

# **THE STOIC BIBLE**

**Meditations of Marcus Aurelius**

**The work of Epictetus**

**Seneca's Moral Letters**

## **THE STOIC BIBLE**

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**COLLECTED BY Adel Sherif  
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MARCVS AVRELIVS.  
*From the Bust in the Naples Museum.*

MARCVS AVRELIVS  
**ANTONINUS**  
 THE ROMAN EMPEROVR,  
 HIS MEDITATIONS  
 concerning HIMSELF:  
 TREATING OF A NATVRALL  
 Mans happinesse; Wherein it confisteth, and of  
 the meanes to attaine unto it.

*TRANSLATED OVT OF THE  
 Originall Greeke; with Notes:*

BY

MERIC CASAVBON, B. of D. and Prebendarie  
 of CHRIST Church, Canterbury.

And now Edited, with an Introduction, Appendix,  
 and Glossary, by W. H. D. ROUSE.

ECCLV. 18. 8.

*What is man, and whereto serveth he?  
 What is his good, and what is his euill?*

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THE EMPEROR  
*receiving the Symbol of Power*

MARCUS AURELIUS  
 ANTONINUS  
 THE ROMAN EMPEROR,  
 HIS FIRST BOOK

concerning HIMSELF :

*Wherein Antoninus recordeth, What and of whom, whether Parents, Friends, or Masters ; by their good examples, or good advice and counsel, he had learned :*

Divided into Numbers or Sections.

ANTONINUS Book vi. Num. xlviii. Whensoever thou wilt rejoice thyself, think and meditate upon those good parts and especial gifts, which thou hast observed in any of them that live with thee: as industry in one, in another modesty, in another bountifulness, in another some other thing. For nothing can so much rejoice thee, as the resemblances and parallels of several virtues, eminent in the dispositions of them that live with thee, especially when all at once, as it were, they represent themselves unto thee. See therefore, that thou have them always in a readiness.

The First Book



F my grandfather Verus I have learned to be gentle and meek, and to refrain from all anger and passion. From the fame and memory of him that begot me I have learned both shamefastness and manlike behaviour. Of my mother I have learned to be religious, and bountiful; and to forbear, not only to do, but to intend any evil; to content myself with a spare diet, and to fly all such excess as is incidental to great wealth. Of my great-

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grandfather, both to frequent public schools and auditories, and to get me good and able teachers at home ; and that I ought not to think much, if upon such occasions, I were at excessive charges.

II. Of him that brought me up, not to be fondly addicted to either of the two great factions of the coursers in the circus, called Prasini, and Veneti : nor in the amphitheatre partially to favour any of the gladiators, or fencers, as either the Parmularii, or the Secutores. Moreover, to endure labour ; nor to need many things ; when I have anything to do, to do it myself rather than by others ; not to meddle with many businesses ; and not easily to admit of any slander.

III. Of Diognetus, not to busy myself about vain things, and not easily to believe those things, which are commonly spoken, by such as take upon them to work wonders, and by sorcerers, or prestidigitators, and impostors ; concerning the power of charms, and their driving out of demons, or evil spirits ; and the like. Not to keep quails for the game ; nor to be mad after such things. Not to be offended with other men's liberty of speech, and to apply myself unto philosophy. Him also I must thank, that ever I heard first Bacchius, then Tandasis and Marcianus, and that I did write dialogues in my youth ; and that I took liking to the philosophers' little couch and skins, and such other things, which by the Grecian discipline are proper to those who profess philosophy.

IV. To Rusticus I am beholding, that I first entered into the conceit that my life wanted some redress and cure. And then, that I did not fall into the ambition of ordinary sophists, either to write tracts concerning the common theorems, or to exhort men unto virtue and the study of philosophy by public orations ; as also that I never by way

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of ostentation did affect to show myself an active able man, for any kind of bodily exercises. And that I gave over the study of rhetoric and poetry, and of elegant neat language. That I did not use to walk about the house in my long robe, nor to do any such things. Moreover I learned of him to write letters without any affectation, or curiosity ; such as that was, which by him was written to my mother from Sinuessa : and to be easy and ready to be reconciled, and well pleased again with them that had offended me, as soon as any of them would be content to seek unto me again. To read with diligence ; not to rest satisfied with a light and superficial knowledge, nor quickly to assent to things commonly spoken of : whom also I must thank that ever I lighted upon Epictetus his *Hypomnemata*, or moral commentaries and commonefactions : which also he gave me of his own.

V. From Apollonius, true liberty, and unvariable steadfastness, and not to regard anything at all, though never so little, but right and reason : and always, whether in the sharpest pains, or after the loss of a child, or in long diseases, to be still the same man ; who also was a present and visible example unto me, that it was possible for the same man to be both vehement and remiss : a man not subject to be vexed, and offended with the incapacity of his scholars and auditors in his lectures and expositions ; and a true pattern of a man who of all his good gifts and faculties, least esteemed in himself, that his excellent skill and ability to teach and persuade others the common theorems and maxims of the Stoic philosophy. Of him also I learned how to receive favours and kindnesses (as commonly they are accounted :) from friends, so that I might not become obnoxious unto them, for them, nor more yielding upon occasion, than in right I ought ; and yet so that I should

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not pass them neither, as an unsensible and unthankful man.

VI. Of Sextus, mildness and the pattern of a family governed with paternal affection ; and a purpose to live according to nature : to be grave without affectation : to observe carefully the several dispositions of my friends, not to be offended with idiots, nor unseasonably to set upon those that are carried with the vulgar opinions, with the theorems, and tenets of philosophers : his conversation being an example how a man might accommodate himself to all men and companies ; so that though his company were sweeter and more pleasing than any flatterer's cogging and fawning ; yet was it at the same time most respected and reverenced : who also had a proper happiness and faculty, rationally and methodically to find out, and set in order all necessary determinations and instructions for a man's life. A man without ever the least appearance of anger, or any other passion ; able at the same time most exactly to observe the Stoic *Apathia*, or unpassionateness, and yet to be most tender-hearted : ever of good credit ; and yet almost without any noise, or rumour : very learned, and yet making little show.

VII. From Alexander the Grammarian, to be unreprovable myself, and not reproachfully to reprehend any man for a barbarism, or a solecism, or any false pronunciation, but dextrously by way of answer, or testimony, or confirmation of the same matter (taking no notice of the word) to utter it as it should have been spoken ; or by some other such close and indirect admonition, handsomely and civilly to tell him of it.

VIII. Of Fronto, to how much envy and fraud and hypocrisy the state of a tyrannous king is subject unto, and how they who are commonly called *εὐπατρίδαι*, i.e.

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nobly born, are in some sort incapable, or void of natural affection.

IX. Of Alexander the Platonic, not often nor without great necessity to say, or to write to any man in a letter, ‘I am not at leisure’ ; nor in this manner still to put off those duties, which we owe to our friends and acquaintances (to every one in his kind) under pretence of urgent affairs.

X. Of Catulus, not to contemn any friend’s expostulation, though unjust, but to strive to reduce him to his former disposition : freely and heartily to speak well of all my masters upon any occasion, as it is reported of Domitius, and Athenodotus : and to love my children with true affection.

XI. From my brother Severus, to be kind and loving to all them of my house and family ; by whom also I came to the knowledge of Thrasea and Helvidius, and Cato, and Dio, and Brutus. He it was also that did put me in the first conceit and desire of an equal commonwealth, administered by justice and equality ; and of a kingdom wherein should be regarded nothing more than the good and welfare of the subjects. Of him also, to observe a constant tenor, (not interrupted, with any other cares and distractions,) in the study and esteem of philosophy : to be bountiful and liberal in the largest measure ; always to hope the best ; and to be confident that my friends love me. In whom I moreover observed open dealing towards those whom he reproved at any time, and that his friends might without all doubt or much observation know what he would, or would not, so open and plain was he.

XII. From Claudius Maximus, in all things to endeavour to have power of myself, and in nothing to be carried about ; to be cheerful and courageous in all sudden chances and accidents, as in sicknesses : to love mildness, and moderation,

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and gravity : and to do my business, whatsoever it be, thoroughly, and without querulousness. Whatsoever he said, all men believed him that as he spake, so he thought, and whatsoever he did, that he did it with a good intent. His manner was, never to wonder at anything ; never to be in haste, and yet never slow : nor to be perplexed, or dejected, or at any time unseemly, or excessively to laugh : nor to be angry, or suspicious, but ever ready to do good, and to forgive, and to speak truth ; and all this, as one that seemed rather of himself to have been straight and right, than ever to have been rectified or redressed ; neither was there any man that ever thought himself undervalued by him, or that could find in his heart, to think himself a better man than he. He would also be very pleasant and gracious.

XIII. In my father, I observed his meekness ; his constancy without wavering in those things, which after a due examination and deliberation, he had determined. How free from all vanity he carried himself in matter of honour and dignity, (as they are esteemed :) his laboriousness and assiduity, his readiness to hear any man, that had aught to say tending to any common good : how generally and impartially he would give every man his due ; his skill and knowledge, when rigour or extremity, or when remissness or moderation was in season ; how he did abstain from all unchaste love of youths ; his moderate condescending to other men's occasions as an ordinary man, neither absolutely requiring of his friends, that they should wait upon him at his ordinary meals, nor that they should of necessity accompany him in his journeys ; and that whensoever any business upon some necessary occasions was to be put off and omitted before it could be ended, he was ever found when he went about it again, the same man that he was before. His accurate examination of things in consultations,

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and patient hearing of others. He would not hastily give over the search of the matter, as one easy to be satisfied with sudden notions and apprehensions. His care to preserve his friends ; how neither at any time he would carry himself towards them with disdainful neglect, and grow weary of them ; nor yet at any time be madly fond of them. His contented mind in all things, his cheerful countenance, his care to foresee things afar off, and to take order for the least, without any noise or clamour. Moreover, how all acclamations and flattery were repressed by him : how carefully he observed all things necessary to the government, and kept an account of the common expenses, and how patiently he did abide that he was reprehended by some for this his strict and rigid kind of dealing. How he was neither a superstitious worshipper of the gods, nor an ambitious pleaser of men, or studious of popular applause ; but sober in all things, and everywhere observant of that which was fitting ; no affecter of novelties : in those things which conduced to his ease and convenience, (plenty whereof his fortune did afford him,) without pride and bragging, yet with all freedom and liberty : so that as he did freely enjoy them without any anxiety or affectation when they were present ; so when absent, he found no want of them. Moreover, that he was never commended by any man, as either a learned acute man, or an obsequious officious man, or a fine orator ; but as a ripe mature man, a perfect sound man ; one that could not endure to be flattered ; able to govern both himself and others. Moreover, how much he did honour all true philosophers, without upbraiding those that were not so ; his sociableness, his gracious and delightful conversation, but never unto satiety ; his care of his body within bounds and measure, not as one that desired to live long, or over-studious of neatness, and elegancy ; and

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yet not as one that did not regard it : so that through his own care and providence, he seldom needed any inward physic, or outward applications : but especially how ingeniously he would yield to any that had obtained any peculiar faculty, as either eloquence, or the knowledge of the laws, or of ancient customs, or the like ; and how he concurred with them, in his best care and endeavour that every one of them might in his kind, for that wherein he excelled, be regarded and esteemed : and although he did all things carefully after the ancient customs of his forefathers, yet even of this was he not desirous that men should take notice, that he did imitate ancient customs. Again, how he was not easily moved and tossed up and down, but loved to be constant, both in the same places and businesses ; and how after his great fits of headache he would return fresh and vigorous to his wonted affairs. Again, that secrets he neither had many, nor often, and such only as concerned public matters : his discretion and moderation, in exhibiting of the public sights and shows for the pleasure and pastime of the people : in public buildings, congiaries, and the like. In all these things, having a respect unto men only as men, and to the equity of the things themselves, and not unto the glory that might follow. Never wont to use the baths at unseasonable hours ; no builder ; never curious, or solicitous, either about his meat, or about the workmanship, or colour of his clothes, or about anything that belonged to external beauty. In all his conversation, far from all inhumanity, all boldness, and incivility, all greediness and impetuosity ; never doing anything with such earnestness, and intention, that a man could say of him, that he did sweat about it : but contrariwise, all things distinctly, as at leisure ; without trouble ; orderly, soundly, and agreeably. A man might

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have applied that to him, which is recorded of Socrates, that he knew how to want, and to enjoy those things, in the want whereof, most men show themselves weak ; and in the fruition, intemperate : but to hold out firm and constant, and to keep within the compass of true moderation and sobriety in either estate, is proper to a man, who hath a perfect and invincible soul ; such as he showed himself in the sickness of Maximus.

XIV. From the gods I received that I had good grandfathers, and parents, a good sister, good masters, good domestics, loving kinsmen, almost all that I have ; and that I never through haste and rashness transgressed against any of them, notwithstanding that my disposition was such, as that such a thing (if occasion had been) might very well have been committed by me, but that it was the mercy of the gods, to prevent such a concurring of matters and occasions, as might make me to incur this blame. That I was not long brought up by the concubine of my father ; that I preserved the flower of my youth. That I took not upon me to be a man before my time, but rather put it off longer than I needed. That I lived under the government of my lord and father, who would take away from me all pride and vainglory, and reduce me to that conceit and opinion that it was not impossible for a prince to live in the court without a troop of guards and followers, extraordinary apparel, such and such torches and statues, and other like particulars of state and magnificence ; but that a man may reduce and contract himself almost to the state of a private man, and yet for all that not to become the more base and remiss in those public matters and affairs, wherein power and authority is requisite. That I have had such a brother, who by his own example might stir me up to think of myself ; and by his respect and love, delight and please me.

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That I have got ingenuous children, and that they were not born distorted, nor with any other natural deformity. That I was no great proficient in the study of rhetoric and poetry, and of other faculties, which perchance I might have dwelt upon, if I had found myself to go on in them with success. That I did by times prefer those, by whom I was brought up, to such places and dignities, which they seemed unto me most to desire ; and that I did not put them off with hope and expectation, that (since that they were yet but young) I would do the same hereafter. That I ever knew Apollonius and Rusticus, and Maximus. That I have had occasion often and effectually to consider and meditate with myself, concerning that life which is according to nature, what the nature and manner of it is : so that as for the gods and such suggestions, helps and inspirations, as might be expected from them, nothing did hinder, but that I might have begun long before to live according to nature ; or that even now that I was not yet partaker and in present possession of that life, that I myself (in that I did not observe those inward motions, and suggestions, yea and almost plain and apparent instructions and admonitions of the gods,) was the only cause of it. That my body in such a life, hath been able to hold out so long. That I never had to do with Benedicta and Theodosius, yea and afterwards when I fell into some fits of love, I was soon cured. That having been often displeased with Rusticus, I never did him anything for which afterwards I had occasion to repent. That it being so that my mother was to die young, yet she lived with me all her latter years. That as often as I had a purpose to help and succour any that either were poor, or fallen into some present necessity, I never was answered by my officers that there was not ready money enough to do it ; and that I myself never had occasion to

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require the like succour from any other. That I have such a wife, so obedient, so loving, so ingenuous. That I had choice of fit and able men, to whom I might commit the bringing up of my children. That by dreams I have received help, as for other things, so in particular, how I might stay my casting of blood, and cure my dizziness, as that also that happened to thee in Cajeta, as unto Chryses when he prayed by the sea-shore. And when I did first apply myself to philosophy, that I did not fall into the hands of some sophists, or spent my time either in reading the manifold volumes of ordinary philosophers, nor in practising myself in the solution of arguments and fallacies, nor dwelt upon the studies of the meteors, and other natural curiosities. All these things without the assistance of the gods, and fortune, could not have been.

### XV. In the country of the Quadi at Granua, these.

Betimes in the morning say to thyself, This day I shall have to do with an idle curious man, with an unthankful man, a railer, a crafty, false, or an envious man ; an unsociable uncharitable man. All these ill qualities have happened unto them, through ignorance of that which is truly good and truly bad. But I that understand the nature of that which is good, that it only is to be desired, and of that which is bad, that it only is truly odious and shameful : who know moreover, that this transgressor, whosoever he be, is my kinsman, not by the same blood and seed, but by participation of the same reason, and of the same divine particle ; How can I either be hurt by any of those, since it is not in their power to make me incur anything that is truly reproachful ? or angry, and ill affected towards him, who by nature is so near unto me ? for we are all born to be fellow-workers, as the feet, the hands, and the eyelids ; as the rows of the upper and under teeth : for such there-

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fore to be in opposition, is against nature ; and what is it to chafe at, and to be averse from, but to be in opposition ?

XVI. Whatsoever I am, is either flesh, or life, or that which we commonly call the mistress and overruling part of man ; reason. Away with thy books, suffer not thy mind any more to be distracted, and carried to and fro ; for it will not be ; but as even now ready to die, think little of thy flesh : blood, bones, and a skin ; a pretty piece of knit and twisted work, consisting of nerves, veins and arteries ; think no more of it, than so. And as for thy life, consider what it is ; a wind ; not one constant wind neither, but every moment of an hour let out, and sucked in again. The third, is thy ruling part ; and here consider ; Thou art an old man ; suffer not that excellent part to be brought in subjection, and to become slavish : suffer it not to be drawn up and down with unreasonable and unsociable lusts and motions, as it were with wires and nerves ; suffer it not any more, either to repine at anything now present, or to fear and fly anything to come, which the destiny hath appointed thee.

XVII. Whatsoever proceeds from the gods immediately, that any man will grant totally depends from their divine providence. As for those things that are commonly said to happen by fortune, even those must be conceived to have dependence from nature, or from that first and general connection, and concatenation of all those things, which more apparently by the divine providence are administered and brought to pass. All things flow from thence : and whatsoever it is that is, is both necessary, and conducing to the whole (part of which thou art), and whatsoever it is that is requisite and necessary for the preservation of the general, must of necessity for every particular nature, be good and behoveful. And as for the whole, it is preserved,

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as by the perpetual mutation and conversion of the simple elements one into another, so also by the mutation, and alteration of things mixed and compounded. Let these things suffice thee ; let them be always unto thee, as thy general rules and precepts. As for thy thirst after books, away with it with all speed, that thou die not murmuring and complaining, but truly meek and well satisfied, and from thy heart thankful unto the gods.



## The Second Book



EMEMBER how long thou hast already put off these things, and how often a certain day and hour as it were, having been set unto thee by the gods, thou hast neglected it. It is high time for thee to understand the true nature both of the world, whereof thou art a part ; and of that Lord and Governor of the world, from whom, as a channel from the spring, thou thyself didst flow : and that there is but a certain limit of time appointed unto thee, which if thou shalt not make use of to calm and allay the many distempers of thy soul, it will pass away and thou with it, and never after return.

II. Let it be thy earnest and incessant care as a Roman and a man to perform whatsoever it is that thou art about, with true and unfeigned gravity, natural affection, freedom and justice : and as for all other cares, and imaginations, how thou mayest ease thy mind of them. Which thou shalt do ; if thou shalt go about every action as thy last action, free from all vanity, all passionate and wilful aberration from reason, and from all hypocrisy, and self-love, and dislike of those things, which by the fates or appointment of God have happened unto thee. Thou seest that those things, which for a man to hold on in a prosperous course, and to live a divine life, are requisite and necessary, are not many, for the gods will require no more of any man, that shall but keep and observe these things.

III. Do, soul, do ; abuse and contemn thyself ; yet a

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while and the time for thee to respect thyself, will be at an end. Every man's happiness depends from himself, but behold thy life is almost at an end, whiles affording thyself no respect, thou dost make thy happiness to consist in the souls, and conceits of other men.

IV. Why should any of these things that happen externally, so much distract thee? Give thyself leisure to learn some good thing, and cease roving and wandering to and fro. Thou must also take heed of another kind of wandering, for they are idle in their actions, who toil and labour in this life, and have no certain scope to which to direct all their motions, and desires.

V. For not observing the state of another man's soul, scarce was ever any man known to be unhappy. But whosoever they be that intend not, and guide not by reason and discretion the motions of their own souls, they must of necessity be unhappy.

VI. These things thou must always have in mind: What is the nature of the universe, and what is mine in particular: This unto that what relation it hath: what kind of part, of what kind of universe it is: And that there is nobody that can hinder thee, but that thou mayest always both do and speak those things which are agreeable to that nature, whereof thou art a part.

VII. Theophrastus, where he compares sin with sin (as after a vulgar sense such things I grant may be compared:) says well and like a philosopher, that those sins are greater which are committed through lust, than those which are committed through anger. For he that is angry seems with a kind of grief and close contraction of himself, to turn away from reason; but he that sins through lust, being overcome by pleasure, doth in his very sin bewray a more impotent, and unmanlike disposition. Well then and like a philosopher

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doth he say, that he of the two is the more to be condemned, that sins with pleasure, than he that sins with grief. For indeed this latter may seem first to have been wronged, and so in some manner through grief thereof to have been forced to be angry, whereas he who through lust doth commit anything, did of himself merely resolve upon that action.

VIII. Whatsoever thou dost affect, whatsoever thou dost project, so do, and so project all, as one who, for aught thou knowest, may at this very present depart out of this life. And as for death, if there be any gods, it is no grievous thing to leave the society of men. The gods will do thee no hurt, thou mayest be sure. But if it be so that there be no gods, or that they take no care of the world, why should I desire to live in a world void of gods, and of all divine providence? But gods there be certainly, and they take care for the world ; and as for those things which be truly evil, as vice and wickedness, such things they have put in a man's own power, that he might avoid them if he would : and had there been anything besides that had been truly bad and evil, they would have had a care of that also, that a man might have avoided it. But why should that be thought to hurt and prejudice a man's life in this world, which cannot any ways make man himself the better, or the worse in his own person ? Neither must we think that the nature of the universe did either through ignorance pass these things, or if not as ignorant of them, yet as unable either to prevent, or better to order and dispose them. It cannot be that she through want either of power or skill, should have committed such a thing, so as to suffer all things both good and bad, equally and promiscuously, to happen unto all both good and bad. As for life therefore, and death, honour and dis-honour, labour and pleasure, riches and poverty, all these things happen unto men indeed, both good and bad, equally ;

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but as things which of themselves are neither good nor bad ; because of themselves, neither shameful nor praiseworthy.

IX. Consider how quickly all things are dissolved and resolved : the bodies and substances themselves, into the matter and substance of the world : and their memories into the general age and time of the world. Consider the nature of all worldly sensible things ; of those especially, which either ensnare by pleasure, or for their irksomeness are dreadful, or for their outward lustre and show are in great esteem and request, how vile and contemptible, how base and corruptible, how destitute of all true life and being they are.

X. It is the part of a man endowed with a good understanding faculty, to consider what they themselves are in very deed, from whose bare conceits and voices, honour and credit do proceed : as also what it is to die, and how if a man shall consider this by itself alone, to die, and separate from it in his mind all those things which with it usually represent themselves unto us, he can conceive of it no otherwise, than as of a work of nature, and he that fears any work of nature, is a very child. Now death, it is not only a work of nature, but also conducing to nature.

XI. Consider with thyself how man, and by what part of his, is joined unto God, and how that part of man is affected, when it is said to be diffused. There is nothing more wretched than that soul, which in a kind of circuit compasseth all things, searching (as he saith) even the very depths of the earth ; and by all signs and conjectures prying into the very thoughts of other men's souls ; and yet of this is not sensible, that it is sufficient for a man to apply himself wholly, and to confine all his thoughts and cares to the tendance of that spirit which is within him, and truly and really to serve him. His service doth consist in this,

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that a man keep himself pure from all violent passion and evil affection, from all rashness and vanity, and from all manner of discontent, either in regard of the gods or men. For indeed whatsoever proceeds from the gods, deserves respect for their worth and excellency ; and whatsoever proceeds from men, as they are our kinsmen, should by us be entertained, with love, always ; sometimes, as proceeding from their ignorance, of that which is truly good and bad, (a blindness no less, than that by which we are not able to discern between white and black :) with a kind of pity and compassion also.

XII. If thou shouldst live three thousand, or as many as ten thousands of years, yet remember this, that man can part with no life properly, save with that little part of life, which he now lives : and that which he lives, is no other, than that which at every instant he parts with. That then which is longest of duration, and that which is shortest, come both to one effect. For although in regard of that which is already past there may be some inequality, yet that time which is now present and in being, is equal unto all men. And that being it which we part with whensoever we die, it doth manifestly appear, that it can be but a moment of time, that we then part with. For as for that which is either past or to come, a man cannot be said properly to part with it. For how should a man part with that which he hath not ? These two things therefore thou must remember. First, that all things in the world from all eternity, by a perpetual revolution of the same times and things ever continued and renewed, are of one kind and nature ; so that whether for a hundred or two hundred years only, or for an infinite space of time, a man see those things which are still the same, it can be no matter of great moment. And secondly, that that life which any the longest

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liver, or the shortest liver parts with<sup>\*</sup>, is for length and duration the very same, for that only which is present, is that, which either of them can lose, as being that only which they have ; for that which he hath not, no man can truly be said to lose.

XIII. Remember that all is but opinion and conceit, for those things are plain and apparent, which were spoken unto Monimus the Cynic ; and as plain and apparent is the use that may be made of those things, if that which is true and serious in them, be received as well as that which is sweet and pleasing.

XIV. A man's soul doth wrong and disrespect itself first and especially, when as much as in itself lies it becomes an aposteme, and as it were an excrescency of the world, for to be grieved and displeased with anything that happens in the world, is direct apostacy from the nature of the universe ; part of which, all particular natures of the world, are. Secondly, when she either is averse from any man, or led by contrary desires or affections, tending to his hurt and prejudice ; such as are the souls of them that are angry. Thirdly, when she is overcome by any pleasure or pain. Fourthly, when she doth dissemble, and covertly and falsely either doth or saith anything. Fifthly, when she doth either affect or endeavour anything to no certain end, but rashly and without due ratiocination and consideration, how consequent or inconsequent it is to the common end. For even the least things ought not to be done, without relation unto the end ; and the end of the reasonable creatures is, to follow and obey him, who is the reason as it were, and the law of this great city, and ancient commonwealth.

XV. The time of a man's life is as a point ; the substance of it ever flowing, the sense obscure ; and the whole composition of the body tending to corruption. His soul is

## Marcus Aurelius

restless, fortune uncertain, and fame doubtful ; to be brief, as a stream so are all things belonging to the body ; as a dream, or as a smoke, so are all that belong unto the soul. Our life is a warfare, and a mere pilgrimage. Fame after life is no better than oblivion. What is it then that will adhere and follow ? Only one thing, philosophy. And philosophy doth consist in this, for a man to preserve that spirit which is within him, from all manner of contumelies and injuries, and above all pains or pleasures ; never to do anything either rashly, or feignedly, or hypocritically : wholly to depend from himself, and his own proper actions : all things that happen unto him to embrace contentedly, as coming from Him from whom he himself also came ; and above all things, with all meekness and a calm cheerfulness, to expect death, as being nothing else but the resolution of those elements, of which every creature is composed. And if the elements themselves suffer nothing by this their perpetual conversion of one into another, that dissolution, and alteration, which is so common unto all, why should it be feared by any ? Is not this according to nature ? But nothing that is according to nature can be evil.

*Whilst I was at Carnuntum.*

# His Meditations

## The Third Book



MAN must not only consider how daily his life wasteth and decreaseth, but this also, that if he live long, he cannot be certain, whether his understanding shall continue so able and sufficient, for either discreet consideration, in matter of businesses ; or for contemplation : it being the thing, whereon true knowledge of things both divine and human, doth depend. For if once he shall begin to dote, his respiration, nutrition, his imaginative, and appetitive, and other natural faculties, may still continue the same : he shall find no want of them. But how to make that right use of himself that he should, how to observe exactly in all things that which is right and just, how to redress and rectify all wrong, or sudden apprehensions and imaginations, and even of this particular, whether he should live any longer or no, to consider duly ; for all such things, wherein the best strength and vigour of the mind is most requisite ; his power and ability will be past and gone. Thou must hasten therefore ; not only because thou art every day nearer unto death than other, but also because that intellective faculty in thee, whereby thou art enabled to know the true nature of things, and to order all thy actions by that knowledge, doth daily waste and decay : or, may fail thee before thou die.

II. This also thou must observe, that whatsoever it is that naturally doth happen to things natural, hath some-

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what in itself that is pleasing and delightful: as a great loaf when it is baked, some parts of it cleave as it were, and part asunder, and make the crust of it rugged and unequal, and yet those parts of it, though in some sort it be against the art and intention of baking itself, that they are thus cleft and parted, which should have been and were first made all even and uniform, they become it well nevertheless, and have a certain peculiar property, to stir the appetite. So figs are accounted fairest and ripest then, when they begin to shrink, and wither as it were. So ripe olives, when they are next to putrefaction, then are they in their proper beauty. The hanging down of grapes, the brow of a lion, the froth of a foaming wild boar, and many other like things, though by themselves considered, they are far from any beauty, yet because they happen naturally, they both are comely, and delightful; so that if a man shall with a profound mind and apprehension, consider all things in the world, even among all those things which are but mere accessories and natural appendices as it were, there will scarce appear anything unto him, wherein he will not find matter of pleasure and delight. So will he behold with as much pleasure the true *rictus* of wild beasts, as those which by skilful painters and other artificers are imitated. So will he be able to perceive the proper ripeness and beauty of old age, whether in man or woman: and whatsoever else it is that is beautiful and alluring in whatsoever is, with chaste and continent eyes he will soon find out and discern. Those and many other things will he discern, not credible unto every one, but unto them only who are truly and familiarly acquainted, both with nature itself, and all natural things.

III. Hippocrates having cured many sicknesses, fell sick himself and died. The Chaldeans and Astrologians having

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foretold the deaths of divers, were afterwards themselves surprised by the fates. Alexander and Pompeius, and Caius Cæsar, having destroyed so many towns, and cut off in the field so many thousands both of horse and foot, yet they themselves at last were fain to part with their own lives. Heraclitus having written so many natural tracts concerning the last and general conflagration of the world, died afterwards all filled with water within, and all bedaubed with dirt and dung without. Lice killed Democritus ; and Socrates, another sort of vermin, wicked ungodly men. How then stands the case ? Thou hast taken ship, thou hast sailed, thou art come to land, go out, if to another life, there also shalt thou find gods, who are everywhere. If all life and sense shall cease, then shalt thou cease also to be subject to either pains or pleasures ; and to serve and tend this vile cottage ; so much the viler, by how much that which ministers unto it doth excel ; the one being a rational substance, and a spirit, the other nothing but earth and blood.

IV. Spend not the remnant of thy days in thoughts and fancies concerning other men, when it is not in relation to some common good, when by it thou art hindered from some other better work. That is, spend not thy time in thinking, what such a man doth, and to what end : what he saith, and what he thinks, and what he is about, and such other things or curiosities, which make a man to rove and wander from the care and observation of that part of himself, which is rational, and overruling. See therefore in the whole series and connection of thy thoughts, that thou be careful to prevent whatsoever is idle and impertinent : but especially, whatsoever is curious and malicious : and thou must use thyself to think only of such things, of which if a man upon a sudden should ask thee, what it is that thou

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art now thinking, thou mayest answer This, and That, freely and boldly, that so by thy thoughts it may presently appear that in all thee is sincere, and peaceable ; as becometh one that is made for society, and regards not pleasures, nor gives way to any voluptuous imaginations at all : free from all contentiousness, envy, and suspicion, and from whatsoever else thou wouldest blush to confess thy thoughts were set upon. He that is such, is he surely that doth not put off to lay hold on that which is best indeed, a very priest and minister of the gods, well acquainted and in good correspondence with him especially that is seated and placed within himself, as in a temple and sacrary : to whom also he keeps and preserves himself unspotted by pleasure, undaunted by pain ; free from any manner of wrong, or contumely, by himself offered unto himself : not capable of any evil from others : a wrestler of the best sort, and for the highest prize, that he may not be cast down by any passion, or affection of his own ; deeply dyed and drenched in righteousness, embracing and accepting with his whole heart whatsoever either happeneth or is allotted unto him. One who not often, nor without some great necessity tending to some public good, mindeth what any other, either speaks, or doth, or purposeth : for those things only that are in his own power, or that are truly his own, are the objects of his employments, and his thoughts are ever taken up with those things, which of the whole universe are by the fates or Providence destinated and appropriated unto himself. Those things that are his own, and in his own power, he himself takes order, for that they be good : and as for those that happen unto him, he believes them to be so. For that lot and portion which is assigned to every one, as it is unavoidable and necessary, so is it always profitable. He remembers besides that whatsoever partakes of reason, is akin unto him, and that to care

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for all men generally, is agreeing to the nature of a man : but as for honour and praise, that they ought not generally to be admitted and accepted of from all, but from such only, who live according to nature. As for them that do not, what manner of men they be at home, or abroad ; day or night, how conditioned themselves with what manner of conditions, or with men of what conditions they moil and pass away the time together, he knoweth, and remembers right well, he therefore regards not such praise and approbation, as proceeding from them, who cannot like and approve themselves.

V. Do nothing against thy will, nor contrary to the community, nor without due examination, nor with reluc-tancy. Affect not to set out thy thoughts with curious neat language. Be neither a great talker, nor a great under-taker. Moreover, let thy God that is in thee to rule over thee, find by thee, that he hath to do with a man ; an aged man ; a sociable man ; a Roman ; a prince ; one that hath ordered his life, as one that expecteth, as it were, nothing but the sound of the trumpet, sounding a retreat to depart out of this life with all expedition. One who for his word or actions neither needs an oath, nor any man to be a witness.

VI. To be cheerful, and to stand in no need, either of other men's help or attendance, or of that rest and tranquillity, which thou must be beholding to others for. Rather like one that is straight of himself, or hath ever been straight, than one that hath been rectified.

VII. If thou shalt find anything in this mortal life better than righteousness, than truth, temperance, fortitude, and in general better than a mind contented both with those things which according to right and reason she doth, and in those, which without her will and knowledge

## Marcus Aurelius

happen unto thee by the providence ; if I say, thou canst find out anything better than this, apply thyself unto it with thy whole heart, and that which is best wheresoever thou dost find it, enjoy freely. But if nothing thou shalt find worthy to be preferred to that spirit which is within thee ; if nothing better than to subject unto thee thine own lusts and desires, and not to give way to any fancies or imaginations before thou hast duly considered of them, nothing better than to withdraw thyself (to use Socrates his words) from all sensuality, and submit thyself unto the gods, and to have care of all men in general : if thou shalt find that all other things in comparison of this, are but vile, and of little moment ; then give not way to any other thing, which being once though but affected and inclined unto, it will no more be in thy power without all distraction as thou oughtest to prefer and to pursue after that good, which is thine own and thy proper good. For it is not lawful, that anything that is of another and inferior kind and nature, be it what it will, as either popular applause, or honour, or riches, or pleasures ; should be suffered to confront and contest as it were, with that which is rational, and operatively good. For all these things, if once though but for a while, they begin to please, they presently prevail, and pervert a man's mind, or turn a man from the right way. Do thou therefore I say absolutely and freely make choice of that which is best, and stick unto it. Now, that they say is best, which is most profitable. If they mean profitable to man as he is a rational man, stand thou to it, and maintain it ; but if they mean profitable, as he is a creature, only reject it ; and from this thy tenet and conclusion keep off carefully all plausible shows and colours of external appearance, that thou mayest be able to discern things rightly.

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VIII. Never esteem of anything as profitable, which shall ever constrain thee either to break thy faith, or to lose thy modesty ; to hate any man, to suspect, to curse, to dissemble, to lust after anything, that requireth the secret of walls or veils. But he that preferreth before all things his rational part and spirit, and the sacred mysteries of virtue which issueth from it, he shall never lament and exclaim, never sigh ; he shall never want either solitude or company : and which is chiefest of all, he shall live without either desire or fear. And as for life, whether for a long or short time he shall enjoy his soul thus compassed about with a body, he is altogether indifferent. For if even now he were to depart, he is as ready for it, as for any other action, which may be performed with modesty and decency. For all his life long, this is his only care, that his mind may always be occupied in such intentions and objects, as are proper to a rational sociable creature.

IX. In the mind that is once truly disciplined and purged, thou canst not find anything, either foul or impure, or as it were festered : nothing that is either servile, or affected : no partial tie ; no malicious averseness ; nothing obnoxious ; nothing concealed. The life of such an one, death can never surprise as imperfect ; as of an actor, that should die before he had ended, or the play itself were at an end, a man might speak.

X. Use thine opinative faculty with all honour and respect, for in her indeed is all : that thy opinion do not beget in thy understanding anything contrary to either nature, or the proper constitution of a rational creature. The end and object of a rational constitution is, to do nothing rashly, to be kindly affected towards men, and in all things willingly to submit unto the gods. Casting therefore all other things aside, keep thyself to these few, and

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remember withal that no man properly can be said to live more than that which is now present, which is but a moment of time. Whatsoever is besides either is already past, or uncertain. The time therefore that any man doth live, is but a little, and the place where he liveth, is but a very little corner of the earth, and the greatest fame that can remain of a man after his death, even that is but little, and that too, such as it is whilst it is, is by the succession of silly mortal men preserved, who likewise shall shortly die, and even whiles they live know not what in very deed they themselves are : and much less can know one, who long before is dead and gone.

XI. To these ever-present helps and mementoes, let one more be added, ever to make a particular description and delineation as it were of every object that presents itself to thy mind, that thou mayest wholly and throughly contemplate it, in its own proper nature, bare and naked ; wholly, and severally ; divided into its several parts and quarters : and then by thyself in thy mind, to call both it, and those things of which it doth consist, and in which it shall be resolved, by their own proper true names, and appellations. For there is nothing so effectual to beget true magnanimity, as to be able truly and methodically to examine and consider all things that happen in this life, and so to penetrate into their natures, that at the same time, this also may concur in our apprehensions : what is the true use of it ? and what is the true nature of this universe, to which it is useful ? how much in regard of the universe may it be esteemed ? how much in regard of man, a citizen of the supreme city, of which all other cities in the world are as it were but houses and families ?

XII. What is this, that now my fancy is set upon ? of what things doth it consist ? how long can it last ? which

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of all the virtues is the proper virtue for this present use? as whether meekness, fortitude, truth, faith, sincerity, contentation, or any of the rest? Of everything therefore thou must use thyself to say, This immediately comes from God, this by that fatal connection and concatenation of things, or (which almost comes to one) by some coincidental casualty. And as for this, it proceeds from my neighbour, my kinsman, my fellow: through his ignorance indeed, because he knows not what is truly natural unto him: but I know it, and therefore carry myself towards him according to the natural law of fellowship; that is kindly, and justly. As for those things that of themselves are altogether indifferent, as in my best judgment I conceive everything to deserve more or less, so I carry myself towards it.

XIII. If thou shalt intend that which is present, following the rule of right and reason carefully, solidly, meekly, and shalt not intermix any other businesses, but shall study this only to preserve thy spirit impolluted, and pure, and shall cleave unto him without either hope or fear of anything, in all things that thou shalt either do or speak, contenting thyself with heroical truth, thou shalt live happily; and from this, there is no man that can hinder thee.

XIV. As physicians and chirurgeons have always their instruments ready at hand for all sudden cures; so have thou always thy dogmata in a readiness for the knowledge of things, both divine and human: and whatsoever thou dost, even in the smallest things that thou dost, thou must ever remember that mutual relation, and connection that is between these two things divine, and things human. For without relation unto God, thou shalt never speed in any worldly actions; nor on the other side in any divine, without some respect had to things human.

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XV. Be not deceived ; for thou shalt never live to read thy moral commentaries, nor the acts of the famous Romans and Grecians ; nor those excerpta from several books ; all which thou hadst provided and laid up for thyself against thine old age. Hasten therefore to an end, and giving over all vain hopes, help thyself in time if thou carest for thyself, as thou oughtest to do.

XVI. To steal, to sow, to buy, to be at rest, to see what is to be done (which is not seen by the eyes, but by another kind of sight :) what these words mean, and how many ways to be understood, they do not understand. The body, the soul, the understanding. As the senses naturally belong to the body, and the desires and affections to the soul, so do the dogmata to the understanding.

XVII. To be capable of fancies and imaginations, is common to man and beast. To be violently drawn and moved by the lusts and desires of the soul, is proper to wild beasts and monsters, such as Phalaris and Nero were. To follow reason for ordinary duties and actions is common to them also, who believe not that there be any gods, and for their advantage would make no conscience to betray their own country ; and who when once the doors be shut upon them, dare do anything. If therefore all things else be common to these likewise, it follows, that for a man to like and embrace all things that happen and are destinatied unto him, and not to trouble and molest that spirit which is seated in the temple of his own breast, with a multitude of vain fancies and imaginations, but to keep him propitious and to obey him as a god, never either speaking anything contrary to truth, or doing anything contrary to justice, is the only true property of a good man. And such a one, though no man should believe that he liveth as he doth, either sincerely and conscientiously, or cheerful and con-

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tentedly; yet is he neither with any man at all angry for it, nor diverted by it from the way that leadeth to the end of his life, through which a man must pass pure, ever ready to depart, and willing of himself without any compulsion to fit and accommodate himself to his proper lot and portion.



## Marcus Aurelius

## The Fourth Book



HAT inward mistress part of man if it be in its own true natural temper, is towards all worldly chances and events ever so disposed and affected, that it will easily turn and apply itself to that which may be, and is within its own power to compass, when that cannot be which at first it intended. For it never doth absolutely addict and apply itself to any one object, but whatsoever it is that it doth now intend and prosecute, it doth prosecute it with exception and reservation ; so that whatsoever it is that falls out contrary to its first intentions, even that afterwards it makes its proper object. Even as the fire when it prevails upon those things that are in his way ; by which things indeed a little fire would have been quenched, but a great fire doth soon turn to its own nature, and so consume whatsoever comes in his way : yea by those very things it is made greater and greater.

II. Let nothing be done rashly, and at random, but all things according to the most exact and perfect rules of art.

III. They seek for themselves private retiring places, as country villages, the sea-shore, mountains ; yea thou thyself art wont to long much after such places. But all this thou must know proceeds from simplicity in the highest degree. At what time soever thou wilt, it is in thy power to retire into thyself, and to be at rest, and free from all businesses. A man cannot any whither retire better than to his own soul ; he especially who is beforehand provided of such







*The Triumphal Entry of  
MARCUS AVRELIVS.*



## His Meditations

things within, which whosoever he doth withdraw himself to look in, may presently afford unto him perfect ease and tranquillity. By tranquillity I understand a decent orderly disposition and carriage, free from all confusion and tumultuousness. Afford then thyself this retiring continually, and thereby refresh and renew thyself. Let these precepts be brief and fundamental, which as soon as thou dost call them to mind, may suffice thee to purge thy soul throughly, and to send thee away well pleased with those things whatsoever they be, which now again after this short withdrawing of thy soul into herself thou dost return unto. For what is it that thou art offended at? Can it be at the wickedness of men, when thou dost call to mind this conclusion, that all reasonable creatures are made one for another? and that it is part of justice to bear with them? and that it is against their wills that they offend? and how many already, who once likewise prosecuted their enmities, suspected, hated, and fiercely contended, are now long ago stretched out, and reduced unto ashes? It is time for thee to make an end. As for those things which among the common chances of the world happen unto thee as thy particular lot and portion, canst thou be displeased with any of them, when thou dost call that our ordinary dilemma to mind, either a providence, or Democritus his atoms; and with it, whatsoever we brought to prove that the whole world is as it were one city? And as for thy body, what canst thou fear, if thou dost consider that thy mind and understanding, when once it hath recollected itself, and knows its own power, hath in this life and breath (whether it run smoothly and gently, or whether harshly and rudely), no interest at all, but is altogether indifferent: and whatsoever else thou hast heard and assented unto concerning either pain or pleasure? But the care of thine honour and reputation will perchance distract

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thee? How can that be, if thou dost look back, and consider both how quickly all things that are, are forgotten, and what an immense chaos of eternity was before, and will follow after all things: and the vanity of praise, and the inconstancy and variableness of human judgments and opinions, and the narrowness of the place, wherein it is limited and circumscribed? For the whole earth is but as one point; and of it, this inhabited part of it, is but a very little part; and of this part, how many in number, and what manner of men are they, that will commend thee? What remains then, but that thou often put in practice this kind of retiring of thyself, to this little part of thyself; and above all things, keep thyself from distraction, and intend not anything vehemently, but be free and consider all things, as a man whose proper object is virtue, as a man whose true nature is to be kind and sociable, as a citizen, as a mortal creature. Among other things, which to consider, and look into thou must use to withdraw thyself, let those two be among the most obvious and at hand. One, that the things or objects themselves reach not unto the soul, but stand without still and quiet, and that it is from the opinion only which is within, that all the tumult and all the trouble doth proceed. The next, that all these things, which now thou seest, shall within a very little while be changed, and be no more: and ever call to mind, how many changes and alterations in the world thou thyself hast already been an eyewitness of in thy time. This world is mere change, and this life, opinion.

