sr 2012

03 Jan 2012


Internet

~ service view: delivers bits from one place to another


~ formal definition: set of all reachable IP addresses

topology view

Protocol



05 Jan 2012




-	TP
~	Public: reachable
\sim	Private: 10. *. *. *, 192. 168. *. *
	D= desktop
	P= printer (private)
	Network Address Translation (NAT)
	google.ca
	Public 179,97.64.2
i de	191.47.69.2
	Client Server
	Keys secure 4
	NFS: local addresses access files from server (remote)
A. New Y	WWW: Gient Top Web sorver Text-based
	Request >
	Browser Response (HTML)—URL: http://server/file.html
	GET /somedir/somefile.html HTTP/1.1
	method location Version
	Host: URL
	User-Agent: Mozilla Ament-Language: en
\sim	Accept-Language: en cookie: String file (like an ID)
,	10 Jan 2012
	~ APP An
1 34 1812	Company 1. Reliability
7.1	~ Error rate - bit error rate
	"pipe" - packet loss rate
9%	e.g. send "1111" using redundancy: (1111)(1111)
	e.g. require confirmation for each packet
ୟ.	e.g. send "1111" using redundancy: (1111)(1111) e.g. require confirmation for each packet Throughput ("bandwidth" - incorrect use of word)

~ bits | sec 3. Delay ~ speed of light propogation delay ~ queueing ~ link throughput ~ speed of light takes about 14 of a second to travel around the world, 74-80 min for mars ~ link throughput 103 bits/sec 103 sec ≈ 20 min limited by file size 4. Security [Privacy 5. Cost ~ money ~ energy how do these things interact? Cookies Response < ~ Stateless: no memory of any clients ~ Apache: "a patchy" server, stateless o Server Third Party Cookies > Request (ID) Google (Dublectick) Response (cookie) Storage ~ knows what you > Request (cookie) bought on Amazon Customized>0 response and watched on CNN.com mozon CNN Another method: use ads to track your behaviour Web # of ~99% of all hits for top hits 1000 websites Site Popularity

~	3-tier Presentation Business Logic Octabase
	Load Cavarcer (Large websites)
~	Small websites: 50-4000 sites 52-4/month/page = \$thousands profit e.g. 181 (Germany)
	<u>DNS</u>
\sim	giving a baby a name based on coordinates and time
~	or, grandparent parent baby
	Registrar
	server[o]. co. (tree)
	unique top level domain
	Domain Name Space (DNS)
	hierarchy
	delegation
\sim	namespace
	D'NS Name -> IP Address
	Easier to remember names
ူ ၁.	Load Balancing
3.	Aliasing (name to name)
	12 Jan 2012
	Domain name Service:
f.	unique names Icanh delegation
	Icann derganon co
	Root toplevel
	Mapping names to IP addresses
3,	Aliasing: Names -> Names
	eg. uwaterloo.ca > wwwl.uwaterloo.ca > IP

~	officemox.com -> staples.com
\sim	uwaterloo.ca -> (www1.uwaterloo.ca)
	Junua. uninterloo.ca
100	(www. Pwww)
	Name Serven
	Reg Name(s) CName > IP(s) A
	search cs101.cs.uwaterloo.ca
	NS IP Address Root
	Nome of NSI.ca (Application)
	1 1 10100
	End to cache > NSI.ca NS uwatedoo.ca NSI.uwatedoo.ca
	A nst. uwater loo, ca. 129.97, 128.2
~	"resolution" name -> IP, iterative or recursive
	Iterative: Your local NS keeps requesting to other servers
	Recursive: Each request goes deeper into the servers
	NSLookup and Dig
∕∵.	Better than having one centralized server:
	- if an owner changes their IP, difficult/hassle
	- speed of light limit
	- very heavy Toad on one server
~ ·	TTL: time to Live (86400 Seconds = 1 day)
	Story: Who is the Donkey? Content Distribution Networks (CDN)
-	Youtube: Resp Servert 9 17-8 Push and pull content distribution
	Server Server
	D-8 D-8
_~	each "copy" server has a cache which stones the most recentl
	requested videos
\sim	Request routing detects your location and sends you video
	Request routing detects your location and sends you video from geographically nearby server



