Role of Honor, Dignity and Face Values in Transitional Justice in Post-Conflict Cyprus

Author(s)

Charis Psaltis[a]

Alex Kirchner[c]

Ayse K Uskul[c]

Iosif Kovras[b]

Androulla Eleftheriou[a]

Institutional Affiliation

[a]Department of Psychology, University of Cyprus
[b]Department of Social and Political Sciences, University of Cyprus
[c]School of Psychology, University of Kent

Author Note

ORCID IDs:

Charis Psaltis: 0000-0001-8724-665X
Alex Kirchner: 0000-0002-2406-7635
Ayse K Uskul: 0000-0001-8013-9931
Iosif Kovras: 0000-0003-2787-2389
Androulla Eleftheriou

Abstract

Transitional justice can help secure some level of justice for victims of human rights violations and reinforce the possibilities for peace, democracy, and reconciliation in societies that have experienced human rights abuses. Despite growing literature on the drives of transitional justice, little emphasis has been paid to the role of culture on shaping transitional justice preferences. The primary objective of the paper was to test the role of honor, face and dignity values in preferences for transitional justice in the context of post-conflict Cyprus. The major hypothesis tested was that honor values would be predictive of retributive (and not reconciliatory) justice preferences over and above any reconciliation related attitudes and intergroup contact. We recruited 450 Greek Cypriots in Cyprus, part of the Mediterranean region characterized by salience of honor values. They completed a questionnaire including measures assessing transitional justice preferences, honor, face and dignity values and other well-known predictors of transitional justice preferences concerning reconciliation attitudes (intergroup contact, trust, prejudice) and demographic variables. Analyses revealed that honor and dignity values predicted retributive justice preferences over and above other reconciliation related variables. Although not significant, there was suggestive evidence that face values predicted transitional justice in the opposite way to honor and dignity values.

Keywords: honor, transitional justice, contact, trust, prejudice, Cyprus

Public health statement: This paper identifies a link between values related to honor and dignity and preferences for transitional justice arrangements in the context of a protracted conflict. Such links are important in making policy accepted by the public in similar contexts.

Role of Honor, Dignity and Face Values in Transitional Justice in Post-Conflict Cyprus

As a growing number of post-conflict countries have deployed a range of policies to deal with their violent past - including prosecutions, truth commissions, apologies, amnesties, reparations, to name only a few – transitional justice is understood to be associated with efforts to restore state-society relations of trust in post-conflict settings. While the literature has thoroughly assessed the success and/or impact of different transitional justice mechanisms, we know relatively little about individual attitudes towards transitional justice (for a discussion see David, 2017, for a few exceptions, see Aguilar et al., 2011; Hall et al., 2018; Samii, 2013). Most importantly, the role of culturally shaped factors remains conspicuously absent from academic debates on transitional justice. Culturally shaped factors play a powerful role in how individuals think, feel and behave in intrapersonal, interpersonal and intergroup domains (for a review see Kitayama & Uskul, 2011), shedding light onto such factors can provide a useful lens to investigate individual attitudes towards different transitional justice arrangements.

Here, we focus on divided Cyprus. We are particularly interested in the views of the youth, with no direct experience of the conflict of 1963-64 or 1974, but indirectly exposed through their parents or grandparents and exposed to one-sided victimization narratives through history teaching at schools in Cyprus (Psaltis et al. 2017). From research and policy perspectives youth preferences are of particular interest, as they will shape any future transitional settlement and will be affected by the transitional justice architecture, (Bozkurt & Yiakinthou, 2012).

Transitional Justice Preferences

One line of research on transitional justice systematically investigates past human rights violations (trials, truth commissions, apologies) as the most effective way to foster reconciliation (Sikkink, 2011) while another one maintains that amnesties could serve as 'midwife' to deliver peace, stability and democratic consolidation in deeply divided societies (Cobban, 2006:24; Vinjamuri, 2010; McEvoy & Mallinder, 2012).

To date, most research on transitional justice has focused on assessing the success and/or impact of specific mechanisms (Dancy et al., 2019; Wiebelhaus-Brahm, 2010; Kim & Sikkink, 2012). Accordingly, not much is known on the factors that can shape individual attitudes towards transitional justice (but see David 2017; Aguilar et al., 2011 on political partisanship; and Bratton, 2011; Hall et al., 2018; Aguilar et al., 2011 on personal and/or family victimization from violence.

The social psychological literature on the other hand shows that the quality of intergroup relations and reconciliation might influence transitional justice preferences (Psaltis et al., 2020). More specifically, negative quality intergroup relations (prejudice, distrust, collective victimhood, ethos of conflict) might be associated with transitional justice preferences that cause some "cost" to the outgroup like retribution of outgroup, demand for public outgroup apology or payment of compensations by outgroup. On the contrary positive intergroup relations and pro-reconciliation variables are generally associated with transitional justice preferences of amnesty towards the outgroup. For example, "ethos of conflict" (Bar-Tal, 2007) and dehumanisation (Leidner et al., 2012) correlates positively with retributive justice. Also individuals who thought that the ingroup has suffered more than the outgroup in a conflict (competitive victimhood) were less likely to express willingness to forgive the other side in conflicts in Northern Ireland and in Chile (Noor et

al., 2008). On the contrary, intergroup contact (Hall et al., 2018), especially when it increases exposure to outgroup victimization narratives forming a conflict specific "inclusive victim consciousness" with an adversary group (Vollhardt, 2015) would be expected to relate to outgroup forgiveness that is closely related to amnesty preferences (David & Choi, 2006).

Research from Cyprus by Psaltis et al., (2020) support these findings. For instance, Greek Cypriots who were more likely to embrace amnesty over retributive justice were more likely to accept members of the other community as neighbors. On the contrary, those more reluctant to accept TCs as neighbors were found to be more likely to prioritize a principled logic of accountability that prioritizes punitive measures of accountability (trials).

Despite these welcome advancements, the literature has overlooked the role of cultural values as a potential factor in predicting individual attitudes towards different transitional justice arrangements. This is an important omission especially if one considers that some of most important transitional justice innovations are embedded within culturally-shaped features. Take, for example, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), one of the most influential cases of transitional justice globally (Wiebelhaus-Brahm, 2010). Most studies attribute not only the decision to set up the TRC, but also its impact, to two concepts well embedded in the South African culture, namely the concept of 'Ubuntu' (compassion) coupled with the Christian ethics of forgiveness (Philpott, 2007). Apologies in East Asian countries, like Japan, are implicitly attributed to traits well embedded in the social structure (Maddux et al., 2011). Still, other regions are marked by the absence of accountability; for example, amnesty laws remain the most frequently deployed mechanism in the Middle East, with notable resistance to restorative forms of

accountability (Lamond, 2016). In short, the role of culturally shaped factors is alluded to but hitherto never theoretical or empirically explored by research in the field of transitional justice.

