Cryptography Overview

Cryptography

- Is
  - A tremendous tool
  - The basis for many security mechanisms
- Is not
  - The solution to all security problems
  - Reliable unless implemented properly
  - Reliable unless used properly
  - Something you should try to invent or implement yourself

Auguste Kerckhoffs

- A cryptosystem should be secure even if **everything** about the system, except the secret key, **is public knowledge**.

baptised as **Jean-Guillaume-Hubert-Victor-François-Alexandre-Auguste Kerckhoffs von Nieuwenhof**

Goal 1:secure communication

Step 1: Session setup to exchange key

Step 2: encrypt data



Goal 2: Protected files



Analogous to secure communication:

Alice today sends a message to Alice tomorrow

Symmetric Cryptography

Assumes parties already share a secret key

Building block: sym. encryption



E, D: cipher   k: secret key (e.g. 128 bits)

m, c: plaintext, ciphertext   n: nonce   (aka IV)

Encryption algorithm is publicly known

- Never use a proprietary cipher

Use Cases

Single use key: (one time key)

- Key is only used to encrypt one message
  - encrypted email: new key generated for every email
- No need for nonce (set to 0)

Multi use key: (many time key)

- Key used to encrypt multiple messages
  - SSL: same key used to encrypt many packets
- Need either *unique* nonce or *random* nonce

First example: One Time Pad

(single use key)

- Vernam (1917)

Key:	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0
Plaintext:	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0
Ciphertext:	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0

$\oplus$

- Shannon '49:
  - OTP is "secure" against ciphertext-only attacks

Stream ciphers (single use key)

Problem: OTP key is as long the message

Solution: Pseudo random key -- stream ciphers



$$c \leftarrow \mathrm{PRG}(k) \oplus m$$

Stream ciphers: RC4 (126 MB/sec) , Salsa20/12 (643 MB/sec)

Dangers in using stream ciphers

One time key !! "Two time pad" is insecure:

$$\begin{cases} C_1 \leftarrow m_1 \oplus \text{PRG}(k) \\ C_2 \leftarrow m_2 \oplus \text{PRG}(k) \end{cases}$$

Eavesdropper does:

$$C_1 \oplus C_2 \rightarrow m_1 \oplus m_2$$

Enough redundant information in English that:

$$m_1 \oplus m_2 \rightarrow m_1 , m_2$$

Block ciphers: crypto work horse



Canonical examples:

1. 3DES: n= 64 bits, k = 168 bits
2. AES: n=128 bits, k = 128, 192, 256 bits

IV handled as part of PT block

Building a block cipher

Input: (m, k)

Repeat simple "mixing" operation several times

- DES: Repeat 16 times:

$$\begin{cases} m_L \leftarrow m_R \\ m_R \leftarrow m_L \oplus F(k, m_R) \end{cases}$$

- AES-128: Mixing step repeated 10 times

Difficult to design: must resist subtle attacks

- differential attacks, linear attacks, brute-force, …

Block Ciphers Built by Iteration



R(k,m): round function

for DES (n=16), for AES (n=10)

Incorrect use of block ciphers

Electronic Code Book (ECB):



Problem:

- if $m_1=m_2$ then $c_1=c_2$

In pictures





Correct use of block ciphers I: CBC mode

E a secure PRP. Cipher Block Chaining with random IV:



Q: how to do decryption?

Use cases: how to choose an IV

Single use key: no IV needed (IV=0)

Multi use key: (CPA Security)

Best: use a fresh *random* IV for every message

Can use *unique* IV (e.g counter)

but then first step in CBC must be $IV' \leftarrow E(k_1, IV)$

benefit: may save transmitting IV with ciphertext

CBC with Unique IVs

unique IV means: (k,IV) pair is used for only one message
may be predictable so use $E(k_1,\cdot)$ as PRF



In pictures





Correct use of block ciphers II: CTR mode

Counter mode with a random IV: (parallel encryption)



- Why are these modes secure? not today.

Performance: Crypto++ 5.6.0 [Wei Dai]

Intel Core 2 (on Windows Vista)

Cipher	Block/key size	Speed (MB/sec)
RC4		126
Salsa20/12		643
3DES	64/168	10
AES/GCM	128/128	102

Data integrity

Message Integrity: MACs

- Goal: message integrity. No confidentiality.
  - ex: Protecting public binaries on disk.



Generate tag:

$tag \leftarrow S(k, m)$

Verify tag:

$V(k, m, tag) \stackrel{?}{=} \text{`yes'}$

note: non-keyed checksum (CRC) is an insecure MAC !!

Secure MACs

- Attacker information: chosen message attack
  - for $m_1,m_2,\ldots,m_q$ attacker is given $t_i \leftarrow S(k,m_i)$
- Attacker's goal: existential forgery.
  - produce some **new** valid message/tag pair (m,t).

$$(m,t) \notin \{ (m_1,t_1) , \ldots , (m_q,t_q) \}$$

- A secure PRF gives a secure MAC:
  - $S(k,m) = F(k,m)$
  - $V(k,m,t)$: `yes' if $t = F(k,m)$ and `no' otherwise.

Construction 1: ECBC



Construction 2: HMAC (Hash-MAC)

Most widely used MAC on the Internet.

