

# Measuring Deployment of ROA Filtering

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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# Results

AMS-IX Route Server checks origins vs ROAs. AMS-IX members can ask Route Server to filter or tag invalid. Observed various behaviors:

1. AS rejects all invalid routes -> validates origins and discards invalid
2. AS accepts invalid over bilateral peering, but not from Route Server  
-> uses Route Server ROA support but does not validate origins itself
3. AS accepts invalid routes

Next steps:

- Check many more ASes
- Set up longitudinal study: what influences adoption over time?
  - Support at IXPs? High profile hijacks? NANOG talks?