

The Many Faces of Strategy Complexity

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Based on joint work with

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March 5, 2025

Talk overview

Strategies are at the center of game-theoretic approaches to reactive synthesis.

Goal of this talk

Motivate and explain a **multifaceted vision** of strategy complexity.


In the second part of this talk, we will focus on:

- **randomised** strategies;
- **alternative** representations of strategies.

Table of contents

- 1 Synthesis via game theory
- 2 Finite-memory strategies
- 3 Randomised strategies
- 4 Multi-objective Markov decision processes
- 5 Beyond Mealy machines

Reactive synthesis through game theory




A **strategy** is a formal blueprint for a **controller of the system**.

Turn-based stochastic games

Turn-based stochastic game \mathcal{G}

- **Finite or countable** state space $S = S_1 \uplus S_2$.
- **Finite** action space A .
- **Randomised** transition function $\delta: S \times A \rightarrow \mathcal{D}(S)$.



Plays are sequences in $(SA)^\omega$ coherent with transitions.

\rightsquigarrow **Example:** $s_0 a s_1 b s_1 \dots$

Strategies

A **history** is a prefix h of a play ending in a **state**.

Strategy



A **behavioural strategy** of \mathcal{P}_i is a function $\sigma_i: \text{Hist}_i(\mathcal{G}) \rightarrow \mathcal{D}(A^{(i)})$.

- Two strategies σ_1, σ_2 and an initial state $s \rightsquigarrow$ **distribution** $\mathbb{P}_s^{\sigma_1, \sigma_2}$ over plays.
- A strategy σ_i is **pure** if $\sigma_i: \text{Hist}_i(\mathcal{G}) \rightarrow A$.
- A strategy is **memoryless** if $\sigma_i: S_i \rightarrow \mathcal{D}(A)$.

Table of contents

- 1 Synthesis via game theory
- 2 Finite-memory strategies**
- 3 Randomised strategies
- 4 Multi-objective Markov decision processes
- 5 Beyond Mealy machines

Strategies and memory



Representation of strategies via Mealy machines with randomisation

- Set of **memory states** M ;
- initial **memory distribution** μ_{init} ;
- **next-move** function $\text{nxt}_{\mathcal{M}}: M \times S_i \rightarrow \mathcal{D}(A)$;
- memory **update** function $\text{up}_{\mathcal{M}}: M \times S \times A \rightarrow \mathcal{D}(M)$.

Strategy complexity via memory

- The complexity of strategies is traditionally measured by the size of their **memory**.
- Memory requirements for optimal strategies in games have been thoroughly studied.

A glimpse into known results on memory

- Characterisations and one-to-two player lifts (e.g., [GZ05; Bou+22]).
- Refining memory bounds/computing optimal bounds (e.g., [Bou+23; Mai24]).
- Trading memory for **randomisation** (e.g., [CAH04; CRR14]).

Strategy complexity in general

- Memory size does **not fully describe** the complexity of strategies.
- Other aspects also play a role in the complexity of strategies.
- **Major question**: what makes a strategy complex?

Our vision

Strategy complexity is **multifaceted**: various factors contribute to the complexity of a strategy.


- **Next step**: a brief look into **randomisation**.

Table of contents


- 1 Synthesis via game theory
- 2 Finite-memory strategies
- 3 Randomised strategies**
- 4 Multi-objective Markov decision processes
- 5 Beyond Mealy machines

Mixed and behavioural strategies

- There exist different definitions of **randomised strategies**.



Behavioural strategies



Mixed strategies

- In general, these two classes of strategies are **not comparable**.
- Kuhn's theorem [Aum64]: in **games of perfect recall** any mixed strategy has an equivalent behavioural strategy and vice-versa.

What happens with finite-memory strategies?

Are all models of **finite-memory randomised strategies** **equivalent**?

