

I.<sup>b</sup>

On the difference between pure and empirical cognition.

There is no doubt whatever that all our cognition begins with experience; for how else should the cognitive faculty be awakened into exercise if not through objects that stimulate our senses and in part themselves produce representations, in part bring the activity of our understanding into motion to compare these, to connect or separate them, and thus to work up the raw material of sensible impressions into a cognition of objects that is called experience?<sup>7</sup> **As far as time is concerned**, then, no cognition in us precedes experience, and with experience every cognition begins.

But although all our cognition commences **with** experience, yet it does not on that account all arise **from** experience. For it could well be that even our experiential cognition is a composite of that which we receive through impressions and that which our own cognitive faculty (merely prompted by sensible impressions) provides out of itself, which addition we cannot distinguish from that fundamental material until long practice has made us attentive to it and skilled in separating it out.

It is therefore at least a question requiring closer investigation, and one not to be dismissed at first glance, whether there is any such cognition independent of all experience and even of all impressions of the senses. One calls such **cognitions *a priori***,<sup>c</sup> and distinguishes them from **empirical** ones, which have their sources *a posteriori*, namely in experience.<sup>8</sup>

The former expression<sup>d</sup> is nevertheless not yet sufficiently determinate to designate the whole sense of the question before us. For it is customary to say of many a cognition derived from experiential sources that we are capable of it or partake in it *a priori*, because we do not derive it

<sup>a</sup> As in the second edition.

<sup>b</sup> Sections I and II (B I–6) replace the first two paragraphs of Section I in the first edition (A I–2).

<sup>c</sup> Normally set in roman type, here emphasized by Kant by the use of italics.

<sup>d</sup> That is, "*a priori*."

immediately from experience, but rather from a general rule that we have nevertheless itself borrowed from experience. So one says of someone who undermined the foundation of his house that he could have known *a priori* that it would collapse, i.e., he need not have waited for the experience of it actually collapsing. Yet he could not have known this entirely *a priori*.<sup>9</sup> For that bodies are heavy and hence fall if their support is taken away must first have become known to him through experience.

In the sequel therefore we will understand by *a priori* cognitions not those that occur independently of this or that experience, but rather those that occur *absolutely* independently of all experience. Opposed to them are empirical cognitions, or those that are possible only *a posteriori*, i.e., through experience. Among *a priori* cognitions, however, those are called **pure** with which nothing empirical is intermixed. Thus, e.g., the proposition "Every alteration has its cause" is an *a priori* proposition, only not pure, since alteration is a concept that can be drawn only from experience.<sup>10</sup>

B 3

## II.

We are in possession of certain *a priori* cognitions, and even the common understanding is never without them.

At issue here is a mark by means of which we can securely distinguish a pure cognition from an empirical one.<sup>11</sup> Experience teaches us, to be sure, that something is constituted thus and so, but not that it could not be otherwise. **First**, then, if a proposition is thought along with its **necessity**, it is an *a priori* judgment; if it is, moreover, also not derived from any proposition except one that in turn is valid as a necessary proposition, then it is absolutely *a priori*. **Second**: Experience never gives its judgments true or strict but only assumed and comparative **universality** (through induction), so properly it must be said: as far as we have yet perceived, there is no exception to this or that rule. Thus if a judgment is thought in strict universality, i.e., in such a way that no exception at all is allowed to be possible, then it is not derived from experience, but is rather valid absolutely *a priori*. Empirical universality is therefore only an arbitrary increase in validity from that which holds in most cases to that which holds in all, as in, e.g., the proposition "All bodies are heavy," whereas strict universality belongs to a judgment essentially; this points to a special source of cognition for it, namely a faculty of *a priori* cognition. Necessity and strict universality are therefore secure indications<sup>a</sup> of an *a priori* cognition, and also belong together in-

B 4

<sup>a</sup> Kennzeichen

separably. But since in their use it is sometimes easier to show the empirical limitation in judgments than the contingency in them, or is often more plausible to show the unrestricted universality that we ascribe to a judgment than its necessity, it is advisable to employ separately these two criteria, each of which is in itself infallible.<sup>12</sup>