The present research addresses this gap and aims to extent our knowledge of transitional justice by incorporating the significant, yet understudied, role of cultural values in explaining individual preferences to transitional justice by exploring the possible role of honor, dignity and face values.

Honor, Face, and Dignity Values

Honor, face and dignity have been distinguished as different ways of thinking and relating (i.e., cultural logics) that can help us make sense of the cross-societal variation in tackling social order (e.g., cooperation) and valuation (e.g., source of self-worth) and how this variation gives rise to cultural variation in core social psychological processes such as morality, punishment, and reciprocity (Leung & Cohen, 2011). Honor, face, and dignity values have been studied to distinguish between cultural groups (e.g., Smith et al., 2016; Yao et al., 2017) as well as individual differences distinguishing between individuals who endorse these values at different degrees (e.g., Frey et al., 2020). In the current research, we focus on these constructs in this latter form and assess the extent to which participants endorse them. Individuals who highly value honor typically strive for protecting and preserving a positive social image and reputation (Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2008) by reciprocating positive and negative actions and being vigilant for attacks directed to their honor and responding to honor threats in ways that make others reluctant to antagonize in the future (e.g., by retaliating).

In contrast, face values are strongly marked by concerns for humility, ingroup harmony, and hierarchy, and self-worth and social status in societies that value face (e.g., East Asian societies) are largely determined by performing social obligations and afforded to individuals by others. Individuals engage in a wide variety of face-saving actions to protect their and close others' reputation that may require cooperation with others, self-restraint, and conformity with social expectations (e.g., Güngör et al., 2014). Strong social norms and attitudes lead people to avoid conflict; dealing with others' norm violating behaviors are typically left to leaders or authorities rather than handled interpersonally.

Dignity values are primarily based on an intrinsic self-assessment in cultural settings (e.g., Northern-American, Western-European societies) where individuals are presumed to deserve equal opportunities and have inherent and inalienable worth that is not "losable" like honor or face by one's own and others' actions (Stewart, 1994). Instead, dignity is like an "internal skeleton" marked by intrinsically derived standards, beliefs, and values (Ayers, 1984); it is the person's moral center and the core of identity and guides behavior more than social condemnation or punishment. We should note that despite cultural groups having been characterized as primarily promoting one type of cultural value over others, these have been put forward mainly as cultural ideals which can be endorsed by individuals within a cultural group at different degrees, resulting in considerable within-culture variation (Leung & Cohen, 2011; Smith et al., 2017).

Honor and Intergroup Relations

Although studies investigating honor in the context of interpersonal relationships are informative, whether their findings translate into intergroup relations cannot be automatically

assumed. For instance, research investigated the role of honor in intergroup retaliation (Barnes et al., 2012; Levin et al., 2015), responses to illegal immigration and terrorism (Barnes et al., 2014), opposition against criminal organizations (Drury & Travaglino, 2020; Travaglino et al. 2015, 2016), dispute management and resolution in tribal and clan-based cultures (e.g., Pely, 2010), and immigrant acculturation (e.g., Lopez-Zafra & El Ghoudani, 2014; Świdrak et al., 2019). Relevant to the current research, Levin et al. (2015) showed that Lebanese and Syrians who valued group honor were more likely to perceive that the US government wants to dishonor them (e.g., by humiliating and disrespecting Arabs), which in turn predicted support for aggressive responses towards Americans, above and beyond other social dominance orientation and right wing authoritarianism. Cumulatively, These findings emphasize the role of honor in intergroup aggression. More importantly, honor has been found to matter even after some of the commonly studied predictors of intergroup relations have been accounted for (e.g., Levin et al., 2015). Despite growing interest in the role of honor in intergroup relations, the majority of existing evidence comes from studies that focused on intergroup aggression in the face of an existing or hypothetical threat from another group.

The Current Study

In the current work, we extend the emerging research on honor and intergroup relations to transitional justice beliefs in the context of post-conflict Cyprus, thus investigating a novel variable in the intergroup domain in relation to honor values. Going beyond research that has traditionally investigated honor primarily in relation to negative outcomes (e.g., intergroup aggression), in the current study, we investigated the role of honor in relation to both positive and negative transitional

justice outcomes, focusing on reconciliatory and retributional transitional justice beliefs, as well as on both positive (reconciliatory) and negative (supporting a divided island) solutions to the Cyprus issue, and we did so alongside dignity and face values.

The Cyprus Context

In 1960 the Republic of Cyprus was established as an independent bi-communal partnership state, representing the two main communities on the island (the Greek-Cypriots [GC] and the Turkish Cypriots [TC]) under a consociational constitution after the British colonial rule. In December 1963 intercommunal conflict erupted after the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, proposed constitutional amendments to improve the functionality of the Cypriot state depriving TCs from powers of representation secured in the 1960 consociational state. The armed conflicts that ensued led to the withdrawal of TC ministers from the Cabinet.

The fighting between extremists from both sides lasted throughout 1963 and 1964. In 1974 a Coup was staged by the Greek Junta, helped by a right wing extremist group EOKA B in Cyprus, against the president Archbishop Makarios followed by a Turkish military offensive in two phases that eventually led to the occupation of 37% of the north of Cyprus. Since then the island remains divided, and the northern part remains under Turkish occupation, in one of the most protracted conflicts in international politics (Loizides 2016; Heraclides 2011). Negotiations under UN facilitation to resolve the conflict since 1977 have been on the basis of a compromise solution in the form of a Bizonal-Bicommunal Federation (BBF). Such a solution would give TCs relative autonomy to define their internal matters in the north of the island whilst sharing power with GCs at the central Federal level. Under BBF there would also be demilitarization of the island,

withdrawal of Turkish troops from the north and return of territory to the GC constituent state in a way that would safeguard the property rights of internally displaced people. The most recent effort to resolve the Cyprus problem on the basis of Bizonal Bicommunal Federation collapsed in July 2017 in the Crans Montana negotiations. Since then the status quo of division of the two communities into an internationally non-recognised (except Turkey) state in the north and an internationally recognised Republic of Cyprus in the south run by GCs is continuing.

