

# The Many Faces of Strategy Complexity

James C. A. Main<sup>1</sup>

Based on joint work with

Michał Ajdarów<sup>3</sup> Petr Novotný<sup>3</sup> Mickaël Randour<sup>2,1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>UMONS – Université de Mons, Belgium

<sup>2</sup>F.R.S.-FNRS, Belgium


<sup>2</sup>Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic

UMONS

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# Reactive synthesis via games on graphs

We study **games on graphs** for **reactive synthesis**.



# Overview of the talk

**Strategies** are the formal counterpart of **controllers** for reactive systems.

We are interested in **simple strategies** to obtain simple controllers.

What is a simple strategy?

Strategy complexity is **multifaceted**.


We mainly focus on three directions:

- **finite-memory** strategies;
- **randomised** strategies;
- **alternative** representations of strategies.

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# Markov decision processes



## Markov decision process (MDP)

An MDP is a tuple  $\mathcal{M} = (S, A, \delta)$  where

- $S$  is a countable **state space**;
- $A$  is a countable **action space** ;
- $\delta: S \times A \rightarrow \mathcal{D}(S)$  is a **transition** function.

**Play**: sequence in  $(SA)^\omega$  coherent with  $\delta$ .

**Ex.**: home train home bike (work meet) $^\omega$

**History**: prefix of a play ending in a state.

# Strategies

Non-determinism in games is resolved through strategies.



## Pure strategies

A **pure strategy** is a function  $\sigma: \text{Hist}(\mathcal{M}) \rightarrow A$ .

A **memoryless strategy** only looks at the current state.

When fixing a **strategy**  $\sigma$  and an initial state  $s$ , we obtain an induced **Markov chain**.

- **Probability notation:**  $\mathbb{P}_s^\sigma$ .
- **Expectation notation:**  $\mathbb{E}_s^\sigma$ .



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

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## Finite-memory strategies



### Representation of pure strategies via Mealy machines

- Set of **memory states**  $M$ ;
- initial **memory state**  $m_{\text{init}}$ ;
- **next-move** function  $\text{nxt}_{\mathcal{M}}: M \times S \rightarrow A$ ;
- memory **update** function  $\text{up}_{\mathcal{M}}: M \times S \times A \rightarrow M$ .

# The study of finite memory

The complexity of strategies is traditionally measured by the size of their **memory**.

## Key questions for finite-memory strategies

### When does finite memory suffice?

~~ Characterisations of specifications for which finite-memory suffices (e.g., [GZ05; Bou+22]).

### How much memory do we need to play optimally?

~~ Computing memory bounds [Bou+23; CO25].

~~ Establishing improved bounds (e.g., [JLS15; Mai24]).

### Can we improve memory requirements by considering more general strategies?


~~ Trading memory for **randomness** (e.g., [CdH04; CRR14]).

## Memory does not tell the whole story (1/2)

Counter-based strategies

Memory does **not fully reflect** the complexity of a strategy.

Consider a game with an **energy-Büchi** objective [CD12], where  $W \in \mathbb{N}$ .




Need memory **exponential** in the binary encoding of  $W$  to satisfy the energy-Büchi objective.

**Polynomial** representation with a **counter**-based approach.

## Memory does not tell the whole story (2/2)

Action choices influence simplicity

Memory does **not fully reflect** the complexity of a strategy.




→ Strategy  $\sigma_1$  is **simpler to represent** than  $\sigma_2$

The **action choices** can impact how concise the strategy can be made.

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
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# What is a randomised strategy?



**Behavioural strategy**

$$\sigma_i: \text{Hist}(\mathcal{M}) \rightarrow \mathcal{D}(A)$$



**Mixed strategy**

$$\mathcal{D}(\sigma_i: \text{Hist}(\mathcal{M}) \rightarrow A)$$

How do these two classes of strategies compare?

