

Текст	Автор	Год	Идеи (будут актуальны всегда.....)					
Big Business in Putin's Russia: Structural and Instrumental Power." Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization	Matveev, Ilya	2019	<p>3 dimensions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - comprises the functioning of the economic ministries that anticipate the investment decisions of private firms. - the mechanisms of corporatist bargaining established in the early 2000s, in which - - the business side can use its structural power to strengthen its case. <p>personalistic lobbying through various informal networks that unite business leaders and representatives of the state.</p> <p>structural power:</p> <p>In the 1990s: the structural power of large firms, as opposed to their instrumental power, was low.</p> <p>after 1998: the responsiveness of the state to the investment imperative (reflecting the structural power of capital) greatly increased. the principle of "equal distance" toward each oligarchic group declared by Putin prior to his election in 2000</p> <p>after the Yukos affair: the state expanded its presence in the oil and gas sector, acquiring a controlling stake in Gazprom and and transforming Rosneft" into the largest oil producer</p> <p>instrumental power (the potential for individual and collective lobbying): peak in the 1990s: control of the media and the financial backing of political parties</p> <p>Putin's first term: the decline in big business' instrumental power was compensated with an increase in their structural power.</p> <p>after the Yukos affair: decline intensified. the direct involvement of large firms in regional politics also decreased.</p> <p>personalistic lobbying is a distinctive feature of the instrumental power of business in Putin's Russia</p> <p>after 2014: big business has a powerful influence on state policy, it does not determine policy outcomes "in the last instance."</p>					
The Politics of Anti-Corruption Campaigns in Putin's Russia: Power, Opposition, and the All-Russia People's Front.	Aburamoto, Mari	2019	<p>Corruption is a universal opportunity to blame the state (nobody likes corruption) Alexey Navalny and other political opposition understand it and built their programmes against it.</p> <p>State understood that they need to fill this gap and created ONF which also fought against corruption to show that state also cares about this problem and try to tackle it</p> <p>ONF with the state support created new anti-corruption legislation, it led to the elite fragmentation and control over corruption but situational (on micro level) being a smokescreen for the higher elites corruption</p>					
Democracy Derailed in Russia: The Failure of Open Politics. Ch. 7. The Institutional Problem: Superpresidentialism	Owen, Catherine, and Eleanor Bindman	2019	<p>The Russian government has developed avenues for public participation in policy processes for non-state actors. People are interested in it because of misrepresentation of their interests in elected bodies. But who are these actors and do they really have an autonomous power to control state policies</p> <p>NGOs (their activities are restricted because they are in the opposition to the state) PCBs (mostly have consultative function but nobody listen to them for real) SONGOs (doing non-political activities solving the problems with which state does nothing)</p> <p>State improves give more responsibilities to SONGOs and PCBs using the New Public Management and the doctrine of 'organic statism' (individualism and elections are downplayed, and a strong, interventionist state is seen as 'playing a relatively autonomous, architectural role in the polity'; organic statism accords an important role for the decentralized political participation of semi-autonomous functional groups)</p>					
Russia's Centralized Authoritarianism in the Disguise of Democratic Federalism: Evidence from the September 2017 Sub-National Elections.	Golosov, Grigorii	2018	<p>Political domination of the pro-government party over the regional political assemblies is sustained by a complex combination of party regulations and electoral rules. In particular, gubernatorial elections are organized and conducted in a way that ensures the victories of the incumbent governors who are effectively appointed by the president of Russia.</p> <p>The analysis of the September 2017 sub-national elections in Russia demonstrates that in fact, constitutional provisions (Russia is a democratic federal state that vests significant powers in the sub-national bodies of government and leaves it for its federal units and municipalities to decide who will govern them by conducting elections) are nullified by restrictive political practices that effectively ensure the national authorities' control over the regions of the country.</p>					