As a result of the two waves of violence both communities were heavily victimized, experiencing systematic disappearances, extrajudicial killings and massive displacement/ethnic cleansing. Given the small size of the island, the legacies of violence cast a long shadow over the two communities. For example, a bi-communal study conducted in 2007 with a representative sample from both communities (Psaltis, 2012) revealed that about a third (or more) in each community experienced internal displacement or had a family member or close friend internally displaced, had a family member taken as a prisoner, gone missing or lost. As a result of this widespread victimization and the proactive mobilization of victim groups to acknowledge their suffering, issues related to dealing with the violent past feature prominently in public debates, and the educational system even today several decades after the end of hostilities (Bozkurt & Yiakinthou, 2012). Despite public pressure, though, debates related to the legacies of the past take place in a political context marked by the absence of an official transitional justice architecture. As such, this has shaped a unique transitional justice landscape marked by selective and arbitrary policy responses. For example, one of the most successful bi-communal projects is a humanitarian

committee tasked to identify the whereabouts of approximately 2,000 persons from both communities who went missing during the conflict.

Cyprus is a 'crucial' case precisely because of its landscape marked by a transitional justice vacuum. Rather than assessing the impact of a generic set of adopted mechanisms (i.e. trials, truth commissions, amnesties), it can help us shed light on the role of culture in shaping transitional justice preferences in context where no policy is in place.

In this study we investigate the consequences of endorsing honor, face, and dignity values for transitional justice beliefs of GCs towards TCs and for support for the various forms of solutions on the island, after accounting for the commonly examined intergroup variables (contact with and trust, and positive feelings towards TCs). Based on previous research we hypothesized that, above and beyond intergroup contact, trust and feelings towards TCs, (1) honor values would negatively predict reconciliatory transitional justice beliefs and positively predict retribution transitional justice beliefs, and that (2) honor would negatively predict solutions to the Cyprus issue that center around reconciliation (i.e., a bizonal-bicommunal federation), and positively predict solutions that center around the continued division of Cyprus (i.e., keeping the status quo, or a two-state solution). In the absence of previous research on face and dignity in this context, we examined the role of these constructs in an exploratory fashion.

Method

Participants

We recruited 450 participants through the participant pool at the University of Cyprus as well as through announcements in courses across different universities in the GC community of

Cyprus. Participants completed a questionnaire on "Individual Differences in Social and Cognitive Orientation" either in the lab (4%) or online (96%). Participants were eligible to participate if they were 18 years or older and born in the GC community of Cyprus and had lived in the country for at least half of their lives. In our analyses we included only participants who self-identified as Cypriot only or as Cypriot *and* belonging to any other ethnic group (e.g., Cypriot-Lebanese). Finally, we included four attention checks in the questionnaire, and excluded from the final sample participants who failed one or more of these checks. After applying these inclusion criteria, we retained 317 participants. We further excluded participants who had missing scores in or who answered one or more of the main predictor variables using the "I don't know" option in order to allow for comparisons in each set of regressions, leaving us with a sample of *N*=248 participants entered into analyses.

Procedure

The present study was part of a larger study on social and cognitive orientation. After providing informed consent, participants completed a series of measures assessing their cognitive thinking style, relational orientation, as well as their endorsement of honor, face, and dignity values. Following these measures, GC participants responded to several items on feelings and beliefs towards the TCs. Finally, they provided demographic information before being thanked and debriefed. Participants received course credit for their participation and were also entered in a lottery for an online shopping coupon worth €100. The study was approved by the ethics committees of The University of KENT and the National Bioethics Committee of Cyprus.

Materials

In the following section we describe the measures that are relevant to the current study. Measures concerning the intergroup relations in Cyprus were adapted from the special section on the Cyprus issue of the 9th round of the European Social Survey (European Social Survey Round 9 Data, 2018). All other materials were originally developed in English, before being translated into Greek by a native speaker and co-author, and then reviewed and checked for accuracy and phrasing by another team member who was fluent in both Greek and English. For all measures we calculated a scale score only if the participant had rated over half of the total number of scale items.

Honor, Face, and Dignity Values

Participants rated their agreement with 22 statements to indicate their endorsement of face, honor, and dignity values (1=*strongly disagree* to 7=*strongly agree*). We included 16 items developed by Yao and colleagues (2017) to measure dignity (6 items; e.g. "*People should be true to themselves regardless of what others think*"), face (6 items; e.g., "*People should be very humble to maintain good relationships*") and honor (4 items; e.g., "*People should not allow others to insult their family*") values. In addition, we included six items from Smith and colleagues (2017; e.g. "*People always need to show off their power in front of their competitors*") to widen the conceptual scope of honor values items. In order to align the phrasing across items, we adjusted the phrasing of some items towards normative beliefs (e.g., "*People do not allow others to insult their family*" to "*People should not allow others to insult their family*").

Following an exploratory principal component analysis with oblimin rotation, we followed a four factor solution consisting of a face factor (5 items; α=.66), a dignity factor (5 items; α=.74), and two honor factors: one which we called 'family honor' (6 items; *People should not allow*

others to insult their family.; α=.86, see SM for the full list of items) that describes a concern for the maintenance and defense of reputation for the family or close family members, and another one which we called 'personal honor' (4 items; e.g., *If a person gets insulted and they don't respond, he or she will look weak*; *α=.67*, see SM for the full list of items) that describes a concern for self-promotion and maintenance of personal reputation through displays of strength and retaliation. We excluded one dignity ("*People should not care what others around them think*") and one face item ("*People should be extremely careful not to embarrass others*") as these did not show a clear loading pattern on either factor.

Transitional Justice

We used six items from Psaltis et al., (2020) to assess participants' attitudes towards transitional justice in the Cyprus context. The items were designed to cover measures from all three major transitional justice schools: trials, truth, and amnesty (Aguillar et al., 2011). An exploratory principal component analysis with oblimin rotation showed a two-factor solution to be most meaningful, largely capturing the justice versus peace dilemma: The first factor was closely related to a retribution logic of transitional justice, and comprised four items that entailed cost or punishment to perpetrators (e.g., *They should have a fair trial and if found guilty they should be harshly punished,* α=.74, see SM for a full list of items). The second subscale comprised two items closer to the logic of amnesty and reconciliation (*They should receive amnesty [no punishment] if that brings lasting peace; They should testify to a truth and reconciliation commission and as an exchange they shouldn't be prosecuted, Spearman-Brown=.59*). As

expected based on the justice versus peace dilemma discussed earlier, these two subscales were significantly negatively correlated, $r=-.24$, $t(259)=-4.05$, $p<.001$.

