

Introduction to dependent type theory

Ali Caglayan

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1 Induction

We begin by preparing the tools we will use later on. One of these tools will be structural induction. We will instead prove[*state?*] a vastly more general theorem[*principle?*] of set theory called the *well-founded induction principal*.

1.1 Well-founded induction

This is a standard theorem in set theory [cite set theory books]. For definitions of well-foundedness that have been treated carefully we follow [9, §8].

Definition 1.1.1.

- (i) A **graph** is a set X , whose elements are called **nodes**, equipped with a binary relation \prec .
- (ii) If $x \prec y$ then we say x is a **child** of y .
- (iii) We call a graph **pointed** if it has a distinguished node \star called the **root**.
- (iv) A pointed graph is **accessible**, if for every $x \in X$, there exists a path $x = x_n \prec \cdots \prec x_0 = \star$.
- (v) For any node x of X we write X/x to denote the graph whose nodes are nodes of X that admit a path to x . This is naturally pointed by x . The relation is the same, simply restricted to the subset X/x of X .

Remark 1.1.2. Note that the definition of accessible relies on a definition of natural numbers. If one was to carry out this construction in a setting more general than sets we would need what is called a *Natural Numbers Object (NNO)*.

We now make sure that subsets of graphs bring the nodes' parents.

Definition 1.1.3. A subset S of a graph X is **inductive** if for any node x in X , when all the children of x are in S , x is also in S .

Definition 1.1.4. A graph X is **well-founded** if any inductive subset of X is equal to all of X .

Remark 1.1.5. This is slightly weaker than classical versions of well-foundedness in logic, in which a graph would be well-founded if every inhabited subset has a \prec -minimal element. In fact such a definition would imply the law of excluded middle.

Lemma 1.1.6. Any subset of a well-founded graph is a well-founded graph with the induced relation.

We will follow the proof outlined in [12]. This has been the simplest proof to understand. Other proofs can be found in for example [7] and [3, Chapter 7]. However we found these proof too technical and verbose for simple use.

Theorem 1.1.7 (Principle of well-founded induction). Let X be a well-founded graph and P be a property of nodes of X . We have that

$$\forall x \in X, P(x) \Leftrightarrow \forall x \in X, ((\forall y \prec x, P(y)) \Rightarrow P(x)).$$

Proof. The proof in the forward direction is an easy tautology. For the converse, we assume $\forall x \in X, ((\forall y \prec x, P(y)) \Rightarrow P(x))$ [FINISH PROOF, just a matter of applying the definitions] \square

[Then here we will talk about structural induction as a special case of well-founded induction. Inductively defined sets and whatnot. This should cover all uses later on.]

2 Syntax

2.1 Introduction

We will follow the structure of syntax outlined in Harper [5]. There are several reasons for this.

Firstly, for example in Barendregt et. al. [1] we have notions of substitution left to the reader under the assumption that they can be fixed. Generally Barendregt's style is like this and even when there is much formalism, it is done in a way that we find peculiar.

In Crole's book [4], syntax is derived from an *algebraic signature* which comes directly from categorical semantics. We want to give an independent view of

type theory. The syntax only has types as well, meaning that only terms can be posed in this syntax. Operations on types themselves would have to be handled separately. This will also make it difficult to work with *bound variables*.

In Lambek and Scott's book [8], very little attention is given to syntax and categorical semantics and deriving type theory from categories for study is in the forefront of their focus.

In Jacob's book [6], we again have much reliance on categorical machinery. A variant of algebraic signature called a many-typed signature is given, which has its roots in mathematical logic. Here it is discussed that classically in logic the idea of a sort and a type were synonymous, and they go onto preferring to call them types. This still has the problems identified before as terms and types being treated separately, when it comes to syntax.

