Properties of New Keynesian Model that Can be Derived Analytically

Lawrence J. Christiano

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- How does the Taylor Principle work to stabilize inflation in the equilibrium local to steady state?

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• Monetary policy rule (inflation target, $\bar{\pi}_t$):

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• Undetermined coefficients method, a_1, a_2, a_3 :

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• Substitute the solution into the equations and require that they hold for all possible $\bar{\pi}_t$:

$$a_3 = a_1 + \phi (a_1 - 1)$$

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• Want to know: a_1, a_3 when $\delta = 0$ and $\delta = 1$.

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• Now start rearranging stuff

$$a_3 = (1 + \phi) a_1 - \phi$$

$$a_1 = \frac{\kappa}{1 - \beta \delta} a_2$$

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• $\delta = 1$ result now obvious $(a_1 = a_3 = 1)$; $\delta = 0$ easy.

• Model:

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• Solution derivation

$$a_1 = \frac{\phi}{\left\lceil \frac{1-\beta\delta}{\kappa} + 1 \right\rceil (1-\delta) + \phi}, \quad a_3 = (1+\phi) a_1 - \phi.$$

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
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$$a_1 = \frac{\phi}{\frac{1}{\kappa} + 1 + \phi} > 0$$
, $a_3 = -\frac{\phi/\kappa}{\frac{1}{\kappa} + 1 + \phi} < 0$.



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 - Forecasts of inflation remained stubbornly high.
 - Eventually, everyone realized that $\bar{\pi}_t$ was down permanently.
 - Fisherian effects kicked in and both interest rates and inflation fell.
 - Output returned to potential.

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 Result: impact on date t variables greater from forward guidance than from immediate policy.

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- Because (i) there are no shocks, (ii) the model is purely forward looking and (iii) Taylor rule with $\phi > 1$ in place after t + 1:

$$r_{t+s} = x_{t+s} = \pi_{t+s} = 0, \ s > 1.$$

• In period t+1

$$r_{t+1} = \theta$$
 $x_{t+1} = x_{t+2} - [r_{t+1} - \pi_{t+2}] = 0 - [r_{t+1} - 0] = -r_{t+1}$
 $\pi_{t+1} = \beta \pi_{t+2} + \kappa x_{t+1} = \kappa x_{t+1} = -\kappa r_{t+1}$

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• So, in t + 1:

$$r_{t+1} = \theta, x_{t+1} = -\theta, \pi_{t+1} = -\kappa\theta.$$

• What happens in period *t*?

• Effect, in the period t+1, of t+1 policy action announced in t:

$$r_{t+1} = \theta$$
, $x_{t+1} = -\theta$, $\pi_{t+1} = -\kappa\theta$.

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$$r_t = 0$$

$$x_t = x_{t+1} - [r_t - \pi_{t+1}]$$

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$$x_t = x_{t+1} - [r_t - \pi_{t+1}] = -\left(\begin{array}{c} \text{direct effect} & \text{indirect effect} \\ 1 & + & \kappa \end{array}\right) r_{t+1}$$

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$$r_{t+1} = \theta$$
, $x_{t+1} = -\theta$, $\pi_{t+1} = -\kappa\theta$.

$$\begin{array}{lll} r_t & = & 0 \\ x_t & = & x_{t+1} - [r_t - \pi_{t+1}] = - \left(\overbrace{1}^{\text{direct effect}} \right) + \overbrace{\kappa}^{\text{indirect effect}} \right) \\ \pi_t & = & \beta \pi_{t+1} + \kappa x_t = -\beta \kappa r_{t+1} + \kappa x_t \\ \text{so.} \end{array}$$

$$\pi_t = -\beta \kappa r_{t+1} + \kappa \underbrace{-(1+\kappa)r_{t+1}}_{=-(1+\kappa)r_{t+1}}$$

• Effect, in the period t + 1, of t + 1 policy action announced in t:

$$r_{t+1} = \theta, x_{t+1} = -\theta, \pi_{t+1} = -\kappa\theta.$$

• In period *t*:

$$r_t = 0$$

$$x_t = x_{t+1} - [r_t - \pi_{t+1}] = -\left(\begin{array}{c} \text{direct effect} & \text{indirect effect} \\ 1 & + & \kappa \end{array}\right) r_{t+1}$$

$$\pi_t = \beta \pi_{t+1} + \kappa x_t = -\beta \kappa r_{t+1} + \kappa x_t$$

so,

$$\pi_{t} = -\beta \kappa r_{t+1} + \kappa \underbrace{x_{t}}^{=-(1+\kappa)r_{t+1}}$$

$$\rightarrow \pi_{t} = -[1+\beta+\kappa] \kappa \theta$$

• Effect, in the period t + 1, of t + 1 policy action announced in t:

$$r_{t+1} = \theta$$
, $x_{t+1} = -\theta$, $\pi_{t+1} = -\kappa\theta$.