B 5 Now it is easy to show that in human cognition there actually are such necessary and in the strictest sense universal, thus pure *a priori* judgments. If one wants an example from the sciences, one need only look at all the propositions of mathematics; if one would have one from the commonest use of the understanding, the proposition that every alteration must have a cause will do; indeed in the latter the very concept of a cause so obviously contains the concept of a necessity of connection with an effect and a strict universality of rule that it would be entirely lost if one sought, as Hume did, to derive it from a frequent association of that which happens with that which precedes and a habit (thus a merely subjective necessity) of connecting representations arising from that association.<sup>13</sup> Even without requiring such examples for the proof of the reality of pure *a priori* principles in our cognition, one could establish their indispensability for the possibility of experience itself, thus establish it *a priori*. For where would experience itself get its certainty if all rules in accordance with which it proceeds were themselves in turn always empirical, thus contingent?;<sup>a</sup> hence one could hardly allow these to count as first principles. Yet here we can content ourselves with having displayed the pure use of our cognitive faculty as a fact together with its indication.<sup>b</sup> Not merely in judgments, however, but even in concepts is an origin of some of them revealed *a priori*. Gradually remove from your experiential concept of a **body** everything that is empirical in it – the color, the hardness or softness, the weight, even the impenetrability – there still remains the **space** that was occupied by the body (which has now entirely disappeared),  
B 6 and you cannot leave that out. Likewise, if you remove from your empirical concept of every object,<sup>c</sup> whether corporeal or incorporeal, all those properties of which experience teaches you, you could still not take from it that by means of which you think of it as a **substance** or as **dependent** on a substance (even though this concept contains more determination than that of an object<sup>d</sup> in general). Thus, convinced by the necessity with which this concept presses itself on you, you must concede that it has its seat in your faculty of cognition *a priori*.

<sup>a</sup> Question mark not in original.

<sup>b</sup> *Kennzeichen*, i.e., sign.

<sup>c</sup> *Objects*

<sup>d</sup> *Objects*

III.<sup>a</sup>

Philosophy needs a science that determines the possibility, the principles,<sup>b</sup> and the domain of all cognitions *a priori*.

But what says still more than all the foregoing<sup>c</sup> is this, that certain cognitions even abandon the field of all possible experiences, and seem to expand the domain of our judgments beyond all bounds of experience through concepts to which no corresponding object at all can be given in experience. A 3

And precisely in these latter cognitions, which go beyond the world of the senses, where experience can give neither guidance nor correction, lie the investigations of our reason that we hold to be far more preeminent in their importance and sublime in their final aim than everything that the understanding can learn in the field of appearances, in which we would rather venture everything, even at the risk of erring, than give up such important investigations because of any sort of reservation or from contempt and indifference. <sup>d</sup>These unavoidable problems of pure reason itself are **God, freedom and immortality**. But the science whose final aim in all its preparations is directed properly only to the solution of these problems is called **metaphysics**, whose procedure is in the beginning **dogmatic**, i.e., it confidently takes on the execution of this task without an antecedent examination of the capacity or incapacity<sup>e</sup> of reason for such a great undertaking. B 7

Now it may seem natural that as soon as one has abandoned the terrain of experience one would not immediately erect an edifice with cognitions that one possesses without knowing whence, and on the credit of principles whose origin one does not know, without having first assured oneself of its foundation through careful investigations, thus that one would all the more<sup>f</sup> have long since raised the question how the understanding could come to all these cognitions *a priori* and what domain, validity, and value they might have. And in fact nothing is more natural, if one understands by the word **natural**<sup>g</sup> that which properly and reasonably ought to happen; but if one understands by it that which usually happens, then conversely nothing is more natural and compre- A 4 B 8

<sup>a</sup> This section number and title added in the second edition. The ensuing paragraph commences the first part of the introduction common to both editions, extending from here to B 14, though with one major interpolation in the next paragraph and another change at B 11–12.

<sup>b</sup> *Principien*

<sup>c</sup> “than all the foregoing” added in the second edition.

<sup>d</sup> The remainder of this paragraph added in the second edition.

<sup>e</sup> *des Vermögens oder Unvermögens*

<sup>f</sup> “*vielmehr*” added in the second edition.

<sup>g</sup> “*dem Wort natürlich*” substituted for “*unter diesem Worte*” in the second edition.

hensible than that this investigation should long have been neglected.<sup>a</sup> For one part of these cognitions, the mathematical, has long been reliable, and thereby gives rise to a favorable expectation about others as well, although these may be of an entirely different nature. Furthermore, if one is beyond the circle of experience, then one is sure of not being refuted<sup>b</sup> through experience. The charm in expanding one's cognitions is so great that one can be stopped in one's progress only by bumping into a clear contradiction. This, however, one can avoid if one makes his inventions carefully, even though they are not thereby inventions any the less. Mathematics gives us a splendid example of how far we can go with *a priori* cognition independently of experience. Now it is occupied, to be sure, with objects and cognitions only so far as these can be exhibited in intuitions. This circumstance, however, is easily overlooked, since the intuition in question can itself be given *a priori*, and thus can hardly be distinguished from a mere pure concept.

