

RSA® Conference 2019 Asia Pacific & Japan

Singapore | 16–18 July | Marina Bay Sands

The logo consists of the word "BETTER." in a bold, white, sans-serif font. The letters are partially obscured by a dynamic, colorful network of lines and dots that radiate from the bottom right corner, creating a sense of motion and connectivity.

SESSION ID: FLE-W08

CYBER-KINETIC ATTACK | EASY AS 1-2-3

Mike Rebutan, MIT, GrDip-DFCS

Global Cybersecurity Operation
@Equinix

#RSAC

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DISCLAIMER |

The knowledge and ideas
expressed in this talk does
not reflect the view of any
of the speaker's employers
– past, present, and future.

RSA® Conference 2019 Asia Pacific & Japan

AT A GLANCE |

- Threat Landscape
- Notable Incidents
- Threat Actors
- TTP's
- 0DAY Threat Hunting
- IT vs OT
- Defense-in-Depth

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AT A GLANCE |

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...**71%** of cyber criminals say they
can breach the perimeter of a
target within **10 hours**.

bugcrowd

INSIDE THE MIND OF A

HACKER

An alternative overview of
Bugcrowd's security researcher
community, the motivations for
bug hunting, and the economics
of whitehat hacking.



Stage 1: Shutdown transportation systems; traffic lights, railroad lines, subway system and airport systems.

Stage 2: Disable financial systems; Wall Street, banks and financial records.

Stage 3: Turn-off public utility systems, such as electricity, gas lines, telecommunications and satellite systems.

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


*Northeast Blackout Likely
to Reduce US Earnings by
\$6.4 Billion*

SCIENTIFIC
AMERICAN™

The event contributed to at least 11 deaths









The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Fitzgerald, damaged by colliding with a Philippine-flagged merchant vessel, at the US naval base in Yokosuka, Japan, June 18, 2017. Toru

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'I'M NOT IN CONTROL' Horrifying glitch caused packed passenger plane to nosedive twice towards the ocean TWICE in a single flight

After the double nosedives, the cabin was a scene of carnage, screaming, crying and praying

By Lauren McMahon and Jon Lockett
18th June 2018, 10:31 am | Updated: 18th June 2018, 11:41 am

WATCH THE VIDEO



PLANE FAILING Boeing 757 controls HACKED remotely while on the runway, officials reveal

The passenger jet failed a security test when a group of experts managed to take over its flight controls

By Margi Murphy

13th November 2017, 10:01 am | Updated: 13th November 2017, 12:21 pm

Emergency



3 COMMENTS

Event Year: A GOVERNMENT official revealed that he and his team of IT experts remotely hacked into a Boeing 757 as it sat on the runway and were able to take control of its flight functions.

Country:

Industry Type: Robert Hickey, a US Homeland Security cyber sleuth, managed to take over the passenger at Atlantic City airport in New Jersey.


Description:



Impact:

ASSOCIATED PRESS

3





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18,341 views | Apr 28, 2019, 12:00pm

Ransomware Hits Yet Another U.S. Airport




Lee Mathews Contributor

Security

Observing, pondering, and writing about tech. Generally in that order.

It wasn't exactly business as usual at Cleveland Hopkins International Airport last week. Several information systems were disrupted by a ransomware outbreak.



ⓘ 🔒 https://www.theregister.co.uk/2019/03/28/f35_software_fail/

A CENTRE WEEKLY NEWSLETTER SOFTWARE SECURITY DEVOPS BUSINESS PERSONAL TECH SCI

Software

Easy-to-hack combat systems, years-old flaws and a massive bill – yup, that's America's F-35

