



San Francisco | March 4–8 | Moscone Center

A large, abstract graphic in the top right corner consists of a dense web of thin, colored lines (blue, green, yellow) radiating from a central point, resembling a neural network or a complex data visualization.

BETTER.

SESSION ID: PDAC-F02

Blockchain Augmentation of the Trusted Supply Chain

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#RSAC

Agenda

- Introduction
- Trusted Supply Chain on Blockchain
- Proof of Concept
- DEMO
- Conclusions and Summary
- Apply What You Learned



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Trusted Supply Chain

An Introduction



Trusted Supply Chain - Introduction

- Problem
 - Assurance of a device's origin in today's diverse manufacturing, logistics, and just in time inventory.
 - Remote deployment and provisioning requires assurance in the Supply Chain.
- Solution
 - Use a Root of Trust to provide assurance of a device's origin
 - This Root of Trust establishes the foundation for a Trusted Supply Chain (TSC)
 - Blockchain adds an additional layer of trust in the overall system supply chain
- We will show how we augmented the existing hardware root of trust with the implementation of a blockchain to establish a TSC.



Trusting the Supply Chain – Problem



Bloomberg Businessweek
October 5, 2018

The Big Hack

The Big Hack: How China Used a Tiny Chip to Infiltrate U.S. Companies

The attack by Chinese spies reached almost 30 U.S. companies, including Amazon and Apple, by compromising America's technology supply chain, according to extensive interviews with government and corporate sources.

"cyber security officials are concerned that computers and handheld devices could introduce compromised hardware into the Defense Department **supply chain**, posing cyber espionage risks, said officials familiar with the report."

Military Warns Chinese Computer Gear Poses Cyber Spy Threat

Lenovo seeking access to classified Pentagon networks, J-2 report says

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BY: Bill Gertz [Follow @BillGertz](#)

October 24, 2016 5:00 am



The Pentagon's Joint Staff recently warned against using equipment made by China's Lenovo computer manufacturer amid concerns about cyber spying against Pentagon networks, according to defense officials.

A recent internal report produced by the J-2 intelligence directorate stated that cyber security officials are concerned that Lenovo computers and handheld devices could

introduce compromised hardware into the Defense Department supply chain, posing cyber espionage risks, said officials familiar with the report. The "supply chain" is how the Pentagon refers to its global network of suppliers that provide key components for weapons and other military systems.

The J-2 report was sent Sept. 28, and also contained a warning that Lenovo was seeking to purchase American information technology companies in a bid to gain access to classified Pentagon and military information networks.



500 Re-marked Engineering Samples crash Dublin, California school district network


Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) 252.246 - Contractor Counterfeit Electronic Part Detection and Avoidance System:

Design, operation, and maintenance of systems to detect and avoid counterfeit electronic parts and suspect counterfeit electronic parts.





Trusted Supply Chain – Value Proposition



Platform Manufacturer



Distribution



End User



- Counterfeit and substitution detection
- Inventory Tracking
 - Reduced cost **with**
 - Increase trust
- Ownership transfer records

• Attestation increases trust and capabilities of analytics

Enterprise



- Reduced maintenance and replacement cost
 - Remote proof allow remote key provisioning
 - Keys allows trusted remote configuration
 - Proof of ownership enables remote provisioning and configuration



Trusted Supply Chain Components

- Trusted Supply Chain (TSC) provides traceability for customer platforms
- The following are the traceability components

TSC COMPONENT	DETAILS
System-Level Traceability	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Supported by <i>signed platform certificates</i>• Linked to discrete Trusted Platform Module (TPM) on motherboard
Component-Level Traceability	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Supported by <i>“as-built” report</i> from Original Design Manufacturer (ODM)• ODM partnerships are vital to two-level traceability• Blockchain provides <i>component supplier</i> level traceability
Statement of Conformance	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Attests to <i>authenticity of system</i>• <i>Signed by Platform Manufacturer</i>• Blockchain provided <i>statement of conformance</i>
Customer Web Portal	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Provides <i>customer access</i> to signed files• Files available for <i>download</i>