~	Trackers:
,	· keep track of peers in overlay: IP Address, sharing stats
	· e.g. the piratebay
	Peer (uip and down) Chunks: ~256 kB
	1 leather
	Leecher "free riding"
	(UP)
~	if leecher isn't sharing with a peer, that peer will drop the
	(COMPECTION)
\sim	freeriding: connecting to new peers when being dropped
\sim	sear on.
	· torrent search engine
	· centralized directory (e.g. Napster)
	Advantage: No 3rd party
	I padresses search, easier to implement Disadu: 1 point of failure,
	Sparch Disadu: I point at failure,
	· decentralized search
	new Adas A Part e.g. Skype
. 7,	peer 12 no House D
.	Scarch Ander Another A
	The Cloud
\sim	a dotacentre
\sim	centralized content
\sim	online apps.
^	renting computing power
\sim	Physical view:
	· Data centres: warehouse full of servers
	am I Wicrosoft: 200 000 Microsoft: 200 000
-	Cooling: ~ major cost
	111.001 (910)
/	Service view:
	· e.g. gmail, dropbox, youtube


	Applications (Paas)
	Platforms e.g. Windows Azure
	Infrastructure ~ outo scaling ~ reliability ~ data backup
	Infrastructure (Toos)
	Mahalization P. a. Amozon Web Services
	Hard Asks ~ rent a server ~ more flexible
	Virtualization: Allows you to "slice" a server
~	Advantage of cloud:
	· users can access data from anywhere
	· Stable, "unlimited" power
	· flexibility
	· much cheaper cost (e.g. on demand, per use)
	19 Jan 2012
	(App) Client (App) Server
	API PIPE JAPI
_	Prof K's Tattoo Parbr
	Client Saket()
	Establish "Store front"
	Determine server location Listen bird()
	Connect
	Socket Socket Accept R/W R/W
	The second secon
	Close Socket FO = int Sock addcin
	Socket FO = int Sock addcin
	Sock Addr_in — Address family: AF_INet/(AF_unit +10st Ent - what is — IP Address: IP of sener or "any"
	returned by DNS Port number Server's Port
۰	Story: Eye of the bird
,	refer to printed program
	receive programs

~	Application Email, HTTP, SSH, PaP, DNS
	Transport Goal: Logical communication between apps. Apps think they're directly connected.
	Network - Routing data grams between networks
	Link Communication between with the nodes on same link
	Physical Me (Access) (Gore) Air, copper, fiber
\sim	Vancouver <u>Network Layer</u> : Canada Post KW
	Link: Mailman
	10 of Application
	Postal Bill X.X
	Recieve: Transport:
	1. Collect from mailbox Physical: 1. Collect
	2. Hard letters out. Trucks, Planes 1 2. Take to mail box
~	Header: Info attached to a packet to indicate Header
	destination; SEC (e.g. envelope) Payload
\sim	Segment: Transport-layer piece of the msq [11]
	Network provides best effort service
\sim	Transport can provide Services
:	· reliable delivery somer thanker
	· flow control
	· Congestion control
	Multiplexing / Demultiplexing
	-> Multiplexing: Many signals to 1 medium
	Demultiplexing: Multiple signals sharing channel, separates
	Applications
	tangend


~ Ports · unique identifier of applications on end-host · 16 bits, 216 · 0-1023 reserved for well-known services · Port 80: http, Port 21: ftp server SIC IP OST I UDP ~ User Datagram Protocol ~ Goal: As simple transport as possible ~ Connectionless: as soon as there's data to send, send it ~ UDP header: 16 bits STC port det port (optional) (required) header Error delection it some no. Length Check Sum (of data) (optional) of bits are corrupt, then Data transport protocol (UDP) detects this TCP (1974) ~ UDP lacks :-· complicated protocol · reliability · in order delivery Why UDP? · faster, fine-grained control, · flow control realitime apps, no connection stat · congestion control · no connection establishment, small packet header, VOIP, video chatting, some video games ~ What protocols are used Transfer TCP SMTP Email HTTP Web ICP File transfer TCP FTP Remote file servers NDP NES (typically) proprietary Streaming MDP VOIP UDP proprietar Network Management SNMP MDP


