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Europe's "1989" in Global Context

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The collapse of socialist regimes across Central and Eastern Europe was a turning point in European history. What is often referred to by the shorthand "1989" significantly accelerated a process of the reintegration of a continent divided by the Cold War. Yet this regional transformation was also part of larger world-historical developments. Europe's "1989" extended the processes of democratization that had taken place in Southern Europe in the 1970s, and in Southeast Asia and Latin America in the 1980s; it marked an acceleration of globalization and the neoliberal restructuring of economies that had begun just over a decade earlier; and it was the end of a longer-term process of imperial disintegration that stretched across the twentieth century. From a global vantage point, "1989" appears less a revolutionary watershed than an important regional manifestation of changes that already had momentum. This is not the whole story, however. The engineers of change from within the region were not only recipients of ideas produced elsewhere. Central and East European economists, politicians and opposition movements were both influenced by and contributed to these global developments. Indeed, the fall of the communist alternative in Eastern Europe provoked powerful reactions across the world.

"1989" as a Neoliberal Revolution

The communist states of Central and Eastern Europe collapsed at a moment of high faith in the efficacy of privatized economies and an ever more integrated world economy. Over the course of the 1980s, newly influential neoliberal reformers helped implement what became known as the "Washington Consensus" around the world. High levels of debt in Africa and Latin America gave leverage to the increasingly powerful

World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to insist on so-called structural adjustment – usually meaning privatization, deregulation and open economies – in return for the easing of repayment terms. East European countries faced similar conditions: The model of extensive growth that had guaranteed high increases in GDP in the postwar period had been exhausted by the early 1970s. In order to satisfy domestic consumer demand, and with a view to modernizing their industries to be competitive on the world market, East European states started to borrow the so-called petrodollars that had flowed out of energy-producing states at low rates of interest in the wake of the oil crisis. Yet the expected revolution in productivity and quality never occurred. From Poland to Bulgaria, states became more and more indebted, increasingly borrowing simply to maintain standards of living necessary to secure the communist parties' short-term legitimacy.[1]

This indebtedness increased the leverage that international financial institutions had over East European states. The structural adjustment policies enforced on Yugoslavia by the IMF disrupted the economic cooperation between its republics, helping accelerate the centrifugal forces which led to its disintegration.[2] Long before the system's collapse, in order to access further credit, Hungary (1982) and Poland (1986) joined the IMF. As communist parties fell in 1989, global financial institutions were able to insist on particular economic prescriptions in return for substantial debt forgiveness. Latin America, the most recent region to undergo democratization and bouts of neoliberal reform, became a rich source of inspiration.[3] Advisors such as Jeffrey Sachs and Arnold Harberger as well as many World Bank experts looked to Chilean, Bolivian and Mexican privatization for their

1 Of Hungary's US$ 20 billion debt, only US$ 4–5 billion was invested in increasing productivity: Ivan T. Berend, "Global Financial Architecture and East Central Europe Before and After 1989," in Ulf Engel, Frank Hadler and Matthias Middell (eds.), *1989 in a Global Perspective* (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2015), 56–57; Stephen Kotkin, "The Kiss of Debt: The East Bloc Goes Borrowing," in Niall Ferguson, Charles S. Maier, Erez Manela and Daniel S. Sargent (eds.), *The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 80–93.

2 Susan Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 1995), esp. ch. 3.

3 Werner Baer and Joseph Love, "Introduction," in Werner Baer and Joseph Love (eds.), *Liberalization and Its Consequences: A Comparative Perspective on Latin America and Eastern Europe* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2000), 4. Influential Hungarian economists advised their government to replicate the *maquiladora* system to attract investments from Western Europe, as Mexico had done from the United States. For contemporary fears that Eastern Europe would become an impoverished Latin America, see e.g. Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 191–92.

postcommunist economic experiment.[4] Poland was targeted as the first key country for reformers: If neoliberal "shock therapies" succeeded in the region's largest economy, they thought, they would be imitated across Eastern Europe.[5]

GDP declined 25–30 percent across the region between 1990 and 1993, leading to high levels of unemployment and falling wages. The economic gap between Western and Eastern Europe widened during the 1990s.[6] Nevertheless, there was remarkably little protest either from the new establishment or from society. The fact that the massive dislocation that accompanied reforms was tolerated, or even welcomed, was partly the result of a neoliberal consensus that had been growing within sections of East European elites before 1989.[7] Reforming economists in particular, despite constituting only a thin intellectual stratum within East European societies, would play a large role in shaping the "transition" – a term derived from the Spanish *"transición"* which usually refers to the postauthoritarian period in Spain from 1975 and in Chile from 1988.[8]

Their embrace of variants of neoliberalism after 1989 resulted from the fact that they had been able to adapt its ideas to many different political projects – even before the political collapse. Before 1989, marketization and global integration were not necessarily linked with the end of one-party

4 On this fascination with Latin American transition as model, see Duccio Basosi, "An Economic Lens on Global Transformations: The Foreign Debt Crisis of the 1980s in the Soviet Bloc and Latin America," in Piotr H. Kosicki and Kyrill Kunakhovich (eds.), *The Legacy of 1989: Continuity and Discontinuity in a Quarter-Century of Global Revolution* (forthcoming). Other "maverick" advisors such as Victor Huaco and Boris Jordan had worked in Latin America before they came to Eastern Europe; see David E. Hoffman, *The Oligarchs: Wealth and Power in the New Russia* (New York: Public Affairs, 2002), 198; Philipp Ther, *Die neue Ordnung auf dem alten Kontinent. Eine Geschichte des neoliberalen Europa* (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2014), 51.

5 Anders Åslund and Simeon Djankov, *The Great Rebirth: Lessons from the Victory of Capitalism over Communism* (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2014); Ther, *Die neue Ordnung*, 90–93. On Eastern Europe as a testing ground for neoliberalism, see Peter Gowan, "Neo-Liberal Theory and Practice for Eastern Europe," *New Left Review* 213, 1 (1995), 3–60; Naomi Klein, *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism* (London: Penguin Books, 2007), 169. On Poland's influence on Russian liberalization under Gaidar, see Hoffman, *Oligarchs*, 184.

6 Berend, "Global Financial Architecture," 58.

7 For this approach, see János Mátyás Kovács and Violetta Zentai, "Prologue," in János Mátyás Kovács and Violetta Zentai (eds.), *Capitalism from Outside? Economic Cultures in Eastern Europe After 1989* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2012), 3–7. On the role of regional economists in transnational debates since the 1960s, see Johanna Bockman, *Markets in the Name of Socialism: The Left-Wing Origins of Neoliberalism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011).

8 Ther, *Die neue Ordnung*, 32.

rule. The socialist states of East Asia were already abandoning central planning and autarky but retaining their authoritarian political structures. China's embrace of entrepreneurship, marketization and openness to world trade was a key moment in the erosion of faith in the Soviet model of planning.[9] Vietnam had rejected regulated prices and was encouraging individual entrepreneurship in key areas of the economy. Nor was the world short of authoritarian states of the political right that were shepherding market transition and integration into the world market, while enjoying the support of Western democracies.[10] When the communist Károly Grósz became prime minister of Hungary in 1987, he looked to the authoritarian model of integration into the world economy exemplified by Park Chung Hee's South Korea.[11] In Poland, so-called Kraków liberals rejected the trade union Solidarność's social-democratic welfarism and called for General Wojciech Jaruzelski to turn himself into a "Polish Pinochet" and carry out the necessary neoliberal reforms himself.[12] Others did challenge such authoritarianism: In Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia, economic experts and dissidents, both of whom recognized the potential for the market and privatization to destabilize the *nomenklatura*'s grasp on power, entered into strategic alliances to defeat the party-state.[13] Yet even here it was not clear that such reforms would lead either to capitalism or to a multiparty system. Right up until the collapse, some prominent East European economists advocated a market economy and enterprise autonomy to save socialism from the overly centralized and unwieldy planning state and hoped that Western neoliberals such as Jeffrey Sachs would be

9 Ibid., 48, 51; Odd Arne Westad, "Conclusion," in George Lawson et al. (eds.), *The Global 1989: Continuity and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 273.

