsche Politiker und die Erfahrungen des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Munich, 2007).
6. For an exemplary study of the nuances of Communist rhetoric regarding democracy, see J. Gotovitch, *Du rouge au tricolore. Les Communistes belges de 1939 à 1944* (Brussels, 1992).
7. S. Berman, *The Social Democratic Moment. Ideas and Politics in the Making of Interwar Europe* (Cambridge Mass. and London, 1998). M. Conway, 'The Age of Christian Democracy. The Frontiers of Success and Failure' in T. Kselman and J. Buttigieg (eds), *Christian Democracy. Historical Legacies and Comparative Perspectives* (Notre Dame Ind, 2003), pp. 436–7.
8. D. Luyten and P. Magnette, 'L'idée du parlementarisme en Belgique', in *Histoire de la Chambre des Représentants de Belgique* (Brussels, 2003), pp. 19–46.
9. M. Conway and P. Romijn (eds), *The War for Legitimacy in Politics and Culture 1936–1946* (Oxford and New York, 2008). P. Romijn, *Burgemeesters in oorlogstijd. Besturen onder Duitse bezetting* (Amsterdam, 2006), pp. 601–32.
10. M. Koreman, *The Expectation of Justice. France 1944–1946* (Durham NC and London, 1999), pp. 1–188.
11. This was very typical of the rather ritualistic references to democracy made by de Gaulle in his wartime speeches in London and Algiers: J. Touchard, *Le gaullisme 1940–1969* (Paris, 1978), pp. 63–4.
12. R. Boehling, *A Question of Priorities. Democratic Reform and Economic Recovery in Postwar Germany* (Oxford and New York, 1996), pp. 207–10. P. Ginsborg, *A History of Contemporary Italy. Society and Politics 1943–1988* (London, 1990), pp. 100–1.
13. M. Conway 'The Rise and Fall of Western Europe's Democratic Age', 73–4.
14. *Les Dossiers de l'Action Sociale Catholique* July–August 1945, 293–5, 'Prélude à une semaine sociale', and September 1945, 368–80, 'Christianisme et Démocratie'.
15. K. Adenauer, *Erinnerungen, 1945–1953* (Stuttgart, 1965), p. 46.
16. E.g. J. Touchard, *Le gaullisme*, pp. 63–4 and 87.
17. SFIO Déclaration des principes, 24 February 1946, reprinted in G. Mollet, *Bilan et perspectives socialistes* (Paris, 1958), p. 109.
18. A. Steinhouse, *Workers' Participation in post-Liberation France* (Lanham MD and Oxford, 2001); T. Behan, *The Long-Awaited Moment. The Working Class and the Italian Communist Party in Milan, 1943–1948* (New York, 1997); D. Luyten, *Sociaal-economisch overleg in België sedert 1918* (Brussels, 1995), pp. 123–42; M. Fichter, 'Aufbau und Neuordnung. Betriebsräte zwischen Klassensolidarität und Betriebsloyalität' in M. Broszat, K.-D. Henke and H. Woller (eds), *Von Stalingrad zur Währungsreform. Zur Sozialgeschichte des Umbruchs in Deutschland* (Munich, 1988), pp. 469–549.
19. P. Ginsborg, *A History of Contemporary Italy*, p. 98; J.-P. Rioux, *The Fourth Republic 1944–1958* (Cambridge, 1987), pp. 97–111; T. Eschenburg, *Jahre der Besatzung, 1945–1949. Mit einem einleitenden Essay von Eberhard Jäckel* (Stuttgart and Wiesbaden, 1983), pp. 124–6.

20. S. Foley, *Women in France since 1789* (Basingstoke and New York, 2004), pp. 237–42; S. Chaperon, '"Feminism is dead. Long live Feminism!" The Women's Movement in France at the Liberation, 1944–1946', in C. Duchen and I. Bandhauer-Schöffmann (eds), *When the War was Over. Women, War and Peace in Europe, 1940–1956* (London and New York, 2000), pp. 146–60; A. Rossi-Doria, 'Italian Women enter Politics' in ibid., pp. 89–102.
