



# How to prove you solved a puzzle without showing how

Dr Alexey Akhunov, Nov 2016





Content of this slide taken from  
YouTube video “[State of the SNARK](#)”  
by Alessandro Chiesa

## Axioms





## Rules




Can derive  
potentially infinite  
number of statements


statement




string



$L$





witness



Example:  
input  $x$ , witness  $a$ ,  
Verification Algorithm:


If  $\lfloor x/a \rfloor * a == x$ :  
Output YES  
else:  
Output NO





  
witness

Example:  $L$  is language of all  
composite numbers,  
 $x \notin L$  means  $x$  is prime

# Protocol for “classical” proofs



Some proofs are too large




proof  $\neq$  witness?



# Another protocol

1535 Mathematical duel Fiorre - Tartaglia



$$x^3 + px + q = 0$$
$$x = \sqrt[3]{-\frac{q}{2} + \sqrt{\frac{q^2}{4} + \frac{p^3}{27}}} + \sqrt[3]{-\frac{q}{2} - \sqrt{\frac{q^2}{4} + \frac{p^3}{27}}}$$



# What we want to the proofs to be

Succinct. Verification time/memory does not depend on the problem size. Allows verifying very large proofs



Non-interactive. We do not need a dedicated verifier, anybody can verify any time.

Zero-knowledge. If prover wants to keep the witness secret. Someone who has seen the proof and accepted it, does not learn anything new about the witness.

Proof of knowledge. We want to be sure that the prover must have known the secret if they were able to produce the proof.







# Toy example - Sokoban (Japan, early 80s)




# NP-hard problem

initial state



...



# Formalisation

$m(\text{ovable}), s(\text{olid}), v(\text{ertical}), n(\text{orthwest}) \in \{0,1\}$

For board of size (2, 5), the state is  $(M=[m_{ij}], S=[s_{ij}])$ ,  $0 \leq i < 2$ ,  $0 \leq j < 5$ ,  $m_{ij}, s_{ij} \in \{0,1\}$ .

$\neg m \wedge s$



$m \wedge s$



$m \wedge \neg s$



$\neg m \wedge \neg s$




$$M = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix}$$

$$S = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix}$$

$v \wedge n$


$\neg v \wedge n$



$\neg v \wedge \neg n$




$v \wedge \neg n$

# Game with max $T$ steps




step  $t$  to step  $t+1$ :  $(M^t, S^t, v^t, n^t) \rightarrow (M^{t+1}, S^{t+1})$

Observation: state of the any cell can only depend on the state of 9 cells from the previous step, and on the movement variables. The only 4 ways the state can change (same for all other movement directions):




$$m_{i-1,j}^t \wedge !s_{i-1,j}^t \wedge !m_{i,j}^t \wedge !s_{i,j}^t \wedge v^t \wedge !n^t \wedge m_{i,j}^{t+1} \wedge !s_{i,j}^{t+1}$$




... and 3 more expressions like that for moving up, right, and left ...

$$m_{i-1,j}^t \wedge !s_{i-1,j}^t \wedge m_{i,j}^t \wedge !s_{i,j}^t \wedge !m_{i+1,j}^t \wedge !s_{i+1,j}^t \wedge v^t \wedge !n^t \wedge m_{i,j}^{t+1} \wedge !s_{i,j}^{t+1}$$




... and 3 more expressions like that for moving up, right, and left ...

$$m_{i,j}^t \wedge !s_{i,j}^t \wedge m_{i+1,j}^t \wedge !s_{i+1,j}^t \wedge v^t \wedge !n^t \wedge !m_{i,j}^{t+1} \wedge !s_{i,j}^{t+1}$$




... and 3 more expressions like that for moving up, right, and left ...

$$m_{i-2,j}^t \wedge !s_{i-2,j}^t \wedge m_{i-1,j}^t \wedge !s_{i-1,j}^t \wedge !m_{i,j}^t \wedge !s_{i,j}^t \wedge !v^t \wedge !n^t \wedge m_{i,j}^{t+1} \wedge s_{i,j}^{t+1}$$




... and 3 more expressions like that for moving up, right, and left ...


