

Training Certifiably Robust Neural Networks

Yuhao Mao

14 February 2024

Empirical Robustness


$$\begin{array}{c} \text{x} \\ \text{“panda”} \\ 57.7\% \text{ confidence} \end{array} + .007 \times \begin{array}{c} \text{sign}(\nabla_x J(\theta, x, y)) \\ \text{“nematode”} \\ 8.2\% \text{ confidence} \end{array} = \begin{array}{c} \text{x} + \epsilon \text{sign}(\nabla_x J(\theta, x, y)) \\ \text{“gibbon”} \\ 99.3 \% \text{ confidence} \end{array}$$



Goodfellow et. al., Explaining and Harnessing Adversarial Examples, ICLR'15

Eykholt et. al., Robust Physical-World Attacks on Deep Learning Visual Classification, CVPR'18

Towards Certified Robustness



Program testing can be used to show the presence
of bugs, but never to show their absence!


(Edsger Dijkstra)

#	paper	model	clean	APGD _{CE}	APGD _{DLR}	FAB	Square	AutoAttack	report.	reduct.
CIFAR-10 - $\epsilon = 8/255$										
1	(Wang et al., 2019)	En ₅ RN	82.39 (0.14)	48.81	49.37	-	78.61	45.56 (0.20)	51.48	-5.9
2	(Yang et al., 2019)	with AT	84.9 (0.6)	30.1	31.9	-	-	26.3 (0.85)	52.8	-26.5
3	(Yang et al., 2019)	pure	87.2 (0.3)	21.5	24.3	-	-	18.2 (0.82)	40.8	-22.6
4	(Grathwohl et al., 2020)	JEM-10	90.99 (0.03)	11.69	15.88	63.07	79.32	9.92 (0.03)	47.6	-37.7
5	(Grathwohl et al., 2020)	JEM-1	92.31 (0.04)	9.15	13.85	62.71	79.25	8.15 (0.05)	41.8	-33.6
6	(Grathwohl et al., 2020)	JEM-0	92.82 (0.05)	7.19	12.63	66.48	73.12	6.36 (0.06)	19.8	-13.4
CIFAR-10 - $\epsilon = 4/255$										
1	(Grathwohl et al., 2020)	JEM-10	91.03 (0.05)	49.10	52.55	78.87	89.32	47.97 (0.05)	72.6	-24.6
2	(Grathwohl et al., 2020)	JEM-1	92.34 (0.04)	46.08	49.71	78.93	90.17	45.49 (0.04)	67.1	-21.6
3	(Grathwohl et al., 2020)	JEM-0	92.82 (0.02)	42.98	47.74	82.92	89.52	42.55 (0.07)	50.8	-8.2


Part 1

A Quick Start to Neural Network Verification

The concept of Verification




The concept of Verification



Sound: if verified, then must be correct; if not verified, potentially be correct/incorrect.


The concept of Verification



Sound: if verified, then must be correct; if not verified, potentially be correct/incorrect.

Complete: if correct, then must be verified.

The concept of Verification




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
Complete: if correct, then must be verified.

Complete and sound is desirable: but **NP-hard** in neural network verification.

Abstract Interpretation




Abstract Interpretation



Poison Test: find a poisonous bottle inside N bottles.

Abstract Interpretation




Relationship 1:
abstracting followed by concretizing

Relationship 2:
concretizing followed by abstracting

Poison Test: find a poisonous bottle inside N bottles.

Randomly mix N/2 bottles and test:

Abstract Interpretation




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Poison Test: find a poisonous bottle inside N bottles.