Randomisation and finite memory [MR24]

A class of Mealy machines is denoted by XYZ where $X, Y, Z \in \{D, R\}$ where D stands for deterministic and R for random, and

- X characterises initialisation,
- Y characterises the next-move function,
- Z characterises updates.




Table of contents

- 1 Synthesis via game theory
- 2 Finite-memory strategies
- 3 Randomised strategies
- 4 Multi-objective Markov decision processes**
- 5 Beyond Mealy machines

Random strategies and multiple objectives

- We study one-player games, i.e., **Markov decision processes**, with **multiple payoffs**.
- In general, the satisfaction of multi-objective queries requires **randomised strategies**.

Main questions



- What is the relationship between expected payoffs of **pure strategies** and expected payoffs of **general strategies**?
- What **type of randomisation** do we need for multi-objective queries?

→ **Goal**: results for the **broadest possible class of payoffs**.

Multi-objective Markov decision processes

We consider **two goals**:

- reaching work under 40 minutes with **high probability**;
- minimising the **expected** time to reach work.



Payoffs

- A **payoff** is a measurable function $f: \text{Plays}(\mathcal{M}) \rightarrow \bar{\mathbb{R}}$.
- We let $\mathbb{E}_s^\sigma(f) = \int_{\pi \in \text{Plays}(\mathcal{M})} f(\pi) d\mathbb{P}_s^\sigma(\pi)$.

Which payoffs f are relevant?

- f is **good** if $\mathbb{E}_s^\sigma(f)$ is well-defined for all strategies σ and all $s \in S$.
- f is **universally integrable** payoffs: $\mathbb{E}_s^\sigma(|f|) \in \mathbb{R}$ if for all strategies σ and all $s \in S$.

For a **multi-dimensional payoff** $\bar{f} = (f_1, \dots, f_d)$ and $s \in S$, we let:

- $\text{Pay}_s(\bar{f}) = \{\mathbb{E}_s^\sigma(\bar{f}) \mid \sigma \text{ strategy}\};$
- $\text{Pay}_s^{\text{pure}}(\bar{f}) = \{\mathbb{E}_s^\sigma(\bar{f}) \mid \sigma \text{ pure strategy}\}.$

Universally integrable payoffs

In the introductory example, we had $\text{Pay}_{\text{home}}(\bar{f}) = \text{conv}(\text{Pay}_{\text{home}}^{\text{pure}}(\bar{f}))$.

When does this generalise?

Theorem ((M., Randour))

Let $\bar{f} = (f_1, \dots, f_d)$ be **universally integrable**. Then, for all states s ,

$$\text{Pay}_s(\bar{f}) = \text{conv}(\text{Pay}_s^{\text{pure}}(\bar{f})).$$

In particular, to match the expected payoff of any strategy, it suffices to:

- **mix $d + 1$ pure strategies**;
- **consider strategies use randomisation at most d along any play.**

Sequel: proof of a weaker result

If \bar{f} is universally integrable, then $\text{cl}(\text{Pay}_s(\bar{f})) = \text{cl}(\text{conv}(\text{Pay}_s^{\text{pure}}(\bar{f})))$.

Universally integrable payoffs

A simpler proof


Non-direct inclusion: $\text{Pay}_s(\bar{f}) \subseteq \text{cl}(\text{conv}(\text{Pay}_s^{\text{pure}}(\bar{f})))$.

Let σ be a strategy and $\mathbf{q} = \mathbb{E}_s^\sigma(\bar{f})$. Assume $\mathbf{q} \notin \text{cl}(\text{conv}(\text{Pay}_s^{\text{pure}}(\bar{f})))$.

Main idea: reduction to a **one-dimensional** payoff.

Theorem (Hyperplane separation theorem)

Let $D_1, D_2 \subseteq \mathbb{R}^d$ be **disjoint convex** sets. If D_1 is **closed** and D_2 is **compact**, then there exists a **linear form** $x^*: \mathbb{R}^d \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ and $\varepsilon > 0$ such that for all $\mathbf{p}_1 \in D_1$ and $\mathbf{p}_2 \in D_2$, $x^*(\mathbf{p}_1) + \varepsilon < x^*(\mathbf{p}_2)$.