21. G. Mollet, *Bilan et perspectives socialistes*, pp. 101–3.
22. *Le Peuple,* 8 October 1945, p. 3, 'Le Congrès du Parti Socialiste Belge'; S. Kramer, 'Belgian Socialism at the Liberation. 1944–1950', *Res Publica,* XX (1978), 131; C. Kesteloot, 'Le maintien de la Charte de Quaregnon. Débats et controverses (1942–1945)', *Socialisme* No. 243, 151–8.
23. *1885/1985. Cent ans de socialisme* (Brussels, 1985), p. 218; G. Mollet, *Bilan et perspectives socialistes*, pp. 98–9.
24. P. Sering (i.e. R. Löwenthal), *Jenseits des Kapitalismus* (Lauf near Nuremberg, 1946).
25. W. Brandt, 'Programmatische Grundlagen des demokratischen Sozialismus', May 1949, in K. Klotzbach, *Der Weg zur Staatspartei. Programmatik, praktische Politik und Organisation der deutschen Sozialdemokratie 1945–1965* (Berlin, 1982), p. 187.
26. *Vers l'Avenir* 20 December 1945, p. 2, 'Une conférence de M. du Bus de Warnaffe'.
27. J. Touchard *Le gaullisme*, pp. 259–60.
28. J. Gotovitch and J. Gérard-Libois, *Léopold III. De l'an 40 à l'effacement* (Brussels, 1991). L. van Ypersele, La question royale ou la guerre des images' in M. Dumoulin, M. Van den Wijngaert and V. Dujardin (eds), *Léopold III* (Brussels, 2001), pp. 303–22. See also more generally A. Schwarzenbach, 'Royal Photographs. Emotions for the People', *Contemporary European History,* XIII (2004), 255–80.
29. R. Pollock (ed.), *The Mind of Pius XII* (New York, 1955), pp. 62–9. M. Conway, 'The Age of Christian Democracy', pp. 51–3.
30. M. Mitchell, 'Materialism and Secularism. CDU Politicians and National Socialism, 1945–1949', *Journal of Modern History,* LXVII (1995), 278–308.
31. P. Misner, 'The Roman Catholic Hierarchy and the Christian Labor Movement. Autonomy and Pluralism', in L. Heerma Van Voss, P. Pasture and J. De Mayer (eds), *Between Cross and Class. Comparative Histories of Christian Labor in Europe, 1840–2000* (Bern, 2005), p. 111.
32. R. Krieg, *Catholic Theologians in Nazi Germany* (New York, 2004), pp. 127–8.
33. P. Letamendia, *Le Mouvement Républicain Populaire. Histoire d'un grand parti français* (Paris, 1995), pp. 47–52. See also G.-R. Horn and E. Gerard (eds.), *Left Catholicism 1943–1955. Catholics in Western Europe at the Point of Liberation* (Leuven, 2001).
34. P. Chenaux, *Une Europe vaticane? Entre le Plan Marshall et les Traités de Rome* (Brussels, 1990); R. Krieg, *Catholic Theologians in Nazi Germany*, p. 121; M. Mitchell, 'Materialism and Secularism', 297–9.
35. H. Mommsen, 'Von Weimar nach Bonn. Zum Demokratieverständnis der Deutschen', in A. Schildt and A. Sywottek (eds), *Modernisierung im Wiederaufbau. Die westdeutsche Gesellschaft der 50er Jahre* (Bonn, 1993), pp. 745–58, especially 753.
36. K. Adenauer, *Erinnerungen, 1945–1953*, p. 281.
37. J.L. Talmon, *The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy* (London, 1952), p. 251.
38. J.-P. Rioux, *The Fourth Republic*, p. 109.
39. W. Koeppen, *Das Treibhaus* (Stuttgart, 1953).

40. The notion of an end to ideological conflicts was increasingly debated in Europe during the later 1950s, notably at the colloquia organized by the Congress for Cultural Freedom: P. Grémion, *Intelligence de l'anticommunisme. Le Congrès pour la liberté de la culture à Paris 1950–1975* (Paris, 1995), pp. 317–77. R. Aron, *Mémoires* Vol. II (Paris, 1983), pp. 577–9. See also R. Aron et al., *La démocratie à l'épreuve du XXe siècle*. In Germany, the sociologist Helmut Schelsky coined the formula of the 'sceptical generation' which he argued had become thoroughly disillusioned after the experience of having been exploited by National Socialism for its totalitarian purposes: H. Schelsky, *Die skeptische Generation. Eine Soziologie der deutschen Jugend* (Dusseldorf and Cologne, 1957). Cf. also A. Schildt, 'Ende der Ideologien? Politisch-ideologische Strömungen in den 50er Jahren', in A. Schildt and A. Sywottek (eds), *Modernisierung im Wiederaufbau*, pp. 627–35.
