Partisanship, Institutions, and Change in American Trade Politics

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We document the change of the identities of Republicans and Democrats on trade policy. This change involves a reversal of positions in the House of Representatives but a convergence on the presidential level. We also demonstrate in pooled cross-sectional analyses that presidents of both parties now exert a free-trade influence on House votes.

For more than one hundred years, it was possible to predict the direction of major changes in American trade policy by monitoring the partisan outcome of elections. When the Democrats took over both houses of Congress as well as the presidency, tariffs fell, and when the Republicans took control of all three institutions, tariffs rose (Stewart and Weingast, 1992, 261–63). However, since the 1930s, tariffs have continued to decline, regardless of partisan control of the government, and the partisan outcome of presidential elections is less consequential for trade politics than is the outcome of congressional elections. Figure 1 documents these observations by showing partisan control as changing only when a different party first takes over all three institutions.

For many years after the formation of the Republican party there was a stable and predictable pattern of partisan alternatives, with the Democrats advocating free trade, and the Republicans supporting protection. Probably the most dramatic change in the history of American trade policy took place within the context of these enduring alternatives. The very protectionist Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930 was passed by the Republicans, while the Reciprocal Trade Act of 1934, which reversed this policy, was passed by the Democrats, who had won the subsequent elections. Even though the policy had changed, there was continuity in the ideology of the parties regarding free trade.

We are grateful for the comments and suggestions of Wendy Hansen, Peng Lian, Timothy McKeown, Thomas Mroz, Michael Munger, James Snyder, and Terry Sullivan on earlier versions of this article. We would also like to acknowledge the research assistance of Hyeon-Woo Lee. Authors names are listed alphabetically.

THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS, Vol. 57, No. 4, November 1995, Pp. 1130–42

FIGURE 1

TARIFF RATES BY PARTISAN CONTROL



Source: *Historical Statistics of the United States.*

In the postwar era, the positions of the two parties became blurred. Trade policy did not swing with the outcome of elections as it had in the past, as described earlier. Republican presidents did not revert to the protectionism of their predecessors, and, indeed, the Republican party in Congress became the party of free trade, while Democrats in Congress took the side of protection.

THE PRESIDENTIAL LEVEL: CHANGE IN PARTY PLATFORMS[1]

In its 1928 platform, the Republican party asserted that we "reaffirm our belief in the protective tariff as a fundamental and essential principle of the economic life of this nation," and four years later, after the passage of the Smoot-Hawley tariff, it again identified itself as the "staunch supporter of the American system of protective tariffs." The Democrats did not make a frontal attack on tariffs in this period but were more conditional than Republicans in their support of tariffs. In the 1932 platform, the Democrats expressed support for reciprocal tariff agreements.

After the passage of the Reciprocal Trade Act, Democrats did not take a rhetorical offensive in favor of free trade. Subsequent platforms of 1936, 1940, and 1944

[1]These platform statements are from Johnson (1978) and from *Congressional Quarterly Almanacs.*

called for the extension of trade but supported protection against unfair competition. Republicans, meanwhile, called for repeal of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement law, and continued an emphasis on protecting American workers from "foreign competition" and "unfair competition in world markets." They asserted that tariff protection is "essential to our American standard of living."

Only after the war did the Democrats begin to take the rhetorical offensive in favor of free trade. Republican platforms ceased to be explicitly protectionist but continued to emphasize unfair competition, and to advocate escape clause and peril point provisions. By the 1960s, the platforms had converged to a common advocacy of free trade, reduction of nontariff barriers, and assistance to domestic producers affected by import competition. On the presidential level, as reflected in platform statements, the parties did not continue toward the reversal of positions we will document later on the congressional level. Instead, Democrats and Republicans both supported free trade and the reduction of trade barriers, while acknowledging the risks to domestic producers and opposing "unfair" competition.

However, by 1972 it was the Democratic platform that was paying more attention to the hardships of free trade for workers hurt by foreign competition. In 1976, the Republicans promised to "guard against protectionism." In 1980, the Republicans were emphasizing free trade, advocating the aggressive promotion of exports, and accusing Carter of contributing to protectionism, which they saw as inviting retaliation. In this year, the Democrats were less outspoken supporters of free trade, and they expressed concerns about the safeguard of domestic industry against unfair trade practices.