Support of Different Solutions to the Cyprus Conflict

We measured individuals' support for four different potential solutions to the Cyprus issue: keeping the status quo, a bizonal-bicommunal federation, a unitary state, and a two-state solution. For each solution, participants rated their stance by choosing whether they were "against the solution", "in favor of the solution", or "neither against nor in favor of the solution but would tolerate if necessary". This item was adapted from the special section on the Cyprus issue from the ESS R9 questionnaire of Cyprus. In preparation of our analyses, we collapsed the last two answer options (as both reflected an accepting stance towards a solution) to create a dichotomous variable (i.e., either "against" or "in favor or tolerate" a particular solution). The percentage of those either in favor or that could tolerate the solution were as follows: keeping the status quo: 64%; bizonal-bicommunal federation: 60%; unitary state: 67%; two-state solution: 41%).

Quantity of Intergroup Contact

We measured the quantity of contact with six items taken from the ESS R9 questionnaire of Cyprus[1] assessing the amount of contact of GCs with TCs in six different domains (at the university, in bicommunal groups, in the neighborhood, in the north, in the south of Cyprus, and on social media; 1=*never* to 7=*everyday*). Due to the highly skewed nature of the measure ("no contact" percentages: *Min*=69% for social media; *Max*=92% for neighborhood), we collapsed all contexts into one dichotomous variable, grouping participants who reported having contact with

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[1] https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/about/country/cyprus/ess_cyprus.html

TCs in any of the six contexts (41%) separate from those who reported no contact or who were not sure if they had contact across the six contexts (59%).

Intergroup Feelings

Participants rated their feelings towards the TC community using a single thermometer item (*How do you feel towards Turkish Cypriots in general?*), using an 11-point scale (0=*cold or negative* to 5=*neutral* to 10=*warm or positive*; item adapted from Converse & Presser, 1986).

Intergroup Trust

We used a single item (*Do you think that most Turkish Cypriots would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?*) from ESS R9 Cyprus questionnaire to assess intergroup trust towards TCs (0=*Most Turkish Cypriots would try to take advantage of me* to 10=*Most Turkish Cypriots would try to be fair*). As above, participants who chose the response option "I don't know" (20.8%) were not included in our analyses.

Socio-Economic Status (SES)

We assessed subjective socio-economic status with the single-item *MacArthur Scale of Subjective Status* (Adler et al., 2000). Participants were asked to indicate their self-perceived socio-economic position on a pictorial ladder relative to others in their country (*Where would you place yourself on this ladder compared to people in the country you live in?*), ranging from 1 (*bottom*) to 10 (*top*).

Religiosity

We assessed religiosity with a 4-item scale (1=*Strongly Disagree* to 5=*Strongly Agree*), based on the religiosity items used in Mathur (2012, e.g., "My religion is very important to me.",

α = .92).

Education

We assessed education of participant's mothers and fathers respectively with 7 options ("No formal education" to "Completed a postgraduate university degree" and "Other"). Most participants reported their father to have completed a high school (47.98%), an undergraduate (23.39%) or a postgraduate degree (17.74%); in contrast, most participants reported their mother to have completed an undergraduate university (41.94%), a high school (33.47%) or a postgraduate degree (13.31%).

Analysis Plan

We tested our hypotheses using stepwise hierarchical linear regression models, with both types of transitional justice (multiple linear regression) as well as support for solutions (binary logistic regression) as dependent variables. In the first step, we included background variables to control for demographic variation: gender (0=*Female*, 1=*Male*), age, father and mother's education (*No formal education* as reference group)[2], SES, and religiosity. In the second step, we added commonly studied predictors of transitional justice to the model: intergroup contact (0=*No contact*, 1=*Contact*), intergroup feelings, and intergroup trust. In the final step, we added honor, face, and dignity values to the model, assessing their predictive value above and beyond the other

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[2] As father and mother's education background were categorical variables, we calculated the overall effect for these variables through model comparisons in the transitional justice analyses: we excluded each variable separately from the complete model at each step and compared the resulting change in model fit; we will therefore not provide single regression coefficients for these variables in the tables.

variables. At each step, we compared the fit of the model to the model of the previous step to examine if the respective variables added a significant amount of explained variance. We considered the last model that showed a significant increase in explained variance as the most relevant model to be conceptually interpreted. For all models, we found no concerns related to predictor multicollinearity (all VIF/GVIF < 10; see Myers, 1990).

Results

We report descriptive statistics for and correlations between continuous study variables in Table 1 and results for regression analyses in Tables 2 and 3.

Honor, Face, and Dignity Values

We first tested differences in honor, face, and dignity values using within-person ANOVA (within-person factor: type of value with 4 levels: dignity, face, family honor, and personal honor). We found a significant main effect for type of value, $F(2.68, 662.25)=326.47$, $p<.001$, *partial $\eta^2=$* 57 (values with Greenhouse-Geisser correction). Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests showed that all value types were significantly different from each other, except for face and family honor ($p=.086$, $d=-0.15$): participants endorsed dignity ($M=6.03$, $SD=0.75$) significantly more strongly than they did family honor ($M=5.27$, $SD=1.13$), $p < .001$, $d = 0.79$, face ($M=5.12$, $SD=0.91$), $p <$ .001, $d = 1.09$, and personal honor ($M=3.77$, $SD=1.14$), $p < .001$, $d=2.34$; also, family honor and face were significantly more strongly endorsed than was personal honor (both $p<.001$, $d=1.31$ and $d=1.32$, respectively).

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Retributive Transitional Justice Beliefs

The hierarchical multiple regression analysis revealed that in step 1 the demographic variables did not explain a significant amount of variance in retributive transitional justice beliefs, R^2=.10, F(16, 212)=1.48, p=.108. The addition of intergroup predictors in step 2 did not significantly increase the model fit, ΔR^2=.02, F(3, 209)=1.80, p=.148. The addition of honor, dignity and face values in step 3, however, showed a significant increase in model fit, ΔR^2=.05, F(4, 205)=3.14, p=.016. In the final step 3 model, out of the demographic variables (step 1), gender emerged to be a significant predictor of retributive transitional justice beliefs, b=0.23, t=2.78, p=.006, suggesting that, controlling for the other variables in the model, men endorsed higher levels of retributive transitional justice beliefs that included a cost to the perpetrators. None of the intergroup predictors (step 2) predicted retributive transitional justice beliefs significantly. Finally, out of honor, face, and dignity variables (step 3), it was only personal honor values that significantly predicted retributive transitional justice beliefs (b=0.23, t=2.78, p=.006) with higher levels of endorsement on personal honor values predicting stronger endorsement of retributive transitional justice measures.

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Reconciliatory Transitional Justice Beliefs

In step 1, the demographic variables did not explain a significant amount of variance in reconciliatory transitional justice beliefs, R^2=.08, F(16, 197)=1.01, p=.443. Both including the social psychological variables in step 2, ΔR^2=.13, F(3, 194)=11.05, p<.001, and honor, dignity and face values in step 3 significantly increased the model fit, ΔR^2=.04, F(4, 190)=2.66, p=.03.