Trusted Supply Chain Process – In Production




The TSC Supply Chain – Problem Statement

Suppliers



- Component Inventory
- Ship components



Manufacturing

- Builds Base Assemblies
- Work In Process (WIP)
- Creates Shipment

Manufacturer In or Out-Source



- The component information (e.g., manufacturer, part number, batch number, distributor) is provided by the ODM through the “Honor System”
- Moving the Trusted Supply Chain to a Blockchain will allow component suppliers to also participate in the supply chain at the component level.
- Component Supplier participation will allow for the verification of the components used by the ODM factory to manufacture the system.
- VARs, Distributors, Resellers can now use the Distributed Application (DAPP) on the blockchain to establish the root of trust for each system.



3rd Party Logistics

- Freight Forwarding
- Customs Clearance
- Consolidation
- FG Inventory



Distributors


- Break Bulk
- Cross Dock
- FG Inventory
- Kit

Distributor

Customer/ Retailer



- Point of Sale, Sell-thru
- Inventory
- Returns, Post-Sales




Customer Data Centers

- Forecast, Sales Orders
- Goods Receipts
- Inventory of New & Returned Goods

Trusted Supply Chain on the Blockchain

A decentralized model

TSC on Blockchain



* "Ethereum is an open-source, public, blockchain-based distributed computing platform and operating system featuring smart contract functionality." – Ethereum Foundation



System-Level Traceability

- Supply chain level traceability based upon the Blockchain
 - Platform provenance starting at the component level
 - Extending into system level root of trust based upon Trusted Platform
- System level traceability based on a hardware root of trust:
 - For example Trusted Platform Module (TPM) 2.0 on motherboard, or silicon traceability using Physical unclonable function (PUF)
 - Associates platform serial number with TPM serial number and public Endorsement Key (EK)
- Software tools deployed during the manufacturing flow at the ODM:
 - Capture system information
 - Capture TPM Certificate (Including public EK)

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TSC on Blockchain Proof of Concept

Architectural details


Proof of Concept (POC) Goals and Objectives

- Conducted a proof of concept to determine the feasibility of productizing TSC on Blockchain
- Objectives:
 - Evaluate cost, performance, and security tradeoffs
 - Compare public versus private blockchain options
 - Evaluate extending TSC to additional participants (component suppliers, distributors, resellers)
 - Gather expertise to develop Distributed Applications (DAPPs)
 - Develop designs for scalability and maintainability
 - Grow understanding of blockchain development ecosystem


TSC on Blockchain DAPP Architecture

- Four tier architecture

- Presentation: Web application, Bulk Upload Tool, AutoVerify Tool
- Middle Tier: C#.NET libraries implement integration with Ethereum Application
- Ethereum Application: Solidity Smart Contracts implement blockchain business logic
- Ethereum Network: Set of nodes running private Ethereum blockchain.




TSC on Blockchain Architecture – Ethereum Application



TSC on Blockchain – Supply Chain Flows

Trusted Supply Chain Flow



Auto Verify Tool

- Blockchain Platform Validation:
 - Verifies that the platform TPM matches the platform certificate data file from the DAPP
 - Platform Attestation is confirmed by comparing the TPM module's Endorsement Key against the Endorsement Key stored in the platform certificate data file
 - Platform data file integrity provided by the blockchain
- Direct Platform Components Validation:
 - The Auto Verify tool compares the “snapshot” of the platform component data taken during manufacturing and stored in the DAPP with a “snapshot” of the platform components taken at first boot
 - Any changes in system will be flagged and reported out to the customer in the tool
 - Additional platform “snapshots” can be generated and stored in the DAPP throughout the Platform life cycle

Auto Verify Tool

Intel® Transparent Supply Chain AutoVerify Tool

Lenovo CERTIFIED

Changes in the Platform Data between snapshots are Identified

System Information

SMBIOS Information Snapshot : As Built Jan 17 2017 and Apr 20 2017 Change Detected

