RSAConference2019 Asia Pacific & Japan

Singapore | 16–18 July | Marina Bay Sands



SESSION ID: SEM-T03A

ATO and the Underground Credential Ecosystem

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Introduction to account takeover (ATO)

 What is ATO? The act of taking over legitimate accounts using compromised or stolen credentials.

Our approach to CTI focuses on adversary actions

 Identifying these core factors which further enable cyber crime, fraud and PII sales is the key to protecting vulnerable assets



Threats vs Solution


- Bank fraud
 - Remains extraordinarily profitable despite all advancements in security in the last three decades
- Customer account fraud
 - Healthcare accounts, Rewards programs, miles, points etc
- Gift card
 - Redeeming compromised retail credit card points for in-store cash, points

- Use threat intelligence to:
 - Track actors in the ecosystem
 - Understand tools and TTPs
 - Obtain configs and dissect them
 - Identify popular credential attacks and tools
 - Understand malicious laaS and take action




VS

ATO Lifecycle









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Credential Harvesting


Feeding ATO



Credential Harvesting

Credential harvesting via malware and other tools is another critical input to ATO and part of the ecosystem. Recent tools of interest for credential harvesting include:

- Vidar
- Azorult





Credential Harvesting – Vidar logs

Possible British actor Junx (aka xSweg, ItsJamie, osnapitzjamie, Jamie Jackson) offers compromised logins from botnet logs

PUBLISHED: 19 APR 2019 11:47:16 UTC

RAW TEXT

On Feb. 28, 2019, the actor **Junx** posted following on the forum Hack Forums:

RESEARCHER COMMENTS

[SELLING] Almost ANY Account Online! [Harvard] [Backends]

Code

Almost ANYTHING on the internet! (Just ask when you are ready to buy!)

Harvard

Stanford

Github

PMA Logins

Cpanels

Teamviewer Accounts

Wordpress

Pizzahut Backend

Bestbuy RMA

RS/Habbo/UMG/GB | Games

SMM Panels

Twitter/Facebook/Instagram/Youtube | Social Media

If you are lucrative you can find good ways to make money from this!

It is simple, I am offering almost any websites account. It is not cracking, rather from Botnet.

Malware campaign has ran hundreds of thousands, we will find what you need.

Also it is not sifted through beforehand, if you understand the immense amount of accounts, no one would attempt this task.



Credential Harvesting – Azorult logs

Actor mmilolika trades compromised personal information, malware logs; Health care organizations in Belgium, France, Hong Kong, US impacted; Allegedly runs AZORult stealer

PUBLISHED: 24 JAN 2019 13:44:37 UTC

TRANSLATED TEXT

RAW TEXT

RESEARCHER COMMENTS

Information from our source and assessment of credibility


The actor **mmilolika** surfaced in the underground in November 2018 and created accounts across 19 cybercrime forums. The actor's primary area of expertise is trading personal information and malware logs. The actor said the logs are sourced from the AZORult stealer. The actor claimed to be female in the xaker.name forum, but no information is available to support this claim. Our sensitive and reliable source who has direct access to **mmilolika**, reported the actor possessed email address and password combination lists stolen from various adult, dating, financial, health care and sports nutrition-related entities, including:

- clpsct.org a website of the Local Health Promotion Center in Charleroi-Thuin, Belgium.
- ecas-heartrhythm.org a website of the European Cardiac Arrhythmia Society (ECAS) in Marseille, France.
- eco-sapiens.com an online shop of organic, natural, and ecological products in Marseille, France.
- essentialelements.com.hk a website of the pharmaceutical and cosmetic product producer Essential Elements based in Hong Kong.
- healthlink.hk a health care-related portal service based in Hong Kong.
- huisarts.be a website of a nonprofit organization in Huisarts, Belgium.
- hvpros.com a website of the surgery center specialists Healthcare Venture Professionals LLC in the U.S.