- A5 Captivated<sup>c</sup> by such a proof of the power of reason, the drive for expansion sees no bounds. The light dove, in free flight cutting through the air the resistance of which it feels, could get the idea<sup>d</sup> that it could  
 B9 do even better in airless space. Likewise, Plato abandoned the world of the senses because it set such narrow limits<sup>e</sup> for the understanding, and dared to go beyond it on the wings of the ideas, in the empty space of pure understanding. He did not notice that he made no headway by his efforts, for he had no resistance, no support, as it were, by which he could stiffen himself, and to which he could apply his powers in order to put his understanding into motion. It is, however, a customary fate of human reason in speculation to finish its edifice as early as possible and only then to investigate whether the ground has been adequately prepared for it. But at that point all sorts of excuses will be sought to assure us of its sturdiness or also, even better,<sup>f</sup> to refuse such a late and dangerous examination. What keeps us free of all worry and suspicion during the construction, however, and flatters us with apparent thoroughness, is this. A great part, perhaps the greatest part, of the business of our reason consists in *analyses* of the concepts that we already have of objects. This affords us a multitude of cognitions that, although they are nothing more than illuminations or clarifications of that which is already thought in our concepts (though still in a confused way), are, at  
 A6 least as far as their form is concerned, treasured as if they were new in-

<sup>a</sup> The second edition reads "*lange*" instead of "*lange Zeit*."

<sup>b</sup> The second edition reads "*widerlegt*" instead of "*widersprochen*."

<sup>c</sup> The second edition reads "*eingenommen*" instead of "*aufgemuntert*."

<sup>d</sup> *Vorstellung*

<sup>e</sup> The second edition reads "*so enge Schranken setzt*" instead of "*so vielfältige Hindernisse legt*."

<sup>f</sup> The second edition inserts the words "*auch*" and "*lieber gar*."

sights, though they do not extend the concepts that we have in either matter or content, but only set them apart from each other. Now since this procedure does yield a real *a priori* cognition, which makes secure and useful progress, reason, without itself noticing it, under these pretenses surreptitiously makes assertions of quite another sort, in which reason adds something entirely alien to given concepts and indeed<sup>a</sup> does so *a priori*, without one knowing how it was able to do this and without such a<sup>b</sup> question even being allowed to come to mind. I will therefore deal with the distinction between these two sorts of cognition right at the outset.

B 10

IV.<sup>c</sup>On the difference between analytic and synthetic judgments.<sup>14</sup>

In all judgments in which the relation of a subject to the predicate is thought (if I consider only affirmative judgments, since the application to negative ones is easy) this relation is possible in two different ways. Either the predicate *B* belongs to the subject *A* as something that is (covertly) contained in this concept *A*; or *B* lies entirely outside the concept *A*, though to be sure it stands in connection with it. In the first case I call the judgment **analytic**, in the second **synthetic**. Analytic judgments (affirmative ones) are thus those in which the connection of the predicate is thought through identity, but those in which this connection is thought without identity are to be called synthetic judgments. One could also call the former **judgments of clarification**, and the latter **judgments of amplification**,<sup>d</sup> since through the predicate the former do not add anything to the concept of the subject, but only break it up by means of analysis into its component concepts, which were already thought in it (though confusedly); while the latter, on the contrary, add to the concept of the subject a predicate that was not thought in it at all, and could not have been extracted from it through any analysis. E.g., if I say: "All bodies are extended," then this is an analytic judgment. For I do not need to go beyond<sup>e</sup> the concept that I combine with the body<sup>f</sup> in order to find that extension is connected with it, but rather I need only to analyze that concept, i.e., become conscious of the manifold that I always think in it, in order to encounter this predicate therein; it is therefore an analytic judgment. On the contrary, if I say:

A 7

B 11

<sup>a</sup> The second edition adds the words "und zwar."

<sup>b</sup> The second edition replaces "*diese*" with "*eine solche*."

<sup>c</sup> Section number "IV" added in the second edition.

<sup>d</sup> "*Erläuterungs-*" and "*Erweiterungsurteile*."

<sup>e</sup> The second edition reads "*über*" instead of "*aus*."

<sup>f</sup> The second edition reads "*dem Körper*" instead of "*dem Wort Körper*."

"All bodies are heavy," then the predicate is something entirely different from that which I think in the mere concept of a body in general. The addition of such a predicate thus yields a synthetic judgment.

