

The Many Faces of Strategy Complexity

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Based on joint work with

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Talk overview

Strategies are at the center of game-theoretic approaches to reactive synthesis.

Goal of this talk

Motivate and explain a **multifaceted vision** of strategy complexity.


In the second part of this talk, we will focus on:

- **randomised** strategies;
- **alternative** representations of strategies.

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Reactive synthesis through game theory




A **strategy** is a formal blueprint for a **controller of the system**.

Turn-based stochastic games

Turn-based stochastic game \mathcal{G}

- **Finite or countable** state space $S = S_1 \uplus S_1$.
- **Finite** action space A .
- **Randomised** transition function $\delta: S \times A \rightarrow \mathcal{D}(S)$.



Plays are sequences in $(SA)^\omega$ coherent with transitions.

~~ Example: $s_0as_1bs_1\dots$

Strategies

A **history** is a prefix h of a play ending in a **state**.

Strategy



A **behavioural strategy** of \mathcal{P}_i is a function $\sigma_i: \text{Hist}_i(\mathcal{G}) \rightarrow \mathcal{D}(A^{(i)})$.

- Two strategies σ_1, σ_2 and an initial state $s \rightsquigarrow$ **distribution** $\mathbb{P}_s^{\sigma_1, \sigma_2}$ over plays.
- A strategy σ_i is **pure** if $\sigma_i: \text{Hist}_i(\mathcal{G}) \rightarrow A$.
- A strategy is **memoryless** if $\sigma_i: S_i \rightarrow \mathcal{D}(A)$.

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Strategies and memory



Representation of strategies via Mealy machines with randomisation

- Set of **memory states** M ;
- initial **memory distribution** μ_{init} ;
- **next-move** function $\text{nxt}_M: M \times S_i \rightarrow \mathcal{D}(A)$;
- memory **update** function $\text{up}_M: M \times S \times A \rightarrow \mathcal{D}(M)$.

Strategy complexity via memory

- The complexity of strategies is traditionally measured by the size of their **memory**.
- Memory requirements for optimal strategies in games have been thoroughly studied.

A glimpse into known results on memory

- Characterisations and one-to-two player lifts (e.g., [GZ05; Bou+22]).
- Refining memory bounds/computing optimal bounds (e.g., [Bou+23; Mai24]).
- Trading memory for **randomisation** (e.g., [CAH04; CRR14]).

Strategy complexity in general

- Memory size does **not fully describe** the complexity of strategies.
- Other aspects also play a role in the complexity of strategies.
- **Major question:** what makes a strategy complex?

Our vision

Strategy complexity is **multifaceted**: various factors contribute to the complexity of a strategy.


- **Next step:** a brief look into **randomisation**.

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
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Mixed and behavioural strategies

- There exist different definitions of **randomised strategies**.



Behavioural strategies



Mixed strategies

- In general, these two classes of strategies are **not comparable**.
- Kuhn's theorem [Aum64]: in **games of perfect recall** any mixed strategy has an equivalent behavioural strategy and vice-versa.

What happens with finite-memory strategies?

Are all models of **finite-memory randomised strategies equivalent**?

Randomisation and finite memory [MR24]

A class of Mealy machines is denoted by XZY where $X, Y, Z \in \{D, R\}$ where D stands for deterministic and R for random, and

- X characterises initialisation,
- Y characterises the next-move function,
- Z characterises updates.




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Random strategies and multiple objectives

- We study one-player games, i.e., **Markov decision processes**, with **multiple payoffs**.
- In general, the satisfaction of multi-objective queries requires **randomised strategies**.

Main questions



- What is the relationship between expected payoffs of **pure strategies** and expected payoffs of **general strategies**?
- What **type of randomisation** do we need for multi-objective queries?

→ **Goal:** results for the **broadest possible class of payoffs**.

Multi-objective Markov decision processes

We consider **two goals**:

- reaching work under 40 minutes with **high probability**;
- minimising the **expected** time to reach work.



Payoffs

- A **payoff** is a measurable function $f: \text{Plays}(\mathcal{M}) \rightarrow \bar{\mathbb{R}}$.
- We let $\mathbb{E}_s^\sigma(f) = \int_{\pi \in \text{Plays}(\mathcal{M})} f(\pi) d\mathbb{P}_s^\sigma(\pi)$.

Which payoffs f are relevant?

- f is **good** if $\mathbb{E}_s^\sigma(f)$ is well-defined for all strategies σ and all $s \in S$.
- f is **universally integrable** payoffs: $\mathbb{E}_s^\sigma(|f|) \in \mathbb{R}$ if for all strategies σ and all $s \in S$.