$$\neg m_{i,j}^t \wedge s_{i,j}^t \wedge \neg m_{i,j}^{t+1} \wedge s_{i,j}^{t+1}$$




$$m_{i,j}^t \wedge s_{i,j}^t \wedge m_{i,j}^{t+1} \wedge s_{i,j}^{t+1}$$



$$m_{i,j}^t \wedge \neg s_{i,j}^t \wedge m_{i,j}^{t+1} \wedge \neg s_{i,j}^{t+1}$$



$$\neg m_{i,j}^t \wedge \neg s_{i,j}^t \wedge \neg m_{i,j}^{t+1} \wedge \neg s_{i,j}^{t+1}$$





# Cell expression (no edge, no corner)

$$(m_{i-1,j}^t \wedge s_{i-1,j}^t \wedge m_{i,j}^t \wedge s_{i,j}^t \wedge v^t \wedge n^t \wedge m_{i,j}^{t+1} \wedge s_{i,j}^{t+1}) \vee (m_{i+1,j}^t \wedge s_{i+1,j}^t \wedge m_{i,j}^t \wedge s_{i,j}^t \wedge v^t \wedge n^{t+1} \wedge m_{i,j}^{t+1} \wedge s_{i,j}^{t+1}) \vee$$

$$(m_{i,j-1}^t \wedge s_{i,j-1}^t \wedge m_{i,j}^t \wedge s_{i,j}^t \wedge v^t \wedge n^t \wedge m_{i,j}^{t+1} \wedge s_{i,j}^{t+1}) \vee (m_{i,j+1}^t \wedge s_{i,j+1}^t \wedge m_{i,j}^t \wedge s_{i,j}^t \wedge v^t \wedge n^t \wedge m_{i,j}^{t+1} \wedge s_{i,j}^{t+1}) \vee$$

$$(m_{i-1,j}^t \wedge s_{i-1,j}^t \wedge m_{i,j}^t \wedge s_{i,j}^t \wedge m_{i+1,j}^t \wedge s_{i+1,j}^t \wedge v^t \wedge n^t \wedge m_{i,j}^{t+1} \wedge s_{i,j}^{t+1}) \vee (m_{i+1,j}^t \wedge s_{i+1,j}^t \wedge m_{i,j}^t \wedge s_{i,j}^t \wedge m_{i-1,j}^t \wedge s_{i-1,j}^t \wedge v^t \wedge n^t \wedge m_{i,j}^{t+1} \wedge s_{i,j}^{t+1}) \vee$$


.....

$$(m_{i,j}^t \wedge s_{i,j}^t \wedge m_{i,j}^{t+1} \wedge s_{i,j}^{t+1}) \vee (!m_{i,j}^t \wedge s_{i,j}^t \wedge !m_{i,j}^{t+1} \wedge s_{i,j}^{t+1})$$

each cell expression binds up to  $2 \cdot (9+1) + 2 = 22$  variables together

# Step constraint

There are  $n*m$  cell expressions, and their conjunction ( $\wedge$ ) binds  $4*n*m+2$  variables







find

compute

prover



verify  $C^1$

verify  $C^2$


...

verifier


one-step  
constraints

$$O(|x|*|a|) \gg O(|x|)$$

# Error correcting and locally testable codes




**ECC:** All messages can be encoded. Noise errors are corrected





**LTC:** Only strings belonging to the language  $L$  can be encoded (with their witness). Deliberate errors are amplified

# Probabilistically Checkable Proofs

PCP Theorem gives the minimal amount of randomness and number of queries required for this proof system to be complete (If  $x \in L$ ,  $\text{Prob}[\text{YES}] = 1$ ) and sound (If  $x \notin L$ ,  $\text{Prob}[\text{NO}] \geq 1/2$ ).