IV. If to understand and to be reasonable be common unto all men, then is that reason, for which we are termed reasonable, common unto all. If reason is general, then is that reason also, which prescribeth what is to be done and what not, common unto all. If that, then law. If law,

## His Meditations

then are we fellow-citizens. If so, then are we partners in some one commonweal. If so, then the world is as it were a city. For which other commonweal is it, that all men can be said to be members of? From this common city it is, that understanding, reason, and law is derived unto us, for from whence else? For as that which in me is earthly I have from some common earth; and that which is moist from some other element is imparted; as my breath and life hath its proper fountain; and that likewise which is dry and fiery in me: (for there is nothing which doth not proceed from something; as also there is nothing that can be reduced unto mere nothing:) so also is there some common beginning from whence my understanding hath proceeded.

V. As generation is, so also death, a secret of nature's wisdom: a mixture of elements, resolved into the same elements again, a thing surely which no man ought to be ashamed of: in a series of other fatal events and consequences, which a rational creature is subject unto, not improper or incongruous, nor contrary to the natural and proper constitution of man himself.

VI. Such and such things, from such and such causes, must of necessity proceed. He that would not have such things to happen, is as he that would have the fig-tree grow without any sap or moisture. In sum, remember this, that within a very little while, both thou and he shall both be dead, and after a little while more, not so much as your names and memories shall be remaining.

VII. Let opinion be taken away, and no man will think himself wronged. If no man shall think himself wronged, then is there no more any such thing as wrong. That which makes not man himself the worse, cannot make his life the worse, neither can it hurt him either inwardly

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or outwardly. It was expedient in nature that it should be so, and therefore necessary.

VIII. Whatsoever doth happen in the world, doth happen justly, and so if thou dost well take heed, thou shalt find it. I say not only in right order by a series of inevitable consequences, but according to justice and as it were by way of equal distribution, according to the true worth of everything. Continue then to take notice of it, as thou hast begun, and whatsoever thou dost, do it not without this proviso, that it be a thing of that nature that a good man (as the word good is properly taken) may do it. This observe carefully in every action.

IX. Conceit no such things, as he that wrongeth thee conceiveth, or would have thee to conceive, but look into the matter itself, and see what it is in very truth.

X. These two rules, thou must have always in a readiness. First, do nothing at all, but what reason proceeding from that regal and supreme part, shall for the good and benefit of men, suggest unto thee. And secondly, if any man that is present shall be able to rectify thee or to turn thee from some erroneous persuasion, that thou be always ready to change thy mind, and this change to proceed, not from any respect of any pleasure or credit thereon depending, but always from some probable apparent ground of justice, or of some public good thereby to be furthered; or from some other such inducement.

XI. Hast thou reason? I have. Why then makest thou not use of it? For if thy reason do her part, what more canst thou require?

XII. As a part hitherto thou hast had a particular subsistence: and now shalt thou vanish away into the common substance of Him, who first begot thee, or rather thou shalt be resumed again into that original rational

## His Meditations

substance, out of which all others have issued, and are propagated. Many small pieces of frankincense are set upon the same altar, one drops first and is consumed, another after ; and it comes all to one.

XIII. Within ten days, if so happen, thou shalt be esteemed a god of them, who now if thou shalt return to the dogmata and to the honouring of reason, will esteem of thee no better than of a mere brute, and of an ape.

XIV. Not as though thou hadst thousands of years to live. Death hangs over thee : whilst yet thou livest, whilst thou mayest, be good.

XV. Now much time and leisure doth he gain, who is not curious to know what his neighbour hath said, or hath done, or hath attempted, but only what he doth himself, that it may be just and holy ? or to express it in Agathos' words, Not to look about upon the evil conditions of others, but to run on straight in the line, without any loose and extravagant agitation.

XVI. He who is greedy of credit and reputation after his death, doth not consider, that they themselves by whom he is remembered, shall soon after every one of them be dead ; and they likewise that succeed those ; until at last all memory, which hitherto by the succession of men admiring and soon after dying hath had its course, be quite extinct. But suppose that both they that shall remember thee, and thy memory with them should be immortal, what is that to thee ? I will not say to thee after thou art dead ; but even to thee living, what is thy praise ? But only for a secret and politic consideration, which we call *oikoupolay*, or dispensation. For as for that, that it is the gift of nature, whatsoever is commended in thee, what might be objected from thence, let that now that we are upon another consideration be omitted as unseasonable. That

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which is fair and goodly, whatsoever it be, and in what respect soever it be, that it is fair and goodly, it is so of itself, and terminates in itself, not admitting praise as a part or member : that therefore which is praised, is not thereby made either better or worse. This I understand even of those things, that are commonly called fair and good, as those which are commended either for the matter itself, or for curious workmanship. As for that which is truly good, what can it stand in need of more than either justice or truth ; or more than either kindness and modesty ? Which of all those, either becomes good or fair, because commended ; or dispraised suffers any damage ? Doth the emerald become worse in itself, or more vile if it be not commended ? Doth gold, or ivory, or purple ? Is there anything that doth though never so common, as a knife, a flower, or a tree ?

XVII. If so be that the souls remain after death (say they that will not believe it) ; how is the air from all eternity able to contain them ? How is the earth (say I) ever from that time able to contain the bodies of them that are buried ? For as here the change and resolution of dead bodies into another kind of subsistence, (whatsoever it be;) makes place for other dead bodies : so the souls after death transferred into the air, after they have conversed there a while, are either by way of transmutation, or transfusion, or conflagration, received again into that original rational substance, from which all others do proceed : and so give way to those souls, who before coupled and associated unto bodies, now begin to subsist single. This, upon a supposition that the souls after death do for a while subsist single, may be answered. And here, (besides the number of bodies, so buried and contained by the earth), we may further consider the number of several beasts,

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eaten by us men, and by other creatures. For notwithstanding that such a multitude of them is daily consumed, and as it were buried in the bodies of the eaters, yet is the same place and body able to contain them, by reason of their conversion, partly into blood, partly into air and fire. What in these things is the speculation of truth? to divide things into that which is passive and material; and that which is active and formal.

XVIII. Not to wander out of the way, but upon every motion and desire, to perform that which is just: and ever to be careful to attain to the true natural apprehension of every fancy, that presents itself.

XIX. Whatsoever is expedient unto thee, O World, is expedient unto me; nothing can either be unseasonable unto me, or out of date, which unto thee is seasonable. Whatsoever thy seasons bear, shall ever by me be esteemed as happy fruit, and increase. O Nature! from thee are all things, in thee all things subsist, and to thee all tend. Could he say of Athens, Thou lovely city of Cecrops; and shalt not thou say of the world, Thou lovely city of God?

XX. They will say commonly, Meddle not with many things, if thou wilt live cheerfully. Certainly there is nothing better, than for a man to confine himself to necessary actions; to such and so many only, as reason in a creature that knows itself born for society, will command and enjoin. This will not only procure that cheerfulness, which from the goodness, but that also, which from the paucity of actions doth usually proceed. For since it is so, that most of those things, which we either speak or do, are unnecessary; if a man shall cut them off, it must needs follow that he shall thereby gain much leisure, and save much trouble, and therefore at every action a man must

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privately by way of admonition suggest unto himself, What? may not this that now I go about, be of the number of unnecessary actions? Neither must he use himself to cut off actions only, but thoughts and imaginations also, that are unnecessary; for so will unnecessary consequent actions the better be prevented and cut off.

XXI. Try also how a good man's life; (of one, who is well pleased with those things whatsoever, which among the common changes and chances of this world fall to his own lot and share; and can live well contented and fully satisfied in the justice of his own proper present action, and in the goodness of his disposition for the future :) will agree with thee. Thou hast had experience of that other kind of life: make now trial of this also. Trouble not thyself any more henceforth, reduce thyself unto perfect simplicity. Doth any man offend? It is against himself that he doth offend: why should it trouble thee? Hath anything happened unto thee? It is well, whatsoever it be, it is that which of all the common chances of the world from the very beginning in the series of all other things that have, or shall happen, was destinated and appointed unto thee. To comprehend all in few words, our life is short; we must endeavour to gain the present time with best discretion and justice. Use recreation with sobriety.

XXII. Either this world is a *κόσμος*, or a comely piece, because all disposed and governed by certain order: or if it be a mixture, though confused, yet still it is a comely piece. For is it possible that in thee there should be any beauty at all, and that in the whole world there should be nothing but disorder and confusion? and all things in it too, by natural different properties one from another differenced and distinguished; and yet all through diffused, and by natural sympathy, one to another united, as they are?

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XXIII. A black or malign disposition, an effeminate disposition ; an hard inexorable disposition, a wild inhuman disposition, a sheepish disposition, a childish disposition ; a blockish, a false, a scurrl, a fraudulent, a tyrannical : what then ? If he be a stranger in the world, that knows not the things that are in it ; why not he a stranger as well, that wonders at the things that are done in it ?

XXIV. He is a true fugitive, that flies from reason, by which men are sociable. He blind, who cannot see with the eyes of his understanding. He poor, that stands in need of another, and hath not in himself all things needful for this life. He an aposteme of the world, who by being discontented with those things that happen unto him in the world, doth as it were apostatise, and separate himself from common nature's rational administration. For the same nature it is that brings this unto thee, whatsoever it be, that first brought thee into the world. He raises sedition in the city, who by irrational actions withdraws his own soul from that one and common soul of all rational creatures.

XXV. There is, who without so much as a coat ; and there is, who without so much as a book, doth put philosophy in practice. I am half naked, neither have I bread to eat, and yet I depart not from reason, saith one. But I say ; I want the food of good teaching, and instructions, and yet I depart not from reason.

XXVI. What art and profession soever thou hast learned, endeavour to affect it, and comfort thyself in it ; and pass the remainder of thy life as one who from his whole heart commits himself and whatsoever belongs unto him, unto the gods : and as for men, carry not thyself either tyrannically or servilely towards any.

XXVII. Consider in my mind, for example's sake, the

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times of Vespasian : thou shalt see but the same things : some marrying, some bringing up children, some sick, some dying, some fighting, some feasting, some merchandising, some tilling, some flattering, some boasting, some suspecting, some undermining, some wishing to die, some fretting and murmuring at their present estate, some wooing, some hoarding, some seeking after magistracies, and some after kingdoms. And is not that their age quite over, and ended ? Again, consider now the times of Trajan. There likewise thou seest the very self-same things, and that age also is now over and ended. In the like manner consider other periods, both of times and of whole nations, and see how many men, after they had with all their might and main intended and prosecuted some one worldly thing or other, did soon after drop away, and were resolved into the elements. But especially thou must call to mind them, whom thou thyself in thy lifetime hast known much distracted about vain things, and in the meantime neglecting to do that, and closely and unseparably (as fully satisfied with it) to adhere unto it, which their own proper constitution did require. And here thou must remember, that thy carriage in every business must be according to the worth and due proportion of it, for so shalt thou not easily be tired out and vexed, if thou shalt not dwell upon small matters longer than is fitting.

XCVIII. Those words which once were common and ordinary, are now become obscure and obsolete ; and so the names of men once commonly known and famous, are now become in a manner obscure and obsolete names. Camillus, Cæso, Volesius, Leonnatus ; not long after, Scipio, Cato, then Augustus, then Adrianus, then Antoninus Pius : all these in a short time will be out of date, and, as things of another world as it were, become fabulous. And this I say

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of them, who once shined as the wonders of their ages, for as for the rest, no sooner are they expired, than with them all their fame and memory. And what is it then that shall always be remembered ? all is vanity. What is it that we must bestow our care and diligence upon ? even upon this only : that our minds and wills be just ; that our actions be charitable ; that our speech be never deceitful, or that our understanding be not subject to error ; that our inclination be always set to embrace whatsoever shall happen unto us, as necessary, as usual, as ordinary, as flowing from such a beginning, and such a fountain, from which both thou thyself and all things are. Willingly therefore, and wholly surrender up thyself unto that fatal concatenation, yielding up thyself unto the fates, to be disposed of at their pleasure.

XXIX. Whatsoever is now present, and from day to day hath its existence ; all objects of memories, and the minds and memories themselves, incessantly consider, all things that are, have their being by change and alteration. Use thyself therefore often to meditate upon this, that the nature of the universe delights in nothing more, than in altering those things that are, and in making others like unto them. So that we may say, that whatsoever is, is but as it were the seed of that which shall be. For if thou think that that only is seed, which either the earth or the womb receiveth, thou art very simple.

XXX. Thou art now ready to die, and yet hast thou not attained to that perfect simplicity : thou art yet subject to many troubles and perturbations ; not yet free from all fear and suspicion of external accidents ; nor yet either so meekly disposed towards all men, as thou shouldest ; or so affected as one, whose only study and only wisdom is, to be just in all his actions.

XXXI. Behold and observe, what is the state of their

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rational part ; and those that the world doth account wise, see what things they fly and are afraid of ; and what things they hunt after.

XXXII. In another man's mind and understanding thy evil cannot subsist, nor in any proper temper or distemper of the natural constitution of thy body, which is but as it were the coat or cottage of thy soul. Wherein then, but in that part of thee, wherein the conceit, and apprehension of any misery can subsist ? Let not that part therefore admit any such conceit, and then all is well. Though thy body which is so near it should either be cut or burnt, or suffer any corruption or putrefaction, yet let that part to which it belongs to judge of these, be still at rest ; that is, let her judge this, that whatsoever it is, that equally may happen to a wicked man, and to a good man, is neither good nor evil. For that which happens equally to him that lives according to nature, and to him that doth not, is neither according to nature, nor against it ; and by consequent, neither good nor bad.

XXXIII. Ever consider and think upon the world as being but one living substance, and having but one soul, and how all things in the world, are terminated into one sensitive power ; and are done by one general motion as it were, and deliberation of that one soul ; and how all things that are, concur in the cause of one another's being, and by what manner of connection and concatenation all things happen.

XXXIV. What art thou, that better and divine part excepted, but as Epictetus said well, a wretched soul, appointed to carry a carcass up and down ?

XXXV. To suffer change can be no hurt ; as no benefit it is, by change to attain to being. The age and time of the world is as it were a flood and swift current,

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consisting of the things that are brought to pass in the world. For as soon as anything hath appeared, and is passed away, another succeeds, and that also will presently out of sight.

XXXVI. Whatsoever doth happen in the world, is, in the course of nature, as usual and ordinary as a rose in the spring, and fruit in summer. Of the same nature is sickness and death ; slander, and lying in wait, and whatsoever else ordinarily doth unto fools use to be occasion either of joy or sorrow. That, whatsoever it is, that comes after, doth always very naturally, and as it were familiarly, follow upon that which was before. For thou must consider the things of the world, not as a loose independent number, consisting merely of necessary events ; but as a discreet connection of things orderly and harmoniously disposed. There is then to be seen in the things of the world, not a bare succession, but an admirable correspondence and affinity.

XXXVII. Let that of Heraclitus never be out of thy mind, that the death of earth, is water, and the death of water, is air ; and the death of air, is fire ; and so on the contrary. Remember him also who was ignorant whither the way did lead, and how that reason being the thing by which all things in the world are administered, and which men are continually and most inwardly conversant with : yet is the thing, which ordinarily they are most in opposition with, and how those things which daily happen among them, cease not daily to be strange unto them, and that we should not either speak, or do anything as men in their sleep, by opinion and bare imagination : for then we think we speak and do, and that we must not be as children, who follow their father's example ; for best reason alleging their bare *καθότι παρειλήφαμεν* ; or, as by successive tradition from our forefathers we have received it.

XXXVIII. Even as if any of the gods should tell

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thee, Thou shalt certainly die to-morrow, or next day, thou wouldest not, except thou wert extremely base and pusillanimous, take it for a great benefit, rather to die the next day after, than to-morrow ; (for alas, what is the difference !) so, for the same reason, think it no great matter to die rather many years after, than the very next day.

XXXIX. Let it be thy perpetual meditation, how many physicians who once looked so grim, and so tetrically shrunk their brows upon their patients, are dead and gone themselves. How many astrologers, after that in great ostentation they had foretold the death of some others, how many philosophers after so many elaborate tracts and volumes concerning either mortality or immortality ; how many brave captains and commanders, after the death and slaughter of so many ; how many kings and tyrants, after they had with such horror and insolency abused their power upon men's lives, as though themselves had been immortal ; how many, that I may so speak, whole cities both men and towns : Helice, Pompeii, Herculaneum, and others innumerable are dead and gone. Run them over also, whom thou thyself, one after another, hast known in thy time to drop away. Such and such a one took care of such and such a one's burial, and soon after was buried himself. So one, so another : and all things in a short time. For herein lieth all indeed, ever to look upon all worldly things, as things for their continuance, that are but for a day : and for their worth, most vile, and contemptible, as for example, What is man ? That which but the other day when he was conceived was vile snivel ; and within few days shall be either an embalmed carcass, or mere ashes. Thus must thou according to truth and nature, throughly consider how man's life is but for a very moment of time, and so depart meek and contented : even as if a ripe olive falling should

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praise the ground that bare her, and give thanks to the tree that begat her.

XL. Thou must be like a promontory of the sea, against which though the waves beat continually, yet it both itself stands, and about it are those swelling waves stilled and quieted.

XLI. Oh, wretched I, to whom this mischance is happened ! nay, happy I, to whom this thing being happened, I can continue without grief ; neither wounded by that which is present, nor in fear of that which is to come. For as for this, it might have happened unto any man, but any man having such a thing befallen him, could not have continued without grief. Why then should that rather be an unhappiness, than this a happiness ? But however, canst thou, O man ! term that unhappiness, which is no mischance to the nature of man ! Canst thou think that a mischance to the nature of man, which is not contrary to the end and will of his nature ? What then hast thou learned is the will of man's nature ? Doth that then which hath happened unto thee, hinder thee from being just ? or magnanimous ? or temperate ? or wise ? or circumspect ? or true ? or modest ? or free ? or from anything else of all those things in the present enjoying and possession whereof the nature of man, (as then enjoying all that is proper unto her,) is fully satisfied ? Now to conclude ; upon all occasion of sorrow remember henceforth to make use of this dogma, that whatsoever it is that hath happened unto thee, is in very deed no such thing of itself, as a misfortune ; but that to bear it generously, is certainly great happiness.

XLII. It is but an ordinary coarse one, yet it is a good effectual remedy against the fear of death, for a man to consider in his mind the examples of such, who greedily

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and covetously (as it were) did for a long time enjoy their lives. What have they got more, than they whose deaths have been untimely? Are not they themselves dead at the last? as Cadicianus, Fabius, Julianus, Lepidus, or any other who in their lifetime having buried many, were at the last buried themselves. The whole space of any man's life, is but little; and as little as it is, with what troubles, with what manner of dispositions, and in the society of how wretched a body must it be passed! Let it be therefore unto thee altogether as a matter of indifference. For if thou shalt look backward; behold, what an infinite chaos of time doth present itself unto thee; and as infinite a chaos, if thou shalt look forward. In that which is so infinite, what difference can there be between that which liveth but three days, and that which liveth three ages?

XLIII. Let thy course ever be the most compendious way. The most compendious, is that which is according to nature: that is, in all both words and deeds, ever to follow that which is most sound and perfect. For such a resolution will free a man from all trouble, strife, dissembling, and ostentation.



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### The Fifth Book

**I**N the morning when thou findest thyself unwilling to rise, consider with thyself presently, it is to go about a man's work that I am stirred up. Am I then yet unwilling to go about that, for which I myself was born and brought forth into this world? Or was I made for this, to lay me down, and make much of myself in a warm bed? 'O but this is pleasing.' And was it then for this that thou wert born, that thou mightest enjoy pleasure? Was it not in very truth for this, that thou mightest always be busy and in action? Seest thou not how all things in the world besides, how every tree and plant, how sparrows and ants, spiders and bees: how all in their kind are intent as it were orderly to perform whatsoever (towards the preservation of this orderly universe) naturally doth become and belong unto them? And wilt not thou do that, which belongs unto a man to do? Wilt not thou run to do that, which thy nature doth require? 'But thou must have some rest.' Yes, thou must. Nature hath of that also, as well as of eating and drinking, allowed thee a certain stint. But thou goest beyond thy stint, and beyond that which would suffice, and in matter of action, there thou comest short of that which thou mayest. It must needs be therefore, that thou dost not love thyself, for if thou didst, thou wouldst also love thy nature, and that which thy nature doth propose unto herself as her end. Others, as many as take pleasure in their trade and profession, can

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even pine themselves at their works, and neglect their bodies and their food for it ; and doest thou less honour thy nature, than an ordinary mechanic his trade ; or a good dancer his art ? than a covetous man his silver, and a vainglorious man applause ? These to whatsoever they take an affection, can be content to want their meat and sleep, to further that every one which he affects : and shall actions tending to the common good of human society, seem more vile unto thee, or worthy of less respect and intention ?

II. How easy a thing is it for a man to put off from him all turbulent adventitious imaginations, and presently to be in perfect rest and tranquillity !

III. Think thyself fit and worthy to speak, or to do anything that is according to nature, and let not the reproach, or report of some that may ensue upon it, ever deter thee. If it be right and honest to be spoken or done, undervalue not thyself so much, as to be discouraged from it. As for them, they have their own rational over-ruling part, and their own proper inclination : which thou must not stand and look about to take notice of, but go on straight, whither both thine own particular, and the common nature do lead thee ; and the way of both these, is but one.

IV. I continue my course by actions according to nature, until I fall and cease, breathing out my last breath into that air, by which continually breathed in I did live ; and falling upon that earth, out of whose gifts and fruits my father gathered his seed, my mother her blood, and my nurse her milk, out of which for so many years I have been provided, both of meat and drink. And lastly, which beareth me that tread upon it, and beareth with me that so many ways do abuse it, or so freely make use of it, so many ways to so many ends.

V. No man can admire thee for thy sharp acute language, such is thy natural disability that way. Be it so :

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yet there be many other good things, for the want of which thou canst not plead the want or natural ability. Let them be seen in thee, which depend wholly from thee ; sincerity, gravity, laboriousness, contempt of pleasures ; be not querulous, be content with little, be kind, be free ; avoid all superfluity, all vain prattling ; be magnanimous. Doest not thou perceive, how many things there be, which notwithstanding any pretence of natural indisposition and unfitness, thou mightest have performed and exhibited, and yet still thou doest voluntarily continue drooping downwards ? Or wilt thou say, that it is through defect of thy natural constitution, that thou art constrained to murmur, to be base and wretched ; to flatter ; now to accuse, and now to please, and pacify thy body : to be vainglorious, to be so giddy-headed, and unsettled in thy thoughts ? nay (witnesses be the Gods) of all these thou mightest have been rid long ago : only, this thou must have been contented with, to have borne the blame of one that is somewhat slow and dull. Wherein thou must so exercise thyself, as one who neither doth much take to heart this his natural defect, nor yet pleaseth himself in it.

VI. Such there be, who when they have done a good turn to any, are ready to set them on the score for it, and to require retaliation. Others there be, who though they stand not upon retaliation, to require any, yet they think with themselves nevertheless, that such a one is their debtor, and they know as their word is what they have done. Others again there be, who when they have done any such thing, do not so much as know what they have done ; but are like unto the vine, which beareth her grapes, and when once she hath borne her own proper fruit, is contented and seeks for no further recompense. As a horse after a race, and a hunting dog when he hath hunted, and a bee when

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she hath made her honey, look not for applause and commendation ; so neither doth that man that rightly doth understand his own nature when he hath done a good turn : but from one doth proceed to do another, even as the vine after she hath once borne fruit in her own proper season, is ready for another time. Thou therefore must be one of them, who what they do, barely do it without any further thought, and are in a manner insensible of what they do. ‘Nay but,’ will some reply perchance, ‘this very thing a rational man is bound unto, to understand what it is, that he doeth.’ For it is the property, say they, of one that is naturally sociable, to be sensible, that he doth operate sociably : nay, and to desire, that the party himself that is sociably dealt with, should be sensible of it too. I answer, That which thou sayest is true indeed, but the true meaning of that which is said, thou dost not understand. And therefore art thou one of those first, whom I mentioned. For they also are led by a probable appearance of reason. But if thou dost desire to understand truly what it is that is said, fear not that thou shalt therefore give over any sociable action.

VII. The form of the Athenians’ prayer did run thus : ‘O rain, rain, good Jupiter, upon all the grounds and fields that belong to the Athenians.’ Either we should not pray at all, or thus absolutely and freely ; and not every one for himself in particular alone.

VIII. As we say commonly, The physician hath prescribed unto this man, riding ; unto another, cold baths ; unto a third, to go barefoot : so it is alike to say, The nature of the universe hath prescribed unto this man sickness, or blindness, or some loss, or damage or some such thing. For as there, when we say of a physician, that he hath prescribed anything, our meaning is, that he hath appointed this for that, as subordinate and conducing

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to health: so here, whatsoever doth happen unto any, is ordained unto him as a thing subordinate unto the fates, and therefore do we say of such things, that they do *συμβαίνειν*, that is, happen, or fall together; as of square stones, when either in walls, or pyramids in a certain position they fit one another, and agree as it were in an harmony, the masons say, that they do *συμβαίνειν*; as if thou shouldest say, fall together: so that in the general, though the things be divers that make it, yet the consent or harmony itself is but one. And as the whole world is made up of all the particular bodies of the world, one perfect and complete body, of the same nature that particular bodies; so is the destiny of particular causes and events one general one, of the same nature that particular causes are. What I now say, even they that are mere idiots are not ignorant of: for they say commonly *τοῦτο ἔφερεν ἀντρό*, that is, This his destiny hath brought upon him. This therefore is by the fates properly and particularly brought upon this, as that unto this in particular is by the physician prescribed. These therefore let us accept of in like manner, as we do those that are prescribed unto us by our physicians. For them also in themselves shall we find to contain many harsh things, but we nevertheless, in hope of health, and recovery, accept of them. Let the fulfilling and accomplishment of those things which the common nature hath determined, be unto thee as thy health. Accept then, and be pleased with whatsoever doth happen, though otherwise harsh and unpleasing, as tending to that end, to the health and welfare of the universe, and to Jove's happiness and prosperity. For this whatsoever it be, should not have been produced, had it not conduced to the good of the universe. For neither doth any ordinary particular nature bring anything to pass, that is not to whatsoever is within the sphere of its

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own proper administration and government agreeable and subordinate. For these two considerations then thou must be well pleased with anything that doth happen unto thee. First, because that for thee properly it was brought to pass, and unto thee it was prescribed ; and that from the very beginning by the series and connection of the first causes, it hath ever had a reference unto thee. And secondly, because the good success and perfect welfare, and indeed the very continuance of Him, that is the Administrator of the whole, doth in a manner depend on it. For the whole (because whole, therefore entire and perfect) is maimed, and mutilated, if thou shalt cut off anything at all, whereby the coherence, and contiguity as of parts, so of causes, is maintained and preserved. Of which certain it is, that thou doest (as much as lieth in thee) cut off, and in some sort violently take somewhat away, as often as thou art displeased with anything that happeneth.

IX. Be not discontented, be not disheartened, be not out of hope, if often it succeed not so well with thee punctually and precisely to do all things according to the right dogmata, but being once cast off, return unto them again : and as for those many and more frequent occurrences, either of worldly distractions, or human infirmities, which as a man thou canst not but in some measure be subject unto, be not thou discontented with them ; but however, love and affect that only which thou dost return unto : a philosopher's life, and proper occupation after the most exact manner. And when thou dost return to thy philosophy, return not unto it as the manner of some is, after play and liberty as it were, to their schoolmasters and pedagogues ; but as they that have sore eyes to their sponge and egg : or as another to his cataplasm ; or as others to their fomentations : so shalt not thou make it a matter of

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ostentation at all to obey reason ; but of ease and comfort. And remember that philosophy requireth nothing of thee, but what thy nature requireth, and wouldest thou thyself desire anything that is not according to nature ? for which of these sayest thou ; that which is according to nature or against it, is of itself more kind and pleasing ? Is it not for that respect especially, that pleasure itself is to so many men's hurt and overthrow, most prevalent, because esteemed commonly most kind, and natural ? But consider well whether magnanimity rather, and true liberty, and true simplicity, and equanimity, and holiness ; whether these be not most kind and natural ? And prudency itself, what more kind and amiable than it, when thou shalt truly consider with thyself, what it is through all the proper objects of thy rational intellectual faculty currently to go on without any fall or stumble ? As for the things of the world, their true nature is in a manner so involved with obscurity, that unto many philosophers, and those no mean ones, they seemed altogether incomprehensible : and the Stoicks themselves, though they judge them not altogether incomprehensible, yet scarce and not without much difficulty, comprehensible, so that all assent of ours is fallible, for who is he that is infallible in his conclusions ? From the nature of things, pass now unto their subjects and matter : how temporary, how vile are they ! such as may be in the power and possession of some abominable loose liver, of some common strumpet, of some notorious oppressor and extortioneer. Pass from thence to the dispositions of them that thou doest ordinarily converse with, how hardly do we bear, even with the most loving and amiable ! that I may not say, how hard it is for us to bear even with our own selves. In such obscurity, and impurity of things : in such and so continual a flux both of the substances and time ;

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both of the motions themselves, and things moved ; what it is that we can fasten upon ; either to honour, and respect especially ; or seriously, and studiously to seek after ; I cannot so much as conceive. For indeed they are things contrary.

X. Thou must comfort thyself in the expectation of thy natural dissolution, and in the meantime not grieve at the delay ; but rest contented in those two things. First, that nothing shall happen unto thee, which is not according to the nature of the universe. Secondly, that it is in thy power, to do nothing against thine own proper God, and inward spirit. For it is not in any man's power to constrain thee to transgress against him.

XI. What is the use that now at this present I make of my soul ? Thus from time to time and upon all occasions thou must put this question to thyself, what is now that part of mine which they call the rational mistress part, employed about ? Whose soul do I now properly possess ? a child's ? or a youth's ? a woman's ? or a tyrant's ? some brute, or some wild beast's soul ?

XII. What those things are in themselves, which by the greatest part are esteemed good, thou mayest gather even from this. For if a man shall hear things mentioned as good, which are really good indeed, such as are prudence, temperance, justice, fortitude ; after so much heard and conceived, he cannot endure to hear of any more, for the word good is properly spoken of them. But as for those which by the vulgar are esteemed good, if he shall hear them mentioned as good, he doth hearken for more. He is well contented to hear, that what is spoken by the comedian, is but familiarly and popularly spoken, so that even the vulgar apprehend the difference. For why is it else, that this offends not and needs not to be excused, when virtues are

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styled good : but that which is spoken in commendation of wealth, pleasure, or honour, we entertain it only as merrily and pleasantly spoken? Proceed therefore, and inquire further, whether it may not be that those things also which being mentioned upon the stage were merrily, and with great applause of the multitude, scoffed at with this jest, that they that possessed them, had not in all the world of their own, (such was their affluence and plenty) so much as a place where to avoid their excrements. Whether, I say, those ought not also in very deed to be much respected, and esteemed of, as the only things that are truly good.

XIII. All that I consist of, is either form or matter. No corruption can reduce either of these unto nothing : for neither did I of nothing become a subsistent creature. Every part of mine then, will by mutation be disposed into a certain part of the whole world, and that in time into another part ; and so *in infinitum* ; by which kind of mutation, I also became what I am, and so did they that begot me, and they before them, and so upwards *in infinitum*. For so we may be allowed to speak, though the age and government of the world, be to some certain periods of time limited, and confined.

XIV. Reason, and rational power, are faculties which content themselves with themselves, and their own proper operations. And as for their first inclination and motion, that they take from themselves. But their progress is right to the end and object, which is in their way, as it were, and lieth just before them : that is, which is feasible and possible, whether it be that which at the first they proposed to themselves, or no. For which reason also such actions are termed *κατορθώσεις*, to intimate the directness of the way, by which they are achieved. Nothing must be thought to belong to a man, which doth not belong unto him as he

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is a man. These, the event of purposes, are not things required in a man. The nature of man doth not profess any such things. The final ends and consummations of actions are nothing at all to a man's nature. The end therefore of a man, or the *summum bonum* whereby that end is fulfilled, cannot consist in the consummation of actions purposed and intended. Again, concerning these outward worldly things, were it so that any of them did properly belong unto man, then would it not belong unto man, to condemn them and to stand in opposition with them. Neither would he be praiseworthy that can live without them ; or he good, (if these were good indeed) who of his own accord doth deprive himself of any of them. But we see contrariwise, that the more a man doth withdraw himself from these wherein external pomp and greatness doth consist, or any other like these ; or the better he doth bear with the loss of these, the better he is accounted.

XV. Such as thy thoughts and ordinary cogitations are, such will thy mind be in time. For the soul doth as it were receive its tincture from the fancies, and imaginations. Dye it therefore and thoroughly soak it with the assiduity of these cogitations. As for example. Wheresoever thou mayest live, there it is in thy power to live well and happy. But thou mayest live at the Court, there then also mayest thou live well and happy. Again, that which everything is made for, he is also made unto that, and cannot but naturally incline unto it. That which anything doth naturally incline unto, therein is his end. Wherein the end of everything doth consist, therein also doth his good and benefit consist. Society therefore is the proper good of a rational creature. For that we are made for society, it hath long since been demonstrated. Or can any man make any question of this, that whatsoever is naturally worse and

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inferior, is ordinarily subordinated to that which is better ? and that those things that are best, are made one for another ? And those things that have souls, are better than those that have none ? and of those that have, those best that have rational souls ?

XVI. To desire things impossible is the part of a mad man. But it is a thing impossible, that wicked man should not commit some such things. Neither doth anything happen to any man, which in the ordinary course of nature as natural unto him doth not happen. Again, the same things happen unto others also. And truly, if either he that is ignorant that such a thing hath happened unto him, or he that is ambitious to be commended for his magnanimity, can be patient, and is not grieved : is it not a grievous thing, that either ignorance, or a vain desire to please and to be commended, should be more powerful and effectual than true prudence ? As for the things themselves, they touch not the soul, neither can they have any access unto it : neither can they of themselves any ways either affect it, or move it. For she herself alone can affect and move herself, and according as the dogmata and opinions are, which she doth vouchsafe herself, so are those things which, as accessories, have any co-existence with her.

XVII. After one consideration, man is nearest unto us ; as we are bound to do them good, and to bear with them. But as he may oppose any of our true proper actions, so man is unto me but as a thing indifferent : even as the sun, or the wind, or some wild beast. By some of these it may be, that some operation or other of mine, may be hindered ; however, of my mind and resolution itself, there can be no let or impediment, by reason of that ordinary constant both exception (or reservation wherewith it inclineth) and ready conversion of objects ; from that which may not be, to that

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which may be, which in the prosecution of its inclinations, as occasion serves, it doth observe. For by these the mind doth turn and convert any impediment whatsoever, to be her aim and purpose. So that what before was the impediment, is now the principal object of her working ; and that which before was in her way, is now her readiest way.

XVIII. Honour that which is chiefest and most powerful in the world, and that is it, which makes use of all things, and governs all things. So also in thyself, honour that which is chiefest, and most powerful ; and is of one kind and nature with that which we now spake of. For it is the very same, which being in thee, turneth all other things to its own use, and by whom also thy life is governed.

XIX. That which doth not hurt the city itself, cannot hurt any citizen. This rule thou must remember to apply and make use of upon every conceit and apprehension of wrong. If the whole city be not hurt by this, neither am I certainly. And if the whole be not, why should I make it my private grievance ? consider rather what it is wherein he is overseen that is thought to have done the wrong. Again, often meditate how swiftly all things that subsist, and all things that are done in the world, are carried away, and as it were conveyed out of sight : for both the substance themselves, we see as a flood, are in a continual flux ; and all actions in a perpetual change ; and the causes themselves, subject to a thousand alterations, neither is there anything almost, that may ever be said to be now settled and constant. Next unto this, and which follows upon it, consider both the infiniteness of the time already past, and the immense vastness of that which is to come, wherein all things are to be resolved and annihilated. Art not thou then a very fool, who for these things, art either puffed up

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with pride, or distracted with cares, or canst find in thy heart to make such moans as for a thing that would trouble thee for a very long time? Consider the whole universe, whereof thou art but a very little part, and the whole age of the world together, whereof but a short and very momentary portion is allotted unto thee, and all the fates and destinies together, of which how much is it that comes to thy part and share! Again: another doth trespass against me. Let him look to that. He is master of his own disposition, and of his own operation. I for my part am in the meantime in possession of as much, as the common nature would have me to possess: and that which mine own nature would have me do, I do.

XX. Let not that chief commanding part of thy soul be ever subject to any variation through any corporal either pain or pleasure, neither suffer it to be mixed with these, but let it both circumscribe itself, and confine those affections to their own proper parts and members. But if at any time they do reflect and rebound upon the mind and understanding (as in an united and compacted body it must needs;) then must thou not go about to resist sense and feeling, it being natural. However let not thy understanding to this natural sense and feeling, which whether unto our flesh pleasant or painful, is unto us nothing properly, add an opinion of either good or bad and all is well.

XXI. To live with the Gods. He liveth with the Gods, who at all times affords unto them the spectacle of a soul, both contented and well pleased with whatsoever is afforded, or allotted unto her; and performing whatsoever is pleasing to that Spirit, whom (being part of himself) Jove hath appointed to every man as his overseer and governor.

XXII. Be not angry neither with him whose breath, neither with him whose arm holes, are offensive. What

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can he do? such is his breath naturally, and such are his arm holes; and from such, such an effect, and such a smell must of necessity proceed. ‘O, but the man (sayest thou) hath understanding in him, and might of himself know, that he by standing near, cannot choose but offend.’ And thou also (God bless thee!) hast understanding. Let thy reasonable faculty, work upon his reasonable faculty; show him his fault, admonish him. If he hearken unto thee, thou hast cured him, and there will be no more occasion of anger.

XXIII. ‘Where there shall neither roarer be, nor harlot.’ Why so? As thou dost purpose to live, when thou hast retired thyself to some such place, where neither roarer nor harlot is: so mayest thou here. And if they will not suffer thee, then mayest thou leave thy life rather than thy calling, but so as one that doth not think himself anyways wronged. Only as one would say, Here is a smoke; I will out of it. And what a great matter is this! Now till some such thing force me out, I will continue free; neither shall any man hinder me to do what I will, and my will shall ever be by the proper nature of a reasonable and sociable creature, regulated and directed.

XXIV. That rational essence by which the universe is governed, is for community and society; and therefore hath it both made the things that are worse, for the best, and hath allied and knit together those which are best, as it were in an harmony. Seest thou not how it hath subordinated, and co-ordinated? and how it hath distributed unto everything according to its worth? and those which have the pre-eminency and superiority above all, hath it united together, into a mutual consent and agreement.

XXV. How hast thou carried thyself hitherto towards the Gods? towards thy parents? towards thy brethren? towards thy wife? towards thy children? towards thy

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masters? thy foster-fathers? thy friends? thy domestics? thy servants? Is it so with thee, that hitherto thou hast neither by word or deed wronged any of them? Remember withal through how many things thou hast already passed, and how many thou hast been able to endure; so that now the legend of thy life is full, and thy charge is accomplished. Again, how many truly good things have certainly by thee been discerned? how many pleasures, how many pains hast thou passed over with contempt? how many things externally glorious hast thou despised? towards how many perverse unreasonable men hast thou carried thyself kindly, and discreetly?

**XXVI.** Why should imprudent unlearned souls trouble that which is both learned, and prudent? And which is that that is so? she that understandeth the beginning and the end, and hath the true knowledge of that rational essence, that passeth through all things subsisting, and through all ages being ever the same, disposing and dispensing as it were this universe by certain periods of time.

**XXVII.** Within a very little while, thou wilt be either ashes, or a sceletum; and a name perchance; and perchance, not so much as a name. And what is that but an empty sound, and a rebounding echo? Those things which in this life are dearest unto us, and of most account, they are in themselves but vain, putrid, contemptible. The most weighty and serious, if rightly esteemed, but as puppies, biting one another: or untoward children, now laughing and then crying. As for faith, and modesty, and justice, and truth, they long since, as one of the poets hath it, have abandoned this spacious earth, and retired themselves unto heaven. What is it then that doth keep thee here, if things sensible be so mutable and unsettled? and the senses so obscure, and so fallible? and our souls nothing

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but an exhalation of blood? and to be in credit among such, be but vanity? What is it that thou dost stay for? an extinction, or a translation; either of them with a propitious and contented mind. But till that time come, what will content thee? what else, but to worship and praise the Gods; and to do good unto men. To bear with them, and to forbear to do them any wrong. And for all external things belonging either to this thy wretched body, or life, to remember that they are neither thine, nor in thy power.

XXVIII. Thou mayest always speed, if thou wilt but make choice of the right way; if in the course both of thine opinions and actions, thou wilt observe a true method. These two things be common to the souls, as of God, so of men, and of every reasonable creature, first that in their own proper work they cannot be hindered by anything: and secondly, that their happiness doth consist in a disposition to, and in the practice of righteousness; and that in these their desire is terminated.

XXIX. If this neither be my wicked act, nor an act anyways depending from any wickedness of mine, and that by it the public is not hurt; what doth it concern me? And wherein can the public be hurt? For thou must not altogether be carried by conceit and common opinion: as for help thou must afford that unto them after thy best ability, and as occasion shall require, though they sustain damage, but in these middle or worldly things; but however do not thou conceive that they are truly hurt thereby: for that is not right. But as that old foster-father in the comedy, being now to take his leave doth with a great deal of ceremony, require his foster-child's rhombus, or rattle-top, remembering nevertheless that it is but a rhombus; so here also do thou likewise. For indeed what is all

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this pleading and public bawling for at the courts ? O man, hast thou forgotten what those things are ! yea but they are things that others much care for, and highly esteem of. Wilt thou therefore be a fool too ? Once I was ; let that suffice.

XXX. Let death surprise me when it will, and where it will, I may be *eūμοιρος*, or a happy man, nevertheless.

For he is a happy man, who in his lifetime dealeth unto himself a happy lot and portion. A happy lot and portion is, good inclinations of the soul, good desires, good actions.



## The Sixth Book



HE matter itself, of which the universe doth consist, is of itself very tractable and pliable. That rational essence that doth govern it, hath in itself no cause to do evil. It hath no evil in itself, neither can it do anything that is evil: neither can anything be hurt by it. And all things are done and determined according to its will and prescript.

II. Be it all one unto thee, whether half frozen or well warm; whether only slumbering, or after a full sleep; whether discommended or commended thou do thy duty: or whether dying or doing somewhat else; for that also ‘to die,’ must among the rest be reckoned as one of the duties and actions of our lives.

III. Look in, let not either the proper quality, or the true worth of anything pass thee, before thou hast fully apprehended it.

IV. All substances come soon to their change, and either they shall be resolved by way of exhalation (if so be that all things shall be reunited into one substance), or as others maintain, they shall be scattered and dispersed. As for that Rational Essence by which all things are governed, as it best understandeth itself, both its own disposition, and what it doth, and what matter it hath to do with and accordingly doth all things; so we that do not, no wonder, if we wonder at many things, the reasons whereof we cannot comprehend.







MARCVS AVRELIVS  
*preparing to offer sacrifice.*



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V. The best kind of revenge is, not to become like unto them.

VI. Let this be thy only joy, and thy only comfort, from one sociable kind action without intermission to pass unto another, God being ever in thy mind.

VII. The rational commanding part, as it alone can stir up and turn itself; so it maketh both itself to be, and everything that happeneth, to appear unto itself, as it will itself.

VIII. According to the nature of the universe all things particular are determined, not according to any other nature, either about compassing and containing; or within, dispersed and contained; or without, depending. Either this universe is a mere confused mass, and an intricate context of things, which shall in time be scattered and dispersed again: or it is an union consisting of order, and administered by Providence. If the first, why should I desire to continue any longer in this fortuit confusion and commixtion? or why should I take care for anything else, but that as soon as may be I may be earth again? And why should I trouble myself any more whilst I seek to please the Gods? Whatsoever I do, dispersion is my end, and will come upon me whether I will or no. But if the latter be, then am not I religious in vain; then will I be quiet and patient, and put my trust in Him, who is the Governor of all.

IX. Whensoever by some present hard occurrences thou art constrained to be in some sort troubled and vexed, return unto thyself as soon as may be, and be not out of tune longer than thou must needs. For so shalt thou be the better able to keep thy part another time, and to maintain the harmony, if thou dost use thyself to this continually; once out, presently to have recourse unto it, and to begin again.

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X. If it were that thou hadst at one time both a step-mother, and a natural mother living, thou wouldest honour and respect her also ; nevertheless to thine own natural mother would thy refuge, and recourse be continually. So let the court and thy philosophy be unto thee. Have recourse unto it often, and comfort thyself in her, by whom it is that those other things are made tolerable unto thee, and thou also in those things not intolerable unto others.