Change BIOS Version	3.222.21
Change BIOS Release Date	2016/12/12
Match System Manufacturer	Lenovo
Match System Serial Number	W5130450-234
Match MB Manufacturer	Lenovo
Match MB Serial Number	TPGF20123345
Match Processor Type	Intel Core 2 Duo T9400M
Match Processor Serial Number	A3F3-235C-8920-2D99-1349-2023
Match Memory Type	DDR4
Match Memory Manufacturer	Micron
Match Memory Serial Number	12161215
Match Battery Manufacturer	LG
Match Battery Serial Number	7EAE

TPM Register Information

Change BIOS	PCR 0 - 9A 44 E3 47 1B 01 33 BD 65 46 EE 7D 75 03 07 D8 E0 DC C1
Change BIOS Configuration	PCR 1 - 89 08 9A 44 E3 47 1B 01 33 EE 7D 75 03 07 D8 E0 DC C1 8D
Match Option ROM	PCR 2 - B2 6E 23 89 08 9A 44 E3 47 1B 01 33 BD 65 46 8D 53 02 75
Match Option ROM Config	PCR 3 - 3A 3F 78 0F 11 A4 B4 99 69 FC AA 80 CD 6E 39 57 C3 3B 22
Match Master Boot Record	PCR 4 - 33 BD 65 46 1B 01 33 BD 65 46 EE 7D 75 03 07 D8 E0 DC C1
Match Master Boot Config	PCR 5 - 1B 01 33 EE 3F 47 1B 01 33 EE 7D 75 03 07 D8 E0 DC C1 8D
Match State Configuration	PCR 6 - EE 7D 75 03 07 D8 E0 DC C1 23 89 08 9A 44 E3 47 1B 01 47
Match Platform Config	PCR 7 - F5 9A F6 A3 13 46 F6 B1 00 BE F6 A3 13 46 F6 B1 00 BE 4D
Match Static OS Config	PCR 8 - B1 00 BE 73 76 F6 A3 13 46 65 46 EE 7D 75 03 07 8D 53 D8

Platform Certificate

Match Platform Certificate	Issuer - Intel Corporation, Santa Clara, CA USA
Match TPM EK Serial Number	- 76 EE 64 E7 DC 15 27 94 1A A3 2B 5F 59 0B F4 23 9F 5D DC 7F
Match TPM Endorsement Key	- 89 08 9A 44 E3 47 1B 01 33 EE 7D 75 03 07 D8 E0 DC C1 8D

Changes As Built Jan 17 2017 Snapshot Apr 20 2017

BIOS Version	3.220.21	3.222.21
BIOS Release Date	2016/10/12	2016/12/12

Drive Information

Match Drive Model Name	TOSHIBA MQ01ACF050
Match Drive Serial Number	46ONCJPVT
Match Drive FW Version	AV001D

Identified changes are displayed

Discard **Save**

Ask me anything 2:40 PM ENG 3/27/2017



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DEMO

Video



Transparent Supply Chain - DAPP Transfer Ownership Login Register

User Logged in as :

Login

Select a Role and Click Login

- ODM User**
- OEM User**
- Reseller**
- Distributor**
- Platform Owner**

[Login](#)

[Login with Email](#)

[Enter the Registered Email and Click "Login with Email"](#)

[Login with Email](#)


© 2018 - Transparent Supply Chain - DAPP

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
TSC on Blockchain Proof of Concept

Performance and Security

Performance and Throughput Comparison



Public
Ethereum



Private
Ethereum

Block mining time

14.5 sec per block

14.5 sec per block

Confirmation time

10 confirmation blocks (145 sec confirmation)

10 confirmation blocks (145 sec confirmation)

Block Gas Limit

8,000,000 gas per block

320,000,000 gas per block

Theoretical Capacity

500,701 platforms / year

188,208,579 platforms / year

Security Comparison

Criteria	Public Ethereum	Private Ethereum
Confidentiality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> End to end file encryption in transit and storage. Uses cloud storage, based on KMS key. Depending on storage key management, access can be controlled so that only the authorized users have access. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> End to end file encryption in transit and storage. Uses cloud storage, based on KMS key. Depending on key management, access can be controlled so that only the authorized users have access. Additionally, private blockchain limits on-blockchain data access to authorized parties
Privacy / Anonymity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Worst of all, pseudonymous at best. Anonymity easy to compromise in public internet. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Pseudonymous. Anonymity exposure limited only to network participants.
Trust	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Large decentralization. Massively distributed, allows independent confirmation, distributed trust among entire public networks (thousands of nodes) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Limited decentralization. Small distribution, allows independent confirmation by individual participants.
Reliability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Highly reliable and available 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reliability based on underlying infrastructure.

