

Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) Attack

Name: Alizeh Jafri

Introduction:


The purpose of this lab is to develop an understanding of the Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) attack. In this lab, we will be attacking a social networking web application with the help of the *CSRF attack*.

Lab Tasks:


Firstly, I started the web server using the following command ‘sudo service apache2 start’ as shown in the screen shot below:

```
[11/14/2019 17:54] seed@ubuntu:~$ su root
Password:
[11/14/2019 17:54] root@ubuntu:/home/seed# sudo service apache2 start
* Starting web server apache2
httpd (pid 2633) already running
[ OK ]
```

Next, I opened the Elgg social networking website by entering the URL ‘www.csrflabelgg.com’ as shown:



Then I viewed Bobby's user profile first, to be able to send friend request to Alice which she had declined. In order to add Bobby to her Elgg friend list. The profile is shown below:




Next, I accessed the directory “/var/www/CSRF/Attacker” to modify the data in the malicious file “index.html”. I modified the data using vim.


```
[11/14/2019 19:29] root@ubuntu:/home/seed# cd /var/www/CSRF/Attacker/  
[11/14/2019 19:29] root@ubuntu:/var/www/CSRF/Attacker# ls  
index.html  
[11/14/2019 19:30] root@ubuntu:/var/www/CSRF/Attacker# vim index.html
```

After the modification in Index.html file, I was able to start the CSRF attack, by sending URL ‘www.csrfattack.com’ from Bobby’s email to Alice’s inbox in Elgg. Thus, when Alice is going to open the email and click on the URL, Bobby will get added to Alice’s friends list. I recognized the add friend HTTP request to GET request. In this attack I used image source tag (img src) that automatically starts an HTTP GET request:


```
[11/14/2019 19:35] root@ubuntu:/var/www/CSRF/Attacker# cat index.html  
<html>  
<head>  
<title>  
Malicious Web  
</title>  
</head>  
<body>  
  
</body>  
</html>  
  
[11/14/2019 19:35] root@ubuntu:/var/www/CSRF/Attacker#
```




Hence, Alice has received Bobby's message. Because of this malicious link 'www.csrlabattacker.com/' Bobby is into Alice's friend list without Alice accepting the friend request as shown:




Alice opened the message and clicked on the URL in the email with Bobby had sent her.




After Bobby had sent the email with the malicious link “www.csrfbattacker.com” to Alice and she opens the link to check if she has won a free ticket to New York, it shows a message on the website with says “Page not found”. The screen shot is shown below:



Now, the LiveHTTPHeaders shows the cookie and on which the URL it denotes.



I visited the Alice's page again, and I found that Bobby became Alice's friend, which means that CSRF attack occurred successfully.



Task 2



I accessed the directory “/elgg/engine/lib” to turn on the countermeasure to find “action_gatekeeper” function which was in ‘action.php’ file. In action.php file I commented the ‘return true’ code as shown in the screen shot below:

```
* @param string $action The action being performed
*
* @return mixed True if valid or redirects.
* @access private
*/
function action_gatekeeper($action) {
    //SEED:Modified to enable CSRF.
    //Comment the below return true statement to enable countermeasure.
    //return true;

    if ($action === 'login') {
        if (validate_action_token(false)) {
            return true;
        }


        $token = get_input('__elgg_token');
        $ts = (int) get_input('__elgg_ts');
        if ($token && elgg_validate_token($token, $ts)) {
```

The screen shot on the left hand side shows, Bobby was Alice’s friend, but then after Alice had removed him, we can see that Bobby can be added by Alice (add friend option is visible) as shown in the screen shot on the right hand side the right hand side:



Next, I tried to re do the attack, but I got an error in Alice's page. The reason why the error had occurred was because we don't have the secret token in our malicious file. Thus, once we commented the (**return true**), another code was implemented.

Now, the Live HTTP header is shown below:



I viewed Alice's friends list again to see if the attack took place or no.



As shown in the screen shot above, there are no friends in Alice's friends. This means the attack didn't occur when we commented (**return true;**) statement.