In the remainder of the 1980s, the Democrats continued to emphasize "fair trade," while the Republicans opposed protection. There were not clear differences in goals, but Democrats seemed more sensitive to the internal costs for American industry of international competition, while Republicans seemed more aware of the benefits of open markets. In 1992, both parties advocated the expansion of trade, but the Democrats emphasized issues of unfair trade, of environmental, health, and safety standards, and of assistance for dislocated workers. Republicans trumpeted their choice "to compete . . . rather than retreat with the Democrats to the limits of yesteryear."

The tracing of these platform positions on trade from the 1920s through the 1990s illustrates a change in the dominant ideology from protection to free trade. In very few instances was there a confrontation between opposing ideologies. Even as the Democrats changed the policy in the 1930s, they did so with rhetorical caution. Differences between the platforms tended to be differences in emphasis within a common value framework. After the Republicans became slightly more explicit advocates of free trade and opponents of protection than the Democrats in the 1970s, the Democrats avoided advocacy of protection in the style of the Republicans of the 1920s. Rather, they emphasized the need for fairness in the access to markets.

On the Congressional Level: Changes in House Voting Patterns

We document the change in congressional voting patterns with an analysis of 20 key House votes on the important *general* trade bills since World War II. Table 1 lists the major trade votes in the House since 1945 by party. The first figure in each pair represents a vote for the position closer to free trade, while the second represents a vote for the more protectionist position.[2] In the period from 1945 through 1962, healthy majorities of House Democrats were consistently and without exception supportive of free trade, while majorities of Republicans usually, but not always, took the more protectionist position.

In the period after the 1960s, majorities of Republicans became consistently supportive of the positions closer to free trade (though not always by a large margin), while majorities of Democrats usually, but not always, took the more protectionist side. Virtually all of the exceptions can be explained in terms of the partisan identity of the president. These votes document a dramatic shift in the positions of the parties in the House of Representatives. Instead of the convergence that appears to have taken place on the presidential level, we see a reversal in partisan identities in Congress.

Our claim of a shift in partisan positions will be more convincing if we can demonstrate that it holds up after control for other variables. We have analyzed the impact of party in a model of House voting on 10 bills between 1951 and 1993. The votes are listed in the appendix. Our independent variables include party affiliation, of course, along with a dummy variable for southern Democrats. The remaining independent variables include four demographic variables, three variables reflecting economic conditions, and three variables measuring industrial structure. These control variables are surrogates for "interests" in protection or free trade.[3]

Table 2 reports the estimates for the political variables on eight bills on which there was partisan division. Party is coded one for Republicans and zero for Democrats, while the free-trade position was coded one and protection zero. The coefficients on the votes for the period before the 1970s show that party was consistently associated with these votes. Democrats were more likely to vote for free trade at the .01 level of statistical significance.

In the 1970 vote (the only one in this analysis in which the president did not take a position), the partisan positions had switched, but the difference was not

[2]We followed the labeling of the bills by *Congressional Quarterly*, often taking into consideration presidential messages. Note that Republican movement to a more liberal position on final passage began during World War II (Fisher 1972, 148).

[3]The demographic variables are percent urban, percent nonwhite, average age, and median years of education. Those reflecting economic conditions are unemployment, and the level and change in per capita income. The industrial structure variables are manufacturing employment, and percentages of income earned in manufacturing and in agriculture. These variables were measured on a statewide basis. In years in which it was possible to measure these variables on a district basis, results were not importantly changed (see Pak 1991).