Azorult IOCs






Tracking Dumps to Malware



VIDAR Datasets - 2019



Version: 6.6 Date: Mon Feb 25 19:48:07 2019 4 MachineID: 5c3eee87-f262-4c8b-a787-1311464cf7d0 5 GUID: {f2dabe0a-aab5-11e8-b900-806e6f6e6963} Path: C:\Users\herma\AppData\Roaming\terra.exe 8 Work Dir: C:\ProgramData\CP8Z9ZN3KMVU03RJRFJ2 Windows: Windows 10 Pro [x64] Computer Name: HERMAN 12 User Name: herman Display Resolution: 1920x1080 Display Language: nl-BE 15 Keyboard Languages: Nederlands (België) / Nederlands (Nederland) 16 Local Time: 25/2/2019 19:48:7 Autofill File names: Cookies Downloads cookie list.txt History Telegram

- information.txt

- outlook.txt

CC

cookie list.txt

information.txt

passwords.txt

screenshot.jpg

screenshot.jpg

11

outlook.txt

- passwords.txt

screenshot.jpeg

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Disruption via Credential Harvesting tool/actor tracking

- Tracking the actors behind credential harvesting tools allows you to disrupt this part of the ecosystem by:
 - Understanding the tools and updates to the tools to invoke preventative measures such as:
 - Delivery methods of the tool (loaders, BPH etc)
 - IOCs related to the tool
 - How token interception works allows reworking of the 2FA implementation
 - Obtain logs and dumps from these tools:
 - Early identification of victim accounts for resets etc
 - Identification of affected applications



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Account Checking Tools

The Core Tech



Account Checkers In The Underground

INFO REPORT

C2

Possible Russian actor Badabing (aka Almanah, Bor88, borisik, Borisik, Bory, Bumsms, MAXsms, milord) offers account-checking tool for uber.com

02 MAY 2019 13:03:06 UTC

INFO REPORT

C3

Possible Moroccan actor DsWeb19778 (aka Thewhat, nabil33, Nabil Saber) shares Python-based Apple account checker

01 MAY 2019 12:51:45 UTC

INFO REPORT

B3

Russian actor Shadder (aka RDP4you, GODLIKEx, greedsgood, Анатолий) seeks brute-forcing tools, checking services targeting US-based banks

30 APR 2019 03:42:40 UTC

INFO REPORT

C2

Possible Ukrainian actor goodnik7 (aka Goodnik77, Bond009) promotes superman-shop.info web shop of stolen accounts

26 APR 2019 13:05:40 UTC

INFO REPORT

Possible Russian actor reiq (aka eskort, McRapist, MOLESTO, rnm) sells source code for brute-force project targeting BB&T, Capital One, Charles Schwab, Comerica, Discover, Fifth Third Bank, Hanmi Bank, KeyBank, OneAZ Credit Union, Regions Bank, Southwest Missouri Bank, SunTrust Bank, TD Bank, USAA, Walmart

25 APR 2019 12:00:12 UTC

INFO REPORT

Actor TopFuel sells about 100,000 Reddit accounts

24 APR 2019 01:27:07 UTC

INFO REPORT

Maldivian actor ZIZ (aka 717, bobby6991, BOBBY, kickace7, nazween, Nazween KickAce, Nazween Mohamed) offers Hilton honor rewards points, suggests gift card monetization at Amazon; Possible real identity revealed

22 APR 2019 13:41:57 UTC



INFO REPORT

B2

Actor SHERIFF sells information about unspecified US-based online payment platform to leverage for banking fraud

09 APR 2019 12:41:46 UTC

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Sentry MBA History

Developed around 2007

Called "Sentry"


• 2011 - Source code released

Development taken over by Astaris





Sentry MBA Functionality





OpenBullet Account Checker/Brute Forcer

The actor **info_hacker** has been prominently promoting open bullet. OpenBullet evolved from the popular brute forcer Black Bullet