10 On the unusual combination in Eastern Europe of democracy followed by marketization, see Leszek Balcerowicz, "Understanding Postcommunist Transitions," *Journal of Democracy* 5, 4 (1994), 76.

11 Stephen Kotkin, *Uncivil Society: 1989 and the Implosion of the Communist Establishment* (New York: Modern Library, 2009), 33.

12 On Franco and Pinochet as models, see Mirosław Dzielski, "Potrzeba twórczego antykomunizmu," *13 Grudnia* 11 (1987), 7; Adam Michnik, *Letters from Freedom: Post-Cold War Realities and Perspectives* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 99; Tobias Rupprecht, "Formula Pinochet: Chilean Lessons for Russian Liberal Reformers During the Soviet Collapse, 1970–2000," *Journal of Contemporary History* 51, 1 (2016), 165–86.

13 On Czechoslovakia, see Petr Roubal, "Anti-Communism of the Future: Czech Post-Dissident Neoconservatives in Post-Communist Transformation," in Michal Kopeček and Piotr Wciślik (eds.), *Thinking Through Transition: Liberal Democracy, Authoritarian Pasts, and Intellectual History in East Central Europe After 1989* (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2015), 188–89.

supporters of their reforms. They were shocked when he declared that his aim was to destroy socialism.[14]

Thus even within parts of Eastern Europe the preconditions for a powerful neoliberal elite consensus already existed before 1989. As communist power collapsed, many reformers of socialism did not find their transformation into cheerleaders for capitalism overly taxing. Leszek Balcerowicz, who had studied economics in the United States in the 1970s and been a communist party member until 1981, became an economic advisor to the Polish opposition in Solidarność and advocate of (socialist) marketization in the 1980s. He then established himself as *the* domestic architect of so-called shock therapy in postcommunist Poland. Others who had earlier recognized neoliberalism's capacities in the struggle against bureaucratic socialism, but had remained in "internal exile" within the state apparatus, came to the political fore. In Prague, Václav Klaus, a member of the Friedrich Hayek Society and an admirer of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, was prime minister for most of the 1990s, and from this position acted as one of the most effective cheerleaders in the region for a "market without adjectives."[15] The group that in the 1980s was called "Gdańsk liberals" would produce a Polish prime minister, Jan Bielecki, and a minister for privatization, Janusz Lewandowski.[16]

In those places where internal neoliberal oppositions had not developed, such as Bulgaria and Romania, the "Washington Consensus" was much slower to arrive.[17] Romania had in fact been one of the first countries to open to the West. It had imported Western technology from the late 1960s, had joined the IMF in 1972 and had been one of the first Comecon (Council of Mutual Economic Assistance) countries to embrace East–West joint ventures. However, from 1981, Romania had decided to pay off all its national debt. The country was thus removed from the reach of Western finance and was ruled with a far greater degree of surveillance and violence

14 On the revival of interest in market socialism in the late 1980s, see Johanna Bockman, "The Long Road to 1989: Neoclassical Economics, Alternative Socialisms, and the Advent of Neoliberalism," *Radical History Review* 112 (2012), 25–30; Agnieszka Paczynska, *State, Labor, and the Transition to a Market Economy: Egypt, Poland, Mexico, and the Czech Republic* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2009), 135.

15 Milan Znoj, "Václav Havel: His Idea of Civil Society," in Kopeček and Wciślik (eds.), *Thinking Through Transition*, 112–13; Gil Eyal, *The Origins of Post-Communist Elites: From the Prague Spring to the Breakup of Czechoslovakia* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), ch. 3.

16 Kochanowicz, "Have Polish Economists Noticed New Institutionalism?," in Kovács and Zentai (eds.), *Capitalism from Outside?*, 205–06.

17 For Bulgaria, see Venelin I. Ganev, *Preying on the State: The Transformation of Bulgaria After 1989* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007), 30, 71–72.

than any other bloc country.[18] With neither the internal development of neoliberalism nor the emergence of a democratic opposition, the domestic basis for a rapid rupture during transition did not exist. The first transitional governments consisted of former communists who followed Moscow's attempts at restructuring a command economy until the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991, and fought to keep workers' social protections in the face of external pressure. In Bulgaria, the former *nomenklatura* dominated the immediate postcommunist political system – keeping neoliberals out of power until 1997.

Levels of social protest in the region were also low. Although surveys in the early 1990s noted the survival of "socialist values" and a skepticism about privatization and foreign investment, the economic and social disruption caused by transition did not come under organized attack.[19] Labor unions were weak, faced a collapsing membership and were unable to expand into new capitalist workplaces, and were easily demonized through their association with the communist era.[20] There was also a widespread faith in the long-term potential of Westernization. Since the 1960s, many communist elites had nurtured a faith in an individualistic consumerism which their own system had been unable to fulfill – the new capitalism appeared to offer the future possibility of its realization.[21] In Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, elites built these expectations into what has been termed "market populism" – a socially resonant morality tale of the good capitalists pitted against the evil communists.[22] Only in Vladimír Mečiar's Slovakia and Ion Iliescu's Romania did resistance show itself: Here governments encouraged opposition to neoliberalism as an essentially foreign imposition, in order to bolster their credentials as protectors of the working class or the nation. Even here, however, privatization would eventually arrive in the late 1990s.

18 Cornel Ban, "Sovereign Debt, Austerity, and Regime Change: The Case of Nicolae Ceaușescu's Romania," *East European Politics and Societies* 26, 4 (2012), 743–76.

19 Jan Drahokoupil, *Globalization and the State in Central and Eastern Europe: The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment* (London: Routledge, 2009), 97.

20 David Ost, "The Consequences of Postcommunism: Trade Unions in Eastern Europe's Future," *East European Politics and Societies* 23, 1 (2009), 14–19.

21 Paulina Bren and Mary Neuberger, "Introduction," in Paulina Bren and Mary Neuberger (eds.), *Communism Unwrapped: Consumption in Cold War Eastern Europe* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 12–13; György Péteri, "Introduction," in György Péteri (ed.), *Imagining the West in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2010), 8–12.

22 David Ost, *The Defeat of Solidarity: Anger and Politics in Postcommunist Europe* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 155–56.

"1989" as a Democratic Awakening

Europe's "1989" became the poster child for the idea that democracy was naturally equated with the market – evidence of a natural order toward which regions across the world were converging.[23] With the exception of Belarus, a democratic settlement prevailed across the region. Romania aside, this change was peacefully enacted in that year. These processes were later harshly criticized by those who believed that justice for the crimes of communism had been sacrificed on the altar of superficially civilized change.[24] Nevertheless, "1989" was a high-water moment for peaceful democratization, and the end point of a series of transformations in the techniques of opposition and in the worldviews of communists that reflected changes in political practices both regionally and globally.