- "Judgments of experience, as such, are all synthetic."** For it would be absurd to ground an analytic judgment on experience, since I do not need to go beyond my concept at all in order to formulate the judgment, and therefore need no testimony from experience for that. That a body is extended is a proposition that is established *a priori*, and is not a judgment of experience. For before I go to experience, I already have all the conditions for my judgment in the concept, from which I merely draw out the predicate in accordance with the principle of contradiction, and can thereby at the same time become conscious of the necessity of the judgment, which experience could never teach me. On the contrary, although I <sup>b</sup>do not at all include the predicate of weight in the concept of a body in general, the concept nevertheless designates an object of experience<sup>c</sup> through a part of it, to which I can therefore add still other parts of the same experience as belonging with the former. I can first cognize the concept of body analytically through the marks of extension, of impenetrability, of shape, etc., which are all thought in this concept. But now I amplify my cognition and, looking back to the experience from which I had extracted this concept of body, I find that weight is also always connected with the previous marks, <sup>d</sup>and I therefore add this synthetically as predicate to that concept. It is thus experience <sup>e</sup>on which the possibility of the synthesis of the predicate of weight with the concept of body is grounded, since both concepts, though the one is not contained in the other, nevertheless belong together, though only contingently, as parts of a whole, namely experience, which is itself a synthetic combination of intuitions.
- <sup>f</sup>But in synthetic *a priori* judgments this means of help is entirely lacking.<sup>15</sup> If I am to go beyond<sup>g</sup> the concept *A* in order to cognize another *B* as combined with it, what is it on which I depend and by means of which the synthesis becomes possible, since I here do not have the advantage of looking around for it in the field of experience? Take the proposition: "Everything that happens has its cause." In the concept of

<sup>a</sup> The first part of the following paragraph replaces two paragraphs in the first edition; see A7–8 above.

<sup>b</sup> The text common to the first edition resumes here.

<sup>c</sup> The second edition has "*einen Gegenstand der Erfahrung*" instead of the first edition's "*die vollständige Erfahrung*."

<sup>d</sup> The remainder of this sentence is added in the second edition.

<sup>e</sup> The remainder of this sentence is modified and expanded in the second edition.

<sup>f</sup> The common text resumes here.

<sup>g</sup> "*über*" substituted in the second edition for "*ausser*" in the first.

something that happens, I think, to be sure, of an existence that was preceded by a time, etc., and from that analytic judgments can be drawn. But the concept of a cause lies entirely outside that concept, and<sup>a</sup> indicates something different than the concept of what happens in general, and is therefore<sup>b</sup> not contained in the latter representation at all. How then do I come to say something quite different about that which happens in general, and to cognize the concept of cause as belonging to it, indeed necessarily,<sup>c</sup> even though not contained in it?<sup>d</sup> What is the unknown =<sup>e</sup>X here on which the understanding depends when it believes itself to discover beyond the concept of A a predicate that is foreign to it yet which it nevertheless believes to be connected with it?<sup>f</sup> It cannot be experience, for the principle that has been adduced adds the latter representations to the former not only with greater generality than experience can provide, but also with the expression of necessity, hence entirely *a priori* and from mere concepts. Now the entire final aim of our speculative *a priori* cognition rests on such synthetic, i.e., ampliative principles; for the analytic ones are, to be sure, most important and necessary, but only for attaining that distinctness of concepts which is requisite for a secure and extended synthesis as a really new acquisition.<sup>g</sup>

A 10

B 14

<sup>b</sup>V.

Synthetic *a priori* judgments are contained as principles<sup>i</sup>  
in all theoretical sciences of reason.

<sup>j</sup>1. **Mathematical judgments are all synthetic.**<sup>16</sup> This proposition seems to have escaped the notice of the analysts of human reason until now, indeed to be diametrically opposed to all of their conjectures, although it is incontrovertibly certain and is very important in the sequel. For since one found that the inferences of the mathematicians all proceed in accordance with the principle of contradiction (which is re-

<sup>a</sup> “*liegt ganz außer jenem Begriffe, und*” added in the second edition.

<sup>b</sup> “*ist also*” in the second edition instead of “*und ist*” in the first.

<sup>c</sup> “*und so gar notwendig*” added in the second edition.

<sup>d</sup> Kant ends this and the next sentence with periods, for which we have substituted question marks.

<sup>e</sup> “*unbekannte =*” added in the second edition.

<sup>f</sup> In the second edition, “*welches er gleichwohl damit verknüpft zu sein erachtet?*” substituted for “*das gleichwohl damit verknüpft sei.*”

<sup>g</sup> In the second edition, “*Erwerb*” replaces “*Anbau.*”

<sup>h</sup> At this point one paragraph from the first edition is omitted and replaced with the following Sections V and VI, B 14 through B 25.

<sup>i</sup> *Principien*

<sup>j</sup> Kant adapts the following five paragraphs from the *Prolegomena*, § 2 (4:268–9).



quired by the nature of any apodictic certainty), one was persuaded that the principles could also be cognized from the principle<sup>a</sup> of contradiction, in which, however, they<sup>b</sup> erred; for a synthetic proposition can of course be comprehended in accordance with the principle of contradiction, but only insofar as another synthetic proposition is presupposed from which it can be deduced, never in itself.

B 15 It must first be remarked that properly mathematical propositions are always *a priori* judgments and are never empirical, because they carry necessity with them, which cannot be derived from experience. But if one does not want to concede this, well then, I will restrict my proposition to **pure mathematics**, the concept of which already implies that it does not contain empirical but merely pure *a priori* cognition.

