# RS/Conference2019

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
Lessons Learned in Automating Decision Making: Pitfalls and Opportunities

#### **Sounil Yu**

@sounilyu

### **Questions to ponder**





- How is AI/ML distinct from automation?
- How mature are our AI/ML and automated decision making capabilities? How mature do they need to be for security?
- What can we learn from failed cases of automated decision making in security?
- What guardrails should be considered for automated decision making until sufficient maturity is achieved?



# Framework #1: Modified OODA Loop

Sensors Sensing **Raw Telemetry Big Data Analytics Sense Making Artificial Intelligence Machine Learning Defined Processes** Artificial intelligence **Decision Making** capabilities are distinct from **Courses of Action Orchestration** robotic automation capabilities **Execution Acting Robotic Automation Response Scripts** 

## Framework #2: DARPA's Perspective on Al

https://www.darpa.mil/about-us/darpa-perspective-on-ai

### Notional intelligence scale

**Perceiving** 

RICH, COMPLEX AND SUBTLE INFORMATION ABOUT THE OUTSIDE WORLD TO UNDERSTAND WHAT'S GOING ON

Learning

WITHIN AN ENVIRONMENT AND ADAPTING TO ITS CONDITIONS AND SITUATIONS BASED ON WHAT IS PERCEIVED

Reasoning

TO PLAN / DECIDE BASED ON A SET OF PRESCRIBED OR IMPLIED RULES AND UNDERSTANDING WHY

**Abstracting** 


BY TAKING KNOWLEDGE OF ONE DOMAIN AND APPLYING TO OTHER DOMAINS TO CREATE NEW MEANINGS

**Human Level** 

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
## **DARPA's Perspective on Al**

https://www.darpa.mil/about-us/darpa-perspective-on-ai





- Enables reasoning over narrowly defined problems
- No learning capability and poor handling of uncertainty
- Examples: Turbotax, Chess, Logistics, DARPA Cyber Grand
   Challenge
- First generation SIEMs




### Second Wave of AI – <u>Statistical</u> Learning

- Nuanced classification and prediction capabilities
- No contextual capability and minimal reasoning capabilities
- Examples: Voice recognition, Face recognition, DARPA Grand
   Challenge Self Driving Cars
- Statistically impressive, individually unreliable
- Current generation SIEMs

# s/Machine Learning | Deep Neural Networks/Statistics/g




83.7% of all statistics are entirely made up Sounil Yu



## **Correlation, not Causation**

http://www.tylervigen.com/spurious-correlations



# Why statistical-based machine learning and neural networks **DO NOT** work for security.

# Outside the Closed World: On Using Machine Learning for Network Intrusion Detection

Robin Sommer, Vern Paxson, 2010 https://www.icsi.berkeley.edu/icsi/node/4511

- Bounded vs unbounded environments
- Inviolable rules vs shifting rules
- Human adversaries deliberately try to shift the rules (i.e., novel attacks)

"...[ML is generally not] suitable for finding **novel** attacks ... Rather, the strength of machine-learning tools is finding activity that is **similar to something previously seen**..."

#### Outside the Closed World: On Using Machine Learning For Network Intrusion Detection

Robin Sommer International Computer Science Institute, and Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory

Vern Paxson International Computer Science Institute, and University of California, Berkeley

Abstract—In network intrusion detection research, one popular strategy for finding attacks is monitoring a network's activity for anomalies: deviations from profiles of normality previously learned from benign traffic, typically identified using tools borrowed from the machine learning community. However, despite extensive academic research one finds a striking gap in terms of actual deployments of such systems: pared with other intrusion detection approaches, machine learning is rarely employed in operational "real world" settings. We examine the differences between the network intrusion detection problem and other areas where machine learning regularly finds much more success. Our main claim is that the task of finding attacks is fundamentally different from these other applications, making it significantly harder for the effectively. We support this claim by identifying challenges particular to network intrusion detection, and provide a set

Keywords-anomaly detection; machine learning; intrusion detection; network security.

#### I. INTRODUCTION

Traditionally, network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) are broadly classified based on the style of detection they are using: systems relying on with the style of detection they are

deployments in the commercial world. Examples from other domains include product recommendations systems such as used by Amazon [3] and Netflix [4]; optical character recognition systems (e.g., [5], [6]); natural language translation [7]; and also spam detection, as an example closer to home [8].