# Naive PCP for Sokoban


$$\text{Prob}[\text{NO}] \geq 1/2$$



$$\#queries = (T+1)/2$$

# sokoban step constraint


for board of certain size and max T steps  
 $[(!\dots\wedge\dots)\vee(\dots\wedge\dots)]\wedge[(!\dots\wedge\dots)\vee(\dots\wedge\dots)]\dots$

$$\begin{aligned} !a &\Rightarrow 1-a & a \wedge b &\Rightarrow ab \\ a \vee b &\Rightarrow !(a \wedge !b) \Rightarrow 1-(1-a)(1-b) \end{aligned}$$

$$[1-(1-((1-\dots)(\dots)))(1-((\dots)(\dots)))]*[1-(1-((1-\dots)(\dots)))(1-((\dots)(\dots)))]\dots$$



Rank-1 Constraint System  
 for board of certain size and  
 max T steps



# Rank-1 Constraint System (R1CS)

We rename all the variables into a vector  $Y=(y_1, y_2, \dots, y_{Nv})$ ,  $Nv$  - number of variables

Then, our system of constraints becomes


constraint 1:  $(a_0^1 + \sum_i a_i^1 y_i) * (b_0^1 + \sum_i b_i^1 y_i) = c_0^1 + \sum_i c_i^1 y_i$

constraint 2:  $(a_0^2 + \sum_i a_i^2 y_i) * (b_0^2 + \sum_i b_i^2 y_i) = c_0^2 + \sum_i c_i^2 y_i$

...

constraint  $Nc$ :  $(a_0^{Nc} + \sum_i a_i^{Nc} y_i) * (b_0^{Nc} + \sum_i b_i^{Nc} y_i) = c_0^{Nc} + \sum_i c_i^{Nc} y_i$


$$\begin{pmatrix} 1 & y_1 & y_2 & y_{..} & y_{Nv} \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} a_0^1 \\ a_1^1 \\ a_2^1 \\ a_{..}^1 \\ a_{Nv}^1 \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} b_0^1 & b_1^1 & b_2^1 & b_{..}^1 & b_{Nv}^1 \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ y_1 \\ y_2 \\ y_{..} \\ y_{Nv} \end{pmatrix}$$




This kind of matrix is of rank 1



# Polynomial encoding (for intuition only)



# Checking divisibility for the codeword



# Interpolation of a, b, c-s: 4 variables, 3 constraints

Pick arbitrary  $\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \alpha_3$

$$\text{constraint 1: } (a_0^1 + a_1^1 y_1 + a_2^1 y_2 + a_3^1 y_3 + a_4^1 y_4) * (b_0^1 + b_1^1 y_1 + b_2^1 y_2 + b_3^1 y_3 + b_4^1 y_4) = c_0^1 + c_1^1 y_1 + c_2^1 y_2 + c_3^1 y_3 + c_4^1 y_4$$

$$\text{constraint 2: } (a_0^2 + a_1^2 y_1 + a_2^2 y_2 + a_3^2 y_3 + a_4^2 y_4) * (b_0^2 + b_1^2 y_1 + b_2^2 y_2 + b_3^2 y_3 + b_4^2 y_4) = c_0^2 + c_1^2 y_1 + c_2^2 y_2 + c_3^2 y_3 + c_4^2 y_4$$

$$\text{constraint 3: } (a_0^3 + a_1^3 y_1 + a_2^3 y_2 + a_3^3 y_3 + a_4^3 y_4) * (b_0^3 + b_1^3 y_1 + b_2^3 y_2 + b_3^3 y_3 + b_4^3 y_4) = c_0^3 + c_1^3 y_1 + c_2^3 y_2 + c_3^3 y_3 + c_4^3 y_4$$

---

$$\text{constraint 1: } [A_0(\alpha_1) + A_1(\alpha_1)y_1 + A_2(\alpha_1)y_2 + A_3(\alpha_1)y_3 + A_4(\alpha_1)y_4] * [B_0(\alpha_1) + B_1(\alpha_1)y_1 + B_2(\alpha_1)y_2 + B_3(\alpha_1)y_3 + B_4(\alpha_1)y_4] = C_0(\alpha_1) + C_1(\alpha_1)y_1 + C_2(\alpha_1)y_2 + C_3(\alpha_1)y_3 + C_4(\alpha_1)y_4$$

$$\text{constraint 2: } [A_0(\alpha_2) + A_1(\alpha_2)y_1 + A_2(\alpha_2)y_2 + A_3(\alpha_2)y_3 + A_4(\alpha_2)y_4] * [B_0(\alpha_2) + B_1(\alpha_2)y_1 + B_2(\alpha_2)y_2 + B_3(\alpha_2)y_3 + B_4(\alpha_2)y_4] = C_0(\alpha_2) + C_1(\alpha_2)y_1 + C_2(\alpha_2)y_2 + C_3(\alpha_2)y_3 + C_4(\alpha_2)y_4$$