**Randomly mix $N/2$ bottles and test:
Positive \rightarrow contain poison**

Abstract Interpretation




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Negative -> no poison

Abstract Interpretation



Relationship 1:
abstracting followed by concretizing


Relationship 2:
concretizing followed by abstracting

Verify that the following program never throws type error:


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
Verify that the following program never throws type error:

```
int x, y, z;  
z = x+y;
```


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
```
int x, y, z;  
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```

$x \rightarrow \text{int}$


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
```
int x, y, z;  
z = x+y;
```

x -> int
y -> int


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
Randomly mix N/2 bottles and test:

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
Negative -> no poison

**$x \rightarrow \text{int}$
 $y \rightarrow \text{int}$
 $\text{int} + \text{int} \rightarrow \text{int}$**

Abstract Interpretation for Neural Net



Abstract Interpretation for Neural Net




Sound but incomplete

Box Domain

Relax the exact set as a hyper-box (interval).

Imprecise for both **linear and **ReLU** layers.**



$$[a, b] + [c, d] = [a + b, c + d]$$

$$\text{ReLU}([a, b]) = [\text{ReLU}(a), \text{ReLU}(b)]$$


$$[a, b] - [c, d] = [a - d, b - c]$$

Zonotope Domain

Relax the exact set as a zonotope.

Precise for linear but imprecise for ReLU layers.


$$a^\top x + b + c^\top e, e = [\epsilon_1, \epsilon_2, \dots, \epsilon_n]$$




DeepPoly/CROWN Domain

Relax the exact set as linear constraints.

Precise for **linear** but imprecise for **ReLU** layers.



$$\text{ReLU}(x) \geq 0, \quad \text{ReLU}(x) \leq \frac{u}{u-l}(x-l)$$




$$\text{ReLU}(x) \geq x, \quad \text{ReLU}(x) \leq \frac{u}{u-l}(x-l)$$

Triangle Domain

Relax the exact set as linear constraints.

Precise for **linear but imprecise for **ReLU** layers.**

The **most precise convex domain.**



$$\text{ReLU}(x) \geq 0,$$

$$\text{ReLU}(x) \geq x,$$



$$\text{ReLU}(x) \leq \frac{u}{u-l}(x-l).$$

Complete Verification

Encode the ReLU as a Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP).

Complete but NP-hard to solve.

Branch-and-Bound (BaB) for solving.



Scale of Verification: VNN'22

	Name	Network Type	# Params	# Neurons	Input Dim	Domain
Complex CNN / ResNet	Carvana UNet	Complex U-Net	150k - 330 k	275k - 373k	5828	BaB* with DeepPoly
	VGGNet 16	Conv + ReLU + MaxPool	138M	13.6 M	164k	Box + DeepPoly
	Cifar Biasfield	Conv + ReLU	363k	45k	16	BaB* with DeepPoly
	Large ResNet	ResNet (Conv + ReLU)	1.3M - 7.9M	55k - 286k	3k-9k	BaB* with DeepPoly
	Collins Rul CNN	Conv + ReLU	60k - 262k	5.5k - 28k	400-800	BaB* with DeepPoly
	oval21	Conv + ReLU	54k - 214k	3.1k - 6.2k	3072	BaB* with DeepPoly
	ResNet A/B	ResNet (Conv + ReLU)	354k	11k	3072	BaB* with DeepPoly
	MNIST FC	FC + ReLU	270k - 530k	512 - 1536	784	BaB* with DeepPoly + MILP refinement

* BaB is implemented via KKT

Take-away

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- Neural network verification is challenging: a general network is NP-hard to verify.
- Many abstract domains are designed to scale the verification in the cost of completeness.
- In general, more precise domains require more space and more computation, thus less scalable.

Part 2

Connecting Certified and Adversarial Training

Training for Robustness

Training for Robustness

Expected Loss

$$\theta = \arg \min_{\theta} \mathbb{E}_{x,y} L(x, y)$$

Training for Robustness

The diagram illustrates the optimization process for training a model to be robust. It starts with a mathematical equation: $\theta = \arg \min_{\theta} \mathbb{E}_{x,y} L(x, y)$. This equation is followed by a large blue arrow pointing to the right. Above the arrow, a blue speech bubble contains the text "Expected Loss".

$$\theta = \arg \min_{\theta} \mathbb{E}_{x,y} L(x, y) \rightarrow \text{Expected Loss}$$

Training for Robustness


The diagram illustrates the shift from standard training to robust training. On the left, a blue speech bubble labeled "Expected Loss" is positioned above the equation $\theta = \arg \min_{\theta} \mathbb{E}_{x,y} L(x, y)$. A large blue arrow points to the right, leading to a second blue speech bubble labeled "Expected Worst-case Loss". Above this arrow is the robust training equation: $\theta = \arg \min_{\theta} \mathbb{E}_{x,y} \left[\max_{x' \in B(x, \epsilon)} L(x', y) \right]$.