Universally integrable payoffs

A simpler proof

Non-direct inclusion: $\text{Pay}_s(\bar{f}) \subseteq \text{cl}(\text{conv}(\text{Pay}_s^{\text{pure}}(\bar{f})))$.

Let σ be a strategy and $\mathbf{q} = \mathbb{E}_s^\sigma(\bar{f})$. Assume $\mathbf{q} \notin \text{cl}(\text{conv}(\text{Pay}_s^{\text{pure}}(\bar{f})))$.

Main idea: reduction to a **one-dimensional** payoff.

- There exists a linear form x^* such that, for all **pure strategies** τ ,

$$x^*(\mathbb{E}_s^\tau(\bar{f})) < x^*(\mathbf{q})$$

- By linearity, we obtain that for all pure strategies τ ,


$$\mathbb{E}_s^\tau(x^*(\bar{f})) < \mathbb{E}_s^\sigma(x^*(\bar{f}))$$

Lemma

Let f be **universally integrable**. For all strategies σ , there exists a **pure** strategy τ such that $\mathbb{E}_s^\sigma(f) \leq \mathbb{E}_s^\tau(f)$.

Beyond universally integrable payoffs

Example



Payoffs

- 1 reaching $t \rightsquigarrow f_1 = \mathbb{1}_{\Diamond t}$;
- 2 sum of weights $\rightsquigarrow f_2 = \sum_{\ell=0}^{\infty} w(c_{\ell})$.

- $\mathbb{E}_s^{\sigma_a}(f_2) = +\infty \implies f_2$ is **not universally integrable**.
- $\text{Pay}_s^{\text{pure}}(\bar{f}) = \{(0, +\infty)\} \cup \{(1, \ell) \mid \ell \in \mathbb{N}\}$.
 $\implies \text{conv}(\text{Pay}_s^{\text{pure}}(\bar{f})) = (\{1\} \times \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}) \cup ([0, 1[\times \{+\infty\})$.
- We have $(1, +\infty) \in \text{Pay}_s(\bar{f})$ via σ such that for all $\ell \in \mathbb{N}$:

$$\sigma(s(as)^{\ell})(a) = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{2} & \text{if } \ell \in 2^{\mathbb{N}} \\ 1 & \text{if } \ell \notin 2^{\mathbb{N}} \end{cases}$$

→ The theorem and the key lemma do not generalise.

Beyond universally integrable payoffs

Theorem (M., Randour)

Let \bar{f} be a good payoff and $s \in S$. Let $\mathbf{q} \in \text{Pay}_s(\bar{f})$.
All neighbourhoods of \mathbf{q} (in $\bar{\mathbb{R}}$) intersect $\text{conv}(\text{Pay}_s^{\text{pure}}(\bar{f}))$. In other words,
 \mathbf{q} can be approximated by **finite-support mixed strategies**.

Table of contents


- 1 Synthesis via game theory
- 2 Finite-memory strategies
- 3 Randomised strategies
- 4 Multi-objective Markov decision processes
- 5 Beyond Mealy machines**

Memory does not tell the whole story (1/2)

Counter-based strategies

Memory and **randomisation** do **not fully reflect** the complexity of a strategy.

- We consider a game with an **energy-Büchi** objective [CD12], where $W \in \mathbb{N}$.




- Need memory **exponential** in the binary encoding of W to satisfy the energy-Büchi objective.
- **Polynomial** representation with a **counter**-based approach.

Memory does not tell the whole story (2/2)

Action choices influence simplicity

Memory and **randomisation** do **not fully reflect** the complexity of a strategy.



→ Strategy σ_1 is **simpler to represent** than σ_2

- The **action choices** can impact how concise the strategy can be made.

