## level08

In the level08 directory, there is an executable named "level08" and a file named "token", which is inaccessible to us. Below is the decompiled code from Ghidra:

```
int main(int argc, char **argv, char **envp)
char *tokenPos;
int fd;
size_t nRead;
ssize_t bytesWritten;
int stackGuard;
char buf[1024];
stackGuard = *(int *)(in_GS_OFFSET + 20);
if (argc == 1)
     printf("%s [file to read]\n", argv[0]);
     exit(1);
tokenPos = strstr(argv[1], "token");
if (tokenPos != NULL)
     printf("You may not access \'%s\'\n", argv[1]);
     exit(1);
fd = open(argv[1], 0);
if (fd == -1)
    err(1, "Unable to open %s", argv[1]);
nRead = read(fd, buf, 1024);
if (nRead == -1)
     err(1, "Unable to read fd %d", fd);
bytesWritten = write(1, buf, nRead);
if (stackGuard != *(int *)(in_GS_OFFSET + 20))
     __stack_chk_fail();
return bytesWritten;
```

## level08<sup>2</sup>

The program is structured with a series of five conditional checks:

- 1. It validates whether *argc* is equal to 1.
- 2. It ascertains if *argv*[1] contains the substring 'token'.
- 3. It determines the accessibility of the specified file for opening.
- 4. Upon successfully opening the file, it verifies the readability of the file descriptor.
- 5. It implements a check for potential buffer overflow.

Recognizing our inability to directly access or rename the "token" file, we crafted a symbolic link with a unique name, that points to the 'token' file. The program checks only the argument's name, not its actual source. Thus, our symbolic link bypasses this validation, allowing indirect content access.