The largest and most influential opposition movement was the Polish trade union Solidarność (Solidarity), which, at its peak in 1981, had more than 10 million members. It was not only the greatest organized challenge to the authority of any regime in the bloc, but also developed forms of opposition that became influential among other East European dissidents and even democracy campaigners in China.[25] Its overwhelming victory in the limited number of seats it was allowed to contest in the June 1989 elections in Poland sparked the first negotiated exit out of communism, providing a model to be followed, domino-like, by a series of national transformations across the region.

At the heart of the movement's strategy lay peaceful, evolutionary change. This was partly a result of regional experiences: The 1960s reformist opposition movements had challenged the policies of the ruling elites and had been met with force – either through internal repression, as in Poland and Yugoslavia, or through Soviet intervention, as in Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The founders of Solidarność came from a generation which knew, following the defeat and then the suppression of workers' strikes in Poland in 1970 and 1976, that little could be achieved through direct political confrontation with the state.[26] The model of Spanish transition of

23 This is most famously articulated in Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992).

24 James Mark et al., "1989 After 1989: Remembering the End of State Socialism in East-Central Europe," in Kopeček and Wciślik (eds.), *Thinking Through Transition*, 498–99.

25 Padraic Kenney, *A Carnival of Revolution: Central Europe 1989* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 136.

26 On links between March 1968 and later dissidence, see Robert Gildea, James Mark and Anette Warring (eds.), *Europe's 1968: Voices of Revolt* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 128–29.

compromise between regime and society, which Solidarność leader Adam Michnik termed in the mid 1970s the "New Evolutionism," was seen as a possible way forward for the Eastern bloc, too.[27] This approach would eventually help to create the political conditions in which communist regimes were prepared to embrace a nonviolent exit out of dictatorship.

Solidarność was able to grow in the late 1970s partly because of the communist state's own (rhetorical) commitment to the idea of citizens' rights. In the 1960s, the Eastern bloc, in alliance with states from the global South, had been at the forefront of the global promotion of rights – particularly to combat racial and religious discrimination, and threats to national sovereignty. Yet by establishing rights as an accepted part of international law – a strategy that was designed to shame Western capitalism and colonialism – they created norms that would eventually disrupt their own authority. In the context of détente, these ideas were now retooled in the Helsinki Accords of 1975.[28] Communist states had initially viewed this agreement as a victory: Its first part had ensured Western recognition for their previously contested borders and thus guaranteed their right to sovereignty. The Accords' protection of other types of rights – notably to free assembly and expression – did not initially appear to threaten states that claimed to be the true bearer of these ideals.[29] Nevertheless, over the next decade, dissident groups, and the transnational networks of human rights advocates that supported them, would make effective appeals to these legal frameworks to eke out spaces that became crucial for the expression of opposition.

The growth of Solidarność was also made possible by its political restraint, the so-called self-limiting revolution.[30] Until the very last years of the 1980s, its leaders did not embrace liberalism or multiparty democracy. This was not merely a matter of tactics under an unreformable state, but was also a reflection of its status as a trade union founded to defend the rights to work

27 Dominik Trutowski, "Poland and Spain 'Entangled': Political Learning in Transitions to Democracy" (forthcoming). On the influence of Mohandas Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr., on Michnik, see also Jeffrey Stout, "Between Secularism and Theocracy: King, Michnik, and the American Culture Wars," in Kosicki and Kunakhovich (eds.), *Legacy of 1989* (forthcoming).

28 Steven L. B. Jensen, *The Making of International Human Rights: The 1960s, Decolonization, and the Reconstruction of Global Values* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 217–18, 235.

29 Ned Richardson-Little, "Dictatorship and Dissent: Human Rights in East Germany in the 1970s," in Jan Eckel and Samuel Moyn (eds.), *The Breakthrough: Human Rights in the 1970s* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014), 59.

30 Jadwiga Staniszkis, *Poland's Self-Limiting Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

and welfare which communist states themselves had long claimed to nurture.[31] Solidarność was committed to an alternative democratic socialism, based around the dignity of the individual and social justice.[32] Following the visit of the Polish pope John Paul II in 1979, the movement incorporated specifically Catholic notions of dignity into its agenda, a development that helped unite the conservative and liberal-left wings of the opposition. Its leaders also framed Solidarność as part of a global rights movement that fought against abuses of power that emanated from regimes of either the right or the left. In doing so, they aimed to present themselves to an international audience as a modern political force that transcended the now-outdated divides of the Cold War.[33] Nevertheless, in Poland in December 1981, it appeared that Solidarność's opposition had not been limited enough: Threatened by the spread of the movement, the communist state imposed martial law. Solidarność did not regain its standing until the late 1980s. A now-dominant liberal-left leadership very quickly moved from its earlier focus on workers' rights to embrace multiparty democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law, joining forces with economic neoliberals. According to later leftist critiques, this alliance marked the moment at which the vision of Solidarity as an economically and democratically inclusive movement was defeated.[34]

East European communist elites, too, played a central role in 1989. In Hungary and Poland, they helped usher in multiparty democracy at round-table talks; in Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic (GDR), they gave up power following a minimum of social pressure. Only in Romania was a violent revolution necessary to remove a dictator from power.[35] The story of "1989" also needs to explain how elites across the region came to embrace, tolerate or reluctantly accept peaceful, democratic change. By 1989, growing numbers in the smaller countries of Eastern Europe

31 Maciej Gdula, "The Architecture of Revival: Left-Wing Ideas and Politics in Poland After 2002," in Kopeček and Wciślik (eds.), *Thinking Through Transition*, 372.

32 Jerzy Szacki considered Solidarność at best "proto-liberal"; see his *Liberalism After Communism* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1995), 173.

33 Kim Christiaens and Idesbald Goddeeris, "Entangled Solidarities? Solidarność and the Global South During the 1980s," in Artemy Kalinovsky, James Mark and Steffi Marung (eds.), *Alternative Globalisations: Encounters Between the Eastern Bloc and the Postcolonial World* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, forthcoming); Kacper Szulecki, "Hijacked Ideas: Human Rights, Peace, and Environmentalism in Czechoslovak and Polish Dissident Discourses," *East European Politics and Societies* 25, 2 (2011), 272–95.

34 Ost, *Defeat of Solidarity*.

35 On the importance of elites, see Kotkin, *Uncivil Society*. For a critique, see Konrad H. Jarausch, "People Power? Towards a Historical Explanation of 1989," in Vladimir Tismaneanu and Bogdan C. Iacob (eds.), *The End and the Beginning: The Revolutions of 1989 and the Resurgence of History* (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2012), 109–25.

were questioning the viability of state socialism, envisioning their countries' futures as part of a broader European community that transcended the Iron Curtain, and envisaging a life for themselves beyond a one-party system and socialist scarcity.

