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Lessons Learned From 30 Years of Security Awareness Efforts

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Seminal Hasn't Changed Much…Sigh

1995 USENIX UNIX Security Symposium

- Do not rely upon common internal identifiers
- Implement call-back procedure for information disclosure
- Implement security awareness program
- Identify direct computer support
- Create a security alert system
- Perform social engineering to test

2018 Social Engineering Webinar

- Be paranoid
- Train client facing staff
- Verify identity with other information
- Implement MFA

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How I Became Cynical, and Maybe an Expert

The Bad Awareness

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The Good

- There are some really screwed up people there
- Despite a couple disasters, there are relatively few significant security problems
- People do accept security procedures when expected to

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The Sacred Cow Slaughter House

Social Engineering Doesn't Qualify You as an Awareness Expert

- I know first hand
- Social Engineering is easy
  - Amateurs are easily successful
- Social engineering can determine unique problems, and possibly the scope
- Awareness is more than telling people, "Here are problems; Don't fall for that!"
- Knowing how to break something does NOT mean you know how to fix it
  - It's a completely different science

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Corollary: An NLP Course is Not a Substitute for Real Human Elicitation Training

- Good spies seem to have a 6th Sense
- Their lives depend on it
- Intelligence operatives have years of training
- NLP is good background, but not the same
  - Maybe it's usually enough
  - 90% successful with just the nerve
- Give up a password vs Betray country under penalty of torture and death

Yes, You Can Patch Stupid

- You better expect users to make mistakes
- Patching is not getting rid of a problem, but implementing a protection
- More later, but…
  - You can prevent attacks from getting to the user
  - Taking decisions away from users
  - Proactively mitigating attacks after the fact

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You, NOT the Users, Are the Weakest Link
(Behind Every Stupid User is a Stupider Security Professional)



- Users are a part of the system you are there to protect
- If you can't secure a critical part of the system, it's your fault
- Calling the user the weakest link abdicates responsibility
- If the user can ruin your network, IT'S YOUR FAULT!

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Users Are NOT the First Line of Defense

- Grandiose terms about users are as bad as disparaging terms
- The users are part of the system
  - They are not a resource to the security team
- They are not the first line of defense
  - You facilitate the attacks getting to them
- They are really not a reliable line of defense

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The Human Firewall Sucks

- In the first place, technical firewalls fail miserably
- In the second place, just don’t
- A human firewall is even more unreliable than a real one
- Users are again not your resource
- Humans are a part of your system

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Yes, You Can Blame the User

- Well, as long as the user should know what to do
- Not following policies and ruining the network/organization should be punished
  - It is literally done with every other business function in an organization
  - Remember the NSA contractors who gave Snowden their passwords
- When you have no enforcement, you have no security program

Stop. Think. Connect. Just. Don't. Do. It.

- STC is a popular campaign
- Novices vs Skilled Sociopaths
- It's a losing equation
- Training people to be on the lookout for the Wascally Wabbit

Gamification Does NOT Mean a Game…

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Funny ≠ Effective

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Some Examples

- You lose your weapon, you will do jail!
- You lose your badge, you have to pay $100 for a replacement
  - It costs RSAC money
  - It prevents badge duplicate badge use
- You don’t badge in, you don’t get paid
- You email out PII, you will be called into the office
  - Laws require it now
  - It costs companies money

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Sommelier Vs Grandma



Awareness Programs Should All Over People



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Likability is NOT a Valid Awareness Metric

- Whether or not people like your training is not a valid measure of effectiveness
- There must be motivation to practice the desired behaviors
- It doesn't matter if people know why they're doing something
- It doesn't matter if it's funny
- They just have to do it

Does it change the behavior?

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Why Awareness?

Awareness is a Business Function

- Awareness is there to reduce business losses
- If it's just a Check the Box, it doesn't matter
  - You might as well do anything
- The only thing that matters is that you return more investment than the cost of the awareness program



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Security efforts get the budgets they deserve, not the budgets that they need

Learn to deserve more!