In the final step of the model, out of the demographic variables (step 1) we again found only gender to be a significant predictor of reconciliatory transitional justice beliefs, b=-0.43, t=-2.07, p = .040, demonstrating that after controlling for the other variables in the model, men (vs. women) endorsed lower levels of transitional justice measures that emphasized amnesty towards perpetrators. Out of the socio-psychological variables (step 2), we found two significant predictors: both feelings towards TCs, b=0.16, t=3.06, p=.003, and contact with TCs, b=0.51, t=2.46, p=.015, predicted reconciliatory transitional justice beliefs positively, showing that participants who felt more warmly towards TCs, and who reported any kind of contact with TCs, endorsed reconciliatory transitional justice beliefs more strongly. Finally, out of the honor, face, and dignity variables (step 3), two variables were significant: Stronger endorsement of dignity values, b=-0.33, t=2.27, p=.025, and personal honor values, b=-0.19, t=-2.06, p=.041, both predicted *lower* levels of reconciliatory transitional justice beliefs in the Cyprus context.

<div align="center">--- INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT THERE ---</div>

Attitudes towards Solution of the Cyprus Conflict

Including the variables on parent education in the models for the conflict solution variables revealed linear dependencies as well as unreasonably large standard errors for the education variables (suggesting incomplete information due to some of the education categories having zero or very low numbers; see Field, Miles, & Field, 2012, pp. 322-323); hence we focus on more robust

models without these variables.[3] We present the final models (i.e., the models that showed a significant increase compared to the step before) for all solutions in Table 3.

Solution 1: Keep the status quo. In step 1, the contribution of demographic variables compared to a null model with only the intercept was not significant, *Model* $\chi^2(4)=4.84$, $p=.304$. Including the social psychological variables in step 2 significantly increased the model fit, $\chi^2(3)=10.4$, $p=.015$; however, adding honor, dignity and face values in step 3 did not, $\chi^2(4)=1.91$, $p=.753$. In the step 2 model, only trust towards TCs (odds-ratio: *OR*=0.81) and contact with Turkish-Cypriots (*OR* = 0.47) emerged as significant predictors, demonstrating that participants who trust Turkish-Cypriots as fairer and those who reported to have contact with Turkish-Cypriots were less likely to be in favor of keeping the status quo.

Solution 2: A bizonal-bicommunal federation. In step 1, the demographic variables contributed a significant variance compared to a null model, $\chi^2(4)=25.1$, $p<.001$. Including the social psychological variables in step 2 again significantly increased model fit, $\chi^2(3)=14.0$, $p=.003$, but adding honor, dignity and face values in step 3 did not, $\chi^2(4)=1.71$, $p=.788$. In the step 2 model, we found only gender (*OR*=0.43), religiosity (*OR*=0.65), and positive feelings towards Turkish-Cypriots to be significant predictors (*OR*=1.33), showing that men and participants with stronger religiosity were less in favor of a bizonal-bicommunal federation, whereas participants who perceived Turkish-Cypriots more favorably were more in favor of a bizonal-bicommunal federation.

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[3] We tested the impact of this decision on the other predictors by running a parallel series of stepwise logistic regression models in which we included either mother or father education (separately, due to linear dependencies in some models), and found that the pattern of results was the same compared to models that excluded these variables.

Solution 3: A unitary state. In step 1, the demographic variables contributed a significant variance compared to a null model, $\chi^2(4)=.14$, $p=.007$. Including the social psychological variables in step 2 increased model fit significantly, $\chi^2(3)=20.7$, $p < .001$, whereas adding honor, face, and dignity values in step 3 did not, $\chi^2(4)=4.13$, $p =.389$. For the step 2 model, only positive feelings towards Turkish-Cypriots turned out to be a marginally significant predictor ($OR=1.18$), demonstrating that participants who felt more warmly towards TCs were also more likely to be in favor of a unitary state.

Solution 4: A two-state solution. In step 1, the demographic variables contributed significant variance compared to a null model, $\chi^2(4)=15.7$, $p=.003$. Including the social psychological variables in step 2 did not significantly increase model fit, $\chi^2(3)=4.14$, $p=.247$; adding values in step 3 also did not lead to a significant increase, $\chi^2(4)=4.16$, $p=.385$. For the step 1 model, only gender of the participant was found to be a significant predictor of attitudes towards a two-state solution ($OR=0.39$), suggesting that male participants were less likely to be in favor of a two-state solution.

--- INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT THERE ---

Discussion

Transitional justice approaches represent a helpful tool than can help secure justice for victims of human rights violations and reinforce the possibilities for peace, democracy, and reconciliation in societies that have experienced human rights abuses (UN, 2008). Yet, our understanding of the link between individual attitudes and transitional justice is still limited. In the current research, using a correlational approach, we examined the role of honor, dignity, and

face values in GC participants' attitudes towards transitional justice in post-conflict Cyprus, above and beyond demographic variables and commonly studied social psychological predictors of intergroup relations. After controlling for demographic variables, intergroup trust, intergroup feelings and intergroup contact, we found that personal honor values predicted more positive attitudes towards retributive policies, and that personal honor and dignity values predicted more negative attitudes towards reconciliatory policies. Although face values did not significantly predict either type of transitional justice attitudes, there was suggestive evidence demonstrating that face values predicted attitudes to both types of transitional justice in the exact opposite way to dignity and honor (i.e., negatively predicting retributive and positively predicting reconciliatory transitional justice). This was despite the fact that face values correlated positively with both types of honor values and dignity values. Honor, dignity, and face values did not predict preference for any of the solution alternatives to the Cyprus conflict presented to participants in our study.

Our findings have significant theoretical and policy implications. They challenge an 'institutionalist' approach - dominant in political science and international law - in which the implementation of transitional justice is limited to the quest for the most effective 'institutions'/mechanisms of transitional justice (see Vinjamuri & Snyder 2015; Nobles 2010). In line with this approach, most international organizations, including the UN, have developed a 'toolkit' of international accountability that is prescribed in post-conflict societies across the globe (see Lundy McGovern, 2008). The current findings suggest that this 'one size fits all' approach to the study of transitional justice may not work for all, by showing how individual-

level values can play a role in transitional justice preferences possibly making certain policy options more likely to take root than others, even if they have been successfully implemented in other cultural settings (see Subotic, 2009; Taylor 2015). Most importantly, individual attitudes towards transitional justice can serve as an indicator of popular support for a set of policies, over alternative options. In particular, the empirical findings from our study in Cyprus suggest that certain transitional justice tools that are widely perceived to be helpful to restoring trust in post-conflict settings, like truth commissions or apologies, may actually be *counter-effective* in honor-based countries which tend to be more vindictive. This is in line with findings from political science research which shows that in polarized/adversarial relations an admission of wrong and public display of remorse by the leader may backfire, by mobilizing the conservative constituents within a particular community leading to further cycles of hatred (Lind, 2011). On the contrary, policies of retribution (e.g. prosecutions or policies of lustration of security services) may be more admissible in honor cultures. Taken together, our findings highlight that in designing a transitional justice architecture it is important to consider the domestic cultural framework, which could lead to more effective policies that resonate with local needs.