TABLE 1

MAJOR TRADE VOTES, 1945–1993

		Republicans	Democrats
45—HR 3240, 3yr extension			
*Knutson recommittal	212-181	7-167	204-13
48—HR 6556, 1yr extension			
*Closed rule	156-212	0-212	154-0
49—HR 1211, 3yr extension			
*Simpson recommittal	241-151	5-144	235-7
51—HR 1612, 2yr extension			
*Final	168-225	4-183	163-42
53—HR 5495, 1yr extension			
Final	363-34	179-25	183-9
54—HR 9474, 1yr extension			
Closed rule	273-63	145-27	127-36
55—HR 1, 3yr extension			
*Reed recommittal	206-199	66-119	140-89
58—HR 1259, 5yr extension			
*pReed recommittal	268-146	108-85	160-61
62—HR 11970 (Trade Expansion Act)			
*pMason recommittal	253-171	43-127	210-44
70—HR 18970 (protectionist bill)			
*Collier recommittal	172-207	88-74	84-133
73—HR 10710 (Trade Reform Act)			
*pAdopt H Res. 657	230-147	136-24	94-123
79—HR 4537 (Trade Agreement Act)			
pFinal	395-7	148-2	247-5
84—HR 6023 (part of HR 3398)			
*pGephardt amendment	95-259	71-66	24-193
84—HR 3398 (Tariff and Trade Act)			
pFinal	386-1	145-1	241-0
86—HR 4800 (Democratic bill)			
*pFinal	115-295	111-59	4-236
87—HR 3 (Democratic bill)			
*pGephardt amendment	214-218	159-17	55-201
88—HR 3			
*pVeto override	113-308	112-60	1-248
88—HR 4848 (PL 100-418)			
*pFinal	376-45	133-41	243-4
91—H Res. 101 (Disapproval of fast-track procedures)			
*p	231-192	140-21	91-170
93—HR 3450 (NAFTA Implementation)			
*pFinal	234-200	132-43	102-156

First numbers for free trade and second numbers for protection.

p for votes on which presidential positions were taken.

*for votes when at least 25% were cast against the majorities.

TABLE 2[a]

SUMMARY OF PROBIT RESULTS OF MAJOR TRADE VOTES

Dependent Variable	PID Dummy	SOUDEM Dummy	% of Votes for Liberal Positions	Chi-square
1951 vote	−3.1749***	.6647	42.6%	311.3(12)
(n = 392)	(−11.31)	(1.55)		
1955 vote	−1.0234***	.2138	50.9%	79.2(12)
(n = 405)	(−6.10)	(.64)		
1958 vote	−.8322***	−.2484	64.7%	58.2(12)
(n = 414)	(−4.78)	(−.78)		
1962 vote	−2.4012***	−1.1109***	59.7%	220.7(12)
(n = 424)	(−11.06)	(−3.07)		
1970 vote[b]	.1049	.3098	45.4%	165.2(12)
(n = 379)	(.61)	(.77)		
1973 vote	1.5801***	.9564***	61.1%	127.3(12)
(n = 377)	(9.03)	(3.06)		
1986 votes[c]	2.1018***	.3295***	36.1%	1195.0(12)
(n = 2,480)	(26.88)	(2.75)		
1987/8 votes[d]	2.3818***	.1538	59.6%	1286.3(12)
(n = 2,125)	(26.26)	(1.07)		
1991/3 votes[e]	1.6750***	1.1519***	51.4%	280.5(12)
(n = 855)	(13.91)	(6.84)		

[a] t-statistic in parentheses: *, **, *** denote significant at .10, .05, and .01 level, respectively.
[b] President Nixon remained neutral to this vote.
[c] Six votes on HR 4800. See appendix.
[d] Five votes on HR 3. See appendix.
[e] Two votes on H Res. 101 and HR 3450.

statistically significant. However, in the subsequent votes, party became statistically significant at the .01 level, but now with the Republicans more likely to take the free-trade side of the issue.[4]

In describing partisanship, we have identified two kinds of change in American politics. On the presidential level, the policy changes initiated in the 1930s led to a shifting of the positions of both parties away from a presumption of protectionism toward a presumption of free trade. There was not a dramatic reversal of positions of the parties on the presidential level, and there was almost never a confrontation of clearly drawn alternative ideologies on trade. Rather, there was a change in the language of presidential platforms and some convergence. The clearest reversal of positions occurred on the congressional level, with the turning point coming around 1970. This change is much more striking than any changes taking place on the presidential level, and it suggests that there may be room for protectionist

[4] It may be that the congressional Democrats have not really become protectionist, but that they use their votes to signal their concern to their constituents. See Pastor (1983) on the "cry-and-sigh" syndrome.

sentiment on the congressional level that does not exist in national contests for chief executive.