$$\theta = \arg \min_{\theta} \mathbb{E}_{x,y} L(x, y)$$

→

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Training for Robustness




Adversarial Training

$$\theta = \arg \min_{\theta} \mathbb{E}_{x,y} [L(x', y)]$$
$$x' \in B(x, \epsilon)$$

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PGD



Certified Training


Certified Training

$$\theta = \arg \min_{\theta} \mathbb{E}_{x,y} [L(B(x, \epsilon), y)]$$

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$$\theta = \arg \min_{\theta} \mathbb{E}_{x,y} [L(B(x, \epsilon), y)]$$

IBP



Research Question

Gowal et al. "Scalable verified training for provably robust image classification." ICCV 2019.

Mirman et al. "Differentiable abstract interpretation for provably robust neural networks." ICML 2018.

Shi et al. "Fast certified robust training with short warmup." NeurIPS 2021.

Research Question

- Adversarial training has **good empirical robustness**, but is **hard to certify**.

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- Can we combine these two, so that we have both **better certified robustness** and **better standard accuracy** than IBP?

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
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- Can we combine these two, so that we have both **better certified robustness** and **better standard accuracy** than IBP?
- The answer is **YES!**

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

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


Small Adversarial Bound Regions




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
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
Training via Adversarially Propagating Subnetworks




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
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
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
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
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


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


Training via Adversarially Propagating Subnetworks


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


Training via Adversarially Propagating Subnetworks



Connecting Adversarial Examples with Bounds


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
$$\frac{dL}{d\underline{z}_i} = \sum_j \frac{dL}{d\hat{z}_j} \frac{\partial \hat{z}_j}{\partial \underline{z}_i} = \frac{dL}{d\hat{z}_i} \frac{\partial \hat{z}_i}{\partial \underline{z}_i}$$

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
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
Precise Approximation

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
Complement Previous SOTA

Small Adversarial Bound Regions
+Training via Adversarially Propagating Subnetworks
(SABR+TAPS=STAPS)




Plot taken from SABR paper.

Empirical Results




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
Better →



CIFAR
 $\epsilon = 2/255$



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- We present the idea of gradient connector, a novel tool for connecting their gradients and thus enable joint training.

Part 3

Understanding the Success of Interval Bound Propagation

Research Question

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
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- There exists a neural network that approximates every continuous function and IBP bounds are nearly optimal, up to ϵ error. However, finding this network is strictly harder than NP-complete problems.

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
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- Understanding how IBP works with the least tight relaxation is critical to future development.

Notions




Notions

- **Layer-wise Approximation** $\text{Box}^\dagger(f, B^\epsilon(x)) = [\underline{z}^\dagger, \bar{z}^\dagger]$:
apply optimal approximation layer-wisely, i.e., IBP approximation.




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
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- **Propagation Tightness**: $\tau = (\underline{z}^* - \bar{z}^*) / (\bar{z}^\dagger - \underline{z}^\dagger)$, i.e., the ratio of optimal and layer-wise box sizes.



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- DLN with all non-negative weights is propagation invariant.

Propagation Invariance