In the early 1970s, the traditional claims of communist elites that they were part of an expanding global system and an important bulwark against reactionary imperialism had not yet become entirely implausible. Outside Europe, decolonization had, in recent decades, brought socialist – or at least noncapitalist – projects to many countries in Africa and Asia. What communists portrayed as fascism seemed to be on the rise too: Elites often noted the renewed importance of communist solidarity in the 1960s and 1970s given the ever-widening presence of right-wing authoritarianism in Latin America, Africa and Southern Europe. Where such right-wing authoritarian regimes were in a state of decay – as with the end of the Franco and Salazar regimes in the mid 1970s – it was still possible to believe that a democratic socialism might take root. Even Henry Kissinger believed the Portuguese "Carnation Revolution" in spring 1974 might be a replay of the Russian Revolution, with Mário Soares playing the role of Aleksandr Kerenskii and paving the way for a radical or Bolshevik takeover.[36] In a speech given in September that year, Hungary's leader János Kádár still had confidence that, just as socialists would eventually oust Augusto Pinochet in Chile, so their comrades would overthrow right-wing dictatorship on the Iberian peninsula and take power.[37]

Yet over the course of the 1970s this worldview was significantly eroded. First, it was increasingly unclear if the world was "going their way." Many East European regimes became ever more distanced from those progressive experiments in the global South which had in some cases turned to radical authoritarianism and, in others, declared allegiance to a campaign for the radical redistribution of wealth from North to South, the so-called New International Economic Order. Only Romania and Yugoslavia joined the club of these states – the G77. The world debt crisis, which forced countries in both regions to prioritize debt payments to the West over older socialist solidarities, further cemented the rift.[38] It was also becoming plain that state

36 This account opens Samuel P. Huntington's *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993), 4–5.

37 See János Kádár's speech, 2 Sep. 1974: "Beszéd a Politikai Főiskola Fennállásának 25. Évfordulója alkalmából rendezett ünnepségen," reproduced in János Kádár, *A fejlett szocialista társadalom építésének utján* (Budapest: Kossuth, 1975), 14–15.

38 Johanna Bockman, Iakov Feygin and James Mark, "The Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and Alternative Globalisations," in Kalinovsky, Mark and Marung (eds.), *Alternative Globalisations*.

socialism was unlikely to spread within Europe: The Southern European transitions saw the advent of liberal democracy, with Spanish Eurocommunists breaking with the Soviet (and Portuguese) traditions of popular workers' democracy, and embracing the liberal-democratic multi-party system. By the late 1970s, the idea of Europe itself was firmly associated with liberal democracy and with the "politics of moderation."[39]

Second, it was increasingly difficult to view the West simply as the enemy. In the early 1970s, West German leaders abandoned confrontation, reached out to the East and promised to guarantee previously contested borders with Poland. With the fear of Western revanchism much diminished, the claims that communist regimes were protectors of the nation from Western imperialism lost their meaning.[40] Links between East and West European economies increased, too: Central European countries began to privilege export to West European markets and to engage in joint ventures. So-called tripartite industrial projects brought together West and East European firms in development projects in Africa and elsewhere.[41] Comecon and the European Community strengthened their ties in the 1970s and 1980s.[42] Claims that Eastern bloc countries were threatened by a predatory Western imperialism were increasingly difficult to sustain.

Nonetheless, this did not mean that communists were ready to give up power. The imposition of martial law in Poland in December 1981 demonstrated the limits of such flexibility when the authority of regimes was threatened. In the late 1980s, elites in the GDR and Czechoslovakia had not opened themselves up to the West or to reform at home. Mikhail Gorbachev's socialist campaigns for *glasnost'* (openness) and new economic thinking left them unmoved. Even in 1988 and 1989, it was not certain they would not resort to force to stay in power. However, after seeing the violent repression of dissent around Tiananmen Square in June 1989, fewer East

39 On the lesson of Portugal as a turn to moderate solutions, see Kenneth Maxwell, "Portugal's Revolution of the Carnations, 1974–1975," in Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton-Ash (eds.), *Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Non-Violent Action from Gandhi to the Present* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 161.

40 This was particularly the case in Poland. See also Charles Maier, "What Have We Learned," *Contemporary European History* 18, 3 (2009), 261.

41 Patrick Gutman, "West-östliche Wirtschaftskooperationen in der Dritten Welt," in Bernd Greiner, Christian Müller and Claudia Weber (eds.), *Ökonomie im Kalten Krieg* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2010), 395–414.

42 Angela Romano and Federico Romero, "European Socialist Regimes Facing Globalisation and European Co-operation: Dilemmas and Responses – Introduction," *European Review of History* 21, 2 (2014), 157–64; Suvi Kansikas, *Socialist Countries Face the European Community: Soviet-Bloc Controversies over East–West Trade* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2014).

European elites were attracted to what became known as the "Chinese solution."[43]

The collapse of state socialism in the region eventually occurred through a series of national, albeit interconnected settlements that reflected the assumptions of all participants that the nation-state was the natural vehicle for transformation.[44] It was Poland and Hungary that led the charge in negotiated round-table talks between regime and opposition. For communists, the advantage was obvious: It allowed them to retain a degree of economic and political power. In the years before the political collapse, in Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria and elsewhere, state managers had already spontaneously taken control of their enterprises and turned them into private companies – often in suspicious circumstances.[45] Bureaucrats in education, military and the Communist Youth had already appropriated the assets of the institutions they controlled.[46] Round-table talks, which were essentially negotiations about politics, left the foundations of former functionaries' new economic power unchallenged. Western leaders encouraged their participation, too: The Spanish prime minister Felipe González provided "sensible communists" with advice about survival derived from his experience of the Spanish transition, and encouraged them to envisage a role for themselves building a socialist Europe in the 1990s. Washington, too, made it clear that it valued the role of reformist communists in ensuring peaceful and predictable change.[47] These roles also allowed them to build new forms of political capital as the cofounders of democracy: In Hungary and Poland, where communists committed to negotiated settlements, they returned to power, recast as economically liberal social democrats.[48]

43 Péter Vámos, "The Tiananmen Square 'Incident' in China and the East Central European Revolutions," in Wolfgang Mueller, Michael Gehler and Arnold Suppan (eds.), *The Revolutions of 1989: A Handbook* (Vienna: Austrian Academy of Sciences Press, 2014), 106–11.

44 Chris Armbruster, "The Revolutions of 1989," in Lawson et al. (eds.), *Global 1989*, 210–13; Gregor Feindt, *Auf der Suche nach politischer Gemeinschaft. Oppositionelles Denken zur Nation im ostmitteleuropäischen Samizdat 1976–1992* (Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2015).

45 Eric Hanley, "Cadre Capitalism in Hungary and Poland: Property Accumulation Among Communist-Era Elites," *East European Politics and Societies* 14, 1 (1999), 143–78; Ganev, *Preying on the State*, 50–55, 57; Jadwiga Staniszkis, *The Dynamics of Breakthrough in Eastern Europe: The Polish Experience* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).

46 Steven Lee Solnick, *Stealing the State: Control and Collapse in Soviet Institutions* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998).

47 László Borhi, "Domestic Change, International Transformation: Hungary's Role in Ending the Bipolar System in 1989," in Engel, Hadler and Middell (eds.), *1989 in a Global Perspective*, 88–89, 95–96.

48 James Mark, *The Unfinished Revolution: Making Sense of the Communist Past in Central-Eastern Europe* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), ch. 1; Anna M. Grzymała-Busse,

The dismantling of the system in Poland and Hungary without Soviet intervention made it plain to those elites who wanted to cling to power that their days were numbered. It still took a modicum of "people power," however. The opening of Hungary's border in May 1989 enabled large numbers of GDR citizens to cross to Austria – leaving their regime increasingly isolated, and its hold on power weakened. The Monday demonstrations in Leipzig, which grew out of the oppositional work of the Protestant Church and the mass protests on Wenceslas Square in Prague, were crucial final steps in pressuring their harder-line regimes to relinquish power. In Romania alone did the regime resort to the use of force, and only here did the world see scenes of violent revolution and the crushing of defeated communists. A repressive state had ensured that there was no organized opposition with whom to negotiate a settlement. A revolution that was started by the protests of a Hungarian reformed church priest in Timişoara led to brutal repression, and more than 1,100 dead, before the army withdrew its support for the regime and summarily executed the leader Nicolae Ceauşescu and his wife Elena.