Institutions as Reflectors of Different Constellations of Interests

The experience of the Great Depression gave weight to the arguments that protectionism can damage prosperity by denying gains from trade. Similarly, the prosperity of the postwar years reinforced the claims made by advocates of free trade that the elimination of protection enhances economic well-being. The executive branch has become an agency that consistently advocated free-trade positions. In all of the bills listed in table 1, when the president took a position, it was a position for the liberal (free-trade) side of the issue and against protectionism. This fact will help explain some of the deviations from the dominant patterns of partisanship identified in that table. We noted earlier that between 1945 and 1962, the Democrats were consistently liberal, while the Republicans were usually protectionist. Two exceptions were votes in 1953 and 1954 in which both parties overwhelmingly supported one-year extensions of the Reciprocal Trade Act. These two bills reflected minimal ideological distance, in that they each supported a free-trade institution, but extended it for only a single year. Moreover, Republicans might find it easier to support legislation that delegated authority to negotiate tariffs to an executive branch controlled by their party. The final exception in this period is the 1958 vote in which President Eisenhower took a position in favor of a five-year extension. Republicans supported this free-trade position taken by their president but by a smaller margin than that of the Democrats, for whom the free-trade position was more compatible with their traditional views.

Similarly, after 1970 the Republicans became consistently liberal, while the Democrats took protectionist positions most of the time but not always. One of the exceptions (the 1979 act) was a case in which the Democratic president took a position in favor of a free-trade bill. The others were two nearly unanimous votes in 1984 and 1988. Each of these bills had features that gave Congress enhanced veto authority regarding the results of the president's "fast track" negotiating capacity (Lohmann and O'Halloran 1994, 618).

Why should the presidency be less protectionist than the Congress? One reason may be that the president has special responsibilities for foreign policy, and that America's hegemonic leadership in the postwar era has led the presidency to be more free-trade oriented than it might be otherwise. There are domestic reasons as well. As Lohmann and O'Halloran (1994) suggest, Congress is trapped into a universalistic and inefficient logroll when making trade legislation. By delegating trade policy-making authority to the president, Congress can implement more efficient trade policy outcomes. For the presidency, with a larger constituency, the interest of consumers tends to prevail over that of individual producer groups, with an

attendant bias toward free trade. For the smaller constituencies of the Congress, and particularly of the House, the political weight of producers relative to consumers is enhanced, and protectionism is more likely.

We expect that the president will have a liberal influence on trade legislation, and that this influence will be carried out most directly through members of his party. But presidential influence is not easy to measure at any given time because it will be collinear with partisanship. A pooled/cross-sectional analysis permits us to infer the free-trade-oriented pull of presidential influence, after controlling for party. Table 3 pools the four votes for the years 1951 through 1962. This gives us four administrations of three presidents: Truman, Eisenhower I and II, and Kennedy. Table 4 pools two votes in 1991 and 1993 that allow variation in presidential partisanship.

The dummy variable PRE is assigned to members of Congress who were of the president's party. We expect a positive coefficient, which would show that the influence of the president draws members of his party in the direction of free trade, even after controlling for party membership. The sign on PRE is indeed positive and significant in both tables, supporting our hypothesis. Democrats were still more liberal than otherwise under the influence of Presidents Truman, Kennedy, and Clinton. Republicans were more liberal than otherwise in this period when Eisenhower or Reagan was president.

A pooled/cross-sectional analysis such as the one reported in table 3 assumes that the structure of the model is constant over the entire period. We suspected that this is not entirely so and introduced dummy variables for each of the years to test for this possibility. The fact that the signs and significance of the demographic variables varies somewhat in columns B through E of table 3 suggests that this is indeed the case. However, even though the influence of the control variables is not stable, the coefficients on partisanship and on presidential influence are quite stable. This analysis explains the anomalies in table 1, when Republicans voted free trade in an era in which they were otherwise protectionist (1958), and it suggests that the same thing happened with the Democrats in 1979.