XI. How marvellous useful it is for a man to represent unto himself meats, and all such things that are for the mouth, under a right apprehension and imagination ! as for example : This is the carcass of a fish ; this of a bird ; and this of a hog. And again more generally ; This phaleratum, this excellent highly commended wine, is but the bare juice of an ordinary grape. This purple robe, but sheep's hairs, dyed with the blood of a shell-fish. So for coitus, it is but the attrition of an ordinary base entrail, and the excretion of a little vile snivel, with a certain kind of convulsion : according to Hippocrates his opinion. How excellent useful are these lively fancies and representations of things, thus penetrating and passing through the objects, to make their true nature known and apparent ! This must thou use all thy life long, and upon all occasions : and then especially, when matters are apprehended as of great worth and respect, thy art and care must be to uncover them, and to behold their vileness, and to take away from them all those serious circumstances and expressions, under which they made so grave a show. For outward pomp and appearance is a great juggler ; and then especially art thou most in danger to be beguiled by it, when (to a man's thinking) thou most seemest to be employed about matters of moment.

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XII. See what Crates pronounceth concerning Xenocrates himself.

XIII. Those things which the common sort of people do admire, are most of them such things as are very general, and may be comprehended under things merely natural, or naturally affected and qualified : as stones, wood, figs, vines, olives. Those that be admired by them that are more moderate and restrained, are comprehended under things animated : as flocks and herds. Those that are yet more gentle and curious, their admiration is commonly confined to reasonable creatures only ; not in general as they are reasonable, but as they are capable of art, or of some craft and subtle invention : or perchance barely to reasonable creatures ; as they that delight in the possession of many slaves. But he that honours a reasonable soul in general, as it is reasonable and naturally sociable, doth little regard anything else : and above all things is careful to preserve his own, in the continual habit and exercise both of reason and sociableness : and thereby doth co-operate with him, of whose nature he doth also participate ; God.

XIV. Some things hasten to be, and others to be no more. And even whatsoever now is, some part thereof hath already perished. Perpetual fluxes and alterations renew the world, as the perpetual course of time doth make the age of the world (of itself infinite) to appear always fresh and new. In such a flux and course of all things, what of these things that hasten so fast away should any man regard, since among all there is not any that a man may fasten and fix upon ? as if a man would settle his affection upon some ordinary sparrow flying by him, who is no sooner seen, than out of sight. For we must not think otherwise of our lives, than as a mere exhalation of blood, or of an ordinary respiration of air. For what in our com-

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mon apprehension is, to breathe in the air and to breathe it out again, which we do daily : so much is it and no more, at once to breathe out all thy respirative faculty into that common air from whence but lately (as being but from yesterday, and to-day), thou didst first breathe it in, and with it, life.

XV. Not vegetative spiration, it is not surely (which plants have) that in this life should be so dear unto us ; nor sensitive respiration, the proper life of beasts, both tame and wild ; nor this our imaginative faculty ; nor that we are subject to be led and carried up and down by the strength of our sensual appetites ; or that we can gather, and live together ; or that we can feed : for that in effect is no better, than that we can void the excrements of our food. What is it then that should be dear unto us ? to hear a clattering noise ? if not that, then neither to be applauded by the tongues of men. For the praises of many tongues, is in effect no better than the clattering of so many tongues. If then neither applause, what is there remaining that should be dear unto thee ? This I think : that in all thy motions and actions thou be moved, and restrained according to thine own true natural constitution and construction only. And to this even ordinary arts and professions do lead us. For it is that which every art doth aim at, that whatsoever it is, that is by art effected and prepared, may be fit for that work that it is prepared for. This is the end that he that dresseth the vine, and he that takes upon him either to tame colts, or to train up dogs, doth aim at. What else doth the education of children, and all learned professions tend unto ? Certainly then it is that, which should be dear unto us also. If in this particular it go well with thee, care not for the obtaining of other things. But is it so, that thou canst not but respect other

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things also ? Then canst not thou truly be free ? then canst thou not have self-content : then wilt thou ever be subject to passions. For it is not possible, but that thou must be envious, and jealous, and suspicious of them whom thou knowest can bereave thee of such things ; and again, a secret underminer of them, whom thou seest in present possession of that which is dear unto thee. To be short, he must of necessity be full of confusion within himself, and often accuse the Gods, whosoever stands in need of these things. But if thou shalt honour and respect thy mind only, that will make thee acceptable towards thyself, towards thy friends very tractable ; and conformable and concordant with the Gods ; that is, accepting with praises whatsoever they shall think good to appoint and allot unto thee.

XVI. Under, above, and about, are the motions of the elements ; but the motion of virtue, is none of those motions, but is somewhat more excellent and divine. Whose way (to speed and prosper in it) must be through a way, that is not easily comprehended.

XVII. Who can choose but wonder at them ? They will not speak well of them that are at the same time with them, and live with them ; yet they themselves are very ambitious, that they that shall follow, whom they have never seen, nor shall ever see, should speak well of them. As if a man should grieve that he hath not been commended by them, that lived before him.

XVIII. Do not ever conceive anything impossible to man, which by thee cannot, or not without much difficulty be effected ; but whatsoever in general thou canst conceive possible and proper unto any man, think that very possible unto thee also.

XIX. Suppose that at the palestra somebody hath all

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to-torn thee with his nails, and hath broken thy head. Well, thou art wounded. Yet thou dost not exclaim ; thou art not offended with him. Thou dost not suspect him for it afterwards, as one that watcheth to do thee a mischief. Yea even then, though thou dost thy best to save thyself from him, yet not from him as an enemy. It is not by way of any suspicious indignation, but by way of gentle and friendly declination. Keep the same mind and disposition in other parts of thy life also. For many things there be, which we must conceit and apprehend, as though we had had to do with an antagonist at the palestra. For as I said, it is very possible for us to avoid and decline, though we neither suspect, nor hate.

XX. If anybody shall reprove me, and shall make it apparent unto me, that in any either opinion or action of mine I do err, I will most gladly retract. For it is the truth that I seek after, by which I am sure that never any man was hurt ; and as sure, that he is hurt that continueth in any error, or ignorance whatsoever.

XXI. I for my part will do what belongs unto me ; as for other things, whether things unsensible or things irrational ; or if rational, yet deceived and ignorant of the true way, they shall not trouble or distract me. For as for those creatures which are not endued with reason, and all other things and matters of the world whatsoever, I freely, and generously, as one endued with reason, of things that have none, make use of them. And as for men, towards them as naturally partakers of the same reason, my care is to carry myself sociably. But whatsoever it is that thou art about, remember to call upon the Gods. And as for the time how long thou shalt live to do these things, let it be altogether indifferent unto thee, for even three such hours are sufficient.

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XXII. Alexander of Macedon, and he that dressed his mules, when once dead both came to one. For either they were both resumed into those original rational essences from whence all things in the world are propagated ; or both after one fashion were scattered into atoms.

XXIII. Consider how many different things, whether they concern our bodies, or our souls, in a moment of time come to pass in every one of us, and so thou wilt not wonder if many more things or rather all things that are done, can at one time subsist, and coexist in that both one and general, which we call the world.

XXIV. If any should put this question unto thee, how this word Antoninus is written, wouldst thou not presently fix thine intention upon it, and utter out in order every letter of it ? And if any shall begin to gainsay thee, and quarrel with thee about it ; wilt thou quarrel with him again, or rather go on meekly as thou hast begun, until thou hast numbered out every letter ? Here then likewise remember, that every duty that belongs unto a man doth consist of some certain letters or numbers as it were, to which without any noise or tumult keeping thyself, thou must orderly proceed to thy proposed end, forbearing to quarrel with him that would quarrel and fall out with thee.

XXV. Is it not a cruel thing to forbid men to affect those things, which they conceive to agree best with their own natures, and to tend most to their own proper good and behoof ? But thou after a sort deniest them this liberty, as often as thou art angry with them for their sins. For surely they are led unto those sins whatsoever they be, as to their proper good and commodity. But it is not so (thou wilt object perchance). Thou therefore teach them better, and make it appear unto them : but be not thou angry with them.

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**XXVI.** Death is a cessation from the impression of the senses, the tyranny of the passions, the errors of the mind, and the servitude of the body.

**XXVII.** If in this kind of life thy body be able to hold out, it is a shame that thy soul should faint first, and give over. Take heed, lest of a philosopher thou become a mere Cæsar in time, and receive a new tincture from the court. For it may happen if thou dost not take heed. Keep thyself therefore, truly simple, good, sincere, grave, free from all ostentation, a lover of that which is just, religious, kind, tender-hearted, strong and vigorous to undergo anything that becomes thee. Endeavour to continue such, as philosophy (hadst thou wholly and constantly applied thyself unto it) would have made, and secured thee. Worship the Gods, procure the welfare of men, this life is short. Charitable actions, and a holy disposition, is the only fruit of this earthly life.

**XXVIII.** Do all things as becometh the disciple of Antoninus Pius. Remember his resolute constancy in things that were done by him according to reason, his equability in all things, his sanctity ; the cheerfulness of his countenance, his sweetness, and how free he was from all vainglory ; how careful to come to the true and exact knowledge of matters in hand, and how he would by no means give over till he did fully, and plainly understand the whole state of the business ; and how patiently, and without any contestation he would bear with them, that did unjustly condemn him : how he would never be over-hasty in anything, nor give ear to slanders and false accusations, but examine and observe with best diligence the several actions and dispositions of men. Again, how he was no backbiter, nor easily frightened, nor suspicious, and in his language free from all affectation and curiosity : and how easily he

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would content himself with few things, as lodging, bedding, clothing, and ordinary nourishment, and attendance. How able to endure labour, how patient ; able through his spare diet to continue from morning to evening without any necessity of withdrawing before his accustomed hours to the necessities of nature : his uniformity and constancy in matter of friendship. How he would bear with them that with all boldness and liberty opposed his opinions ; and even rejoice if any man could better advise him : and lastly, how religious he was without superstition. All these things of him remember, that whosoever thy last hour shall come upon thee, it may find thee, as it did him, ready for it in the possession of a good conscience.

XXIX. Stir up thy mind, and recall thy wits again from thy natural dreams, and visions, and when thou art perfectly awoken, and canst perceive that they were but dreams that troubled thee, as one newly awakened out of another kind of sleep look upon these worldly things with the same mind as thou didst upon those, that thou sawest in thy sleep.

XXX. I consist of body and soul. Unto my body all things are indifferent, for of itself it cannot affect one thing more than another with apprehension of any difference ; as for my mind, all things which are not within the verge of her own operation, are indifferent unto her, and for her own operations, those altogether depend of her ; neither does she busy herself about any, but those that are present ; for as for future and past operations, those also are now at this present indifferent unto her.

XXXI. As long as the foot doth that which belongeth unto it to do, and the hand that which belongs unto it, their labour, whatsoever it be, is not unnatural. So a man as long as he doth that which is proper unto a man, his labour

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cannot be against nature ; and if it be not against nature, then neither is it hurtful unto him. But if it were so that happiness did consist in pleasure : how came notorious robbers, impure abominable livers, parricides, and tyrants, in so large a measure to have their part of pleasures ?

**XXXII.** Dost thou not see, how even those that profess mechanic arts, though in some respect they be no better than mere idiots, yet they stick close to the course of their trade, neither can they find in their heart to decline from it : and is it not a grievous thing that an architect, or a physician shall respect the course and mysteries of their profession, more than a man the proper course and condition of his own nature, reason, which is common to him and to the Gods ?

**XXXIII.** Asia, Europe ; what are they, but as corners of the whole world ; of which the whole sea, is but as one drop ; and the great Mount Athos, but as a clod, as all present time is but as one point of eternity. All, petty things ; all things that are soon altered, soon perished. And all things come from one beginning ; either all severally and particularly deliberated and resolved upon, by the general ruler and governor of all ; or all by necessary consequence. So that the dreadful hiatus of a gaping lion, and all poison, and all hurtful things, are but (as the thorn and the mire) the necessary consequences of goodly fair things. Think not of these therefore, as things contrary to those which thou dost much honour, and respect ; but consider in thy mind the true fountain of all.

**XXXIV.** He that seeth the things that are now, hath seen all that either was ever, or ever shall be, for all things are of one kind ; and all like one unto another. Meditate often upon the connection of all things in the world ; and upon the mutual relation that they have one unto another.

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For all things are after a sort folded and involved one within another, and by these means all agree well together. For one thing is consequent unto another, by local motion, by natural conspiration and agreement, and by substantial union, or, reduction of all substances into one.

XXXV. Fit and accommodate thyself to that estate and to those occurrences, which by the destinies have been annexed unto thee ; and love those men whom thy fate it is to live with ; but love them truly. An instrument, a tool, an utensil, whatsoever it be, if it be fit for the purpose it was made for, it is as it should be, though he perchance that made and fitted it, be out of sight and gone. But in things natural, that power which hath framed and fitted them, is and abideth within them still : for which reason she ought also the more to be respected, and we are the more obliged (if we may live and pass our time according to her purpose and intention) to think that all is well with us, and according to our own minds. After this manner also, and in this respect it is, that he that is all in all doth enjoy his happiness.

XXXVI. What things soever are not within the proper power and jurisdiction of thine own will either to compass or avoid, if thou shalt propose unto thyself any of those things as either good, or evil ; it must needs be that according as thou shalt either fall into that which thou dost think evil, or miss of that which thou dost think good, so wilt thou be ready both to complain of the Gods, and to hate those men, who either shall be so indeed, or shall by thee be suspected as the cause either of thy missing of the one, or falling into the other. And indeed we must needs commit many evils, if we incline to any of these things, more or less, with an opinion of any difference. But if we mind and fancy those things only, as good and bad, which

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wholly depend of our own wills, there is no more occasion why we should either murmur against the Gods, or be at enmity with any man.

XXXVII. We all work to one effect, some willingly, and with a rational apprehension of what we do : others without any such knowledge. As I think Heraclitus in a place speaketh of them that sleep, that even they do work in their kind, and do confer to the general operations of the world. One man therefore doth co-operate after one sort, and another after another sort ; but even he that doth murmur, and to his power doth resist and hinder ; even he as much as any doth co-operate. For of such also did the world stand in need. Now do thou consider among which of these thou wilt rank thyself. For as for him who is the Administrator of all, he will make good use of thee whether thou wilt or no, and make thee (as a part and member of the whole) so to co-operate with him, that whatsoever thou doest, shall turn to the furtherance of his own counsels, and resolutions. But be not thou for shame such a part of the whole, as that vile and ridiculous verse (which Chrysippus in a place doth mention) is a part of the comedy.

XXXVIII. Doth either the sun take upon him to do that which belongs to the rain ? or his son Æsculapius that, which unto the earth doth properly belong ? How is it with every one of the stars in particular ? Though they all differ one from another, and have their several charges and functions by themselves, do they not all nevertheless concur and co-operate to one end ?

XXXIX. If so be that the Gods have deliberated in particular of those things that should happen unto me, I must stand to their deliberation, as discrete and wise. For that a God should be an imprudent God, is a thing hard even to conceive : and why should they resolve to do me hurt ? for

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what profit either unto them or the universe (which they specially take care for) could arise from it? But if so be that they have not deliberated of me in particular, certainly they have of the whole in general, and those things which in consequence and coherence of this general deliberation happen unto me in particular, I am bound to embrace and accept of. But if so be that they have not deliberated at all (which indeed is very irreligious for any man to believe : for then let us neither sacrifice, nor pray, nor respect our oaths, neither let us any more use any of those things, which we persuaded of the presence and secret conversation of the Gods among us, daily use and practise :) but, I say, if so be that they have not indeed either in general, or particular deliberated of any of those things, that happen unto us in this world ; yet God be thanked, that of those things that concern myself, it is lawful for me to deliberate myself, and all my deliberation is but concerning that which may be to me most profitable. Now that unto every one is most profitable, which is according to his own constitution and nature. And my nature is, to be rational in all my actions and as a good, and natural member of a city and commonwealth, towards my fellow members ever to be sociably and kindly disposed and affected. My city and country as I am Antoninus, is Rome ; as a man, the whole world. Those things therefore that are expedient and profitable to those cities, are the only things that are good and expedient for me.

XL. Whatsoever in any kind doth happen to any one, is expedient to the whole. And thus much to content us might suffice, that it is expedient for the whole in general. But yet this also shalt thou generally perceive, if thou dost diligently take heed, that whatsoever doth happen to any one man or men. . . . And now I am content that the word expedient, should more generally be understood of

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those things which we otherwise call middle things, or things indifferent ; as health, wealth, and the like.

XLI. As the ordinary shows of the theatre and of other such places, when thou art presented with them, affect thee ; as the same things still seen, and in the same fashion, make the sight ingrateful and tedious ; so must all the things that we see all our life long affect us. For all things, above and below, are still the same, and from the same causes. When then will there be an end ?

XLII. Let the several deaths of men of all sorts, and of all sorts of professions, and of all sort of nations, be a perpetual object of thy thoughts, . . . so that thou mayst even come down to Philistio, Phœbus, and Origanion. Pass now to other generations. Thither shall we after many changes, where so many brave orators are ; where so many grave philosophers ; Heraclitus, Pythagoras, Socrates. Where so many heroes of the old times ; and then so many brave captains of the latter times ; and so many kings. After all these, where Eudoxus, Hipparchus, Archimedes ; where so many other sharp, generous, industrious, subtile, peremptory dispositions ; and among others, even they, that have been the greatest scoffers and deriders of the frailty and brevity of this our human life ; as Menippus, and others, as many as there have been such as he. Of all these consider, that they long since are all dead, and gone. And what do they suffer by it ! Nay they that have not so much as a name remaining, what are they the worse for it ? One thing there is, and that only, which is worth our while in this world, and ought by us much to be esteemed ; and that is, according to truth and righteousness, meekly and lovingly to converse with false, and unrighteous men.

XLIII. When thou wilt comfort and cheer thyself, call to mind the several gifts and virtues of them, whom thou

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dost daily converse with ; as for example, the industry of the one ; the modesty of another ; the liberality of a third ; of another some other thing. For nothing can so much rejoice thee, as the resemblances and parallels of several virtues, visible and eminent in the dispositions of those who live with thee ; especially when, all at once, as near as may be, they represent themselves unto thee. And therefore thou must have them always in a readiness.

XLIV. Dost thou grieve that thou dost weigh but so many pounds, and not three hundred rather ? Just as much reason hast thou to grieve that thou must live but so many years, and not longer. For as for bulk and substance thou dost content thyself with that proportion of it that is allotted unto thee, so shouldst thou for time.

XLV. Let us do our best endeavours to persuade them ; but however, if reason and justice lead thee to it, do it, though they be never so much against it. But if any shall by force withstand thee, and hinder thee in it, convert thy virtuous inclination from one object unto another, from justice to contented equanimity, and cheerful patience : so that what in the one is thy hindrance, thou mayst make use of it for the exercise of another virtue : and remember that it was with due exception, and reservation, that thou didst at first incline and desire. For thou didst not set thy mind upon things impossible. Upon what then ? that all thy desires might ever be moderated with this due kind of reservation. And this thou hast, and mayst always obtain, whether the thing desired be in thy power or no. And what do I care for more, if that for which I was born and brought forth into the world (to rule all my desires with reason and discretion) may be ?

XLVI. The ambitious supposeth another man's act, praise and applause, to be his own happiness ; the voluptuous

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his own sense and feeling ; but he that is wise, his own action.

XLVII. It is in thy power absolutely to exclude all manner of conceit and opinion, as concerning this matter ; and by the same means, to exclude all grief and sorrow from thy soul. For as for the things and objects themselves, they of themselves have no such power, whereby to beget and force upon us any opinion at all.

XLVIII. Use thyself when any man speaks unto thee, so to hearken unto him, as that in the interim thou give not way to any other thoughts ; that so thou mayst (as far as is possible) seem fixed and fastened to his very soul, whosoever he be that speaks unto thee.

XLIX. That which is not good for the bee-hive, cannot be good for the bee.

L. Will either passengers, or patients, find fault and complain, either the one if they be well carried, or the others if well cured ? Do they take care for any more than this ; the one, that their shipmaster may bring them safe to land, and the other, that their physician may effect their recovery ?

L.I. How many of them who came into the world at the same time when I did, are already gone out of it ?

LII. To them that are sick of the jaundice, honey seems bitter ; and to them that are bitten by a mad dog, the water terrible ; and to children, a little ball seems a fine thing. And why then should I be angry ? or do I think that error and false opinion is less powerful to make men transgress, than either choler, being immoderate and excessive, to cause the jaundice ; or poison, to cause rage ?

LIII. No man can hinder thee to live as thy nature:

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doth require. Nothing can happen unto thee, but what the common good of nature doth require.

LIV. What manner of men they be whom they seek  
to please, and what to get, and by what actions:  
how soon time will cover and bury all things,  
and how many it hath already buried !



## The Seventh Book



HAT is wickedness? It is that which many times and often thou hast already seen and known in the world. And so oft as anything doth happen that might otherwise trouble thee, let this memento presently come to thy mind, that it is that which thou hast already often seen and known. Generally, above and below, thou shalt find but the same things. The very same things whereof ancient stories, middle age stories, and fresh stories are full: whereof towns are full, and houses full. There is nothing that is new. All things that are, are both usual and of little continuance.

II. What fear is there that thy dogmata, or philosophical resolutions and conclusions, should become dead in thee, and lose their proper power and efficacy to make thee live happy, as long as those proper and correlative fancies, and representations of things on which they mutually depend (which continually to stir up and revive is in thy power,) are still kept fresh and alive? It is in my power concerning this thing that is happened, whatsoever it be, to conceit that which is right and true. If it be, why then am I troubled? Those things that are without my understanding, are nothing to it at all: and that is it only, which doth properly concern me. Be always in this mind, and thou wilt be right.

III. That which most men would think themselves

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most happy for, and would prefer before all things, if the Gods would grant it unto them after their deaths, thou mayst whilst thou livest grant unto thyself ; to live again. See the things of the world again, as thou hast already seen them. For what is it else to live again ? Public shows and solemnities with much pomp and vanity, stage plays, flocks and herds ; conflicts and contentions : a bone thrown to a company of hungry curs ; a bait for greedy fishes ; the painfulness, and continual burden-bearing of wretched ants, the running to and fro of terrified mice : little puppets drawn up and down with wires and nerves : these be the objects of the world. Among all these thou must stand steadfast, meekly affected, and free from all manner of indignation ; with this right ratiocination and apprehension ; that as the worth is of those things which a man doth affect, so is in very deed every man's worth more or less.

IV. Word after word, every one by itself, must the things that are spoken be conceived and understood ; and so the things that are done, purpose after purpose, every one by itself likewise. And as in matter of purposes and actions, we must presently see what is the proper use and relation of every one ; so of words must we be as ready, to consider of every one what is the true meaning, and signification of it according to truth and nature, however it be taken in common use.

V. Is my reason, and understanding sufficient for this, or no ? If it be sufficient, without any private applause, or public ostentation as of an instrument, which by nature I am provided of, I will make use of it for the work in hand, as of an instrument, which by nature I am provided of. If it be not, and that otherwise it belong not unto me particularly as a private duty, I will either give it over, and leave it to some other that can better effect it : or I will endeavour

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it ; but with the help of some other, who with the joint help of my reason, is able to bring somewhat to pass, that will now be seasonable and useful for the common good. For whatsoever I do either by myself, or with some other, the only thing that I must intend, is, that it be good and expedient for the public. For as for praise, consider how many who once were much commended, are now already quite forgotten, yea they that commended them, how even they themselves are long since dead and gone. Be not therefore ashamed, whensoever thou must use the help of others. For whatsoever it be that lieth upon thee to effect, thou must propose it unto thyself, as the scaling of walls is unto a soldier. And what if thou through either lameness or some other impediment art not able to reach unto the top of the battlements alone, which with the help of another thou mayst ; wilt thou therefore give it over, or go about it with less courage and alacrity, because thou canst not effect it all alone ?

VI. Let not things future trouble thee. For if necessity so require that they come to pass, thou shalt (whensoever that is) be provided for them with the same reason, by which whatsoever is now present, is made both tolerable and acceptable unto thee. All things are linked and knitted together, and the knot is sacred, neither is there anything in the world, that is not kind and natural in regard of any other thing, or, that hath not some kind of reference and natural correspondence with whatsoever is in the world besides. For all things are ranked together, and by that decency of its due place and order that each particular doth observe, they all concur together to the making of one and the same *κόσμος* or world : as if you said, a comely piece, or an orderly composition. For all things throughout, there is but one and the same order ; and through all things, one

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and the same God, the same substance and the same law. There is one common reason, and one common truth, that belongs unto all reasonable creatures, for neither is there save one perfection of all creatures that are of the same kind, and partakers of the same reason.

VII. Whatsoever is material, doth soon vanish away into the common substance of the whole ; and whatsoever is formal, or, whatsoever doth animate that which is material, is soon resumed into the common reason of the whole ; and the fame and memory of anything, is soon swallowed up by the general age and duration of the whole.

VIII. To a reasonable creature, the same action is both according to nature, and according to reason.

IX. Straight of itself, not made straight.

X. As several members in one body united, so are reasonable creatures in a body divided and dispersed, all made and prepared for one common operation. And this thou shalt apprehend the better, if thou shalt use thyself often to say to thyself, I am *μέλος*, or a member of the mass and body of reasonable substances. But if thou shalt say I am *μέρος*, or a part, thou dost not yet love men from thy heart. The joy that thou takest in the exercise of bounty, is not yet grounded upon a due ratiocination and right apprehension of the nature of things. Thou dost exercise it as yet upon this ground barely, as a thing convenient and fitting ; not, as doing good to thyself, when thou dost good unto others.

XI. Of things that are external, happen what will to that which can suffer by external accidents. Those things that suffer let them complain themselves, if they will ; as for me, as long as I conceive no such thing, that that which is happened is evil, I have no hurt ; and it is in my power not to conceive any such thing.

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XII. Whatsoever any man either doth or saith, thou must be good ; not for any man's sake, but for thine own nature's sake ; as if either gold, or the emerald, or purple, should ever be saying to themselves, Whatsoever any man either doth or saith, I must still be an emerald, and I must keep my colour.

XIII. This may ever be my comfort and security : my understanding, that ruleth over all, will not of itself bring trouble and vexation upon itself. This I say ; it will not put itself in any fear, it will not lead itself into any concupiscence. If it be in the power of any other to compel it to fear, or to grieve, it is free for him to use his power. But sure if itself do not of itself, through some false opinion or supposition incline itself to any such disposition ; there is no fear. For as for the body, why should I make the grief of my body, to be the grief of my mind ? If that itself can either fear or complain, let it. But as for the soul, which indeed, can only be truly sensible of either fear or grief ; to which only it belongs according to its different imaginations and opinions, to admit of either of these, or of their contraries ; thou mayst look to that thyself, that it suffer nothing. Induce her not to any such opinion or persuasion. The understanding is of itself sufficient unto itself, and needs not (if itself doth not bring itself to need) any other thing besides itself, and by consequent as it needs nothing, so neither can it be troubled or hindered by anything, if itself doth not trouble and hinder itself.

XIV. What is *εὐδαιμονία*, or happiness : but *ἀγαθὸς δαίμων*, or, a good dæmon, or spirit ? What then dost thou do here, O opinion ? By the Gods I adjure thee, that thou get thee gone, as thou camest : for I need thee not. Thou camest indeed unto me according to thy ancient wonted manner. It is that, that all men have ever been

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subject unto. That thou camest therefore I am not angry with thee, only begone, now that I have found thee what thou art.

XV. Is any man so foolish as to fear change, to which all things that once were not owe their being? And what is it, that is more pleasing and more familiar to the nature of the universe? How couldst thou thyself use thy ordinary hot baths, should not the wood that heateth them first be changed? How couldst thou receive any nourishment from those things that thou hast eaten, if they should not be changed? Can anything else almost (that is useful and profitable) be brought to pass without change? How then dost not thou perceive, that for thee also, by death, to come to change, is a thing of the very same nature, and as necessary for the nature of the universe?

XVI. Through the substance of the universe, as through a torrent pass all particular bodies, being all of the same nature, and all joint workers with the universe itself, as in one of our bodies so many members among themselves. How many such as Chrysippus, how many such as Socrates, how many such as Epictetus, hath the age of the world long since swallowed up and devoured? Let this, be it either men or businesses, that thou hast occasion to think of, to the end that thy thoughts be not distracted and thy mind too earnestly set upon anything, upon every such occasion presently come to thy mind. Of all my thoughts and cares, one only thing shall be the object, that I myself do nothing which to the proper constitution of man, (either in regard of the thing itself, or in regard of the manner, or of the time of doing,) is contrary. The time when thou shalt have forgotten all things, is at hand. And that time also is at hand, when thou thyself shalt be forgotten by all. Whilst thou art, apply thyself to that especially which unto

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man as he is a man, is most proper and agreeable, and that is, for a man even to love them that transgress against him. This shall be, if at the same time that any such thing doth happen, thou call to mind, that they are thy kinsmen ; that it is through ignorance and against their wills that they sin ; and that within a very short while after, both thou and he shall be no more. But above all things, that he hath not done thee any hurt ; for that by him thy mind and understanding is not made worse or more vile than it was before.

XVII. The nature of the universe, of the common substance of all things as it were of so much wax hath now perchance formed a horse ; and then, destroying that figure, hath new tempered and fashioned the matter of it into the form and substance of a tree : then that again into the form and substance of a man : and then that again into some other. Now every one of these doth subsist but for a very little while. As for dissolution, if it be no grievous thing to the chest or trunk, to be joined together ; why should it be more grievous to be put asunder ?

XVIII. An angry countenance is much against nature, and it is oftentimes the proper countenance of them that are at the point of death. But were it so, that all anger and passion were so thoroughly quenched in thee, that it were altogether impossible to kindle it any more, yet herein must not thou rest satisfied, but further endeavour by good consequence of true ratiocination, perfectly to conceive and understand, that all anger and passion is against reason. For if thou shalt not be sensible of thine innocence ; if that also shall be gone from thee, the comfort of a good conscience, that thou doest all things according to reason : what shouldest thou live any longer for ? All things that now thou seest, are but for a moment. That nature, by which all things in

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the world are administered, will soon bring change and alteration upon them, and then of their substances make other things like unto them : and then soon after others again of the matter and substance of these : that so by these means, the world may still appear fresh and new.

XIX. Whosoever any man doth trespass against thee, presently consider with thyself what it was that he did suppose to be good, what to be evil, when he did trespass. For this when thou knowest, thou wilt pity him ; thou wilt have no occasion either to wonder, or to be angry. For either thou thyself dost yet live in that error and ignorance, as that thou dost suppose either that very thing that he doth, or some other like worldly thing, to be good ; and so thou art bound to pardon him if he have done that which thou in the like case wouldest have done thyself. Or if so be that thou dost not any more suppose the same things to be good or evil, that he doth ; how canst thou but be gentle unto him that is in an error ?

XX. Fancy not to thyself things future, as though they were present : but of those that are present, take some aside, that thou takest most benefit of, and consider of them particularly, how wonderfully thou wouldest want them, if they were not present. But take heed withal, lest that whilst thou dost settle thy contentment in things present, thou grow in time so to overprize them, as that the want of them (whosoever it shall so fall out) should be a trouble and a vexation unto thee. Wind up thyself into thyself. Such is the nature of thy reasonable commanding part, as that if it exercise justice, and have by that means tranquillity within itself, it doth rest fully satisfied with itself without any other thing.

XXI. Wipe off all opinion : stay the force and violence of unreasonable lusts and affections : circumscribe the present

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time : examine whatsoever it be that is happened, either to thyself or to another : divide all present objects, either in that which is formal or material : think of the last hour. That which thy neighbour hath committed, where the guilt of it lieth, there let it rest. Examine in order whatsoever is spoken. Let thy mind penetrate, both into the effects, and into the causes. Rejoice thyself with true simplicity, and modesty ; and that all middle things between virtue and vice are indifferent unto thee. Finally, love mankind ; obey God.

XXII. All things (saith he) are by certain order and appointment. And what if the elements only. . . . It will suffice to remember, that all things in general are by certain order and appointment : or if it be but few. . . . And as concerning death, that either dispersion, or the atoms, or annihilation, or extinction, or translation will ensue. And as concerning pain, that that which is intolerable is soon ended by death ; and that which holds long must needs be tolerable ; and that the mind in the meantime (which is all in all) may by way of interclusion, or interception, by stopping all manner of commerce and sympathy with the body, still retain its own tranquillity. Thy understanding is not made worse by it. As for those parts that suffer, let them, if they can, declare their grief themselves. As for praise and commendation, view their mind and understanding, what estate they are in ; what kind of things they fly, and what things they seek after : and that as in the seaside, whatsoever was before to be seen, is by the continual succession of new heaps of sand cast up one upon another, soon hid and covered ; so in this life, all former things by those which immediately succeed.

XXIII. Out of Plato. ‘ He then whose mind is endowed with true magnanimity, who hath accustomed himself to the contemplation both of all times, and of all

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things in general; can this mortal life (thinkest thou) seem any great matter unto him? It is not possible, answered he. Then neither will such a one account death a grievous thing? By no means.'

XXIV. Out of Antisthenes. 'It is a princely thing to do well, and to be ill-spoken of. It is a shameful thing that the face should be subject unto the mind, to be put into what shape it will, and to be dressed by it as it will; and that the mind should not bestow so much care upon herself, as to fashion herself, and to dress herself as best becometh her.'

XXV. Out of several poets and comics. 'It will but little avail thee, to turn thine anger and indignation upon the things themselves that have fallen across unto thee. For as for them, they are not sensible of it, &c. Thou shalt but make thyself a laughing-stock; both unto the Gods and men, &c. Our life is reaped like a ripe ear of corn; one is yet standing and another is down, &c. But if so be that I and my children be neglected by the gods, there is some reason even for that, &c. As long as right and equity is of my side, &c. Not to lament with them, not to tremble, &c.'

XXVI. Out of Plato. 'My answer, full of justice and equity, should be this: Thy speech is not right, O man! if thou supposest that he that is of any worth at all, should apprehend either life or death, as a matter of great hazard and danger; and should not make this rather his only care, to examine his own actions, whether just or unjust: whether actions of a good, or of a wicked man, &c. For thus in very truth stands the case, O ye men of Athens. What place or station soever a man either hath chosen to himself, judging it best for himself; or is by lawful authority put and settled in, therein do I think

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(all appearance of danger notwithstanding) that he should continue, as one who feareth neither death, nor anything else, so much as he feareth to commit anything that is vicious and shameful, &c. But, O noble sir, consider I pray, whether true generosity and true happiness, do not consist in somewhat else rather, than in the preservation either of our, or other men's lives. For it is not the part of a man that is a man indeed, to desire to live long or to make much of his life whilst he liveth : but rather (he that is such) will in these things wholly refer himself unto the Gods, and believing that which every woman can tell him, that no man can escape death ; the only thing that he takes thought and care for is this, that what time he liveth, he may live as well and as virtuously as he can possibly, &c. To look about, and with the eyes to follow the course of the stars and planets, as though thou wouldest run with them ; and to mind perpetually the several changes of the elements one into another. For such fancies and imaginations, help much to purge away the dross and filth of this our earthly life,' &c. That also is a fine passage of Plato's, where he speaketh of worldly things in these words : 'Thou must also as from some higher place look down, as it were, upon the things of this world, as flocks, armies, husbandmen's labours, marriages, divorces, generations, deaths : the tumults of courts and places of judicatures ; desert places ; the several nations of barbarians, public festivals, mournings, fairs, markets.' How all things upon earth are pell-mell ; and how miraculously things contrary one to another, concur to the beauty and perfection of this universe.

XXVII. To look back upon things of former ages, as upon the manifold changes and conversions of several monarchies and commonwealths. We may also foresee things future, for they shall all be of the same kind ; neither

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is it possible that they should leave the tune, or break the concert that is now begun, as it were, by these things that are now done and brought to pass in the world. It comes all to one therefore, whether a man be a spectator of the things of this life but forty years, or whether he see them ten thousand years together : for what shall he see more ? ‘And as for those parts that came from the earth, they shall return unto the earth again ; and those that came from heaven, they also shall return unto those heavenly places.’ Whether it be a mere dissolution and unbinding of the manifold intricacies and entanglements of the confused atoms ; or some such dispersion of the simple and incorruptible elements. . . . ‘With meats and drinks and divers charms, they seek to divert the channel, that they might not die. Yet must we needs endure that blast of wind that cometh from above, though we toil and labour never so much.’

XXVIII. He hath a stronger body, and is a better wrestler than I.—What then ? Is he more bountiful ? is he more modest ? Doth he bear all adverse chances with more equanimity : or with his neighbour’s offences with more meekness and gentleness than I ?

XXIX. Where the matter may be effected agreeably to that reason, which both unto the Gods and men is common, there can be no just cause of grief or sorrow. For where the fruit and benefit of an action well begun and prosecuted according to the proper constitution of man may be reaped and obtained, or is sure and certain, it is against reason that any damage should there be suspected. In all places, and at all times, it is in thy power religiously to embrace whatsoever by God’s appointment is happened unto thee, and justly to converse with those men, whom thou hast to do with ; and accurately to examine every fancy that presents

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itself, that nothing may slip and steal in, before thou hast rightly apprehended the true nature of it.

XXX. Look not about upon other men's minds and understandings ; but look right on forwards whither nature, both that of the universe, in those things that happen unto thee ; and thine in particular, in those things that are done by thee : doth lead, and direct thee. Now every one is bound to do that, which is consequent and agreeable to that end which by his true natural constitution he was ordained unto. As for all other things, they are ordained for the use of reasonable creatures : as in all things we see that that which is worse and inferior, is made for that which is better. Reasonable creatures, they are ordained one for another. That therefore which is chief in every man's constitution, is, that he intend the common good. The second is, that he yield not to any lusts and motions of the flesh. For it is the part and privilege of the reasonable and intellective faculty, that she can so bound herself, as that neither the sensitive, nor the appetitive faculties, may not anyways prevail upon her. For both these are brutish. And therefore over both she challengeth mastery, and cannot anyways endure, if in her right temper, to be subject unto either. And this indeed most justly. For by nature she was ordained to command all in the body. The third thing proper to man by his constitution, is, to avoid all rashness and precipitancy ; and not to be subject to error. To these things then, let the mind apply herself and go straight on, without any distraction about other things, and she hath her end, and by consequent her happiness.

XXXI. As one who had lived, and were now to die by right, whatsoever is yet remaining, bestow that wholly as a gracious overplus upon a virtuous life. Love and affect that only, whatsoever it be that happeneth, and is by

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the fates appointed unto thee. For what can be more reasonable? And as anything doth happen unto thee by way of cross, or calamity, call to mind presently and set before thine eyes, the examples of some other men, to whom the self-same thing did once happen likewise. Well, what did they? They grieved; they wondered; they complained. And where are they now? All dead and gone. Wilt thou also be like one of them? Or rather leaving to men of the world (whose life both in regard of themselves, and them that they converse with, is nothing but mere mutability; or men of as fickle minds, as fickle bodies; ever changing and soon changed themselves: let it be thine only care and study, how to make a right use of all such accidents. For there is good use to be made of them, and they will prove fit matter for thee to work upon, if it shall be both thy care and thy desire, that whatsoever thou doest, thou thyself mayst like and approve thyself for it. And both these, see, that thou remember well, according as the diversity of the matter of the action that thou art about shall require. Look within; within is the fountain of all good. Such a fountain, where springing waters can never fail, so thou dig still deeper and deeper.

XXXII. Thou must use thyself also to keep thy body fixed and steady; free from all loose fluctuant either motion, or posture. And as upon thy face and looks, thy mind hath easily power over them to keep them to that which is grave and decent; so let it challenge the same power over the whole body also. But so observe all things in this kind, as that it be without any manner of affectation.

XXXIII. The art of true living in this world is more like a wrestler's, than a dancer's practice. For in this they both agree, to teach a man whatsoever falls upon him, that

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he may be ready for it, and that nothing may cast him down.

XXXIV. Thou must continually ponder and consider with thyself, what manner of men they be, and for their minds and understandings what is their present estate, whose good word and testimony thou dost desire. For then neither wilt thou see cause to complain of them that offend against their wills ; or find any want of their applause, if once thou dost but penetrate into the true force and ground both of their opinions, and of their desires. ‘No soul (saith he) is willingly bereft of the truth,’ and by consequent, neither of justice, or temperance, or kindness, and mildness ; nor of anything that is of the same kind. It is most needful that thou shouldst always remember this. For so shalt thou be far more gentle and moderate towards all men.

XXXV. What pain soever thou art in, let this presently come to thy mind, that it is not a thing whereof thou needest to be ashamed, neither is it a thing whereby thy understanding, that hath the government of all, can be made worse. For neither in regard of the substance of it, nor in regard of the end of it (which is, to intend the common good) can it alter and corrupt it. This also of Epicurus mayst thou in most pains find some help of, that it is ‘neither intolerable, nor eternal ;’ so thou keep thyself to the true bounds and limits of reason and give not way to opinion. This also thou must consider, that many things there be, which oftentimes unsensibly trouble and vex thee, as not armed against them with patience, because they go not ordinarily under the name of pains, which in very deed are of the same nature as pain ; as to slumber unquietly, to suffer heat, to want appetite : when therefore any of these things make thee discontented, check thyself

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with these words : Now hath pain given thee the foil ; thy courage hath failed thee.

XXXVI. Take heed lest at any time thou stand so affected, though towards unnatural evil men, as ordinary men are commonly one towards another.

XXXVII. How know we whether Socrates were so eminent indeed, and of so extraordinary a disposition ? For that he died more gloriously, that he disputed with the Sophists more subtilly ; that he watched in the frost more assiduously ; that being commanded to fetch innocent Salaminius, he refused to do it more generously ; all this will not serve. Nor that he walked in the streets, with much gravity and majesty, as was objected unto him by his adversaries : which nevertheless a man may well doubt of, whether it were so or no, or, which above all the rest, if so be that it were true, a man would well consider of, whether commendable, or discommendable. The thing therefore that we must inquire into, is this ; what manner of soul Socrates had : whether his disposition was such ; as that all that he stood upon, and sought after in this world, was barely this, that he might ever carry himself justly towards men, and holily towards the Gods. Neither vexing himself to no purpose at the wickedness of others, nor yet ever condescending to any man's evil fact, or evil intentions, through either fear, or engagement of friendship. Whether of those things that happened unto him by God's appointment, he neither did wonder at any when it did happen, or thought it intolerable in the trial of it. And lastly, whether he never did suffer his mind to sympathise with the senses, and affections of the body. For we must not think that Nature hath so mixed and tempered it with the body, as that she hath not power to circumscribe herself, and by herself to intend her own ends and occasions.

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XXXVIII. For it is a thing very possible, that a man should be a very divine man, and yet be altogether unknown. This thou must ever be mindful of, as of this also, that a man's true happiness doth consist in very few things. And that although thou dost despair, that thou shalt ever be a good either logician, or naturalist, yet thou art never the further off by it from being either liberal, or modest, or charitable, or obedient unto God.

XXXIX. Free from all compulsion in all cheerfulness and alacrity thou mayst run out thy time, though men should exclaim against thee never so much, and the wild beasts should pull in sunder the poor members of thy pampered mass of flesh. For what in either of these or the like cases should hinder the mind to retain her own rest and tranquillity, consisting both in the right judgment of those things that happen unto her, and in the ready use of all present matters and occasions? So that her judgment may say, to that which is befallen her by way of cross: this thou art in very deed, and according to thy true nature: notwithstanding that in the judgment of opinion thou dost appear otherwise: and her discretion to the present object; thou art that, which I sought for. For whatsoever it be, that is now present, shall ever be embraced by me as a fit and seasonable object, both for my reasonable faculty, and for my sociable, or charitable inclination to work upon. And that which is principal in this matter, is that it may be referred either unto the praise of God, or to the good of men. For either unto God or man, whatsoever it is that doth happen in the world hath in the ordinary course of nature its proper reference; neither is there anything, that in regard of nature is either new, or reluctant and intractable, but all things both usual and easy.

XL. Then hath a man attained to the estate of per-

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fection in his life and conversation, when he so spends every day, as if it were his last day : never hot and vehement in his affections, nor yet so cold and stupid as one that had no sense ; and free from all manner of dissimulation.

XLI. Can the Gods, who are immortal, for the continuance of so many ages bear without indignation with such and so many sinners, as have ever been, yea not only so, but also take such care for them, that they want nothing ; and dost thou so grievously take on, as one that could bear with them no longer ; thou that art but for a moment of time ? yea thou that art one of those sinners thyself ? A very ridiculous thing it is, that any man should dispense with vice and wickedness in himself, which is in his power to restrain ; and should go about to suppress it in others, which is altogether impossible.

XLII. What object soever, our reasonable and sociable faculty doth meet with, that affords nothing either for the satisfaction of reason, or for the practice of charity, she worthily doth think unworthy of herself.