Related challenge

How to represent and analyse **memoryless strategies** when the state space is **infinite**?

Memoryless strategies in one-counter MDPs

- We study **one-counter Markov decision processes**.
- We consider counter-based strategies with a **compact representation** that we call **interval strategies**.


Our contribution (Ajdarów, M., Novotný, Randour)

- PSPACE **verification** algorithms for interval strategies.
- PSPACE **realisability** algorithms for **structurally-constrained** interval strategies.
- Our algorithms are based on a **finite abstraction** of an **infinite system**.


One-counter Markov decision processes

One-counter MDP (OC-MDP) \mathcal{Q}

- **Finite** MDP (Q, A, δ) .
- **Weight function**
 $w: Q \times A \rightarrow \{-1, 0, 1\}$.

MDP $\mathcal{M}^{\leq \infty}(\mathcal{Q})$ induced by \mathcal{Q}

- **Countable** MDP over $S = Q \times \mathbb{N}$.
- State transitions via δ .
- Counter updates via w .



Interval strategies

We study a restricted class of **memoryless strategies** of $\mathcal{M}^{\leq \infty}(\mathcal{Q})$.

Open-ended interval strategies (OEIS)

σ is an OEIS if $\exists k_0 \in \mathbb{N}$ s.t. $\forall q \in \mathcal{Q}$ and $\forall k \geq k_0$, $\sigma(q, k) = \sigma(q, k_0)$.

\mathbb{N}_0	1	2	\dots	$k_0 - 1$	k_0	$k_0 + 1$	\dots
\mathcal{Q}	σ_1	σ_2	\dots	σ_{k_0-1}	σ_{k_0}	σ_{k_0}	\dots

Group counter values
in intervals


constant

Inter.	I_1	I_2	\dots	$I_d = \llbracket k_0, \infty \rrbracket$
\mathcal{Q}	τ_1	τ_2	\dots	$\tau_d = \sigma_{k_0}$


\rightsquigarrow **Finite partition** of
 \mathbb{N}_0 into **intervals**

Objectives

- An **objective** is a measurable set of plays.
- Let $T \subseteq Q$ be a **target**.
- We study variants of **reachability objectives**.



State reachability $\text{Reach}(T)$



Selective termination $\text{Term}(T)$

Interval strategy verification problem

Interval strategy verification problem

Decide whether $\mathbb{P}_{\mathcal{M}^{\leq \infty}(\mathcal{Q}), s_{\text{init}}}^{\sigma}(\Omega) \geq \theta$ given an **OEIS** σ , an **objective** $\Omega \in \{\text{Reach}(T), \text{Term}(T)\}$, a **threshold** $\theta \in \mathbb{Q} \cap [0, 1]$ and an **initial configuration** $s_{\text{init}} \in Q \times \mathbb{N}$.

- We construct a finite **compressed Markov chain** $\mathcal{C}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\sigma}$.
- We have formulae (in the signature $\{0, 1, +, -, \cdot, \leq\}$):
 - $\Phi_{\delta}^{\mathcal{I}}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{z}^{\sigma})$ for **transition probabilities** of $\mathcal{C}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\sigma}$;
 - $\Phi_{\Omega}^{\mathcal{I}}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y})$ for **termination probabilities** from configurations of $\mathcal{C}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\sigma}$.
- We can solve the verification problem by checking if

$$\mathbb{R} \models \forall \mathbf{x} \forall \mathbf{y} (\Phi_{\delta}^{\mathcal{I}}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{z}^{\sigma}) \wedge \Phi_{\Omega}^{\mathcal{I}}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y})) \implies y_{s_{\text{init}}} \geq \theta.$$

Conclusion

Strategy complexity can be analysed through different approaches:

- memory requirements;
- randomisation requirements;
- the existence of small strategy representations.

In a nutshell

We are interested in developing deeper insight on **strategy complexity** and studying **alternative strategy models**.

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