# Two B methods: Classical B and Event B

Marielle Petit-Doche

Systerel

April 16<sup>th</sup>, 2013


Work licensed under Creative Common Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License







### Why a formal language?



Best trade-off between human and machine for expression of properties



### Two B approaches

- Both languages developed by Jean-Raymond Abrial
- Classical B (in the late 1980s) :

#### how the system works

- ⇒ functionnal description of a software
- Event B (in the late 1990s) :

#### why the system works

- ⇒ system safety requirements
- Same basic notation based on first order logic and set theory






#### Classical B



### Main usage in railway industry

#### Classical B Software Design :

- full functional description
- some safety constraints
- structured model
- refinement
- deterministic model to generate code (translation)





#### Historical

- ► The B Book, Assigning Programs to Meanings [Abrial1996]
- More than 20 years of practice in industry
- First important system : METEOR in 1998
- Used by main manufacturers : ALSTOM, SIEMENS, AREVA....
- Lots of application in urban railway domain : CBTC, ZC, CC, PMI,..
- Some applications in mainline domain : KVB, Eurobalise....
- Well adapted to develop critical software according to EN50128

4 D > 4 D > 4 D > 4 D >

### Classical B approach

- Language : first order logic + set theory (inherited from Z notation, Hoare logic,...)
- Structured models : Modules to describe the software architecture
- Operations, Variables, Invariants
- Correct by construction approach
- Formal proof (partially interactive)
- Automatic code translation (C, Ada,...)
- Industrial tool : Atelier B (now free but closed source)




### Summary

- + Mature approach
- Well adapted to design critical software : from software informal specification to automatic code generation
- + Easy to maintain
- + Formal verification
- Industrial approaches and tools adapted to EN50128 requirements
- Methodology and Know-how not shared
- Stable input needed
- Industrial tools are not open source



8/32



#### **Event B**






#### How to use the event B language

#### Event B System analysis:

- initial non deterministic model
- gradual refinements : several levels of abstraction
- proof of safety requirements
- decomposition in sub-systems




#### Event B in a quick view

- Seminal article : B Conference 1996
- Modeling in Event-B [Abrial2010]
- Same basic formal language as classical B
- Consistency of the model
- Choice of abstraction level
- Formal proof (interactive and automatic)
- Tool : Rodin : open-source tool based on Eclipse
- www.event-b.org





### Approach: System behaviour via Events



#### VARIABLES


```
S tate
INVARIANTS
```

```
S tate \in \{SB, SH, FS, IS\}
EVENTS
Event switch\_SB\_SH \cong
   when
         State = SB
   then
         State := SH
   end
Event switch_SB\_FS \cong
   when
         State = SB
   then
         State := FS
   end
```



< ∄ →

#### Closed model: Controller + environment




```
VARIABLES
    State
INVARIANTS
    S tate \in \{SB, SH, FS, IS\}
EVENTS
Initialisation
   begin
          init State : State := SB
   end
Event driver isolates \widehat{=}
   begin
          enter_IS : State := IS
   end
END
```




1 H F 1 F F 1 E F 1 E F


#### State machine




### Requirement traceability








### VnV: Animation or Simulation (1)



4 □ > 4 □ > 4 □ > 4 □ >

### VnV: Animation or Simulation (2)



### VnV : Formal Proof : Principle

#### Goal:

- Show the model is sound
- Verify properties


#### Kind of proof obligations:

- Invariant preservation
- Non-deterministic action feasibility
- Guard strengthening (refinement)
- Well-definedness
- **.**..






#### VnV: Formal Proof: Means



### VnV: Data Validation (1)

- Generic systems
- Lots of data to validate
- Separate data preparation from data validation
- Formal model of properties
- Industrial applications
- DS-Event-B [Badeau13]
- ovado.fr











### VnV: Data Validation (2)





## Safety: IMOFIS Safety case


#### [ERTS2012]








### Safety: IMOFIS Safety tree





# Safety: IMOFIS requirement management

#### [ERTS2012]










### Safety: IMOFIS event B and proof








### Rodin platform (1)

www.event-b.org











### Rodin platform (2)

- EPL Licence
- Open approach
- Possibility to add plug-ins :
  - Requirement management : ProR
  - Animation, simulation : ProB, AnimB
  - State machines : IUML
  - Provers : SMT solver, AtelierB
  - Decomposition




#### Summary

- + Well adapted to system analysis
- + Abstraction definition
- + Open source approach
- Possible links to other (semi)-formal approaches
- + Graphical support for design
- Simulation of the model
- + Extensible approach and platform
- Little industrial experience
- Not adapted to software design





#### Event B / Classical B



Classical B Software Design



code generation



one deterministic model




#### Guideline definition

Event B System analysis

Classical B Software Design






You need a guideline!



#### Event B / Classical B in OpenETCS project





### Event B / Classical B in OpenETCS project