In table 4, we analyze the votes cast on two occasions concerning the NAFTA: one on the 1991 House resolution to stop the presidential authority to negotiate the NAFTA under the fast-track procedures, the other on the final passage of the Trade Expansion Act (NAFTA) in 1993. Due to the proximity of the times votes were cast, we can safely ignore the possibility of serious environmental changes over the trade issue and treat the votes as if they had been cast at one time.

The first model that includes the interest variables only suggests that the interests accounted for by these surrogates are not impressive determinants of the votes; even though four variables pass the traditional significance test and these ten variables as a group seem to have influenced members of Congress's decisions, the model successfully predicts less than 60% of the votes. The second model incorporates two political variables into the first one, which improves the fit considerably. The change of per capita income turns out to have a significant

TABLE 3[a]

RESULTS OF POOLED DATA (1951, 1955, 1958, AND 1962)

	ALL (A)	YR51 Dummies (B)	YR55 Dummies (C)	YR58 Dummies (D)	YR62 Dummies (E)
Intercept	−3.3670	−4.0193	−2.0660	−4.1398	−3.2532
Percent Urban	.0034	.0077	−.0022	.0004	.0073
	(.53)	(1.31)	(−.35)	(.06)	(1.17)
Percent Nonwhite	.0111	.0038	−.0014	.0118	.0151*
	(1.61)	(.49)	(−.17)	(1.62)	(1.95)
Average Age	.0955***	.1328***	.0657*	.1022***	.0680**
	(3.139)	(4.17)	(1.85)	(3.17)	(1.98)
Median Years of Education	.1238**	.0127	.1072	.1199*	.1134*
	(2.08)	(.18)	(1.52)	(1.91)	(1.73)
Manufacturing Employment	.0082	.0235***	.0154	.0069	.0044
	(1.18)	(2.83)	(1.21)	(.91)	(.60)
Percent of Income Earned in Manufacturing	−.0107*	−.0294***	−.0254	−.0030	−.0091
	(−1.73)	(−4.11)	(−1.52)	(−.45)	(−1.47)
Percent of Income Earned in Agriculture	.0105	.0277***	−.0230*	.0135*	.0147*
	(1.35)	(3.28)	(−1.84)	(1.72)	(1.80)
Per Capita Income	−.0008	—	—	—	—
	(−.16)				
Change in Per Capita Income	−.0031	—	—	—	—
	(−.30)				
Unemployment	−.0245	—	—	—	—
	(−.68)				
Party Identification	−1.6380***	−1.7008***	−1.6217***	−1.6478***	−1.6740***
	(−18.11)	(−17.95)	(−17.80)	(−18.19)	(−17.97)
President	.7092***	.7113***	.7455***	.7062***	.8151***
	(9.95)	(9.16)	(9.72)	(9.48)	(10.43)
Southern Democrat	−.3624**	−.4166***	−.3420**	−.2810*	−.3405**
	(−2.26)	(−2.77)	(−2.23)	(−1.88)	(−2.26)
Dummy	—	8.8376***	−3.5489	−.7122	−.7085
D × URB	—	.0072	.0050	.0072	−.0120
D × NWHT	—	−.0234	.0257*	.0065	−.0311*
D × AGE	—	−.1703**	.1074*	.0621	.0664
D × EDU	—	−.4705***	−.0630	−.0462	−.0298
D × MNFEMP	—	.0096	−.0002	−.0461**	.0370
D × MNF	—	−.0154	.0056	.0303	−.0285
D × AGR	—	−.0317	.0526***	.0338	−.0500
−2 × L.L.	1,728.44	1,640.42	1,706.74	1,692.00	1,702.46

TABLE 3 (*continued*)

	ALL (A)	YR51 Dummies (B)	YR55 Dummies (C)	YR58 Dummies (D)	YR62 Dummies (E)
Chi-square	523.80	611.84	545.51	560.25	549.79
	(13)	(18)	(18)	(18)	(18)
$n = 1{,}635$					

[a] *t*-statistic in parentheses: *, **, *** denote significant at .10, .05, and .01 level, respectively.

coefficient sign with four other surrogates for interest. The two political variables are significant with predicted signs and their addition resulted in the rise of the prediction level up to 75%.