26 Jan 2012

	Buffer:
\sim	Bucket that holds packets until a system is ready for th
	Reliability
~	Messages sent will be delivered
	PC Buffer Router dst
	☐ → Ⅲ ⊗ → ☐ If buffer is full, packet is thrown away.
~	M. Utala caries
	P(success) = 1-(error rate)
	assurant Packet ast
	1 (leached
	Num copies Time
~	Ask for acknowledgement timeout RTT Packet
	· Timeout = some amount
	of time, after which we
	assume packet was dropped timeout > RTT
	· Round trip time = time for a packet to be sent to dst and
	for dst to acknowledge src Pht dst
	· Cumulative ack
	· 3-way handshake: SE SMA dst
	Flow Control Synockock Synockock Synockock Synockock
^	rectiniques to match
-	a src's sending rate
	to the service rate
_	of the dst and network devices between src and dst
\sim	Objectives:
	· Simplicity
	· efficiency (minimal overheads)
	· fairness (bandwidth share)
	· stability (converge to an equilibrium)
\sim	No feedback heaven sender and det



31 Jan 2012







OR Feb 2012

band width

~ Flow control: vs. Congestion Control: Regulate the sending Control the entry of traffic into the network to prevent rate to match the congestion collapse receiving rate ~ Timeout Time until we declare & packet lost Throughput = KTT Drawbacks of TCP ~ Fairness can be gamed = dst C B 45 — dst D ~ Assumes that packet losses mean congestion e.g. 10 Gbps link, 1500 byte packets. In order to send at 18Gbps: W=83 333. I packet loss every 5 billion packets. Unrealistic! ~ Detects congestion using loss TOP has to fill the bottleneck buffer · Bursts cause massive losses request and a second in-cost noo servers ~ | Sensitive to threshold e.g. If w=1, 3 RT's to get a webpage, but if you start with w=10, only 1 RTI needed Syn flooding · a form of Denial of Service Atlack (DoS) nothing ~ Only info TCP has is packet loss · have to overflow buffers to find amount of available

~ Explicit congestion notification · when buffer nearly full, we mark congestion field · drawback: all network devices have to support it · Implicit: Changing protocol only involves changing end-hosts What is an Ideal Transport Protocol? ~ Depends on the network 100 Mbps (8) 11-11) B 100 Mbps · 2.5s = 256Mb = 32 MB Earth RTT=2.55 Mars before receiving an ack ~ Datacentre Networks: · high bandwidth, low RTT · Microsoft: TCP + explicit congestion notification (ECN) · single owner of datacentre · buy switches with ECN support · ECN: Additive decrease in mindew si ~ Wireless Networks · High loss rates · Solution: Use link layer to help TCP · Links themselves help TCP by quickly retransmitting lost segments ~ TCP works very well on wide range of networks · Wide Area Networks (the Internet) · works well for wide range of RTT's · widely tested · best we have 07 Feb 2012 App \sim addresses ~ forwarding API ~ routing Transport 0-20-30 Transport ~ geo: addressing ~ hierarchy





Step 1: Send data gram DST Port Next label 1 3 3 (from "use 3")	
14 Feb 2012	
IP Header Version < 4 - 32 bit, most used	
Header length (in "words" - 4 byt Options	ure" have
Type of Service — Delay-sensitive Delay-insensit	e (e.g. Skype) five (e.g. bit Torrent)
· Not used because can't be enfe · ATM service, but was dropped	orced The control of
Length (header + Data) in bytes = TTL: Time to Live: set to 0-255 by every router. if field = = 0 =	by source. Decremented
an error message - Internet Co (ICMP) - Packet expired	
Traceroute TIL=2 TIL=3 TIL=1 R2 R3 R3	
Protocol (Upper Layer)	


1.

2.

3. 4.


5.


