RS/Conference2019

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The Industry of Social Network Manipulation: from Botnets to Hucksters

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RS/Conference2019 **Research Context**

Research Context

New York Attorney General to Investigate Firm That Sells Fake Followers

By Nicholas Confessore

Jan. 27, 2018



The New York attorney general, Eric T. Schneiderman, on Saturday opened an investigation into a company that sold millions of fake followers on social media platforms, some of them copying real users' personal information.

The company, Devumi, and its sale of automated followers to a swath of celebrities, sports stars, journalists and politicians, was <u>detailed in a New York Times article</u> published earlier on Saturday. While based in Florida, Devumi claims on its website to be based in New York City.



The Followers' Factory (New York Times Inv.)





We thought...

Targeting Demuvi!



There is so much more behind this industry



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Uncover the supply chain behind social media fraud

Main Providers: botnets

Linux/Moose

An IoT botnet that conducts social media fraud



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Recap of Linux/Moose


- Affects routers / Internet of Things (IoT)
 - Embedded Linux systems with busybox userland
- Worm-like behavior
 - Telnet credential brute force
- Payload: Proxy service
 - SOCKSv4/v5, HTTP, HTTPS
- Used to proxy traffic to social media sites (mainly Instagram)





Catching Linux/Moose

- Software-based
- Low interaction
- Side-loaded an ARM virtual machine
 - Which we infected




Linux/Moose Honeypots





HTTPS Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attack





Investigating Linux/Moose

- Built and infected IoT honeypots (10 in 5 countries)
- Conducted a man-in-the-middle-attack



Accessed the raw traffic



At the time...



nseĉ

nseĉ









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ABSTRACT

The size of a social media account's audience – in terms of followers or friends count – is believed to be a good measure of its influence and popularity. To gain quick artificial popularity on online social networks (OSN), one can buy likes, follows and views, from social media fraud (SMF) services. SMF is the generation of likes, follows and views on OSN such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Instagram. Using a research method that combines computer sciences and social sciences, this paper

1. INTRODUCTION

Online social networks (OSN) are primary outlets for many activities such as advertising, personal communications, news broadcasts, political announcements and advocating social causes. They now engage a large portion of the world's population, making it possible for individuals, companies and governments to reach a large audience through the acquisition of a fan base, also known as 'followers' and/or 'friends'. In most cases, attracting new followers and friends is done by publishing interesting



ATTACKING LINUX/MOOSE

GOSECURE Olivier Bilodeau

GoSecure Inc.

UNRAVELED AN EGO MARKET

Masarah Paquet-Clouston

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The Untold Feature of Linux/Moose

Whitelisted IP addresses

Untold Feature of Linux/Moose

Seven whitelisted IPs

• Reseller model?

```
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                                                      connection:
                                                                       li
                                                                               $v0, 0x10
                                                                               $v0, 0x68+addrlen($fp)
                                                                               $v0, config
                                                                               $a0, (srvsockfd - 0x441658)($v0)
                                                                               $v1, $fp, 0x68+addr
                                                                               $v0, $fp, 0x68+addrlen
                                                                               $a1, $v1
                                                                               Sa2, SvO
                                                                                        # addrlen
                                                                       move
                                                                       jal
                                                                               accept
                                                                       nop
                                                                               $v0, 0x68+sockfd($fp)
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                                                                       lw
                                                                       nop
                                                                               $v0, connected
                                                                       bgez
                                                                       nop
                  connected:
                                          $v1, 0x68+addr.sin_addr($fp)
                                          $v0, $fp, 0x68+srv_whlst_eflag
                                  addiu
                                           $a0, $v1 # ip addr
                                          $a1, $v0 # whitelist entry flag
                                  move
                                          is in whitelist
                                  jal
                                  nop
                                          $v0, fail
                                  begz
                                  nop
                                                        4 🚅
et and config to a worker thread
                                                       fail:
           $a0, 0xC # size
                                                                                 $a0, 0x68+sockfd($fp)
   li
   jal
           pthread malloc
                                                                        jal
                                                                                 close
   nop
           $v0, 0x68+shd_mem($fp)
                                                                                 connection
   SW
           $v1, 0x68+addr.sin addr($fp)
   lw
           $v0, 0x68+shd mem($fp)
                                                         # End of function thd serve10073
   lw
   nop
```



Testing the Reseller Model Hypothesis

Investigate similarities in traffic sent by each whitelisted IP based on these variables:

- Honeypots used
- Websites targeted
- TLS fingerprints
- User agents
- API calls
- Timestamps
- Accounts created on social networks
- Accounts followed on social networks



Honeypots Used


Where Whitelisted IP addresses sent Traffic Requests in the World





Websites Targeted

OSN Targeted per Whitelisted IP Address



Other Options


- TLS fingerprinting
 - Lee Brotherston's TLS Fingerprinting project
 - Salesforces' JA3 project
- User agents
- API calls





Timestamps


Number of Requests sent per Whitelisted IP Address





Timestamps

Number of Requests sent per Whitelisted IP Address






Accounts Created and Accounts Followed

Different whitelisted IPs followed the same accounts \rightarrow

AND

List of fake accounts per whitelisted IP →








Purpose of the Whitelisted IPs

Fake account management!

