The Costs of Choice in Health Insurance Markets: Evidence from Medicare Advantage*

Matthew V. Zahn[†]

Job Market Paper: Latest Version

Abstract

Ipsum lorem.

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JEL Codes: D82, G22, H75, I11, I13, L11, L13

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[†]Department of Economics, Johns Hopkins University; matthew.zahn@jhu.edu.

Summary

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References

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