The presidential effect is measured in the third model with other political and economic variables. Even though the fit of the model does not improve and other variables remain relatively intact with the addition of this variable, the presidential party dummy clearly has a significant positive sign. Incorporated into the last model is the union membership variable with the expectation that members of Congress from districts with many union members tend to vote for the protectionist positions. But the result tells us that the strength of the labor union does not exert extra protectionist pressures upon representatives.

From table 4 we can confirm that the partisan positions that have evolved since the early 1970s have been solidified among the members of the two major parties. Southern Democrats are between Republicans and northern Democrats in the continuum of trade liberalism and protectionism. The analysis suggests that the institutional factors do matter in the 1990s as they did in the earlier decades.

Our findings are compatible with those of Lohmann and O'Halloran (1994), who argue that free trade fares better under unified party government. But the early part of the article shows that this assertion is historically conditioned and was not always so. We add a small refinement to this argument regarding the current era. We expect Congress to be most unanimously liberal on trade issues under unified government when the president is associated with the more protectionist party in Congress. The free-trade-oriented congressional party will already be supportive, and the president may be able to pull his normally protectionist party into support for free trade.

Two of the most unanimous votes in our study took place under such circumstances. In 1953, Eisenhower added the support of the otherwise protectionist Republicans to that of the already liberal Democrats for a vote of 363 to 34. In 1979, Carter added the support of the now more protectionist Democrats to that of the already free-trade oriented Republicans for a vote of 395 to 7 (see table 1). This implies that NAFTA may well have failed under a Republican president.

TABLE 4[a]

RESULTS OF POOLED DATA (1991 AND 1993)

	(A)	(B)	(C)	(D)
Intercept	6.3952	7.2846	5.7681	5.7781
Percent Urban	.0248***	.0294***	.0306***	.0307***
	(−3.58)	(3.64)	(3.75)	(3.75)
Percent Nonwhite	.0006	−.0123	−.0115	−.0115
	(.08)	(−1.36)	(−1.27)	(−1.26)
Average Age	.0517	.0125	.0104	−.0100
	(.52)	(.39)	(.32)	(.31)
Median Years of Education	.0299**	.0439***	.0415***	.0408**
	(2.13)	(2.90)	(2.73)	(2.45)
Manufacturing Employment	.0165	−.0236	−.0215	−.0230
	(.49)	(−.62)	(−.56)	(−.56)
Percent of Income Earned in Manufacturing	−.0245	.0456	.0438	.0456
	(−.68)	(1.09)	(1.04)	(1.01)
Percent of Income Earned in Agriculture	−.0049	.0433	.0467	.0465
	(−.09)	(.72)	(.77)	(.77)
Per Capita Income	−.0259***	−.0165***	−.0162***	−.0160**
	(−5.17)	(−2.80)	(−2.76)	(−2.53)
Change in Per Capita Income	−.0645	−.1021**	−.0870*	−.0869*
	(−1.52)	(−2.16)	(−1.81)	(−1.81)
Unemployment	−.0945***	−.1070***	−.1236***	−.1228***
	(−2.78)	(−2.79)	(−3.17)	(−3.09)
Union	—	—	—	−.0006
				(−.11)
Party Identification	—	1.6750***	1.6911***	1.6887***
		(13.91)	(13.92)	(13.66)
Southern Democrat	—	1.1519***	1.1466***	1.1400***
		(6.84)	(6.79)	(6.33)
President	—	—	.2464**	.2462**
			(2.45)	(2.45)
−2 × L.L.	1,121.20	898.24	892.20	892.19
Chi-square	57.50	280.45	286.49	286.50
	(10)	(12)	(13)	(14)
% Correctly Predicted	58.9	74.9	75.1	75.1
$n = 855$				

[a] t-statistic in parentheses: *, **, *** denote significant at .10, .05, and .01 level, respectively.