To be sure, one might initially think that the proposition " $7 + 5 = 12$ " is a merely analytic proposition that follows from the concept of a sum of seven and five in accordance with the principle of contradiction. Yet if one considers it more closely, one finds that the concept of the sum of 7 and 5 contains nothing more than the unification of both numbers in a single one, through which it is not at all thought what this single number is which comprehends the two of them. The concept of twelve is by no means already thought merely by my thinking of that unification of seven and five, and no matter how long I analyze my concept of such a possible sum I will still not find twelve in it. One must go beyond these concepts, seeking assistance in the intuition that corresponds to one of the two, one's five fingers, say, or (as in Segner's arithmetic)<sup>17</sup> five points, and one after another add the units of the five given in the intuition to the concept of seven. 'For I take first the number 7, and, as I take the fingers of my hand as an intuition for assistance with the concept of 5, to that image of mine I now add the units that I have previously taken together in order to constitute the number 5 one after another to the number 7, and thus see the number 12 arise. That 7 **should** be added to 5 I have, to be sure, thought in the concept of a sum  $= 7 + 5$ , but not that this sum is equal to the number 12. The arithmetical proposition is therefore always synthetic; one becomes all the more distinctly aware of that if one takes somewhat larger numbers, for it is then clear that, twist and turn our concepts as we will, without getting help from intuition we could never find the sum by means of the mere analysis of our concepts.

B 16

<sup>a</sup> Satz

<sup>b</sup> Kant switches number from "*man*" to "*sie*."

<sup>c</sup> This and the following sentence are substituted here for the clause "*Man erweitert also wirklich seinen Begriff durch diesen Satz  $7 + 5 = 12$  und thut zu dem ersteren Begriff einen neuen hinzu, der in jenem gar nicht gedacht war*" (One therefore really amplifies his concept through this proposition " $7 + 5 = 12$ " and adds a new concept to the former, which was not thought in it) in the *Prolegomena* (4:269).

Just as little is any principle of pure geometry analytic. That the straight line between two points is the shortest is a synthetic proposition. For my concept of **the straight** contains nothing of quantity, but only a quality.<sup>18</sup> The concept of the shortest is therefore entirely additional to it, and cannot be extracted out of the concept of the straight line by any analysis. Help must here be gotten from intuition, by means of which alone the synthesis is possible.

To be sure, a few principles that the geometers presuppose are actually analytic and rest on the principle of contradiction; but they also<sup>a</sup> only serve, as identical propositions, for the chain of method and not as principles,<sup>b</sup> e.g.,  $a = a$ , the whole is equal to itself, or  $(a + b) > a$ , i.e., the whole is greater than its part. And yet even these, although they are valid in accordance with mere concepts, are admitted in mathematics only because they can be exhibited in intuition.<sup>19</sup> What usually makes us believe here that the predicate of such apodictic judgments already lies in our concept, and that the judgment is therefore analytic, is merely the ambiguity of the expression. We **should**, namely, add a certain predicate to a given concept in thought, and this necessity already attaches to the concepts. But the question is not what we **should think** in addition to the given concept, but what we **actually think** in it, though only obscurely, and there it is manifest that the predicate certainly adheres to those concepts necessarily, though not as thought in the concept itself,<sup>c</sup> but by means of an intuition that must be added to the concept.

B 17

2. **Natural science (*Physica*) contains within itself synthetic *a priori* judgments as principles.**<sup>d</sup> I will adduce only a couple of propositions as examples, such as the proposition that in all alterations of the corporeal world the quantity of matter remains unaltered, or that in all communication of motion effect and counter-effect must always be equal. In both of these not only the necessity, thus their *a priori* origin, but also that they are synthetic propositions is clear. For in the concept of matter I do not think persistence, but only its presence in space through the filling of space. Thus I actually go beyond the concept of matter in order to add something to it *a priori* that I did not think **in it**. The proposition is thus not analytic, but synthetic, and nevertheless thought *a priori*, and likewise with the other propositions of the pure part of natural science.

B 18

3. **In metaphysics**, even if one regards it as a science that has thus far

<sup>a</sup> "*auch*" added to text from *Prolegomena* (4:269).

<sup>b</sup> *Principien*

<sup>c</sup> "*als im Begriffe selbst gedacht*" substituted here for the word "*unmittelbar*" in the *Prolegomena* (4:269).