**Kuhn's theorem:** same expressiveness when **perfect recall holds**.

# What about finite-memory strategies?

## Components of Mealy machines for **pure** strategies

- Initial **memory state**  $m_{\text{init}}$ ;
- **next-move** function  $\text{nxt}_{\mathcal{M}}: M \times S \rightarrow A^{(i)}$ ;
- memory **update** function  $\text{up}_{\mathcal{M}}: M \times S \times \bar{A} \rightarrow M$ .

How can we **extend** Mealy machines to model **randomised strategies**?

## Stochastic Mealy machines – behavioural version

- Initial **memory state**  $m_{\text{init}}$ ;
- **randomised next-move** function  $\text{nxt}_{\mathcal{M}}: M \times S \rightarrow \mathcal{D}(A)$ ;
- memory **update** function  $\text{up}_{\mathcal{M}}: M \times S \times A \rightarrow M$ .

# What about finite-memory strategies?

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How can we **extend** Mealy machines to model **randomised strategies**?

## Stochastic Mealy machines – mixed version

- Initial **memory distribution**  $\mu_{\text{init}} \in \mathcal{D}(M)$ ;
- **next-move** function  $\text{nxt}_{\mathcal{M}}: M \times S \rightarrow A$ ;
- memory **update** function  $\text{up}_{\mathcal{M}}: M \times S \times A \rightarrow M$ .

# What about finite-memory strategies?

## Components of Mealy machines for **pure** strategies

- Initial **memory state**  $m_{\text{init}}$ ;
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How can we **extend** Mealy machines to model **randomised strategies**?


## Stochastic Mealy machines – full randomisation

- Initial **memory distribution**  $\mu_{\text{init}} \in \mathcal{D}(M)$ ;
- **randomised next-move** function  $\text{nxt}_{\mathcal{M}}: M \times S \rightarrow \mathcal{D}(A)$ ;
- **randomised** memory **update** function  $\text{up}_{\mathcal{M}}: M \times S \times A \rightarrow \mathcal{D}(M)$ .

## Randomisation and finite memory [MR24]

Acronyms **XYZ** where  $X, Y, Z \in \{D, R\}$  and D = deterministic and R = random, and

- X characterises initialisation,
- Y characterises the next-move function,
- Z characterises updates.





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# Randomisation and multiple objectives

Randomisation can be used to **balance multiple goals**. For instance:

- reaching work under 40 minutes with **high probability**;
- minimising the **expected** time to reach work.



# Randomisation and multiple objectives

In **multi-objective MDPs**, **randomised strategies** may be necessary for some specifications.

## Main questions

- What **type of randomisation** do we need for multi-objective queries?
- What is the relationship between expected payoffs of **pure strategies** and expected payoffs of **general strategies**?

## Applicability of our results

A **payoff** is a measurable function  $f: \text{Plays}(\mathcal{M}) \rightarrow \bar{\mathbb{R}}$ .

We want results that apply to a **broad class of payoffs**.

Which payoffs  $f$  do we consider?

- A payoff  $f$  is **good** if it has a **well-defined expectation** under all strategies from all initial states.
- A payoff  $f$  is **universally integrable** if its expectation is **finite** under all strategies from all initial states.

For a **multi-dimensional payoff**  $\bar{f} = (f_1, \dots, f_d)$  and  $s \in S$ , we study:

- $\text{Pay}_s(\bar{f}) = \{\mathbb{E}_s^\sigma(\bar{f}) \mid \sigma \text{ strategy}\};$
- $\text{Pay}_s^{\text{pure}}(\bar{f}) = \{\mathbb{E}_s^\sigma(\bar{f}) \mid \sigma \text{ pure strategy}\}.$

# Universally integrable payoffs

Theorem (M., Randour, 2025)

Let  $\bar{f}$  be **universally integrable**. Then for all  $s \in S$ ,

$$\text{Pay}_s(\bar{f}) = \text{conv}(\text{Pay}_s^{\text{pure}}(\bar{f})).$$

**Proof idea:** reasoning on **lexicographic multi-objective MDPs**.

Lemma (M., Randour, 2025)

If  $\bar{f}$  is **universally integrable**, then for all strategies  $\sigma$ , there exists a **pure strategy**  $\tau$  such that  $\mathbb{E}_s^\sigma(\bar{f}) \leq_{\text{lex}} \mathbb{E}_s^\tau(\bar{f})$ .