XLIII. When thou hast done well, and another is benefited by thy action, must thou like a very fool look for a third thing besides, as that it may appear unto others also that thou hast done well, or that thou mayest in time, receive one good turn for another ? No man useth to be weary of that which is beneficial unto him. But every action according to nature, is beneficial. Be not weary then of doing that which is beneficial unto thee, whilst it is so unto others.

XLIV. The nature of the universe did once certainly before it was created, whatsoever it hath done since, deliberate and so resolve upon the creation of the world. Now since that time, whatsoever it is, that is and happens in the world, is either but a consequent of that one and

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first deliberation : or if so be that this ruling rational part of the world, takes any thought and care of things particular, they are surely his reasonable and principal creatures, that are the proper object of his particular care and providence. This often thought upon, will much conduce to thy tranquillity.



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### The Eighth Book



HIS also, among other things, may serve to keep thee from vainglory ; if thou shalt consider, that thou art now altogether incapable of the commendation of one, who all his life long, or from his youth at least, hath lived a philosopher's life. For both unto others, and to thyself especially, it is well known, that thou hast done many things contrary to that perfection of life. Thou hast therefore been confounded in thy course, and henceforth it will be hard for thee to recover the title and credit of a philosopher. And to it also is thy calling and profession repugnant. If therefore thou dost truly understand, what it is that is of moment indeed ; as for thy fame and credit, take no thought or care for that : let it suffice thee if all the rest of thy life, be it more or less, thou shalt live as thy nature requireth, or according to the true and natural end of thy making. Take pains therefore to know what it is that thy nature requireth, and let nothing else distract thee. Thou hast already had sufficient experience, that of those many things that hitherto thou hast erred and wandered about, thou couldst not find happiness in any of them. Not in syllogisms, and logical subtleties, not in wealth, not in honour and reputation, not in pleasure. In none of all these. Wherein then is it to be found ? In the practice of those things, which the nature of man, as he is a man, doth require. How then shall he do those things ? If his

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dogmata, or moral tenets and opinions (from which all motions and actions do proceed), be right and true. Which be those dogmata? Those that concern that which is good or evil, as that there is nothing truly good and beneficial unto man, but that which makes him just, temperate, courageous, liberal; and that there is nothing truly evil and hurtful unto man, but that which causeth the contrary effects.

II. Upon every action that thou art about, put this question to thyself; How will this when it is done agree with me? Shall I have no occasion to repent of it? Yet a very little while and I am dead and gone; and all things are at end. What then do I care for more than this, that my present action whatsoever it be, may be the proper action of one that is reasonable; whose end is, the common good; who in all things is ruled and governed by the same law of right and reason, by which God Himself is.

III. Alexander, Caius, Pompeius; what are these to Diogenes, Heraclitus, and Socrates? These penetrated into the true nature of things; into all causes, and all subjects: and upon these did they exercise their power and authority. But as for those, as the extent of their error was, so far did their slavery extend.

IV. What they have done, they will still do, although thou shouldst hang thyself. First; let it not trouble thee. For all things both good and evil: come to pass according to the nature and general condition of the universe, and within a very little while, all things will be at an end; no man will be remembered: as now of Africanus (for example) and Augustus it is already come to pass. Then secondly; fix thy mind upon the thing itself; look into it, and remembering thyself, that thou art bound nevertheless to be a good man, and what it is that thy nature requireth of thee as thou art a man, be not diverted from what thou art about,

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and speak that which seemeth unto thee most just : only speak it kindly, modestly, and without hypocrisy.

V. That which the nature of the universe doth busy herself about, is ; that which is here, to transfer it thither, to change it, and thence again to take it away, and to carry it to another place. So that thou needest not fear any new thing. For all things are usual and ordinary ; and all things are disposed by equality.

VI. Every particular nature hath content, when in its own proper course it speeds. A reasonable nature doth then speed, when first in matter of fancies and imaginations, it gives no consent to that which is either false or uncertain. Secondly, when in all its motions and resolutions it takes its level at the common good only, and that it desireth nothing, and flieth from nothing, but what is in its own power to compass or avoid. And lastly, when it willingly and gladly embraceth, whatsoever is dealt and appointed unto it by the common nature. For it is part of it ; even as the nature of any one leaf, is part of the common nature of all plants and trees. But that the nature of a leaf, is part of a nature both unreasonable and unsensible, and which in its proper end may be hindered ; or, which is servile and slavish : whereas the nature of man is part of a common nature which cannot be hindered, and which is both reasonable and just. From whence also it is, that according to the worth of everything, she doth make such equal distribution of all things, as of duration, substance, form, operation, and of events and accidents. But herein consider not whether thou shalt find this equality in everything absolutely and by itself ; but whether in all the particulars of some one thing taken together, and compared with all the particulars of some other thing, and them together likewise.

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VII. Thou hast no time nor opportunity to read. What then? Hast thou not time and opportunity to exercise thyself, not to wrong thyself; to strive against all carnal pleasures and pains, and to get the upper hand of them; to contemn honour and vainglory; and not only, not to be angry with them, whom towards thee thou doest find unsensible and unthankful; but also to have a care of them still, and of their welfare?

VIII. Forbear henceforth to complain of the troubles of a courtly life, either in public before others, or in private by thyself.

IX. Repentance is an inward and self-reprehension for the neglect or omission of somewhat that was profitable. Now whatsoever is good, is also profitable, and it is the part of an honest virtuous man to set by it, and to make reckoning of it accordingly. But never did any honest virtuous man repent of the neglect or omission of any carnal pleasure: no carnal pleasure then is either good or profitable.

X. This, what is it in itself, and by itself, according to its proper constitution? What is the substance of it? What is the matter, or proper use? What is the form or efficient cause? What is it for in this world, and how long will it abide? Thus must thou examine all things, that present themselves unto thee.

XI. When thou art hard to be stirred up and awaked out of thy sleep, admonish thyself and call to mind, that, to perform actions tending to the common good is that which thine own proper constitution, and that which the nature of man do require. But to sleep, is common to unreasonable creatures also. And what more proper and natural, yea what more kind and pleasing, than that which is according to nature?

XII. As every fancy and imagination presents itself

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unto thee, consider (if it be possible) the true nature, and the proper qualities of it, and reason with thyself about it.

XIII. At thy first encounter with any one, say presently to thyself: This man, what are his opinions concerning that which is good or evil? as concerning pain, pleasure, and the causes of both; concerning honour, and dishonour, concerning life and death? thus and thus. Now if it be no wonder that a man should have such and such opinions, how can it be a wonder that he should do such and such things? I will remember then, that he cannot but do as he doth, holding those opinions that he doth. Remember, that as it is a shame for any man to wonder that a fig tree should bear figs, so also to wonder that the world should bear anything, whatsoever it is which in the ordinary course of nature it may bear. To a physician also and to a pilot it is a shame either for the one to wonder, that such and such a one should have anague; or for the other, that the winds should prove contrary.

XIV. Remember, that to change thy mind upon occasion, and to follow him that is able to rectify thee, is equally ingenuous, as to find out at the first, what is right and just, without help. For of thee nothing is required, that is beyond the extent of thine own deliberation and judgment, and of thine own understanding.

XV. If it were thine act and in thine own power, why wouldest thou do it? If it were not, whom dost thou accuse? the atoms, or the Gods? For to do either, is the part of a mad man. Thou must therefore blame nobody, but if it be in thy power, redress what is amiss; if it be not, to what end is it to complain? For nothing should be done but to some certain end.

XVI. Whatsoever dieth and falleth, however and where-

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soever it die and fall, it cannot fall out of the world. If here it have its abode and change, here also shall it have its dissolution into its proper elements. The same are the world's elements, and the elements of which thou dost consist. And they when they are changed, they murmur not ; why shouldest thou ?

XVII. Whatsoever is, was made for something : as a horse, a vine. Why wonderest thou ? The sun itself will say of itself, I was made for something ; and so hath every god its proper function. What then were thou made for ? to disport and delight thyself ? See how even common sense and reason cannot brook it.

XVIII. Nature hath its end as well in the end and final consummation of anything that is, as in the beginning and continuation of it.

XIX. As one that tosseth up a ball. And what is a ball the better, if the motion of it be upwards ; or the worse if it be downwards ; or if it chance to fall upon the ground ? So for the bubble ; if it continue, what is it the better ? and if it dissolve, what is it the worse ? And so is it of a candle too. And so must thou reason with thyself, both in matter of fame, and in matter of death. For as for the body itself, (the subject of death) wouldest thou know the vileness of it ? Turn it about, that thou mayest behold it the worst sides upwards as well, as in its more ordinary pleasant shape ; how doth it look, when it is old and withered ? when sick and pained ? when in the act of lust, and fornication ? And as for fame. This life is short. Both he that praiseth, and he that is praised ; he that remembers, and he that is remembered, will soon be dust and ashes. Besides, it is but in one corner of this part of the world that thou art praised ; and yet in this corner, thou hast not the joint praises of all men ; no nor scarce of any one constantly. And yet the

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whole earth itself, what is it but as one point, in regard of the whole world ?

XX. That which must be the subject of thy consideration, is either the matter itself, or the dogma, or the operation, or the true sense and signification.

XXI. Most justly have these things happened unto thee : why dost not thou amend ? O but thou hadst rather become good to-morrow, than to be so to-day.

XXII. Shall I do it ? I will ; so the end of my action be to do good unto men. Doth anything by way of cross or adversity happen unto me ? I accept it, with reference unto the Gods, and their providence ; the fountain of all things, from which whatsoever comes to pass, doth hang and depend.

XXIII. By one action judge of the rest : this bathing which usually takes up so much of our time, what is it ? Oil, sweat, filth ; or the sordes of the body : an excrementitious viscosity, the excrements of oil and other ointments used about the body, and mixed with the sordes of the body : all base and loathsome. And such almost is every part of our life ; and every worldly object.

XXIV. Lucilla buried Verus ; then was Lucilla herself buried by others. So Secunda Maximus, then Secunda herself. So Epitynchanus, Diotimus ; then Epitynchanus himself. So Antoninus Pius, Faustina his wife ; then Antoninus himself. This is the course of the world. First Celer, Adrianus ; then Adrianus himself. And those austere ones ; those that foretold other men's deaths ; those that were so proud and stately, where are they now ? Those austere ones I mean, such as were Charax, and Demetrius the Platonic, and Eudæmon, and others like unto those. They were all but for one day ; all dead and gone long since. Some of them no sooner dead, than forgotten.

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Others soon turned into fables. Of others, even that which was fabulous, is now long since forgotten. This therefore thou must remember, that whatsoever thou art compounded of, shall soon be dispersed, and that thy life and breath, or thy soul, shall either be no more, or shall be translated, and appointed to some certain place and station.

**XXV.** The true joy of a man, is to do that which properly belongs unto a man. That which is most proper unto a man, is, first, to be kindly affected towards them, that are of the same kind and nature as he is himself ; to contemn all sensual motions and appetites ; to discern rightly all plausible fancies and imaginations, to contemplate the nature of the universe ; both it, and all things that are done in it. In which kind of contemplation three several relations are to be observed. The first, to the apparent secondary cause. The second, to the first original cause, God, from whom originally proceeds whatsoever doth happen in the world. The third and last, to them that we live and converse with : what use may be made of it, to their use and benefit.

**XXVI.** If pain be an evil, either it is in regard of the body ; (and that cannot be, because the body of itself is altogether insensible :) or in regard of the soul. But it is in the power of the soul, to preserve her own peace and tranquillity, and not to suppose that pain is evil. For all judgment and deliberation ; all prosecution, or aversation is from within, whither the sense of evil (except it be let in by opinion) cannot penetrate.

**XXVII.** Wipe off all idle fancies, and say unto thyself incessantly ; Now if I will, it is in my power to keep out of this my soul all wickedness, all lust, and concupiscences, all trouble and confusion. But on the contrary, to behold and consider all things according to their true nature, and to carry myself towards everything according to its true worth.

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Remember then this thy power,<sup>\*</sup> that nature hath given thee.

**XXVIII.** Whether thou speak in the Senate, or whether thou speak to any particular, let thy speech be always grave and modest. But thou must not openly and vulgarly observe that sound and exact form of speaking, concerning that which is truly good and truly evil ; the vanity of the world, and of worldly men : which otherwise truth and reason doth prescribe.

**XXIX.** Augustus his court ; his wife, his daughter, his nephews, his sons-in-law ; his sister, Agrippa, his kinsmen, his domestics, his friends ; Areus, Mæcenas, his slayers of beasts for sacrifice and divination : there thou hast the death of a whole court together. Proceed now on to the rest that have been since that of Augustus. Hath death dwelt with them otherwise, though so many and so stately whilst they lived, than it doth use to deal with any one particular man ? Consider now the death of a whole kindred and family, as of that of the Pompeys, as that also that useth to be written upon some monuments, **HE WAS THE LAST OF HIS OWN KINDRED.** O what care did his predecessors take, that they might leave a successor, yet behold ! at last one or other must of necessity be **THE LAST.** Here again therefore consider the death of a whole kindred.

**XXX.** Contract thy whole life to the measure and proportion of one single action. And if in every particular action thou dost perform what is fitting to the utmost of thy power, let it suffice thee. And who can hinder thee, but that thou mayest perform what is fitting ? But there may be some outward let and impediment. Not any, that can hinder thee, but that whatsoever thou dost, thou may do it, justly, temperately, and with the praise of God.

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Yea, but there may be somewhat, whereby some operation or other of thine may be hindered. And then, with that very thing that doth hinder, thou mayest be well pleased, and so by this gentle and equanimous conversion of thy mind unto that which may be, instead of that which at first thou didst intend, in the room of that former action there succeedeth another, which agrees as well with this contraction of thy life, that we now speak of.

**XXXI.** Receive temporal blessings without ostentation, when they are sent ; and thou shalt be able to part with them with all readiness and facility when they are taken from thee again.

**XXXII.** If ever thou sawest either a hand, or a foot, or a head lying by itself, in some place or other, as cut off from the rest of the body, such must thou conceive him to make himself, as much as in him lieth, that either is offended with anything that is happened, (whatsoever it be) and as it were divides himself from it : or that commits anything against the natural law of mutual correspondence, and society among men : or, he that commits any act of uncharitableness. Whosoever thou art, thou art such, thou art cast forth I know not whither out of the general unity, which is according to nature. Thou wert born indeed a part, but now thou hast cut thyself off. However, herein is matter of joy and exultation, that thou mayst be united again. God hath not granted it unto any other part, that once separated and cut off, it might be reunited, and come together again. But, behold, that GOODNESS how great and immense it is ! which hath so much esteemed MAN. As at first he was so made, that he needed not, except he would himself, have divided himself from the whole ; so once divided and cut off, IT hath so provided and ordered it, that if he would himself, he might return, and grow

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together again, and be admitted into its former rank and place of a part, as he was before.

XXXIII. As almost all her other faculties and properties the nature of the universe hath imparted unto every reasonable creature, so this in particular we have received from her, that as whatsoever doth oppose itself unto her, and doth withstand her in her purposes and intentions, she doth, though against its will and intention, bring it about to herself, to serve herself of it in the execution of her own destinated ends ; and so by this though not intended co-operation of it with herself makes it part of herself whether it will or no. So may every reasonable creature, what crosses and impediments soever it meets with in the course of this mortal life, it may use them as fit and proper objects, to the furtherance of whatsoever it intended and absolutely proposed unto itself as its natural end and happiness.

XXXIV. Let not the general representation unto thyself of the wretchedness of this our mortal life, trouble thee. Let not thy mind wander up and down, and heap together in her thoughts the many troubles and grievous calamities which thou art as subject unto as any other. But as everything in particular doth happen, put this question unto thyself, and say : What is it that in this present matter, seems unto thee so intolerable ? For thou wilt be ashamed to confess it. Then upon this presently call to mind, that neither that which is future, nor that which is past can hurt thee ; but that only which is present. (And that also is much lessened, if thou dost rightly circumscribe it :) and then check thy mind if for so little a while, (a mere instant), it cannot hold out with patience.

XXXV. What ? are either Panthea or Pergamus abiding to this day by their masters' tombs ? or either Chabrias or Diotimus by that of Adrianus ? O foolery ! For what

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if they did, would their masters be sensible of it? or if sensible, would they be glad of it? or if glad, were these immortal? Was not it appointed unto them also (both men and women,) to become old in time, and then to die? And these once dead, what would become of these former? And when all is done, what is all this for, but for a mere bag of blood and corruption?

XXXVI. If thou beest quick-sighted, be so in matter of judgment, and best discretion, saith he.

XXXVII. In the whole constitution of man, I see not any virtue contrary to justice, whereby it may be resisted and opposed. But one whereby pleasure and voluptuousness may be resisted and opposed, I see: continence.

XXXVIII. If thou canst but withdraw conceit and opinion concerning that which may seem hurtful and offensive, thou thyself art as safe, as safe may be. Thou thyself? and who is that? Thy reason. 'Yea, but I am not reason.' Well, be it so. However, let not thy reason or understanding admit of grief, and if there be anything in thee that is grieved, let that, (whatsoever it be,) conceive its own grief, if it can.

XXXIX. That which is a hindrance of the senses, is an evil to the sensitive nature. That which is a hindrance of the appetitive and prosecutive faculty, is an evil to the sensitive nature. As of the sensitive, so of the vegetative constitution, whatsoever is a hindrance unto it, is also in that respect an evil unto the same. And so likewise, whatsoever is a hindrance unto the mind and understanding, must needs be the proper evil of the reasonable nature. Now apply all those things unto thyself. Do either pain or pleasure seize on thee? Let the senses look to that. Hast thou met with some obstacle or other in thy purpose and intention? If thou didst propose without due reserva-

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tion and exception, now hath thy reasonable part received a blow indeed. But if in general thou didst propose unto thyself whatsoever might be, thou art not thereby either hurt, nor properly hindered. For in those things that properly belong unto the mind, she cannot be hindered by any man. It is not fire, nor iron ; nor the power of a tyrant, nor the power of a slandering tongue ; nor anything else, that can penetrate into her.

XL. If once round and solid, there is no fear that ever it will change.

XLI. Why should I grieve myself; who never did willingly grieve any other ! One thing rejoices one, and another thing another. As for me, this is my joy ; if my understanding be right and sound, as neither averse from any man, nor refusing any of those things, which as a man I am subject unto ; if I can look upon all things in the world meekly and kindly ; accept all things, and carry myself towards everything according to the true worth of the thing itself.

XLII. This time that is now present, bestow thou upon thyself. They that rather hunt for fame after death, do not consider, that those men that shall be hereafter, will be even such, as these whom now they can so hardly bear with. And besides they also will be mortal men. But to consider the thing in itself, if so many with so many voices, shall make such and such a sound, or shall have such and such an opinion concerning thee, what is it to thee ?

XLIII. Take me and throw me where thou wilt : I am indifferent. For there also I shall have that spirit which is within me propitious ; that is well pleased and fully contented both in that constant disposition, and with those particular actions, which to its own proper constitution are suitable and agreeable.

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**XLIV.** Is this then a thing of that worth, that for it my soul should suffer, and become worse than it was ? as either basely dejected, or disordinately affected, or confounded within itself, or terrified ? What can there be, that thou shouldest so much esteem ?

**XLV.** Nothing can happen unto thee, which is not incidental unto thee, as thou art a man. As nothing can happen either to an ox, a vine, or to a stone, which is not incidental unto them ; unto every one in his own kind. If therefore nothing can happen unto anything, which is not both usual and natural ; why art thou displeased ? Sure the common nature of all would not bring anything upon any, that were intolerable. If therefore it be a thing external that causes thy grief, know, that it is not that properly that doth cause it, but thine own conceit and opinion concerning the thing : which thou mayest rid thyself of, when thou wilt. But if it be somewhat that is amiss in thine own disposition, that doth grieve thee, mayest thou not rectify thy moral tenets and opinions. But if it grieve thee, that thou doest not perform that which seemeth unto thee right and just, why doest not thou choose rather to perform it than to grieve ? But somewhat that is stronger than thyself doth hinder thee. Let it not grieve thee then, if it be not thy fault that the thing is not performed. ‘Yea but it is a thing of that nature, as that thy life is not worth the while, except it may be performed.’ If it be so, upon condition that thou be kindly and lovingly disposed towards all men, thou mayest be gone. For even then, as much as at any time, art thou in a very good estate of performance, when thou doest die in charity with those, that are an obstacle unto thy performance.

**XLVI.** Remember that thy mind is of that nature as that it becometh altogether unconquerable, when once

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recollected in herself, she seeks no other content than this, that she cannot be forced : yea though it so fall out, that it be even against reason itself, that it doth bandy. How much less when by the help of reason she is able to judge of things with discretion ? And therefore let thy chief fort and place of defence be, a mind free from passions. A stronger place, (whereunto to make his refuge, and so to become impregnable) and better fortified than this, hath no man. He that seeth not this is unlearned. He that seeth it, and betaketh not himself to this place of refuge, is unhappy.

XLVII. Keep thyself to the first bare and naked apprehensions of things, as they present themselves unto thee, and add not unto them. It is reported unto thee, that such a one speaketh ill of thee. Well ; that he speaketh ill of thee, so much is reported. But that thou art hurt thereby, is not reported : that is the addition of opinion, which thou must exclude. I see that my child is sick. That he is sick, I see, but that he is in danger of his life also, I see it not. Thus thou must use to keep thyself to the first motions and apprehensions of things, as they present themselves outwardly ; and add not unto them from within thyself through mere conceit and opinion. Or rather add unto them ; but as one that understandeth the true nature of all things that happen in the world.

XLVIII. Is the cucumber bitter ? set it away. Brambles are in the way ? avoid them. Let this suffice. Add not presently speaking unto thyself, What serve these things for in the world ? For, this, one that is acquainted with the mysteries of nature, will laugh at thee for it ; as a carpenter would or a shoemaker, if meeting in either of their shops with some shavings, or small remnants of their work, thou shouldest blame them for it. And yet those men, it is not

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for want of a place where to throw them that they keep them in their shops for a while: but the nature of the universe hath no such out-place; but herein doth consist the wonder of her art and skill, that she having once circumscribed herself within some certain bounds and limits, whatsoever is within her that seems either corrupted, or old, or unprofitable, she can change it into herself, and of these very things can make new things; so that she needeth not to seek elsewhere out of herself either for a new supply of matter and substance, or for a place where to throw out whatsoever is irrecoverably putrid and corrupt. Thus she, as for place, so for matter and art, is herself sufficient unto herself.

**XLIX.** Not to be slack and negligent; or loose, and wanton in thy actions; nor contentious, and troublesome in thy conversation; nor to rove and wander in thy fancies and imaginations. Not basely to contract thy soul; nor boisterously to sally out with it, or furiously to launch out as it were, nor ever to want employment.

**L.** ‘They kill me, they cut my flesh: they persecute my person with curses.’ What then? May not thy mind for all this continue pure, prudent, temperate, just? As a fountain of sweet and clear water, though she be cursed by some stander by, yet do her springs nevertheless still run as sweet and clear as before; yea though either dirt or dung be thrown in, yet is it no sooner thrown, than dispersed, and she cleared. She cannot be dyed or infected by it. What then must I do, that I may have within myself an overflowing fountain, and not a well? Beget thyself by continual pains and endeavours to true liberty with charity, and true simplicity and modesty.

**LI.** He that knoweth not what the world is, knoweth not where he himself is. And he that knoweth not what

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the world was made for, cannot possibly know either what are the qualities, or what is the nature of the world. Now he that in either of these is to seek, for what he himself was made is ignorant also. What then dost thou think of that man, who proposeth unto himself, as a matter of great moment, the noise and applause of men, who both where they are, and what they are themselves, are altogether ignorant? Dost thou desire to be commended of that man, who thrice in one hour perchance, doth himself curse himself? Dost thou desire to please him, who pleaseth not himself? or dost thou think that he pleaseth himself, who doth use to repent himself almost of everything that he doth?

LII. Not only now henceforth to have a common breath, or to hold correspondency of breath, with that air, that compasseth us about; but to have a common mind, or to hold correspondency of mind also with that rational substance, which compasseth all things. For, that also is of itself, and of its own nature (if a man can but draw it in as he should) everywhere diffused; and passeth through all things, no less than the air doth, if a man can but suck it in.

LIII. Wickedness in general doth not hurt the world. Particular wickedness doth not hurt any other: only unto him it is hurtful, whosoever he be that offends, unto whom in great favour and mercy it is granted, that whosoever he himself shall but first desire it, he may be presently delivered of it. Unto my free-will my neighbour's free-will, whoever he be, (as his life, or his body), is altogether indifferent. For though we are all made one for another, yet have our minds and understandings, each of them their own proper and limited jurisdiction. For else another man's wickedness might be my evil; which God would not have,

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that it might not be in another man's power to make me unhappy : which nothing now can do but mine own wickedness.

LIV. The sun seemeth to be shed abroad. And indeed it is diffused but not effused. For that diffusion of it is a *τάσις* or an extension. For therefore are the beams of it called *ἀκτῖνες* from the word *ἐκτίνεσθαι*, to be stretched out and extended. Now what a sunbeam is, thou mayest know if thou observe the light of the sun, when through some narrow hole it pierceth into some room that is dark. For it is always in a direct line. And as by any solid body, that it meets with in the way that is not penetrable by air, it is divided and abrupted, and yet neither slides off, or falls down, but stayeth there nevertheless : such must the diffusion of the mind be ; not an effusion, but an extension. What obstacles and impediments soever she meeteth within her way, she must not violently, and by way of an impetuous onset light upon them ; neither must she fall down ; but she must stand, and give light unto that which doth admit of it. For as for that which doth not, it is its own fault and loss, if it bereave itself of her light.

LV. He that feareth death, either feareth that he shall have no sense at all, or that his senses will not be the same. Whereas, he should rather comfort himself, that either no sense at all, and so no sense of evil ; or if any sense, then another life, and so no death properly.

LVI. All men are made one for another : either then teach them better, or bear with them.

LVII. The motion of the mind is not as the motion of a dart. For the mind when it is wary and cautious, and by way of diligent circumspection turneth herself many ways, may then as well be said to go straight on to the object, as when it useth no such circumspection.

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LVIII. To pierce and penetrate into the estate of  
every one's understanding that thou hast to do  
with : as also to make the estate of thine  
own open, and penetrable to any other.



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## The Ninth Book



E that is unjust, is also impious. For the nature of the universe, having made all reasonable creatures one for another, to the end that they should do one another good ; more or less according to the several persons and occasions ; but in nowise hurt one another : it is manifest that he that doth transgress against this her will, is guilty of impiety towards the most ancient and venerable of all the deities. For the nature of the universe, is the nature the common parent of all, and therefore piously to be observed of all things that are, and that which now is, to whatsoever first was, and gave it its being, hath relation of blood and kindred. She is also called truth ; and is the first cause of all truths. He therefore that willingly and wittingly doth lie, is impious in that he doth receive, and so commit injustice : but he that against his will, in that he disagreeth from the nature of the universe, and in that striving with the nature of the world he doth in his particular, violate the general order of the world. For he doth no better than strive and war against it, who contrary to his own nature applieth himself to that which is contrary to truth. For nature had before furnished him with instincts and opportunities sufficient for the attainment of it ; which he having hitherto neglected, is not now able to discern that which is false from that which is true. He also that pursues after pleasures, as that which is truly good ; and flies from pains, as that which is truly evil : is impious. For such a one must of necessity oftentimes

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accuse that common nature, as distributing many things both unto the evil, and unto the good, not according to the deserts of either : as unto the bad oftentimes pleasures, and the causes of pleasures ; so unto the good, pains, and the occasions of pains. Again, he that feareth pains and crosses in this world, feareth some of those things which some time or other must needs happen in the world. And that we have already showed to be impious. And he that pursueth after pleasures, will not spare, to compass his desires, to do that which is unjust, and that is manifestly impious. Now those things which unto nature are equally indifferent (for she had not created both, both pain and pleasure, if both had not been unto her equally indifferent) : they that will live according to nature, must in those things (as being of the same mind and disposition that she is) be as equally indifferent. Whosoever therefore in either matter of pleasure and pain ; death and life ; honour and dishonour, (which things nature in the administration of the world, indifferently doth make use of), is not as indifferent, it is apparent that he is impious. When I say that common nature doth indifferently make use of them, my meaning is, that they happen indifferently in the ordinary course of things, which by a necessary consequence, whether as principal or accessory, come to pass in the world, according to that first and ancient deliberation of Providence, by which she from some certain beginning, did resolve upon the creation of such a world, conceiving then in her womb as it were some certain rational generative seeds and faculties of things future, whether subjects, changes, successions ; both such and such, and just so many.

II. It were indeed more happy and comfortable, for a man to depart out of this world, having lived all his life long clear from all falsehood, dissimulation, voluptuousness,

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and pride. But if this cannot be, yet it is some comfort for a man joyfully to depart as weary, and out of love with those ; rather than to desire to live, and to continue long in those wicked courses. Hath not yet experience taught thee to fly from the plague ? For a far greater plague is the corruption of the mind, than any certain change and distemper of the common air can be. This is a plague of creatures, as they are living creatures ; but that of men as they are men or reasonable.

III. Thou must not in matter of death carry thyself scornfully, but as one that is well pleased with it, as being one of those things that nature hath appointed. For what thou dost conceive of these, of a boy to become a young man, to wax old, to grow, to ripen, to get teeth, or a beard, or grey hairs ; to beget, to bear, or to be delivered ; or what other action soever it be, that is natural unto man according to the several seasons of his life ; such a thing is it also to be dissolved. It is therefore the part of a wise man, in matter of death, not in any wise to carry himself either violently, or proudly ; but patiently to wait for it, as one of nature's operations : that with the same mind as now thou dost expect when that which yet is but an embryo in thy wife's belly shall come forth, thou mayst expect also when thy soul shall fall off from that outward coat or skin : wherein as a child in the belly it lieth involved and shut up. But if thou desirest a more popular, and though not so direct and philosophical, yet a very powerful and penetrative recipe against the fear of death, nothing can make thee more willing to part with thy life, than if thou shalt consider, both what the subjects themselves are that thou shalt part with, and what manner of dispositions thou shalt no more have to do with. True it is, that offended with them thou must not be by no means,

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but take care of them, and meekly bear with them. However, this thou mayst remember, that whensoever it happens that thou depart, it shall not be from men that held the same opinions that thou dost. For that indeed, (if it were so) is the only thing that might make thee averse from death, and willing to continue here, if it were thy hap to live with men that had obtained the same belief that thou hast. But now, what a toil it is for thee to live with men of different opinions, thou seest : so that thou hast rather occasion to say, Hasten, I thee pray, O Death ; lest I also in time forget myself.

IV. He that sinneth, sinneth unto himself. He that is unjust, hurts himself, in that he makes himself worse than he was before. Not he only that committeth, but he also that omitteth something, is oftentimes unjust.

V. If my present apprehension of the object be right, and my present action charitable, and this, towards whatsoever doth proceed from God, be my present disposition, to be well pleased with it, it sufficeth.

VI. To wipe away fancy, to use deliberation, to quench concupiscence, to keep the mind free to herself.

VII. Of all unreasonable creatures, there is but one unreasonable soul ; and of all that are reasonable, but one reasonable soul, divided betwixt them all. As of all earthly things there is but one earth, and but one light that we see by ; and but one air that we breathe in, as many as either breathe or see. Now whatsoever partakes of some common thing, naturally affects and inclines unto that whereof it is part, being of one kind and nature with it. Whatsoever is earthly, presseth downwards to the common earth. whatsoever is liquid, would flow together. And whatsoever is airy, would be together likewise. So that without some obstacle, and some kind of violence, they

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cannot well be kept asunder. Whatsoever is fiery, doth not only by reason of the elementary fire tend upwards ; but here also is so ready to join, and to burn together, that whatsoever doth want sufficient moisture to make resistance, is easily set on fire. Whatsoever therefore is partaker of that reasonable common nature, naturally doth as much and more long after his own kind. For by how much in its own nature it excels all other things, by so much more is it desirous to be joined and united unto that, which is of its own nature. As for unreasonable creatures then, they had not long been, but presently begun among them swarms, and flocks, and broods of young ones, and a kind of mutual love and affection. For though but unreasonable, yet a kind of soul these had, and therefore was that natural desire of union more strong and intense in them, as in creatures of a more excellent nature, than either in plants, or stones, or trees. But among reasonable creatures, begun commonwealths, friendships, families, public meetings, and even in their wars, conventions, and truces. Now among them that were yet of a more excellent nature, as the stars and planets, though by their nature far distant one from another, yet even among them began some mutual correspondency and unity. So proper is it to excellency in a high degree to affect unity, as that even in things so far distant, it could operate unto a mutual sympathy. But now behold, what is now come to pass. Those creatures that are reasonable, are now the only creatures that have forgotten their natural affection and inclination of one towards another. Among them alone of all other things that are of one kind, there is not to be found a general disposition to flow together. But though they fly from nature, yet are they stopt in their course, and apprehended. Do they what they can, nature doth prevail.

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And so shalt thou confess, if thou dost observe it. For sooner mayst thou find a thing earthly, where no earthly thing is, than find a man that naturally can live by himself alone.

VIII. Man, God, the world, every one in their kind, bear some fruits. All things have their proper time to bear. Though by custom, the word itself is in a manner become proper unto the vine, and the like, yet is it so nevertheless, as we have said. As for reason, that beareth both common fruit for the use of others ; and peculiar, which itself doth enjoy. Reason is of a diffusive nature, what itself is in itself, it begets in others, and so doth multiply.

IX. Either teach them better if it be in thy power ; or if it be not, remember that for this use, to bear with them patiently, was mildness and goodness granted unto thee. The Gods themselves are good unto such ; yea and in some things, (as in matter of health, of wealth, of honour,) are content often to further their endeavours : so good and gracious are they. And mightest thou not be so too ? or, tell me, what doth hinder thee ?

X. Labour not as one to whom it is appointed to be wretched, nor as one that either would be pitied, or admired ; but let this be thine only care and desire ; so always and in all things to prosecute or to forbear, as the law of charity, or mutual society doth require.

XI. This day I did come out of all my trouble. Nay I have cast out all my trouble ; it should rather be. For that which troubled thee, whatsoever it was, was not without anywhere that thou shouldest come out of it, but within in thine own opinions, from whence it must be cast out, before thou canst truly and constantly be at ease.

XII. All those things, for matter of experience are usual

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and ordinary ; for their continuance but for a day ; and for their matter, most base and filthy. As they were in the days of those whom we have buried, so are they now also, and no otherwise.

XIII. The things themselves that affect us, they stand without doors, neither knowing anything themselves nor able to utter anything unto others concerning themselves. What then is it, that passeth verdict on them ? The understanding.

XIV. As virtue and wickedness consist not in passion, but in action ; so neither doth the true good or evil of a reasonable charitable man consist in passion, but in operation and action.

XV. To the stone that is cast up, when it comes down it is no hurt unto it ; as neither benefit, when it doth ascend.

XVI. Sift their minds and understandings, and behold what men they be, whom thou dost stand in fear of what they shall judge of thee, what they themselves judge of themselves.

XVII. All things that are in the world, are always in the estate of alteration. Thou also art in a perpetual change, yea and under corruption too, in some part : and so is the whole world.

XVIII. It is not thine, but another man's sin. Why should it trouble thee ? Let him look to it, whose sin it is.

XIX. Of an operation and of a purpose there is an ending, or of an action and of a purpose we say commonly, that it is at an end : from opinion also there is an absolute cessation, which is as it were the death of it. In all this there is no hurt. Apply this now to a man's age, as first, a child ; then a youth, then a young man, then an old man ; every change from one age to another is a kind of death.

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And all this while here is no matter of grief yet. Pass now unto that life first, that which thou livedst under thy grandfather, then under thy mother, then under thy father. And thus when through the whole course of thy life hitherto thou hast found and observed many alterations, many changes, many kinds of endings and cessations, put this question to thyself, What matter of grief or sorrow dost thou find in any of these? Or what doest thou suffer through any of these? If in none of these, then neither in the ending and consummation of thy whole life, which is also but a cessation and change.

XX. As occasion shall require, either to thine own understanding, or to that of the universe, or to his, whom thou hast now to do with, let thy refuge be with all speed. To thine own, that it resolve upon nothing against justice. To that of the universe, that thou mayest remember, part of whom thou art. Of his, that thou mayest consider, whether in the estate of ignorance, or of knowledge. And then also must thou call to mind, that he is thy kinsman.

XXI. As thou thyself, whoever thou art, wert made for the perfection and consummation, being a member of it, of a common society ; so must every action of thine tend to the perfection and consummation of a life that is truly sociable. What action soever of thine therefore that either immediately or afar off, hath not reference to the common good, that is an exorbitant and disorderly action ; yea it is seditious ; as one among the people who from such and such a consent and unity, should factiously divide and separate himself.

XXII. Children's anger, mere bables ; wretched souls bearing up dead bodies, that they may not have their fall so soon : even as it is in that common dirge song.

XXIII. Go to the quality of the cause from which the

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effect doth proceed. Behold it by itself bare and naked, separated from all that is material. Then consider the utmost bounds of time that that cause, thus and thus qualified, can subsist and abide.

XXIV. Infinite are the troubles and miseries, that thou hast already been put to, by reason of this only, because that for all happiness it did not suffice thee, or, that thou didst not account it sufficient happiness, that thy understanding did operate according to its natural constitution.

XXV. When any shall either impeach thee with false accusations, or hatefully reproach thee, or shall use any such carriage towards thee, get thee presently to their minds and understandings, and look in them, and behold what manner of men they be. Thou shalt see, that there is no such occasion why it should trouble thee, what such as they are think of thee. Yet must thou love them still, for by nature they are thy friends. And the Gods themselves, in those things that they seek from them as matters of great moment, are well content, all manner of ways, as by dreams and oracles, to help them as well as others.

XXVI. Up and down, from one age to another, go the ordinary things of the world ; being still the same. And either of everything in particular before it come to pass, the mind of the universe doth consider with itself and deliberate : and if so, then submit for shame unto the determination of such an excellent understanding : or once for all it did resolve upon all things in general ; and since that whatsoever happens, happens by a necessary consequence, and all things indivisibly in a manner and inseparably hold one of another. In sum, either there is a God, and then all is well ; or if all things go by chance and fortune, yet mayest thou use thine own providence in those things that concern thee properly ; and then art thou well.

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XXVII. Within a while the earth shall cover us all, and then she herself shall have her change. And then the course will be, from one period of eternity unto another, and so a perpetual eternity. Now can any man that shall consider with himself in his mind the several rollings or successions of so many changes and alterations, and the swiftness of all these rollings ; can he otherwise but contemn in his heart and despise all worldly things ? The cause of the universe is as it were a strong torrent, it carrieth all away.

XXVIII. And these your professed politicians, the only true practical philosophers of the world, (as they think of themselves) so full of affected gravity, or such professed lovers of virtue and honesty, what wretches be they in very deed ; how vile and contemptible in themselves ? O man ! what ado doest thou keep ? Do what thy nature doth now require. Resolve upon it, if thou mayest : and take no thought, whether anybody shall know it or no. Yea, but sayest thou, I must not expect a Plato's commonwealth. If they profit though never so little, I must be content ; and think much even of that little progress. Doth then any of them forsake their former false opinions that I should think they profit ? For without a change of opinions, alas ! what is all that ostentation, but mere wretchedness of slavish minds, that groan privately, and yet would make a show of obedience to reason, and truth ? Go too now and tell me of Alexander and Philippus, and Demetrius Phalereus. Whether they understood what the common nature requireth, and could rule themselves or no, they know best themselves. But if they kept a life, and swaggered ; I (God be thanked) am not bound to imitate them. The effect of true philosophy is, unaffected simplicity and modesty. Persuade me not to ostentation and vainglory.

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**XXIX.** From some high place as it were to look down, and to behold here flocks, and there sacrifices, without number ; and all kind of navigation ; some in a rough and stormy sea, and some in a calm : the general differences, or different estates of things, some, that are now first upon being ; the several and mutual relations of those things that are together ; and some other things that are at their last. Their lives also, who were long ago, and theirs who shall be hereafter, and the present estate and life of those many nations of barbarians that are now in the world, thou must likewise consider in thy mind. And how many there be, who never so much as heard of thy name, how many that will soon forget it ; how many who but even now did commend thee, within a very little while perchance will speak ill of thee. So that neither fame, nor honour, nor anything else that this world doth afford, is worth the while. The sum then of all ; whatsoever doth happen unto thee, whereof God is the cause, to accept it contentedly : whatsoever thou doest, whereof thou thyself art the cause, to do it justly : which will be, if both in thy resolution and in thy action thou have no further end, than to do good unto others, as being that, which by thy natural constitution, as a man, thou art bound unto.

**XXX.** Many of those things that trouble and straiten thee, it is in thy power to cut off, as wholly depending from mere conceit and opinion ; and then thou shalt have room enough.

**XXXI.** To comprehend the whole world together in thy mind, and the whole course of this present age to represent it unto thyself, and to fix thy thoughts upon the sudden change of every particular object. How short the time is from the generation of anything, unto the dissolution of the same ; but how immense and infinite both that

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which was before the generation, and that which after the generation of it shall be. All things that thou seest, will soon be perished, and they that see their corruptions, will soon vanish away themselves. He that dieth a hundred years old, and he that dieth young, shall come all to one.

XXXII. What are their minds and understandings ; and what the things that they apply themselves unto : what do they love, and what do they hate for ? Fancy to thyself the estate of their souls openly to be seen. When they think they hurt them shrewdly, whom they speak ill of ; and when they think they do them a very good turn, whom they commend and extol : O how full are they then of conceit, and opinion !

XXXIII. Loss and corruption, is in very deed nothing else but change and alteration ; and that is it, which the nature of the universe doth most delight in, by which, and according to which, whatsoever is done, is well done. For that was the estate of worldly things from the beginning, and so shall it ever be. Or wouldest thou rather say, that all things in the world have gone ill from the beginning for so many ages, and shall ever go ill ? And then among so many deities, could no divine power be found all this while, that could rectify the things of the world ? Or is the world, to incessant woes and miseries, for ever condemned ?

XXXIV. How base and putrid, every common matter is ! Water, dust, and from the mixture of these bones, and all that loathsome stuff that our bodies do consist of ; so subject to be infected, and corrupted. And again those other things that are so much prized and admired, as marble stones, what are they, but as it were the kernels of the earth ? gold and silver, what are they, but as the more gross fæces of the earth ? Thy most royal apparel, for matter, it is but as it were the hair of a silly sheep, and for colour, the

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very blood of a shell-fish ; of this nature are all other things. Thy life itself, is some such thing too ; a mere exhalation of blood : and it also, apt to be changed into some other common thing.

XXXV. Will this querulousness, this murmuring, this complaining and dissembling never be at an end ? What then is it, that troubleth thee ? Doth any new thing happen unto thee ? What doest thou so wonder at ? At the cause, or the matter ? Behold either by itself, is either of that weight and moment indeed ? And besides these, there is not anything. But thy duty towards the Gods also, it is time thou shouldst acquit thyself of it with more goodness and simplicity.

XXXVI. It is all one to see these things for a hundred of years together, or but for three years.

XXXVII. If he have sinned, his is the harm, not mine. But perchance he hath not.

XXXVIII. Either all things by the providence of reason happen unto every particular, as a part of one general body ; and then it is against reason that a part should complain of anything that happens for the good of the whole ; or if, according to Epicurus, atoms be the cause of all things and that life be nothing else but an accidentary confusion of things, and death nothing else, but a mere dispersion and so of all other things : what doest thou trouble thyself for ?

XXXIX. Sayest thou unto that rational part, Thou art dead ; corruption hath taken hold on thee ? Doth it then also void excrements ? Doth it like either oxen, or sheep, graze or feed ; that it also should be mortal, as well as the body ?

XL. Either the Gods can do nothing for us at all, or they can still and allay all the distractions and distempers of thy mind. If they can do nothing, why doest thou pray ?

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If they can, why wouldest not thou rather pray, that they will grant unto thee, that thou mayst neither fear, nor lust after any of those worldly things which cause these distractions and distempers of it? Why not rather, that thou mayst not at either their absence or presence, be grieved and discontented: than either that thou mayst obtain them, or that thou mayst avoid them? For certainly it must needs be, that if the Gods can help us in anything, they may in this kind also. But thou wilt say perchance, ‘In those things the Gods have given me my liberty: and it is in mine own power to do what I will.’ But if thou mayst use this liberty, rather to set thy mind at true liberty, than wilfully with baseness and servility of mind to affect those things, which either to compass or to avoid is not in thy power, wert not thou better? And as for the Gods, who hath told thee, that they may not help us up even in those things that they have put in our own power? Whether it be so or no, thou shalt soon perceive, if thou wilt but try thyself and pray. One prayeth that he may compass his desire, to lie with such or such a one, pray thou that thou mayst not lust to lie with her. Another how he may be rid of such a one; pray thou that thou mayst so patiently bear with him, as that thou have no such need to be rid of him. Another, that he may not lose his child. Pray thou that thou mayst not fear to lose him. To this end and purpose, let all thy prayer be, and see what will be the event.