7.




setting all

	,
11.	Header checksum (sum = 65536)
	Panity bit:
	· Even parity: 1011 011 [] 0111 100.00 · chosen so sum always adds to particular number (65536
	· chosen so sum always adds to particular number (65536
12.	Src address
13.	Dst address
	Address Allocation
~	IP Address
	· For an interface
	2 steps to get an address:
١.	Allocation: Organizations get a block of oddresses
	· Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA). Regis-
	trars, e.g. ARIN (North America), RIPE (Europe)
٧.	Hand it out (DHCP) - Dynamic Host Config Protocol
	Loptop Lease DHCPK (Pool of Media Arress Address (MAC) Server (IP)
	IP
	subnet special address - broadcast, subnet number 111111
	Special addicas Disaweds, Jabret Malling Hall
	16 Feb 2012
~	IPU4: 32 bit "net ten"
	Private address 10. * /8 - first network (ARPANET)
	(P2.168.0.0/16
	need NAT to translate
	(Network Address Translation)
	· use IP as you wish
\sim	Subnet GNAT (TCP/IP) Porty Por
	192.168.0.2 In 1971 1971 1971 1971 1971 1971 1971 197
	[aptop] NAT PECKIEY 12341 12345 12341 12345 1235
	192.168-0.3
	Wii
	192.168.0.3 12002 128.32.16.8 1234!








· CSMA-carrier sense multiple access · CSMA/CD - CSMA + collision detect + random backoff Used by Ethernet 7 If collision choose backoff_value random (1, backoff) backoff = 2 * backoff account down backoff value Try again ~ Freq + Time cell phones (Rogers) ~ Code: cell phones (Bell) Aloha: cable Story: Metcalf (Ethernet) Ethernet 1 Mbps -> 10 -> 100 -> 16 -> 106 -> 406 · copper wire -> fiber · hub -> Ethernet switch (no CSMA needed) MAC Preamble Start MAC OF Frame Dest Type IP TCP Data 7* 10101010 10101011 6 bytes 6 bytes 64 bits 3 magnificatives, 3 social# upper layer 06 Mar 2012 ~ Ethernet: 802.3 Wifi: 802.11 (bia, g.n. ac) Standard distribution: IEEE/IETF/ITU · infrastructure mode ad hoc mode

(roaming)



03 Mar 2012 cell phone tower 519 Area ation -"cells" · if driving fast, handover 98.5 towers ~ 16 - analog ~ 2G-FPM4TDM (GSM)-digital · time division · frequency division 8 Slots Stol2 8 3G - data-oriented - peak ~200 kbps 46- all IP (IPV6)-peak 16bps 1 500 Mbps 1 LTE-Advanced, IMT-Advanced (46) IMSI (Sim Subscriber ID Module) 19 Home Location Register (#, credit card) Visitor Location Register (#, cell tower) signalling channel: when to ring, etc Mobytes -SMS-Small Messaging Service /Sprint Roaming OFDM MIMO multiple in multple out ≤kbps → 16bps

13 Mar 2012

	src Trudy dst
/	Types of Attacks
	· copy · injection
	· Injection
	· replace/modify
	· spoofed · inferred
	· preventing delivery (Dos)
	western Digital hack story
,	Ken Thompson
	· put a backdoor in any UNIX system
4	· no evidence in code
	Pentagon Tiger team
	· server in Yocked room
	· DEC letter forged work request
,	House Keys The Man Man The Comment of the Comment o
	leforging by taking a photo
,	Despite the presence of malicious parties:
	· Privacy: Messages can't be early to pped or inferred · Authentication: Messages sent to right party
	· Authentication: Messages sent to right party
	· Integrity: Can't be tampered with
•	· Denial of service : Ensure delivery -
•	ENCRYPHION TO THE PROPERTY OF
	· Encode a message so that only intended receiver
1	N'00
	Plain text > Encryption Cigher text > decryption Plain text > algorithm Trudy algorithm
	Trudy [algorithm]
	How secure is encryption!
4.00.0000000000000000000000000000000000	How secure is encryption? · attacker could try all keys · strength of encryption depends on number of keys
And the second second	· strength of encryption depends on number of keys