- Chatter on the underground indicates this tool may the next Sentry MBA
- Looking at the similarities of evolution it is possible; Both are open sourced, very easy to load/use, and have many users offering configs for free
- Configs are .loli format and are sought out heavily



"Bigger Products"

Private keeper:

- Released in 2014 by the actor deival909 likely from Lviv Ukraine
- Features include proxy (list) support, attack timing configurations and defeating of CAPTCHA using OCR


uAdmin:

- The actor kaktys1010 sells uAdmin for \$500 and began in February of 2017
- Base features include a phishing generator, victim tracker, and token interception.
- Additional framework plugins include a text manager, money mule manager,
 VNC capability, event logging, and log parsing



#RSAC


uAdmin





deival909's partners (for PrivateKeeper)

- Developers of tools for specific targets:
 - Ukrainian actor Coco (possibly lives in Ivano-Frankivsk) targets US banks and e-commerce companies







Disruption via Account Checking tool/actor tracking

- Get latest copy of the tool to understand defaults and provide critical input into the security stack for adjustment:
 - Default user agent strings
 - Understand captcha solving limitations
 - Understand brute force avoidance techniques
 - Anti-gateway modules (cyclic parsing)
- Understand "business" partners and related tool for TTP insights



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Configurations


Targeting

Configurations

- All of these tools take a configuration
- These configurations are part of the ecosystem as they are generally sold by different actors than the tool
- Even frameworks like PrivateKeeper can take separate configs
- These configs are usually organization specific so finding yours early is key





Sentry MBA





OpenBullet







OpenBullet Config Example (.loli format)

```
[SETTINGS]
  "Name": "
  "SuggestedBots": 1,
  "LastModified": "2019-04-22T13:36:30.1326612-05:00",
  "AdditionalInfo": "",
  "Author": "The Killer Rkil",
  "Version": "1.0.0",
  "IgnoreResponseErrors": false,
  "NeedsProxies": true,
  "OnlySocks": false,
  "OnlySsl": false,
  "MaxProxyUses": 0,
  "AllowedWordlist1": "UserPass",
  "AllowedWordlist2": "",
  "DataRules": [],
  "CustomInputs": [],
  "ForceHeadless": false,
  "AlwaysOpen": false,
  "AlwaysQuit": false,
  "DisableNotifications": false,
  "CustomUserAgent": "",
  "RandomUA": false,
  "CustomCMDArgs": ""
[SCRIPT]
FUNCTION RandomNum 10000 90000 -> VAR "num"
FUNCTION RandomNum 10 90 -> VAR "num2"
FUNCTION RandomNum 100 900 -> VAR "num3"
```



OpenBullet Config Example (cont'd)

```
CONTENTTYPE "application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=utf-8"
  HEADER "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like
Gecko"
  HEADER "Pragma: no-cache"
  HEADER "Accept: */*"
  HEADER ": scheme: https"
  HEADER "accept: */*"
  HEADER "accept-encoding: gzip, deflate, br"
  HEADER "accept-language: en-US,en;q=0.9"
  HEADER "content-length: 1566"
  HEADER "dnt: 1"
  HEADER "origin: https://global.
                                                 com"
  HEADER "referer: https://global.
                                                  com/login/en-GB?inav=gb_utility_login"
  HEADER "user-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML,
like Gecko) Chrome/73.0.3683.103 Safari/537.36"
KEYCHECK
  KEYCHAIN Failure OR
    KEY "{\"statusCode\":1,\"errorCode\":\"LGON001\",\""
  KEYCHAIN Success OR
    KEY "{\"statusCode\":0,\""
```



Disruption via Configuration Monitoring

- Understand the specific app endpoint(s) being targeted
 - Make adjustments to the application
 - Wrap additional protection on legacy app endpoints
- Updates to the default settings (beyond the tools section)
 - New techniques
 - Specialty settings (rate limiting, obfuscation etc)
 - Captcha solving/captcha upgrades



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Bulletproof Hosting and Proxy Nets