By reducing to **one-dimensional MDPs**, we can prove that

$$\text{cl}(\text{Pay}_s(\bar{f})) = \text{cl}(\text{conv}(\text{Pay}_s^{\text{pure}}(\bar{f}))).$$

# Mixing for universally integrable payoffs

Proof of the weaker result

Let  $\bar{f}$  be universally integrable and  $s \in S$ .

**Goal:** show that  $\text{Pay}_s(\bar{f}) \subseteq \text{cl}(\text{conv}(\text{Pay}_s^{\text{pure}}(\bar{f})))$ .

Fix a strategy  $\sigma$  and let  $\mathbf{q} = \mathbb{E}_s^\sigma(\bar{f})$ .

**Proof by contradiction.**


Assume  $\mathbf{q} \in \text{Pay}_s(\bar{f}) \setminus \text{cl}(\text{conv}(\text{Pay}_s^{\text{pure}}(\bar{f})))$ .

**Separate  $\mathbf{q}$  and  $\text{cl}(\text{conv}(\text{Pay}_s^{\text{pure}}(\bar{f})))$  with  $x^*$ .**

By the Lemma, there is a **pure strategy  $\tau$**  such that


$$x^*(\mathbf{q}) = \mathbb{E}_s^\sigma(x^* \circ \bar{f}) \leq \mathbb{E}_s^\tau(x^* \circ \bar{f}).$$

This contradicts the fact that  $x^*$  is separating.  $\square$



# Beyond universally integrable payoffs

What if  $\bar{f}$  is not universally integrable?



Non-universally-integrable example

$$f(\pi) = \begin{cases} k & \text{if } \pi = (sa)^k s(bt)^\omega \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

The theorem for universally integrable payoffs does not generalise:

- $\text{Pay}_s^{\text{pure}}(\bar{f}) = \mathbb{N} \implies \text{conv}(\text{Pay}_s^{\text{pure}}(\bar{f})) = [0, +\infty[,$
- $+\infty \in \text{Pay}_s(\bar{f}).$

## Other results

What can we say about good payoffs in general?

Theorem (M., Randour, 2025)

Let  $\bar{f} = (f_1, \dots, f_d)$  be a *good payoff* and  $s \in S$ . Then

$$\text{cl}(\text{Pay}_s(\bar{f})) = \text{cl}(\text{conv}(\text{Pay}_s^{\text{pure}}(\bar{f}))).$$

How many strategies do we have to mix?

Theorem (M., Randour, 2025)

- Payoffs of *finite-support mixed strategies* can be *obtained* by *mixing  $d + 1$  strategies*.
- Payoffs of *finite-support mixed strategies* can be *dominated* by *mixing  $d$  strategies*.

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# Memoryless strategies in one-counter MDPs

We study **one-counter Markov decision processes**.

We consider counter-based strategies with a **compact representation** that we call **interval strategies**.

Our contribution (Ajdarów, M., Novotný, Randour, ICALP 2025)


- PSPACE **verification** algorithms for interval strategies.
- PSPACE **realisability** algorithms for **structurally-constrained** interval strategies.

Our algorithms are based on a **finite abstraction** of an **infinite system**.

# One-counter Markov decision processes


## One-counter MDP (OC-MDP) $\mathcal{Q}$

- Finite MDP  $(Q, A, \delta)$ .
- Weight function  
 $w: Q \times A \rightarrow \{-1, 0, 1\}$ .