	· breaking encryption: should be exponential in key
	· breaking encryption: should be exponential in key Strength
	Atime to break
	time / > time to encrypt/decrypt
	Key Size
\sim	How practical?
	· Usually depends on efficient encrypt decrypt · Security depends on long keys (and hard to guess) Time to check all 5-letter passwords (lower case)
	· Security depends on long keys (and hard to guess)
\sim	Time to check all 5-letter passwords (lower case)
	• 86 - 10 (VIIIIOV)
	· In 1975: 1 day, 1992: 10 sec, 2008: 0.001 sec
\sim	6 letter password: upper, lower, numerical, control
	· +0° ~ 600 Billion
	· In 1992 : 6 days, 2008 : < 1 sec using 1000 PC's
\sim	Two types: Secret key (symmetric), public key (asymmetric)
\sim	Secret Key single private key for encrypt/decrypt
	Man Man
-	Plaintext m > Cipher text c > Idecrypt m >
	K Geculpt
\sim	First scheme: $a \rightarrow e$, $b \rightarrow f$, $c \rightarrow q$
	· only 25 combinations (N-1)
\sim	Second attempt (random):
	$a \rightarrow d$, $b \rightarrow b$, $c \rightarrow a$, $d \rightarrow e$, $e \rightarrow d$, $f \rightarrow c$
	· N! combinations (6! or 26!)
	Both parties have to know key
\sim	One-time Rad:
	· random sequence of bits that's the same length as m
	· m = 01000110 XOR 0
	$S = \frac{14.0421001}{1001} = \frac{11.0421001}{1001} = \frac{11.0421001}{10$
	$C = \{00\} \{11\} \{11\}$
	· Secure because m and p are same size (bits) · 2m combinations: too large! (size of msg)
	· & COMPORTIONS - 700 MIGE, (SIZE OF MIGH)

\sim	DES (data encryption standard)
	· key is 56 bits
1	· m = [c, co co a a co co copher block
1 A	· m = [c, c, c, c, c, c, c] Cipher block Chaining
	C3 C1 C2 C5 C6 C4
\sim	Public Key Crypto: keys for encryption are public (Ki, Ki), keys for decryption are private (Ki, Ko). Alice wants to send m to Bob
	(KA, Ke), Keys for decryption are private (KA, Ko)
- Indiana	· Alice wants to send m to Bob
	$C = K_{\overline{b}}(m)$
	· Bob decrypts by $m = K_0 (K_0^+(m))$
	· Relies on the existance of one-way functions
~	RSA (Rivest, Shamir, Adternain, 1978)
	· Choice of public/private keys
	· encrypt/decrypt algorithms
~	Bob needs to choose Kt, Ko
1.	Choose two large primes, p and a
Э.	Compute $n = pq$ and $Z = (p-1)(q-1)$ Chase a number e , $(e < n)$ and e and z are
3.	Charse a number e, (eKn) and e and z are
	relatively prime (no common factors)
4.	Find d such that ed-1 is divisible by z
	$K_{0}^{+} = (n, e), K_{0}^{-} = (n, d)$
/	Alice wants to send m to Bob (m < n)
	· To encrypt she computes me and the remainder when me is divided by n: c=me mod n
÷	· Fo decrypt, Bub computes m = cd mod n
	TO SECURITION IN CONTROL IN
	15 Mar 2012
1.	p, q primes
2.	n = pq and $Z = (p-1)(q-1)$
3.	n=pq and $Z=(p-1)(q-1)est e(e,z)=1$ 3 RSA
4.	$d = 0 \mod Z$