XLI. ‘In my sickness’ (saith Epicurus of himself:) ‘my discourses were not concerning the nature of my disease, neither was that, to them that came to visit me, the subject of my talk; but in the consideration and contemplation of that, which was of especial weight and moment, was all my time bestowed and spent, and among others in this very thing, how my mind, by a natural and

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unavoidable sympathy partaking in some sort with the present indisposition of my body, might nevertheless keep herself free from trouble, and in present possession of her own proper happiness. Neither did I leave the ordering of my body to the physicians altogether to do with me what they would, as though I expected any great matter from them, or as though I thought it a matter of such great consequence, by their means to recover my health : for my present estate, methought, liked me very well, and gave me good content.' Whether therefore in sickness (if thou chance to sicken) or in what other kind of extremity soever, endeavour thou also to be in thy mind so affected, as he doth report of himself : not to depart from thy philosophy for anything that can befall thee, nor to give ear to the discourses of silly people, and mere naturalists.

**XLII.** It is common to all trades and professions to mind and intend that only, which now they are about, and the instrument whereby they work.

**XLIII.** When at any time thou art offended with any one's impudency, put presently this question to thyself : 'What ? Is it then possible, that there should not be any impudent men in the world ! Certainly it is not possible.' Desire not then that which is impossible. For this one, (thou must think) whosoever he be, is one of those impudent ones, that the world cannot be without. So of the subtle and crafty, so of the perfidious, so of every one that offendeth, must thou ever be ready to reason with thyself. For whilst in general thou dost thus reason with thyself, that the kind of them must needs be in the world, thou wilt be the better able to use meekness towards every particular. This also thou shalt find of very good use, upon every such occasion, presently to consider with thyself, what proper virtue nature hath furnished man with, against such a vice,

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or to encounter with a disposition vicious in this kind. As for example, against the unthankful, it hath given goodness and meekness, as an antidote, and so against another vicious in another kind some other peculiar faculty. And generally, is it not in thy power to instruct him better, that is in an error? For whosoever sinneth, doth in that decline from his purposed end; and is certainly deceived. And again, what art thou the worse for his sin? For thou shalt not find that any one of these, against whom thou art incensed, hath in very deed done anything whereby thy mind (the only true subject of thy hurt and evil) can be made worse than it was. And what a matter of either grief or wonder is this, if he that is unlearned, do the deeds of one that is unlearned? Should not thou rather blame thyself, who, when upon very good grounds of reason, thou mightst have thought it very probable, that such a thing would by such a one be committed, didst not only not foresee it, but moreover dost wonder at it, that such a thing should be. But then especially, when thou dost find fault with either an unthankful, or a false man, must thou reflect upon thyself. For without all question, thou thyself art much in fault, if either of one that were of such a disposition, thou didst expect that he should be true unto thee: or when unto any thou didst a good turn, thou didst not there bound thy thoughts, as one that had obtained his end; nor didst not think that from the action itself thou hadst received a full reward of the good that thou hadst done. For what wouldest thou have more? Unto him that is a man, thou hast done a good turn: doth not that suffice thee? What thy nature required, that hast thou done. Must thou be rewarded for it? As if either the eye for that it seeth, or the feet that they go, should require satisfaction. For as these being by nature appointed for such

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an use, can challenge no more, than that they may work according to their natural constitution : so man being born to do good unto others whensoever he doth a real good unto any by helping them out of error ; or though but in middle things, as in matter of wealth, life, ferment, and the like, doth help to further their desires ; he doth that for which he was made, and therefore can require no more.



# His Meditations

## The Tenth Book



MY soul, the time I trust will be, when thou shalt be good, simple, single, more open and visible, than that body by which it is enclosed. Thou wilt one day be sensible of their happiness, whose end is love, and their affections dead to all worldly things. Thou shalt one day be full, and in want of no external thing : not seeking pleasure from anything, either living or insensible, that this world can afford ; neither wanting time for the continuation of thy pleasure, nor place and opportunity, nor the favour either of the weather or of men. When thou shalt have content in thy present estate, and all things present shall add to thy content : when thou shalt persuade thyself, that thou hast all things ; all for thy good, and all by the providence of the Gods : and of things future also shalt be as confident, that all will do well, as tending to the maintenance and preservation in some sort, of his perfect welfare and happiness, who is perfection of life, of goodness, and beauty ; who begets all things, and containeth all things in himself, and in himself doth recollect all things from all places that are dissolved, that of them he may beget others again like unto them. Such one day shall be thy disposition, that thou shalt be able, both in regard of the Gods, and in regard of men, so to fit and order thy conversation, as neither to complain of them at any time, for anything that they do ; nor to do anything thyself, for which thou mayest justly be condemned.

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II. As one who is altogether governed by nature, let it be thy care to observe what it is that thy nature in general doth require. That done, if thou find not that thy nature, as thou art a living sensible creature, will be the worse for it, thou mayest proceed. Next then thou must examine, what thy nature as thou art a living sensible creature, doth require. And that, whatsoever it be, thou mayest admit of and do it, if thy nature as thou art a reasonable living creature, will not be the worse for it. Now whatsoever is reasonable, is also sociable. Keep thyself to these rules, and trouble not thyself about idle things.

III. Whatsoever doth happen unto thee, thou art naturally by thy natural constitution either able, or not able to bear. If thou beest able, be not offended, but bear it according to thy natural constitution, or as nature hath enabled thee. If thou beest not able, be not offended. For it will soon make an end of thee, and itself, (whatsoever it be) at the same time end with thee. But remember, that whatsoever by the strength of opinion, grounded upon a certain apprehension of both true profit and duty, thou canst conceive tolerable ; that thou art able to bear that by thy natural constitution.

IV. Him that offends, to teach with love and meekness, and to show him his error. But if thou canst not, then to blame thyself, or rather not thyself neither, if thy will and endeavours have not been wanting.

V. whatsoever it be that happens unto thee, it is that which from all time was appointed unto thee. For by the same coherence of causes, by which thy substance from all eternity was appointed to be, was also whatsoever should happen unto it, destinated and appointed.

VI. Either with Epicurus, we must fondly imagine the atoms to be the cause of all things, or we must needs grant

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a nature. Let this then be thy first ground, that thou art part of that universe, which is governed by nature. Then secondly, that to those parts that are of the same kind and nature as thou art, thou hast relation of kindred. For of these, if I shall always be mindful, first as I am a part, I shall never be displeased with anything, that falls to my particular share of the common chances of the world. For nothing that is behoveful unto the whole, can be truly hurtful to that which is part of it. For this being the common privilege of all natures, that they contain nothing in themselves that is hurtful unto them ; it cannot be that the nature of the universe (whose privilege beyond other particular natures, is, that she cannot against her will by any higher external cause, be constrained,) should beget anything and cherish it in her bosom that should tend to her own hurt and prejudice. As then I bear in mind that I am a part of such an universe, I shall not be displeased with anything that happens. And as I have relation of kindred to those parts that are of the same kind and nature that I am, so I shall be careful to do nothing that is prejudicial to the community, but in all my deliberations shall they that are of my kind ever be ; and the common good, that, which all my intentions and resolutions shall drive unto, as that which is contrary unto it, I shall by all means endeavour to prevent and avoid. These things once so fixed and concluded, as thou wouldest think him a happy citizen, whose constant study and practice were for the good and benefit of his fellow citizens, and the carriage of the city such towards him, that he were well pleased with it ; so must it needs be with thee, that thou shalt live a happy life.

VII. All parts of the world, (all things I mean that are contained within the whole world,) must of necessity at

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some time or other come to corruption. Alteration I should say, to speak truly and properly ; but that I may be the better understood, I am content at this time to use that more common word. Now say I, if so be that this be both hurtful unto them, and yet unavoidable, would not, thinkest thou, the whole itself be in a sweet case, all the parts of it being subject to alteration, yea and by their making itself fitted for corruption, as consisting of things different and contrary ? And did nature then either of herself thus project and purpose the affliction and misery of her parts, and therefore of purpose so made them, not only that haply they might, but of necessity that they should fall into evil ; or did not she know what she did, when she made them ? For either of these two to say, is equally absurd. But to let pass nature in general, and to reason of things particular according to their own particular natures ; how absurd and ridiculous is it, first to say that all parts of the whole are, by their proper natural constitution, subject to alteration ; and then when any such thing doth happen, as when one doth fall sick and dieth, to take on and wonder as though some strange thing had happened ? Though this besides might move not so grievously to take on when any such thing doth happen, that whatsoever is dissolved, it is dissolved into those things, whereof it was compounded. For every dissolution is either a mere dispersion, of the elements into those elements again whereof everything did consist, or a change, of that which is more solid into earth ; and of that which is pure and subtile or spiritual, into air. So that by this means nothing is lost, but all resumed again into those rational generative seeds of the universe ; and this universe, either after a certain period of time to be consumed by fire, or by continual changes to be renewed, and so for ever to endure. Now that solid and spiritual that

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we speak of, thou must not conceive it to be that very same, which at first was, when thou wert born. For alas ! all this that now thou art in either kind, either for matter of substance, or of life, hath but two or three days ago partly from meats eaten, and partly from air breathed in, received all its influx, being the same then in no other respect, than a running river, maintained by the perpetual influx and new supply of waters, is the same. That therefore which thou hast since received, not that which came from thy mother, is that which comes to change and corruption. But suppose that that for the general substance, and more solid part of it, should still cleave unto thee never so close, yet what is that to the proper qualities and affections of it, by which persons are distinguished, which certainly are quite different ?

VIII. Now that thou hast taken these names upon thee of good, modest, true ; of ἔμφρων, σύμφρων, ὑπέρφρων ; take heed lest at any times by doing anything that is contrary, thou be but improperly so called, and lose thy right to these appellations. Or if thou do, return unto them again with all possible speed. And remember, that the word ἔμφρων notes unto thee an intent and intelligent consideration of every object that presents itself unto thee, without distraction. And the word σύμφρων, a ready and contented acceptation of whatsoever by the appointment of the common nature, happens unto thee. And the word ὑπέρφρων, a super-extension, or a transcendent, and out-reaching disposition of thy mind, whereby it passeth by all bodily pains and pleasures, honour and credit, death and whatsoever is of the same nature, as matters of absolute indifference, and in no wise to be stood upon by a wise man. These then if inviolably thou shalt observe, and shalt not be ambitious to be so called by others, both thou

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thyself shalt become a new man, and thou shalt begin a new life. For to continue such as hitherto thou hast been, to undergo those distractions and distempers as thou must needs for such a life as hitherto thou hast lived, is the part of one that is very foolish, and is overfond of his life. Whom a man might compare to one of those half-eaten wretches, matched in the amphitheatre with wild beasts ; who as full as they are all the body over with wounds and blood, desire for a great favour, that they may be reserved till the next day, then also, and in the same estate to be exposed to the same nails and teeth as before. Away therefore, ship thyself, and from the troubles and distractions of thy former life convey thyself as it were unto these few names ; and if thou canst abide in them, or be constant in the practice and possession of them, continue there as glad and joyful as one that were translated unto some such place of bliss and happiness as that which by Hesiod and Plato is called the Islands of the Blessed, by others called the Elysian Fields. And whosoever thou findest thyself, that thou art in danger of a relapse, and that thou art not able to master and overcome those difficulties and temptations that present themselves in thy present station : get thee into any private corner, where thou mayst be better able. Or if that will not serve, forsake even thy life rather. But so that it be not in passion, but in a plain voluntary modest way : this being the only commendable action of thy whole life, that thus thou art departed, or this having been the main work and business of thy whole life, that thou mightest thus depart. Now for the better remembrance of those names that we have spoken of, thou shalt find it a very good help, to remember the Gods as often as may be ; and that, the thing which they require at our hands, of as many of us, as are by nature reasonable

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creatures ; is not that with fair words, and outward show of piety and devotion we should flatter them, but that we should become like unto them : and that as all other natural creatures, the fig tree for example ; the dog, the bee ; both do, all of them, and apply themselves unto that, which by their natural constitution, is proper unto them ; so man likewise should do that, which by his nature, as he is a man, belongs unto him.

IX. Toys and fooleries at home ; wars abroad : sometimes terror, sometimes torpor, or stupid sloth : this is thy daily slavery. By little and little, if thou doest not better look to it, those sacred dogmata will be blotted out of thy mind. How many things be there, which when as a mere naturalist, thou hast barely considered of according to their nature, thou doest let pass without any further use ? Whereas thou shouldst in all things so join action and contemplation, that thou mightest both at the same time attend all present occasions, to perform everything duly and carefully ; and yet so intend the contemplative part too, that no part of that delight and pleasure, which the contemplative knowledge of everything according to its true nature doth of itself afford, might be lost. Or, that the true and contemplative knowledge of everything according to its own nature, might of itself, (action being subject to many lets and impediments) afford unto thee sufficient pleasure and happiness. Not apparent indeed, but not concealed. And when shalt thou attain to the happiness of true simplicity, and unaffected gravity ? When shalt thou rejoice in the certain knowledge of every particular object according to its true nature : as what the matter and substance of it is ; what use it is for in the world : how long it can subsist : what things it doth consist of : who they be that are capable of it, and who they that can give it, and take it away ?

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X. As the spider, when it hath caught the fly that it hunted after, is not little proud, nor meanly conceited of herself: as he likewise that hath caught an hare, or hath taken a fish with his net: as another for the taking of a boar, and another of a bear: so may they be proud, and applaud themselves for their valiant acts against the Sarmatæ, or northern nations lately defeated. For these also, these famous soldiers and warlike men, if thou dost look into their minds and opinions, what do they for the most part but hunt after prey?

XI. To find out, and set to thyself some certain way and method of contemplation, whereby thou mayest clearly discern and represent unto thyself, the mutual change of all things, the one into the other. Bear it in thy mind evermore, and see that thou be thoroughly well exercised in this particular. For there is not anything more effectual to beget true magnanimity.

XII. He hath got loose from the bonds of his body, and perceiving that within a very little while he must of necessity bid the world farewell, and leave all these things behind him, he wholly applied himself, as to righteousness in all his actions, so to the common nature in all things that should happen unto him. And contenting himself with these two things, to do all things justly, and whatsoever God doth send to like well of it: what others shall either say or think of him, or shall do against him, he doth not so much as trouble his thoughts with it. To go on straight, whither right and reason directed him, and by so doing to follow God, was the only thing that he did mind, that, his only business and occupation.

XIII. What use is there of suspicion at all? or, why should thoughts of mistrust, and suspicion concerning that which is future, trouble thy mind at all? What now is to

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be done, if thou mayest search and inquire into that, what needs thou care for more? And if thou art well able to perceive it alone, let no man divert thee from it. But if alone thou doest not so well perceive it, suspend thine action, and take advice from the best. And if there be anything else that doth hinder thee, go on with prudence and discretion, according to the present occasion and opportunity, still proposing that unto thyself, which thou doest conceive most right and just. For to hit that aright, and to speed in the prosecution of it, must needs be happiness, since it is that only which we can truly and properly be said to miss of, or miscarry in.

XIV. What is that that is slow, and yet quick? merry, and yet grave? He that in all things doth follow reason for his guide.

XV. In the morning as soon as thou art awaked, when thy judgment, before either thy affections, or external objects have wrought upon it, is yet most free and impartial: put this question to thyself, whether if that which is right and just be done, the doing of it by thyself, or by others when thou art not able thyself, be a thing material or no. For sure it is not. And as for these that keep such a life, and stand so much upon the praises, or dispraises of other men, hast thou forgotten: what manner of men they be? that such and such upon their beds, and such at their board: what their ordinary actions are: what they pursue after, and what they fly from: what thefts and rapines they commit, if not with their hands and feet, yet with that more precious part of theirs, their minds: which (would it but admit of them) might enjoy faith, modesty, truth, justice, a good spirit.

XVI. Give what thou wilt, and take away what thou wilt, saith he that is well taught and truly modest, to Him that gives, and takes away. And it is not out of a stout

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and peremptory resolution, that he saith it, but in mere love, and humble submission.

XVII. So live as indifferent to the world and all worldly objects, as one who liveth by himself alone upon some desert hill. For whether here, or there, if the whole world be but as one town, it matters not much for the place. Let them behold and see a man, that is a man indeed, living according to the true nature of man. If they cannot bear with me, let them kill me. For better were it to die, than so to live as they would have thee.

XVIII. Make it not any longer a matter of dispute or discourse, what are the signs and proprieties of a good man, but really and actually to be such.

XIX. Ever to represent unto thyself, and to set before thee, both the general age and time of the world, and the whole substance of it. And how all things particular in respect of these are for their substance, as one of the least seeds that is : and for their duration, as the turning of the pestle in the mortar once about. Then to fix thy mind upon every particular object of the world, and to conceive it, (as it is indeed,) as already being in the state of dissolution, and of change ; tending to some kind of either putrefaction or dispersion ; or whatsoever else it is, that is the death as it were of everything in his own kind.

XX. Consider them through all actions and occupations, of their lives : as when they eat, and when they sleep : when they are in the act of necessary exoneration, and when in the act of lust. Again, when they either are in their greatest exultation ; and in the middle of all their pomp and glory ; or being angry and displeased, in great state and majesty, as from an higher place, they chide and rebuke. How base and slavish, but a little while ago, they were fain to be, that they might come to this ; and within

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a very little while what will be their estate, when death hath once seized upon them.

XXI. That is best for every one, that the common nature of all doth send unto every one, and then is it best, when she doth send it.

XXII. The earth, saith the poet, doth often long after the rain. So is the glorious sky often as desirous to fall upon the earth, which argues a mutual kind of love between them. And so (say I) doth the world bear a certain affection of love to whatsoever shall come to pass. With thine affections shall mine concur, O world. The same (and no other,) shall the object of my longing be, which is of thine. Now that the world doth love, as it is true indeed, so is it as commonly said, and acknowledged, when, according to the Greek phrase, imitated by the Latins, of things that use to be, we say commonly, that they love to be.

XXIII. Either thou doest continue in this kind of life, and that is it, which so long thou hast been used unto and therefore tolerable : or thou doest retire, or leave the world, and that of thine own accord, and then thou hast thy mind : or thy life is cut off, and then mayest thou rejoice that thou hast ended thy charge. One of these must needs be. Be therefore of good comfort.

XXIV. Let it always appear and be manifest unto thee, that solitariness, and desert places, by many philosophers so much esteemed of and affected, are of themselves but thus and thus ; and that all things are here to them that live in towns, and converse with others : as they are the same nature everywhere to be seen and observed : to them that have retired themselves to the top of mountains, and to desert havens, or what other desert and inhabited places soever. For anywhere if thou wilt mayest thou quickly find and apply that to thyself, which Plato saith of his philosopher,

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in a place ; as private and retired, saith he, as if he were shut up and enclosed about in some shepherd's lodge, on the top of a hill. There by thyself to put these questions to thyself, or to enter in these considerations : What is my chief and principal part, which hath power over the rest ? What is now the present estate of it, as I use it ; and what is it, that I employ it about ? Is it now void of reason or no ? Is it free, and separated ; or so affixed, so congealed and grown together as it were with the flesh, that it is swayed by the motions and inclinations of it ?

XXV. He that runs away from his master, is a fugitive. But the law is every man's master. He therefore that forsakes the law, is a fugitive. So is he, whosoever he be, that is either sorry, angry, or afraid, or for anything that either hath been, is, or shall be by his appointment, who is the Lord and Governor of the universe. For he truly and properly is *Nόμος*, or the law, as the only *νέμων*, or distributor and dispenser of all things that happen unto any one in his lifetime. Whatsoever then is either sorry, angry, or afraid, is a fugitive.

XXVI. From man is the seed, that once cast into the womb, man hath no more to do with it. Another cause succeedeth, and undertakes the work, and in time brings a child (that wonderful effect from such a beginning !) to perfection. Again, man lets food down through his throat ; and that once down, he hath no more to do with it. Another cause succeedeth and distributeth this food into the senses, and the affections : into life, and into strength ; and doth with it those other many and marvellous things, that belong unto man. These things therefore that are so secretly and invisibly wrought and brought to pass, thou must use to behold and contemplate ; and not the things themselves only, but the power also by which they are

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effected ; that thou mayst behold it, though not with the eyes of the body, yet as plainly and visibly as thou canst see and discern the outward efficient cause of the depression and elevation of anything.

XXVII. Ever to mind and consider with thyself, how all things that now are, have been heretofore much after the same sort, and after the same fashion that now they are: and so to think of those things which shall be hereafter also. Moreover, whole dramata, and uniform scenes, or scenes that comprehend the lives and actions of men of one calling and profession, as many as either in thine own experience thou hast known, or by reading of ancient histories ; (as the whole court of Adrianus, the whole court of Antoninus Pius, the whole court of Philippus, that of Alexander, that of Crœsus) : to set them all before thine eyes. For thou shalt find that they are all but after one sort and fashion : only that the actors were others.

XXVIII. As a pig that cries and flings when his throat is cut, fancy to thyself every one to be, that grieves for any worldly thing and takes on. Such a one is he also, who upon his bed alone, doth bewail the miseries of this our mortal life. And remember this, that unto reasonable creatures only it is granted that they may willingly and freely submit unto Providence : but absolutely to submit, is a necessity imposed upon all creatures equally.

XXIX. Whatsoever it is that thou goest about, consider of it by thyself, and ask thyself, What ? because I shall do this no more when I am dead, should therefore death seem grievous unto me ?

XXX. When thou art offended with any man's transgression, presently reflect upon thyself, and consider what thou thyself art guilty of in the same kind. As that thou

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also perchance dost think it a happiness either to be rich, or to live in pleasure, or to be praised and commended, and so of the rest in particular. For this if thou shalt call to mind, thou shalt soon forget thine anger ; especially when at the same time this also shall concur in thy thoughts, that he was constrained by his error and ignorance so to do : for how can he choose as long as he is of that opinion ? Do thou therefore if thou canst, take away that from him, that forceth him to do as he doth.

XXXI. When thou seest Satyro, think of Socratus, and Eutyches, or Hymen, and when Euphrates, think of Eutychio, and Sylvanus, when Alciphron, of Tropæophorus, when Xenophon, of Crito, or Severus. And when thou doest look upon thyself, fancy unto thyself some one or other of the Cæsars ; and so for every one, some one or other that hath been for estate and profession answerable unto him. Then let this come to thy mind at the same time ; and where now are they all ? Nowhere or anywhere ? For so shalt thou at all times be able to perceive how all worldly things are but as the smoke, that vanisheth away : or, indeed, mere nothing. Especially when thou shalt call to mind this also, that whatsoever is once changed, shall never be again as long as the world endureth. And thou then, how long shalt thou endure ? And why doth it not suffice thee, if virtuously, and as becometh thee, thou mayest pass that portion of time, how little soever it be, that is allotted unto thee ?

XXXII. What a subject, and what a course of life is it, that thou doest so much desire to be rid of. For all these things, what are they, but fit objects for an understanding, that beholdeth everything according to its true nature, to exercise itself upon ? Be patient therefore, until that (as a strong stomach that turns all things into his own

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nature ; and as a great fire that turneth in flame and light, whatsoever thou doest cast into it) thou have made these things also familiar, and as it were natural unto thee.

XXXIII. Let it not be in any man's power, to say truly of thee, that thou art not truly simple, or sincere and open, or not good. Let him be deceived whosoever he be that shall have any such opinion of thee. For all this doth depend of thee. For who is it that should hinder thee from being either truly simple or good ? Do thou only resolve rather not to live, than not to be such. For indeed neither doth it stand with reason that he should live that is not such. What then is it that may upon this present occasion according to best reason and discretion, either be said or done ? For whatsoever it be, it is in thy power either to do it, or to say it, and therefore seek not any pretences, as though thou wert hindered. Thou wilt never cease groaning and complaining, until such time as that, what pleasure is unto the voluptuous, be unto thee, to do in everything that presents itself, whatsoever may be done conformably and agreeably to the proper constitution of man, or, to man as he is a man. For thou must account that pleasure, whatsoever it be, that thou mayest do according to thine own nature. And to do this, every place will fit thee. Unto the *cylindrus*, or roller, it is not granted to move everywhere according to its own proper motion, as neither unto the water, nor unto the fire, nor unto any other thing, that either is merely natural, or natural and sensitive ; but not rational. For many things there be that can hinder their operations. But of the mind and understanding this is the proper privilege, that according to its own nature, and as it will itself, it can pass through every obstacle that it finds, and keep straight on forwards.

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Setting therefore before thine eyes this happiness and felicity of thy mind, whereby it is able to pass through all things, and is capable of all motions, whether as the fire, upwards ; or as the stone downwards, or as the *cylindrus* through that which is sloping : content thyself with it, and seek not after any other thing. For all other kind of hindrances that are not hindrances of thy mind either they are proper to the body, or merely proceed from the opinion, reason not making that resistance that it should, but basely, and cowardly suffering itself to be foiled ; and of themselves can neither wound, nor do any hurt at all. Else must he of necessity, whosoever he be that meets with any of them, become worse than he was before. For so is it in all other subjects, that that is thought hurtful unto them, whereby they are made worse. But here contrariwise, man (if he make that good use of them that he should) is rather the better and the more praiseworthy for any of those kind of hindrances, than otherwise. But generally remember that nothing can hurt a natural citizen, that is not hurtful unto the city itself, nor anything hurt the city, that is not hurtful unto the law itself. But none of these casualties, or external hindrances, do hurt the law itself ; or, are contrary to that course of justice and equity, by which public societies are maintained : neither therefore do they hurt either city or citizen.

XXXIV. As he that is bitten by a mad dog, is afraid of everything almost that he seeth : so unto him, whom the dogmata have once bitten, or in whom true knowledge hath made an impression, everything almost that he sees or reads be it never so short or ordinary, doth afford a good memento ; to put him out of all grief and fear, as that of the poet, ‘The winds blow upon the trees, and their leaves fall upon the ground. Then do the trees begin to bud

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again, and by the spring-time they put forth new branches. So is the generation of men ; some come into the world, and others go out of it.' Of these leaves then thy children are. And they also that applaud thee so gravely, or, that applaud thy speeches, with that their usual acclamation, *ἀξιοπλοτῶς*, O wisely spoken ! and speak well of thee, as on the other side, they that stick not to curse thee, they that privately and secretly dispraise and deride thee, they also are but leaves. And they also that shall follow, in whose memories the names of men famous after death, is preserved, they are but leaves neither. For even so is it of all these worldly things. Their spring comes, and they are put forth. Then blows the wind, and they go down. And then in lieu of them grow others out of the wood or common matter of all things, like unto them. But, to endure but for a while, is common unto all. Why then shouldest thou so earnestly either seek after these things, or fly from them, as though they should endure for ever ? Yet a little while, and thine eyes will be closed up, and for him that carries thee to thy grave shall another mourn within a while after.

XXXV. A good eye must be good to see whatsoever is to be seen, and not green things only. For that is proper to sore eyes. So must a good ear, and a good smell be ready for whatsoever is either to be heard, or smelt : and a good stomach as indifferent to all kinds of food, as a mill-stone is, to whatsoever she was made for, to grind. As ready therefore must a sound understanding be for whatsoever shall happen. But he that saith, O that my children might live ! and, O that all men might commend me for whatsoever I do ! is an eye that seeks after green things ; or as teeth, after that which is tender.

XXXVI. There is not any man that is so happy in

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his death, but that some of those that are by him when he dies, will be ready to rejoice at his supposed calamity. Is it one that was virtuous and wise indeed? Will there not some one or other be found, who thus will say to himself, 'Well now at last shall I be at rest from this pedagogue. He did not indeed otherwise trouble us much: but I know well enough that in his heart, he did much condemn us.' Thus will they speak of the virtuous. But as for us, alas! how many things be there, for which there be many that glad would be to be rid of us. This therefore if thou shalt think of whensoever thou diest, thou shalt die the more willingly, when thou shalt think with thyself, I am now to depart from that world, wherein those that have been my nearest friends and acquaintances, they whom I have so much suffered for, so often prayed for, and for whom I have taken such care, even they would have me die, hoping that after my death they shall live happier, than they did before. What then should any man desire to continue here any longer? Nevertheless, whensoever thou diest, thou must not be less kind and loving unto them for it; but as before, see them, continue to be their friend, to wish them well, and meekly, and gently to carry thyself towards them, but yet so that on the other side, it make thee not the more unwilling to die. But as it fareth with them that die an easy quick death, whose soul is soon separated from their bodies, so must thy separation from them be. To these had nature joined and annexed me: now she parts us; I am ready to depart, as from friends and kinsmen, but yet without either reluctance or compulsion. For this also is according to Nature.

XXXVII. Use thyself, as often, as thou seest any man do anything, presently (if it be possible) to say unto thyself, What is this man's end in this his action? But begin this

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course with thyself first of all, and diligently examine thyself concerning whatsoever thou doest.

XXXVIII. Remember, that that which sets a man at work, and hath power over the affections to draw them either one way, or the other way, is not any external thing properly, but that which is hidden within every man's dogmata, and opinions : That, that is rhetoric ; that is life ; that (to speak true) is man himself. As for thy body, which as a vessel, or a case, compasseth thee about, and the many and curious instruments that it hath annexed unto it, let them not trouble thy thoughts. For of themselves they are but as a carpenter's axe, but that they are born with us, and naturally sticking unto us. But otherwise, without the inward cause that hath power to move them, and to restrain them, those parts are of themselves of no more use unto us, than the shuttle is of itself to the weaver, or the pen to the writer, or the whip to the coachman.



## The Eleventh Book



HE natural properties, and privileges of a reasonable soul are: That she seeth herself; that she can order, and compose herself: that she makes herself as she will herself: that she reaps her own fruits whatsoever, whereas plants, trees, unreasonable creatures, what fruit soever (be it either fruit properly, or analogically only) they bear, they bear them unto others, and not to themselves. Again; whensoever, and wheresoever, sooner or later, her life doth end, she hath her own end nevertheless. For it is not with her, as with dancers and players, who if they be interrupted in any part of their action, the whole action must needs be imperfect: but she in what part of time or action soever she be surprised, can make that which she hath in her hand whatsoever it be, complete and full, so that she may depart with that comfort, 'I have lived; neither want I anything of that which properly did belong unto me.' Again, she compasseth the whole world, and penetrateth into the vanity, and mere outside (wanting substance and solidity) of it, and stretcheth herself unto the infiniteness of eternity; and the revolution or restoration of all things after a certain period of time, to the same state and place as before, she fetcheth about, and doth comprehend in herself; and considers withal, and sees clearly this, that neither they that shall follow us, shall see any new thing, that we have not seen, nor they that went before, anything more than we: but that he that is once come to forty (if

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he have any wit at all) can in a manner (for that they are all of one kind) see all things, both past, and future. As proper is it, and natural to the soul of man to love her neighbour, to be true and modest ; and to regard nothing so much as herself : which is also the property of the law : whereby by the way it appears, that sound reason and justice comes all to one, and therefore that justice is the chief thing, that reasonable creatures ought to propose unto themselves as their end.

II. A pleasant song or dance ; the Pancratiast's exercise, sports that thou art wont to be much taken with, thou shalt easily contemn ; if the harmonious voice thou shalt divide into so many particular sounds whereof it doth consist, and of every one in particular shall ask thyself, whether this or that sound is it, that doth so conquer thee. For thou wilt be ashamed of it. And so for shame, if accordingly thou shalt consider it, every particular motion and posture by itself : and so for the wrestler's exercise too. Generally then, whatsoever it be, besides virtue, and those things that proceed from virtue that thou art subject to be much affected with, remember presently thus to divide it, and by this kind of division, in each particular to attain unto the contempt of the whole. This thou must transfer and apply to thy whole life also.

III. That soul which is ever ready, even now presently (if need be) from the body, whether by way of extinction, or dispersion, or continuation in another place and estate to be separated, how blessed and happy is it ! But this readiness of it, it must proceed, not from an obstinate and peremptory resolution of the mind, violently and passionately set upon opposition, as Christians are wont ; but from a peculiar judgment ; with discretion and gravity, so that others may be persuaded also and drawn to the like

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example, but without any noise and passionate exclamations.

IV. Have I done anything charitably? then am I benefited by it. See that this upon all occasions may present itself unto thy mind, and never cease to think of it. What is thy profession? to be good. And how should this be well brought to pass, but by certain theorems and doctrines; some concerning the nature of the universe, and some concerning the proper and particular constitution of man?

V. Tragedies were at first brought in and instituted, to put men in mind of worldly chances and casualties: that these things in the ordinary course of nature did so happen: that men that were much pleased and delighted by such accidents upon this stage, would not by the same things in a greater stage be grieved and afflicted: for here you see what is the end of all such things; and that even they that cry out so mournfully to Cithaeron, must bear them for all their cries and exclamations, as well as others. And in very truth many good things are spoken by these poets; as that (for example) is an excellent passage: ‘But if so be that I and my two children be neglected by the Gods, they have some reason even for that,’ &c. And again, ‘It will but little avail thee to storm and rage against the things themselves,’ &c. Again, ‘To reap one’s life, as a ripe ear of corn;’ and whatsoever else is to be found in them, that is of the same kind. After the tragedy, the ancient comedy was brought in, which had the liberty to inveigh against personal vices; being therefore through this her freedom and liberty of speech of very good use and effect, to restrain men from pride and arrogancy. To which end it was, that Diogenes took also the same liberty. After these, what were either the Middle, or New Comedy

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admitted for, but merely, (or for the most part at least) for the delight and pleasure of curious and excellent imitation ? ‘It will steal away ; look to it,’ &c. Why, no man denies, but that these also have some good things whereof that may be one : but the whole drift and foundation of that kind of dramatical poetry, what is it else, but as we have said ?

VI. How clearly doth it appear unto thee, that no other course of thy life could fit a true philosopher’s practice better, than this very course, that thou art now already in ?

VII. A branch cut off from the continuity of that which was next unto it, must needs be cut off from the whole tree : so a man that is divided from another man, is divided from the whole society. A branch is cut off by another, but he that hates and is averse, cuts himself off from his neighbour, and knows not that at the same time he divides himself from the whole body, or corporation. But herein is the gift and mercy of God, the Author of this society, in that, once cut off we may grow together and become part of the whole again. But if this happen often the misery is that the further a man is run in this division, the harder he is to be reunited and restored again : and however the branch which, once cut off, afterwards was grafted in, gardeners can tell you is not like that which sprouted together at first, and still continued in the unity of the body.

VIII. To grow together like fellow branches in matter of good correspondence and affection ; but not in matter of opinions. They that shall oppose thee in thy right courses, as it is not in their power to divert thee from thy good action, so neither let it be to divert thee from thy good affection towards them. But be it thy care to keep thyself constant in both ; both in a right judgment and action, and in true meekness towards them, that either shall do their endeavour to hinder thee, or at least will be displeased with thee for

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what thou hast done. For to fail in either (either in the one to give over for fear, or in the other to forsake thy natural affection towards him, who by nature is both thy friend and thy kinsman) is equally base, and much savouring of the disposition of a cowardly fugitive soldier.

IX. It is not possible that any nature should be inferior unto art, since that all arts imitate nature. If this be so ; that the most perfect and general nature of all natures should in her operation come short of the skill of arts, is most improbable. Now common is it to all arts, to make that which is worse for the better's sake. Much more then doth the common nature do the same. Hence is the first ground of justice. From justice all other virtues have their existence. For justice cannot be preserved, if either we settle our minds and affections upon worldly things ; or be apt to be deceived, or rash, and inconstant.

X. The things themselves (which either to get or to avoid thou art put to so much trouble) come not unto thee themselves ; but thou in a manner goest unto them. Let then thine own judgment and opinion concerning those things be at rest ; and as for the things themselves, they stand still and quiet, without any noise or stir at all ; and so shall all pursuing and flying cease.

XI. Then is the soul as Empedocles doth liken it, like unto a sphere or globe, when she is all of one form and figure : when she neither greedily stretcheth out herself unto anything, nor basely contracts herself, or lies flat and dejected ; but shineth all with light, whereby she does see and behold the true nature, both that of the universe, and her own in particular.

XII. Will any contemn me ? let him look to that, upon what grounds he does it : my care shall be that I may never be found either doing or speaking anything that doth truly

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deserve contempt. Will any hate me? let him look to that. I for my part will be kind and loving unto all, and even unto him that hates me, whomsoever he be, will I be ready to show his error, not by way of exprobation or ostentation of my patience, but ingenuously and meekly: such as was that famous Phocion, if so be that he did not dissemble. For it is inwardly that these things must be: that the Gods who look inwardly, and not upon the outward appearance, may behold a man truly free from all indignation and grief. For what hurt can it be unto thee whatsoever any man else doth, as long as thou mayest do that which is proper and suitable to thine own nature? Wilt not thou (a man wholly appointed to be both what, and as the common good shall require) accept of that which is now seasonable to the nature of the universe?

XIII. They contemn one another, and yet they seek to please one another: and whilst they seek to surpass one another in worldly pomp and greatness, they most debase and prostitute themselves in their better part one to another.

XIV. How rotten and insincere is he, that saith, I am resolved to carry myself hereafter towards you with all ingenuity and simplicity. O man, what doest thou mean! what needs this profession of thine? the thing itself will show it. It ought to be written upon thy forehead. No sooner thy voice is heard, than thy countenance must be able to show what is in thy mind: even as he that is loved knows presently by the looks of his sweetheart what is in her mind. Such must he be for all the world, that is truly simple and good, as he whose arm-holes are offensive, that whosoever stands by, as soon as ever he comes near him, may as it were smell him whether he will or no. But the affectation of simplicity is nowise laudable. There is nothing more shameful than perfidious friendship. Above all things,

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that must be avoided. However true goodness, simplicity, and kindness cannot so be hidden, but that as we have already said in the very eyes and countenance they will show themselves.

XV. To live happily is an inward power of the soul, when she is affected with indifference, towards those things that are by their nature indifferent. To be thus affected she must consider all worldly objects both divided and whole : remembering withal that no object can of itself beget any opinion in us, neither can come to us, but stands without still and quiet ; but that we ourselves beget, and as it were print in ourselves opinions concerning them. Now it is in our power, not to print them ; and if they creep in and lurk in some corner, it is in our power to wipe them off. Remembering moreover, that this care and circumspection of thine, is to continue but for a while, and then thy life will be at an end. And what should hinder, but that thou mayest do well with all these things ? For if they be according to nature, rejoice in them, and let them be pleasing and acceptable unto thee. But if they be against nature, seek thou that which is according to thine own nature, and whether it be for thy credit or no, use all possible speed for the attainment of it : for no man ought to be blamed, for seeking his own good and happiness.

XVI. Of everything thou must consider from whence it came, of what things it doth consist, and into what it will be changed : what will be the nature of it, or what it will be like unto when it is changed ; and that it can suffer no hurt by this change. And as for other men's either foolishness or wickedness, that it may not trouble and grieve thee ; first generally thus ; What reference have I unto these ? and that we are all born for one another's good : then more particularly after another consideration ; as a ram is first in

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a flock of sheep, and a bull in a herd of cattle, so am I born to rule over them. Begin yet higher, even from this : if atoms be not the beginning of all things, than which to believe nothing can be more absurd, then must we needs grant that there is a nature, that doth govern the universe. If such a nature, then are all worse things made for the better's sake ; and all better for one another's sake. Secondly, what manner of men they be, at board, and upon their beds, and so forth. But above all things, how they are forced by their opinions that they hold, to do what they do ; and even those things that they do, with what pride and self-conceit they do them. Thirdly, that if they do these things rightly, thou hast no reason to be grieved. But if not rightly, it must needs be that they do them against their wills, and through mere ignorance. For as, according to Plato's opinion, no soul doth willingly err, so by consequent neither doth it anything otherwise than it ought, but against her will. Therefore are they grieved, whosoever they hear themselves charged, either of injustice, or unconscionableness, or covetousness, or in general, of any injurious kind of dealing towards their neighbours. Fourthly, that thou thyself doest transgress in many things, and art even such another as they are. And though perchance thou doest forbear the very act of some sins, yet hast thou in thyself an habitual disposition to them, but that either through fear, or vainglory, or some such other ambitious foolish respect, thou art restrained. Fifthly, that whether they have sinned or no, thou doest not understand perfectly. For many things are done by way of discreet policy ; and generally a man must know many things first, before he be able truly and judiciously to judge of another man's action. Sixthly, that whosoever thou doest take on grievously, or makest great woe, little doest thou remember then that a

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man's life is but for a moment of time, and that within a while we shall all be in our graves. Seventhly, that it is not the sins and transgressions themselves that trouble us properly ; for they have their existence in their minds and understandings only, that commit them ; but our own opinions concerning those sins. Remove then, and be content to part with that conceit of thine, that it is a grievous thing, and thou hast removed thine anger. But how should I remove it ? How ? reasoning with thyself that it is not shameful. For if that which is shameful, be not the only true evil that is, thou also wilt be driven whilst thou doest follow the common instinct of nature, to avoid that which is evil, to commit many unjust things, and to become a thief, and anything, that will make to the attainment of thy intended worldly ends. Eighthly, how many things may and do oftentimes follow upon such fits of anger and grief ; far more grievous in themselves, than those very things which we are so grieved or angry for. Ninthly, that meekness is a thing unconquerable, if it be true and natural, and not affected or hypocritical. For how shall even the most fierce and malicious that thou shalt conceive, be able to hold on against thee, if thou shalt still continue meek and loving unto him ; and that even at that time, when he is about to do thee wrong, thou shalt be well disposed, and in good temper, with all meekness to teach him, and to instruct him better ? As for example ; My son, we were not born for this, to hurt and annoy one another ; it will be thy hurt not mine, my son : and so to show him forcibly and fully, that it is so in very deed : and that neither bees do it one to another, nor any other creatures that are naturally sociable. But this thou must do, not scoffingly, not by way of exprobation, but tenderly without any harshness of words. Neither must thou do it by way of exercise,

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or ostentation, that they that are by and hear thee, may admire thee : but so always that nobody be privy to it, but himself alone : yea, though there be more present at the same time. These nine particular heads, as so many gifts from the Muses, see that thou remember well : and begin one day, whilst thou art yet alive, to be a man indeed. But on the other side thou must take heed, as much to flatter them, as to be angry with them : for both are equally uncharitable, and equally hurtful. And in thy passions, take it presently to thy consideration, that to be angry is not the part of a man, but that to be meek and gentle, as it savours of more humanity, so of more manhood. That in this, there is strength and nerves, or vigour and fortitude : whereof anger and indignation is altogether void. For the nearer everything is unto unpassionateness, the nearer it is unto power. And as grief doth proceed from weakness, so doth anger. For both, both he that is angry and that grieveth, have received a wound, and cowardly have as it were yielded themselves unto their affections. If thou wilt have a tenth also, receive this tenth gift from Hercules the guide and leader of the Muses : that is a mad man's part, to look that there should be no wicked men in the world, because it is impossible. Now for a man to brook well enough, that there should be wicked men in the world, but not to endure that any should transgress against himself, is against all equity, and indeed tyrannical.

XVII. Four several dispositions or inclinations there be of the mind and understanding, which to be aware of, thou must carefully observe : and whensoever thou doest discover them, thou must rectify them, saying to thyself concerning every one of them, This imagination is not necessary ; this is uncharitable : this thou shalt speak as another man's slave, or instrument ; than which nothing

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can be more senseless and absurd : for the fourth, thou shalt sharply check and upbraid thyself, for that thou doest suffer that more divine part in thee, to become subject and obnoxious to that more ignoble part of thy body, and the gross lusts and concupiscences thereof.

XVIII. What portion soever, either of air or fire there be in thee, although by nature it tend upwards, submitting nevertheless to the ordinance of the universe, it abides here below in this mixed body. So whatsoever is in thee, either earthy, or humid, although by nature it tend downwards, yet is it against its nature both raised upwards, and standing, or consistent. So obedient are even the elements themselves to the universe, abiding patiently wheresoever (though against their nature) they are placed, until the sound as it were of their retreat, and separation. Is it not a grievous thing then, that thy reasonable part only should be disobedient, and should not endure to keep its place : yea though it be nothing enjoined that is contrary unto it, but that only which is according to its nature ? For we cannot say of it when it is disobedient, as we say of the fire, or air, that it tends upwards towards its proper element, for then goes it the quite contrary way. For the motion of the mind to any injustice, or incontinency, or to sorrow, or to fear, is nothing else but a separation from nature. Also when the mind is grieved for anything that is happened by the divine providence, then doth it likewise forsake its own place. For it was ordained unto holiness and godliness, which specially consist in an humble submission to God and His providence in all things ; as well as unto justice : these also being part of those duties, which as naturally sociable, we are bound unto ; and without which we cannot happily converse one with another : yea and the very ground and fountain indeed of all just actions.