<sup>d</sup> *Principien*

merely been sought but is nevertheless indispensable because of the nature of human reason, **synthetic *a priori* cognitions** are supposed to **be contained**, and it is not concerned merely with analyzing concepts that we make of things *a priori* and thereby clarifying them analytically, but we want to amplify our cognition *a priori*; to this end we must make use of such principles that add something to the given concepts that was not contained in them, and through synthetic *a priori* judgments go so far beyond that experience itself cannot follow us that far, e.g., in the proposition “The world must have a first beginning,” and others besides, and thus metaphysics, at least as far as **its end is concerned**, consists of purely synthetic *a priori* propositions.<sup>20</sup>

B 19

## VI.

The general problem<sup>a</sup> of pure reason.<sup>21</sup>

One has already gained a great deal if one can bring a multitude of investigations under the formula of a single problem. For one thereby not only lightens one's own task, by determining it precisely, but also the judgment of anyone else who wants to examine whether we have satisfied our plan or not. The real problem of pure reason is now contained in the question: **How are synthetic judgments *a priori* possible?**

B 20

That metaphysics has until now remained in such a vacillating state of uncertainty and contradictions is to be ascribed solely to the cause that no one has previously thought of this problem and perhaps even of the distinction between **analytic** and **synthetic** judgments. On the solution of this problem, or on a satisfactory proof that the possibility that it demands to have explained does not in fact exist at all, metaphysics now stands or falls. David Hume, who among all philosophers came closest to this problem, still did not conceive of it anywhere near determinately enough and in its universality, but rather stopped with the synthetic proposition of the connection of the effect with its cause (*Principium causalitatis*), believing himself to have brought out that such an *a priori* proposition is entirely impossible, and according to his inferences everything that we call metaphysics would come down to a mere delusion of an alleged insight of reason into that which has in fact merely been borrowed from experience and from habit has taken on the appearance of necessity; an assertion, destructive of all pure philosophy, on which he would never have fallen if he had had our problem in its generality before his eyes, since then he would have comprehended that according to his argument there could also be no pure mathematics, since this certainly contains synthetic *a priori* propositions, an assertion

<sup>a</sup> Aufgabe

from which his sound understanding would surely have protected him.<sup>22</sup>

In the solution of the above problem there is at the same time contained the possibility of the pure use of reason in the grounding and execution of all sciences that contain a theoretical *a priori* cognition of objects, i.e., the answer to the questions:

**How is pure mathematics possible?**

**How is pure natural science possible?**

About these sciences, since they are actually given, it can appropriately be asked **how** they are possible; for that they must be possible is proved through their actuality.\* As far as **metaphysics** is concerned, however, its poor progress up to now, and the fact that of no metaphysics thus far expounded can it even be said that, as far as its essential end is concerned, it even really exists, leaves everyone with ground to doubt its possibility.

B 2 I

But now this **kind of cognition** is in a certain sense also to be regarded as given, and metaphysics is actual, if not as a science yet as a natural predisposition (*metaphysica naturalis*). For human reason, without being moved by the mere vanity of knowing it all, inexorably pushes on, driven by its own need to such questions that cannot be answered by any experiential use of reason and of principles<sup>a</sup> borrowed from such a use; and thus a certain sort of metaphysics has actually been present in all human beings as soon as reason has extended itself to speculation in them, and it will also always remain there. And now about this too the question is: **How is metaphysics as a natural predisposition possible?** i.e., how do the questions that pure reason raises, and which it is driven by its own need to answer as well as it can, arise from the nature of universal human reason?

B 2 2

But since unavoidable contradictions have always been found in all previous attempts to answer these natural questions, e.g., whether the world has a beginning or exists from eternity, etc., one cannot leave it up to the mere natural predisposition to metaphysics, i.e., to the pure faculty of reason itself, from which, to be sure, some sort of metaphysics (whatever it might be) always grows, but it must be possible to bring it

\* Some may still doubt this last point in the case of pure natural science. Yet one need merely consider the various propositions that come forth at the outset of proper (empirical) physics, such as those of the persistence of the same quantity of matter, of inertia, of the equality of effect and counter-effect, etc., and one will quickly be convinced that they constitute a *physica pura* (or *rationalis*), which well deserves to be separately established, as a science of its own, in its whole domain, whether narrow or wide.

B 2 I

<sup>a</sup> *Principien*

to certainty regarding either the knowledge or ignorance of objects, i.e., to come to a decision either about the objects of its questions or about the capacity and incapacity<sup>d</sup> of reason for judging something about them, thus either reliably to extend our pure reason or else to set determinate and secure limits for it. This last question, which flows from the general problem above, would rightly be this: **How is metaphysics possible as science?**

B 23 The critique of reason thus finally leads necessarily to science; the dogmatic use of it without critique, on the contrary, leads to groundless assertions, to which one can oppose equally plausible ones, thus to **skepticism**.

Further, this science cannot be terribly extensive, for it does not deal with objects<sup>b</sup> of reason, whose multiplicity<sup>c</sup> is infinite, but merely with itself, with problems that spring entirely from its own womb, and that are not set before it by the nature of things that are distinct from it but through its own nature; so that, once it has become completely familiar with its own capacity<sup>d</sup> in regard to the objects that may come before it in experience, then it must become easy to determine, completely and securely, the domain and the bounds of its attempted use beyond all bounds of experience.

