

601.445/601.645

Practical Cryptographic Systems

MPC and Private Computation Continued

Instructor: Alishah Chator

Housekeeping

- Assignment 2 due Tuesday 10/26 at 11:59pm
- Weekly HW#3 Due Thursday 10/28 at 11:59pm
- Midterm 11/1
 - In Class, Let us know ASAP if you cannot attend that day


News

Last Time


MPC Formally

- A Multiparty Computation Protocol involves a set of parties $\{A, B, C, \dots\}$, a private input for each party $\{x_A, x_B, x_C, \dots\}$ and some functionality to jointly compute $f(x_A, x_B, x_C, \dots) = y$
 - Each party should learn nothing besides the output y
 - Crucially, that means the input of all other parties should be hidden

MPC: Ideal vs Reality



1-out-of-2 Oblivious Transfer



Private Information Retrieval (PIR)

- Goal: Query a server's database without:
 - The server learning which entry was looked up
 - The client learning other entries of the database
- How might we do this naively?
- Can we use OT to build this?

Today


- How can we build general MPC for two parties
- How can we build MPC for an arbitrary number of parties

Boolean Circuits

- Way of breaking down functions into logical operations (AND, OR, NOT)

Boolean Circuits








- Way of breaking down functions into logical operations (AND, OR, NOT)



Gates and Truth Tables

- The basic gates in a boolean circuit are AND, OR, NOT, XOR
- Their operations are described in truth tables


Logic Gates

Name	NOT	AND	NAND	OR	NOR	XOR	XNOR																																																																																																
Alg. Expr.	\overline{A}	AB	\overline{AB}	$A + B$	$\overline{A + B}$	$A \oplus B$	$\overline{A \oplus B}$																																																																																																
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Universality

- Some combinations of gates are **Universal**
 - These gates can be combined to build any function
- Examples are {NAND}, {AND,OR,NOT}
- Often in cryptography we are limited to {AND, XOR}

NAND from AND + XOR



Two-Party Secure Computation from circuits?

- We can build any function from {AND, XOR}, how does this help us?

Two-Party Secure Computation from circuits?

- We can build any function from {AND, XOR}, how does this help us?
- IDEA: Build a circuit that can only be run on one input!

Garbled Circuits

- A **Garbled Circuit** is a two party secure computation protocol between a Garbler and an Evaluator.

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 - **Universality of NAND (can be built from {AND,XOR})**
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Garbled Circuits


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$\begin{array}{c} a \\ \backslash b \end{array}$	0	1
0	0	0
1	0	1



$\begin{array}{c} a \\ \backslash b \end{array}$	X_a^0	X_a^1
X_b^0	X_c^0	X_c^0
X_b^1	X_c^0	X_c^1



$\begin{array}{c} a \\ \backslash b \end{array}$	X_a^0	X_a^1
X_b^0	$\mathbf{E}_{X_a^0, X_b^0}(X_c^0)$	$\mathbf{E}_{X_a^1, X_b^0}(X_c^0)$
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- If you only know one label for each input to a gate you can only evaluate the gate one way
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- This process is done for every gate in the circuit
- If you only know one label for each input to a gate you can only evaluate the gate one way
 - You only get one wire label as output from each gate
- Does order matter for the garbled truth table?
- What about the inputs wires to the circuit?

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Sending the Garbled Circuit

- The garbler sends over the garbled truth tables for each gate
- The garbler also sends over the wire labels corresponding to their input
 - Why don't these reveal the garblers input?
- Does the Evaluator have everything they need to evaluate?

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Getting the Evaluator's labels

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- Two possible labels for each input wire, need to obtain exactly 1 label for each. Do we have a primitive for this?
 - Use 1-out-of-2 Oblivious Transfer!

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 - **The evaluator evaluates the circuit**
 - **Uses the given wire labels to evaluate the garbled truth tables one by one**

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 - The garbler can send the mapping over
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- In either case, we see we only have **semi-honest security**
- Should be easy to see that inputs remain hidden for both parties

Limitations


- Only support two parties
- Computation and Communication cost depend on the number of gates
 - Not all functions have concise circuit representations

So what can we do with garbled circuits

- Ideal for the secure evaluations of functions with low depth/number of gates
- PRFs (i.e. AES) have workable circuit sizes
- Why might we want to securely evaluate a PRF?

Private Set Intersection (PSI)

- Functionality: Find the overlapping elements between two party's inputs



Building PSI

- Attempt 1: Server sends its database to the client

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- Attempt 3: ???

Oblivious PRF

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- How can we build it?
 - Construct a Garbled Circuit for f where the parties inputs are k and x respectively

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 - Server computes $f_k(y)$ for all $y \in \text{database}$
 - Server sends $C, f_k(y) \dots$ to client
 - Client evaluates C for each of its inputs x and compares the results to the hashed database

Applications of PSI

- Private contact discovery
- Client-side scanning
- Contact tracing