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XIX. He that hath not one and the self-same general end always as long as he liveth, cannot possibly be one and the self-same man always. But this will not suffice except thou add also what ought to be this general end. For as the general conceit and apprehension of all those things which upon no certain ground are by the greater part of men deemed good, cannot be uniform and agreeable, but that only which is limited and restrained by some certain proprieties and conditions, as of community : that nothing be conceived good, which is not commonly and publicly good : so must the end also that we propose unto ourselves, be common and sociable. For he that doth direct all his own private motions and purposes to that end, all his actions will be agreeable and uniform ; and by that means will be still the same man.

XX. Remember the fable of the country mouse and the city mouse, and the great fright and terror that this was put into.

XXI. Socrates was wont to call the common conceits and opinions of men, the common bugbears of the world : the proper terror of silly children.

XXII. The Lacedæmonians at their public spectacles were wont to appoint seats and forms for their strangers in the shadow, they themselves were content to sit anywhere.

XXIII. What Socrates answered unto Perdiccas, why he did not come unto him, Lest of all deaths I should die the worst kind of death, said he : that is, not able to re-quite the good that hath been done unto me.

XXIV. In the ancient mystical letters of the Ephesians, there was an item, that a man should always have in his mind some one or other of the ancient worthies.

XXV. The Pythagoreans were wont betimes in the morning the first thing they did, to look up unto the

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heavens, to put themselves in mind of them who constantly and invariably did perform their task : as also to put themselves in mind of orderliness, or good order, and of purity, and of naked simplicity. For no star or planet hath any cover before it.

**XXVI.** How Socrates looked, when he was fain to gird himself with a skin, Xanthippe his wife having taken away his clothes, and carried them abroad with her, and what he said to his fellows and friends, who were ashamed ; and out of respect to him, did retire themselves when they saw him thus decked.

**XXVII.** In matter of writing or reading thou must needs be taught before thou can do either : much more in matter of life. ‘For thou art born a mere slave, to thy senses and brutish affections ;’ destitute without teaching of all true knowledge and sound reason.

**XXVIII.** ‘My heart smiled within me.’ ‘They will accuse even virtue herself, with heinous and opprobrious words.’

**XXIX.** As they that long after figs in winter when they cannot be had ; so are they that long after children, before they be granted them.

**XXX.** ‘As often as a father kisseth his child, he should say secretly with himself’ (said Epictetus,) ‘to-morrow perchance shall he die.’ But these words be ominous. No words ominous (said he) that signify anything that is natural : in very truth and deed not more ominous than this, ‘to cut down grapes when they are ripe.’ Green grapes, ripe grapes, dried grapes, or raisins : so many changes and mutations of one thing, not into that which was not absolutely, but rather so many several changes and mutations, not into that which hath no being at all, but into that which is not yet in being.

## His Meditations

XXXI. ‘Of the free will there is no thief or robber :’ out of Epictetus ; Whose is this also : that we should find a certain art and method of assenting ; and that we should always observe with great care and heed the inclinations of our minds, that they may always be with their due restraint and reservation, always charitable, and according to the true worth of every present object. And as for earnest longing, that we should altogether avoid it : and to use averseness in those things only, that wholly depend of our own wills. It is not about ordinary petty matters, believe it, that all our strife and contention is, but whether, with the vulgar, we should be mad, or by the help of philosophy wise and sober, said he.

XXXII. Socrates said, ‘What will you have ? the souls of reasonable, or unreasonable creatures ? Of reasonable. But what ? Of those whose reason is sound and perfect ? or of those whose reason is vitiated and corrupted ? Of those whose reason is sound and perfect. Why then labour ye not for such ? Because we have them already. What then do ye so strive and contend between you ?’



## The Twelfth Book



HATSOEVER thou doest hereafter aspire unto, thou mayest even now enjoy and possess, if thou doest not envy thyself thine own happiness. And that will be, if thou shalt forget all that is past, and for the future, refer thyself wholly to the Divine Providence, and shalt bend and apply all thy present thoughts and intentions to holiness and righteousness. To holiness, in accepting willingly whatsoever is sent by the Divine Providence, as being that which the nature of the universe hath appointed unto thee, which also hath appointed thee for that, whatsoever it be. To righteousness, in speaking the truth freely, and without ambiguity ; and in doing all things justly and discreetly. Now in this good course, let not other men's either wickedness, or opinion, or voice hinder thee : no, nor the sense of this thy pampered mass of flesh : for let that which suffers, look to itself. If therefore whosoever the time of thy departing shall come, thou shalt readily leave all things, and shalt respect thy mind only, and that divine part of thine, and this shall be thine only fear, not that some time or other thou shalt cease to live, but thou shalt never begin to live according to nature : then shalt thou be a man indeed, worthy of that world, from which thou hadst thy beginning ; then shalt thou cease to be a stranger in thy country, and to wonder at those things that happen daily, as things strange and unexpected, and anxiously to depend of divers things that are not in thy power.

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II. God beholds our minds and understandings, bare and naked from these material vessels, and outsides, and all earthly dross. For with His simple and pure understanding, He pierceth into our inmost and purest parts, which from His, as it were by a water pipe and channel, first flowed and issued. This if thou also shalt use to do, thou shalt rid thyself of that manifold luggage, wherewith thou art round about encumbered. For he that does regard neither his body, nor his clothing, nor his dwelling, nor any such external furniture, must needs gain unto himself great rest and ease. Three things there be in all, which thou doest consist of ; thy body, thy life, and thy mind. Of these the two former, are so far forth thine, as that thou art bound to take care for them. But the third alone is that which is properly thine. If then thou shalt separate from thyself, that is from thy mind, whatsoever other men either do or say, or whatsoever thou thyself hast heretofore either done or said ; and all troublesome thoughts concerning the future, and whatsoever, (as either belonging to thy body or life :) is without the jurisdiction of thine own will, and whatsoever in the ordinary course of human chances and accidents doth happen unto thee ; so that thy mind (keeping herself loose and free from all outward coincidental entanglements ; always in a readiness to depart :) shall live by herself, and to herself, doing that which is just, accepting whatsoever doth happen, and speaking the truth always ; if, I say, thou shalt separate from thy mind, whatsoever by sympathy might adhere unto it, and all time both past and future, and shalt make thyself in all points and respects, like unto Empedocles his allegorical sphere, ‘all round and circular,’ &c., and shalt think of no longer life than that which is now present : then shalt thou be truly able to pass the remainder of thy days without troubles and distractions ;

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nobly and generously disposed, and in good favour and correspondency, with that spirit which is within thee.

III. I have often wondered how it should come to pass, that every man loving himself best, should more regard other men's opinions concerning himself, than his own. For if any God or grave master standing by, should command any of us to think nothing by himself, but what he should presently speak out ; no man were able to endure it, though but for one day. Thus do we fear more what our neighbours will think of us, than what we ourselves.

IV. How comes it to pass that the Gods having ordered all other things so well and so lovingly, should be overseen in this one only thing, that whereas there hath been some very good men, that have made many covenants as it were with God, and by many holy actions, and outward services contracted a kind of familiarity with Him ; that these men when once they are dead, should never be restored to life, but be extinct for ever. But this thou mayest be sure of, that this (if it be so indeed) would never have been so ordered by the Gods, had it been fit otherwise. For certainly it was possible, had it been more just so ; and had it been according to nature, the nature of the universe would easily have borne it. But now because it is not so, (if so be that it be not so indeed) be therefore confident that it was not fit it should be so. For thou seest thyself, that now seeking after this matter, how freely thou doest argue and contest with God. But were not the Gods both just and good in the highest degree, thou durst not thus reason with them. Now if just and good, it could not be that in the creation of the world, they should either unjustly or unreasonably oversee anything.

V. Use thyself even unto those things that thou doest at first despair of. For the left hand we see, which for the

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most part lieth idle because not used ; yet doth it hold the bridle with more strength than the right, because it hath been used unto it.

VI. Let these be the objects of thy ordinary meditation : to consider, what manner of men both for soul and body we ought to be, whensoever death shall surprise us : the shortness of this our mortal life : the immense vastness of the time that hath been before, and will be after us : the frailty of every worldly material object : all these things to consider, and behold clearly in themselves, all disguisement of external outside being removed and taken away. Again, to consider the efficient causes of all things : the proper ends and references of all actions : what pain is in itself, what pleasure, what death : what fame or honour, how every man is the true and proper ground of his own rest and tranquillity, and that no man can truly be hindered by any other : that all is but conceit and opinion. As for the use of thy dogmata, thou must carry thyself in the practice of them, rather like unto a pancratiastes, or one that at the same time both fights and wrestles with hands and feet, than a gladiator. For this, if he lose his sword that he fights with, he is gone : whereas the other hath still his hand free, which he may easily turn and manage at his will.

VII. All worldly things thou must behold and consider, dividing them into matter, form, and reference, or their proper end.

VIII. How happy is man in this his power that hath been granted unto him : that he needs not do anything but what God shall approve, and that he may embrace contentedly, whatsoever God doth send unto him ?

IX. Whatsoever doth happen in the ordinary course and consequence of natural events, neither the Gods, (for it is not possible, that they either wittingly or unwittingly should do

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anything amiss) nor men, (for it is through ignorance, and therefore against their wills that they do anything amiss) must be accused. None then must be accused.

X. How ridiculous and strange is he, that wonders at anything that happens in this life in the ordinary course of nature !

XI. Either fate, (and that either an absolute necessity, and unavoidable decree; or a placable and flexible Providence) or all is a mere casual confusion, void of all order and government. If an absolute and unavoidable necessity, why doest thou resist ? If a placable and exorable Providence, make thyself worthy of the divine help and assistance. If all be a mere confusion without any moderator, or governor, then hast thou reason to congratulate thyself, that in such a general flood of confusion thou thyself hast obtained a reasonable faculty, whereby thou mayest govern thine own life and actions. But if thou beest carried away with the flood, it must be thy body perchance, or thy life, or some other thing that belongs unto them that is carried away : thy mind and understanding cannot. Or should it be so, that the light of a candle indeed is still bright and lightsome until it be put out : and should truth, and righteousness, and temperance cease to shine in thee whilst thou thyself hast any being ?

XII. At the conceit and apprehension that such and such a one hath sinned, thus reason with thyself, What do I know whether this be a sin indeed, as it seems to be ? But if it be, what do I know but that he himself hath already condemned himself for it ? And that is all one as if a man should scratch and tear his own face, an object of compassion rather than of anger. Again, that he that would not have a vicious man to sin, is like unto him that would not have moisture in the fig, nor children to weep, nor a horse to neigh,

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nor anything else that in the course of nature is necessary. For what shall he do that hath such an habit? If thou therefore beest powerful and eloquent, remedy it if thou canst.

XIII. If it be not fitting, do it not. If it be not true, speak it not. Ever maintain thine own purpose and resolution free from all compulsion and necessity.

XIV. Of everything that presents itself unto thee, to consider what the true nature of it is, and to unfold it, as it were, by dividing it into that which is formal : that which is material : the true use or end of it, and the just time that it is appointed to last.

XV. It is high time for thee, to understand that there is somewhat in thee, better and more divine than either thy passions, or thy sensual appetites and affections. What is now the object of my mind, is it fear, or suspicion, or lust, or any such thing? To do nothing rashly without some certain end ; let that be thy first care. The next, to have no other end than the common good. For, alas ! yet a little while, and thou art no more : no more will any, either of those things that now thou seest, or of those men that now are living, be any more. For all things are by nature appointed soon to be changed, turned, and corrupted, that other things might succeed in their room.

XVI. Remember that all is but opinion, and all opinion depends of the mind. Take thine opinion away, and then as a ship that hath stricken in within the arms and mouth of the harbour, a present calm ; all things safe and steady : a bay, not capable of any storms and tempests : as the poet hath it.

XVII. No operation whatsoever it be, ceasing for a while, can be truly said to suffer any evil, because it is at an end. Neither can he that is the author of that operation ; for this

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very respect, because his operation is at an end, be said to suffer any evil. Likewise then, neither can the whole body of all our actions (which is our life) if in time it cease, be said to suffer any evil for this very reason, because it is at an end ; nor he truly be said to have been ill affected, that did put a period to this series of actions. Now this time or certain period, depends of the determination of nature : sometimes of particular nature, as when a man dieth old ; but of nature in general, however ; the parts whereof thus changing one after another, the whole world still continues fresh and new. Now that is ever best and most seasonable, which is for the good of the whole. Thus it appears that death of itself can neither be hurtful to any in particular, because it is not a shameful thing (for neither is it a thing that depends of our own will, nor of itself contrary to the common good) and generally, as it is both expedient and seasonable to the whole, that in that respect it must needs be good. It is that also, which is brought unto us by the order and appointment of the Divine Providence ; so that he whose will and mind in these things runs along with the Divine ordinance, and by this concurrence of his will and mind with the Divine Providence, is led and driven along, as it were by God Himself, may truly be termed and esteemed the *θεοφόρητος*, or divinely led and inspired.

XVIII. These three things thou must have always in a readiness : first concerning thine own actions, whether thou doest nothing either idly, or otherwise, than justice and equity do require : and concerning those things that happen unto thee externally, that either they happen unto thee by chance, or by providence ; of which two to accuse either, is equally against reason. Secondly, what like unto our bodies are whilst yet rude and imperfect, until they be animated : and from their animation, until their expiration : of what

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things they are compounded, and into what things they shall be dissolved. Thirdly, how vain all things will appear unto thee when, from on high as it were, looking down, thou shalt contemplate all things upon earth, and the wonderful mutability, that they are subject unto : considering withal, the infinite both greatness and variety of things aerial and things celestial that are round about it. And that as often as thou shalt behold them, thou shalt still see the same : as the same things, so the same shortness of continuance of all those things. And, behold, these be the things that we are so proud and puffed up for.

XIX. Cast away from thee opinion, and thou art safe. And what is it that hinders thee from casting of it away ? When thou art grieved at anything, hast thou forgotten that all things happen according to the nature of the universe ; and that him only it concerns, who is in fault ; and moreover, that what is now done, is that which from ever hath been done in the world, and will ever be done, and is now done everywhere : how nearly all men are allied one to another by a kindred not of blood, nor of seed, but of the same mind. Thou hast also forgotten that every man's mind partakes of the Deity, and issueth from thence ; and that no man can properly call anything his own, no not his son, nor his body, nor his life ; for that they all proceed from that One who is the giver of all things : that all things are but opinion ; that no man lives properly, but that very instant of time which is now present. And therefore that no man whosoever he dieth can properly be said to lose any more, than an instant of time.

XX. Let thy thoughts ever run upon them, who once for some one thing or other, were moved with extraordinary indignation ; who were once in the highest pitch of either honour, or calamity ; or mutual hatred and enmity ; or of

## Marcus Aurelius

any other fortune or condition whatsoever. Then consider what's now become of all those things. All is turned to smoke ; all to ashes, and a mere fable ; and perchance not so much as a fable. As also whatsoever is of this nature, as Fabius Catulinus in the field ; Lucius Lupus, and Stertinus, at Baiæ ; Tiberius at Capreae : and Velius Rufus, and all such examples of vehement prosecution in worldly matters ; let these also run in thy mind at the same time ; and how vile every object of such earnest and vehement prosecution is ; and how much more agreeable to true philosophy it is, for a man to carry himself in every matter that offers itself, justly, and moderately, as one that followeth the Gods with all simplicity. For, for a man to be proud and high conceited, that he is not proud and high conceited, is of all kind of pride and presumption, the most intolerable.

XXI. To them that ask thee, Where hast thou seen the Gods, or how knowest thou certainly that there be Gods, that thou art so devout in their worship ? I answer first of all, that even to the very eye, they are in some manner visible and apparent. Secondly, neither have I ever seen mine own soul, and yet I respect and honour it. So then for the Gods, by the daily experience that I have of their power and providence towards myself and others, I know certainly that they are, and therefore worship them.

XXII. Herein doth consist happiness of life, for a man to know thoroughly the true nature of everything ; what is the matter, and what is the form of it : with all his heart and soul, ever to do that which is just, and to speak the truth. What then remaineth but to enjoy thy life in a course and coherence of good actions, one upon another immediately succeeding, and never interrupted, though for never so little a while ?

XXIII. There is but one light of the sun, though it be

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intercepted by walls and mountains, and other thousand objects. There is but one common substance of the whole world, though it be concluded and restrained into several different bodies, in number infinite. There is but one common soul, though divided into innumerable particular essences and natures. So is there but one common intellectual soul, though it seem to be divided. And as for all other parts of those generals which we have mentioned, as either sensitive souls or subjects, these of themselves (as naturally irrational) have no common mutual reference one unto another, though many of them contain a mind, or reasonable faculty in them, whereby they are ruled and governed. But of every reasonable mind, this the particular nature, that it hath reference to whatsoever is of her own kind, and desireth to be united : neither can this common affection, or mutual unity and correspondency, be here intercepted or divided, or confined to particulars as those other common things are.

XXIV. What doest thou desire ? To live long. What ? To enjoy the operations of a sensitive soul ; or of the appetitive faculty ? or wouldest thou grow, and then decrease again ? Wouldest thou long be able to talk, to think and reason with thyself ? Which of all these seems unto thee a worthy object of thy desire ? Now if of all these thou doest find that they be but little worth in themselves, proceed on unto the last, which is, in all things to follow God and reason. But for a man to grieve that by death he shall be deprived of any of these things, is both against God and reason.

XXV. What a small portion of vast and infinite eternity it is, that is allowed unto every one of us, and how soon it vanisheth into the general age of the world : of the common substance, and of the common soul also what a

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small portion is allotted unto us : and in what a little clod of the whole earth (as it were) it is that thou doest crawl. After thou shalt rightly have considered these things with thyself, fancy not anything else in the world any more to be of any weight and moment but this, to do that only which thine own nature doth require ; and to conform thyself to that which the common nature doth afford.

XXVI. What is the present estate of my understanding ? For herein lieth all indeed. As for all other things, they are without the compass of mine own will : and if without the compass of my will, then are they as dead things unto me, and as it were mere smoke.

XXVII. To stir up a man to the contempt of death this among other things, is of good power and efficacy, that even they who esteemed pleasure to be happiness, and pain misery, did nevertheless many of them contemn death as much as any. And can death be terrible to him, to whom that only seems good, which in the ordinary course of nature is seasonable ? to him, to whom, whether his actions be many or few, so they be all good, is all one ; and who whether he behold the things of the world being always the same either for many years, or for few years only, is altogether indifferent ? O man ! as a citizen thou hast lived, and conversed in this great city the world. Whether just for so many years, or no, what is it unto thee ? Thou hast lived (thou mayest be sure) as long as the laws and orders of the city required ; which may be the common comfort of all. Why then should it be grievous unto thee, if (not a tyrant, nor an unjust judge, but) the same nature that brought thee in, doth now send thee out of the world ? As if the prætor should fairly dismiss him from the stage, whom he had taken in to act a while. Oh, but the play is not yet at an end, there are but three acts

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yet acted of it? Thou hast well said: for in matter of life, three acts is the whole play. Now to set a certain time to every man's acting, belongs unto him only, who as first he was of thy composition, so is now the cause of thy dissolution. As for thyself, thou hast to do with neither. Go thy ways then well pleased and contented: for so is He that dismisseth thee.





## APPENDIX

CORRESPONDENCE OF M. AURELIUS  
ANTONINUS AND M. CORNELIUS  
FRONTO<sup>1</sup>



CORNELIUS FRONTO was a Roman by descent, but of provincial birth, being native to Cirta, in Numidia. Thence he migrated to Rome in the reign of Hadrian, and became the most famous rhetorician of his day. As a pleader and orator he was counted by his contemporaries hardly inferior to Tully himself, and as a teacher his aid was sought for the noblest youths of Rome. To him was entrusted the education of M. Aurelius and of his colleague L. Verus in their boyhood ; and he was rewarded for his efforts by a seat in the Senate and the consular rank (A.D. 143). By the exercise of his profession he became wealthy ; and if he speaks of his means as not great,<sup>2</sup> he must be comparing his wealth with the grandees of Rome, not with the ordinary citizen.

Before the present century nothing was known of the works of Fronto, except a grammatical treatise ; but in 1815

<sup>1</sup> References are made to the edition of Naber, Leipzig (Trübner), 1867.

<sup>2</sup> *Ad Verum Imp. Aur. Cœs.*, ii. 7.

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Cardinal Mai published a number of letters and some short essays of Fronto, which he had discovered in a palimpsest at Milan. Other parts of the same MS. he found later in the Vatican, the whole being collected and edited in the year 1823. We now possess parts of his correspondence with Antoninus Pius, with M. Aurelius, with L. Verus, and with certain of his friends, and also several rhetorical and historical fragments.

Though none of the more ambitious works of Fronto have survived, there are enough to give proof of his powers. Never was a great literary reputation less deserved. It would be hard to conceive of anything more vapid than the style and conception of these letters ; clearly the man was a pedant without imagination or taste. Such indeed was the age he lived in, and it is no marvel that he was like to his age. But there must have been more in him than mere pedantry ; there was indeed a heart in the man, which Marcus found, and he found also a tongue which could speak the truth. Fronto's letters are by no means free from exaggeration and laudation, but they do not show that loathsome flattery which filled the Roman court. He really admires what he praises, and his way of saying so is not unlike what often passes for criticism at the present day. He is not afraid to reprove what he thinks amiss ; and the astonishment of Marcus at this will prove, if proof were needed, that he was not used to plain dealing. ‘How happy I am,’ he writes, ‘that my friend Marcus Cornelius, so distinguished as an orator and so noble as a man, thinks me worth praising and blaming !’<sup>1</sup> In another place he deems himself blest because Fronto had taught him to speak the truth ;<sup>2</sup> although the context shows him to be speaking of expression, it is still a point in favour of Fronto. A sincere heart is better

<sup>1</sup> *Ad M. Cæs.*, iii. 17.

<sup>2</sup> iii. 12.

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than literary taste ; and if Fronto had not done his duty by the young prince, it is not easy to understand the friendship which remained between them up to the last.

An example of the frankness which was between them is given by a difference they had over the case of Herodes Atticus. Herodes was a Greek rhetorician who had a school at Rome, and Marcus Aurelius was among his pupils. Both Marcus and the Emperor Antoninus had a high opinion of Herodes ; and all we know goes to prove he was a man of high character and princely generosity. When quite young he was made administrator of the free cities in Asia, nor is it surprising to find that he made bitter enemies there ; indeed, a just ruler was sure to make enemies. The end of it was that an Athenian deputation, headed by the orators Theodotus and Demostratus, made serious accusations against his honour. There is no need to discuss the merits of the case here ; suffice it to say, Herodes succeeded in defending himself to the satisfaction of the emperor. Fronto appears to have taken the delegates' part, and to have accepted a brief for the prosecution, urged to some extent by personal considerations ; and in this cause Marcus Aurelius writes to Fronto as follows :—

‘AURELIUS CÆSAR to his friend FRONTO, greeting.<sup>1</sup>

‘I know you have often told me you were anxious to find how you might best please me. Now is the time ; now you can increase my love towards you, if it can be increased. A trial is at hand, in which people seem likely not only to hear your speech with pleasure, but to see your indignation with impatience. I see no one who dares give you a hint in the matter ; for those who are less friendly, prefer to see you act with some inconsistency ; and those who are more friendly, fear to seem too friendly to your opponent if they should dissuade you from your accusation ; then

<sup>1</sup> *Ad M. Cæs., iii. 2.*

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again, in case you have prepared something neat for the occasion, they cannot endure to rob you of your harangue by silencing you. Therefore, whether you think me a rash counsellor, or a bold boy, or too kind to your opponent, not because I think it better, I will offer my counsel with some caution. But why have I said, offer my counsel? No, I demand it from you; I demand it boldly, and if I succeed, I promise to remain under your obligation. What? you will say: if I am attackt, shall I not pay tit for tat? Ah, but you will get greater glory, if even when attackt you answer nothing. Indeed, if he begins it, answer as you will and you will have fair excuse; but I have demanded of him that he shall not begin, and I think I have succeeded. I love each of you according to your merits; and I know that he was educated in the house of P. Calvisius, my grandfather, and that I was educated by you; therefore I am full of anxiety that this most disagreeable business shall be managed as honourably as possible. I trust you may approve my advice, for my intention you will approve. At least I prefer to write unwisely, rather than to be silent unkindly.'

Fronto replied, thanking the prince for his advice, and promising that he will confine himself to the facts of the case. But he points out that the charges brought against him were such, that they can hardly be made agreeable; amongst them being spoliation, violence, and murder. However, he is willing even to let some of these drop if it be the prince's pleasure. To this Marcus returned the following answer: <sup>1</sup>—

‘ This one thing, my dearest Fronto, is enough to make me truly grateful to you, that so far from rejecting my counsel, you have even approved it. As to the questions you raise in your kind letter, my opinion is this: all that concerns the case which you are supporting must be clearly brought forward; what concerns your own feelings, though you may have had just provocation, should be left unsaid.’

<sup>1</sup> *Ad M. Cæs., iii. 5.*  
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The story does credit to both. Fronto shows no loss of temper at the interference, nor shrinks from stating his case with frankness ; and Marcus, with forbearance remarkable in a prince, does not command that his friend be left unmolested, but merely stipulates for a fair trial on the merits of the case.

Another example may be given from a letter of Fronto's :<sup>1</sup>—

‘Here is something else quarrelsome and querulous. I have sometimes found fault with you in your absence somewhat seriously in the company of a few of my most intimate friends : at times, for example, when you mixt in society with a more solemn look than was fitting, or would read books in the theatre or in a banquet ; nor did I absent myself from theatre or banquet when you did.<sup>2</sup> Then I used to call you a hard man, no good company, even disagreeable, sometimes, when anger got the better of me. But did any one else in the same banquet speak against you, I could not endure to hear it with equanimity. Thus it was easier for me to say something to your disadvantage myself, than to hear others do it ; just as I could more easily bear to chastise my daughter Gratia, than to see her chastised by another.’

The affection between them is clear from every page of the correspondence. A few instances are now given, which were written at different periods :—

### ‘To MY MASTER.<sup>3</sup>

‘This is how I have past the last few days. My sister was suddenly seized with an internal pain, so violent that I was horrified at her looks ; my mother in her trepidation on that account accidentally bruised her side on a corner of the wall ; she and we were greatly troubled about that blow. For myself, on going to rest I found a scorpion in my bed ; but I did not lie down upon him, I

<sup>1</sup> *Ad M. Cæs.*, iv. 12.

<sup>2</sup> The text is obscure.

<sup>3</sup> *Ad M. Cæs.*, v. 8.

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killed him first. If you are getting on better, that is a consolation. My mother is easier now, thanks be to God. Good-bye, best and sweetest master. My lady sends you greeting.'

<sup>1</sup> 'What words can I find to fit my bad luck, or how shall I upbraid as it deserves the hard constraint which is laid upon me? It ties me fast here, troubled my heart is, and beset by such anxiety; nor does it allow me to make haste to my Fronto, my life and delight, to be near him at such a moment of ill-health in particular, to hold his hands, to chafe gently that identical foot, so far as may be done without discomfort, to attend him in the bath, to support his steps with my arm.'

<sup>2</sup> 'This morning I did not write to you, because I heard you were better, and because I was myself engaged in other business, and I cannot ever endure to write anything to you unless with mind at ease and untroubled and free. So if we are all right, let me know: what I desire, you know, and how properly I desire it, I know. Farewell, my master, always in every chance first in my mind, as you deserve to be. My master, see I am not asleep, and I compel myself to sleep, that you may not be angry with me. You gather I am writing this late at night.'

<sup>3</sup> 'What spirit do you suppose is in me, when I remember how long it is since I have seen you, and why I have not seen you! and it may be I shall not see you for a few days yet, while you are strengthening yourself, as you must. So while you lie on the sick-bed, my spirit also will lie low; and, whenas,<sup>4</sup> by God's mercy you shall stand upright, my spirit too will stand firm, which is now burning with the strongest desire for you. Farewell, soul of your prince, your friend, your pupil.'

<sup>5</sup> 'O my dear Fronto, most distinguished Consul! I yield, you have conquered: all who have ever loved before, you have con-

<sup>1</sup> *Ad M. Cæs.*, i. 2.

<sup>2</sup> iii. 21.

<sup>3</sup> iii. 19.

<sup>4</sup> The writer sometimes uses archaisms such as *quom*, which I render 'whenas.'

<sup>5</sup> *Ad M. Cæs.*, ii. 2.

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quered out and out in love's contest. "Receive the victor's wreath ; and the herald shall proclaim your victory aloud before your own tribunal : "M. Cornelius Fronto, Consul, wins, and is crowned victor in the Open International Love-race."<sup>1</sup> But beaten though I may be, I shall neither slacken nor relax my own zeal. Well, you shall love me more than any man loves any other man ; but I, who possess a faculty of loving less strong, shall love you more than any one else loves you ; more indeed than you love yourself. Gratia and I will have to fight for it ; I doubt I shall not get the better of her. For, as Plautus says, her love is like rain, whose big drops not only penetrate the dress, but drench to the very marrow.'

Marcus Aurelius seems to have been about eighteen years of age when the correspondence begins, Fronto being some thirty years older.<sup>2</sup> The systematic education of the young prince seems to have been finisht, and Fronto now acts more as his adviser than his tutor. He recommends the prince to use simplicity in his public speeches, and to avoid affectation.<sup>3</sup> Marcus devotes his attention to the old authors who then had a great vogue at Rome : Ennius, Plautus, Nævius, and such orators as Cato and Gracchus.<sup>4</sup> Fronto urges on him the study of Cicero, whose letters, he says, are all worth reading. When he wishes to compliment Marcus he declares one or other of his letters has the true Tullian ring. Marcus gives his nights to reading when he ought to be sleeping. He exercises himself in verse composition and on rhetorical themes.

'It is very nice of you,' he writes to Fronto,<sup>5</sup> 'to ask for my hexameters ; I would have sent them at once if I had them by me. The fact is my secretary, Anicetus—you know who I mean—did

<sup>1</sup> The writer parodies the proclamation at the Greek games ; the words also are Greek.

<sup>2</sup> From internal evidence: the letters are not arranged in order of time. See Naber's *Prolegomena*, p. xx. foll.

<sup>1</sup> *Ad M. Cæs.*, iii. 1.

<sup>4</sup> ii. 10, iii. 18, ii. 4.

<sup>5</sup> ii. 10.

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not pack up any of my compositions for me to take away with me. He knows my weakness ; he was afraid that if I got hold of them I might, as usual, make smoke of them. However, there was no fear for the hexameters. I must confess the truth to my master : I love them. I study at night, since the day is taken up with the theatre. I am weary of an evening, and sleepy in the daylight, and so I don't do much. Yet I have made extracts from sixty books, five volumes of them, in these latter days. But when you read remember that the "sixty" includes plays of Novius, and farces, and some little speeches of Scipio ; don't be too much startled at the number. You remember your Polemon ; but I pray you do not remember Horace, who has died with Pollio as far as I am concerned.<sup>1</sup> Farewell, my dearest and most affectionate friend, most distinguished consul and my beloved master, whom I have not seen these two years. Those who say two months, count the days. Shall I ever see you again ?'

Sometimes Fronto sends him a theme to work up, as thus : 'M. Lucilius tribune of the people violently throws into prison a free Roman citizen, against the opinion of his colleagues who demand his release. For this act he is branded by the censor. Analyse the case, and then take both sides in turn, attacking and defending.'<sup>2</sup> Or again : 'A Roman consul, doffing his state robe, dons the gauntlet and kills a lion amongst the young men at the Quinquatrus in full view of the people of Rome. Denunciation before the censors.'<sup>3</sup> The prince has a fair knowledge of Greek, and quotes from Homer, Plato, Euripides, but for some reason Fronto dissuaded him from this study.<sup>4</sup> His *Meditations* are written in Greek. He continued his literary studies throughout his life, and after he became emperor we still find him asking his adviser for copies of Cicero's Letters, by

<sup>1</sup> He implies, as in i. 6, that he has ceased to study Horace. Pollio was a grammarian, who taught Marcus.

<sup>2</sup> *Ad. M. Cæs.*, v. 27.

<sup>3</sup> v. 22.

<sup>4</sup> *Ep. Greæc.*, 6.

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which he hopes to improve his vocabulary.<sup>1</sup> Fronto helps him with a supply of similes, which, it seems, he did not think of readily. It is to be feared that the fount of Marcus's eloquence was pumped up by artificial means.

Some idea of his literary style may be gathered from the letter which follows :<sup>2</sup>—

‘I heard Polemo declaim the other day, to say something of things sublunary. If you ask what I thought of him, listen. He seems to me an industrious farmer, endowed with the greatest skill, who has cultivated a large estate for corn and vines only, and indeed with a rich return of fine crops. But yet in that land of his there is no Pompeian fig or Arician vegetable, no Tarentine rose, or pleasing coppice, or thick grove, or shady plane tree ; all is for use rather than for pleasure, such as one ought rather to commend, but cares not to love.

‘A pretty bold idea, is it not, and rash judgment, to pass censure on a man of such reputation ? But whenas I remember that I am writing to you, I think I am less bold than you would have me.

‘In that point I am wholly undecided.

‘There’s an unpremeditated hendecasyllable for you. So before I begin to poetize, I’ll take an easy with you. Farewell, my heart’s desire, your Verus’s best beloved, most distinguisht consul, master most sweet. Farewell I ever pray, sweetest soul.

‘What a letter do you think you have written me ! I could make bold to say, that never did she who bore me and nurst me, write anything so delightful, so honey-sweet. And this does not come of your fine style and eloquence : otherwise not my mother only, but all who breathe.’

To the pupil, never was anything on earth so fine as his master’s eloquence ; on this theme Marcus fairly bubbles over with enthusiasm.

<sup>1</sup> *Ad Anton. Imp.*, ii. 4.

<sup>2</sup> *Ad M. Cæs.*, ii. 5.

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<sup>1</sup> ‘ Well, if the ancient Greeks ever wrote anything like this, let those who know decide it : for me, if I dare say so, I never read any invective of Cato’s so fine as your encomium. O if my Lord<sup>2</sup> could be sufficiently praised, sufficiently praised he would have been undoubtedly by you ! This kind of thing is not done nowadays.<sup>3</sup> It were easier to match Pheidias, easier to match Apelles, easier in a word to match Demosthenes himself, or Cato himself, than to match this finisht and perfect work. Never have I read anything more refined, anything more after the ancient type, anything more delicious, anything more Latin. O happy you, to be endowed with eloquence so great ! O happy I, to be under the charge of such a master ! O arguments,<sup>4</sup> O arrangement, O elegance, O wit, O beauty, O words, O brilliancy, O subtility, O grace, O treatment, O everything ! Mischief take me, if you ought not to have a rod put in your hand one day, a diadem on your brow, a tribunal raised for you ; then the herald would summon us all—why do I say “us” ? Would summon all, those scholars and orators : one by one you would beckon them forward with your rod and admonish them. Hitherto I have had no fear of this admonition ; many things help me to enter within your school. I write this in the utmost haste ; for whenas I am sending you so kindly a letter from my Lord, what needs a longer letter of mine ? Farewell then, glory of Roman eloquence, boast of your friends, magnifico, most delightful man, most distinguished consul, master most sweet.

‘ After this you will take care not to tell so many fibs of me, especially in the Senate. A monstrous fine speech this is ! O if I could kiss your head at every heading of it ! You have looked down on all with a vengeance. This oration once read, in vain shall we study, in vain shall we toil, in vain strain every nerve. Farewell always, most sweet master.’

<sup>1</sup> *Ad M. Cæs., ii. 3.*

<sup>2</sup> The Emperor Antoninus Pius is spoken of as *dominus meus*.

<sup>3</sup> This sentence is written in Greek.

<sup>4</sup> Several of these words are Greek, and the meaning is not quite clear.

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Sometimes Fronto descends from the heights of eloquence to offer practical advice ; as when he suggests how Marcus should deal with his suite. It is more difficult, he admits, to keep courtiers in harmony than to tame lions with a lute ; but if it is to be done, it must be by eradicating jealousy. ‘Do not let your friends,’ says Fronto,<sup>1</sup> ‘envy each other, or think that what you give to another is filched from them. . . . Keep away envy from your suite, and you will find your friends kindly and harmonious.’

Here and there we meet with allusions to his daily life, which we could wish to be more frequent. He goes to the theatre or the law-courts,<sup>2</sup> or takes part in court ceremony, but his heart is always with his books. The vintage season, with its religious rites, was always spent by Antoninus Pius in the country. The following letters give some notion of a day’s occupation at that time :<sup>3</sup>—

‘MY DEAREST MASTER,—I am well. To-day I studied from the ninth hour of the night to the second hour of day, after taking food. I then put on my slippers, and from the second to the third hour had a most enjoyable walk up and down before my chamber. Then booted and cloaked—for so we were commanded to appear—I went to wait upon my lord the emperor. We went a-hunting, did doughty deeds, heard a rumour that boars had been caught, but there was nothing to see. However, we climbed a pretty steep hill, and in the afternoon returned home. I went straight to my books. Off with the boots, down with the cloak ; I spent a couple of hours in bed. I read Cato’s speech on the Property of Pulchra, and another in which he impeaches a tribune. Ho, ho ! I hear you cry to your man, Off with you as fast as you can, and bring me these speeches from the library of Apollo. No use to send : I have those books with me too. You must get round the Tiberian librarian ; you will have to spend something on the matter ; and when I return to town,

<sup>1</sup> *Ad M. Cæs.*, iv. 1.

<sup>2</sup> ii. 14.

<sup>3</sup> iv. 5, 6.

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I shall expect to go shares with him. Well, after reading these speeches I wrote a wretched trifle, destined for drowning or burning. No, indeed my attempt at writing did not come off at all to-day ; the composition of a hunter or a vintager, whose shouts are echoing through my chamber, hateful and wearisome as the law-courts. What have I said ? Yes, it was rightly said, for my master is an orator. I think I have caught cold, whether from walking in slippers or from writing badly, I do not know. I am always annoyed with phlegm, but to-day I seem to snivel more than usual. Well, I will pour oil on my head and go off to sleep. I don't mean to put one drop in my lamp to-day, so weary am I from riding and sneezing. Farewell, dearest and most beloved master, whom I miss, I may say, more than Rome itself.'

' MY BELOVED MASTER,—I am well. I slept a little more than usual for my slight cold, which seems to be well again. So I spent the time from the eleventh hour of the night to the third of the day partly in reading in Cato's Agriculture, partly in writing, not quite so badly as yesterday indeed. Then, after waiting upon my father, I soothed my throat with honey-water, ejecting it without swallowing : I might say *gargle*, but I won't, though I think the word is found in Novius and elsewhere. After attending to my throat I went to my father, and stood by his side as he sacrificed. Then to luncheon. What do you think I had to eat ? A bit of bread so big, while I watched others gobbling boiled beans, onions, and fish full of roe. Then we set to work at gathering the grapes, with plenty of sweat and shouting, and, as the quotation runs, "A few high-hanging clusters did we leave survivors of the vintage." After the sixth hour we returned home. I did a little work, and poor work at that. Then I had a long gossip with my dear mother sitting on the bed. My conversation was : What do you think my friend Fronto is doing just now ? She said : And what do you think of my friend Gratia ?<sup>1</sup> My turn now : And what of our little Gratia,<sup>2</sup> the sparrowkin ? After

<sup>1</sup> Fronto's wife.

<sup>2</sup> Fronto's daughter.

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this kind of talk, and an argument as to which of you loved the other most, the goog sounded, the signal that my father had gone to the bath. We supped, after ablutions in the oil-cellar—I mean we supped after ablutions, not after ablutions in the oil-cellar ; and listened with enjoyment to the rustics gibing. After returning, before turning on my side to snore, I do my task and give an account of the day to my delightful master, whom if I could long for a little more, I should not mind growing a trifle thinner. Farewell, Fronto, wherever you are, honey-sweet, my darling, my delight. Why do I want you ? I can love you while far away.'

One anecdote puts Marcus before us in a new light :<sup>1</sup>—

‘When my father returned home from the vineyards, I mounted my horse as usual, and rode on ahead some little way. Well, there on the road was a herd of sheep, standing all crowded together as though the place were a desert, with four dogs and two shepherds, but nothing else. Then one shepherd said to another shepherd, on seeing a number of horsemen : I say, says he, look you at those horsemen ; they do a deal of robbery. When I heard this, I clap spurs to my horse, and ride straight for the sheep. In consternation the sheep scatter ; hither and thither they are fleeting and bleating. A shepherd throws his fork, and the fork falls on the horseman who came next to me. We make our escape.’

We like Marcus none the worse for this spice of mischief.

Another letter<sup>2</sup> describes a visit to a country town, and shows the antiquarian spirit of the writer :—

‘M. CÆSAR to his Master M. FRONTO, greeting.

‘After I entered the carriage, after I took leave of you, we made a journey comfortable enough, but we had a few drops of rain to wet us. But before coming to the country-house, we broke our

<sup>1</sup> *Ad M. Cæs.*, ii. 12.

<sup>2</sup> iv. 4.

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journey at Anagnia, a mile or so from the highroad. Then we inspected that ancient town, a miniature it is, but has in it many antiquities, temples, and religious ceremonies quite out of the way. There is not a corner without its shrine, or fane, or temple ; besides, many books written on linen, which belongs to things sacred. Then on the gate as we came out was written twice, as follows : “ Priest don the fell.”<sup>1</sup> I asked one of the inhabitants what that word was. He said it was the word in the Hernican dialect for the victim’s skin, which the priest puts over his conical cap when he enters the city. I found out many other things which I desired to know, but the only thing I do not desire is that you should be absent from me ; that is my chief anxiety. Now for yourself, when you left that place, did you go to Aurelia or to Campania ? Be sure to write to me, and say whether you have opened the vintage, or carried a host of books to the country-house ; this also, whether you miss me ; I am foolish to ask it, whenas you tell it me of yourself. Now if you miss me and if you love me, send me your letters often, which is a comfort and consolation to me. Indeed I should prefer ten times to read your letters than all the vines of Gaurus or the Marsians ; for these Signian vines have grapes too rank and fruit too sharp in the taste, but I prefer wine to must for drinking. Besides, those grapes are nicer to eat dried than fresh-ripe ; I vow I would rather tread them under foot than put my teeth in them. But I pray they may be gracious and forgiving, and grant me free pardon for these jests of mine. Farewell, best friend, dearest, most learned, sweetest master. When you see the must ferment in the vat, remember that just so in my heart the longing for you is gushing and flowing and bubbling. Good-bye.’

Making all allowances for conventional exaggerations, it is clear from the correspondence that there was deep love between Marcus and his preceptor. The letters cover several years in succession, but soon after the birth of Marcus’s daughter, Faustina, there is a large gap. It does

<sup>1</sup> *Samentum.*







*Conquered Barbarians craving mercy from  
MARCUS AVRELIVS.*



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not follow that the letters ceased entirely, because we know part of the collection is lost ; but there was probably less intercourse between Marcus and Fronto after Marcus took to the study of philosophy under the guidance of Rusticus.

When Marcus succeeded to the throne in 161, the letters begin again, with slightly increased formality on Fronto's part, and they go on for some four years, when Fronto, who has been continually complaining of ill-health, appears to have died. One letter of the later period gives some interesting particulars of the emperor's public life, which are worth quoting. Fronto speaks of Marcus's victories and eloquence in the usual strain of high praise, and then continues :<sup>1</sup>—

'The army when you took it in hand was sunk in luxury and revelry, and corrupted with long inactivity. At Antiochia the soldiers had been wont to applaud at the stage plays, knew more of the gardens at the nearest restaurant than of the battlefield. Horses were hairy from lack of grooming, horsemen smooth because their hairs had been pulled out by the roots ;<sup>2</sup> a rare thing it was to see a soldier with hair on arm or leg. Moreover, they were better drest than armed ; so much so, that Laelianus Pontius, a strict man of the old discipline, broke the cuirasses of some of them with his finger-tips, and observed cushions on the horses' backs. At his direction the tufts were cut through, and out of the horsemen's saddles came what appeared to be feathers pluckt from geese. Few of the men could vault on horseback, the rest clambered up with difficulty by aid of heel and knee and leg ; not many could throw a lance hurtling, most did it without force or power, as though they were things of wool. Dicing was common in the camp, sleep lasted all night, or if they kept watch it was over the winecup. By what regulations to restrain such soldiers as these, and to turn them to honesty and industry, did you

<sup>1</sup> *Ad Verum. Imp.*, ii. 1, s. fin.

<sup>2</sup> A common mark of the effeminate at Rome.

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not learn from Hannibal's sternness, the discipline of Africanus, the acts of Metellus recorded in history ?'

After the preceptorial letters cease the others are concerned with domestic events, health and sickness, visits or introductions, birth or death. Thus the emperor writes to his old friend, who had shown some diffidence in seeking an interview :<sup>1</sup>—

‘To my Master.