Yet for the most part "1989" in Europe was a year of elite-guided transitions – indeed, even in Romania the popular revolutionary process was coopted by a newly formed organization, the National Salvation Front – which was in essence a reformed wing of the communist party.[49] Even oppositions were fearful of excessive democratic sentiment. In Poland, liberal-left elites in Solidarność dreaded potentially destabilizing excessive religious, nationalist and moralistic sentiments that the collapse of authoritarianism might release.[50] In Hungary, the designers of the Round Table feared a return to the violence of 1956 without a managed process that would keep the radical anti-communist forces on the political margins.[51] A wide variety of human rights, anti-militaristic, religious and ecological groups had mobilized in the years leading up to 1989. Their activities provided a context in which swift and large-scale protest against one-party states became feasible in late 1989. Yet the expressions of direct democracy and radical change that

Redeeming the Communist Past: The Regeneration of Communist Parties in East Central Europe After 1989 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

49 Peter Siani-Davies, *The Romanian Revolution of December 1989* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), ch. 7.

50 Adam Michnik, *Takie czasy . . . rzecz o kompromisie* (London: Aneks, 1985); Adam Michnik, "Three Kinds of Fundamentalism," in Michnik, *Letters from Freedom*, 178–84; Hella Dietz, *Polnischer Protest. Zur pragmatistischen Fundierung von Theorien sozialen Wandels* (Frankfurt am Main and New York: Campus, 2015), 281–91.

51 Mark, *Unfinished Revolution*, 5–6.

groups such as Poland's Freedom and Peace movement, Hungary's Orange Alternative and Czechoslovakia's Independent Peace Association represented were quickly sidelined in the settlement itself.[52]

For Václav Klaus, who would become prime minister of the Czech Republic (1993–98) and then its president (2003–13), the collective and populist impulses which had been nurtured under communism would, if not checked, lead to a directionless popular democracy outside a party system that would result "not in freedom, the market and democracy, but in nonpolitical politics; a dependence on vaguely defined civic movements, forums and impulses; the promotion of ambiguous utopian projects by intellectuals [and] new collectivisms."[53] For Klaus, consolidated indirect party politics and market capitalism were the disciplining tools to build a new society; "the third way," by contrast, was "the fastest way to the Third World."[54] In this sense, "1989" was not only a triumph of a peaceful and civilized settlement – an image that was later assiduously cultivated by its participants – but was also a managed road to a parliamentary system led by former elites and oppositionists both of whom were skeptical about their own societies' capacity to cope with the challenges of freedom after decades of dictatorship.[55]

"1989" as the End of Empire

It was at the western borders of the Moscow-led bloc that authoritarian rule first started to crumble in 1989, a process in which all European communist parties would lose their power and which eventually led to the disintegration of the Soviet Union itself within two years. But democratization was the result of, not the trigger for, this retreat of the last European empire in the twentieth century. At the moment when Gorbachev had taken over in the Kremlin four years earlier, national democratic movements in Eastern Europe as well as human rights activists in the Soviet Union were being firmly held at bay by authoritarian political rulers.[56] It was an impulse from

52 Kenney, *A Carnival of Revolution*, 299.
53 Václav Klaus, speech at the 10th Party Conference, Občanská demokratická strana (Civic Democratic Party), Dec. 1999, quoted in Znoj, "Václav Havel," 127.
54 Václav Klaus, speech at the World Economic Forum, Davos, Jan. 1990.
55 On the link between managed transition and later illiberalism, see Ivan Krastev, "The Strange Death of the Liberal Consensus," *Journal of Democracy* 18, 4 (2007), 58–60.
56 Robert Brier, "Entangled Protest: Dissent and the Transnational History of the 1970s and 1980s," in Robert Brier (ed.), *Transnational Approaches to the History of Dissent in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union* (Osnabrück: Fibre, 2013), 25; Kotkin, *Uncivil Society*, 122–23.

Moscow, an act of voluntary withdrawal from imperial control, that allowed popular movements to regain influence in the periphery and that enabled their assertive claims to national independence. While Western political leaders including US president George Bush had long supported the territorial integrity of the Soviet Union (without the Baltic states), these reinvigorated East European independence movements, in turn, inspired and supported nationalists in some of the Soviet republics. Eastern Europe's "1989" thus strengthened the centrifugal forces in the Soviet Union and contributed to its collapse in 1991.

Ironically, the imperial retreat during *perestroika*, which finally led to the end of state socialism in Europe, had begun as an attempt to revive socialist ideology.[57] Under Leonid Brezhnev's and Yurii Andropov's leadership, the capacity to enact authoritarian control had often been more important than the belief in the socialist cause. In Eastern Europe, the Soviets had acclaimed the rule of a nationalist military leader, General Wojciech Jaruzelski, who had suppressed the socialist trade union movement Solidarność. A new type of pragmatist imperialism had dominated in relations with Third World allies, too: No longer was it apparently idealistic socialist liberation heroes who enjoyed most Soviet support, but hard-boiled military regimes such as those in Ethiopia, South Yemen, Libya and Peru.[58] The Soviet Union had also revised earlier socialist economic visions abroad: In the case of Vietnam, a member of Comecon, the Kremlin terminated its support of failed industrialization projects and advocated an adjustment to world market demands instead.[59]

Gorbachev, by contrast, referred to an idealized notion of Leninism in foreign as in domestic politics and often used the old Prague Spring catchphrase of "socialism with a human face." His worldview had been shaped by his career in the provincial ranks of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), far from the cynicism and pragmatism in the imperial center. It was informed by an early encounter with Jawaharlal Nehru's political philosophy during his student years in 1950s Moscow and by the idealist socialism of the Soviet 1960s generation; and was influenced by

57 Stephen Kotkin, *Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse 1970–2000* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 29–30; Michail Gorbatschow, *Perestroika. Die zweite Russische Revolution* (Munich: Droemer Knaur 1987), 27–29, 207–09.

58 Tobias Rupprecht, *Soviet Internationalism After Stalin: Interaction and Exchange between the USSR and Latin America During the Cold War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 231–32.

59 Chris Miller, *The Struggle to Save the Soviet Economy: Mikhail Gorbachev and the Collapse of the USSR* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2016).