## MDP $\mathcal{M}^{\leq \infty}(\mathcal{Q})$ induced by $\mathcal{Q}$

- Countable MDP over  $S = Q \times \mathbb{N}$ .
- State transitions via  $\delta$ .
- Counter updates via  $w$ .




# Objectives

- An **objective** is a measurable set of plays.
- Let  $T \subseteq Q$  be a **target**.
- We study variants of **reachability objectives**.



State reachability  $\text{Reach}(T)$



Selective termination  $\text{Term}(T)$

# Interval strategies

We study a restricted class of **memoryless strategies** of  $\mathcal{M}^{\leq\infty}(\mathcal{Q})$ .

## Open-ended interval strategies (OEIS)

$\sigma$  is an OEIS if  $\exists k_0 \in \mathbb{N}$  s.t.  $\forall q \in Q$  and  $\forall k \geq k_0$ ,  $\sigma(q, k) = \sigma(q, k_0)$ .

$\mathbb{N}_0$	1	2	$\dots$	$k_0 - 1$	$k_0$	$k_0 + 1$	$\dots$
$Q$	$\sigma_1$	$\sigma_2$	$\dots$	$\sigma_{k_0-1}$	$\sigma_{k_0}$	$\sigma_{k_0}$	$\dots$
	Group counter values in intervals				constant		
Inter.	$I_1$	$I_2$	$\dots$	$I_d = [\![k_0, \infty]\!]$	$\rightsquigarrow$ Finite partition of $\mathbb{N}_0$ into intervals		
$Q$	$\tau_1$	$\tau_2$	$\dots$	$\tau_d = \sigma_{k_0}$			

# Verification of interval strategies

**Verification problem.** When following a given interval strategy, do we **reach a target state** with probability greater than or equal to some given threshold?

## Challenges

- **Infinite** Markov chain.
- Compressed Markov chains have **irrational** or **very precise** probabilities.

## Solutions

- **Compression** to finite Markov chain.
- Transition probabilities can be represented by small **logical formulae**.

## Algorithm


Construct a **universal logical formula** and check if it is satisfied in the **theory of the reals**.

We have also built on these logical formulae to design **synthesis algorithms**.

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# Conclusion



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# Mixing for universally integrable payoffs

## Proof

Let  $\bar{f}$  be universally integrable and  $s \in S$ .

**Goal:** show that  $\text{Pay}_s(\bar{f}) \subseteq \text{conv}(\text{Pay}_s^{\text{pure}}(\bar{f}))$ .

Fix a strategy  $\sigma$  and  $\mathbf{q} = \mathbb{E}_s^\sigma(\bar{f})$ .



**Step 1:** isolate  $\mathbf{q}$  as much as possible with an intersection of **supporting hyperplanes**.

**Example 1:**  $\mathbf{q} = (0, 1)$ .

- First hyperplane:  $x = 0 \rightsquigarrow x_1^*(x, y) = -x$ .
- Second hyperplane:  $y = 1 \rightsquigarrow x_2^*(x, y) = y$

$\sigma$  is **lexicographically optimal** for  $(x_1^*, x_2^*) \circ \bar{f}$   
 $\implies \mathbf{q} \in \text{Pay}_s^{\text{pure}}(\bar{f})$ .

$$f_1 = \mathbb{1}_{\text{Reach}(t_1)} \quad f_2 = \mathbb{1}_{\text{Reach}(t_2)}$$



# Mixing for universally integrable payoffs

## Proof

Let  $\bar{f}$  be universally integrable and  $s \in S$ .

**Goal:** show that  $\text{Pay}_s(\bar{f}) \subseteq \text{conv}(\text{Pay}_s^{\text{pure}}(\bar{f}))$ .

Fix a strategy  $\sigma$  and  $\mathbf{q} = \mathbb{E}_s^\sigma(\bar{f})$ .