In this paper we set out to examine the differences between the intrusion detection domain and other areas where machine learning is used with more success. Our main claim is that the task of finding attacks is fundamentally different from other applications, making it significantly harder for the intrusion detection community to employ machine learning effectively. We believe that a significant part of the problem already originates in the premise, found in virtually any relevant textbook, that anomaly detection is suitable for finding novel attacks; we argue that this premise does not hold with the generality commonly implied. Rather, the strength of machine-learning tools is finding activity that is similar to something previously seen, without the need however to precisely describe that activity up front (as misuse detection must).

In addition, we identify further char-

"Our main claim is that the task of finding attacks is fundamentally different from these other applications, making it significantly harder for the intrusion detection community to employ machine learning effectively."

## **DARPA's Perspective on Al continued**

https://www.darpa.mil/about-us/darpa-perspective-on-ai





Source:

Robust Physical-World Attacks on Machine Learning Models By Ivan Evtimov, Kevin Eykholt, Earlence Fernandes, Tadayoshi Kohno, Bo Li, Atul Prakash, Amir Rahmati, and Dawn Song

- Third Wave of AI Contextual Adaptation
  - Systems construct explanatory models for classes of real world phenomena
  - Models explain decisions (cause and effect)
  - Understand why and why not
    - → leads to an understanding of when the system will succeed or fail
    - → leads to when to trust and why mistakes are made

Classified 100% of the time as...




How do I know this really is a stop sign?

### **Explainable model:**

- Red
- Octagonal
- At intersections

# Why Do We Need Better Decision Making? ... Because of Deliberate Attempts to Fool Sensing and Sense Making...



10

Source: Nguyen A, Yosinski J, Clune J.

Deep Neural Networks are Easily Fooled: High Confidence Predictions for Unrecognizable Images. In Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR '15), IEEE, 2015

### Framework #3: Classical Education Trivium



### Rhetoric

Convincing and persuading
Bearing fruit in wisdom
Applying and integrating subjects

# Dialectic/Logic

Investigating the truth of opinions
Gaining in understanding
Explaining "why" and "how"

### Grammar

Structures and rules
Soaking in knowledge
Memorizing a broad base of facts

Remember:
According to the
DARPA Framework,
this capability emerges
in the Third Wave

# The "Age" of Machine Learning



### Rhetoric

Convincing and persuading Bearing fruit in wisdom Applying and integrating subjects

### Dialectic/Logic

Investigating the truth of opinions Gaining in understanding Explaining "why" and "how"

#### Grammar

Structure and rules Soaking in knowledge Memorizing a broad base of facts

GRADES K-6 ELEMENTARY SCHOOL	GRADES 7-9 JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL	GRADES 10-12 HIGH SCHOOL
RHETORIC	RHETORIC	RHETORIC
DIALECTIC	DIALECTIC	
GRAMMAR		DIALECTIC
	Grammar	Grammar



Machine learning has not left this stage yet

# Children vs Fully Grown Adults

Children

### Sensing

### **Sense Making**

**Decision Making** 

**Acting** 

# Questionable Inputs

Peers, Memes,
 Social Media

### "Algorithms"

- Irrational
- Illogical

### **Amygdala**

- Fear
- Emotion
- Impulse
- Aggression
- Instinct

Fully Developed at Birth

### **Fully Grown Adults**

#### **Better Filters and Prioritization**

- Knowledge and Wisdom
- Discernment
- Model Based Perception

### "Algorithms"


- Rational and logical
- Explainable

#### **Prefrontal Cortex**


- Coordinates and adjusts complex behavior
- Controls impulse
- Prioritizes competing and simultaneous inputs

Fully Developed at Age 25

# **Lessons Learned when Skipping Steps**




## Lessons Learned: Reflexive Stimulus - Response



- Threat Intel Sharing
  - Blocking google.com
  - Null routing 0.0.0.0/0
- Automated patching
  - NotPetya
  - Windows 10 1809 The "I hope you made a backup" Update
- Guardrails:
  - Ensure sensor sources are trustworthy and reliable
  - Apply actions that are narrowly scoped
  - Have a kill switch ready if it goes beyond the scope
  - Make the action immediately reversible



# Lessons Learned: Conditional response based on analysis, enrichment, and regression testing



- Threat Intel Sharing
  - Would this new regex pattern create false positives by matching on anything else over the past 30 days?
  - Is there a unanimous verdict based on enrichment from multiple other sources? (i.e., what does VirusTotal say?)
- Automated patching after regression testing
  - Do all systems in the testbed continue to operate as expected after the patch?
  - Did any applications stop working after the patch?