Italian and French Eurocommunism, which he got to know during his many trips across Europe in the 1960s and 1970s.[60] Holding on to an idealized version of socialist internationalism, Gorbachev and his foreign-policy advisors Anatolii Cherniaev and Aleksandr Yakovlev ended this imperialist pragmatism toward pro-Soviet dictators, and strengthened contacts with those whom they considered true socialists. In the Third World, they increased support for leftists such as the Nicaraguan Sandinistas.[61] In the West, Gorbachev reached out to the leading representatives of the Socialist International such as Willy Brandt and Pierre Mauroy. He became a close friend of Felipe González, head of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party, and he admired the Swedish socialist Olof Palme.[62]

Soviet policies toward the East European satellite states during *perestroika* wavered between pressure for change and fears of destabilization. Once Gorbachev had consolidated his power, the highly centralized decision-making processes of Soviet foreign policy allowed him to pursue his idealistic idea that freeing states from the Kremlin's control would liberate them to opt for reformed socialism and more amicable relations with Moscow. In early 1989, he ordered the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and later that year from most of Eastern Europe. The "Sinatra doctrine," announced by his foreign affairs spokesman Gennadii Gerasimov in Helsinki in October 1989, enabled the states of the Soviet empire to "do it their way." Yet the reformers of *perestroika*, initially, had not expected a Westernization of the socialist world, but rather multiple freely chosen paths to a reformed socialism. The rhetoric of a "common European home," a phrase already used by Brezhnev during his 1981 visit to Bonn, and by Gorbachev in London in 1984, replaced the theory of two ideologically opposed camps which had perpetuated a divided Europe. Nevertheless, this "new thinking" in foreign policy still had an anti-American thrust, and was contained within broadly socialist categories, though they were ill defined and in the process of change.[63]

60 Michail Gorbatschow, *Erinnerungen* (Berlin: Siedler, 1995), 80, 147, 247, 759–61, 988; Archie Brown, *The Gorbachev Factor* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 116.
61 Gorbatschow, *Perestroika*, 221–46. 62 Gorbatschow, *Erinnerungen*, 752, 760–67.
63 Helmut Altrichter, *Russland 1989. Der Untergang des sowjetischen Imperiums* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2009), 327–28; Dietrich Beyrau, "Das sowjetische Modell. Über Fiktionen zu den Realitäten," in Peter Hübner, Christoph Kleßmann and Klaus Tenfelde (eds.), *Arbeiter im Staatssozialismus. Ideologischer Anspruch und soziale Wirklichkeit* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2005), 47–70; Archie Brown, "Did Gorbachev as General Secretary Become a Social Democrat?," *Europe–Asia Studies* 65, 2 (Mar. 2013), 198–220.

Gorbachev's tragedy was that few people inside or outside the Soviet Union around 1989 still shared his idealist socialism. The conservatives in the CPSU were more interested in the retention of power, or sympathized with Slavic nationalism. For the bulk of the Soviet population, the economic situation had worsened dramatically by 1989, and they did not care much about ideology and foreign affairs: In a review of the past year's events, the press agency Novosti discussed the ten topics that concerned citizens most; none referred to anything beyond the Soviet Union. The popular journal *Ogonek* reported in October 1989 that only 12 percent of Soviet citizens expected a significant improvement in their lives thanks to Gorbachev's reforms.[64] The Soviet empire was associated with socialist internationalism and was thus now mostly seen as a waste of the people's scarce resources.[65] The idea that the union and the bloc were a financial burden also led Russian nationalists to demand an end to empire: Valentin Rasputin, one of the most popular Russian novelists at the time, addressed the Soviet People's Congress in early 1989 and, in a philippic against moral decline and Western pluralism, suggested that Russia leave the union.[66] In this spirit, the populist Boris Yeltsin, as president of the Russian People's Congress, declared secession a year later – an event subsequently celebrated annually in Russia as Independence Day.

In the East European "outer empire," the Soviet retreat in the late 1980s provoked different reactions. Those conservative political elites who were hoping to ride out *perestroika*, such as Erich Honecker in the GDR, Nicolae Ceauşescu in Romania and Todor Zhivkov in Bulgaria, were eventually toppled in palace coups by more reform-oriented circles of their own parties, who had support from Moscow. But political leaders who, inspired by *perestroika*, supported reforms within the socialist system, such as General Jaruzelski in Poland and Alexander Dubček in Czechoslovakia, were soon overruled too. Dissident movements gained confidence from Gorbachev's renouncing of Soviet imperialist ambitions: Poland's Adam Michnik believed that the Soviet leader viewed Solidarność as the realization of his "Reformation" in Central Europe, and such groups were emboldened in their struggle against hardline elites.[67] Some, particularly in the two Germanys, enthusiastically hailed Gorbachev as liberator and idealized him – in a productive misunderstanding – as a Westernizer. Economic liberals,

64 Altrichter, *Russland 1989*, 39–40.
65 Rupprecht, *Soviet Internationalism After Stalin*, 281–83. 66 Altrichter, *Russland 1989*, 37.
67 Adam Michnik, "1989, from Poland to the World," in Kosicki and Kunakhovich (eds.), *Legacy of 1989* (forthcoming).

nationalists and anti-socialist intellectuals all over Central and Eastern Europe, by contrast, took heart from their perception of Gorbachev's reformed socialist project as a failure, a development they considered to herald the end of the Soviet-dominated system as a whole.

While Gorbachev's voluntary retreat from imperial control is a textbook case of historical contingency and of the role of the individual in history, the end of the Soviet empire, from a world-historical perspective, can be viewed as the final stage of the European age of imperialism after the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires after World War I, the end of the Nazi Empire in World War II and of the French, British and Portuguese Empires after that. In 1960s Eastern Europe, this connection had commonly been made: Both anti-communists who wished to throw off Soviet control, and leftist critics of communist authoritarianism, took inspiration from the postwar decolonization of Africa and Asia and its socialist liberation movements. Nevertheless, by the 1980s, few saw themselves as part of this tradition. An increasingly assertive nationalism, bare of socialist anti-imperialist rhetoric, and often explicitly anti-socialist, predominated, which called for a re-creation of national culture and a "return to Europe."

This East European nationalism reverberated in the western parts of the Soviet Union. The political liberalization under Gorbachev in the late 1980s had allowed nationalist sentiments to develop rapidly; the end of communist rule in Eastern Europe further emboldened those who challenged the Soviet regime from within. Popular fronts and human rights movements in the Baltic states demanded political autonomy: Estonian elites, for instance, called for a "Hungarian model." Following Ceauşescu's execution, the new Romanian government stoked pan-Romanian anti-Soviet nationalist sentiment in the Soviet republic of Moldova.[68] Polish actors were the most active in promoting their country as a role model of transition for Soviet republics, and they helped to inspire a reinvigorated nationalism in the Baltic states, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova.[69] Polish tourists and organizations smuggled pro-independence literature into the Soviet Union; Polish television was an important source of information during the independence struggle in Latvia and Lithuania. Solidarność developed particularly close ties with pro-independence groups in Ukraine and Lithuania: Political leaders in Vilnius declared their "readiness to follow Poland's own path away from

68 Mark Kramer, "The Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions Within the Soviet Union (Part 1)," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 5, 4 (2003), 238–42.

69 Kotkin, *Uncivil Society*, 138–39.

Communism";[70] and in the Donbass striking coalminers took their inspiration from the Polish trade union movement.[71] Intellectual movements in Central Asia such as Rastokhez (Revival) in Tajikistan and Birlik (Unity) in Uzbekistan in turn modeled themselves on Baltic popular front movements like Sajudis, and received assistance from them in their political work.[72]

Gorbachev's attempts to contain this spillover from Eastern Europe into the western parts of the Soviet Union proved futile. After a brief recourse to violence in Vilnius, the Soviet army was called off, and all Soviet republics declared their independence after the August 1991 putsch in Moscow. In the Central Asian republics, by contrast, populations voted to remain part of a reformed union. Here, Eastern Europe's "1989" had the reverse effect: Communist party bosses such as Nursultan Nazarbaev in Kazakhstan and Islam Karimov in Uzbekistan observed the democratic awakening in the western Soviet Union warily and looked to preserve their power by managing independence from above and rebranding themselves as nationalist leaders.