The Practical Logic of Judicial Decision Making	Paneyakh, Ella	2016	<p>Three groups of strategies, which enable the state prosecutor to dominate court proceedings:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Participating in the selection of judges (former defense attorneys and lawyers with experience of working in private companies or public organizations rarely become judges, while former procurators constitute the second largest group among judges) 2. Manipulating the appeals process (Annulment of a decision is regarded as a sign of poor work and is viewed in an extremely negative manner) 3. Ensuring regular interaction (there are about as many judges constantly engaged in hearing criminal cases in a court as there are assistant procurators regularly presenting state indictments in the same court → same few procuracy officials and judges meet one another over and over again in different criminal trials) <p><i>importance of seriousness of the charge →</i></p> <p>Only 29.05 percent of cases of private prosecution end with conviction of the defendant BCS <u>judges regard only incarceration as a real punishment</u> →</p> <p>→ In cases involving imprisonment the discretion of the judge is inversely proportional to the seriousness of the charge and therefore to the severity of the punishment facing the defendant.</p> <p>→ the greater the guilt admitted by the defendant the more inclined the judge to spare him punishment altogether</p> <p>judges are indeed under structural pressure—pressure strong enough to compel them to take into account the interests of the state prosecution even when in their own minds they consider the arguments of the prosecution insufficiently weighty to support a conviction → the judge is constantly in search of discretion that will be "free of charge"—that is, ways to realize his values without having to risk anything.</p>					

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Can Russia Modernise?: Sistema, Power Networks and Informal Governance	Ledeneva, Alena V.	2013	<p>'Telephone justice' is a colloquial phrase to denote <i>inequality before the law, selectivity in law enforcement and the consequent gap between law and justice</i>.</p> <p>- influence with judges and prosecutors can yield desired results in criminal, commercial and civil trials and that, even if unfavourable judgments are handed down, there are ways to ensure that they are not enforced Kudeshkina ECHR case (женщину уволили из Мосгорсуда) + example of sistema – ways how courts and judges may be influenced and pressured by higher level.</p> <p>- <i>sistema</i> provides different approaches to different individuals</p> <p>Kudeshkina ECHR case (женщину уволили из Мосгорсуда) + example of sistema – ways how courts and judges may be influenced and pressured by higher level.</p> <p><i>sistema</i> provides different approaches to different individuals</p> <p>various sections are indicative of the problems of the Russian judicial system as viewed by international experts:</p> <p>(a) historical roots;</p> <p>(b) pressures on judges to convict;</p> <p>(c) views of the leadership of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation;</p> <p>(d) jury trials – a key reform under threat;</p> <p>(e) defence lawyers – a high-risk profession;</p> <p>(f) lack of safeguards during the trial against irregularities at the investigative stage;</p> <p>(g) 'legal nihilism' – two emblematic case (<i>Yukos & Magnitskiy cases</i>)</p> <p>extradition cases in the UK</p> <p>Politically motivated charges and the dependence of the Russian judiciary, backed by documents and expert witnesses, constituted the key themes in the defence against extradition.</p> <p>example – Zakaev case (leader of Chechen independence movement, British judge ruled that Zakaev's case was based on ethnic and political grounds)</p> <p><i>Three types of incompetence</i> are recurrently referred to in judicial rulings on extradition cases, all of them related to modernisation:</p> <p>1 time discipline (documents from the Russian side are not provided on time)</p> <p>2 substance discipline (materials provided by the RF are often inadequate)</p> <p>3 'fair process' discipline ("Russians are 'not easy to work with, even if you represent them'")</p> <p><i>It is one of the outcomes of globalisation that the weakness of the rule of law in Russia is now exposed in foreign courts</i></p>				
The Regional Roots of Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia	Golosov, Grigorii V.	2011	<p>- 1991 - refusal to hold new elections (anti-communist Yeltsin coalition) >> Refusal of elections contributed to the preservation of bureaucratic elites. In the republics, the presidential elections strengthened the positions of the former elites.</p> <p>- Political processes of the 1990s > creation of consolidated political regimes</p> <p>- The Law on Political Parties (June 2001) >! The law <i>did not</i> solve the problem of low demand for parties from the elites and the electorate</p> <p>- The result of the 2005-2007 transformation in Russia - in the system of electoral authoritarianism, elections are devoid of political meaning. The source of the changes was the fundamental inability of the Russian authorities to combine the tasks of national construction with the construction of democratic institutions.</p>				
Media and Political Persuasion: Evidence from Russia.	Enikolopov, Ruben, Maria Petrova, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya	2011	<p>- Election 1999:</p> <p>- NTV was able to <i>persuade</i> its viewers to vote for the party <i>despite their initial voting intentions</i> just before the elections</p> <p>- NTV prevented undecided voters <i>from voting for the pro government</i> party criticized by NTV.</p> <p>- The absence of independent TV may not be fully compensated by other media >> <i>television</i> may need to be considered <i>a separate market</i> for the purposes of <i>regulation</i></p> <p>- Media effects in Russia due to: <i>the unstable party system, weak partisan attachments, the lack of prior information about the performance of politicians in office, unclear policy positions, the importance of candidates' individual traits, and the lack of competitiveness in the media market.</i></p>				