POGO says no-go on money-pit jet fighter

By [Shaun Nichols](#) in San Francisco 28 Mar 2019 at 23:37

84

SHARE



The F-35 aircraft remains woefully unprepared against malware

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- OnionDog APT
- Inj3ct0r Team
- IceFog APT
- Operation Ghoul
- Turla Group
- Naikon APT
- Hellsing APT
- APT3
- NewsBeef APT
- Union Spider
- Fancy Bear
- aLLiGaToR
- TeaMp0isoN
- Operation Newscaster
- Silent Chollima
- Transparent Tribe

- Anchor Panda
- APT 5
- Crimson Iron
- The Dukes
- Override Panda
- Magnallium
- Callisto Group
- Shanghai Group
- Cutting Kitten
- Dark Caracal
- SIG25
- Gallmaker
- Gamaredon Group
- Icefog
- Inception Framework
- Ke3chang

Threat Actors

- Lazarus Group
- Dragonfish
- Lucky Cat
- Moafee
- Mofang
- MuddyWater
- NetTraveler
- Patchwork
- Pawn Storm
- Mythic Leopard
- Tropic Trooper
- Achilles
- Allanite
- Axiom
- Covellite
- Shadow Crane

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- Inveigh
- Powershell scripts
- PSEexec
- SecreetsDump
- THC Hydra
- APT3 Keylogger
- Bemstour
- CookieCutter
- DoublePulsar
- EternalBlue
- HTran
- Hupigon
- Kaba
- LaZagne
- OSInfo
- Pirpi
- PlugX
- Shareip
- SHOTPUT
- TTCalc
- w32times
- 0-days for IE, Firefox and Flash.
- Poison Ivy
- AUMLIB
- DynCalc/DNSCalc
- ETUMBOT
- HIGHTIDE
- IXESHE
- RapidStealer,
- THREEBYTE
- WaterSpout.

TOOLS

- Gh0st RAT
- hcdLoad
- HTTPBrowser
- Pisloader
- Roseam
- StickyFingers
- 0-day exploits for Flash
- C0d0so
- Cobalt Strike
- Empire
- Derusbi
- PlugX
- Mimikatz
- PowerSploit
- Metasploit
- NMAP

TECHNIQUES & PROCEDURES

- Watering Hole Attacks
- Trojanized Software
- Remote Access
- Network Penetrations
- Targeting POS
- Phishing Campaign
- Supply Chain Attacks
- Backdoor Installation
- Bruteforce
- Fuzzing / Buffer Over Flow
- Physical Social Engineering Attack

- <https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035/>
- <https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0020/>
- <https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0027/>
- <https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0037/>
- <https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046/>
- <https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049/>
- <https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0051/>
- <https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0064/>
- <https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0068/>
- <https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0033/>

MORE!!!

https://www.securityweek.com/most-ot-organizations-hit-damaging-cyberattacks

https://www.cpomagazine.com/cyber-security/polymorphic-phishing-attacks-now-make-up-almost-half-of-all-phishing-attempts

CYBER SECURITY NEWS

Polymorphic Phishing Attacks Now Make Up Almost Half of All Phishing Attempts

Scott Ikeda — On Jun 18, 2019

A cyberattack that causes significant downtime


Leakage of business-confidential information, such as emails

Economic espionage (theft of intellectual property)

Downtime to OT systems is the number one factor when quantifying cyber risk, with 53% of respondents citing it as a factor. Organizations also assess risk based on the frequency of unpatched vulnerabilities (45%), theft of intellectual property (41%), loss of employee productivity (40%), and financial loss (38%)

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FILELESS MALWARE



POLYMORPHIC MALWARE

Security Environment Statements

Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

■ Agree ■ Neutral ■ Disagree

I am very concerned about the growing number of attacks on cloud service providers.



I believe threat intelligence services and feeds will help my organization to better prepare for and defend against new malware threats.



I am very concerned about the possibility of attacks on the Internet of Things.




I am more concerned about ransomware than I was a year ago.



I am more worried about zero-days and sophisticated hacks than about automated, polymorphic malware.



The discovery/disclosure of a new vulnerability frequently changes my security team's plans and priorities for the week.