The Global Impact of Europe's "1989"

The events of Europe's 1989 resonated in most parts of the world. Hitherto-influential communist parties disbanded or sank into irrelevance once support from Moscow was cut. Gorbachev's socialist ideas of a "common European home" were superseded by a neoliberal Europe from Galicia to Galicia. The Russian world, where political and economic reforms soon stagnated, was left beyond the walls of this home, where many new inhabitants rejected the idea of being "eastern" and revived the westward-facing concept of Central Europe. For the old "Western" Europe of the Cold War, "1989" was a historical watershed, too. Social democrats, who implemented privatization schemes and a deregulation of the labor market in the course of the following decade, repositioned themselves alongside their East European counterparts. After the end of the communist threat from the East, neoliberalism also gained further momentum in the West and the South.[73]

The end of state socialism also encouraged the assertion of ethnic nationalisms, which had been simmering within European polities, irrespective of

70 Kramer, "The Collapse of East European Communism," 204–12. 71 Ibid., 216–37.
72 Isaac Scarborough, "From February to February and from Ru ba Ru to Rastokhez: Political Mobilisation in Late Soviet Tajikistan (1989–1990)," *Cahiers d'Asia Centrale* 26 (2016), 143–71.
73 Ther, *Die neue Ordnung*, 281.

their ideological orientation, since the late 1970s. As the Soviet Union headed toward collapse, conflicts broke out in Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Chechnya and the Fergana Valley, which remain unsettled to this day.[74] The nationalist Slobodan Milošević took over the presidency in the Republic of Serbia in May 1989, and Yugoslavia drifted toward a bloody conflict that broke the country apart. The revival of minority nationalisms did not stop at the former Iron Curtain. Radical anti-imperialist movements with a socialist bent, from Northern Ireland to West Germany and from the Basque country to Kurdistan, having lost the support of East European secret services, sometimes disbanded, but more often just toned down the socialist element in their nationalist rhetoric. At the same time, a number of right-wing separatist-nationalist movements gained influence all over the continent. In May 1989, all major Belgian parties agreed on the political isolation of the Vlaams Belang (the Flemish nationalist party), whose support was growing. Separatists in northern Italy founded the Lega Nord in December 1989. Spanish prime minister Felipe González, confronted with Catalan and Basque separatism, was well aware of the contagiousness of this reinvigorated nationalism from the East. More than any other Western political figure, he encouraged Gorbachev to keep the Soviet Union together; Spain later refused to recognize the independence of Kosovo.[75]

Beyond Europe, the transformations of 1989 contributed to the fall of other authoritarian-socialist regimes, particularly in Africa. The televised execution in December 1989 of Romanian ruler Nicolae Ceauşescu, a frequent visitor to the continent since the 1970s, shocked many a dictator. In the months that followed the "fall" in Eastern Europe, most governments made gestures toward multiparty rule. Marxism-Leninism was abandoned as official state philosophy by ideologically flexible leaders in Angola, Mozambique, the Republic of the Congo, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Benin, Zambia, Mali and Madagascar.[76] Several countries adapted to the demands of the thoroughly "neoliberalized" IMF. In Somalia and Ethiopia, socialist autocrats were overthrown.[77] While rulers in most other countries managed to stay in power by rigging elections, Botswana, Gambia, Mauritius, Namibia and Senegal preserved democracy – and

74 Fred Halliday, "Third World Socialism: 1989 and After," in Lawson et al. (eds.), *Global 1989*, 132.
75 Gorbatschow, *Erinnerungen*, 763.
76 Richard Banégas, "Tropical Democracy," in Jacques Rupnik (ed.), *1989 as a World Event: Democracy, Europe and the New International System in the Age of Globalization* (London: Routledge, 2007), 101–10.
77 Halliday, "Third World Socialism," 123.

political figures all over the continent showed interest in learning from Eastern Europe's transition: The 1990 Africa Leadership Forum conference on the implications for Africa of changes in Eastern Europe attracted some fifty political leaders from across Africa.[78]

In southern Africa, superpower rapprochement allowed for a settlement of the war in what became Namibia; both Cuba and South Africa withdrew their troops. Within the now ruling South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), liberal forces gained the upper hand over the Marxist wing. No longer fearing the pro-Moscow strand in the African National Congress (ANC), the United States pressured the South African government to end the ban on the organization and release Nelson Mandela from prison.[79] By the early 1990s, the ANC, which had abandoned armed struggle in favor of negotiation, and Marxism in favor of the market economy, looked to the peaceful settlement in Eastern Europe for inspiration through what they, alongside the South African Communist Party, termed the "Leipzig option" of peaceful mass action.[80] Participants in the Polish Round Table discussions were invited to South Africa to share their experience of negotiated settlements.[81]

Latin American popular movements and authoritarian political rulers of the left and the right reacted differently to the winds of change. Inspired by Gorbachev's reforms, Mexican pundits, around 1989, called for a PRIstroika, a democratization of the country's political institutions following the decades-long one-party rule of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI).[82] Paying close attention to the democratic changes already under way in Poland and Hungary, 91 percent of Chilean voters opted for a return to political pluralism and democracy in a June 1989 referendum, which the military junta had considered acceptable after the end of the perceived threat of international communism. Socialists returning from their exile in Eastern Europe had no desire to implement centralized planning as they had seen it and thus more readily acceded to the neoliberal consensus. In Paraguay,

78 Ulf Engel, "Africa's '1989,'" in Engel, Hadler and Middell (eds.), *1989 in a Global Perspective*, 331–48; Fukuyama, *The End of History*, 35; Jorge Braga de Macedo, Foy Colm and Charles Oman (eds.), *Development Is Back* (Paris: OECD Development Studies, 2002), 270.

79 Chris Saunders, "'1989' and Southern Africa," in Engel, Hadler and Middell (eds.), *1989 in a Global Perspective*, 349–61.

80 Ibid., 358.

81 Padraic Kenney, "Electromagnetic Forces and Radio Waves or Does Transnational History Really Happen?," in Brier (ed.), *Transnational Approaches*, 50.

82 Russell H. Bartley and Sylvia Erickson Bartley, *Eclipse of the Assassins: The CIA, Imperial Politics, and the Slaying of Mexican Journalist Manuel Buendía* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2015), 63.

a palace coup ended Alfredo Stroessner's dictatorship in February 1989. Brazil, in November that year, held its first democratic presidential elections since 1960. Democratic elections were announced in Nicaragua in 1989, which the socialist Sandinistas lost the year after, when the return to democracy also paved the way for the later settlements of the Guatemalan and Salvadoran civil wars. Cuba remained an exception in the Americas: Now cut off from Soviet economic aid, the country experienced harsh economic decline, but Fidel Castro initially refused any political reforms. Only in the mid 1990s would he grudgingly legalize a small degree of private farming to tackle widespread undernourishment. The rest of Latin America, by that time, had entered a phase of neoliberal economic reforms that, in turn, informed similar policies back in Eastern Europe: Balcerowicz had drawn inspiration from the successful Bolivian struggle against inflation and for fiscal stabilization in the mid 1980s; as Polish finance minister around 1990, he was closely monitoring the parallel reforms in Argentina under President Carlos Menem.[83]

The transformation of Eastern Europe did not help the cause of democracy elsewhere. In the People's Republic of China, many of the factors that had led to the disintegration of one-party rule had not pertained: The country had avoided significant indebtedness and had overseas communities prepared to invest; reform had been confined to the economic sphere and had – through the liberalization of agriculture in a country with lower levels of development – created dynamic growth in the 1980s that had not simultaneously stoked societal demands for Western levels of consumption. Foreign models had not been democratic: The East Asian tigers provided a template for development that retained strong state control.[84] Indeed, the political collapse in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe may have helped the Chinese communists avoid a similar fate. Gorbachev, whose reforms, alongside Václav Havel's writings, had inspired a young protest movement in China, visited Beijing in May 1989. But the lessons his official hosts drew from the Soviets was that excessive criticism undermined faith in the party and that

83 Interview with Balcerowicz in *Der Spiegel* 5 (1990); see also Rupprecht, "Formula Pinochet", Basosi, "An Economic Lens" and the interviews with economic decision-makers at www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/lo/index.html.