H: hash function.

example: SHA-256 ; output is 256 bits

Building a MAC out of a hash function:

Standardized method: HMAC

$$S(k, m) = H(k \oplus opad \,\|\, \mathbf{H(k \oplus ipad \,\|\, m)})$$

SHA-256: Merkle-Damgard



h(t, m[i]): compression function

Thm 1: if h is collision resistant then so is H

"Thm 2": if h is a PRF then HMAC is a PRF

Construction 3: PMAC – parallel MAC

- ECBC and HMAC are sequential. PMAC:



- Why are these MAC constructions secure?

  … not today – take CS255

- Why the last encryption step in ECBC?
  - CBC (aka Raw-CBC) is not a secure MAC:
    - Given tag on a message m, attacker can deduce tag for some other message m'
    - How: good crypto exercise …

Authenticated Encryption: Encryption + MAC

Combining MAC and ENC (CCA)

Encryption key K_E MAC key = K_I

Option 1: MAC-then-Encrypt (SSL)



Option 2: Encrypt-then-MAC (IPsec)

Secure on general grounds



Option 3: Encrypt-and-MAC (SSH)



OCB

offset codebook mode

More efficient authenticated encryption



Rogaway, …

Public-key Cryptography

Public key encryption: (Gen, E, D)



Applications

Session setup (for now, only eavesdropping security)



Non-interactive applications: (e.g. Email)

- Bob sends email to Alice encrypted using pk_{alice}
- Note: Bob needs pk_{alice} (public key management)

Applications

Encryption in non-interactive settings:

- Encrypted File Systems



Applications

Encryption in non-interactive settings:

- Key escrow: data recovery without Bob's key



Trapdoor functions (TDF)

<u>Def</u>: a trapdoor func. $X \longrightarrow Y$ is a triple of efficient algs. (G, F, F^{-1})

- $G()$: randomized alg. outputs key pair (pk, sk)
- $F(pk, \cdot)$: det. alg. that defines a func. $X \longrightarrow Y$
- $F^{-1}(sk, \cdot)$: defines a func. $Y \longrightarrow X$ that inverts $F(pk, \cdot)$

Security: $F(pk, \cdot)$ is one-way without sk

Public-key encryption from TDFs

- (G, F, F^{-1}): secure TDF $X \longrightarrow Y$
- (E_s, D_s) : symm. auth. encryption with keys in K
- $H: X \longrightarrow K$ a hash function

We construct a pub-key enc. system (G, E, D):

Key generation G: same as G for TDF

Public-key encryption from TDFs

- (G, F, F^{-1}): secure TDF $X \longrightarrow Y$
- (E_s, D_s) : symm. auth. encryption with keys in K
- $H: X \longrightarrow K$ a hash function

E(pk, m) :

$x \xleftarrow{R} X$, $y \leftarrow F(pk, x)$

$k \leftarrow H(x)$, $c \leftarrow E_s(k, m)$

output (y, c)

D(sk, (y,c)) :

$x \leftarrow F^{-1}(sk, y)$,

$k \leftarrow H(x)$, $m \leftarrow D_s(k, c)$

output m

In pictures:

$$\underbrace{F(pk, x)}_{\text{header}}\ \underbrace{E_s(\ H(x),\ m\ )}_{\text{body}}$$

Security Theorem:

If **(G, F, F^{-1})** is a secure TDF,

(E_s, D_s) provides auth. enc.

and **H:** $X \longrightarrow K$ is a "random oracle"

then **(G,E,D)** is CCA^{ro} secure.

Digital Signatures

- Public-key encryption
  - Alice publishes encryption key
  - Anyone can send encrypted message
  - Only Alice can decrypt messages with this key
- Digital signature scheme
  - Alice publishes key for verifying signatures
  - Anyone can check a message signed by Alice
  - Only Alice can send signed messages

Digital Signatures from TDPs

- (G, F, F^{-1}): secure TDP $X \longrightarrow X$
- $H: M \longrightarrow X$ a hash function

Sign(sk, m∈X) :

output

$$sig = F^{-1}\big(sk, H(m)\big)$$

Verify(pk, m, sig) :

output

$$\begin{cases} 1 & \text{if} \quad H(m) = F(pk, sig) \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Security: existential unforgeability under a chosen message attack in the random oracle model

Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI)

- Anyone can send Bob a secret message
  - Provided they know Bob's public key
- How do we know a key belongs to Bob?
  - If imposter substitutes another key, can read Bob's mail

- One solution: PKI
  - Trusted root Certificate Authority (e.g. Symantec)
    - Everyone must know the verification key of root CA
    - Check your browser; there are hundreds!!
  - Root authority signs intermediate CA
  - Results in a certificate chain

Back to SSL/TLS



Limitations of cryptography

- Most security problems are not crypto problems
  - This is good: cryptography works!
  - This is bad
    - People make other mistakes; crypto doesn't solve them
- Misuse of cryptography is fatal for security
  - WEP – ineffective, highly embarrassing for industry
  - Occasional unexpected attacks on systems subjected to serious review


A CRYPTO NERD'S IMAGINATION:
HIS LAPTOP'S ENCRYPTED. LET'S BUILD A MILLION-DOLLAR CLUSTER TO CRACK IT.
NO GOOD! IT'S 4096-BIT RSA!
BLAST! OUR EVIL PLAN IS FOILED!
WHAT WOULD ACTUALLY HAPPEN:
HIS LAPTOP'S ENCRYPTED. DRUG HIM AND HIT HIM WITH THIS $5 WRENCH UNTIL HE TELLS US THE PASSWORD.
GOT IT.