If there was a way to do so legally, I would want to hack back against my online attackers.



My organization is more frequently infected by malware today than it was a year ago.




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METAMORPHIC MALWARE




METAMORPHIC MALWARE

Metamorphic Structure



Morphing Engine Structure



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0-DAYS

2 engines detected this file

SHA-256: 8f1ee2fb9b11ed41ee8de09ae9fb464ca470662385589b0e1aa080177e773494

File name: ArtRebultanDiscovery3.exe

File size: 26.5 KB

Last analysis: 2018-08-01 08:41:18 UTC

Detection: 2 / 66

Baidu

2 engines detected this file

SHA-256: 8f1ee2fb9b11ed41ee8de09ae9fb464ca470662385589b0e1aa080177e773494

File name: ArtRebultanDiscovery3.exe

File size: 26.5 KB

Last analysis: 2018-08-01 08:41:18 UTC

Detection: 2 / 66

Baidu

Search Results

2 engines detected this file

SHA-256: 99e4c8974efb364d6f5b4caf8587f3f9eb407e253ad677170ba84a9f1969f715

File name: executable.760-106868692f4fc222110559eb0fe2a56e.exe

File size: 26.5 KB

Last analysis: 2018-08-01 08:41:18 UTC

Detection: 2 / 66

CrowdStrike Falcon

malicious_confidence_80% (D)

One engine detected this file

SHA-256: 470062cef8ece00339fa010aee5a614014ab525fb5aab9748ac32037bfa8f383

File name: ArtRebultanDiscovery4.exe

File size: 2.74 MB

Last analysis: 2018-08-01 13:19:12 UTC

Detection: 1 / 66

CrowdStrike Falcon

malicious_confidence_80% (D)

Ad-Aware

Clean

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.vmem = raw memory

.vmsn & .vmss = memory image

.sav = partial memory image



.bin = memory image

.vsv = save state

.MEM = memory image



- Win7 x86 w/ Office 2010 SP2, Java 1.8.0_x, Flash 16.x, Acrobat Reader 11.x, IE 11, Chrome 55, Firefox 43
- Win7 x64 w/ Office 2003 SP3, Java 1.8.0_x, Flash 16.x, Acrobat Reader 11.x, IE 11, Chrome 41, Firefox 36
- Win10 x64 (v. 1803) w/ Office 2016 Adobe Reader DC 19, Chrome 70, Firefox 63, Java 8.171, Flash 30.0.0.113
- WinXP x86 SP2 (*least option*)

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MEMORY FORENSICS |


- **Rogue Processes**
 - **pslist**, psscan, pstree
- **Process DLLs and Handles**
 - **dlllist**, getsids, handles, filescan, svcscan
- **Network Artifacts**
 - connections, **connscan**, sockets, netscan
- **Code Injection**
 - **malfind**, ldrmodules, **malfinddeep**, **hollowfind**, **malprocfind**
- **Rootkit Signs**
 - **psxview**, driverscan, apihooks, driverirp, idt
- **Dump Suspicious Processes and Drivers**
 - **dlldump**, moddump, procdump, memdump