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Sciences That Don't Seem to Work

The Bro-Science of Awareness

Psychology

- I realize it's counterintuitive
- Psychology is the study of the individual
- Individuals are mostly different
- You can't have a different awareness program for every person
- It helps, but it is too fluffy

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Neuro-Linguistic Programming (NLP)

- And generally the science of influence
- Fundamentally, it makes Security behaviors a should
- Influence is about how to manipulate an individual
  - You are trying to create behaviors, not convincing people to take a specific action at a given time
- Can try to incorporate it into awareness
- Fundamentally Hacking ≠ Security

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Mental Models Don't Help

- How someone perceives something and makes a decision
- Some studies indicate Mental Models don't help with security
- One study showed that the wrong Mental Model can be the best
  - It doesn't matter what they know, it matters what they do
- Either way, your goal is to create the behavior no matter how each and every person in the company thinks

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A Bit of Science That Works

ABCs of Applied Behavioral Science

- Antecedent might create up to 20% of behaviors
- Consequences create 80%+ of possible behaviors
- Consequences can be positive, negative, or neutral
- Positive consequences can reinforce bad behaviors and vice versa

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ABCs of Awareness

- Awareness creates behaviors
- Behaviors consistently practiced create culture
- Culture creates awareness
- Culture creates behaviors
- Culture is peer pressure
- Peer pressure should be the most effective form of awareness training

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Gamification

- When implemented properly
- A reward structure for exhibiting desired behaviors
- For the right environments and roles
- Tactically for specific behaviors
- Business drivers tell you what to reward
- Culture tells you how to reward

Safety Science

- Critical financial motivation
  - Injuries cost a lot of money
- 90% injuries from environment
- 10% from carelessness or ignorance
  - Assuming they know the appropriate behavior
- The last 10% is where awareness comes in

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Just About Every Other Business Function

- The CFO would be fired for saying people-related losses are too hard to control
- The COO would be fired for saying that they can't get the employees to do their jobs properly
- McDonald's automates away just about every employee decision

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What Should an Awareness Program Look Like?

It's More than Phishing and CBT

- Pervasive
- You are creating a culture
- Any communication tool that will work
  - Speakers
  - Newsletters
  - Coffee cup sleeves
  - Anything

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The Two Basics

- Culture
- Business Drivers

The Components of an Awareness Program

- Topics driven by business drivers
- Communications tools driven by culture
- Metrics driven by
  - Business drivers to measure what's important
  - Culture to determine what is easy and available to measure

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About Metrics

- Should measure the root behavior
  - Not the symptoms
  - Reports of phishing messages
  - Anti-malware reports
  - Calls to the Help Desk
  - Stopping strangers
- Should be real business practices

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What You Really Need to Do

Create Grandma's House

Culture is the Best Awareness Tool

- When everyone does the right thing everyone will do the right thing
- With or without an awareness program, everyone does what everyone else does

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Address Security Like Every Other Business Process

- Remove decision making process from users
- Governance to determine process specifically
- Technology to implement process
  - Eliminate decisions where possible (passwords, MFA)
- Governance defines behavior
  - Specifies how decisions are to be made
- Exception handling

Which One Are You Creating?

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The Big Question

What Are You Trying To Accomplish?

An Aware User or Mitigating User Related Losses?

Need a Holistic Approach

- More at Lab tomorrow
- Prevent attacks from reaching user
  - Technology and process
- User decisions are defined
- Technology and process take over to mitigate poor user decision

Awareness is Valuable, But…

- Generally 1 in 20 users will fail
  - That's 50 people for every 1,000
- All it takes is 1
- Risk reduction is critical though
  - Is it better to have 5 in 20 fail?

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…You Need to Reduce Need for Awareness

- Take away need for user action
- Take away the need to Think.
- Define decisions
- Force decisions

Apply

- Within a week
  - Attend my lab tomorrow
  - Determine what type of awareness you have
  - Determine if you want to change it
- Within 30 days
  - Determine a plan to start migrating
  - Get support to implement plan
- Within a 90 days
  - Create a plan
  - Determine first project to enhance awareness or human security
  - Implement low hanging fruit

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The Book, The Myth, The Legend



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