41. J.-P. Sartre, 'Preface' to F. Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (republished London, 2001), pp. 7–26.
42. 'Il semble difficile de soutenir que le général de Gaulle est un démocrate, au sens habituel du terme': J. Touchard, *Le gaullisme*, pp. 309–10.
43. P. Theunissen, *1950, le dénouement de la question royale* (Brussels, 1986), pp. 29–31. J. Duvieusart, *La question royale, crise et dénouement. juin, juillet, août 1950* (Brussels, 1975).
44. L. Lewin, *Ideology and Strategy. A Century of Swedish Politics* (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 218–37.
45. A. Camus, 'Democracy and Modesty', in J. Lévi-Valensi (ed.), *Camus at Combat. Writing 1944–1947* (Princeton, 2006), p. 287.
46. G. Orwell, 'Toward European Unity', republished in G. Orwell (ed. P. Davison), *Orwell and Politics* (London, 2001), pp. 473–9.
47. I. Woloch, 'Left, Right and Centre. The MRP and the Post-War Moment', *French History,* XXI (2007), 86–7.
48. M. Baum, *Rückblick auf mein Leben* (Heidelberg, 1950), pp. 293–4. Similar views were expressed by Arnold Brecht. See A. Brecht, *Aus nächster Nähe. Lebenserinnerungen, 1884–1927* (Stuttgart, 1966), p. 125; A. Brecht, *Mit der Kraft des Geistes. Lebenserinnerungen. Zweite Hälfte 1927–1967* (Stuttgart, 1967), pp. 126 and 142–3.
49. K. Adenauer, *Erinnerungen, 1945–1953*, p. 502.
50. K. Adenauer, *Erinnerungen, 1945–1953*, pp. 48–9, 51 and 53. H. Pünder, *Von Preußen nach Europa. Lebenserinnerungen* (Stuttgart, 1968), pp. 201–2; F. Friedensburg, *Es ging um Deutschlands Einheit. Rückschau eines Berliners auf die Jahre nach 1945* (Berlin, 1971), p. 46; W. Keil, *Erlebnisse eines Sozialdemokraten* (Stuttgart, 1948) Vol. II, pp. 212, 332–3, 336, 340, 458–9, 679 and 684.
51. H.R. Kedward, *Resistance in Vichy France. A Study of Ideas and Motivation in the Southern Zone 1940–1942* (Oxford, 1978), pp. 153–9.
52. E. Wolfrum, *Geschichspolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Der Weg zur bundesrepublikanischen Erinnerung, 1948–1990* (Darmstadt, 1999), pp. 394–9.
53. H. Kaelble, *Europäer über Europa. Die Entstehung des europäischen Selbstverständnisses im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt am Main, 2001), pp. 128–38.
54. For the following cf. A. Trunk, *Europa, ein Ausweg*, pp. 154–71; H. Kaelble *Europäer über Europa*, pp. 136–8 and 157–63; V. Depkat, *Lebenswenden und Zeitenwenden*, pp. 221–6.
55. A. Trunk, *Europa, ein Ausweg*, pp. 171–95; V. Depkat, *Lebenswenden und Zeitenwenden*, pp. 226–8.

56. K. Adenauer 'To Wilhelm Sollmann' 16 Mar. 1946, in K. Adenauer (ed. H.P. Mensing), *Briefe 1945–1947*, (Paderborn et al., 1983), p. 191; K. Adenauer *Erinnerungen, 1945–1953,* p. 375.