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INFO : volatility.debug : Determining profile based on KDBG search...						
Suggested Profile(s) : WinXPSP2x86, WinXPSP3x86 (Instantiated with WinXPSP2x86)						
AS Layer1 : IA32PagedMemoryPae (Kernel AS)						
AS Layer2 : FileAddressSpace (/home/remnux/ parasabayan.vmem)						
PAE type : PAE						
DTB : 0x319000L						
KDBG : 0x80544ce0L						
Number of Processors : 1						
Image Type (Service Pack) : 2						
Offset(P)	Local Address	Remote Address	4d 5a 90 00 03 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 ff ff 00 00	1884	1884	MZ.....@.....
0x010732d8	172.16.176.143:1086	65	0x10020000	b8 00 00 00 00 00 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	1884@.....
0x010735e0	172.16.176.143:1098	65	0x10020010	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	1884@.....
0x01073778	172.16.176.143:1077	65	0x10020020	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	1884@.....
0x01073d00	172.16.176.143:1096	65	0x10020030	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 d8 00 00 00	1884@.....
0x0107ae70	172.16.176.143:1063	20				
0x0107e6d8	172.16.176.143:1073	65				
0x0107ed58	172.16.176.143:1088	65				
0x010c5e70	172.16.176.143:1074	65				
0x010f1d00	172.16.176.143:1079	20				
0x010fb4b8	172.16.176.143:1089	65				
0x0111d900	172.16.176.143:1070	72				
0x01134e70	172.16.176.143:1068	65				
0x0113b638	172.16.176.143:1076	65				
0x02214988	172.16.176.143:1052	65				
0x02db12e8	172.16.176.143:1091	65				
0x02db1480	172.16.176.143:1080	65				
0x0485dd58	172.16.176.143:1061	65				
0x04862b60	172.16.176.143:1069	96				
0x04863810	172.16.176.143:1078	65				
0x05ce6e70	172.16.176.143:1059	65				
0x05e354b8	172.16.176.143:1090	65				
0x05e3cb48	172.16.176.143:1062	4.				
0x06015ab0	172.16.176.143:1056	69				
0x06232e70	172.16.176.143:1064	64				
0x06384e70	172.16.176.143:1055	20...				
		20...172.16.176.21:80				

Process: IEXPLORE.EXE Pid: **1884** Address: 0x10020000
Vad Tag: VadS Protection: PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE
Flags: CommitCharge: 22, MemCommit: 1, PrivateMemory: 1, Protection: 6

MZ.....@.....





SHODAN

port:502 country:"SG"

Vulnerable

Exploits

Maps

Share Search

naystak

Search

About

Go Premium

Search

satellite jammer

Search

Found 420 results.

[Advertise here](#) - contact us via the form

GPS Jammers blocker Satellite TV signal reception

<http://43f74pccymmgu3sf.onion/tv-satellite.html>

GPS Jammers blocker **Satellite** TV signal reception [] Welcome to the **Jammer**-Shop, You can choose retail Phone **Jammer** [] \$219.87 Buy Very High Power Broadband Jammers [] \$216.36 [] [] **Satellite** TV signal signal **jammer**.

Satellite radio **jammer** interference signal radiation is bigger, can affect the health of the residents

Through the above information we know that the **satellite** **signal** **jammer** to accept to be reckoned with

GPS Jammers blocker **Satellite** TV signal reception

[Cached version](#) - Historical versions - Datapoints (e.g. bitcoin addresses) - Report for removal

GPS Jammers blocker Satellite TV signal reception

<http://2tnhglajammerkg.onion/tv-satellite.html>

GPS Jammers blocker **Satellite** TV signal reception [] Welcome to the **Jammer**-Shop, You can choose retail Phone **Jammer** [] \$219.87 Buy Very High Power Broadband Jammers [] \$216.36 [] [] **Satellite** TV signal signal **jammer**.