"Standard Oil and Yukos in the Context of Early Capitalism in the United States and Russia." Demokratizatsiya	Volkov, Vadim	2008	<p>1) There were conflicts between large businesses and the state in the United States (Standard Oil) and Russia (Yukos) in the context of early capitalism.</p> <p>2) Both conflicts were influenced by the state's growing authority and occurred in weak institutional environments.</p> <p>3) The Standard Oil conflict involved legal proceedings against the company and its founder, John D. Rockefeller, for monopolistic practices and violations of antitrust laws. The conflict lasted for several years and resulted in the dissolution of the company into smaller entities.</p> <p>4) The Yukos conflict involved the arrest and charges of financial fraud, tax evasion, and theft against the company's head, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, and the freezing of a significant portion of the company's stock. The conflict was seen as a politically motivated attack on Khodorkovsky and his associates.</p>				
Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse	Kotkin, Stephen	2008	<p>- N. Teonov - "all our troubles derived from the so-called subjective factor— the personal qualities of our leaders"</p> <p>- Contrary to the Kremlin line, the Soviet presence amounted to an occupation</p> <p>- Khrushchev's multiple administrative reorganizations and campaigns caused disruption and brought mixed results to Corbachev.</p> <p>- The generation in between— that of 1920— had been largely decimated in the war.</p> <p>- The tropical crowds of the surprise 1959 Cuban revolution evoked for a visiting Soviet delegation their own revolution in 1917.</p>				
The Consolidation of Dictatorship in Russia	Ostrow, Joel M., Georgii Satarov, and Irina Khakamada	2007	<p>Critical Junctures: eliminating communist political system, new constitution, political competition, leadership change</p> <p>1) Ignore politics: Yeltsin had the opportunity to institute political reform and create a democratic system of government, but instead chose to focus on economic transformation and retain communist-era institutions</p> <p>2) Corrupted constitution: constitution made by assembly wouldn't guarantee democratic development but the changes made by Yeltsin's advisors undermined the balance of power between executive and legislature</p> <p>3) Corrupt elections: 1996 presidential and parliamentary - violations of democratic principles, state resources, media to support Yeltsin, manipulation of the electoral process by the government. Role of the oligarchs in funding and supporting Yeltsin's campaign in exchange for political favors and access to state resources. 1996 elections set a precedent for the manipulation of electoral outcomes in Russia and contributed to the emergence of an authoritarian regime in the country.</p> <p>4) Successor: Yeltsin worked to anoint a successor to maintain control over the government. Yeltsin's actions contributed to the continuation of authoritarian rule in Russia, as his chosen successor, Vladimir Putin, consolidated power and suppressed political opposition.</p>				

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Democracy Derailed in Russia: The Failure of Open Politics. Ch. 7. The Institutional Problem: Superpresidentialism	Fish, M Steven	2005	<p>Presidentialism vs. Parliamentarism vs. Semipresidentialism (p. is powerful and popularly elected but PM is also might; varies depending on the parliamentary power to appoint ministers/dismiss the government/oversight/monopoly on lawmaking)</p> <p>+ Pre: Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan</p> <p>+ Sem: Croatia, Lithuania, Moldova, Mongolia, Poland, Romania [strong P.]; Russia, Ukraine [less powerful P.]; Kazakhstan [weak P.]</p> <p>! Parliamentary systems do well, semipresidential systems less well, and presidential systems worst in terms of political openness + vice versa</p> <p>! Russia is a case of superpresidentialism, parliamentary powers are a fiction</p> <p>! R. constitutional choice: undermining the communist regime by asserting the sovereignty of Russia → concentration of powers in the presidency (parl. was associated with the old order)</p> <p>1) country-specific circumstances shaped constitutional choices, 2) popular preferences often influenced those choices; 3) the openness of the political system did not necessarily determine the powers that the constitution granted the legislature</p> <p>! Hyperpersonalization, people couldn't separate actors from institutions, parties and ideologies mean little</p> <p>Problems with superpresidentialism:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - the legitimacy of the political system depends on one individual's performance - gives no incentives to build strong parties (executive positions are more attractive) + facilitates intracamp competition - prevents people to enter the national politics + weak parliament doesn't train real politicians - counters institution building and undermines state capacity (deinstitutionalization) - exacerbates corruption 				