Most likely: windows servers with proxy-aware Instagram fat-client is used to manage fake accounts and the flows of interactions with social networks





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Uncover the supply chain behind social media fraud


Bulk Reseller Panels

Bulk Reseller Panels

Found in the decrypted traffic: reseller panels



Bulk Reseller Panels



Username	
Password	
Remember me	
Sign in	Do not have an account? Sign up

SMM Reseller Panel For Freelancers

Socialnavy.com is the best worlds #1 Automated and cheapest SMM Panel for Resseller.We provide most of the social media marketing service, you can buy instagram followers, buy twitter followers and all other safe social media services.

*** We are the main Provider of all Social Media Services ***

You can resell our social media marketing (SMM) services to your own panel or resell on Fiverr ,Seoclerks and more others social stores.

We offer:-


- · Fully automated panel service with API
- · Instant start and process and same day delivery
- · Confidentially 100 %
- · One Click Deposit via Paypal, Perfect Money, Bitcoin, Web Money, Payza
- · Easy to Order/ Mass Orders Tab
- . Full API Support for Panel and Website Owners.
- · Trusted SMM Service Provider
- · 24 / 7 customer support



Reseller Panels (N=343)

- Fingerprint of the web application
- Domain registration information
- IP address
- HTML content





2/3 of the Dataset

- Coded in PHP
- Used similar combinations of client-side JavaScript libraries
- Hosted on the same IP address belonging to OVH





OVH IP

Resolve	First	Last	Source
ip228.ip-54-37-92.eu	2018-04-19	2018-10-03	riskiq
takipcidestegim.com	2018-06-24	2018-10-03	riskiq
bayimarketi.com	2018-04-30	2018-10-03	riskiq
takipdeposu.com	2018-04-19	2018-10-03	riskiq
turuncubayi.com	2018-10-02	2018-10-03	riskiq
privatesmm.com	2018-04-19	2018-10-03	riskiq
smmfollows.com	2018-04-19	2018-10-03	riskiq
smmlite.com	2018-04-19	2018-10-03	riskiq
auto-sm.com	2018-04-19	2018-10-03	riskiq
medyabayim.com	2018-05-03	2018-10-03	riskiq
viasmm.com	2018-05-15	2018-10-03	riskiq
vinasocial.com	2018-09-05	2018-10-03	riskiq
sosyalbayin.com	2018-09-05	2018-10-03	riskiq
sosyalbayilik.com	2018-04-19	2018-10-03	riskiq
buzpromoter.com	2018-05-30	2018-10-03	riskiq
perfectpanel.com	2018-04-18	2018-10-03	pingly, riskiq



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Uncover the supply chain behind social media fraud

Software Panel Seller

The Software Panel Seller

Perfect Panel

Features

Pricing

emo FA

Sign in

Get started

#RSAC

The best SMM panels platform

All-in-one solution for reselling or providing SMM services.



Service

All in one solution:

- Ready to go software
- Provides web hosting
- You only need a domain name
 Track your workers

Features:

- API to receive orders
- API to send orders

Montly price based on the number of orders made, ranging from \$50 up to \$200 per month.




Finding the Main Provider






Finding the Main Provider





Summary

Social Media Fraud Supply Chain





Revenue Division in the Chain

	Customer-Facing Websites	Reseller Panels
Medium Price for 1,000 followers on Instagram	\$ 13	\$ 1

Customer-facing sellers: 92% of profit margin (if no other costs incurred)

Reseller panel owners: \$1 per 1,000 followers

Main SMF provider: Revenue < \$1 per 1,000 followers



Key Takeaways

- This study goes from malware analysis to market ecosystem understandings
- We find that botnets are at the end of a supply chains: many actors are involved in reselling social media fraud
- We conclude that potentials target to disrupt social media fraud are software panel sellers



Apply

• Next week, you should:

Change Telnet default credentials of all devices within the organization!

• Within the next year, you should:

Educate the public of such threat, ensure other individuals do not only use "followers" as indicators of credibility



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Thank you! Questions?

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