



# Protocol Audit Report

Version 1.0

*swarecito*

March 9, 2025

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## Table of Contents

- Table of Contents
- Protocol Summary
- Disclaimer
- Risk Classification
- Audit Details
  - Scope
- Protocol Summary
  - Roles
- Executive Summary
  - Issues found
- Findings
  - High
    - \* [H-1] Storing the password on-chain makes it visible to everyone and no longer private.
    - \* [H-2] Missing access control on `PasswordStore::setPassword` allows anyone to change the password.
  - Informational
    - \* [I-1] The `PasswordStore::getPassword` function does not have any parameter whereas comments says it does which is confusing.

## Protocol Summary

Protocol does X, Y, Z

## Disclaimer

The YOUR\_NAME\_HERE team makes all effort to find as many vulnerabilities in the code in the given time period, but holds no responsibilities for the findings provided in this document. A security audit by the team is not an endorsement of the underlying business or product. The audit was time-boxed and the review of the code was solely on the security aspects of the Solidity implementation of the contracts.

## Risk Classification

		Impact		
		High	Medium	Low
Likelihood	High	H	H/M	M
	Medium	H/M	M	M/L
	Low	M	M/L	L

We use the CodeHawks severity matrix to determine severity. See the documentation for more details.

## Audit Details

The findings described in this document correspond the following commit hash:

```
1 2e8f81e263b3a9d18fab4fb5c46805ffc10a9990
```

## Scope

```
1 src/  
2 --- PasswordStore.sol
```

## Protocol Summary

PasswordStore is a protocol dedicated to storage and retrieval of a user's passwords. The protocol is designed to be used by a single user, and is not designed to be used by multiple users. Only the owner should be able to set and access this password.

### Roles

- Owner: Is the only one who should be able to set and access the password.

For this contract, only the owner should be able to interact with the contract.

## Executive Summary

### Issues found

Severity	Number of issues found
High	2
Medium	0
Low	0
Info	1
Gas Optimizations	0
Total	3

## Findings

### High

**[H-1] Storing the password on-chain makes it visible to everyone and no longer private.**

**Description:** All data stored on-chain is visible to everyone, and can be read by anyone. The `PasswordStore:s_password` variable is intended to be a private variable and only accessed through.

He show one such method of reading any data off-chain below.

**Impact:** Anyone can read the private password, severely breaking the functionality of the protocol.

**Proof of Concept:**

1. Run the anvil node

```
1 make anvil
```

2. Deploy the contract

```
1 make deploy
```

3. Use cast `call` to read the contract storage slot

```
1 cast storage 0x5FbDB2315678afecb367f032d93F642f64180aa3 1 --rpc-url  
127.0.0.1:8545 | cast --parse-bytes32-string  
2 Output: myPassword
```

**Recommended Mitigation:** The recommended mitigation is to store the password off-chain, hash it, and store the hash on-chain.

**[H-2] Missing access control on PasswordStore::setPassword allows anyone to change the password.**

**Description:** The `PasswordStore::setPassword` function does not have any access control, allowing anyone to change the password. This is a critical vulnerability as it allows anyone to change the password, breaking the functionality of the protocol.

**Impact:** Anyone can change the password, severely breaking the functionality of the protocol.

**Proof of Concept:**

1. Run the anvil node

```
1 make anvil
```

2. Deploy the contract

```
1 make deploy
```

3. Use cast `send` to make a transaction to change the password

Output:

**Recommended Mitigation:** The recommended mitigation is to add access control to the `PasswordStore::setPassword` function. This can be done by adding a modifier that checks if the sender is the owner of the contract. Or adding a check in the function to ensure that only the owner can change the password.

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## Informational

**[I-1] The PasswordStore::getPassword function does not have any paramater whereas comments says it does which is confusing.**

**Description:** The `PasswordStore::getPassword` function signature is `function getPassword()external view returns (string memory)` but the natspec say it is `function getPassword(string memory newPassword)external view returns (string memory)`. This is confusing and can lead to confusion.

**Impact:** The natspec is incorrect.

**Recommended Mitigation:** Update the natspec to match the function signature.

```
1 -      * @param newPassword The new password to set.
```

—### [I-1] The `PasswordStore::getPassword` function does not have any paramater whereas comments says it does which is confusing.

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