**Step 1:** isolate  $\mathbf{q}$  as much as possible with an intersection of **supporting hyperplanes**.

**Example 2:**  $\mathbf{q} = (\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2})$ .

We construct  $L_{\mathbf{q}}$  linear such that:

- $\sigma$  **lexicographically optimal** from  $s$  for  $L_{\mathbf{q}} \circ \bar{f}$ ;
- $\mathbf{q} \in \text{ri}(\text{Pay}_s(\bar{f}) \cap V)$  for  $V = L_{\mathbf{q}}^{-1}(L_{\mathbf{q}}(\mathbf{q}))$

$$f_1 = \mathbb{1}_{\text{Reach}(t_1)} \quad f_2 = \mathbb{1}_{\text{Reach}(t_2)}$$



# Mixing for universally integrable payoffs

Proof – continued

**Goal:**  $\mathbf{q} \in \text{conv}(\text{Pay}_s^{\text{pure}}(\bar{f}))$ .

**Step 2:** it suffices to prove:

$$\text{cl}(\text{Pay}_s(\bar{f}) \cap V) = \text{cl}(\text{conv}(\text{Pay}_s^{\text{pure}}(\bar{f})) \cap V).$$

**Proof by contradiction.**


Let  $\mathbf{p} \in \text{Pay}_s(\bar{f}) \cap V \setminus \text{cl}(\text{conv}(\text{Pay}_s^{\text{pure}}(\bar{f})) \cap V)$ .

Separate  $\mathbf{p}$  and  $\text{cl}(\text{conv}(\text{Pay}_s^{\text{pure}}(\bar{f})) \cap V)$  with  $x^*$ .

There is a **pure strategy**  $\tau$  such that

$$\mathbb{E}_s^\tau((L_{\mathbf{q}}, x^*) \circ \bar{f}) \geq_{\text{lex}} (L_{\mathbf{q}}(\mathbf{p}), x^*(\mathbf{p})).$$


$$\implies x^*(\mathbb{E}_s^\tau(\bar{f})) \geq x^*(\mathbf{p}) \quad (\text{contradiction}).$$



# Verification

## Interval strategy verification problem

Given an **interval strategy**  $\sigma$ , an **objective**  $\Omega \in \{\text{Reach}(T), \text{Term}(T)\}$ , a **threshold**  $\alpha \in \mathbb{Q} \cap [0, 1]$  and an **initial configuration**  $s_{\text{init}} \in Q \times \mathbb{N}$ , decide whether  $\mathbb{P}_{\mathcal{M}^{\leq \infty}(\mathcal{Q}), s_{\text{init}}}^{\sigma}(\Omega) \geq \alpha$



# Interval strategy verification problem

We construct a finite **compressed Markov chain**  $\mathcal{C}_{\mathcal{I}}^\sigma$ .

## Solving the verification problem through compressed Markov chains

- To compress, we **keep few configurations** and adjust transitions.
- We have formulae (in the signature  $\{0, 1, +, -, \cdot, \leq\}$ ):
  - $\Phi_{\delta}^{\mathcal{I}}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{z}^\sigma)$  for **transition probabilities** of  $\mathcal{C}_{\mathcal{I}}^\sigma$ ;
  - $\Phi_{\Omega}^{\mathcal{I}}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y})$  for **termination probabilities** from configurations of  $\mathcal{C}_{\mathcal{I}}^\sigma$ .

We can solve the verification problem by checking if

$$\mathbb{R} \models \forall \mathbf{x} \forall \mathbf{y} (\Phi_{\delta}^{\mathcal{I}}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{z}^\sigma) \wedge \Phi_{\Omega}^{\mathcal{I}}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y})) \implies y_{s_{\text{init}}} \geq \theta.$$

	Unbounded counter	Bounded counter
Upper bound	co-ETR	$P^{\text{PosSLP}}$
Lower bound	Square-root-sum-hard [EWY10]	Square-root-sum-hard