Beyond the contributions of dignity and personal honor values to attitudes towards transitional justice, our findings showed that a number of social psychological variables of intergroup relations (contact, positive feelings and trust) in an expected direction since status quo supporters were more characterized by distrust and lack of contact whereas Bizonal Bicommunal Federation supporters were more characterized by reduced prejudice levels, and increased contact with TCs in line with previous research (Psaltis, et al., 2020).

Beyond the expected finding about the negative role played by personal honor in reconciliatory transitional justice preferences, we would like to highlight the finding concerning the negative role played by dignity in support for reconciliatory transitional justice preferences. Research so far has provided limited evidence in relation to the relative role played by honor, face, and dignity in social psychological outcomes and when these constructs were studied together, predictions concerning honor and dignity were typically in the opposing direction (e.g., Aslani et al., 2016), with dignity assumed to be associated with more positive outcomes compared to honor. In this study, we found that dignity operated in a similar fashion to honor, with both constructs negatively predicting reconciliatory transitional justice preferences. Different to honor values, dignity values did not positively predict retributive transitional justice preferences. Thus, individuals who strongly endorsed dignity values were less likely to support a positive outcome, but not more likely to support a *negative* outcome, as did individuals who strongly endorsed personal honor values. These findings raise questions around the role of dignity and honor in social psychological outcomes by demonstrating that in some circumstances these constructs may operate in similar ways, challenging the notion of dignity in the literature as the more morally superior value (for a critical view on the portrayal of dignity vs. honor see Yona, 2021). They also underscore the need to examine dignity, face, and honor together (as opposed to just focusing on honor) to flesh out their relative role in psychological outcomes and to be able to critically examine their differences and similarities.

Contributions, Limitations and Future Directions

The current study makes several novel contributions to the literature that cuts across social, cultural, political psychology and political science. First, it introduces cultural values as a new analytical lens to understand attitudes towards and preferences for different transitional justice policies (e.g., Aguilar et al 2011; David, 2017; Hall et al., 2018). In doing so, it examines, for the first time, the role of honor, dignity and face values in transitional justice in the context of post-conflict Cyprus. Second, with its emphasis on transitional justice, the current research goes beyond the currently examined role of honor in interpersonal relationships and adds to the emerging literature on the role of honor in intergroup contexts where honor has been predominantly studied in relation to group-relevant variables such as collective action (e.g., Drury & Travaglino, 2020; Travaglino et al., 2015, 2016), frequency of external warfare (Nawata, 2020), and aggressive responses towards other national or ethnic groups (e.g., Barnes et al., 2012; Levin et al., 2015) (for a review see Uskul, Cross, & Günsoy, 2022). Moreover, in this study, we examined honor values together with dignity and face values, providing novel evidence on the relative predictive value of three different sets of values for transitional justice. By examining the role of honor, dignity and face values in transitional justice together with commonly studied social psychological variables in intergroup contexts, the study also builds connections between the social and political psychology literature on intergroup contact, intergroup attitudes and intergroup trust on one hand and the cultural psychological literature on values on the other. Third, by providing empirical evidence from Cyprus, an understudied Mediterranean cultural context, the study expands the geographical diversity of the literature on the role of honor in psychological

processes. Fourth, by including a comparable number of men and women in our sample, we were able to provide a meaningful examination of gender differences in transitional justice attitudes in this particular conflict context. Finally, as illustrated above, the study addresses the growing academic and policy calls for evidence-based policies tailored to meet the specific needs of post-conflict societies (Kochanski, 2020), as opposed to externally imposed solutions that often fail to take root in different cultural settings (Subotic, 2009).

The current study provided important novel insights into the role of honor and dignity in transitional justice, yet it did so focusing primarily on students within a narrow age range who reside primarily in urban areas of the island and from a single conflict context where participants reported low levels of contact with members of the TC community. Targeting younger adults for recruitment is also likely to have led to higher dignity (vs. honor) endorsement in this sample, which further underscores the need to replicate the current work in a representative sample. Furthermore, in this study we operationalized and assessed honor as values. Exploration of the same question in post-conflict zones around the world while assessing honor in its different forms that are more directly related to intergroup relationships (i.e., as ideologies or honor related to one's national identity) would provide further insights into these understudied relationships. Testing the relationship between values and transitional justice in cultural groups where honor, face, and dignity are differentially salient (e.g., Korea, Ireland), as well as in contexts where intergroup contact is more common would help further examine the moderating role of contextual effects in these associations. Obtaining similar data from the members of the TC community would also provide helpful comparative insight, especially for those who work on peace-building

initiatives on the island. Another caveat is that our study relies exclusively on self-report in a cross-sectional design and examines attitudes towards transitional justice, thus how these attitudes play a role in actual behaviors (e.g., voting for a specific solution on the island) as well as how the examined relationships might evolve when examined in a longitudinal design remains to be studied in future research. Future research studying the psychological mechanisms (e.g., reputation, revenge) through which honor and dignity relate to transitional justice attitudes, as well as the conditions under which dignity and honor play a similar or different role in intergroup variables would also help expand our theoretical understanding of these constructs and their applied importance.

Future research designed to identify the conditions under which honor may be associated with stronger restorative transitional justice beliefs and actions and positive solutions to the Cyprus problem would provide the much needed fine-grained understanding of the role of honor in intergroup contexts. This research would also respond to recent calls that have drawn attention to the fact that social and cultural psychological research has mostly focused on negative aspects of honor endorsement that have led to overlooking its potential positive aspects (e.g., Gul et al., 2020; Uskul et al., 2019).

Conclusions

In this paper we found evidence of two new predictors of transitional justice preferences beyond the ones examined up to now in the field: personal honor and dignity. These are important findings not only for the Cypriot context where the peace process has never in the past identified the negative role played by these two set of values in the reconciliation process but also more

generally in the field of transitional justice that has so far not explored the role of honor, face and dignity values as predictors of transitional justice preferences. The current findings suggest that policy makers should pay more attention to the role of cultural values in peacebuilding efforts in the future.