Explaining the Change in Partisanship

Our article has described rather than explained a change in partisanship regarding trade policy. Here we speculate about the sources of such change. Why should the parties have reversed positions? We suspect that the answer to this question has to do with the position of American labor in an increasingly open economy. As labor-intensive goods became increasingly subject to import competition, the Democratic party as the party of labor moved in the direction of protection. Meanwhile, the Republican party as the party of capital, the more mobile of the factors, became increasingly supportive of free trade.

The old partisan ideologies had reflected the interests of the parties that were defined in the nineteenth century, when the Republicans had supported protection for developing American industry, while the Democrats had supported free trade to enhance the export of southern cotton. These ideologies rationalize and congeal patterns of interest, and as ideas they take on a life of their own. As a matter of taking sides on free-trade issues, the old partisan stances may outlive their relevance.[5] However, we do not expect them to last long when they are at odds with newly defined interests of partisan clienteles. Ideology can define and interpret interests when they are ambiguous, but when interests change, we expect ideology to follow.

We have seen that the relative positions of the partisan players may change, and that the dominant ideology may change, as it did from protection to free trade. When it does, the interaction between the players can take place in different locations on that continuum. But even as the positions of the parties change, we expect the presidency to continue to articulate a more liberal view on trade issues than Congress regardless of the party of the president.

Manuscript submitted 7 March 1994
Final manuscript received 11 January 1995

Appendix

Major Trade Votes

1951: Simpson amendment to Trade Agreements extension bill (HR 19) directing Tariff Commission to determine minimum "peril point" tariff rates. Agreed to 225-168[a] (D 42-163; R 183-4).

1955: Reed motion to recommit Trade Agreements extension bill (HR 1) with instructions to require president's compliance with Tariff Commission findings. Rejected 199-206 (D 80-140; R 119-66).

1958: Reed motion to recommit Trade Agreements extension bill (HR 12591) to the Ways and Means Committee, without instructions. Rejected 146-268 (D 61-160; R 85-108).

1962: Mason motion to recommit Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (HR 11970) with instructions to substitute a one-year extension of the expiring Trade Agreement Act. Rejected 171-253 (D 44-210; R 127-43).

[5] See Goldstein (1993).

1970: Collier motion to recommit HR 18970 that would have imposed statutory import quotas on textiles and footwear and provided for quotas on other commodities. No presidential position was taken and Senate killed the bill. Rejected 172-207 (D 84-133; R 88-74).

1973: Vote to adopt HR 657 for rules limiting floor amendments on HR 10710, that later became the Trade Reform Act of 1973. Agreed 230-147 (D 94-123; R 136-24).

1986: Six votes on HR 4800, omnibus trade bill sponsored by Democrats. This bill emphasized retaliation against other countries that fail to allow U.S. goods into their markets.

1. Crane amendment, Failed 137-276 (D 7-237; R 130-44).
2. Frenzel amendment, Failed 109-306 (D 0-241; R 109-65).
3. Roth amendment, Failed 181-238 (D 48-196; R 133-42).
4. Bonker amendment, Passed 248-166 (D 186-56; R 62-110).
5. Wylie amendment, Failed 188-221 (D 23-217; R 165-4).
6. Final passage, Passed 295-115 (D 236-4; R 59-111).

1987/1988: Five votes on HR 3, omnibus trade bill sponsored by Democrats. The bill would have revised statutory procedures for dealing with unfair foreign trade practices and import damage to the U.S. industries and revised agriculture and education programs.

1. Gephardt amendment, Passed 218-214 (D 201-55; R 17-159).
2. Wylie amendment, Failed 187-239 (D 17-234; R 170-5).
3. Final passage, Passed 290-137 (D 247-6; R 43-131).
4. Conference report, Passed 312-107 (D 244-2; R 68-105).
5. Veto override, Passed 308-113 (D 248-1; R 60-112).

1991: Vote to adopt HR 101 that would have disapproved the president's request to extend "fast-track procedures" for two more years. Rejected 192-231 (D 170-91; R 21-140).

1993: Vote to pass HR 3450, the Trade Expansion Act of 1993 (NAFTA). Passed 234-200 (D 102-156; R 132-43).

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[a]Underlined are the votes cast for liberal positions: One "No" vote was cast by an independent in 1951.

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