Where to launch attacks from

Malicious Infrastructure (BPH and Proxy Nets)

All of these tools operate through malicious infrastructure such as bulletproof hosting or proxy networks, including both the account checking tool and the credential harvesting. (rate limiting by IP, endpoint access tracking by IP is defeated via this method)





Russian actor, bulletproof hoster yalishanda (aka downlow, stas_vl) hosts new phishing campaign involving ABN AMRO, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena, Banca Popolare dell'Emilia Romagna, Commonwealth Bank, POSB Bank, Vodafone; Current proxy-net size sits at 90 IP addresses

PUBLISHED: 14 JAN 2019 13:51:57 UTC



IaaS BPH and Proxy Nets

By tracking the actors that provide these malicious infrastructure services we can obtain almost real time insight into the infrastructure being provided. We can see some of the domains targeting Asia Pacific are hosted in China but rented out by a Russian adversary.

49.51.136.239, CHN, Tencent Cloud

49.51.137.76, CHN, Tencent Cloud

49.51.146.62, CHN, Tencent Cloud

49.51.170.17, CHN, Tencent Cloud

49.51.170.102, CHN, Tencent Cloud

49.51.171.96, CHN, Tencent Cloud

49.51.172.220,CHN,TencentCloud

49.51.173.30,CHN,TencentCloud

49.51.173.192,CHN,TencentCloud

49.51.173.225, CHN, Tencent Cloud

79.143.28.108, RUS, Selectel Ltd.

89.108.65.190, RUS, Reg. Ru Network Operations

185.176.26.66, RUS, Cloud-services

185.229.224.120,ISR,CloudWebManage

185.247.117.183,NDL,EU-AMS-VPSSERVERCOM

In the last 72 hours, no hosts were added to the actor's fast-flux infrastructure.

INTEL**47**

— 49.51.171.96 alosbwgs.com dbs-security.info deligvsiogsd.com digefinsed.com epinnora.com fiosbewos.com ing-verification.com ingbank-verify.com ingbankieren-online.com ingbankieren.org jestowendo.com mackdonatap.com mail.alosbwgs.com mail.dbs-security.info mail.deligvsiogsd.com mail.digefinsed.com mail.epinnora.com mail.fiosbewos.com mail.jestowendo.com mail.mackdonatap.com mail.personal-confirmation.com mail.personal-confirmation.info mail.personal-verification.info mail.posb-dbs-online.net *mail.posb-dbs-sq.org mail.posb-dbs-support.com mail.rbc-login.com mail.serverconnectionfailed.com mail.verification-online.net mail.westpac-verify.com mobile_rovalbank.com.rbc-login.con

Disruption via BPH Actor Tracking

- By having access to real time infrastructure updates and information it is possible to:
 - Block initial infection vector
 - Block second stage callback
 - Block exfiltration
- Information about the actor provides strategic insight on which actors are working with which other actors in the ecosystem to provide focus



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Wrap Up and Review

Whats Hot?

Investment in this ecosystem continues to grow as we can see just this year:

- Actor foxovsky has closed support for the stealer Arkei but retains a private version (Vidar) and has provided and open access to the bot builder.
- Actor offenders has offered up a new stealer with a full admin panel. (enabling ATO as a service/affiliate program)
- Actor Satoshi, behind much of the credential monetization apprehended in Belarus (bruteforce[.]online, fraud[.]im, rpgclub[.]com)
- STORM account checker remains immensely popular



Review of the Ecosystem and Disruption Opportunity



Credential Harvesting: disruption by tracking the actors to understand techniques and get ahead of credential lists.



Configurations for account checkers: disruption by tracking the actors to obtain configs early and make application adjustments.



Account checking tools: disruption by tracking the actors to obtain copies of the tools for techniques, defaults and understand business partners for additional components and targets.



Malicious Infrastructure: disruption by tracking the actors to obtain infrastructure updates for blocking and prevention.



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Questions and Thank You!