


Motivation: (previously: PRF to construct MAC), now a general "hash-then-PRF" paradigm using "universal hash function" (UHF)



satisfy weak collision resistant

adversary knows nothing about the key.

UHF Attack Game:

chal
 $k \xleftarrow{R} \mathcal{K}$
 adv
 $m_0, m_1 \in \mathcal{M}$

$$\text{UHFadv}[\mathcal{A}, H] = \Pr[H(k, m_0) = H(k, m_1)]$$

$\rightarrow \text{UHFadv}[\mathcal{A}, H] \leq \epsilon$

- ϵ -UHF
- Statistical-UHF $\hookrightarrow \epsilon$ is negl.
- Computational UHF \hookrightarrow adv is efficient & ϵ is negl.

} unbounded

Multi-query UHF (MUHF):

chal
 $k \xleftarrow{R} \mathcal{K}$
 adv
 $m_0, \dots, m_s \in \mathcal{M}$
 $s \leq Q$

$$\text{MUHFadv}[\mathcal{A}, H] \leq \frac{Q^2}{2} \cdot \text{UHFadv}[\mathcal{B}, H]$$

Constructing statistical UHF using polynomials:

$$H_{\text{poly}}(K, (a_1, \dots, a_v)) := K^v + a_1 \cdot K^{v-1} + a_2 \cdot K^{v-2} + \dots + a_{v-1} K + a_v \in \mathbb{Z}_p$$

NOTE: 1. evaluation w/o knowledge of $\text{len}(m)$ ahead of time

Horner's method:

Input: $m = (a_1, \dots, a_v)$, $K \in \mathbb{Z}_p$

Output: $t := H_{\text{poly}}(K, m)$

Set $t \leftarrow 1$

For $i \leftarrow 1$ to v :

$t \leftarrow t \cdot K + a_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p$

Output t

4-way parallel:

\Rightarrow

For $i=1$ to v , increment i by 4

$$t \leftarrow t \cdot K^4 + a_i \cdot K^3 + a_{i+1} \cdot K^2 + \dots + a_{i+3} \in \mathbb{Z}_p$$

2. H_{poly} over $(\mathbb{Z}_p, \mathbb{Z}_p^{\leq l}, \mathbb{Z}_p)$ is a $(\frac{l}{p})$ -UHF.

3. the leading term k^v is necessary to be UHF.

(counter-example: $m_0 = (a_1, a_2)$, $m_2 = (0, a_1, a_2)$ are collisions)

if we restrict message to fixed length, then H_{poly} is $(\frac{l-1}{p})$ -UHF

4. just by adapting H_{poly} from \mathbb{Z}_p to $GF(2^n)$ would result in an insecure UHF

↳ see Ex 7.1. But why? What fundamentally about $GF(2^n)$ makes it unsuitable?

5. revealing ^{few} points about the function could recover the key.

Constructing Computational UHF using CBC & Cascade:

1st theorem: prefix-free, extendable secure PRF is a computational UHF,

and

$$UHF_{adv}[A, PF] \leq PRF_{adv}^{Pf}[B, PF] + \frac{1}{|y|}$$

PF: over $(K, X^{\leq l+1}, Y)$, UHF: over $(K, X^{\leq l}, Y)$


NOTE: require extra 1 block to build adv. B since its queries to PRF chal. have to be "prefix-free", whereas A to B (or A's chal.) doesn't have to. Thus by padding 1 block to achieve prefix-free.

2nd theorem: PF is also a multi-query UHF,

$$MUHF_{adv}[A, PF] \leq PRF_{adv}^{Pf}[B, PF] + \frac{Q^2}{2|y|}$$

unique number of pairs/possibilities:
 $\frac{Q(Q-1)}{2}$

Constructing parallel UHF:



$$\text{UHFadv}[\mathcal{A}, F^{\oplus}] \leq \text{PRFadv}[\mathcal{B}, F] + \frac{1}{|\mathcal{Y}|}$$