File	Disclosure Date	Initial MSF Release Date
dataserver_listall.rb	Mar. 24, 2011	May 16, 2011
dataserver_rename.rb	Mar. 24, 2011	Jun. 9, 2011
e17.rb	Mar. 24, 2011	May 30, 2011
y_bof.rb	Mar. 21, 2011	Mar. 22, 2011
web_server.rb	Sep. 13, 2011	Sep. 17, 2011
csv.rb	Dec. 2, 2011	Dec 13, 2011
pro.rb	Sep. 16, 2010	Nov. 11, 2010
cat.rb	Aug. 11, 2011	Aug. 11, 2011
jbd.rb	Sep. 13, 2011	Oct. 10, 2011
Jan. 19, 2012	Jan. 19, 2012	Jan. 19, 2012
jbd.rb	Jan. 19, 2012	Jan. 19, 2012
nbroker.rb	Mar. 21, 2011	Jul. 17, 2011
ebhmi_setactivexguid.rb	May 5, 2011	May 11, 2011
cmdexe.rb	Sep. 16, 2011	Sep. 16, 2011
ntool.rb	Oct. 20, 2010	Nov. 6, 2010
pc_initialize.rb	Sep. 26, 2008	Sep. 30, 2008
pc_initialize_rf.rb	Oct. 15, 2010	Oct. 18, 2010
pc_txtevent.rb	Oct. 15, 2010	Oct. 18, 2010
pc_txtevent.rb	Nov. 18, 2010	Nov. 24, 2010
fc_binfile_arb	Mar. 21, 2011	Jun. 19, 2011
fcs_login.rb	Mar. 21, 2011	Jun. 22, 2011
ore_server.rb	Sep. 8, 2011	Sep. 12, 2011
hone_zip.rb	Sep. 12, 2011	Sep. 13, 2011
da_odbc.rb	Jun. 11, 2008	Nov. 8, 2010
ntime.rb	Jan. 13, 2011	Jun. 21, 2011
ink_cssservice.rb	Mar. 25, 2011	Jun. 24, 2011
vorylink_vn_09.rb	Mar. 21, 2011	Jun. 21, 2011
exploit/exploits/windows/browser/teechart_pro.rb	Aug. 11, 2011	Aug. 11, 2011

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Not secure | hackerlijeb.onion



HACK GROUP

SERVICES

PRICING

ABOUT

FAQ

SUPPORT

Login

PROFESSIONAL HACK GROUP QUICKLY HELPS TO SOLVE YOUR NEEDS

BASIC SERVICES THAT WE PROVIDE:

Hacking

- Have you been hacked?
- Do you want to find out if your website, computer or network can be or has been hacked?
- Would you like to hack into a computer, website or network?

- Web Industry

SMM

Social Media Threats

- Has your Facebook, Twitter or Google+ account been hacked? We can help get it restored and track the person who did it in many cases.



Nickname:

Direction: Breaking mails, Breaking social. Network Status: Verified seller

Computer Spying and Surveillance

- Do you want to install spyware on a cellphone or computer?
- Do you want to know if you have spyware on your computer?

Affiliate to advertising

Read more

ons.

Remove A Link

- Mugshot Picture Removed
- Blog Link Removed
- Google Link Removed

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**“TORless”
Journey to
the Center of
the Dark Web**



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```
msf5 > search scada
```

```
Matching Modules
```

```
=====
```

```
msf5 > search modbus
```

```
#
```

```
- Matching Modules
```

```
0 =====
```

```
msf5
```

```
msf5 > search plc
```

```
Matching Modules
```

```
msf5 > search radio
```

```
Matching Modules
```

```
=====
```

```
# Name
```

```
-----
```

```
Rank
```

```
Check
```

```
Description
```

```
0 auxiliary/scanner/gprs/gtp_echo
```

```
normal
```

```
Yes
```

```
GTP Echo Scanner
```

```
1 exploit/windows/browser/aol_ampx_convertfile 2009-05-19 normal No AOL Radio AmpX ActiveX Control ConvertFile() Buffer Overflow
```

```
2 exploit/windows/fileformat/xradio_xrl_sehbof 2011-02-08 normal No xRadio 0.95b Buffer Overflow
```

```
3 post/hardware/rftransceiver/transmitter normal No RF Transceiver Transmitter
```

```
8 auxiliary/scanner/scada/modbusclient
```

```
normal
```

```
No
```

```
Modbus Client Utility
```

```
9 auxiliary/scanner/scada/modbusdetect 2011-11-01 normal Yes Modbus Version Scanner
```

