

# Alexander P. Hansak

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## RESEARCH INTERESTS

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Primary      Macroeconomics  
Secondary    Computational Economics, Heterogeneous Agent Macroeconomics, Wealth Inequality,  
Consumer Debt, Quantitative Modelling

## EDUCATION

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2018 – 2023 (expected)      **PhD in Economics**, *Vienna Graduate School of Economics, University of Vienna*  
Supervisors: Michael Reiter and Alejandro Cuñat  
2016 – 2018      **MSc in Political and Empirical Economics**, *University of Graz*  
1<sup>st</sup> place in SOWI-Ranking of best master's students  
2013 – 2016      **B.A. in Economics**, *University of Graz*  
2014 – 2023 (expected)      **BSc in Mathematics**, *University of Vienna and Technical University Graz*  
Specialisation: Financial Mathematics  
2013 – 2015      **Diploma programme: Law**, *University of Graz (Discontinued)*

## REFERENCES

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**Michael Reiter**  
Dept. of Economics and Finance  
IHS, Vienna  
[mreiter@ihs.ac.at](mailto:mreiter@ihs.ac.at)

**Alejandro Cuñat**  
Department of Economics  
University of Vienna  
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## JOB MARKET PAPER

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### [Quantifying the Effects of Basic Income Programs in the Presence of Automation](#)

The trend towards increasing automation and robotization is a challenge for the labor market, especially for the demand for low skilled labor. Concepts of a Universal Basic Income (UBI) are often brought up as potential reforms to current welfare systems which could provide additional insurance against this trend. I develop a quantitative theory of the labor market where firms endogenously decide on their investment in robots, while workers can insure themselves against the risk of automation induced job-loss by obtaining a college degree. This framework allows for an analysis of the interaction between unconditional transfers and automation and reveals a negative relationship between the generosity of the basic income and the investment in robots. UBI lowers the effective marginal tax rates for unemployed and reduces the incentives for obtaining a college degree. Both effects lead to an increase in participation and search effort in the automation sector and investment in robots is discouraged while employment increases. Concerning worker welfare, my framework highlights a generational conflict: When comparing stationary equilibria, workers would always prefer being born into an economy without a basic income. However, older cohorts who are already alive during the introduction of the basic income can expect welfare gains during the transition to the new equilibrium.

## WORKING PAPERS

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### "Naïve Consumers and Financial Mistakes" with Florian Exler (University of Vienna)

Financial contracts are complicated and consumers often do not grasp them in their entirety. This may lead to financial mistakes. We develop a quantitative theory of unsecured credit and equilibrium default where borrowers can sign debt contracts that trade off interest rates for penalty fees. These fees make unforeseen financial shocks - such as paying late or borrowing over limit - costly. The economy is populated with sophisticated and naïve borrowers. Naïves face higher financial uncertainty without internalizing this fact. They make financial mistakes as they choose inefficiently high penalty fees. In equilibrium, these fees cross-subsidize interest rates for sophisticates. We use this framework to analyze two unexplored features of the CARD act: transparency requirements and penalty fee limits. More transparency leads to less financial uncertainty for naïve borrowers, while fee limits constrain everyone. Policies reduce financial mistakes and increase the welfare of naïves. The effects on sophisticates, in contrast, are negative: If naïves make fewer mistakes due to clearer language, sophisticates lose cross-subsidization and experience welfare losses. The same holds true in the case of fee limits. When high-fee contracts are banned, expected revenue from naïve fee payments falls and interest rates rise. As a result, sophisticates experience a welfare loss.

### "The Distributional Effects of Tax Evasion"

This paper quantifies and discusses the distributional effects of tax evasion. I set up a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous households, who can invest in their own business and pay capital gains taxes on realized gains. However, these capital taxes can be evaded by under-reporting the real tax base, which bears the risk of being detected and having to pay a punishment fee. The model parameters are first calibrated to Scandinavia to exploit the rich estimates on tax evasion for Norway, Sweden and Denmark and is then taken to the US. The benchmark economy exhibits high wealth inequality as reported for the US and leads to a realistic evasion behavior. A counterfactual analysis then shows that if individuals can try to evade some of their tax payments, wealth inequality is higher under a tax regime with positive capital gains taxes. Comparing welfare, however, I find that the socially optimal tax rate is still strictly positive.

## TEACHING EXPERIENCE

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2021 - 2023	Introductory Econometrics (MSc, English), Teaching Assistant to Prof. Nikolaus Hautsch, <i>University of Vienna</i>
2020 – 2021	Dynamic Macroeconomics with Numerics (MSc, English), Teaching Assistant to Prof. Monika Gehrig-Merz, <i>University of Vienna</i>
2019 – 2021	Growth and Business Cycles (MSc, English), Teaching Assistant to Prof. Gerhard Sorger, <i>University of Vienna</i>
2016 - 2018	Tutorial for Econometrics 2 (BA, English/German), Student Assistant, <i>University of Graz</i>
2016 - 2018	Tutorial for Econometrics 1 (BA, English/German), Student Assistant, <i>University of Graz</i>

## FELLOWSHIPS, GRANTS AND AWARDS

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2021 – 2023	Two-year DOC-Fellowship of the Austrian Academy of Science
2021	Anniversary Fund, Austrian National Bank (project leader: Florian Exler)

2018 – 2021	Three-year Fellowship, Vienna Graduate School of Economics
2018	1 <sup>st</sup> place in SOWI-Ranking (best master's students) at the University of Graz
2015 - 2018	Merit-based scholarships at the University of Graz
2012	Ferdinand-Tremel-Medal for school thesis about the Great Depression
2009	2 <sup>nd</sup> price at the 40 <sup>th</sup> Austrian Olympiad in Mathematics

## PRESENTATIONS & WORKSHOPS

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2022	Young Economist Conference 2022 hosted by the Chamber of Labour Vienna, QED Jamboree at the University of Vienna, Annual Meeting of the Austrian Economic Association (NOeG meeting, Vienna), Poster-Session at the 2022 Vienna Macro Café at the Institute of Advanced Studies (Vienna), Vienna PhD Workshop at the Central European University
2021	2021 Annual Meeting of the Austrian Economic Association (NOeG meeting, Vienna)
2020	Young Economist Conference 2020 hosted by the Chamber of Labour Vienna
2019	Poster Session at the Vienna Macroeconomics Workshop (IHS), Vienna

## COMPETENCES

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**Software:** R, Matlab, LaTeX, C++, Kotlin, MS Office

**Languages:** German (native), English (fluent), French (intermediate), Spanish (elementary)