B 24 Thus one can and must regard as undone all attempts made until now to bring about a metaphysics **dogmatically**; for what is analytic in one or the other of them, namely the mere analysis of the concepts that inhabit our reason *a priori*, is not the end at all, but only a preparation for metaphysics proper, namely extending its *a priori* cognition synthetically, and it is useless for this end, because it merely shows what is contained in these concepts, but not how we attain such concepts *a priori* in order thereafter to be able to determine their valid use in regard to the objects of all cognition in general. It also requires only a little self-denial in order to give up all these claims, since the contradictions of reason, which cannot be denied and which are also unavoidable in dogmatic procedure, have long since destroyed the authority of every previous metaphysics. More resolution will be necessary in order not to be deterred by internal difficulty and external resistance from using another approach,<sup>e</sup> entirely opposed to the previous one, in order to promote the productive and fruitful growth of a science that is indispensable for human reason, and from which one can chop down every stem that has shot up without ever being able to eradicate its root.

<sup>a</sup> *Vermögen und Unvermögen*

<sup>b</sup> *Objecten*

<sup>c</sup> *Mannigfaltigkeit*

<sup>d</sup> *Vermögen*

<sup>e</sup> *Behandlung*

<sup>a</sup>VII.

The idea and division of a special science  
under the name of a critique of pure reason.

Now from all of this there results the idea of a special science, which A 11  
can be called the **critique of pure reason**.<sup>b</sup> For<sup>c</sup> reason is the faculty  
that provides the principles<sup>d</sup> of cognition *a priori*. Hence pure reason is  
that which contains the principles<sup>e</sup> for cognizing something absolutely  
*a priori*. An **organon** of pure reason would be a sum total of all those B 25  
principles<sup>f</sup> in accordance with which all pure *a priori* cognitions can be  
acquired and actually brought about. The exhaustive application of  
such an organon would create a system of pure reason. But since that  
requires a lot, and it is still an open question whether such an amplifi-  
cation of our knowledge is possible at all and in what cases it would be  
possible, we can regard a science of the mere estimation of pure reason,  
of its sources and boundaries, as the **propaedeutic** to the system of  
pure reason. Such a thing would not be a **doctrine**, but must be called  
only a **critique** of pure reason, and its utility in regard to speculation<sup>g</sup>  
would really be only negative, serving not for the amplification but only  
for the purification of our reason, and for keeping it free of errors, by  
which a great deal is already won. I call all cognition transcendental that  
is occupied not so much with objects but rather with our mode of cog-  
nition of objects insofar as this is to be possible *a priori*.<sup>h,23</sup> A **system** of A 12  
such concepts would be called **transcendental philosophy**. But this is  
again too much for the beginning. For since such a science would have  
to contain completely both the analytic as well as the synthetic *a priori*  
cognition, it is, so far<sup>i</sup> as our aim is concerned, too broad in scope, since  
we need to take the analysis only as far as is indispensably necessary in  
order to provide insight into the principles of *a priori* synthesis in their  
entire scope, which is our only concern. This investigation, which we B 26

<sup>a</sup> The section number VII and the following title are inserted at this point in the second edition, following which the text common to the two editions resumes, with minor alterations.

<sup>b</sup> "*die Kritik der reinen Vernunft heißen kann*" substituted in the second edition for "*die zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft dienen könne*." The next two sentences in the first edition are omitted; see A 11 above.

<sup>c</sup> "*Dem*" substituted in the second edition for "*Nun*."

<sup>d</sup> *Principien*

<sup>e</sup> *Principien*

<sup>f</sup> *Principien*

<sup>g</sup> "*in Ansehung der Spekulation*" added in the second edition.

<sup>h</sup> "*sondern mit unserer Erkenntnisart von Gegenständen, so fern diese a priori möglich sein soll*" substituted in the second edition for "*sondern mit unsern Begriffen a priori von Gegenständen*."

<sup>i</sup> "*so weit*" substituted for "*insofern*" in the second edition.

can properly call not doctrine but only transcendental critique, since it does not aim at the amplification of cognitions themselves but only at their correction, and is to supply the touchstone of the worth or worthlessness of all cognitions *a priori*, is that with which we are now concerned. Such a critique is accordingly a preparation, if possible, for an organon, and, if this cannot be accomplished, then at least for a canon, in accordance with which the complete system of the philosophy of pure reason, whether it is to consist in the amplification or mere limitation<sup>a</sup> of its cognition, can in any case at least some day be exhibited both analytically and synthetically. For that this should be possible, indeed that such a system should not be too great in scope for us to hope to be able entirely to complete it, can be assessed in advance from the fact that our object is not the nature of things, which is inexhaustible, but the understanding, which judges about the nature of things, and this in turn only in regard to its *a priori* cognition, the supply of which, since we do not need to search for it externally, cannot remain hidden from us, and in all likelihood is small enough to be completely recorded, its worth or worthlessness assessed, and subjected to a correct appraisal.