For a **multi-dimensional payoff** $\bar{f} = (f_1, \dots, f_d)$ and $s \in S$, we let:

- $\text{Pay}_s(\bar{f}) = \{\mathbb{E}_s^\sigma(\bar{f}) \mid \sigma \text{ strategy}\};$
- $\text{Pay}_s^{\text{pure}}(\bar{f}) = \{\mathbb{E}_s^\sigma(\bar{f}) \mid \sigma \text{ pure strategy}\}.$

Universally integrable payoffs

In the introductory example, we had $\text{Pay}_{\text{home}}(\bar{f}) = \text{conv}(\text{Pay}_{\text{home}}^{\text{pure}}(\bar{f}))$.

When does this generalise?

Theorem ((M., Randour))

Let $\bar{f} = (f_1, \dots, f_d)$ be **universally integrable**. Then, for all states s ,

$$\text{Pay}_s(\bar{f}) = \text{conv}(\text{Pay}_s^{\text{pure}}(\bar{f})).$$

In particular, to match the expected payoff of any strategy, it suffices to:

- mix $d + 1$ **pure strategies**;
- consider strategies use **randomisation at most d** along any play.

Sequel: proof of a weaker result

If \bar{f} is universally integrable, then $\text{cl}(\text{Pay}_s(\bar{f})) = \text{cl}(\text{conv}(\text{Pay}_s^{\text{pure}}(\bar{f})))$.

Universally integrable payoffs

A simpler proof


Non-direct inclusion: $\text{Pay}_s(\bar{f}) \subseteq \text{cl}(\text{conv}(\text{Pay}_s^{\text{pure}}(\bar{f})))$.

Let σ be a strategy and $\mathbf{q} = \mathbb{E}_s^\sigma(\bar{f})$. Assume $\mathbf{q} \notin \text{cl}(\text{conv}(\text{Pay}_s^{\text{pure}}(\bar{f})))$.

Main idea: reduction to a **one-dimensional** payoff.

Theorem (Hyperplane separation theorem)

Let $D_1, D_2 \subseteq \mathbb{R}^d$ be **disjoint convex** sets. If D_1 is **closed** and D_2 is **compact**, then there exists a **linear form** $x^* : \mathbb{R}^d \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ and $\varepsilon > 0$ such that for all $\mathbf{p}_1 \in D_1$ and $\mathbf{p}_2 \in D_2$, $x^*(\mathbf{p}_1) + \varepsilon < x^*(\mathbf{p}_2)$.



Universally integrable payoffs

A simpler proof

Non-direct inclusion: $\text{Pay}_s(\bar{f}) \subseteq \text{cl}(\text{conv}(\text{Pay}_s^{\text{pure}}(\bar{f})))$.

Let σ be a strategy and $\mathbf{q} = \mathbb{E}_s^\sigma(\bar{f})$. Assume $\mathbf{q} \notin \text{cl}(\text{conv}(\text{Pay}_s^{\text{pure}}(\bar{f})))$.

Main idea: reduction to a **one-dimensional** payoff.

- There exists a linear form x^* such that, for all **pure strategies** τ ,

$$x^*(\mathbb{E}_s^\tau(\bar{f})) < x^*(\mathbf{q})$$

- By linearity, we obtain that for all pure strategies τ ,


$$\mathbb{E}_s^\tau(x^*(\bar{f})) < \mathbb{E}_s^\sigma(x^*(\bar{f}))$$

Lemma

Let f be **universally integrable**. For all strategies σ , there exists a **pure** strategy τ such that $\mathbb{E}_s^\sigma(f) \leq \mathbb{E}_s^\tau(f)$.

Beyond universally integrable payoffs

Example



Payoffs

- 1 reaching $t \rightsquigarrow f_1 = \mathbb{1}_{\Diamond t};$
- 2 sum of weights $\rightsquigarrow f_2 = \sum_{\ell=0}^{\infty} w(c_{\ell}).$

- $\mathbb{E}_s^{\sigma_a}(f_2) = +\infty \implies f_2$ is **not universally integrable**.
- $\text{Pay}_s^{\text{pure}}(\bar{f}) = \{(0, +\infty)\} \cup \{(1, \ell) \mid \ell \in \mathbb{N}\}.$
 $\implies \text{conv}(\text{Pay}_s^{\text{pure}}(\bar{f})) = (\{1\} \times \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}) \cup ([0, 1[\times \{+\infty\}).$
- We have $(1, +\infty) \in \text{Pay}_s(\bar{f})$ via σ such that for all $\ell \in \mathbb{N}$:

$$\sigma(s(as)^{\ell})(a) = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{2} & \text{if } \ell \in 2^{\mathbb{N}} \\ 1 & \text{if } \ell \notin 2^{\mathbb{N}} \end{cases}$$

→ The theorem and the key lemma do not generalise.