5. c=me mod n and m=cd mod n

```
~ e.g. Bob chooses p=5 and q=7. Then, n=3.5 and z=24
   Choose e=5, d=29. a=1, b=2, c=3, ...

Message = "L". m=12. c=m^5=248832 mod 35=17.
   Decrypt: m = 1729 mod 35 = 4819 ... mod 35 = 12. M = "L".
~ Why does RSA work?
    K& (K& (m)) = (me)d mod n
Theorem: If p, g are prime and n=pg, then x mod n = x (y mod (p-1)(q+1)), so:
   KB (Ko (m)) = m (ed mod (p-1)(q-1)) mod n
              = m^2 \mod n (b/c mod (p-1)(q-1) = 1)
              = m (since m < n)
~ Breaking RSA is as hard as factoring
~ Quantum computers: poly-time factoring
~ RSA is compute expensive
~ DES is much faster
~ Use RSA to exchange private keys then switch
   to DES.
   Message Integrity
~ To authenticate a message, Bob must verify =
   · Message originated from Alice
   · m was not tampered with in transit.
   If m has these properties, it has integrity
        20 = Routers. Trudy poses as Router 1.
    Cryptographic hash function:

computationally infeasible to find two

messages x and y st. H(x) = H(y).
   · e.g. MD5 (Rivest), SHA-1
~ First altempt at message integrity:
1. Alice has m, computes H(m)
2. Sends (m, H(m)) to Bob.
3. Bob computes H(m). If H(m) = h, everything is OK.
   Attack: Trudy creates m', sends Bob ('m', 'A(m'))
~ We need a secret!
~ Let authentication key = s.
```

``	Totonil
1	1111cgr 1+y 010+0001
1	Integrity protocol: Alice computes [H(m+s)] - Message authentication code Send (m, H(m+s)) to Boh.
3.	Bob checks if H(m+s) = h. If so, everything is OK.
	Digital Signature
پم .	Attests that an entity owns something or agrees to
	its contents.
. Δ.	Needs to be : verifiable, non-forgeable
	Polos signatura no militar
, V	Bob's signature must be unique.
\sim	Public key crypto has unique private and public keys.
~	300 3 30 110 10 13 KB (11). WITH
	· If his public key is known, then anyone can check
\sim	Attack: Trudy announces KB as her public signature. Public Key Certification: Certifies that a public key helphas to a menific entity
~	Public Key Certification: Certifies that a public key
	belongs to a specific entity.
\sim	certification Authority (CA):
***************************************	Verifies that an entity is who it says it is.
١.	Tosues coolition of the line of the line of the
d.	Issues certificate that binds the public key to entity.
***	36 commercial CA's
	End-Point Authentication
\sim	Process of proving your identity.
\sim	Authentication Protocol 1.0 (apr.0)
	· says "I'm Alice"
٠.,	· AHack Trudy says "I'm Alice"
\sim	ap 2.0
4.34	· Alice says ("I'm Alice" IP address)
	· Alice says ("I'm Alice", IP address) · Attack: Trady spoofs Alice's IP
^	ap 3.0
	· key = ("I'm Alice", password)
10 m	· Attack : spill mal to Mic to a commend
_	· Attack : sniff network traffic for password
/ 🔾 .	WE D:
	· key = ("I'm Alice", encrypted password) · Attack: Playback attack (resend encrypted password)
	· HHACK: May back attack (resend encrypted password)


~ ap4.0: Need to verify password is fresh.


1. Alice says "I'm Alice" to Bob. 2. Chooses a one-time-use number R, sends R to Alice. 3. Alice encrypts Rusing KAB(R), sends to Bob. 4. Bub decrypts. If equals R, then it's Alice. Security in Practice ~ No way to prove secureness · Can show known attacks don't work · If no known attacks (long time), it should be secure ~ Black hat and white hat hackers ~ Vulnerability scanning ~ Password cracking ~ Packet sniffing ~ Spoofing ~ Root kit ~ | Social Engineering * ~ Trojan horses, viruses, worms, keyloggers 20 Mar 2012 Distributed Systems ~ System: Set of interacting components with output and producing functionality (service) · computation interface resources" · Storage · communication orsub-system Application -> Distributed System (networked application) Transport Network Link client,-server centralized System