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Table 1

Means an Standard Deviations and Intercorrelations between the variables of the study

	Mean	SD	Reliability	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1 Age	21.02	2.40	-	-									
2 SES	3.23	1.10	-	-0.03	-								
3 Religiosity	6.01	1.19	.92	-0.18**	0.07	-							
4 Intergroup Feelings	5.04	2.70	-	0.06	-0.03	-0.35***	-						
5 Intergroup Trust	5.22	2.72	-	0.06	0.06	-0.29***	0.74***	-					
6 Dignity	6.03	0.75	.75	-0.13*	0.03	0.02	0.08	0.08	-				
7 Face	5.12	0.91	.66	-0.13*	0.00	0.40***	-0.13**	-0.16**	0.32***	-			
8 Family Honor	5.27	1.13	.86	-0.10	-0.01	0.48***	-0.29***	-0.30***	0.29***	0.59***	-		
9 Personal Honor	3.77	1.14	.67	-0.08	-0.08	0.21**	-0.25***	-0.28***	0.09	0.26***	0.41***	-	
10 Retributive TJ	5.02	1.26	.74	0.07	-0.03	0.08	-0.15*	-0.11	0.11	0.02	0.14*	0.23**	-
11 Reconciliatory TJ	3.06	1.41	.59	0.11	0.07	-0.10	0.36***	0.28***	-0.08	0.01	-0.13*	-0.20**	-0.29***

*Note. *: $p < .05$. **: $p < 0.01$. ***: $p < 0.001$.*
Reliabilities are given as Cronbach's Alphas except for Reconciliatory Transitional Justice (TJ), which consisted of two items; the internal reliability for this is therefore represented by the Spearman-Brown Formula (Eisinga, Grotenhuis, & Pelzer, 2013).

Table 2

Hierarchical Regression Model Predicting Retributive Transitional Justice Beliefs from Honor, Dignity and Face Values

Model		R^2	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t / F	Sig.
			B	Std. Error	Beta		
1		0.10				1.484	.108
	(Constant)		2.616	1.542	-	1.696	.091
	Age		0.010	0.038	0.019	0.262	.794
	Gender		0.403	0.186	0.154	2.170	.031
	Religiosity		0.129	0.080	0.113	1.619	.107
	SES		0.008	0.080	0.007	0.096	.923
	Education Father		-	-	-	1.553	.163
	Education Mother		-	-	-	1.001	.426
2		0.12				1.548	.072
	(Constant)		3.288	1.561	-	2.106	.036
	Age		0.013	0.038	0.024	0.334	.739
	Gender		0.388	0.186	0.148	2.082	.039
	Religiosity		0.060	0.086	0.052	0.698	.486
	SES		0.001	0.080	0.001	0.015	.988
	Education Father		-	-	-	1.477	.187
	Education Mother		-	-	-	0.926	.477
	Feelings		-0.055	0.048	-0.118	-1.154	.250
	Trust		0.010	0.047	0.022	0.219	.827
	Contact		-0.252	0.185	-0.099	-1.359	.176
3		0.17				1.878	.011
	(Constant)		1.112	1.766	-	0.630	.530
	Age		0.028	0.037	0.054	0.750	.454
	Gender		0.392	0.189	0.150	2.077	.039
	Religiosity		0.060	0.095	0.053	0.632	.528
	SES		0.020	0.079	0.019	0.248	.805
	Education Father		-	-	-	1.237	.289
	Education Mother		-	-	-	0.838	.542
	Feelings		-0.053	0.047	-0.113	-1.122	.263
	Trust		0.019	0.047	0.041	0.415	.678
	Contact		-0.185	0.184	-0.073	-1.005	.316
	Dignity		0.209	0.131	0.120	1.591	.113
	Face		-0.143	0.117	-0.103	-1.227	.221
	Family Honor		0.032	0.103	0.029	0.310	.757
	Personal Honor		0.233	0.084	0.208	2.779	.006

Note. $N = 229$; For categorical variables of father's and mother's education background, we calculated the effect for these variables by excluding each variable from the complete model at each step, and comparing model fit; test statistics represent F values for these variables.

Table 3

Hierarchical Regression Model Predicting Reconciliatory Transitional Justice Beliefs from Honor, Dignity and Face Values

Model		R^2	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t / F	Sig.
			B	Std. Error	Beta		
		0.08				1.014	.443
	(Constant)		0.594	1.774	-	0.335	.738
	Age		0.078	0.045	0.132	1.744	.083
1	Gender		-0.455	0.217	-0.156	-2.100	.037
	Religiosity		-0.096	0.094	-0.076	-1.021	.309
	SES		0.112	0.092	0.096	1.215	.226
	Education Father		-	-	-	0.629	.707
	Education Mother		-	-	-	0.847	.535
		0.21				2.729	< .001
	(Constant)		-1.087	1.679	-	-0.648	.518
	Age		0.063	0.042	0.108	1.521	.130
	Gender		-0.364	0.204	-0.125	-1.784	.076
	Religiosity		0.115	0.095	0.091	1.212	.227
2	SES		0.112	0.087	0.096	1.288	.199
	Education Father		-	-	-	0.233	.966
	Education Mother		-	-	-	0.704	.647
	Feelings		0.158	0.053	0.302	2.979	.003
	Trust		-0.003	0.051	-0.005	-0.054	.957
	Contact		0.572	0.204	0.201	2.800	.006
		0.25				2.793	< .001
	(Constant)		0.917	1.907	-	0.481	.631
	Age		0.044	0.041	0.076	1.073	.284
	Gender		-0.429	0.208	-0.147	-2.068	.040
	Religiosity		0.063	0.105	0.049	0.594	.554
	SES		0.107	0.086	0.091	1.241	.216
	Education Father		-	-	-	0.214	.972
3	Education Mother		-	-	-	1.026	.410
	Feelings		0.160	0.052	0.306	3.056	.003
	Trust		-0.002	0.051	-0.004	-0.037	.970
	Contact		0.505	0.205	0.178	2.464	.015
	Dignity		-0.327	0.144	-0.169	-2.265	.025
	Face		0.215	0.127	0.139	1.687	.093
	Family Honor		0.031	0.114	0.026	0.276	.783
	Personal Honor		-0.192	0.093	-0.156	-2.055	.041

Note. $N = 214$; For categorical variables of father's and mother's education background, we calculated the effect for these variables by excluding each variable from the complete model at each step, and comparing model fit; test statistics represent F values for these variables.