$$\text{constraint 3: } [A_0(\alpha_3) + A_1(\alpha_3)y_1 + A_2(\alpha_3)y_2 + A_3(\alpha_3)y_3 + A_4(\alpha_3)y_4] * [B_0(\alpha_3) + B_1(\alpha_3)y_1 + B_2(\alpha_3)y_2 + B_3(\alpha_3)y_3 + B_4(\alpha_3)y_4] = C_0(\alpha_3) + C_1(\alpha_3)y_1 + C_2(\alpha_3)y_2 + C_3(\alpha_3)y_3 + C_4(\alpha_3)y_4$$

# Encoding of all constraints


constraint j:  $(A_0(\alpha_j) + \sum_i A_i(\alpha_j)y_i) * (B_0(\alpha_j) + \sum_i B_i(\alpha_j)y_i) = C_0(\alpha_j) + \sum_i C_i(\alpha_j)y_i$

Codeword for the whole solution:  $(A_0(z) + \sum_i A_i(z)y_i) * (B_0(z) + \sum_i B_i(z)y_i) - C_0(z) + \sum_i C_i(z)y_i$


Codeword polynomial turns 0 at points  $\{\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \dots, \alpha_{N_C}\}$ , if all  $y_i$  are assigned to correct values.

Therefore,  $\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \dots, \alpha_{N_C}$  are its roots, and it is divisible by  $(z-\alpha_1)(z-\alpha_2)\dots(z-\alpha_{N_C})!$


# Setup (before initial game position is known)



# Prover's preparation (initial position known)





Prover cheats:  $H(\tau) = \frac{A(\tau)B(\tau) - C(\tau)}{Z(\tau)}$



# Linear PCP based on CDH

“Computational Diffie-Hellman” is the assumption that given element of the group:  $g$ ,  $g^x$ , and  $g^y$ , it is computationally hard to find  $g^{xy}$






# Linear PCP based on CDH

If we accept CDH assumption, we can “hide” numbers by representing them as group elements (kind of “wrapping” them). To “hide” numbers  $\tau^1, \tau^2, \dots$ , verifier computes  $g\tau^1, g\tau^2, \dots$ . The same applies to “hiding”  $A_0(\tau), A_1(\tau), \dots, A_{N_V}(\tau), B_0(\tau), B_1(\tau), \dots, B_{N_V}(\tau), C_0(\tau), C_1(\tau), \dots, C_{N_V}(\tau)$ .

Because the prover does not know the multipliers of  $g\tau^1, g\tau^2, \dots, gA_0(\tau), gA_1(\tau), \dots, gA_{N_V}(\tau), gB_0(\tau), gB_1(\tau), \dots, gB_{N_V}(\tau), gC_0(\tau), gC_1(\tau), \dots, gC_{N_V}(\tau)$ , computationally bounded prover cannot multiply them with each other, but it can multiply them by number and add them together. It cannot solve this equation:


$$H(\tau) = \frac{A(\tau)B(\tau) - C(\tau)}{Z(\tau)}$$

# Verifier is restricted too!



# Solution - pairing

It does not allow multiplying group elements, but allows checking equality of two products




# Pairings and elliptic curves


Pairings exist for some classes of groups induced by point arithmetics on elliptic curves. That is one of the reason elliptic curves are using in these constructions


Another reason - discrete logarithm is believed to be solved more easily groups of numbers (versus groups induced by elliptic curves), and solving discrete logarithm is enough to break CDH assumption

# Remove interaction?




# Trusted setup





# Prover's preparation (zero knowledge)

Preserve  
divisibility, but  
make results  
appear random






# Succinctness

Proof is very short - few points of some elliptic curve:  $gA(\tau), gB(\tau), gC(\tau), gH(\tau)$

Verification is very efficient - couple of pairings -  $e(gH(\tau), gZ(\tau)) = e(gA(\tau)gB(\tau)) - e(gC(\tau), g)?$

Prover's work is proportional to the runtime of verification algorithm  $V(x, a)$

Setup is expensive and has to be trusted - major drawback



Content of this slide taken from  
YouTube video “[State of the SNARK](#)”  
by Alessandro Chiesa

THANK YOU