• In period *t*:

SO,

$$r_t = 0$$

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$$\pi_t = -\beta \kappa r_{t+1} + \kappa \underbrace{\chi_t}^{=-(1+\kappa)r_{t+1}}$$
 $\rightarrow \pi_t = -[1+\beta+\kappa] \kappa \theta, \quad x_t = -(1+\kappa) \theta$

- Announcement at time $t: r_t = \theta \neq 0$, $r_{t+1} = 0$ and Taylor rule thereafter.
- Because the model is completely forward looking,

$$r_{t+s} = x_{t+s} = \pi_{t+s} = 0, \ s > 0.$$

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• So,

$$\rightarrow r_t = \theta$$
, $x_t = -\theta$, $\pi_t = -\kappa\theta$.

which is smaller than with one-period forward guidance:

$$\pi_t = -\left[1 + 2\kappa\right]\kappa\theta, \quad x_t = -\left(1 + \kappa\right)\theta$$

- Consider *j* Period Forward Guidance.
 - Announcement at time $t: r_{t+j} = \theta \neq 0$ and $r_{t+s} = 0$ for s = 0, 1, ..., j 1. Switch to Taylor rule after t + j.

- Consider *j* Period Forward Guidance.
 - Announcement at time $t: r_{t+j} = \theta \neq 0$ and $r_{t+s} = 0$ for s = 0, 1, ..., j-1. Switch to Taylor rule after t+j.
- IS equation (recall, $r_t = ... = r_{t+j-1} = 0$):

$$x_{t+j} = x_{t+j+1} - (r_{t+j} - \pi_{t+j+1})$$

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 $x_{t+j-1} = x_{t+j} - (r_{t+j-1} - \pi_{t+j})$

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$$\vdots$$

$$x_{t} = -(r_{t} - \pi_{t+1}) - (r_{t+1} - \pi_{t+2})$$

$$- \dots - (r_{t+j-1} - \pi_{t+j}) - r_{t+j}$$

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- Change in r_{t+j} has a *direct* effect on x_t and an *indirect* effect.
 - Direct: change in r_{t+j} moves x_{t+j} and (by consumption smoothing channel) that leads to an equal change in earlier output gaps, including x_t .

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- Change in r_{t+i} has a direct effect on x_t and an indirect effect.
 - Direct: change in r_{t+j} moves x_{t+j} and (by consumption smoothing channel) that leads to an equal change in earlier output gaps, including x_t .
 - This channel holds fixed the real interest rates, $(r_{t+s} \pi_{t+s+1})$, s = 0,...,j-1.

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 - Direct: change in r_{t+j} moves x_{t+j} and (by consumption smoothing channel) that leads to an equal change in earlier output gaps, including x_t .
 - This channel holds fixed the real interest rates, $(r_{t+s} \pi_{t+s+1})$, s = 0, ..., j-1.
 - Indirect: change in r_{t+j} affects $(r_{t+s} \pi_{t+s+1})$, $0 \le s \le j-1$ in each date between now and t+j by reducing inflation in each date.
 - The impact on x_t of the indirect effect is the *cumulative sum* (increasing in j) of the changes in the real interest rate.

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 - This offers what is perhaps the simplest resolution: in practice, announcements about policy actions far in the future have little impact on behavior because they are not credible.

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 - This offers what is perhaps the simplest resolution: in practice, announcements about policy actions far in the future have little impact on behavior because they are not credible.
 - In my presentation, I assumed 100% credibility.

How Does the Taylor Principle Work to Stabilize Inflation?