57. Trunk, *Europa, ein Ausweg*, pp. 195–207; H. Kaelble, *Europäer über Europa*, pp. 138–57, 163–83.
58. J.L. Gaddis, *We Now Know. Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford, 1997), pp. 26–53.
59. M. Conway, 'Legacies of Exile. The Exile Governments in London during the Second World War and the Politics of Post-War Europe', in M. Conway and J. Gotovitch (eds), *Europe in Exile. European Exile Communities in Britain 1940–45* (New York and Oxford, 2001), pp. 255–74; W. Kaiser, *Christian Democracy and the Origins of the European Union* (Cambridge, 2007).
60. P. Grémion, *Intelligence de l'anticommunisme*.
61. Trunk's study is based on the material handed down from these institutions. Cf. A. Trunk, *Europa ein Ausweg*.
62. R. Branche, *La guerre d'Algérie. Une histoire apaisée?* (Paris, 2005), pp. 349–59.
63. G. Morrell, 'A Higher Stage of Imperialism? The Big Three, the Trusteeship Council and the Early Cold War', in R.M. Douglas, M.D. Callahan and E. Bishop (eds), *Imperialism on Trial. International Oversight of Colonial Rule in Historical Perspective* (Lanham MD, etc., 2006), pp. 125–7.
64. R. Dahrendorf, *Gesellschaft und Demokratie in Deutschland* (Munich, 1965). For Dahrendorf's book in the context of West Germany's debate about democratization cf. M. Scheibe, 'Auf der Suche nach der demokratischen Gesellschaft', in U. Herbert (ed.), *Wandlungsprozesse in Westdeutschland. Belastung, Integration, Liberalisierung 1945–1980* (Göttingen, 2002), pp. 245–77.
65. V. Depkat, *Lebenswenden and Zeitenwenden*, pp. 213–15 and 383–4; P. Mendès-France 'La crise de la démocratie', in P. Mendès-France, *Oeuvres complètes* (Paris, 1987), Vol. IV, pp. 98–101.
66. L. Niethammer, *Entnazifizierung in Bayern* (Frankfurt am Main, 1973); R. Grohnert, *Die Entnazifizierung in Baden 1945–1949* (Stuttgart, 1991).
67. Adenauer, 'To Wilhelm Sollmann', p. 191.
68. e.g. M. Young and P. Wilmott, *Family and Kinship in East London* (London, 1957).
69. P. Mendès-France, 'La crise de la démocratie', p. 82.
70. H. Kaelble, *Sozialgeschichte Europas, 1945 bis zur Gegenwart* (Munich, 2007), pp. 332–60; H. Kaelble, *Europäer über Europa*, pp. 218–45.
71. See, for example, G. Eley, *Forging Democracy. The History of the Left in Europe, 1850–2000* (Oxford and New York, 2002), pp. 311–20.
72. L. Erhard, *Wohlstand für alle* (Dusseldorf, 1957); O. Ruin, *Tage Erlander. Serving the Welfare State, 1946–1969* (Pittsburgh, 1990), pp. 214–21.
73. M. Koreman, *The Expectation of Justice*, pp. 258–63.
74. L. Wylie, *Village in the Vaucluse,* 3rd ed. (Cambridge Mass. and London, 1974), pp. 206–11.
75. R. Rémond, *1958. Le retour de de Gaulle* (Brussels, 1983), pp. 119–39.
76. *Le Peuple,* 20 April 1945, p. 1, 'Le sentiment public sous l'occupation'; *De Nieuwe Standaard* 22–23 April 1945, p. 1, 'Waarom zouden wij voor elkander vreezen?'.
77. C. Applegate, *A Nation of Provincials. The German Idea of Heimat* (Berkeley, etc., 1999), pp. 242–3.
78. A. Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State* (London, 1992).
79. See the contribution of Wardhaugh et al. in this volume.

80. H. Rousso, *Le syndrome de Vichy* (Paris, 1987). P. Lagrou, *The Legacy of Nazi Occupation. Patriotic Memory and National Recovery in Western Europe, 1945–1965* (Cambridge and New York, 2000).
81. A characteristic example of the genre is P.-H. Spaak, *Combats inachevés* 2 vols. (Paris, 1969).
82. K. Jarausch, *After Hitler. Recivilizing Germans, 1945–1995* (Oxford, 2006), pp. 99–184.
83. H. Pünder, *Von Preußen nach Europa*, p. 443.
84. G. Eley, *Forging Democracy*, pp. 341–83.