‘I have a serious grievance against you, my dear master, yet indeed my grief is more than my grievance, because after so long a time I neither embraced you nor spoke to you, though you visited the palace, and the moment after I had left the prince my brother. I reproached my brother severely for not recalling me ; nor durst he deny the fault.’

Fronto again writes on one occasion : ‘I have seen your daughter. It was like seeing you and Faustina in infancy, so much that is charming her face has taken from each of yours.’ Or again, at a later date :<sup>2</sup>—

‘I have seen your chicks, most delightful sight that ever I saw in my life, so like you that nothing is more like than the likeness. . . . By the mercy of Heaven they have a healthy colour and strong lungs. One held a piece of white bread, like a little prince, the other a common piece, like a true philosopher’s son.’

Marcus, we know, was devoted to his children. They were delicate in health, in spite of Fronto’s assurance, and only one son survived the father. We find echoes of this affection now and again in the letters. ‘We have summer heat here still,’ writes Marcus, ‘but since my little girls are pretty well, if I may say so, it is like the bracing climate of spring to us.’<sup>3</sup> When little Faustina came back from

<sup>1</sup> *Ad Verum. Imp. Aur. Cæs.*, i. 3.

<sup>2</sup> *Ad Ant. Imp.*, i. 3. <sup>3</sup> *Ad M. Cæs.*, v. 19.

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the valley of the shadow of death, her father at once writes to inform Fronto.<sup>1</sup> The sympathy he asks he also gives, and as old age brings more and more infirmity, Marcus becomes even more solicitous for his beloved teacher. The poor old man suffered a heavy blow in the death of his grandson, on which Marcus writes :<sup>2</sup> ‘I have just heard of your misfortune. Feeling grieved as I do when one of your joints gives you pain, what do you think I feel, dear master, when you have pain of mind?’ The old man’s reply, in spite of a certain self-consciousness, is full of pathos. He recounts with pride the events of a long and upright life, in which he has wronged no man, and lived in harmony with his friends and family. His affectations fall away from him, as the cry of pain is forced from his heart :—

<sup>3</sup> ‘Many such sorrows has fortune visited me with all my life long. To pass by my other afflictions, I have lost five children under the most pitiful conditions possible : for the five I lost one by one when each was my only child, suffering these blows of bereavement in such a manner that each child was born to one already bereaved. Thus I ever lost my children without solace, and got them amidst fresh grief. . . .’

The letter continues with reflections on the nature of death, ‘more to be rejoiced at than bewailed, the younger one dies,’ and an arrangement of Providence not without dignity, wrung from him as it were by this last culminating misfortune. It concludes with a summing-up of his life in protest against the blow which has fallen on his grey head :—

‘Through my long life I have committed nothing which might bring dishonour, or disgrace, or shame : no deed of avarice or

<sup>1</sup> *Ad M. Cæs.*, iv. xi.

<sup>2</sup> *De Nepote Amisso.*

<sup>3</sup> *De Nepote Amisso*, 2.

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treachery have I done in all my days : nay, but much generosity, much kindness, much truth and faithfulness have I shown, often at the risk of my own life. I have lived in amity with my good brother, whom I rejoice to see in possession of the highest office by your father's goodness, and by your friendship at peace and perfect rest. The offices which I have myself obtained I never strove for by any underhand means. I have cultivated my mind more than my body ; the pursuit of learning I have preferred to increasing my wealth. I preferred to be poor rather than bound by any man's obligation, even to want rather than to beg. I have never been extravagant in spending money, I have earned it sometimes because I must. I have scrupulously spoken the truth, and have been glad to hear it spoken to me. I have thought it better to be neglected than to fawn, to be dumb than to feign, to be seldom a friend than to be often a flatterer. I have sought little, deserved not little. So far as I could, I have assisted each according to my means. I have given help readily to the deserving, fearlessly to the undeserving. No one by proving to be ungrateful has made me more slow to bestow promptly all benefits I could give, nor have I even been harsh to ingratitude. (A fragmentary passage follows, in which he appears to speak of his desire for a peaceful end, and the desolation of his house.) I have suffered long and painful sickness, my beloved Marcus. Then I was visited by pitiful misfortunes : my wife I have lost, my grandson I have lost in Germany :<sup>1</sup> woe is me ! I have lost my Decimanus. If I were made of iron, at this time I could write no more.'

It is noteworthy that in his *Meditations* Marcus Aurelius mentions Fronto only once.<sup>2</sup> All his literary studies, his oratory and criticism (such as it was) is forgotten ; and, says he, 'Fronto taught me not to expect natural affection from the highly-born.' Fronto really said more

<sup>1</sup> In the war against the Catti.

<sup>2</sup> Page 4 above.

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than this : that ‘affection’ is not a Roman quality, nor has it a Latin name.<sup>1</sup> Roman or not Roman, Marcus found affection in Fronto ; and if he outgrew his master’s intellectual training, he never lost touch with the true heart of the man ; it is that which Fronto’s name brings up to his remembrance, not dissertations on compound verbs or fatuous criticisms of style.

<sup>1</sup> *Ad Verum*, ii. 7.





## NOTES

THIS being neither a critical edition of the text nor an emended edition of Casaubon's translation, it has not been thought necessary to add full notes. Casaubon's own notes have been omitted, because for the most part they are discursive, and not necessary to an understanding of what is written. In those which here follow, certain emendations of his are mentioned, which he proposes in his notes, and follows in the translation. In addition, one or two corrections are made where he has mistaken the Greek, and the translation might be misleading. Those which do not come under these two heads will explain themselves.

The text itself has been prepared by a comparison of the editions of 1634 and 1635. It should be borne in mind that Casaubon's is often rather a paraphrase than a close translation; and it did not seem worth while to notice every variation or amplification of the original. In the original editions all that Casaubon conceives as understood, but not expressed, is enclosed in square brackets. These brackets are here omitted, as they interfere with the comfort of the reader; and so have some of the alternative renderings suggested by the translator. In a few cases, Latin words in the text have been replaced by English.

Numbers in brackets refer to the Teubner text of Stich, but the divisions of the text are left unaltered. For some of the references identified I am indebted to Mr. G. H. Rendall's *Marcus Aurelius*.

### BOOK I

p. 2. "Both to frequent" (4). Gr.  $\tau\delta\mu\eta$ , C. conjectures  $\tau\delta\mu\epsilon$ .

The text is probably right: "I did not frequent public lectures, and I was taught at home."

## Notes

- p. 4. Idiots. . . . philosophers (9). The reading is doubtful, but the meaning seems to be: "simple and unlearned men."
- p. 5. "Claudius Maximus" (15). The reading of the Palatine MS. (now lost) was παράκλησις Μαξίμου, which C. supposes to conceal the letters κλ as an abbreviation of Claudius.
- p. 7. "Patient hearing. . . . He would not" (16). C. translates his conjectural reading ἐπίμονον ἀλλον. οὐ προαπέστη . . . Stich suggests a reading with much the same sense: . . . ἐπίμονη. ἀλλ' οὗτοι . . .
- "Strict and rigid dealing" (16). C. translates τονῶν (*Pal. MS.*) as though from τόνος, in the sense of "strain," "rigour." The reading of other MSS. τινῶν is preferable.
- p. 8. "Congaries" (13). διανομαῖς, "doles."
- p. 11. "Cajeta" (17). The passage is certainly corrupt. C. spies a reference to Chryses praying by the sea-shore in the *Iliad*, and supposes M. Aurelius to have done the like. None of the emendations suggested is satisfactory. At § xv. Book II. is usually reckoned to begin.

## BOOK II

- p. 14. "Do, soul" (6). If the received reading be right, it must be sarcastic; but there are several variants which show how unsatisfactory it is. C. translates "εὐ γὰρ δὲ βιός ἔκάστω sc. παρ' ἑαυτῷ," which I do not understand. The sense required is: "Do not violence to thyself, for thou hast not long to use self-respect. Life is not (v. l. οὐδὲ) <long> for each, and this life for thee is all but done."
- p. 17. "Honour and credit do proceed" (12). The verb has dropt out of the text, but C. has supplied one of the required meaning.

## Notes

p. 17. "Consider," etc. (12). This verb is not in the Greek, which means: "(And reason also shows) how man, etc."

### BOOK IV

p. 37. "Agathos" (18): This is probably not a proper name, but the text seems to be unsound. The meaning may be "the good man ought . . ."

*οἰκονομίαν* (16) is a "practical benefit," a secondary end.

p. 46. "For herein lieth all" (43). C. translates his conjecture *ὅλον* for *ὅλα*.

### BOOK V

p. 57. *κατορθώσεις* (15): Acts of "rightness" or "straightness."

p. 62. "Roarer" (28): Gr. "tragedian." Ed. 1 has "whoremonger," ed. 2 corrects to "harlot," but omits to alter the word at its second occurrence.

p. 63. "Thou hast . . . them" (33): A quotation from Homer, *Odyssey* iv. 690.

"One of the poets" (33): Hesiod, *Op. et Dies*, 197.

pp. 64–65. §§ xxix. and xxx. (36). The Greek appears to contain quotations from sources not known, and the translation is a paraphrase. (One or two alterations are here made on the authority of the second edition.)

### BOOK VI

p. 69. "Affected and qualified" (14): *ἔξις*, the power of cohesion shown in things inanimate; *φύσις*, power of growth seen in plants and the like.

p. 71. "Wonder at them" (18): *i.e.* mankind.

p. 78. "Chrysippus" (42): C. refers to a passage of Plutarch *De Communibus Notitiis* (c. xiv.), where Chrysippus is represented as saying that a coarse phrase may be vile in itself, yet have due place in a comedy as contributing to a certain effect.

## Notes

- p. 79. "Man or men . . ." (45). There is no hiatus in the Greek, which means: "Whatever (is beneficial) for a man is so for other men also."
- p. 80. § xlvi. There is no hiatus in the Greek.

## BOOK VII

- p. 87. § ix. (11). C. translates his conjecture  $\mu\eta$  for  $\eta$ . The Greek means "straight, or rectified," with a play on the literal and metaphorical meaning of  $\delta\rho\theta\delta s$ .
- p. 88.  $\epsilon\nu\deltaai\muovia$  contains the word  $\deltaai\muov$  in composition.
- p. 92. "Plato" (35): *Republic*, vi. p. 486 A.
- § xxii. (31). The text is corrupt, but the words "or if it be but few" should be "that is little enough."
- p. 93 "It will," etc. (38): Euripides, *Bellerophon*, frag. 287 (Nauck).
- "Lives," etc. (40): Euripides, *Hypsipyle*, frag. 757 (Nauck).
- "As long," etc. (42): Aristophanes, *Acharnæ*, 661.
- "Plato" (44): *Apology*, p. 28 B.
- "For thus" (45): *Apology*, p. 28 E.
- p. 94. "But, O noble sir," etc. (46): Plato, *Gorgias*, 512 D.
- p. 95. "And as for those parts," etc. (50). A quotation from Euripides, *Chrysippus*, frag. 839 (Nauck).
- "With meats," etc. (51): From Euripides, *Supplices*, 1110.
- p. 97. § xxxiii. (63): "They both," i.e. life and wrestling.  
"Says he" (63): Plato, quoted by Epictetus, Arr. i. 28, 2 and 22.
- p. 99. "How know we," etc. (66). The Greek means: "How know we whether Telauges were not nobler in character than Sophocles?" The allusion is unknown.  
"Frost" (66): The word is written by Casaubon as a proper name, "Pagus."  
"The hardihood of Socrates was famous"; see Plato, *Symposium*, p. 220.

## Notes

## BOOK X

- p. 149. § xxii. (24) : The Greek means, "paltry breath bearing up corpses, so that the tale of Dead Man's Land is clearer."
- p. 149. "The poet" (21) : Euripides, frag. 898 (Nauck); compare Aeschylus, *Danaides*, frag. 44.
- "Plato" (23) : *Theaetetus*, p. 174 D.
- p. 154. "The poet" (34) : Homer, *Iliad*, vi. 147.
- p. 155. "Wood" : A translation of *ὕλη*, "matter."
- p. 157. "Rhetoric" (38) : Rather "the gift of speech"; or perhaps the "decree" of the reasoning faculty.

## BOOK XI

- p. 160. "Cithaeron" (6) : Oedipus utters this cry after discovering that he has fulfilled his awful doom. He was exposed on Cithaeron as an infant to die, and the cry implies that he wishes he had died there. Sophocles, *Oedipus Tyrannus*, 1391.
- "New Comedy . . ." etc. C. has here strayed from the Greek rather widely. Translate: "and understand to what end the New Comedy was adopted, which by small degrees degenerated into a mere show of skill in mimicry." C. writes *Comedia Vetus, Media, Nova*.
- p. 163. "Phocion" (13) : When about to be put to death he charged his son to bear no malice against the Athenians.
- p. 170. "My heart," etc. (31) : From Homer, *Odyssey* ix. 413.  
"They will" (32) : From Hesiod, *Opera et Dies*, 184.
- "Epictetus" (34) : Arr. i. 11, 37.
- "Cut down grapes" (35) : Correct "ears of corn."
- p. 171. "Epictetus" (36) : Arr. 3, 22, 105.



## GLOSSARY

*This Glossary includes all proper names (excepting a few which are insignificant or unknown), and all obsolete or obscure words.*

- ADRIANUS**, or Hadrian (76–138 A.D.), 14th Roman Emperor.
- Agrippa**, M. Vipsanius (63–12 B.C.), a distinguished soldier under Augustus.
- Alexander the Great**, King of Macedonia, and Conqueror of the East, 356–323 B.C.
- Antisthenes** of Athens, founder of the sect of Cynic philosophers, and an opponent of Plato, 5th century B.C.
- Antoninus Pius**, 15th Roman Emperor, 138–161 A.D., “one of the best princes that ever mounted a throne.”
- Apathia**: the Stoic ideal was calmness in all circumstances, an insensitivity to pain, and absence of all exultation at pleasure or good fortune.
- Apelles**, a famous painter of antiquity.
- Apollonius** of Alexandria, called *Dyrcolus*, or the “Ill-tempered,” a great grammarian.
- Aposteme**, tumour, excrescence.
- Archimedes** of Syracuse, 287–212 B.C., the most famous mathematician of antiquity.
- Athos**, a mountain promontory at the N. of the Aegean Sea.
- Augustus**, first Roman Emperor (ruled 31 B.C.–14 A.D.).
- Avoid**, void.
- BACCHUS**: there were several persons of this name, and the one meant is perhaps the musician.
- Brutus** (1) the liberator of the Roman people from their kings, and (2) the murderer of Cæsar. Both names were household words.
- CÆSAR**, C. Julius, the Dictator and Conqueror.
- Caieta**, a town in Latium.
- Camillus**, a famous dictator in the early days of the Roman Republic.
- Carnuntum**, a town on the Danube in Upper Pannonia.
- Cato**, called of Utica, a Stoic who died by his own hand after the battle of Thapsus, 46 B.C. His name was proverbial for virtue and courage.
- Cautelous**, cautious.
- Cecrops**, first legendary King of Athens.
- Charax**, perhaps the priestly historian of that name, whose date is unknown, except that it must be later than Nero.
- Chirurgeon**, surgeon.
- Chrysippus**, 280–207 B.C., a Stoic philosopher, and the founder of Stoicism as a systematic philosophy.
- Circus**, the Circus Maximus at Rome, where games were held. There were four companies who contracted to provide horses, drivers, etc. These were called *Factiores*, and each had its distinguishing colour: *russata* (red), *albata* (white), *veneta* (blue), *prasina* (green). There was high rivalry between them, and riots and bloodshed not infrequently.
- Cithaeron**, a mountain range N. of Attica.
- Comedy**, ancient; a term applied to the Attic comedy of Aristophanes and his time, which criticised persons and politics, like a modern

## Glossary

- conic journal, such as *Punch.*  
*See New Comedy.*
- Compendious, short.
- Conceit, opinion.
- Contentation, contentment.
- Crates, a Cynic philosopher of the 4th century B.C.
- Croesus, King of Lydia, proverbial for wealth; he reigned 560–546 B.C.
- Cynics, a school of philosophers, founded by Antisthenes. Their texts were a kind of caricature of Socraticism. Nothing was good but virtue, nothing bad but vice. The Cynics repudiated all civil and social claims, and attempted to return to what they called a state of nature. Many of them were very disgusting in their manners.
- DEMETRIUS of Phalerum, an Athenian orator, statesman, philosopher, and poet. Born 345 B.C.
- Democritus of Abdera (460–361 B.C.), celebrated as the “laughing philosopher,” whose constant thought was “What fools these mortals be.” He invented the Atomic Theory.
- Dio of Syracuse, a disciple of Plato, and afterwards tyrant of Syracuse. Murdered 353 B.C.
- Diogenes, the Cynic, born about 412 B.C., renowned for his rudeness and hardihood.
- Diognetus, a painter.
- Dispense with, put up with.
- Dogmata, pithy sayings, or philosophical rules of life.
- EMPEROCLES of Agrigentum, fl. 5th century B.C., a philosopher, who first laid down that there were “four elements.” He believed in the transmigration of souls, and the indestructibility of matter.
- Epictetus, a famous Stoic philosopher. He was of Phrygia, at first a slave, then freedman, lame, poor, and contended. The work called *Encheiridion* was compiled by a pupil from his discourses.
- Epicureans, a sect of philosophers founded by Epicurus, who “combined the physics of Democritus,” i.e. the atomic theory, “with the ethics of Aristippus.” They proposed to live for happiness, but the word did not bear that coarse and vulgar sense originally which it soon took.
- Epicurus of Samos, 342–270 B.C. Lived at Athens in his “gardens,” an urbane and kindly, if somewhat useless, life. His character was simple and temperate, and had none of the vice or indulgence which was afterwards associated with the name of Epicurean.
- Eudoxus of Cnidus, a famous astronomer and physician of the 4th century B.C.
- FATAL, fated.
- Fortuit, chance (adj.).
- Fronto, M. Cornelius, a rhetorician and pleader, made consul in 143 A.D. A number of his letters to M. Aur. and others are extant.
- GRANUA, a tributary of the Danube.
- HELICE, ancient capital city of Achaia, swallowed up by an earthquake, 373 B.C.
- Helvidius Priscus, son-in-law of Thrasea Pätus, a noble man and a lover of liberty. He was banished by Nero, and put to death by Vespasian.
- Heracitus of Ephesus, who lived in the 6th century B.C. He wrote on philosophy and natural science.
- Herculaneum, near Mount Vesuvius, buried by the eruption of 79 A.D.
- Hercules, p. 167, should be Apollo.  
*See Muses.*
- Hiatus, gap.

## Glossary

Hipparchus of Bithynia, an astronomer of the 2nd century B.C., "The true father of astronomy." Hippocrates of Cos, about 460-357 B.C. One of the most famous physicians of antiquity.

**Idiot**, means merely the non-proficient in anything, the "layman," he who was not technically trained in any art, craft, or calling.

**LEONNATUS**, a distinguished general under Alexander the Great.

Lucilla, daughter of M. Aurelius, and wife of Verus, whom she survived.

**MAECENAS**, a trusted adviser of Augustus, and a munificent patron of wits and literary men.

Maximus, Claudius, a Stoic philosopher.

Menippus, a Cynic philosopher.

Meteores, τὰ μετεωρολογικά, "high philosophy," used specially of astronomy and natural philosophy, which were bound up with other speculations.

Middle Comedy, something "mid-way" between the Old and New Comedy. *See* Comedy, Ancient, and New Comedy.

Middle things, p. 80. The Stoicks divided all things into virtue, vice, and indifferent things; but as "indifferent" they regarded most of those things which the world regards as good or bad, such as wealth or poverty. Of these, some were "to be desired," some "to be rejected."

Muses, the nine deities who presided over various kinds of poetry, music, etc. Their leader was Apollo, one of whose titles is Musegetes, the Leader of the Muses.

Neaves, strings.

New Comedy, the Attic Comedy of Menander and his school, which criticised not persons but manners, like a modern comic opera. *See* Comedy, Ancient.

**PALESTRA**, wrestling school.

Pancretiast, competitor in the pancretium, a combined contest which comprised boxing and wrestling. Parmularii, gladiators armed with a small round shield (*parma*).

Pheidias, the most famous sculptor of antiquity.

Philippus, founder of the Macedonian supremacy, and father of Alexander the Great.

Phocion, an Athenian general and statesman, a noble and high-minded man, 4th century B.C. He was called by Demosthenes, "the pruner of my periods." He was put to death by the State in 317, on a false suspicion, and left a message for his son "to bear no grudge against the Athenians."

Pine, torment.

Plato of Athens, 429-347 B.C. He used the dialectic method invented by his master Socrates. He was, perhaps, as much poet as philosopher. He is generally identified with the Theory of Ideas, that things are what they are by participation with our eternal Idea. His "Commonwealth" was a kind of Utopia. Platonics, followers of Plato.

Pompeii, near Mount Vesuvius, buried in the eruption of 79 A.D.

Pompeius, Cn. Pompeius Magnus, a very successful general at the end of the Roman Republic (106-48 B.C.).

Prestidigitator, juggler.

Pythagoras of Samos, a philosopher, scientist, and moralist of the 6th century B.C.

## Glossary

**QUADI**, a tribe of S. Germany. M. Aurelius carried on war against them, and part of this book was written in the field.

**RICHTUS**, gape, jaws.  
**RUSTICUS**, Q. Junius, or Stoic philosopher, twice made consul by M. Aurelius.

**SACRARY**, shrine.  
**Salaminius**, p. 99, Leon of Salamis. Socrates was ordered by the Thirty Tyrants to fetch him before them, and Socrates, at his own peril, refused.

**Sarmatae**, a tribe dwelling in Poland.

**Scelutum**, skeleton.

**Sceptics**, a school of philosophy founded by Pyrrho (4th century B.C.). He advocated "suspension of judgment," and taught the relativity of knowledge and impossibility of proof. The school is not unlike the Agnostic school.

**Scipio**, the name of two great soldiers, P. Corn. Scipio Africanus, conqueror of Hannibal, and P. Corn. Sc. Afr. Minor, who came into the family by adoption, who destroyed Carthage.

**Secutoriani** (a word coined by C.), the *secutores*, light-armed gladiators, who were pitted against others with net and trident.

**Sextus of Chaeronea**, a Stoic philosopher, nephew of Plutarch.

**Silly**, simple, common.

**Sinuessa**, a town in Latium.

**Socrates**, an Athenian philosopher (469-399 B.C.), founder of the dialectic method. Put to death on a trumped-up charge by his countrymen.

**Stint**, limit (without implying niggardliness).

**Stoics**, a philosophic system founded by Zeno (4th century B.C.), and systematised by Chrysippus (3rd century B.C.). Their physical theory was a pantheistic materialism, their *summum bonum* "to live according to nature." Their "wise man" needs nothing, he is sufficient to himself; virtue is good, vice bad, external things indifferent.

**THEOPHRASTUS**, a philosopher, pupil of Aristotle, and his successor as president of the Lyceum. He wrote a large number of works on philosophy and natural history. Died 287 B.C.

**Thræsa**, P. Thræsa Pætus, a senator and Stoic philosopher, a noble and courageous man. He was condemned to death by Nero.

**Tiberius**, 2nd Roman Emperor (14-31 A.D.). He spent the latter part of his life at Capreae (Capri), off Naples, in luxury or debauchery, neglecting his imperial duties.

**To-torn**, torn to pieces.

**Trajan**, 13th Roman Emperor, 52-117 A.D.

**Væus**, Lucius Aurelius, colleague of M. Aurelius in the Empire. He married Lucilla, daughter of M. A., and died 169 A.D.

**Vespasian**, 9th Roman Emperor (9-79 A.D.).

**XENOCRATES** of Chalcedon, 396-314 B.C., a philosopher, and president of the Academy.

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THE WORKS  
OF  
EPICTETUS.

HIS DISCOURSES, IN FOUR BOOKS, THE EN-  
CHIRIDION, AND FRAGMENTS.

*A TRANSLATION FROM THE GREEK*  
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BY  
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## LIST OF BOOKS CONSULTED.

*[For the Complete Works.]*

1. Epicteti quæ supersunt Dissertationes ab Arriano collectæ, . . . . illustravit Joannes Uptonus, Præbend. Rossensis. Londini, 1741. 2 vols. 8vo.
2. Epicteti Dissertationum libri iv. . . . . post J. Uptoni aliorumque curas, edidit J. Schweighäuser. Lipsiæ, 1799, 1800. 5 vols. in 6. 8vo.
3. The Works of Epictetus, . . . . translated from the original Greek, by Mrs. Elizabeth Carter. . . . . London, 1758. 4to. [2d ed., 2 vols., 12mo, 1759. 3d ed., 2 vols., 12mo, 1768. 4th ed., 2 vols., 8vo, 1804.]
4. . . . . Epicteti Dissertationes ab Arriani literis mandatæ. . . . . [Didot, Bib. Græc.] Parisiis, 1840. 8vo.

*[For the Enchiridion.]*

5. Simplicii Commentarius in Enchiridion Epicteti, . . . . . cum versione Hier. Wolfii et Cl. Salmasii animadversionibus. . . . . Lugduni Batavorum, 1640. 4to.
6. The most excellent Morals of Epictetus made English in a Poetical Paraphrase, by Ellis Walker, M. A. London, 1692. 12mo. [Also, London, 1697, 1701, 1709, 1716, 1732; Boston, Mass., 1863, from the edition of 1716. The two latter are those which I have seen.]
7. Epictetus, his Morals, with Simplicius, his Commentary. Made English from the Greek by George Stanhope. . . . . London, 1694. 12mo. [Also, London, 1700, 1704, 1721, 1741, 1750.]
8. Epicteti Manuale. . . . . Græce et Latine in usum tyronum accommodati. . . . . illustravit Joseph Simpson. Editio Quarta. Londini, 1758. 8vo.
9. Epicteti Enchiridion Græce et Latine . . . . . curavit Chr.

Gottl. Heyne. Altera Editio. Varsaviæ, 1776. 18mo. [A previous edition at Dresden, 1756.]

10. Manuale di Epicteto . . . secondo la Versione del Rev. Padre Pagnini. [Opere di G. D. Romagnosi. Vol. I. Part 2.] Milano, 1844. 8vo.

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[The following English versions I find mentioned in Adam Clarke's "Account of English Translations of Greek and Roman Classics." London, 1806 ; -- but I have not met with them.

1. The Manual of Epictetus, translated out of Greek into French, and now into English, compared with two Latin translations, . . . by Jas. Sandford. London, 1567. 8vo.

2. The Life and Philosophy of Epictetus . . . rendered into English by John Davies. London, 1670. 8vo.

3. The Manual of Epictetus the Philosopher, translated from the original Greek by Wm. Bond. London, 1730. 12mo.

Ellis Walker, in his preliminary life of Epictetus, speaks of still another English translation, by Healey ; also of French versions by Du Vair and Boilean. There is also a critical edition of the Enchiridion, by Coray, with a French translation (Paris, 1826), which I have not seen.]

**T H E**

**DISCOURSES OF EPICETUS.**

## ARRIAN TO LUCIUS GELLIUS

WISHETH ALL HAPPINESS.

I NEITHER composed the Discourses of Epictetus in such a manner as things of this nature are commonly composed, nor did I myself produce them to public view, any more than I composed them. But whatever sentiments I heard from his own mouth, the very same I endeavored to set down in the very same words, so far as possible, and to preserve as memorials for my own use, of his manner of thinking, and freedom of speech.

These Discourses are such as one person would naturally deliver from his own thoughts, *extempore*, to another; not such as he would prepare to be read by numbers afterwards. Yet, notwithstanding this, I cannot tell how, without either my consent or knowledge, they have fallen into the hands of the public. But it is of little consequence to me, if I do not appear an able writer, and of none to Epictetus, if any one treats his Discourses with contempt; since it was very evident, even when he uttered them, that he aimed at nothing more than to excite his hearers to virtue. If they produce that one effect, they have in

them what, I think, philosophical discourses ought to have. And should they fail of it, let the readers however be assured, that when Epictetus himself pronounced them, his audience could not help being affected in the very manner he intended they should. If by themselves they have less efficacy, perhaps it is my fault, or perhaps it is unavoidable.

Farewell.

## THE DISCOURSES OF EPICETUS.

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### BOOK I.

#### CHAPTER I.

OF THE THINGS WHICH ARE, AND THE THINGS WHICH  
ARE NOT IN OUR OWN POWER.

OF other faculties, you will find no one that contemplates, and consequently approves or disapproves itself. How far does the proper sphere of grammar extend? As far as the judging of language. Of music? As far as the judging of melody. Does either of them contemplate itself, then? By no means.

Thus, for instance, when you are to write to your friend, grammar will tell you what to write; but whether you are to write to your friend at all, or no, grammar will not tell you. Thus music, with regard to tunes; but whether it be proper or improper, at any particular time, to sing or play, music will not tell you.

What will tell, then?

That which contemplates both itself and all other things.

And what is that?

The Reasoning Faculty; for that alone is found to consider both itself, its powers, its value, and like-

wise all the rest. For what is it else that says, gold is beautiful ; for the gold itself does not speak ? Evidently that faculty, which judges of the appearances of things. What else distinguishes music, grammar, the other faculties, proves their uses, and shows their proper occasions ?

Nothing but this.

As it was fit then, this most excellent and superior faculty alone, a right use of the appearances of things, the gods have placed in our own power ; but all other matters, they have not placed in our power. What, was it because they would not ? I rather think, that if they could, they had granted us these too ; but they certainly could not. For, placed upon earth, and confined to such a body, and to such companions, how was it possible that, in these respects, we should not be hindered by things without us ?

But what says Zeus ? " O Epictetus, if it were possible, I had made this little body and property of thine free, and not liable to hindrance. But now do not mistake : it is not thy own, but only a finer mixture of clay. Since, then, I could not give thee this, I have given thee a certain portion of myself ; this faculty of exerting the powers of pursuit and avoidance, of desire and aversion, and, in a word, the use of the appearances of things. Taking care of this point, and making what is thy own to consist in this, thou wilt never be restrained, never be hindered ; thou wilt not groan, wilt not complain, wilt not flatter any one. How, then ! Do all these advantages seem small to thee ? Heaven forbid ! Let them suffice thee then, and thank the gods."

But now, when it is in our power to take care of one thing, and to apply to one, we choose rather to

take care of many, and to encumber ourselves with many; body, property, brother, friend, child, and slave; and, by this multiplicity of encumbrances, we are burdened and weighed down. Thus, when the weather doth not happen to be fair for sailing, we sit in distress and gaze out perpetually. Which way is the wind? — North. — What do we want of that? When will the west blow? — When it pleases, friend, or when *Æolus* pleases; for Zeus has not made you dispenser of the winds, but *Æolus*.

What then is to be done?

To make the best of what is in our power, and take the rest as it occurs.

And how does it occur?

As it pleases God.

What, then, must I be the only one to lose my head?

Why, would you have all the world, then, lose their heads for your consolation? Why are not you willing to stretch out your neck, like *Lateranus*,\* when he was commanded by Nero to be beheaded? For, shrinking a little after receiving a weak blow, he stretched it out again. And before this, when *Epaphroditus*,† the freedman of Nero, interrogated

\* *Plantins Lateranus*, a Consul elect, was put to death by the command of Nero, for being privy to the conspiracy of Piso. His execution was so sudden, that he was not permitted to take leave of his wife and children; but was hurried into a place appropriated to the punishment of slaves, and there killed by the hand of the tribune *Statius*. He suffered in obstinate silence, and without making any reproach to *Statius*, who was concerned in the same plot for which he himself was punished. *TACITUS*, Ann. xv. c. 60. — C.

† *Epaphroditus* was the master of requests and freedman of Nero, and the master of Epictetus. He assisted Nero in killing himself; for which he was condemned to death by Domitian. *SUETONIUS* in *Vita Neronis*, c. 49; *Domit.* c. 14. — C.

him about the conspiracy : “ If I have a mind to say anything,” replied he, “ I will tell it to your master.”

What resource have we then upon such occasions ? Why, what else but to distinguish between what is *ours*, and what not *ours*; what is right, and what is wrong. I must die, and must I die groaning too ?— Be fettered. Must I be lamenting too ?— Exiled. And what hinders me, then, but that I may go smiling, and cheerful, and serene ?— “ Betray a secret.” — I will not betray it ; for this is in my own power. — “ Then I will fetter you.”— What do you say, man ? Fetter me ? You will fetter my leg ; but not Zeus himself can get the better of my free will. “ I will throw you into prison : I will behead that paltry body of yours.” Did I ever tell you, that I alone had a head not liable to be cut off ?— These things ought philosophers to study ; these ought they daily to write ; and in these to exercise themselves.

Thræseas\* used to say, “ I had rather be killed to-day, than banished to-morrow.” But how did Rufus † answer him ? “ If you prefer it as a heavier misfortune, how foolish a preference ! If as a lighter, who has put it in your power ? Why do not you study to be contented with what is allotted you ? ”

Well, and what said Agrippinus,‡ upon this ac-

\* Thræseas Pætus, a Stoic philosopher, put to death by Nero. He was husband of Arria, so well known by that beautiful epigram in Martial. The expression of Tacitus concerning him is remarkable : “ After the murder of so many excellent persons, Nero at last formed a desire of cutting off virtue itself, by the execution of Thræseas Pætus and Bareas Soranus.” Ann. xvi. c. 21.— C.

† Rufus was a Tuscan, of the equestrian order, and a Stoic philosopher. When Vespasian banished the other philosophers, Rufus was alone excepted.— C.

‡ Agrippinus was banished by Nero, for no other crime than the

count? "I will not be a hindrance to myself." Word was brought him, "Your cause is trying in the senate."—"Good luck attend it; but it is eleven o'clock" (the hour when he used to exercise before bathing): "Let us go to our exercise." This being over, a messenger tells him, "You are condemned." To banishment, says he, or to death? "To banishment."—What of my estate?—"It is not taken away." Well then, let us go as far as Aricia,\* and dine there.

This it is to have studied what ought to be studied; to have placed our desires and aversions above tyranny and above chance. I must die: if instantly, I will die instantly; if in a short time, I will dine first; and when the hour comes, then I will die. How? As becomes one who restores what is not his own.

## CHAPTER II.

### IN WHAT MANNER, UPON EVERY OCCASION, TO PRESERVE OUR CHARACTER.

**T**O a reasonable creature, that alone is insupportable which is unreasonable; but everything reasonable may be supported. Stripes are not naturally insupportable.—"How so?"—See how the Spartans† bear whipping, after they have learned that it unfortunate death of his father, who had been causelessly killed by the command of Tiberius; and this had furnished a pretence for accusing him of hereditary disloyalty. *TACITUS*, Ann. xvi. c. 28, 29.—C.

\* Aricia, a town about sixteen miles from Rome, which lay in his road to banishment.—C.

† The Spartans, to make a trial of the fortitude of their children, used to have them publicly whipped at the altar of Diana; and often

is a reasonable thing. Hanging is not insupportable ; for, as soon as a man has taken it into his head that it is reasonable, he goes and hangs himself. In short we shall find by observation, that no creature is oppressed so much by anything, as by what is unreasonable ; nor, on the other hand, attracted to anything so strongly, as to what is reasonable.

But it happens that different things are reasonable and unreasonable, as well as good and bad, advantageous and disadvantageous, to different persons. 'On this account, chiefly, we stand in need of a liberal education, to teach us to adapt the preconceptions of reasonable and unreasonable to particular cases, conformably to nature. But to judge of reasonable and unreasonable, we make use not only of a due estimation of things without us, but of what relates to each person's particular character. Thus, it is reasonable for one man to submit to a menial office, who considers this only, that if he does not submit to it, he shall be whipt, and lose his dinner, but that if he does, he has nothing hard or disagreeable to suffer ; whereas to another it appears insupportable, not only to submit to such an office himself, but to respect any one else who does. If you ask me, then, whether you shall do this menial office or not, I will tell you, it is a more valuable thing to get a dinner, than not ; and a greater disgrace to be whipt, than not to be whipt ; — so that, if you measure yourself by these things, go and do your office.

"Ay, but this is not suitable to my character."

It is you who are to consider that, not I ; for it is

with so much severity, that they expired. The boys supported this exercise with so much constancy as never to cry out, nor even groan.—C.

you who know yourself, what value you set upon yourself, and at what rate you sell yourself; for different people sell themselves at different prices.

Hence Agrippinus\* when Florus was considering whether he should go to Nero's shows, and perform some part in them himself, bid him go.—“But why do not you go then?” says Florus. “Because,” replied Agrippinus, “I do not deliberate about it.” For he who once sets himself about such considerations, and goes to calculating the worth of external things, approaches very near to those who forget their own character. For, why do you ask me whether death or life be the more eligible? I answer, life. Pain or pleasure? I answer, pleasure.—“But if I do not act a part, I shall lose my head.”—Go and act it then, but I will not.—“Why?”—Because you esteem yourself only as one thread of many that make up the piece.—“What then?”—You have nothing to care for, but how to be like the rest of mankind, as one thread desires not to be distinguished from the others. But I would be the purple,† that small and brilliant part, which gives a lustre and beauty to the rest. Why do you bid me resemble the multitude then? At that rate, how shall I be the purple?

This Priscus Helvidius ‡ too saw, and acted accord-

\* Nero was remarkably fond of theatrical entertainments; and used to introduce upon the stage the descendants of noble families, whom want had rendered venal. TACITUS, Ann. xiv. c. 14. — C.

† An allusion to the purple border, which distinguished the dress of the Roman nobility.—C.

‡ Helvidius Priscus was no less remarkable for his learning and philosophy, than for the sanctity of his manners and the love of his country. He behaved however with too much haughtiness on several

ingly ; for when Vespasian had sent to forbid his going to the Senate, he answered, “ It is in your power to prevent my continuing a senator ; but while I am one, I must go.” — “ Well then, at least be silent there.” — “ Do not ask my opinion and I will be silent.” — “ But I must ask it.” — “ And I must speak what appears to me to be right.” — “ But if you do, I will put you to death.” — “ When did I ever tell you that I was immortal ? You will do your part, and I mine : it is yours to kill and mine to die intrepid ; yours to banish, mine to depart untroubled.”

What good, then, did Priscus do, who was but a single person ? Why, what good does the purple do to the garment ? What, but to be beautiful in itself, and to set a good example to the rest ? Another, perhaps, if in such circumstances Cæsar had forbidden his going to the Senate, would have answered, “ I am obliged to you for excusing me.” But such a one he would not have forbidden to go ; well knowing, that he would either sit like a statue, or, if he spoke, would say what he knew to be agreeable to Cæsar, and would overdo it, by adding still more.

Thus acted even a wrestler, who was in danger of death, unless he consented to an ignominious amputation. His brother, who was a philosopher, coming to him, and saying “ Well, brother, what do you design to do ? Let us cut away this part, and return again to the field.” He refused, and courageously died.

When it was asked, whether he acted thus as a wrestler, or a philosopher ? I answer, as a man, said occasions, to Vespasian, who sentenced him to death with great reluctance, and even forbade the execution, when it was too late. SUETON. in Vesp. § 15.—C.

Epictetus; but as a man who had been proclaimed a champion at the Olympic games; who had been used to such places, and not exercised merely in the school of Bato.\* Another would have had his very head cut off, if he could have lived without it. This is that regard to character, so powerful with those who are accustomed to introduce it, from their own breasts, into their deliberations.

"Come now, Epictetus, take off your beard." † — If I am a philosopher, I answer, I will not take it off. — "Then I will take off your head." — If that will do you any good, take it off.

It was asked, How shall each of us perceive what belongs to his character? Whence, replied Epictetus, does a bull, when the lion approaches, alone recognize his own qualifications, and expose himself alone for the whole herd? It is evident, that with the qualifications, occurs, at the same time, the consciousness of being indued with them. And in the same manner, whoever of us hath such qualifications, will not be ignorant of them. But neither is a bull, nor a gallant-spirited man, formed all at once. We are to exercise, and qualify ourselves, and not to run rashly upon what doth not concern us.

Only consider at what price you sell your own free will, O man! if only that you may not sell it for a trifle. The highest greatness and excellence perhaps seem to belong to others, to such as Socrates. Why then, as we are born with a like nature, do not all, or the greater number, become such as he?

\* Bato was a famous master of the Olympic exercises. — C.

† Domitian ordered all the philosophers to be banished. To avoid this inconvenience, those who had a mind to disguise their profession, took off their beards. — C.

Why, are all horses swift ? Are all dogs sagacious ? What then, because my gifts are humble, shall I neglect all care of myself ? Heaven forbid ! Epictetus may not surpass Socrates ; granted : but could I overtake him, it might be enough for me. I shall never be Milo, and yet I do not neglect my body ; nor Croesus, and yet I do not neglect my property ; nor should we omit any effort, from a despair of arriving at the highest.

### CHAPTER III.

HOW, FROM THE DOCTRINE THAT GOD IS THE FATHER OF MANKIND, WE MAY PROCEED TO ITS CONSEQUENCES.

IF a person could be persuaded of this principle as he ought, that we are all originally descended from God, and that he is the father of men and gods ; I conceive he never would think of himself meanly or ignobly. Suppose Cæsar were to adopt you, there would be no bearing your haughty looks ; and will you not feel ennobled on knowing yourself to be the son of God ? Yet, in fact, we are not ennobled. But having two things united in our composition, a body in common with the brutes, and reason in common with the gods, many incline to this unhappy and mortal kindred, and only some few to that which is happy and divine. And, as of necessity every one must treat each particular thing, according to the notions he forms about it ; so those few, who suppose that they are made for faith and honor, and a wise use of things, will never think meanly or ignobly concerning themselves. But with the multitude the case is

contrary ; “ For what am I ? A poor contemptible man, with this miserable flesh of mine ? ” Miserable indeed. But you have likewise something better than this poor flesh. Why then, overlooking that, do you pine away in attention to this ?

By means of this [animal] kindred, some of us, deviating towards it, become like wolves, faithless, and crafty, and mischievous ; others, like lions, wild, and savage, and untamed ; but most of us foxes, and disgraceful even among brutes. For what else is a slanderous and ill-natured man, but a fox, or something yet more wretched and mean ? Watch and take heed then, that you do not sink thus low.

## CHAPTER IV

### OF PROGRESS.

**H**E who is entering on a state of progress, having learnt from the philosophers, that good should be sought and evil shunned ; and having learnt too, that prosperity and peace are no otherwise attainable by man, than in not missing what he seeks, nor incurring what he shuns ; such a one removes totally from himself and banishes all wayward desire, and shuns only those things over which he can have control. For if he should attempt to shun those things over which he has no control, he knows that he must sometimes incur that which he shuns, and be unhappy. Now if virtue promises happiness, prosperity, and peace ; then progress in virtue is certainly progress in each of these. For to whatever point the per-

fection of anything absolutely brings us, progress is always an approach towards it.

How happens it then, that when we confess virtue to be such, yet we seek, and make an ostentatious show of progress in other things? What is the business of virtue?

A life truly prosperous.

Who is in a state of progress then? He who has best studied Chrysippus?\* Why, does virtue consist in having read Chrysippus through? If so, progress is confessedly nothing else than understanding a great deal of Chrysippus; otherwise we confess virtue to consist in one thing, and declare progress, which is an approach to it, to be quite another thing.

This person, they say, is already able to understand Chrysippus, by himself.—“Certainly, sir, you have made a vast improvement!” What improvement? Why do you delude him? Why do you withdraw him from a sense of his real needs? Why do not you show him the real function of virtue, that he may know where to seek progress?—Seek it there, O! unfortunate, where your work lies. And where doth your work lie? In learning what to seek and what to shun, that you may neither be disappointed of the one, nor incur the other; in practising how to pursue and how to avoid, that you may not be liable to fail; in practising intellectual assent and doubt, that you may not be liable to be deceived. These are the first and most necessary things. But if you merely seek, in trembling and lamentation, to

\* Chrysippus was regarded as the highest authority among the later Stoics; but not one of his seven hundred volumes has come down to posterity.—H.

keep away all possible ills, what real progress have you made ?

Show me then your progress in this point. As if I should say to a wrestler, Show me your muscle ; and he should answer me, " See my dumb-bells." Your dumb-bells are your own affair : I desire to see the effect of them.

" Take the treatise on the active powers, and see how thoroughly I have perused it."

I do not inquire into this, O ! slavish man ; but how you exert those powers ; how you manage your desires and aversions, how your intentions and purposes ; how you meet events, whether in accordance with nature's laws, or contrary to them. If in accordance, give me evidence of that, and I will say you improve : if the contrary, go your way, and not only comment on these treatises, but write such yourself, and yet what service will it do you ? Do not you know that the whole volume is sold for five denarii ? Doth he who comments upon it, then, value himself at more than that sum ? Never make your life to consist in one thing and yet seek progress in another.

Where is progress, then ?