84 Martin Dimitrov, "Understanding Communist Collapse and Resilience," in Martin Dimitrov (ed.), *Why Communism Did Not Collapse: Understanding Authoritarian Regime Resilience in Asia and Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 20–24; Christoph Boyer, "Big '1989,' Small '1989': A Comparative View," in Engel, Hadler and Middell (eds.), *1989 in a Global Perspective*, 193–202.

democratization would lead to social and economic chaos.[85] They also drew similar lessons from Jaruzelski's Poland: Martial law was introduced in China, too, just after Gorbachev left the country. And two weeks later Deng Xiaoping ordered the violent suppression of the ideologically diverse student protests around Tiananmen Square, with units that had been sent to Poland for anti-riot training.[86] The Chinese crackdown on dissent helped to prevent further change in the broader region, and communist parties in Vietnam, Laos and North Korea held onto political power. Democratization was limited to Taiwan, South Korea and the Philippines. In much of Asia around 1989, economic policies changed more than political systems did. Countries from Indonesia to India gave up their state-developmentalist policies, deregulated their economies and opened to the world market.[87]

The geopolitical effects of "1989" were felt in the Middle East, too, but, as in China, the wave of democratization petered out before it hit the region. Deprived of a powerful external counterweight, Arab states' willingness to negotiate with the West over the Israeli–Palestinian conflict increased. Palestinians, bereft of Soviet support, were prepared to make concessions that eventually led to the Oslo Accords. Yet, unlike in Latin America or southern Africa, urban elites in the region clung to secular and protectionist authoritarian dictators, often out of fear of radical Islam, which had also profited from the Soviet retreat. But among some Western elites, "1989" as a self-congratulatory story of the victory of market capitalism, and of the demise of communism, increased confidence that they could liberate countries of autocratic systems from the outside.[88] Former Cold War security specialists of the "neoconservative" and "liberal-interventionist" schools became

85 David L. Shambaugh, *China's Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2008); Václav Havel's 1979 samizdat essay "The Power of the Powerless" was translated into dozens of languages and became a popular reference for anti-authoritarian political movements worldwide: Václav Havel, *The Power of the Powerless: Citizens Against the State in Central-Eastern Europe* (London: Hutchinson, 1985).

86 Jean-Philipp Béja, "China and the End of Socialism in Europe: A Godsend for Beijing Communists," in Rupnik (ed.), *1989 as a World Event*, 214–15; Maurice Meisner, *The Deng Xiaoping Era: An Inquiry into the Fate of Chinese Socialism, 1978–1994* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1996), 455.

87 David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 118.

88 Barbara J. Falk, "From Berlin to Baghdad: Learning the 'Wrong Lessons' from the Collapse of Communism," in Lawson et al. (eds.), *Global 1989*, 244–46; see also Ellen Schrecker (ed.), *Cold War Triumphalism: The Misuse of History After the Fall of Communism* (New York: New Press, 2004).

influentiol foreign-policy advisors, and Western coalitions toppled those left-wing revolutionary autocrats in the Islamic world whom they regarded as Cold War hangovers, from Saddam Hussein in 2003 to Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. Interpreting the assistance of Western anti-communists during the Cold War for Eastern Europe's "liberation" as a source of moral obligation, and viewing support for democracy as an important demonstration of their newly cemented Western identity, many East and Central European elites supported such interventions too.[89] Leszek Balcerowicz and Yegor Gaidar shared their expertise from the Polish and Russian privatization and deregulation programs for the transformation of Iraq.[90] And, during the so-called Arab Awakening, Polish and Bulgarian elites took this message of peaceful transition to Egypt, Libya and Tunisia.[91]

None of the major shifts in global geopolitics and economic reforms after 1989 were caused by the end of state socialism in Eastern Europe alone. But the events in Moscow, Warsaw, Budapest and Berlin were one factor that contributed to political and economic changes across Asia, Africa and Latin America. The demise of the communist alternative in Eastern Europe helped resolve Cold War conflicts; it contributed to the collapse, and in other places to the survival of, authoritarian regimes, provided an important exemplar of negotiated transition, and contributed to the ongoing circulation and political implementation of neoliberal economic ideas. Democratization, very much dominant in the Western perception of "1989," proved less successful on a global scale, and has lately experienced setbacks in several parts of the post-Soviet sphere as well. New forms of cultural and economic globalization after 1989 meant that not only the former Soviet bloc, but soon also Western Europe, and with it its concept of modern democratic society, lost some of its political leverage on the global scale:[92] "1989" may have been the last European event to have truly global resonance.[93]

89 Maria Mälksoo, *The Politics of Becoming European: A Study of Polish and Baltic Post-Cold War Security Imaginaries* (London: Routledge, 2010), 125, 128–30.

90 Leszek Balcerowicz, "Economic Reform: Lessons for Post-Saddam Iraq from Post-Soviet Europe," working paper for the American Enterprise Institute, 24 Mar. 2005; "Ein 'Balcerowicz-Plan' für den irakischen Wiederaufbau. Was der Irak von Polen lernen kann," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (14 Jun. 2005); Oksana Yablokova and Catherine Belton, "Gaidar Invited to Shock, Awe Iraq," *Moscow Times* (9 Sep. 2003).

91 Mark et al., "1989 After 1989," 498–99.

92 Matthias Middell, Frank Hadler and Ulf Engel, "Introduction," in Engel, Hadler and Middell (eds.), *1989 in a Global Perspective*, 10.

93 Jacques Rupnik, "The World After 1989 and the Exhaustion of Three Cycles," in Rupnik (ed.), *1989 as a World Event*, 7.

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There are excellent collections that address the causes and meanings of "1989" from multiple perspectives. See Vladimir Tismaneanu (ed.), *The Revolutions of 1989* (London: Routledge, 1999). For the most comprehensive intellectual history of the shifts "around 1989," see Michal Kopeček and Piotr Wciślik (eds.), *Thinking Through Transition: Liberal Democracy, Authoritarian Pasts, and Intellectual History in East Central Europe After 1989* (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2015); Wolfgang Mueller, Michael Gehler and Arnold Suppan (eds.), *The Revolutions of 1989: A Handbook* (Vienna: Austrian Academy of Sciences Press, 2014).

For a revisionist account that is aware of alternatives, see Johanna Bockman, "The Long Road to 1989: Neoclassical Economics, Alternative Socialisms, and the Advent of Neoliberalism," *Radical History Review* 112 (2012), 9–42. For the "disappointments of 1989," see David Ost, *The Defeat of Solidarity: Anger and Politics in Postcommunist Europe* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005); and James Mark, *The Unfinished Revolution: Making Sense of the Communist Past in Central-Eastern Europe* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010).