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- $W^{(2)}W^{(1)} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 2 \\ -3 & 4 \end{pmatrix} \rightarrow$ not propagation invariant.
- A two-layer propagation invariant DLN has $O(N)$ degree of freedom for parameter signs, while a general two-layer DLN has $O(N^2)$.


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
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
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

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
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

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Generalization to Trained ReLU Nets

Width brings less regularization than depth.




Generalization to Trained ReLU Nets

Width-scale Rule
Predicts Better Models.




Dataset	ϵ	Method	Width	Accuracy	Certified
MNIST	0.1	IBP	1×	98.83	98.10
			4×	98.86	98.23
		SABR	1×	98.99	98.20
			4×	98.99	98.32
	0.3	IBP	1×	97.44	93.26
			4×	97.66	93.35
		SABR	1×	98.82	93.38
			4×	98.48	93.85
CIFAR-10	$\frac{2}{255}$	IBP	1×	67.93	55.85
			2×	68.06	56.18
		IBP-R	1×	78.43	60.87
			2×	80.46	62.03
	$\frac{8}{255}$	SABR	1×	79.24	62.84
			2×	79.89	63.28
		IBP	1×	47.35	34.17
			2×	47.83	33.98
TinyImageNet	$\frac{1}{255}$	SABR	1×	50.78	34.12
			2×	51.56	34.95
		IBP	0.5×	24.47	18.76
			1×	25.33	19.46
		IBP	2×	25.40	19.92
			0.5×	27.56	20.54
		SABR	1×	28.63	21.21
			2×	28.97	21.36

Generalization to Trained ReLU Nets



Generalization to Trained ReLU Nets




Larger input box leads to larger tightness.



Generalization to Trained ReLU Nets

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Propagation Invariance is associated with strong regularization.






Generalization to Trained ReLU Nets

Larger input box leads to larger tightness.

Propagation Invariance is associated with strong regularization.

IBP > SABR > PGD consistently in terms of tightness.



IBP-based vs non-IBP-based

Method	ϵ	Accuracy	Tightness	Certified
PGD	2/255	81.2	0.001	-
	8/255	69.3	0.007	-
COLT	2/255	78.4*	0.009	60.7*
	8/255	51.7*	0.057	26.7*
IBP-R	2/255	78.2*	0.033	62.0*
	8/255	51.4*	0.124	27.9*
SABR	2/255	75.6	0.182	57.7
	8/255	48.2	0.950	31.2
IBP	2/255	63.0	0.803	51.3
	8/255	42.2	0.977	31.0

* Literature result.

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- IBP-based methods get significantly larger tightness (17x to 80x).
- Certified method with no IBP component (COLT) still has significantly larger tightness than PGD (8x).
- Large tightness seems necessary for large ϵ (see SABR).

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Take-away

- We quantify Interval Bound Propagation, the key component of all SOTA methods in recent years, in terms of approximation error.
- We theoretically prove that (1) it leads to strong regularization on the parameter signs, (2) it requires more model capacity, and (3) it benefits more from width than depth.
- Based on our insights, we explain the improvement of recent SOTA over IBP and successfully push SOTA further by simply increasing the model width.

Part 4

The Future of (Deterministic) Neural Network Verification

Infeasibility of Single-Neuron Relaxation

Baader et. al., Expressivity of ReLU-networks Under Convex Relaxation, ICLR'24.

Ferrari et. al., Complete Verification via Multi-Neuron Relaxation Guided Branch-and-Bound, ICLR'22.

Infeasibility of Single-Neuron Relaxation


- The most precise single-neuron convex relaxation (triangle) is unable to precisely encode $\max(x_1, x_2)$ with arbitrary ReLU network.

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- The most precise single-neuron convex relaxation (triangle) is unable to precisely encode $\max(x_1, x_2)$ with arbitrary ReLU network.
- Multi-neuron relaxation is key to designing future verifiers.

Bad Gradients from Precise Relaxation


Relaxation	Tightness	Certified (%)
IBP / Box	0.73	86.8
hBox / Symbolic Intervals	1.76	83.7
CROWN / DeepPoly	3.36	70.2
DeepZ / CAP / FastLin / Neurify	3.00	69.8
CROWN-IBP (R)	2.15	75.4



Bad Gradients from Precise Relaxation

- While being the least precise, IBP training gets better results than all the other precise domains.

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Bad Gradients from Precise Relaxation

- While being the least precise, IBP training gets better results than all the other precise domains.
- More precise methods with decent gradient quality is key to future certified training methods, e.g., SABR and TAPS.

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