Constrained or Irrelevant: The Media in Putin's Russia	Lipman, Masha	2005	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Compared to the Soviet era, today's Russian media still has considerable freedom (constraints apply almost exclusively to politically sensitive coverage) - National television — a tool for maintaining Putin's popularity and the political dominance of his administration. - Harassment of journalists one by one was more likely to encourage than to intimidate them. Self-censorship among journalists has become pervasive <p>Instead, the Kremlin went after media owners (case of Media-MOST, Gusinsky; Berezovsky)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The problem with today's media in Russia is not just that the Kremlin controls national television, but also that those publications that remain uncontrolled do not make a difference, since they operate in a virtually empty public space - The Kremlin more recently (статья 2005 года) seems to be extending its control over smaller-circulation media; example: It orchestrated a change of ownership in Izvestia and a television company with a relatively small audience and a liberal editorial line <p>Insufficient reasons for the opposition failure in 2000s: supply side (lack of coalitions and other forms of cooperation between real oppositional forces (e.g. liberals)) demand side (success of Putin's economic policies and absence of will of changing the system)</p> <p>How does it work according to Gelman? The causal mechanism is built on the relations between opposition and elites. The main criterias are how the elites and institutions are structured and interrelated and level of loyalty of the opposition</p> <p>During Putin's term the elite became much less differentiated and gained more power. Oppositional powers have no choice: it became co-opted or damaged, located at the periphery of the political arena, and lost its role as a political actor.</p> <p>What can the opposition do? The choice of opposition strategies lies between "loyalty", "voice," and "exit" , represented, in the form of doing "petty things;" (i.e., oppositional activities without serious challenge to the status quo); mass mobilization (mainly electoral), and bargaining with the ruling group and consequent cooptation ("implementation into power"). None of these strategies were successful in Russia.</p> <p>What did the opposition try to do? Parties KPRF - had a success as a principal opposition but became too radical and after loss (unsuccessful policy of "neglecting") of power became a semi-oppositional power Liberals - victims of their success in 90s who are semi-opposition because of saving loyalty to the state being part of the state apparatus from the beginning of its existence (one of the consequences - lack of success in the parliamentary elections) Democrats - from principal opposition (had some influence in the first state Duma) to weak semi-oppositional power because of too strong emphasis on Yavlinsky presidential promotion</p>				
"Political Opposition in Russia: A Dying Species?	Gel'man, Vladimir	2005					
Was the Soviet System Reformable?	Cohen, Stephen F.	2004	<p>"Intrinsic irreformability of Soviet Communism" (worst formulated axiom): "Communism" is an abstract notion, "Sovietism" is analytical</p> <p>Functioning components of Soviet system:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>official ideology</i> → became inobligatory, was replaced by western-style social democracy - <i>authoritarian nature of CPSU</i> → split into reformist and conservative wings ("era of schism"), politicization of the party - <i>CPSU's monopoly on politics</i> → end of censorship, organized opposition, Congress of People's Deputies (1989), presidency (1990), mass demonstrations and strikes - <i>pyramid of pseudodemocratic soviets</i> → became popularly elected - <i>monopolistic control of the economy</i> → transition to mixed economy: cooperatives, privatization of enterprise by nomenclatura, commercial banks, rise of entrepreneurial elites, fair competition btw different forms of property - <i>the multinational federation (de-facto a unitary state)</i> → preparation of new Union treaty based on the idea of voluntary federation <p>All these components were reformed</p> <p>Parts of CPSU: the party apparatus, nomenklatura, rank-and-file members, reformist and conservative crypto-political parties</p>				
When Majorities Fail	Andrews, Josephine T.	2002	<p>Cycling - a form of collective irrationality when people repeatedly switch their preferences between different options. 1992, Chapter 2, deputies amended it nine times. draft constitution (option a) > Soviet-era constitution (option c), amendments (option b) > (option a), (option c) > (option b) -> return back to status quo. Ruslan Khasbulatov vs Yeltsin</p> <p><i>The Supreme Soviet was elected by Congress of People's Deputies</i></p>				
Violent Entrepreneurship in Post-Communist Russia.	Volkov, Vadim	1999	<p>Three types of "violent entrepreneurial agencies" in post-communist Russia: 1) state and illegal (units of state police and security forces acting as private entrepreneurs); 2) non-state (private) and legal (private protection companies); 3) and private and illegal (organised criminal or bandit groups).</p> <p>Power entrepreneurship is the use of organized power, the skills of its application to convert this power into market goods on a permanent basis. For example, the sale of "services": security, security and conflict resolution.</p> <p>Power entrepreneurship develops and thrives in a weak state. The heyday of power entrepreneurship in Russia – the 1990s.</p>				