

Quantized Versions of Llama Robustness Against Prompt-Based Adversarial Attacks

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Abstract

Modern natural language processing (NLP) models such as BERT, GPT-3, and LLaMA have achieved impressive language understanding capabilities but remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Even minor input modifications can lead to misclassifications or unintended outputs, posing a significant challenge for their reliable deployment in critical applications. Although recent efforts to optimize and quantize these models enable efficient deployment on resource-constrained devices like smartphones — exemplified by Meta’s quantized LLaMA variants, which offer substantial reductions in model size and memory usage — such optimizations often come at the cost of decreased robustness. In this work, we systematically investigate the vulnerabilities of quantized NLP models to adversarial perturbations and develop techniques to enhance their resilience. By identifying the factors that contribute to robustness degradation in smaller, more efficient models, we propose strategies to strengthen their defenses without compromising their efficiency benefits. Our findings aim to improve the trustworthiness of NLP models across a wide spectrum of hardware platforms, ultimately fostering safer and more reliable language technologies for real-world deployments.

1 Introduction

Modern NLP models excel at various tasks but are susceptible to adversarial attacks, where small input modifications can manipulate predictions. This issue is particularly critical for models optimized for mobile or low-resource environments, such as Meta’s quantized LLaMA models. These vulnerabilities challenge the deployment of NLP systems in security-critical applications like content moderation, AI decision-making, and more.

Adversarial attacks in NLP have seen significant advancements through innovative methods targeting text classifiers and transformer models. One notable approach is HotFlip, introduced by (Ebrahimi

et al., 2017), a white-box adversarial attack method for character-level neural text classifiers. HotFlip uses gradient-based optimization to make small changes, or "flips," to individual characters in the input text. These perturbations are designed to maximize the model’s loss while preserving semantic meaning and fluency. The efficiency of HotFlip lies in its ability to generate adversarial examples with minimal modifications, effectively fooling classifiers at both character and word levels.

Building on these advancements, Gradient-Based Distributional Attack (GBDA) was proposed by Guo et al. (Guo et al., 2021) as a novel framework specifically for transformer models in NLP. GBDA overcomes the challenges of discrete text data by formulating a continuous matrix representation of adversarial examples. Using Gumbel-softmax, it ensures semantic similarity and fluency in the generated examples. This approach enables efficient gradient-based attacks while achieving high attack success rates in both white-box and black-box settings, setting a new standard for adversarial attack frameworks.

In another significant contribution, (Maheshwary et al., 2021) introduced a decision-based attack strategy tailored for hard-label black-box scenarios. These attacks focus on text classification and entailment tasks where only the top predicted label is available, without access to gradients or probability distributions. Their method employs a population-based optimization algorithm to generate adversarial examples that maintain high semantic similarity and grammatical correctness with minimal word perturbations. This approach not only achieves high attack success rates but also ensures lower perturbation rates compared to prior methods, demonstrating its effectiveness in crafting robust adversarial examples. These works highlight the need for defenses that preserve semantic integrity while improving robustness.

The aim of this work is to identify vulnerabili-

ties in LLMs, particularly optimized versions, and to develop robust defense mechanisms. By doing so, we address the trade-off between efficiency and robustness, ensuring reliability across devices ranging from high-performance systems to mobile phones.

2 Motivation

Despite their efficiency, optimized LLMs are more susceptible to adversarial perturbations. For instance, Meta’s quantized LLaMA models achieve a 56% size reduction but exhibit increased vulnerability to attacks due to their compact architectures. Addressing these vulnerabilities is essential for real-world applications where robustness and reliability are paramount.

3 Problem Statement

Deploying LLMs on resource-constrained devices faces challenges due to the susceptibility of optimized models to adversarial attacks. This project investigates:

- Susceptibility of different versions of LLaMA 3.2 to adversarial perturbations.
- Fine-Tuning and robustness evaluation across sentiment analysis Stanford Sentiment Treebank (SST-2 dataset), as well as paraphrase detection on Quora Question Pairs (QQP dataset).
- Incorporating methods used in AdvGLUE dataset for enhancing robustness through adversarial training.

In terms of Novelty, this project studies the vulnerabilities of the quantized versions of the LLaMA 3.2 versions that have been published recently for resource-constrained devices like cellphones. Our results are strong enough to show that the quantized versions are more vulnerable to small perturbations to various prompts. This study can be helpful to the people who are trying to publish their plug-ins for cellphone devices and may want to consider how prompt-perturbation can affect their efficiency.

4 Approach

Based on the attacks used in the AdvGLUE (Wang et al., 2021) dataset, we’ve chosen to apply one of the adversary perturbations which is computationally much expensive and used it during the training. This makes the model familiar

with various adversary samples and robust to it against perturbations.

4.1 Tasks and Datasets

We evaluate quantized Llama 1B and 3B parameters models’ robustness using the Stanford Sentiment Treebank (SST-2) (Wolf et al., 2020) and Quora Question Pairs (QQP) (Peinelt et al., 2019) dataset. We performed a binary classification on the SST-2 (Wolf et al., 2020) dataset, as well as QQP (Peinelt et al., 2019) dataset where classifies two questions as 1 if they are paraphrase of each other, otherwise they classify as 0.