# Lessons Learned: Conditional response based on analysis, enrichment, and regression testing

Sensing **Sense Making** Acting


The CHASE program seeks to develop automated tools to detect and characterize novel attack vectors, collect the right contextual data, and disseminate protective measures both within and across enterprises



"The automation process has to leave a trail of logic behind decisions so humans can follow it up,"


Sam Hamilton, Chief Scientist BAE Systems, Cyber Tech Group

# Lessons Learned: Conditional response based on analysis, enrichment, and regression testing



- Automating funds transfers requests from emails to an electronic transfer system
  - Assumed that emails were only coming from legitimate sources
  - Assumed that copying action was purely mechanical and didn't involve any further analysis or thought beyond mapping email content to the proper fields
- Guardrails
  - Use regression testing to ensure the outcomes are fully deterministic
  - Validate assumptions that no other decision making is actually needed or happening
  - Ensure entire process is well documented and understood by the operators

# Lessons Learned: Conditional response based on business considerations



- Bank of Valletta shuts down all of its operations after hackers broke into its systems and shifted funds overseas
- DoD responds to the Code Red worm by disconnecting NIPRNet from the Internet, resulting in the Army Corps of Engineers not being able to control the locks on the Mississippi River
- Guardrails:
  - Pre-establish thresholds where the costs of inaction are worse than the negative repercussions of action
  - Pre-determine authorities for actions and accountabilities for outcomes

# Comparing Frameworks... How Mature is AI/ML Today?

**OODA Loop DARPA Classical Education** Sensing Perceiving **Grammar Stage** Sense Making Learning **Dialectic Stage Decision Making Rhetoric Stage** Reasoning Abstracting Acting

# Summary of Guardrails: When might it be okay to enable automated decision-making?

### **Sensor Diversity**

Ensure sensor sources are trustworthy and reliable based on multiple sources of truth

### **Bounded Conditions**

Ensure decisions are highly deterministic and narrowly scoped using regression testing

### **Established Thresholds**

Know when the costs of inaction are worse than the negative repercussions of action

### **Algorithmic Integrity**

Ensure entire process and all assumptions are well documented and understood by the operators

### **Brakes and Reverse Gear**

Have a kill switch ready if it goes beyond the scope and make the action immediately reversible

### **Authorities and Accountabilities**

Pre-establish authorities for taking action and accountabilities for outcomes



Create a conscious mental chasm that you deliberately choose to cross when enabling automated decision-making

Robotic Automation

# "Apply" Slide

- Within the next month
  - Start inventorying capabilities broken out by Sensing, Sense-Making, Decision-Making, Acting
  - Determine where automated decision-making may be happening within those capabilities
- Within the next 90 days
  - Review potential guardrails for automated decision-making
- Within the next year
  - Establish governance processes to ensure that systems with automated decision-making stay within those guardrails

## For further reading

- DARPA's Perspective on Artificial Intelligence https://www.darpa.mil/about-us/darpa-perspective-on-ai
- Al is now so complex its creators can't trust why it makes decisions https://qz.com/1146753/ai-is-now-so-complex-its-creators-cant-trust-why-it-makes-decisions/
- Automation Should Be Like Iron Man, Not Ultron https://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?id=2841313
- How can we be sure AI will behave? Perhaps by watching it argue with itself. <a href="https://www.technologyreview.com/s/611069/how-can-we-be-sure-ai-will-behave-perhaps-by-watching-it-argue-with-itself/">https://www.technologyreview.com/s/611069/how-can-we-be-sure-ai-will-behave-perhaps-by-watching-it-argue-with-itself/</a>
- Al is more powerful than ever. How do we hold it accountable? https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/ai-is-more-powerful-than-ever-how-do-we-hold-it-accountable/2018/03/20/e867b98a-2705-11e8-bc72-077aa4dab9ef\_story.html
- Artificial Intelligence Has A Problem With Bias, Here's How To Tackle It <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2019/01/29/3-steps-to-tackle-the-problem-of-bias-in-artificial-intelligence/">https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2019/01/29/3-steps-to-tackle-the-problem-of-bias-in-artificial-intelligence/</a>
- The case against understanding why AI makes decisions https://qz.com/1192977/the-case-against-understanding-why-ai-makes-decisions/
- When computers decide: European Recommendations on Machine-Learned Automated Decision Making https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3185595
- Counterfactual Explanations without Opening the Black Box: Automated Decisions and the GDPR https://arxiv.org/abs/1711.00399
- Explanation in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Social Sciences <a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/1706.07269">https://arxiv.org/abs/1706.07269</a>

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Questions?

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