In Barendregt's older book [2], there are models of the syntax of (untyped) lambda calculus, using Scott topologies on complete lattices. We acknowledge that this is a working model of the lambda calculus but we believe it to be overly complex for the task at hand. It introduces a lot of mostly irrelevant mathematics for studying the lambda calculus. And we doubt very much that these models will hold up to much modification of the calculus. Typing seems impossible.

In Sørensen and Urzyczyn's book [10] a more classical unstructured approach to syntax is taken. This is very similar to the approaches that Church, Curry and de Bruijn gave early on. The difficulty with this approach is that it is very hard to prove things about the syntax. There are many exceptional cases to be weary of (for example if a variable is bound etc.). It can also mean that the syntax is vulnerable to mistakes. We acknowledge it's correctness in this case, however we prefer to use a safer approach.

We will finally look at one more point of view, that of mathematical logic. We look at Troelstra and Schwichtenberg's book [11] which studies proof theory. This is essentially the previous style but done to a greater extent, for they use that kind of handling of syntax to argue about more general logics. As before, we do not choose this approach.

We have seen books from either end of the spectrum, on one hand Barendregt's type theoretic camp, and on the other, the more categorical logically oriented camp. We have argued that the categorical logically oriented texts do not do a good job of explaining and defining syntax, their only interest is in their categories. The type theoretic texts also seem to be on mathematically shaky ground, sometimes much is left to the reader and finer details are overlooked.

Harper's seems more sturdy and correct in our opinion. Harper doesn't concern himself with abstraction for the sake of abstraction but rather when it will benefit the way of thinking about something. The framework for working with syntax also seems ideal to work with, when it comes to adding features to a theory (be it a type theory or otherwise).

2.2 Abstract Syntax Trees

We begin by outlining what exactly syntax is, and how to work with it. This will be important later on if we want to prove things about our syntax as we will essentially have good data structures to work with.

Definition 2.2.1 (Sorts). Let \mathcal{S} be a finite set, which we will call **sorts**. An element of \mathcal{S} is called a **sort**.

A sort could be a term, a type, a kind or even an expression. It should be thought of an abstract notion of the kind of syntactic element we have. Examples will follow making this clear.

Definition 2.2.2 (Arities). An **arity** is an element $((s_1, \dots, s_n), s)$ of the set of **arities** $\mathcal{Q} := \mathcal{S}^* \times \mathcal{S}$ where \mathcal{S}^* is the Kleene-star operation on the set \mathcal{S} (a.k.a the free monoid on \mathcal{S} or set of finite tuples of elements of \mathcal{S}). An arity is typically written as $(s_1, \dots, s_n)s$.

Definition 2.2.3 (Operators). Let $\mathcal{O} := \{\mathcal{O}_\alpha\}_{\alpha \in \mathcal{Q}}$ be an \mathcal{Q} -indexed (arity-indexed) family of disjoint sets of **operators** for each arity. An element $o \in \mathcal{O}_\alpha$ is called an **operator** of arity α . If o is an operator of arity $(s_1, \dots, s_n)s$ then we say o has **sort** s and that o has n **arguments** of sorts s_1, \dots, s_n respectively.

Definition 2.2.4 (Variables). Let $\mathcal{X} := \{\mathcal{X}_s\}_{s \in \mathcal{S}}$ be an \mathcal{S} -indexed (sort-indexed) family of disjoint (finite?) sets \mathcal{X}_s of **variables** of sort s . An element $x \in \mathcal{X}_s$ is called a **variable** x of **sort** s .

Definition 2.2.5 (Fresh variables). We say that x is **fresh** for \mathcal{X} if $x \notin \mathcal{X}_s$ for any sort $s \in \mathcal{S}$. Given an x and a sort $s \in \mathcal{S}$ we can form the family \mathcal{X}, x of variables by adding x to \mathcal{X}_s .

Remark 2.2.6. The notation \mathcal{X}, x is ambiguous because the sort s associated to x is not written. But this can be remedied by being clear from the context what the sort of x should be.