A 13

B 27 <sup>b</sup>Even less can one expect here a critique of the books and systems of pure reason, but rather that of the pure faculty of reason itself. Only if this is one's ground does one have a secure touchstone for appraising the philosophical content of old and new works in this specialty; otherwise the unqualified historian and judge assesses the groundless assertions of others through his own, which are equally groundless.

Transcendental philosophy is here the idea of a science,<sup>d</sup> for which the critique of pure reason is to outline the entire plan architectonically, i.e., from principles,<sup>e</sup> with a full guarantee for the completeness and certainty of all the components that comprise this edifice. It is the system of all principles<sup>f</sup> of pure reason.<sup>g</sup> That this critique is not itself already called transcendental philosophy rests solely on the fact that in order to be a complete system it would also have to contain an exhaustive analysis of all of human cognition *a priori*. Now our critique must, to be sure, lay before us a complete enumeration of all of the ancestral concepts<sup>h</sup> that comprise the pure cognition in question. Only it properly refrains from the exhaustive analysis of these concepts themselves as well as

<sup>a</sup> *Begrenzung*

<sup>b</sup> The next two sentences are added in the second edition.

<sup>c</sup> The title "**II. Division of transcendental philosophy**" present in the first edition is omitted in the second.

<sup>d</sup> "*Die Idee einer Wissenschaft*" substituted in the second edition for "*bier nur eine Idee.*"

<sup>e</sup> *Principien*

<sup>f</sup> *Principien*

<sup>g</sup> This sentence inserted in the second edition.

<sup>h</sup> *Stammbegriffe*



from the complete review of all of those derived from them, partly because this analysis would not be purposeful,<sup>a</sup> since it does not contain the difficulty encountered in the synthesis on account of which the whole critique is actually undertaken, partly because it would be contrary to the unity of the plan to take on responsibility for the completeness of such an analysis and derivation, from which one could yet be relieved given its aim. This completeness of the analysis as well as the derivation from the *a priori* concepts that are to be provided in the future will nevertheless be easy to complete as long as they are present as exhaustive principles<sup>b</sup> of synthesis, and if nothing is lacking in them in regard to this essential aim.

A 14/B 28

To the critique of pure reason there accordingly belongs everything that constitutes transcendental philosophy, and it is the complete idea of transcendental philosophy, but is not yet this science itself, since it goes only so far in the analysis as is requisite for the complete estimation of synthetic *a priori* cognition.

The chief target in the division of such a science is that absolutely no concept must enter into it that contains anything empirical, or that the *a priori* cognition be entirely pure. Hence, although the supreme principles of morality and the fundamental concepts of it are *a priori* cognitions, they still do not belong in transcendental philosophy,<sup>c</sup> for, while they do not, to be sure, take the concepts of pleasure and displeasure, of desires and inclinations, etc., which are all of empirical origin, as the ground of their precepts, they still must necessarily include them in the composition of the system of pure morality in the concept of duty, as the hindrance that must be overcome or the attraction that ought not to be made into a motive. Hence transcendental philosophy is a philosophy<sup>d</sup> of pure, merely speculative reason. For everything practical, insofar as it contains incentives,<sup>e</sup> is related to feelings, which belong among empirical sources of cognition.

A 15

B 29

Now if one wants to set up the division of this science from the general viewpoint of a system in general, then what we will now present must contain first a **Doctrine of Elements** and second a **Doctrine of Method** of pure reason. Each of these main parts will have its subdivision, the grounds for which cannot yet be expounded. All that seems

<sup>a</sup> *zweckmäßig*

<sup>b</sup> *Principien*

<sup>c</sup> The remainder of this sentence in the second edition is substituted for the following in the first: "since the concepts of pleasure and displeasure, of desires and inclinations, of choice, etc., which are all of empirical origin, must thereby be presupposed."

<sup>d</sup> *Weltweisheit*

<sup>e</sup> *Bewegungsgründe* in the first edition is replaced in the second with *Triebfedern* to leave room for the idea that although incentives based on feelings are not adequate for morality, there can be other, more purely rational motives for it.



necessary for an introduction or preliminary is that there are two stems of human cognition, which may perhaps arise from a common but to us unknown root, namely sensibility and understanding, through the first of which objects are given to us, but through the second of which they are thought. Now if sensibility were to contain *a priori* representations, which constitute the condition<sup>a</sup> under which objects are given to us, it will belong to transcendental philosophy. The transcendental doctrine of the senses will have to belong to the first part of the science of elements, since the conditions under which alone the objects of human cognition are given precede those under which those objects are thought.

<sup>a</sup> “*Bedingung*” in the second edition replaces “*Bedingungen*” in the first.