Model

$$x_{t} = E_{t}x_{t+1} - [r_{t} - E_{t}\pi_{t+1} - r_{t}^{*}]$$

$$r_{t} = \phi_{\pi}\pi_{t}, \quad \phi_{\pi} > 1$$

$$\pi_{t} = \beta E_{t}\pi_{t+1} + \kappa x_{t}$$

$$\Delta a_{t} = \rho \Delta a_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{t}$$

$$r_{t}^{*} = E_{t}(a_{t+1} - a_{t}) = \rho \Delta a_{t}.$$

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 $\pi_{t} = \beta E_{t}\pi_{t+1} + \kappa x_{t}$
 $\Delta a_{t} = \rho \Delta a_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{t}$
 $r_{t}^{*} = E_{t}(a_{t+1} - a_{t}) = \rho \Delta a_{t}.$

• Unique non-explosive solution:

$$\pi_t = \gamma_1 \Delta a_t, x_t = \gamma_2 \Delta a_t, r_t = \gamma_3 \Delta a_t$$

- γ_i 's ~ undetermined coefficients.

Model and solution

$$x_{t} = E_{t}x_{t+1} - [r_{t} - E_{t}\pi_{t+1} - r_{t}^{*}]$$

$$r_{t} = \phi_{\pi}\pi_{t}, \quad \phi_{\pi} > 1$$

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$$\pi_{t} = \gamma_{1}\Delta a_{t}, x_{t} = \gamma_{2}\Delta a_{t}, r_{t} = \gamma_{3}\Delta a_{t}$$

Model and solution

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$$r_{t}^{*} = E_{t}(a_{t+1} - a_{t}) = \rho \Delta a_{t}$$

$$\pi_{t} = \gamma_{1}\Delta a_{t}, x_{t} = \gamma_{2}\Delta a_{t}, r_{t} = \gamma_{3}\Delta a_{t}$$

Substitute solution into model:

$$\gamma_2 = \rho \gamma_2 - \gamma_3 + \rho \gamma_1 + \rho$$

$$\gamma_3 = \phi_{\pi} \gamma_1$$

$$\gamma_1 = \beta \gamma_1 \rho + \kappa \gamma_2$$

Model and solution

$$x_{t} = E_{t}x_{t+1} - [r_{t} - E_{t}\pi_{t+1} - r_{t}^{*}]$$

$$r_{t} = \phi_{\pi}\pi_{t}, \quad \phi_{\pi} > 1$$

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• Substitute solution into model:

$$\gamma_2 = \rho \gamma_2 - \gamma_3 + \rho \gamma_1 + \rho$$
 $\gamma_3 = \phi_\pi \gamma_1$
 $\gamma_1 = \beta \gamma_1 \rho + \kappa \gamma_2$

• Real rate: $\tilde{r}_t = r_t - E_t \pi_{t+1} = \gamma_4 \Delta a_t$, $\gamma_4 = \gamma_3 - \gamma_1 \rho$.

• Each to verify:

$$r_{t} - E_{t}\pi_{t+1} = \underbrace{\psi}^{=\gamma_{4}} \Delta a_{t}, x_{t} = \underbrace{\frac{(1 - \beta \rho)}{\kappa (\phi_{\pi} - \rho)} \psi}^{=\gamma_{2}} \Delta a_{t}, \pi_{t} = \underbrace{\psi}^{=\gamma_{1}} \Delta a_{t}$$
where

$$\psi \equiv \frac{\rho}{\frac{(1-\beta\rho)(1-\rho)}{\kappa(\rho-\rho)} + 1}.$$

Each to verify:

$$r_{t} - E_{t}\pi_{t+1} = \underbrace{\psi}^{=\gamma_{4}} \Delta a_{t}, x_{t} = \underbrace{\frac{(1 - \beta \rho)}{\kappa (\phi_{\pi} - \rho)} \psi}^{=\gamma_{2}} \Delta a_{t}, \pi_{t} = \underbrace{\psi}^{=\gamma_{1}} \Delta a_{t}$$
where

$$\psi \equiv rac{
ho}{rac{(1-eta
ho)(1-
ho)}{\kappa(\phi_\pi-
ho)}+1}.$$

• For ϕ_{π} sufficiently large,

$$\psi \simeq \rho$$
, $r_t - E_t \pi_{t+1} \simeq r_t^*$, $\pi_t \simeq 0$, $x_t \simeq 0$.