Beyond universally integrable payoffs

Theorem (M., Randour)

Let \bar{f} be a good payoff and $s \in S$. Let $\mathbf{q} \in \text{Pay}_s(\bar{f})$.

All neighbourhoods of \mathbf{q} (in $\bar{\mathbb{R}}$) intersect $\text{conv}(\text{Pay}_s^{\text{pure}}(\bar{f}))$. In other words, \mathbf{q} can be approximated by **finite-support mixed strategies**.

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
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Memory does not tell the whole story (1/2)

Counter-based strategies

Memory and randomisation do not fully reflect the complexity of a strategy.

- We consider a game with an energy-Büchi objective [CD12], where $W \in \mathbb{N}$.




- Need memory exponential in the binary encoding of W to satisfy the energy-Büchi objective.
- Polynomial representation with a counter-based approach.

Memory does not tell the whole story (2/2)

Action choices influence simplicity

Memory and randomisation do not fully reflect the complexity of a strategy.



→ Strategy σ_1 is simpler to represent than σ_2

- The action choices can impact how concise the strategy can be made.

Related challenge

How to represent and analyse memoryless strategies when the state space is infinite?

Memoryless strategies in one-counter MDPs

- We study **one-counter Markov decision processes**.
- We consider counter-based strategies with a **compact representation** that we call **interval strategies**.


Our contribution (Ajdarów, M., Novotný, Randour)

- PSPACE **verification** algorithms for interval strategies.
- PSPACE **realisability** algorithms for **structurally-constrained** interval strategies.
- Our algorithms are based on a **finite abstraction** of an **infinite system**.

One-counter Markov decision processes


One-counter MDP (OC-MDP) \mathcal{Q}

- Finite MDP (Q, A, δ) .
- Weight function
 $w: Q \times A \rightarrow \{-1, 0, 1\}$.



MDP $\mathcal{M}^{\leq \infty}(\mathcal{Q})$ induced by \mathcal{Q}

- Countable MDP over $S = Q \times \mathbb{N}$.
- State transitions via δ .
- Counter updates via w .



Interval strategies

We study a restricted class of **memoryless strategies** of $\mathcal{M}^{\leq\infty}(\mathcal{Q})$.

Open-ended interval strategies (OEIS)

σ is an OEIS if $\exists k_0 \in \mathbb{N}$ s.t. $\forall q \in Q$ and $\forall k \geq k_0$, $\sigma(q, k) = \sigma(q, k_0)$.

\mathbb{N}_0	1	2	\dots	$k_0 - 1$	k_0	$k_0 + 1$	\dots
Q	σ_1	σ_2	\dots	σ_{k_0-1}	σ_{k_0}	σ_{k_0}	\dots


**Group counter values
in intervals** ↴ → **constant**

Inter.	I_1	I_2	\dots	$I_d = [\![k_0, \infty]\!]$		
Q	τ_1	τ_2	\dots	$\tau_d = \sigma_{k_0}$		

↔ **Finite partition of \mathbb{N}_0 into intervals**


Objectives

- An **objective** is a measurable set of plays.
- Let $T \subseteq Q$ be a **target**.
- We study variants of **reachability objectives**.



State reachability $\text{Reach}(T)$

Selective termination $\text{Term}(T)$



Interval strategy verification problem

Interval strategy verification problem

Decide whether $\mathbb{P}_{\mathcal{M} \leq \infty(\mathcal{Q}), s_{\text{init}}}^{\sigma}(\Omega) \geq \theta$ given an **OEIS** σ , an **objective** $\Omega \in \{\text{Reach}(T), \text{Term}(T)\}$, a **threshold** $\theta \in \mathbb{Q} \cap [0, 1]$ and an **initial configuration** $s_{\text{init}} \in Q \times \mathbb{N}$.

- We construct a finite **compressed Markov chain** $\mathcal{C}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\sigma}$.
- We have formulae (in the signature $\{0, 1, +, -, \cdot, \leq\}$):
 - $\Phi_{\delta}^{\mathcal{I}}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{z}^{\sigma})$ for **transition probabilities** of $\mathcal{C}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\sigma}$;
 - $\Phi_{\Omega}^{\mathcal{I}}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y})$ for **termination probabilities** from configurations of $\mathcal{C}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\sigma}$.
- We can solve the verification problem by checking if

$$\mathbb{R} \models \forall \mathbf{x} \forall \mathbf{y} (\Phi_{\delta}^{\mathcal{I}}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{z}^{\sigma}) \wedge \Phi_{\Omega}^{\mathcal{I}}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y})) \implies y_{s_{\text{init}}} \geq \theta.$$

Conclusion

Strategy complexity can be analysed through different approaches:

- memory requirements;
- randomisation requirements;
- the existence of small strategy representations.

In a nutshell

We are interested in developing deeper insight on **strategy complexity** and studying **alternative strategy models**.

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