```
10 auxiliary/scanner/scada/pcomclient normal No Unitronics PCOM Client
```

```
flow
```

```
68 exploit/windows/scada/yokogawa_bkhodeq_bof  
Overflow
```


```
2014-03-10
```

```
average
```

```
Yes
```

```
Yokogawa CENTUM CS 3000 BKH0deq.exe Buffer
```

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


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AT A GLANCE |


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
Building Management System

**- to monitor and control the mechanical devices
(ex: power, light, fire, heating systems and security systems etc.)**







Energy Management System

- monitors, controls and optimizes performance of the electrical buildings.



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PHYSICAL SECURITY |

- **Perimeter Defense**
 - Fence, CCTV, Guarded and Limited Entry/Access Points
- **Clear Zone & Parking Lot**
 - CCTV/Surveillance Camera, Intrusion Detection Sensor
- **Reception Area**
 - Card Reader, Security Key System, Door Operator, CCTV
- **Hallway Area**
 - Security Personnel, CCTV, Access Control, Computerized Signage
- **Server Room**
 - Biometric Reader, Card Reader, CCTV / Surveillance Camera
- **Server Rack / Cabinet**
 - Designated Access Control / Escorted Security Personnel, Dome Camera,



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- **Policies & Procedures**
 - NIST, NERC, USNRC, NIE, IIC, CMMI, ISO, etc.
- **Network Segmentation**
 - ISA-99 or IEC 62243
- **MFA**
- **Application Whitelisting**
- **Network Sensors**
 - Ingress and Egress Point
- **IDS/IPS, DMZ, FW**
 - Deny All
- **Real-Time Monitoring**
 - NMS and Log Management System

OPERATIONS TECHNOLOGY


- **Visibility & Control**
 - Asset Management & EPP
- **Patch Management**
- **OS Lockdown**
 - CIS, OPC Host Hardening
- **OS Auditing**
- **Vulnerability Management**
 - Regular Basis, Iteration
- **Penetration Testing and/or Red Teaming**
 - Attack Simulation (IT Prod / OT Backup)
- **Continuous Cyber Security Awareness**
 - IT/OT Personnel

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INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

Effectiveness of Technologies in Protecting Data

Please rate the effectiveness of the following technologies in protecting enterprise data.



Base: 315 respondents in 2018; not asked in 2017

Data: UBM survey of security professionals, May 2018

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OPERATIONS TECHNOLOGY

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links |

- **The 2016 UK Rail Cyber Security Guidance**
 - <https://www.rssb.co.uk/Library/improving-industry-performance/2016-02-cyber-security-rail-cyber-security-guidance-to-industry.pdf>
- **Critical Aspects in the Maritime Sector, European Network and Information Security Agency**
 - <https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/cyber-security-aspects-in-the-maritime-sector-1>
- **Cyber Kinetic Attack Timeline**
 - <https://www.ultra-3eti.com/timeline-of-key-cyber-kinetic-attacks-incidents-and-research/>
- **Past Recorded Incident Database**
 - <https://www.risidata.com/>

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THANK YOU !!!

- **LinkedIn**
 - <https://www.linkedin.com/in/ArtRebultan>
- **CyberSec-Blogs**
 - <https://www.cybrary.it/members/Strainer/>
 - <https://www.peerlyst.com/users/Mike-Art-Rebultan>
- **FB Page**
 - InfoSec-Tarlac

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SPEAKER BIO

- **Mike Rebuttan, aka "Art"** has more than 16 years of experience as an IT professional with a background in PCI-DSS audit management, Unix/Linux server lockdown and systems administration, R&D, VAPT, and currently a DFIR/SecOps in an ICS/OT company.
- Holding a master degree in IT with concentration in E-Commerce security. He has also a professional graduate diploma in Digital Forensics and Cyber Security as continuing education.
- Specializing in Computer Forensics, Network Intrusion, Data Breach, Cybercrime Investigation, Malware Analysis and Reverse Engineering.