• Each to verify:

$$r_t - E_t \pi_{t+1} = \psi \Delta a_t, x_t = \underbrace{\frac{-\gamma_2}{(1 - \beta \rho)}}_{= \gamma_1} \psi \Delta a_t, \pi_t = \underbrace{\frac{-\gamma_1}{\psi}}_{= \gamma_1} \Delta a_t$$

where

$$\psi \equiv rac{
ho}{rac{(1-eta
ho)(1-
ho)}{\kappa(\phi_\pi-
ho)}+1}.$$

• For ϕ_{π} sufficiently large,

$$\psi \simeq \rho$$
, $r_t - E_t \pi_{t+1} \simeq r_t^*$, $\pi_t \simeq 0$, $x_t \simeq 0$.

- Big value of ϕ stabilizes equilibrium around first best.
 - However, requires very large value of ϕ_{π} .
 - For practical values, Taylor rule too weak, $\psi < \rho$ and $\gamma_2 > 0$.

• Each to verify:

$$r_t - E_t \pi_{t+1} = \underbrace{\psi}^{=\gamma_4} \Delta a_t, x_t = \underbrace{\frac{-\gamma_2}{(1 - \beta \rho)} \psi}_{\kappa (\phi_{\pi} - \rho)} \Delta a_t, \pi_t = \underbrace{\psi}_{\phi_{\pi} - \rho} \Delta a_t$$
 where

 $\psi\equivrac{
ho}{rac{(1-eta
ho)(1ho)}{\kappa(\phi_\piho)}+1}.$ ullet For ϕ_π sufficiently large,

$$\psi \simeq \rho$$
, $r_t - E_t \pi_{t+1} \simeq r_t^*$, $\pi_t \simeq 0$, $x_t \simeq 0$.

- Big value of ϕ stabilizes equilibrium around first best.
 - However, requires very large value of ϕ_{π} .
 - For practical values, Taylor rule too weak, $\psi < \rho$ and $\gamma_2 > 0$.
- Taylor principle:
 - real rate of interest increases when π_t high $(\psi > 0$ and $\phi > \rho)$.
 - effects bigger with bigger ϕ_{π} .

The equations:

$$\begin{split} r_t &= \pi_t + \phi \left(\pi_t - \bar{\pi}_t \right) \\ \pi_t &= \beta \pi_{t+1} + \kappa x_t \\ x_t &= x_{t+1} - \left[r_t - \pi_{t+1} \right]. \end{split}$$

• Substitute the solution in here:

$$a_3 = a_1 + \phi (a_1 - 1)$$

 $a_1 = \beta \delta a_1 + \kappa a_2$
 $a_2 = a_2 \delta - [a_3 - a_1 \delta]$.

• Rearranging:

$$\begin{split} &a_3 = (1+\phi) \, a_1 - \phi \\ &a_1 = \frac{\kappa}{1-\beta\delta} a_2 \\ &a_2 = a_2\delta - \left[a_3 - a_1\delta \right] = a_2\delta - (1+\phi-\delta) \, a_1 + \phi \\ &\rightarrow &a_2 = -\frac{1+\phi-\delta}{1-\delta} a_1 + \frac{\phi}{1-\delta} \end{split}$$

Working on the second equation,

$$a_1 \frac{1 - \beta \delta}{\kappa} = -\frac{(1 + \phi - \delta)}{1 - \delta} a_1 + \frac{\phi}{1 - \delta}$$

then,

$$a_1 = \frac{\frac{\phi}{1-\delta}}{\frac{1-\beta\delta}{\kappa} + \frac{1+\phi-\delta}{1-\delta}} = \frac{\frac{\phi}{1-\delta}}{\frac{1-\beta\delta}{\kappa} + 1 + \frac{\phi}{1-\delta}} = \frac{\phi}{\left\lceil \frac{1-\beta\delta}{\kappa} + 1 \right\rceil (1-\delta) + \phi}$$

• Then,

$$a_{3} = \frac{(1+\phi)\phi}{\left\lceil \frac{1-\beta\delta}{\kappa} + 1 \right\rceil (1-\delta) + \phi} - \phi$$

• So, when $\delta=1$: $a_1=a_3=1$. When $\delta=0$, get formulas for a_1,a_3 in main presentation. • Go Back