Definition 2.2.7 (Abstract syntax trees). The family $\mathcal{A}[\mathcal{X}] = \{\mathcal{A}[\mathcal{X}]_s\}_{s \in \mathcal{S}}$ of **abstract syntax trees** (or **asts**), of **sort** s , is the smallest family satisfying the following properties:

1. A variable x of sort s is an ast of sort s : if $x \in \mathcal{X}_s$, then $x \in \mathcal{A}[\mathcal{X}]_s$.
2. Operators combine asts: If o is an operator of arity $(s_1, \dots, s_n)s$, and if $a_1 \in \mathcal{A}[\mathcal{X}]_{s_1}, \dots, a_n \in \mathcal{A}[\mathcal{X}]_{s_n}$, then $o(a_1; \dots; a_n) \in \mathcal{A}[\mathcal{X}]_s$.

Remark 2.2.8. The idea of a smallest family satisfying certain properties is that of structural induction. So another way to say this would be a family of sets inductively generated by the following constructors.

Remark 2.2.9. An ast can be thought of as a tree whose leaf nodes are variables and branch nodes are operators.

[Examples and pictures]

Remark 2.2.10. When we prove properties $\mathcal{P}(a)$ of an ast a we can do so by structural induction on the cases above.

[Some more notes on structural induction, perhaps this can be defined and discussed with trees in the section before?]

[add examples of sorts, operators, variables and how they fit together in asts]

Lemma 2.2.11. If we have $\mathcal{X} \subseteq \mathcal{Y}$ then, $\mathcal{A}[\mathcal{X}] \subseteq \mathcal{A}[\mathcal{Y}]$.

Proof. Suppose $\mathcal{X} \subseteq \mathcal{Y}$ and $a \in \mathcal{A}[\mathcal{X}]$, now by structural induction on a :

1. If a is in \mathcal{X} then it is obviously also in \mathcal{Y} .
2. If $a := o(a_1; \dots; a_n) \in \mathcal{A}[\mathcal{X}]$ we have $a_1, \dots, a_n \in \mathcal{A}[\mathcal{X}]$ also. By induction we can assume these to be in $\mathcal{A}[\mathcal{Y}]$ hence giving us $a \in \mathcal{A}[\mathcal{Y}]$.

Hence by induction we have shown that $\mathcal{A}[\mathcal{X}] \subseteq \mathcal{A}[\mathcal{Y}]$. \square

Definition 2.2.12 (Substitution). If $a \in \mathcal{A}[\mathcal{X}, x]_{s'}$, and $b \in \mathcal{A}[\mathcal{X}]_s$, then $[b/x]a \in \mathcal{A}[\mathcal{X}]_{s'}$ is the result of **substituting** b for every occurrence of x in a . The ast a is called the **target**, the variable x is called the **subject** of the **substitution**. We define substitution on an ast a by induction:

1. $[b/x]x = b$ and $[b/x]y = y$ if $x \neq y$.
2. $[b/x]o(a_1; \dots; a_n) = o([b/x]a_1; \dots; [b/x]a_n)$

[Examples of substitution]

Theorem 2.2.13. If $a \in \mathcal{A}[\mathcal{X}, x]$, then for every $b \in \mathcal{A}[\mathcal{X}]$ there exists a unique $c \in \mathcal{A}[\mathcal{X}]$ such that $[b/x]a = c$.

Proof. By structural induction on a , we have three cases: $a := x$, $a := y$ where $y \neq x$ and $a := o(a_1; \dots; a_n)$. In the first we have $[b/x]x = b = c$ by definition. In the second we have $[b/x]y = y = c$ by definition. In both cases $c \in \mathcal{A}[\mathcal{X}]$ and are uniquely determined. Finally, when $a := o(a_1; \dots; a_n)$, we have by induction unique c_1, \dots, c_n such that $c_i := [b/x]a_i$ for $1 \leq i \leq n$. Hence we have a unique $c = o(c_1, \dots, c_n) \in \mathcal{A}[\mathcal{X}]$. \square

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