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TSC on Blockchain Proof of Concept

Findings and Observations

Development Ecosystem

- Access to development tools, documentation, and sample code is challenging.
- It is recommended to use patterns to enable scalability and maintenance.
- Difficult to integrate tools and programming languages to develop the Ethereum application.
- Recommended Tools:

Truffle

- Development framework
- <https://github.com/trufflesuite/truffle>

Geth

- Ethereum node in Go
- <https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/wiki/geth>

Ganache

- Run simulated dev network
- <https://truffleframework.com/ganache>

MIST Browser

- Ethereum web browser
- <https://github.com/ethereum/mist>

Nethereum 3.0

- .NET DAPP integration library
- <https://nethereum.com/>



Challenges and Learnings

- Little documentation available to address issues encountered during development.
- Nethereum is an excellent library for integrating C# code
- Research on blockchain security is limited. Few mathematical models exists to evaluate security of blockchain transactions.
- Transactional capacity on the Ethereum blockchain is limited. Private Ethereum configuration changes can be made to improve performance.

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Conclusions and Summary



Conclusions and Recommendations

- Conclusions
 - Increased platform security can be achieved by using blockchain for platform attestation
 - Data storage is now decentralized, no central party has access or control
 - Privacy in the blockchain is always a concern, private blockchain reduces exposure.
 - Developing blockchain security models is imperative as future work
- Recommendations
 - Transfer supply chain management to the blockchain whenever possible
 - Private blockchain networks are better suited for supply chain solutions where privacy and performance are required
 - Use off-chain sensitive data storage such as Cloud storage
 - Use blockchain to maintain integrity of data records

Summary

- A Trusted Supply Chain is based on a hardware Root of Trust and the Blockchain
 - TPM provides hardware Root of Trust
 - Ethereum blockchain provides supply chain trust
- End-user verifiable component authenticity backs up the hardware Root of Trust
 - Auto-Verify tool validates the system component
 - Blockchain provides data integrity and verification
- Blockchain implementation of a Trusted Supply Chain is feasible

Apply What You Have Learned Today

- Next week you should:
 - Consider your companies IT Components supply chains
- In the first three months following this presentation you should:
 - Identify IT Components that have supply chain risk
 - Determine if there is an opportunity to incorporate TSC supply chain
- Within six months you should:
 - Implement a blockchain based secure supply chain solution
 - Consider platforms that incorporate TSC
 - Review the Trusted Supply Chain on Blockchain POC whitepaper (located here)



Helpful Resources

- The Ethereum project (<https://www.ethereum.org/>)
- The Five Types Model Sample Project (<https://github.com/harshpokharna/The-5-Types-Model-Simple-Bank-System-Solidity>)
- The Ethereum Blog (<https://blog.ethereum.org/>)
- Solidity Documentation (<https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/latest/index.html>)
- Nethereum Documentation (<https://nethereum.readthedocs.io/en/latest/>)
- Smart Contract Programming Tutorial (<https://medium.com/@ConsenSys/a-101-noob-intro-to-programming-smart-contracts-on-ethereum-695d15c1dab4>)
- Ethereum and Solidity (<https://www.udemy.com/ethereum-and-solidity-the-complete-developers-guide/>)


References

- Contacts:
 - Tom Dodson: tom.dodson@intel.com
 - Eduardo Cabre: eduardo.cabre@intel.com
- Transparent Supply Chain
 - <https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/servers/transparent-supply-chain.html>
- Software Stacks
 - <https://github.com/tpm2-software>
 - <https://sourceforge.net/projects/ibmtpm20tss/>
- A Practical Guide to TPM 2.0
 - <https://www.apress.com/us/book/9781430265832>




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Support Slides



TSC on Blockchain – Supply Chain Flows

Trusted Supply Chain Flow



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