5436 (confid storefront site client Client storefront a site warehouse → inconsistensy Desireable Properties Concurrency -· atomicity · consistency · isolation ~ Motivation : · durability · scalability · fault tolerance · fault tolerance · scalability · delegation: local control ·synchrony · localization · transparency · performance ~ Atomicity · heterogeneity Response Database Transfer \$200 from chequing to savings. Read cha Transaction write sav Write cha ~ Consistency: after transaction, chq amt + sav amt is the same ~ Isolotion: as if you're the only user on the system ~ Durability: nothing gets undone after completed ~ Fault tolerance : define faults · Link failure, computer failure, disk failure · Packet corruption, incorrect computation, disk corruption · Combination of failures causes huge problems ~ Scalability: e.g. Wikipedia, google, Kell'phones ~ Performance: need a metric ~ Synchrony: "happens before" ~ Transparency services are Room | Q independent of implementation


~	Heterogeneity: Different brands can be used
\sim	Locking (for Atomicity):
	1 many and 1 dog sign
1.00 100 000 mg	processes # of tic-tac-toe players critical section
	a critical section

SALES OF PROPERTY.	
T AND DESCRIPTION OF THE PARTY NAMED IN	22 Mar 2012
,	poducer
med tills attacked	concurrent processes servicing the queue
	queue
	/ V/° V/ consumers
\sim	if gueue length > 0 then (read)
	ob work:
	· remove job from queue exclusion
er engaño de deservo.	· decrement queue length (write) · need lock
to a Marina or arrange	· process jab manager
er son off trades someophones	else wait for queue granularity stone
\sim	get-lock (gl, ID);
	if (91>0) { (read)
	remove job;
	91; (write)
to a transmission (s	release lock (ql, ID) ; \leftarrow release as soon as possibly
	process job; can
*** ***	3 else release lock (q1, ID);
\sim	Read Lock, Write Lock
	· Many readers
	· Lwriter + many readers
~	If program crashes before releasing lock, lock manager can check if it died-difficult to know what to do
on the second	check If it died - difficult to know what to do
~	Solution to dead lock: two-phase locking
\sim	Deadlock: Process A Process B
	get_tock(g11, ID) get_lock(g2, ID)
	get_lock(g12, ID) get_lock(g1, ID)
	\sim





*	
	29 Mar 2012
na sanahannanya sa sanaya nasadhasa namay	Design Techniques
~	Hierarchy Delegation
- a commence measure persons a make more as a second	· DNS: server 101.cs.uwater 100.ca -> IP Address
,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,	· Implicit Hierarchy: e.g. Vahoo Homepage
	Delegation:
a cinalente antes portes en momenta como como	"Look for the name space"
	OKW OTOR O
\sim	Replication > Failover-primary/backup
	Pirectory A /- Read-only is easy, That tree copy /- Read-write is Very difficult
	That tree constitution Read-write is
APRESIS ANTENNAS SE ST. L. P. Miller Marchester March	Very difficult
and the second on the second order of the second order	· Advantages: more capacity, scaling
	· Disadvantages: cost, maintaining consistency,
•	dealing with failure
emander assessment, not asses have use on the eman	· Google search: Q o HDFS
artenin emilien. Hinto et u neptembere et europ	I serier B & O A
tagir var yang padaga pipada ana ang aya aya dipilihan ang dipilihan dipilih	x3 copies A 600 / 000 Z
~	Story: "complience port" - Parnassus
ann ann an an an an ann an Array an an Array den an	uw As
AND THE STREET, STOLET BOLDER 1 P. S. SALA	UW AS BANGETT STOP BOTH Main routers are backups for each other
	Orion D VRRP
~	Indirection: "Go there"
	Root Server:
THE REST CONTRACT OF THE CONTR	IPaddresses
Modernija die pro por com den Spanjer comm	
<u> </u>	Servers> · net
	Interface
The statement of the transformation	e.g. calling 1-800 # page tables
	Load Balancina



Some Exam Notes

Multiple Access

~ Frequency division: allocate frequency, "muxing" ~ Time division: time base

~ Code division: allocate codes

~ Polling : ask clients

~ Token ring: pass token ~ Aloha: send anytime, random backoff ~ CSMA: check before transmission, random backoff ~ CSMA/CD: CSMA with collision detect

~ CSMA/CA: require ack, random backoff before transmission, double backoff upon collision