Table 4
Final Hierarchical Logistic Regression Models Predicting Support for different Solutions to the Cyprus Issue

		Solution 1: Keep the Status Quo *(Final Model: Step 2)*					Solution 2: Bizonal-Bicommunal Federation *(Final Model: Step 2)*				
		χ^2	B	SE	OR	Sig.	χ^2	B	SE	OR	Sig.
	Model Fit	15.261				.033	39.161				< .001
	(Constant)		3.715	1.947	-	.056		-1.282	2.081	-	.538
	Age		-0.089	0.071	0.914	.211		0.130	0.080	1.139	.105
Step 1	Gender		-0.428	0.366	0.652	.242		-0.853	0.373	0.426	.022
	Religiosity		-0.226	0.179	0.798	.205		-0.425	0.187	0.654	.023
	SES		0.075	0.148	1.078	.611		-0.036	0.141	0.964	.796
	Feelings		0.137	0.092	1.147	.139		0.285	0.092	1.33	.002
Step 2	Trust		-0.207	0.094	0.813	.028		-0.053	0.090	0.948	.555
	Contact		-0.766	0.374	0.465	.041		-0.374	0.367	0.688	.309

		Solution 3: Unitary State *(Final Model: Step 2)*					Solution 4: Two-State Solution *(Final Model: Step 1)*				
		χ^2	B	SE	OR	Sig.	χ^2	B	SE	OR	Sig.
	Model Fit	34.774				< .001	15.684				.003
	(Constant)		-0.982	2.083	-	.637		0.585	1.670	1.794	.726
	Age		0.071	0.079	1.073	.371		-0.068	0.065	0.934	.294
Step 1	Gender		0.314	0.351	1.369	.372		-0.952	0.325	0.386	.003
	Religiosity		-0.168	0.176	0.846	.342		0.119	0.138	1.127	.388
	SES		-0.136	0.137	0.873	.319		0.072	0.122	1.075	.552
	Feelings		0.169	0.089	1.184	.057		-	-	-	-
Step 2	Trust		0.124	0.085	1.132	.144		-	-	-	-
	Contact		0.255	0.344	1.291	.459		-	-	-	-

Note. $N_{Solution1}$ = 163; $N_{Solution2}$ = 189; $N_{Solution3}$ = 214; $N_{Solution4}$ = 213; Presented are the final logistic regression models for all solutions, i.e. the coefficients of those models that showed the last significant increase in model fit compared to model fit in the previous step (see in-text). Model fit indices present a test of the respective model against a base model (i.e. whether the model is better than chance). Odds Ratios reflect the change in odds following a 1-unit increase in the predictor variable, with values greater than 1 representing an increased likelihood of being in favour of a particular solution, and values smaller than 1 representing a decreased likelihood of being in favor of a particular solution.

Supplementary Materials:
The Role of Honor, Dignity, and Face Values in Transitional Justice Preferences in Post-Conflict Cyprus

SM.1: Overview over items and scales

1. Dignity, Face, and Honor Values:

How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? (1 = *Strongly Disagree* to 7 = *Strongly Agree*)

Dignity (Yao et al., 2018)	1	People should speak their mind.
	2	People should make decisions based on their own opinions and not based on what others think.
	3	People should be true to themselves regardless of what others think.
	4	People should stand up for what they believe in even when others disagree.
	5	How much a person respects himself is far more important than how much others respect him.
	6	People should not care what others around them think.
Face (Yao et al., 2018)	7	People should be very humble to maintain good relationships.
	8	People should control their behavior in front of others.
	9	People should be extremely careful not to embarrass others.
	10	People should minimize conflict in social relationships at all costs.
	11	It is important to maintain harmony within one's group.
	12	People should never criticize others in public.
Honor (Yao et al., 2018)	13	People should be concerned about their family having a bad reputation.
	14	People should not allow others to insult their family.
	15	People should be concerned about defending their families' reputation.
	16	People should be concerned about damaging their families' reputation.
Honor (Smith et al., 2017)	17	People must always be ready to defend their honor.
	18	It is important to promote oneself to others.
	19	People always need to show off their power in front of their competitors.
	20	Men need to protect their women's reputation at all costs.
	21	You must punish people who insult you.
	22	If a person gets insulted and they don't respond, he or she will look weak.

2. Transitional Justice (1 = *Strongly Disagree* to 7 = *Strongly Agree*):

What do you think should be done with those people who harmed Greek Cypriots during the Turkish invasion of 1974 or earlier during the Intercommunal Conflicts of the period 1963-1968? (1 = *Strongly Disagree* to 7 = *Strongly Agree*)

1	They should receive amnesty (no punishment) if that brings lasting peace
2	They should beg for forgiveness from their victims and victims' families
3	They should have a fair trial and if found guilty they should be harshly punished
4	War criminals should pay financial compensation to their victims
5	Foreign states to blame should pay financial compensation to victims
6	They should testify to a truth and reconciliation commission and as an exchange they shouldn't be prosecuted

3. Support of Different Solutions to the Cyprus Conflict:
Which one of the three options (against, in favour or neither but tolerate it if necessary) given below would you choose for the following possible solutions to the Cyprus issue? (1 = Against, 2 = neither against nor in favour but would tolerate it if necessary, 3 = in favour)

1	Keep the status quo
2	A bizonal bicommunal federation
3	A unitary state
4	A two state solution

4. Quantity of Intergroup Contact:
Thinking of social contacts – communicating and talking - how often do you have contact these days with Turkish Cypriots in each of the following situations? (1 = Never, 2 = Less than once a month, 3 = Once a month, 4 = Several times a month, 5 = Once a week, 6 = Several times a week, 7 = Every day)

1	At work
2	In bi-communal meetings
3	In your neighbourhood where you live
4	In the occupied areas of Cyprus
5	In the non-occupied areas of Cyprus
6	On social media (e.g. Facebook)

5. Intergroup Feelings:
How do you feel towards Turkish Cypriots in general? (0 = Cold or negative, 5 = Neutral, 10 = Warm or positive)

6. Socioeconomic Status:
Where would you place yourself on this ladder compared to people in the country you live in? (0 = Bottom, 5 = Middle, 10 = Top)

7. Religiosity:
Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements. (1 = Strongly Disagree to 5 = Strongly Agree)

1	I am very religious.
2	I believe in God.
3	My religion is very important to me.
4	I regularly take part in religious services and events.

8. Parent Education:
What is the highest educational attainment of your mother / father?

1	No formal education
2	Completed primary school
3	Completed middle school
4	Completed high school (e.g. A-Levels)
5	Completed an undergraduate university degree
6	Completed a post-graduate university degree (M.D., MSc, Ph.D., etc.)
7	Other