4.2 Adversarial Attacks

In here, we evaluated the quantized models with the AdvGLUE (Wang et al., 2021) dataset, which uses different attack strategies to perturb the prompts. We will explain some of these methods in the following:

Typo-Based Perturbation: We select TextBugger (Li et al., 2018) as the representative algorithm for generating typo-based adversarial examples. When performing the attack, TextBugger first identifies the important words and then replaces them with typos.

Embedding-similarity-based Perturbation: We choose TextFooler (Jin et al., 2020) as the representative adversarial attack that considers embedding similarity as a constraint to generate semantically consistent adversarial examples. Essentially, TextFooler first performs word importance ranking, and then substitutes those important ones to their synonyms extracted according to the cosine similarity of word embeddings.

Distraction-based Perturbation: We integrate two attack strategies: (i) StressTest (Naik et al., 2018) appends three true statements (“and true is true”, “and false is not true”, “and true is true” for five times) to the end of the hypothesis sentence for NLI tasks. (ii) CheckList (Ribeiro et al., 2020) adds randomly generated URLs and handles to distract model attention. Since the aforementioned distraction-based perturbations may impact the linguistic acceptability and the understanding of semantic equivalence, we mainly apply these rules to part of the GLUE (Wang, 2018) tasks, including SST-2 (Wolf et al., 2020) and NLI tasks (MNLI, RTE, QNLI), to evaluate whether model can be easily misled by the strong negation words or such lexical similarity. Table 1 discussed about the all

methods used to generate AdvGLUE (Wang et al., 2021) dataset.

4.3 Evaluation Metric

We use **Attack Success Rate (ASR)** and **Classification Accuracy** (for classification tasks) to quantify model vulnerability:

$$\text{ASR} = \frac{\text{Successful Attacks}}{\text{Total Attempts}} \times 100\%.$$

4.4 Proposed Method

Adversarial fine-tuning integrates adversarial algorithms during training, enabling models to adapt to perturbations. The AdvGLUE (Wang et al., 2021) dataset provides diverse adversarial discussed briefly in Section 4.2.

5 Experiments and Results

All the experiments were performed on a server with an NVIDIA A100 GPU.

5.1 Experimental Setup

LLaMA 3.2 models (1B and 3B parameters) were fine-tuned on SST-2 (Wolf et al., 2020). TextBugger (Li et al., 2018) was chosen for adversarial training (AT) due to its low computational demand, in a way that in every iteration of training, the perturbed prompt goes to network and compared with the label at the end. Table 2 shows how the models' accuracy improves using this technique. The first two big models (13B and 7B LLaMA) were obtained from the (Yang et al., 2024). Since the adversary training demands a powerful computation, and this couldn't happen on colab notebook, we haven't trained these big models with the perturbations.

Model	Test (No Attack)	Test (With Attack)	AT
LLaMA 13B	0.963	0.812	-
LLaMA 7B	0.968	0.820	-
LLaMA 3B	0.912	0.446	0.513
LLaMA 1B	0.887	0.350	0.492

Table 2: Accuracy percentage under adversarial conditions.

Optimized models are disproportionately vulnerable to white-box attacks due to their compact architectures. For instance, LLaMA 1B exhibited significant drops in accuracy under adversarial perturbation, underscoring the need for resource-efficient robustness mechanisms.

6 Ethics and Discussion

Adversarial attack research can be misused. However, it is essential for developing defenses against malicious actors. Ensuring responsible use through transparency and ethical guidelines is critical for advancing the field without societal harm.

7 Limitations & Challenges

The size of the models makes fine-tuning time-consuming, even for optimized models like LLaMA 3.2 with 1B parameters. AdvGLUE (Wang et al., 2021) was generated using several algorithms to attack well-known models, with human annotation applied to certain parts. This combination makes it challenging to improve the robustness of models against this test bench using only one algorithm (due to resource limitations) and without comprehensive human annotation across the entire dataset.

8 Conclusion and Future Work

Adversarial training improves robustness against token manipulation attacks. In terms of Novelty, this project studies the vulnerabilities of the quantized versions of the LLaMA 3.2 versions that have been published recently for resource-constraint devices like cellphones. Our results are strong enough to show that the quantized versions are more venerable to small perturbations to various prompts. This study can be helpful to the people how are trying to publish their plug-ins for cellphone devices and may want to consider how prompt-perturbation can effect their efficiency.

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Method	Type	Computation(1-5)
TextBugger	Word-level	2
TextFooler	Word-level	3
BERT-ATTACK	Word-level	4
SememePSO	Word-level	5
CompAttack	Word-level	5
SCPN	Sentence-level	4
T3	Sentence-level	5
AdvFever	Sentence-level	4
CheckList	Sentence-level	3
StressTest	Sentence-level	3

Table 1: Computational demand ratings for adversarial attack methods in NLP.

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