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BETTER.

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Anatomy of an Enterprise Mobile Security Incident

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@AARONRTURNER


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Session Outline

- The price of mobile complacency
- Understanding the enterprise mobile ecosystem
- The Venn Diagrams of Mobile Security Doom
- Step-by-step recreation efforts
- Mobile security tool evaluations
- Recommendations and roadmaps

20 years of Enterprise Mobility

- One chart that pretty much tells the story of why enterprise mobile security is so awful today




Credit: comScore MobiLense

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



The Global View

IDC: Worldwide smartphone shipments (millions of units)



Enterprise Mobile Situation

- Among US knowledge workers in information-centric businesses, iOS continues to dominate
- Among global manufacturing, logistics, hospitality and retail customers, Android is king
- Both platforms suffer terribly from hygiene problems
 - 56% of enterprise-connected iOS devices are vulnerable to commodity exploits



Data based upon IANS Research mobile security assessments
<https://www.iansresearch.com>



What is an iOS ‘Commodity Exploit’?

- LMGTFY
- A non-persistent exploit/jailbreak
- Useful to get temporary access to iOS kernel
 - And all data and credentials as well

Google search results for "ios 12.0.1 exploit github":

- GitHub - externalist/exploit_playground:** Analysis of public exploits or ...
https://github.com/externalist/exploit_playground ▾
It is a commented version of kudima's WebKit remote code execution exploit(fixed in this commit). It is fixed in iOS 12.1, and works up to iOS 12.0.1. The issue is ...
- GitHub - userlandkernel/jailbreakme-unified:** Framework for iOS ...
<https://github.com/userlandkernel/jailbreakme-unified> ▾
Framework for iOS browser exploitation to kernel privileges and rootfs remount ... 8.4.1 & 9.3 up to 9.3.3 & 11.3.1 & 12.0 - 12.0.1 (64-bit); 3.1.2 up to 4.0.1 & 8.4.1 ... The payload is aligned so it can be used later when the exploit has created an ...
- GitHub - CloudFTL/OnlineRespring**
<https://github.com/CloudFTL/OnlineRespring> ▾
ios 12.1 NO ios 12.0.1 YES ios 12.0 YES ios 11.4 YES ios 11.3.1 YES ios 11.3 YES ios 11.2.6 YES ios ... The Exploits Work On Pretty Much Anything.

The Incident

- Global enterprise conglomerate, more than 50,000 employees worldwide
- Office 365 Global Admin travels to hostile country
- Global Admins are only required to use soft tokens while on untrusted networks
- Staff member returns to the US
- Office 365 badness ensues

The Aftermath

- No IoC's on Global Admin's Laptop
- No IoC's on Global Admin's iPhone
- But...
 - Clear evidence of unauthorized Office 365 activity and privilege abuse
- Zeroing in on the iOS device:
 - More than 60 days out-of-date, vulnerable to more than 10 exploits at the time staff member was traveling in hostile country
 - As soon as the staff member's credentials were reset and MFA soft token revoked and reissued, unauthorized access ceased

Zeroing in on the iOS device

- More than 60 days out-of-date
- Vulnerable to more than 10 exploits at the time of travel
- Credential reset and soft-token revocation and redeployment resulted in immediate stop to Office 365 privilege abuse


Trying to Explain the Unexplainable

- Client asks team to create a report outlining potential ways that the scenario could be explained
- Collaboration among a group of iOS and Office 365 experts yields a theory:
 - Staff member was targeted with iOS exploit while in hostile country
 - Non-persistent jailbreak uses kernel vulnerability to gain access to stored credentials and cryptographic secrets in iOS keychain
 - Attackers inject stolen credentials and cryptographic secrets into attack device, essentially cloning user's credentials and MFA soft token
 - Evidence of the attack deleted when iOS device is rebooted


This is not supposed to happen!

- Nearly all vendors offering soft token solutions claim to leverage iOS's secure enclave encryption facility
 - The secure enclave is essentially a cryptographic co-processor which helps improve the integrity of encryption operations on iOS devices
 - For more information, read the 'Storing Keys in the Secure Enclave' article in the Apple developer documentation
- Soft tokens store secret data in keychain locations which can expose soft tokens to remote attacks
- Result: a kernel-mode exploit could successfully steal the MFA soft token secrets, clone them to an attacker device and the back-end system would be none the wiser

Mobile Security Venn Diagrams of Doom



Fortune 1000 Mobile Trend



Top 5 Financial Services Org

The Mobile Identity Problem

- When you don't enforce any sort of software integrity on mobile endpoints, but...
- Implement software-based systems to attempt to drive integrity into identity and access processes...
- Bad things are going to happen

Mobile security tools will help!

- MAM, MDM, MTD... to the rescue!
... or not...

What can you do to a vulnerable iPhone with MTD installed?

- A remarkable amount of badness
- IANS Research evaluated two market-leading MTD platforms through a series of penetration tests
- Rules of the game: Target devices had to be 60 days out-of-date (in-line with 60% of this customer's mobile fleet)
- The worst-case scenario:
 - IANS successfully compromised one MTD's VPN credentials and injected an unauthorized root of trust into the certificate store

```
Type: "Generic Password"
Account = "Password1"
Access Group = "DPT4QME9Y6.com"
Creation Date = "2018-02-09 18:27:07 +0000"
User Defined Attribute: Password1
Modified Date = "2018-02-09 18:27:07 +0000"
Accessible: "When Device is Unlocked"
Service: VPN Service
Password: Password1
```

| iOS Function Evaluation | 1 | 2 |
|-------------------------------------|---|---|
| Kernel execution | | |
| Operating memory protection | | |
| File system integrity | | |
| Security secret store integrity | | |
| Cryptographic store integrity | | |
| Application execution integrity | | |
| Physical-layer network integrity | | |
| Application-layer network integrity | | |

| | |
|---|--|
| MTD Detection Failed | |
| MTD Detection Failed but slight advantage | |
| MTD Detection Succeeded | |

What can you do to a vulnerable mobile device with InTune?

- When you have a kernel-mode exploit, application/user controls are not effective AT ALL
- IANS Research coordinated review of both iOS and Android devices managed by InTune

| Function Evaluation | iOS | And. |
|-------------------------------------|-----|------|
| Kernel execution | | |
| Operating memory protection | | |
| File system integrity | | |
| Security secret store integrity | | |
| Cryptographic store integrity | | |
| Application execution integrity | | |
| Physical-layer network integrity | | |
| Application-layer network integrity | | |
| InTune Security Detection Failed | | |
| InTune Security Detection Succeeded | | |



Vulnerability Management on Mobile is Important!

- Groundbreaking research:
 - Installing security updates on mobile devices significantly reduces the risks associated with attacks on mobile devices
- There are really only 2 paths forward at this time:
 - iOS: only allow iOS devices to connect to enterprise resources if they have the latest security updates
 - Android: only allow Pixel or Android One devices to connect to enterprise resources if they have the latest security updates

Once updates are installed, key policies to enforce

- iOS security policies
 - Prohibit untrusted TLS certificates
 - Block documents in unmanaged apps
 - Treat AirDrop as unmanaged destination
- Android security policies
 - Only allow Android for Work capable devices
 - Block sharing from work to personal profile
 - Prevent users from manually adding or removing work profiles
 - Enforce Verify Apps for work and personal profiles

But none of these matter on a vulnerable mobile device!