If any of you, withdrawing himself from externals, turns to his own will, to train, and perfect, and render it conformable to nature ; noble, free, unrestrained, unhindered, faithful, humble ; if he hath learnt, too, that whoever desires or shuns things beyond his own power, can neither be faithful nor free, but must necessarily take his chance with them, must necessarily too be subject to others, to such as can procure or prevent what he desires or shuns ; if, rising in the morning, he observes and keeps to these

rules ; bathes regularly, eats frugally ; and to every subject of action, applies the same fixed principles, — if a racer to racing, if an orator to oratory ; this is he, who truly makes progress ; this is he, who hath not labored in vain. But if he is wholly intent on reading books, and hath labored that point only, and travelled for that ; I bid him go home immediately, and do his daily duties ; since that which he sought is nothing.

The only real thing is, to study how to rid life of lamentation, and complaint, and *Alas !* and *I am undone*, and misfortune, and failure ; and to learn what death, what exile, what a prison, what poison is ; that he may be able to say in a prison, like Socrates, “ My dear Crito, if it thus pleases the gods, thus let it be ” ; and not, “ Wretched old man, have I kept my gray hairs for this ! ” [Do you ask] who speaks thus ? Do you think I quote some mean and despicable person ? Is it not Priam who says it ? Is it not Oedipus ? Nay, how many kings say it ? For what else is tragedy, but the dramatized sufferings of men, bewildered by an admiration of externals ? If one were to be taught by fictions, that things beyond our will are nothing to us, I should rejoice in such a fiction, by which I might live prosperous and serene. But what you wish for, it is your business to consider.

Of what service, then, is Chrysippus to us ?

To teach you, that those things are not false, on which true prosperity and peace depend. “ Take my books, and you will see, how true and conformable to nature those things are, which give me peace.” How great a happiness ! And how great the benefactor, who shows the way ! To Triptolemus all men have

raised temples and altars, because he gave us a milder kind of food: but to him who hath discovered, and brought to light, and communicated the truth to all; \* the means, not of living merely, but of living well; who among you ever raised an altar or a temple, or dedicated a statue, or who worships God in his name? We offer sacrifices in memory of those who have given us corn and the vine; and shall we not give thanks to God, for those who have nurtured such fruit in the human breast; even the truth which makes us blessed?

## CHAPTER V.

## CONCERNING THE ACADEMICS.†

IT is said that there are those who will oppose very evident truths, and yet it is not easy to find a reason which may persuade such an one to alter his opinion. This may arise neither from his own strength, nor from the weakness of his teacher; but when a man becomes obstinate in error, reason cannot always reach him.

Now there are two sorts of obstinacy: the one, of the intellect; the other, of the will. A man may obstinately set himself not to assent to evident truths, nor to quit the defence of contradictions. We all dread a bodily paralysis; and would make use of every contrivance to avoid it: but none of us is troubled about a paralysis of the soul. And yet, indeed,

\* Triptolemus was said to have introduced agriculture and vegetable food among men, under the guidance of Ceres.—H.

† The New Academy denied the existence of any universal truths.—H.

even with regard to the soul, when a person is so affected as not to apprehend or understand anything, we think him in a sad condition ; but where the emotions of shame and modesty are under an absolute paralysis, we go so far as even to call this strength of mind !

Are you certain that you are awake ? — “ I am not,” replies such a person, “ for neither am I certain when in dreaming I appear to myself to be awake.” Is there no difference, then, between these appearances ? — “ None.” Shall I argue with this man any longer ? For what steel or what caustic can I apply, to make him sensible of his paralysis ? If he is sensible of it, and pretends not to be so, he is even worse than dead. He sees not his inconsistency, or, seeing it, holds to the wrong. He moves not, makes no progress ; he rather falls back. His sense of shame is gone ; his reasoning faculty is not gone, but brutalized. Shall I call *this* strength of mind ? By no means : unless we allow it to be such in the vilest debauchees, publicly to speak and act out their worst impulses.

## CHAPTER VI.

### OF PROVIDENCE.

FROM every event that happens in the world it is easy to celebrate Providence, if a person hath but these two qualities in himself ; a faculty of considering what happens to each individual, and a grateful temper. Without the first, he will not perceive the usefulness of things which happen ; and

without the other, he will not be thankful for them. If God had made colors, and had not made the faculty of seeing them, what would have been their use ? None. On the other hand, if he had made the faculty of observation, without objects to observe, what would have been the use of that ? None. Again ; if he had formed both the faculty and the objects, but had not made light ? Neither in that case would they have been of any use.

Who is it then that hath fitted each of these to the other ? Who is it that hath fitted the sword to the scabbard, and the scabbard to the sword ? Is there no such Being ? From the very construction of a complete work, we are used to declare positively, that it must be the operation of some artificer, and not the effect of mere chance. Doth every such work, then, demonstrate an artificer ; and do not visible objects, and the sense of seeing, and light, demonstrate one ? Do not the difference of the sexes, and their inclination to each other, and the use of their several powers ; do not these things demonstrate an artificer ? Most certainly they do.

But further ; this constitution of understanding, by which we are not simply impressed by sensible objects, but take and subtract and add and combine, and pass from point to point by inference ; is not all this sufficient to prevail on some men, and make them ashamed of leaving an artificer out of their scheme ? If not, let them explain to us what the power is that effects each of these ; and how it is possible that chance should produce things so wonderful, and which carry such marks of design.?

What, then, do these things belong to us alone ?

Many indeed ; such as are peculiarly necessary for

a reasonable creature; but you will find many, which are common to us with mere animals.

Then, do they too understand what happens?

Not at all; for use is one affair, and understanding another. But God had need of animals, to make use of things; and of us to understand that use. It is sufficient, therefore, for them to eat, and drink, and sleep, and continue their species, and perform other such offices as belong to each of them; but to us, to whom he hath given likewise a faculty of understanding, these offices are not sufficient. For if we do not proceed in a wise and systematic manner, and suitably to the nature and constitution of each thing, we shall never attain our end. For where the constitution of beings is different, their offices and ends are different likewise. Thus where the constitution is adapted only to use, there use is alone sufficient; but where understanding is added to use, unless that too be duly exercised, the end of such a being will never be attained.

Well then; each of the animals is constituted either for food, or husbandry, to produce milk, or for some other like use; and for these purposes what need is there of understanding things, and being able to discriminate concerning them? But God hath introduced man, as a spectator of himself and of his works; and not only as a spectator, but an interpreter of them. It is therefore shameful that man should begin and end, where irrational creatures do. He is indeed to begin there, but to end where nature itself hath fixed our end; and that is, in contemplation and understanding, and in a scheme of life conformable to nature.

Take care, then, not to die without the contempla-

tion of these things. You take a journey to Olympia to behold the work of Phidias, and each of you thinks it a misfortune to die without a knowledge of such things ; and will you have no inclination to see and understand those works, for which there is no need to take a journey ; but which are ready and at hand, even to those who bestow no pains ! Will you never perceive what you are, or for what you were born, or for what purpose you are admitted to behold this spectacle ?

But there are in life some things unpleasant and difficult.

And are there none at Olympia ? Are not you heated ? Are not you crowded ? Are not you without good conveniences for bathing ? Are not you wet through, when it happens to rain ? Do you not have uproar, and noise, and other disagreeable circumstances ? But I suppose, by comparing all these with the merit of the spectacle, you support and endure them. Well ; and have you not received faculties by which you may support every event ? Have you not received greatness of soul ? Have you not received a manly spirit ? Have you not received patience ? What signifies to me anything that happens, while my soul is above it ? What shall disconcert or trouble or appear grievous to me ? Shall I not use my powers to that purpose for which I received them ; but lament and groan at every casualty ?

“ True, no doubt ; but I have such a disagreeable catarrh ! ” Attend to your diseases, then, as best you can. Do you say, it is unreasonable that there should be such a discomfort in the world ?

And how much better is it that you should have a

catarrh than complain? Pray, what figure do you think Hercules would have made, if there had not been a lion, and a hydra, and a stag, and unjust and brutal men, whom he expelled and cleared away? And what would he have done, if none of these had existed? Is it not plain, that he must have wrapt himself up and slept? In the first place, then, he would never have become a Hercules, by slumbering away his whole life in such delicacy and ease; or if he had, what good would it have done? What would have been the use of his arm and his strength,—of his patience and greatness of mind,—if such circumstances and subjects of action had not roused and exercised him?

What then, must we provide these things for ourselves; and introduce a boar, and a lion, and a hydra, into our country?

This would be madness and folly. But as they were in being, and to be met with, they were proper subjects to call out and exercise Hercules. Do you therefore likewise, being sensible of this, consider the faculties you have; and after taking a view of them, say, "Bring on me now, O Zeus, what difficulty thou wilt, for I have faculties granted me by thee, and powers by which I may win honor from every event."—No; but you sit trembling, for fear this or that should happen, and lamenting, and mourning, and groaning at what doth happen; and then you accuse the gods. For what is the consequence of such a baseness, but impiety? And yet God hath not only granted these faculties, by which we may bear every event, without being depressed or broken by it; but, like a good prince, and a true father, hath placed their exercise above restraint, compulsion, or hin-

drance, and wholly within our own control ; nor hath he reserved a power, even to himself, of hindering or restraining them. Having these things free, and your own, will you not use them, nor consider what you have received, nor from whom ? But you sit groaning and lamenting, some of you, blind to him who gave them, and not acknowledging your benefactor ; and others basely turn themselves to complaints and accusations against God ! Yet I undertake to show you, that you have means and powers to exhibit greatness of soul, and a manly spirit ; but what occasion you have to find fault, and complain, do you show me if you can.

## CHAPTER VII.

## OF THE USE OF THE FORMS OF RIGHT REASONING.

IT is not understood by most persons that the proper use of inferences and hypotheses and interrogations, and logical forms generally, has any relation to the duties of life. In every subject of action, the question is, how a wise and good man may come honestly and consistently out of it. We must admit, therefore, either that the wise man will not engage in difficult problems ; or that, if he does, he will not think it worth his care to deal with them thoroughly ; or if we allow neither of these alternatives, it is necessary to confess, that some examination ought to be made of those points on which the solution of these problems chiefly depends. For what is reasoning ? To lay down true positions ; to reject false ones ; and to suspend the judgment in doubt-

ful ones. Is it enough, then, to have learned merely this? It is enough, say you.—Is it enough, then, for him who would not commit any mistake in the use of money, merely to have heard, that we are to receive the good pieces, and to reject the bad?—This is not enough.—What must be added besides? That skill which tries and distinguishes what pieces are good, what bad.—Therefore, in reasoning too, the definition just given is not enough; but it is necessary that we should be able to prove and distinguish between the true, and the false, and the doubtful. This is clear.

And what further is professed in reasoning?—To admit the consequence of what you have properly granted. Well? and is it enough merely to know this necessity?—It is not; but we must learn how such a thing is the consequence of such another; and when one thing follows from one premise, and when from many premises. Is it not moreover necessary, that he, who would behave skilfully in reasoning, should both himself demonstrate whatever he asserts, and be able to comprehend the demonstrations of others; and not be deceived by such as sophisticate, as if they were demonstrating? Hence arises the use and practice of logical forms; and it appears to be indispensable.

But it may possibly happen, that from the premises which we have honestly granted, there arises some consequence, which, though false, is nevertheless a fair inference. What then ought I to do? To admit a falsehood?—Impossible.—To deny my concessions?—But this will not be allowed.—Or assert that the consequence does not fairly follow from the premises?—Nor is even this practicable.—What

then is to be done in the case?—Is it not this? As the having once borrowed money is not enough to make a person a debtor, unless he still continues to owe money, and has not paid it; so the having granted the premises is not enough to make it necessary to grant the inference, unless we continue our concessions. If the premises continue to the end, such as they were when the concessions were made, it is absolutely necessary to continue the concessions, and to admit what follows from them. But if the premises do not continue such as they were when the concession was made, it is absolutely necessary to revoke the concession, and refuse to accept the inference. For this inference is no consequence of ours, nor belongs to us, when we have revoked the concession of the premises. We ought then thoroughly to consider our premises, and their different aspects, on which any one, by laying hold,—either on the question itself, or on the answer, or on the inference or elsewhere,—may embarrass the unthinking who did not foresee the result. So that in this way we may not be led into any unbecoming or confused position.

The same thing is to be observed in hypotheses and hypothetical arguments. For it is sometimes necessary to require some hypothesis to be granted, as a kind of step to the rest of the argument. Is every given hypothesis then to be granted, or not every one; and if not every one, which? And is he who has granted an hypothesis, forever to abide by it? Or is he sometimes to revoke it, and admit only consequences, but not to admit contradictions?—Ay, but a person may say, on your admitting a possible hypothesis I will drive you upon an impossibility. With such a one as this, shall the wise man never engage,

but avoid all argument and conversation with him ? — And yet who beside the wise man is capable of treating an argument, or who beside is sagacious in reasoning, and incapable of being deceived and imposed on by sophistry ? — Or will he indeed engage, but without regarding whether he behaves rashly and heedlessly in the argument ? — Yet how then can he be wise as we are supposing him ? and without some such exercise and preparation, how can he hold his own ? If this could be shown, then indeed all these forms of reasoning would be superfluous and absurd, and unconnected with our idea of the virtuous man.

Why then are we still indolent, and slothful, and sluggish, seeking pretexts of avoiding labor ? Shall we not be watchful to render reason itself accurate ? — “ But suppose after all, I should make a mistake in these points ? it is not as if I had killed a father.” — O, slavish man ! in this case you had no father to kill ; but the only fault that you could commit in this instance, you have committed. This very thing I myself said to Rufus, when he reproved me for not finding the weak point in some syllogism. Why, said I, have I burnt the capitol then ? Slave ! answered he, was the thing here involved the capitol ? Or are there no other faults, but burning the capitol, or killing a father ? and is it no fault to treat rashly, and vainly, and heedlessly the things which pass before our eyes ; not to comprehend a reason, nor a demonstration, nor a sophism ; nor, in short, to see what is strong in reasoning and what is weak ? Is there nothing wrong in this ?

## CHAPTER VIII.

THAT LOGICAL SUBTLETIES ARE NOT SAFE TO THE UNINSTRUCTED.

**I**N as many ways as equivalent syllogisms may be varied, in so many may the logical forms be varied likewise. As for instance: "If you had borrowed, and not paid, you owe me money. But you have not borrowed, and not paid; therefore you do not owe me money." To perform these processes skilfully, is the peculiar mark of a philosopher. For if an enthymema be an imperfect syllogism; he who is versed in the perfect syllogism, must be equally ready to detect an imperfect one.

"Why then do not we exercise ourselves and others, after this manner?"

Because, even now, though we are not absorbed in these things, nor diverted, by me at least, from the study of morality; yet we make no eminent advances in virtue. What is to be expected then if we should add this avocation too? Especially as it would not only withdraw us from more necessary studies, but likewise afford a capital occasion of conceit and insolence. For the faculty of arguing, and of persuasive reasoning is great; and particularly, if it be constantly practised, and receive an additional ornament from rhetoric. For, in general, every such faculty is dangerous to weak and uninstructed persons, as being apt to render them arrogant and elated. For by what method can one persuade a young man, who excels in these kinds of study, that he ought not to be an appendage to these accomplish-

ments, but they to him ? Will he not trample upon all such advice ; and walk about elated and puffed up, not bearing that any one should touch him, to put him in mind where he is wanting, and in what he goes wrong ?

What then, was not Plato a philosopher ?

Well, and was not Hippocrates a physician ? Yet you see how he expresses himself. But what has his style to do with his professional qualities ? Why do you confound things, accidentally united in the same men ? If Plato was handsome and well made, must I too set myself to becoming handsome and well made ; as if this was necessary to philosophy, because a certain person happened to be at once handsome and a philosopher ? Why will you not perceive and distinguish what are the things that make men philosophers, and what belong to them on other accounts ? Pray, if I were a philosopher, would it be necessary that you should be lame too ?

What then ? Do I reject these special faculties ? By no means ; — neither do I reject the faculty of seeing. But if you ask me, what is the good of man ; I know not where it lies, save in dealing wisely with the phenomena of existence.

## CHAPTER IX.

### HOW FROM THE DOCTRINE OF OUR RELATIONSHIP TO GOD, WE ARE TO DEDUCE ITS CONSEQUENCES.

**I**F what philosophers say of the kinship between God and men be true, what has any one to do, but, like Socrates, when he is asked what countryman he

is, never to say that he is a citizen of Athens, or of Corinth, but of the universe ? For why, if you limit yourself to Athens, do you not farther limit yourself to that mere corner of Athens where your body was brought forth ? Is it not, evidently, from some larger local tie, which comprehends not only that corner, and your whole house, but the whole country of your fathers, that you call yourself an Athenian, or a Corinthian ? He then, who understands the administration of the universe, and has learned that the principal and greatest and most comprehensive of all things is this vast system, extending from men to God ; and that from Him the seeds of being are descended, not only to one's father or grandfather, but to all things that are produced and born on earth ; and especially to rational natures; as they alone are qualified to partake of a communication with the Deity, being connected with him by reason ; why may not such a one call himself a citizen of the universe ? Why not a son of God ? And why shall he fear anything that happens among men ? Shall kinship to Cæsar, or any other of the great at Rome, enable a man to live secure, above contempt; and void of all fear whatever ; and shall not the having God for our maker, and father, and guardian, free us from griefs and alarms ?

“ But wherewithal shall I be fed ? For I have nothing.”

To what do fugitive slaves trust, when they run away from their masters ? Is it to their estates ? Their servants ? Their plate ? To nothing but themselves. Yet they do not fail to obtain the necessaries of life. And must a philosopher, think you, leave his own abode, to rest and rely upon others ; and not take

care of himself? Must he be more helpless and anxious than the brute beasts ; each of which is self-sufficient, and wants neither proper food, nor any suitable and natural provision ? One would think that you would need an instructor, not to guard you from thinking too meanly or ignobly of yourselves ; but that his business would be to take care lest there be young men of such a spirit, that, knowing their affinity to the gods, and that we are as it were fettered by the body and its possessions, and by so many other things as are thus made needful for the daily pursuits of life, they should resolve to throw them all off, as both troublesome and useless, and depart to their divine kindred.

This is the work, if any, that ought to employ your master and preceptor, if you had one, that you should come to him, and say : “ Epictetus, we can no longer bear being tied down to this poor body ; feeding, and resting, and cleaning it, and vexed with so many low cares on its account. Are not these things indifferent, and nothing to us ; and death no evil ? Are we not of kindred to God ; and did we not come from him ? Suffer us to go back thither from whence we came : suffer us at length to be delivered from these fetters that bind and weigh us down. Here thieves and robbers, courts and tyrants, claim power over us, through the body and its possessions. Suffer us to show them that they have no power.”

And in this case it would be my part to answer : “ My friends, wait for God till he shall give the signal, and dismiss you from this service ; then return to him. For the present, be content to remain at this post, where he has placed you. The time of your abode here is short and easy, to such as are disposed

like you ; for what tyrant, what robber, what thief or what court can be formidable to those who thus count for nothing the body and its possessions. Stay, nor foolishly depart."

Thus ought the case to stand between a preceptor and ingenuous young men. But how stands it now ? The preceptor has no life in him ; and you have none. When you have had enough to-day, you sit weeping about to-morrow, how you shall get food. Why, if you have it, slave, you will have it ; if not, you will go out of life. The door is open ; why do you lament ; what room remains for tears ; what occasion for flattery ? Why should any one person envy another ? Why should he be impressed with awe by those who have great possessions, or are placed in high rank ? especially, if they are powerful and passionate ? For what will they do to us ? The things which they can do, we do not regard : the things about which we are concerned, they cannot reach. Who then, after all, shall hold sway over a person thus disposed ? How behaved Socrates in regard to these things ? As it became one conscious of kinship with the gods. He said to his judges :—

" If you should tell me, ' We will acquit you, upon condition that you shall no longer discourse in the manner you have hitherto done, nor make any disturbance either among our young or our old people ' ; I would answer : ' You are ridiculous in thinking, that if your general had placed me in any post, I ought to maintain and defend it, and choose to die a thousand times, rather than desert it ; but that if God hath assigned me any station or method of life, I ought to desert that for you. ' "

This it is, for a man to truly recognize his relation-

ship with God. But we habitually think of ourselves as mere stomach and intestines and bodily parts. Because we fear, because we desire, we flatter those who can help us in these matters ; we dread them too.

A person desired me once to write for him to Rome. He was one vulgarly esteemed unfortunate, as he had been formerly illustrious and rich, and was afterwards stripped of all his possessions, and reduced to live here. I wrote for him in a submissive style ; but, after reading my letter, he returned it to me, and said : “ I wanted your assistance, not your pity ; for no evil hath befallen me.”

Thus Rufus, to try me, used to say, this or that you will have from your master. When I answered him, these are mere human affairs ; Why then, says he, should I intercede with him,\* when you can receive from yourself things more important ? For what one hath of his own, it is superfluous and vain to receive from another. Shall I then, who can receive nobleness and a manly spirit from myself, receive an estate, or a sum of money, or a place, from you ? Heaven forbid ! I will not be so insensible of my own possessions. But, if a person is fearful and abject, what else is necessary, but to apply for permission to bury him as if he were dead. “ Please forward to us the corpse of such a one.” For, in fact, such a one is that, and nothing more. For, if he were anything more, he would be sensible that man is not to be made miserable at the will of his fellow-man.

\* This is a disputed passage, and something is probably lost. The above version mainly follows Upton and Mrs. Carter. — H.

## CHAPTER X.

## CONCERNING THOSE WHO SEEK PREFERMENT AT ROME.

IF we all applied ourselves as heartily to our proper business, as the old politicians at Rome to their schemes, perhaps we too might make some proficiency. I know a man older than I am, who is now a commissary at Rome. When he passed through this place, on his return from exile, what an account did he give me of his former life! and how did he promise, that for the future, when he had returned, he would apply himself to nothing but how to spend the remainder of his days in repose and tranquillity. "For how few have I now remaining!" he said.— You will not do it, said I. When you are once within reach of Rome, you will forget all this; and, if you can but once gain admittance to court, you will be rejoiced and thank God. "If you ever find me, Epictetus," said he, "putting one foot into the court, think of me whatever you please." Now, after all, how did he act? Before he entered the city, he was met by a billet from Cæsar. On receiving it, he forgot all his former resolutions; and has ever since been accumulating business upon himself. I should be glad now to have an opportunity of putting him in mind of his discourse upon the road; and of pointing out by how much I was the truer prophet.

What then do I say? that man is made for an inactive life? No, surely. But why is not ours a life of action? For my own part, I wake at dawn to recollect what things I am to read over again [with my pupils], and then say to myself quickly, What is it to

me how such a one reads ? My present business is to sleep.

Yet what likeness is there between their kind of activity and ours ? If you consider what it is they do, you will see. For about what are they employed the whole day, but in calculating, contriving, consulting, about provisions, about an estate, or other interests like these ? Is there any likeness, then, between reading such a petition from any one, as, "I entreat you to give me a permission to export corn"; and, "I entreat you to learn from Chrysippus, what the administration of the universe is; and what place a reasonable creature holds in it. Learn, too, what you yourself are; and wherein your good and evil consist." Are these things at all alike ? Do they require an equal degree of application ? And is it as shameful to neglect the one as the other ?

Well, then, are we older men the only idle dreamers ? No : but you young men are so in a greater degree. And as we old folks, when we see young ones trifling, are tempted to trifle with them ; so, much more, if I were to see you earnest and ardent, I should be excited to labor with you.

## CHAPTER XI.

### OF NATURAL AFFECTION.

WHEN an important personage once came to visit him, Epictetus, having inquired into the particulars of his affairs, asked him, Whether he had a wife and children ? The other replying that he had, Epictetus likewise inquired, In what manner do you

live with them? "Very miserably," says he.—How so? For men do not marry, and get children, to be miserable; but rather to make themselves happy.—"But I am so very miserable about my children, that the other day, when my daughter was sick, and appeared to be in danger, I could not bear even to be with her; but ran away, till it was told me, that she was recovered."—And pray do you think this was acting right?—"It was acting naturally," said he.—Well? do but convince me that it was acting naturally, and I can as well convince you that everything natural is right.—"All, or most of us fathers, are affected in the same way."—I do not deny the fact; but the question between us is, whether it be right. For by this way of reasoning, it must be said, that diseases happen for the good of the body, because they do happen; and even that vices are natural, because all, or most of us, are guilty of them. Do you show me then, how such a behavior as yours appears to be natural.

"I cannot undertake that. But do you rather show me, that it is neither natural nor right."

If we were disputing about black and white, what criterion must we call in, to distinguish them?

"The sight."

If about hot and cold, or hard and soft, what?

"The touch."

Well then? when we are debating about natural and unnatural, and right and wrong; what criterion are we to take?

"I cannot tell

And yet to be ignorant of a criterion of colors, or of smells, or tastes, might perhaps be no very great loss. But do you think, that he suffers only a small

loss, who is ignorant of what is good and evil, and natural and unnatural to man ?

“ No. The very greatest.”

Well ; tell me ; are all things which are judged good and proper by some, rightly judged to be so ? Thus, is it possible, that the several opinions of Jews, and Syrians, and Egyptians, and Romans, concerning food, should all be right ?

“ How can it be possible ? ”

I suppose then, it is absolutely necessary that, if the opinions of the Egyptians be right, the others must be wrong ; if those of the Jews be good, all the rest must be bad.

“ How can it be otherwise ? ”

And where ignorance is, there likewise is want of wisdom and instruction in the most necessary points.

“ It is granted.”

Then as you are sensible of this, you will for the future apply to nothing, and think of nothing else, but how to learn the criterion of what is agreeable to nature ; and to use that, in judging of each particular case.

At present the assistance I have to give you, towards what you desire, is this. Does affection seem to you to be a right and a natural thing ?

“ How should it be otherwise ? ”

Well ; and is affection natural and right, and reason not so ?

“ By no means.”

Is there any opposition, then, between reason and affection ?

“ I think not.”

Suppose there were : if one of two opposites be natural, the other must necessarily be unnatural. Must it not ?

“It must.”

What we find, then, to accord at once with love and reason, *that* we may safely pronounce to be right and good.

“Agreed.”

Well, then: you will not dispute this, that to run away, and leave a sick child, is contrary to reason. It remains for us to consider, whether it be consistent with affection.

“Let us consider it.”

Did you, then, from an affection to your child, do right in running away, and leaving her? Has her mother no affection for the child?

“Yes, surely, she has.”

Would it have been right, then, that her mother too should leave her; or would it not?

“It would not.”

And does not her nurse love her?

“She does.”

Then ought she likewise to leave her?

“By no means.”

And does not her preceptor love her?

“He does.”

Then ought he also to have run away, and left her; the child being thus left alone and unassisted, from the great affection of her parents, and her friends; or left to die among people, who neither loved her, nor took care of her?

“Heaven forbid!”

But is it not unreasonable and unjust, that what you think right in yourself, on account of your affection, should not be allowed to others, who have the very same affection with you?

“It is absurd.”

Pray, if you were sick yourself, should you be willing to have your family, and even your wife and children, so very affectionate, as to leave you helpless and alone ?

“ By no means.”

Or would you wish to be so loved by your friends, as from their excessive affection always to be left alone when you were sick ? Or would you not rejoice, if it were possible, to have such a kind of affection from your enemies, as to make them thus let you alone ? If so, it remains, that your behaviour was by no means affectionate. But now, was there no other motive that induced you to desert your child ?

“ How is that possible ? ”

I mean some such motive as induced a person at Rome to hide his face while a horse was running, to which he earnestly wished success ; and when, beyond his expectation, it won the race, he was obliged himself to be sponged, to recover from his faintness.

“ And what was this motive ? ”

At present, perhaps, it cannot be made clear to you. It is sufficient to be convinced, if what philosophers say be true, that we are not to seek any motive merely from without ; but that there is the same [unseen] motive in all cases, which moves us to do or forbear any action ; to speak or not to speak ; to be elated or depressed ; to avoid or pursue : that very impulse which hath now moved us two ; you, to come, and sit and hear me ; and me, to speak as I do.

“ And what is that ? ”

Is it anything else, than that it seemed right to us to do so ?

“ Nothing else.”

And if it had seemed otherwise to us, what else should we have done, than what we thought right ? This, and not the death of Patroclus, was the real source of the lamentation of Achilles,—for every man is not thus affected by the death of a friend,—that it seemed right to him. This too was the cause of your running away from your child, that it then seemed right ; and if hereafter you should stay with her, it will be because that seems right. You are now returning to Rome, because it seems right to you ; but if you should alter your opinion, you will not return. In a word, neither death, nor exile, nor pain, nor anything of this kind, is the real cause of our doing or not doing any action : but our inward opinions and principles. Do I convince you of this, or not ?

“ You do.”

Well then : such as the cause is, such will be the effect. From this day forward, then, whenever we do anything wrong, we will impute it to the wrong principle from which we act ; and we will endeavor to remove and extirpate that, with greater care than we would remove wens and tumors from the body. In like manner, we will ascribe what we do right, to the same cause ; and we will accuse neither servant, nor neighbor, nor wife, nor children, as the cause of any evil to us ; persuaded that if we had not accepted such principles, we should not carry them to such consequences. The control of these principles lies in us, and not in any outward things. Of these principles we ourselves, and not externals, are the masters.

“ Agreed.”

From this day, then, we will not so closely inquire as to any external conditions,—estate, or slaves, or

horses, or dogs,—but only make sure of our own principles.

“ Such is my desire,” said the visitor.

You see, then, that it is necessary for you to become a student, that being whom every one laughs at, if you really desire to make an examination of your own principles. But this, as you should know, is not the work of an hour or a day.

## CHAPTER XII.

### OF CONTENTMENT.

CONCERNING the gods, some affirm, that there is no deity; others, that he indeed exists, but is slothful, negligent, and without providential care; a third class admits both his being and his providence, but only in respect to great and heavenly objects, not earthly; a fourth recognizes him both in heaven and earth, but only in general, not individual matters; a fifth, like Ulysses and Socrates, says, “ I cannot be hid from thee in any of my motions.”\*

It is, before all things, necessary to examine each of these opinions; which is, and which is not rightly spoken. Now, if there are no gods, wherefore serve them? If there are, but they take no care of anything, how is the case bettered? Or, if they both are, and take care; yet, if there is nothing communicated from them to men, and therefore certainly nothing to me, how much better is it? A wise and good man, after examining these things, submits his mind to Him who administers the whole, as good citizens do to the laws of the commonwealth.

\* Xenophon, Mem. I. 1; Homer, Iliad, X. 278.—H.

He, then, who comes to be instructed, ought to come with this aim : “ How may I in everything follow the gods ? How may I acquiesce in the divine administration ? And how may I be free ? ” For he is free, to whom all happens agreeably to his desire, and whom no one can unduly restrain.

“ What then, is freedom mere license ? ”

By no means ; for madness and freedom are incompatible.

“ But I would have that happen which appears to me desirable ; however it comes to appear so.”

You are mad : you have lost your senses. Do not you know, that freedom is a very beautiful and valuable thing ? But for me to choose at random, and for things to happen agreeably to such a choice, may be so far from a beautiful thing, as to be, of all others, the most undesirable. For how do we proceed in writing ? Do I choose to write the name of Dion (for instance) as I will ? No ; but I am taught to be willing to write it as it ought to be written. And what is the case in music ? The same. And what in every other art or science ? Otherwise, it would be of no purpose to learn anything, if it were to be adapted to each one’s particular humor. Is it then only in the greatest and principal matter, that of freedom, permitted me to desire at random ? By no means ; but true instruction is this,—learning to desire that things should happen as they do. And how do they happen ? As the appointer of them hath appointed. He hath appointed, that there should be summer and winter, plenty and dearth, virtue and vice, and all such contrarieties, for the harmony of the whole. To each of us he has given a body and its parts, and our several possessions and companions.

Mindful of this appointment, we should enter upon a course of education and instruction, not in order to change the constitution of things ; — a gift neither practicable nor desirable ; — but that things being as they are with regard to us, we may have our mind accommodated to the facts. Can we, for instance, flee from mankind ? How is that possible ? Can we, by conversing with them, transform them ? Who has given us such a power ? What then remains, or what method is there to be found, for such a commerce with them, that, while they act according to the appearances in their own minds, we may nevertheless be affected conformably to nature ?

But you are wretched and discontented. If you are alone, you term it a desert ; and if with men, you call them cheats and robbers. You find fault too with your parents, and children, and brothers, and neighbors. Whereas you ought, if you live alone, to call that repose and freedom, and to esteem yourself as resembling the gods ; and when you are in company, not to call it a crowd, and a tumult, and a trouble, but an assembly, and a festival ; and thus to take all things contentedly. What then, is the punishment of those who do not so accept them ? To be — as they are. Is any one discontented with being alone ? Let him remain in his desert. Discontented with his parents ? Let him be a bad son ; and let him mourn. Discontented with his children ? Let him be a bad father. Shall we throw him into prison ? What prison ? Where he already is, for he is in a situation against his will, and wherever any one is against his will, that is to him a prison ; just as Socrates was not truly in prison, for he was willingly there.

“What, then, must my leg be lame ?”

And is it for one paltry leg, wretch, that you accuse the universe ? Can you not forego that, in consideration of the whole ? Can you not give up something ? Can you not gladly yield it to him who gave it ? And will you be angry and discontented with the decrees of Zeus ; which he, with the Fates, who spun in his presence the thread of your birth, ordained and appointed ? Do not you know how very small a part you are of the whole ? That is, as to body ; for, as to reason, you are neither worse, nor less, than divine. For reason is not measured by size or height, but by principles. Will you not therefore place your good there, where you share with the gods ?

“But how wretched am I, in such a father and mother !”

What, then, was it granted you to come beforehand, and make your own terms, and say, “Let such and such persons, at this hour, be the authors of my birth ” ? It was not granted ; for it was necessary that your parents should exist before you, and so you be born afterwards. — Of whom ? — Of just such as they were. What, then, since they are such, is there no remedy afforded you ? Surely, you would be wretched and miserable, if you knew not the use of sight, and shut your eyes in presence of colors ; and are not you more wretched and miserable, in being ignorant, that you have within you the needful nobleness and manhood wherewith to meet these accidents ? Events proportioned to your reason are brought before you ; but you turn it away, at the very time when you ought to have it the most open and discerning. Why do not you rather thank the

gods, that they have made you superior to those events which they have not placed within your own control ; and have rendered you accountable for that only, which is within your own control ? Of your parents they acquit you, as not accountable : of your brothers they acquit you ; of body, possessions, death, life, they acquit you. For what, then, have they made you accountable ? For that which is alone in your own power ; a right use of things as they appear. Why, then, should you draw those cares upon yourself, for which you are not accountable ? This is giving one's self vexation, without need.

## CHAPTER XIII.

HOW EVERYTHING MAY BE PERFORMED TO THE DIVINE  
ACCEPTANCE.

WHEN a person inquired, how any one might eat to the divine acceptance ; if he eats with justice, said Epictetus, and with gratitude, and fairly, and temperately, and decently, must he not also eat to the divine acceptance ? And if you call for hot water, and your servant does not hear you ; or, if he does, brings it only warm ; or perhaps is not to be found at home ; then to abstain from anger or petulance, is not this to the divine acceptance ?

“ But how, then, can one bear such things ? ”

O slavish man ! will you not bear with your own brother, who has God for his Father, as being a son from the same stock, and of the same high descent ? But, if you chance to be placed in some superior station, will you presently set yourself up for a tyrant ?

Will you not remember what you are, and over whom you bear rule? That they are by nature your relations, your brothers; that they are the offspring of God?

“But I have them by right of purchase, and not they me.”

Do you see what it is you regard? Your regards look downward towards the earth, and what is lower than earth, and towards the unjust laws of men long dead; but up towards the divine laws you never turn your eyes.

#### CHAPTER XIV.

##### THAT ALL THINGS ARE UNDER THE DIVINE SUPERVISION.

WHEN a person asked him, how any one might be convinced that his every act is under the supervision of God? Do not you think, said Epictetus, that all things are mutually connected and united?

“I do.”

Well; and do not you think, that things on earth feel the influence of the heavenly powers?

“Yes.”

Else how is it that in their season, as if by express command, God bids the plants to blossom and they blossom, to bud and they bud, to bear fruit and they bear it, to ripen it and they ripen; — and when again he bids them drop their leaves, and withdrawing into themselves to rest and wait, they rest and wait? Whence again are there seen, on the increase and decrease of the moon, and the approach and departure of the sun, so great changes and transformations in

earthly things ? Have then the very leaves, and our own bodies, this connection and sympathy with the whole ; and have not our souls much more ? But our souls are thus connected and intimately joined to God, as being indeed members and distinct portions of his essence ; and must not he be sensible of every movement of them, as belonging and connatural to himself ? Can even you think of the divine administration, and every other divine subject, and together with these of human affairs also ; can you at once receive impressions on your senses and your understanding, from a thousand objects ; at once assent to some things, deny or suspend your judgment concerning others, and preserve in your mind impressions from so many and various objects, by whose aid you can revert to ideas similar to those which first impressed you ? Can you retain a variety of arts and the memorials of ten thousand things ? And is not God capable of surveying all things, and being present with all, and in communication with all ? Is the sun capable of illuminating so great a portion of the universe, and of leaving only that small part of it unilluminated, which is covered by the shadow of the earth,— and cannot He who made and moves the sun, a small part of himself, if compared with the whole,— cannot he perceive all things ?

“ But I cannot,” say you, “ attend to all things at once.” Who asserts that you have equal power with Zeus ? Nevertheless he has assigned to each man a director, his own good genius, and committed him to that guardianship ; a director sleepless and not to be deceived. To what better and more careful guardian could he have committed each one of us ? So that when you have shut your doors, and darkened your

room, remember, never to say that you are alone ; for you are not alone ; but God is within, and your genius is within ; and what need have they of light, to see what you are doing ? To this God you likewise ought to swear such an oath as the soldiers do to Cæsar. For they, in order to receive their pay, swear to prefer before all things the safety of Cæsar ; and will not you swear, who have received so many and so great favors ; or, if you have sworn, will you not fulfil the oath ? And what must you swear ? Never to distrust, nor accuse, nor murmur at any of the things appointed by him ; nor to shrink from doing or enduring that which is inevitable. Is this oath like the former ? In the first oath persons swear never to dishonor Cæsar ; by the last, never to dishonor themselves.

## CHAPTER XV.

## WHAT PHILOSOPHY PROMISES.

WHEN one consulted him, how he might persuade his brother to forbear treating him ill ; — Philosophy, answered Epictetus, doth not promise to procure any outward good for man ; otherwise it would admit something beyond its proper theme. For as the material of a carpenter is wood ; of a statuary, brass ; so of the art of living, the material is each man's own life.

“ What, then, is my brother's life ? ”

That, again, is matter for his own art, but is external to you ; like property, health, or reputation. Philosophy promises none of these. In every circum-

stance I will keep my will in harmony with nature. To whom belongs that will ? To Him in whom I exist.

“ But how, then, is my brother’s unkindness to be cured ? ”

Bring him to me, and I will tell him ; but I have nothing to say to you about his unkindness.

But the inquirer still further asking for a rule for self-government, if he should not be reconciled ; Epicetus answered thus : —

No great thing is created suddenly ; any more than a bunch of grapes or a fig. If you tell me, that you desire a fig, I answer you, that there must be time. Let it first blossom, then bear fruit, then ripen. Since then, the fruit of a fig-tree is not brought to perfection suddenly, or in one hour ; do you think to possess instantaneously and easily the fruit of the human mind ? I warn you, expect it not.

## CHAPTER XVI.

### OF PROVIDENCE.

**B**E not surprised, if other animals have all things necessary to the body, ready provided for them, not only meat and drink, but lodging ; if they want neither shoes, nor bedding, nor clothes ; while we stand in need of all these. For they not being made for themselves, but for service, it was not fit that they should be so formed as to be waited on by others. For consider what it would be for us to take care, not only for ourselves, but for sheep and asses too ; how they should be clothed, how shod, and how they

should eat and drink. But as soldiers are furnished ready for their commander, shod, clothed, and armed,—for it would be a grievous thing for a colonel to be obliged to go through his regiment to put on their clothes,—so nature has furnished these useful animals, ready provided, and standing in need of no further care. So that one little boy, with only a crook, drives a flock.

But we, instead of being thankful for this, complain of God, that there is not the same kind of care taken of us likewise. And yet, good Heaven ! any one thing in the creation is sufficient to demonstrate a Providence, to a humble and grateful mind. Not to instance great things, the mere possibility of producing milk from grass, cheese from milk, and wool from skins ; who formed and planned it ? No one, say you. O surprising irreverence and dulness ! But come ; let us omit the primary works of nature. Let us contemplate her merely incidental traits. What is more useless than the hairs upon one's chin ? And yet has she not made use even of these, in the most becoming manner possible ? Has she not by these distinguished the sexes ? Does not nature in each of us call out, even at a distance, I am a man ; approach and address me as such ; inquire no further ; see the characteristic. On the other hand, with regard to women, as she has mixed something softer in their voice, so she has deprived them of a beard. But no ; [some think] this living being should have been left undistinguished, and each of us should be obliged to proclaim, "I am a man !" But why is not this characteristic beautiful and becoming, and venerable ? How much more beautiful than the comb of cocks ; how much more noble than the mane of lions !

Therefore, we ought to preserve the characteristics, made by the Creator ; we ought not to reject them, nor confound, as much as in us lies, the distinct sexes.

Are these the only works of Providence, with regard to us ? And what speech can fitly celebrate their praise ? For, if we had any understanding, ought we not, both in public and in private, incessantly to sing and praise the Deity, and rehearse his benefits ? Ought we not, whether we dig, or plough, or eat, to sing this hymn to God ? Great is God, who has supplied us with these instruments to till the ground ; great is God, who has given us hands and organs of digestion ; who has given us to grow insensibly, to breathe in sleep. These things we ought forever to celebrate ; but to make it the theme of the greatest and divinest hymn, that he has given us the power to appreciate these gifts, and to use them well. But because the most of you are blind and insensible, there must be some one to fill this station, and lead in behalf of all men, the hymn to God ; for what else can I do, a lame old man, but sing hymns to God ? Were I a nightingale, I would act the part of a nightingale ; were I a swan, the part of a swan. But since I am a reasonable creature, it is my duty to praise God. This is my business. I do it. Nor will I ever desert this post, so long as it is permitted me ; and I call on you to join in the same song.

## CHAPTER XVII.

## THAT THE ART OF REASONING IS NECESSARY.

SINCE it is Reason which shapes and regulates all other things, it ought not itself to be left in disorder. But by what shall it be regulated? Evidently, either by itself, or by something else. Well; either that too is Reason, or something else superior to Reason, which is impossible; and, if it be Reason, what again shall regulate that? For, if this Reason can regulate itself, so can the former; and, if we still require any further agent, the series will be infinite, and without end.

"But," say you, "the essential thing is to prescribe for qualities of character."

Would you hear about these, therefore? Well; hear. But then, if you say to me, that you cannot tell whether my arguments are true or false; and if I happen to express myself ambiguously, and you bid me make it clearer; I will then at once show you that this is the first essential. Therefore, I suppose, they first establish the art of reasoning; just as, before the measuring of corn, we settle the measure. For, unless we first determine the measure and the weight, how shall we be able to measure or weigh? Thus, in the present case; unless we have first learned, and fixed, that which is the criterion of other things, and by which other things are learned, how shall we be able accurately to learn anything else? How is it possible? Well; a bushel-measure is only wood, a thing of no value, but it measures corn. And logic is of no value in itself;—that we will consider here-

after, but grant it now ;— it is enough that it distinguishes and examines, and, as one may say, measures and weighs all other things. Who says this ? Is it only Chrysippus, and Zeno, and Cleanthes ? Does not Antisthenes say it ? And who is it then, who has written, that the beginning of a right education is the examination of words ? Does not Socrates say it ? Of whom, then, does Xenophon write, that he began by the examination of words, what each signified ?

Is this, then, the great and admirable thing, to understand or interpret Chrysippus ?

Who says that it is ? But what, then, is the admirable thing ?

To understand the will of nature.

Well then ; do you conform to it yourself ? In that case, what need have you for any one else ? For, if it be true, that men err but unwillingly, and if you have learnt the truth, you must needs act rightly.

But, indeed, I do not conform to the will of nature.

Who, then, shall interpret that ?

They say, Chrysippus. I go and inquire what this interpreter of nature says. Soon I cannot understand his meaning. I seek one to interpret that. I call on him to explain everything as clearly as if it were in Latin. Yet what right has this last interpreter to boast ? Nor has Chrysippus himself, so long as he only interprets the will of nature, and does not follow it ; and much less has his interpreter. For we have no need of Chrysippus, on his own account ; but that, by his means, we may apprehend the will of nature ; just as no one values a diviner on his own account, but that, by his assistance, men

hope to understand future events and heavenly indications ; nor the auguries, on their own account, but on account of what is signified by them ; neither is it the raven, or the crow, that is admired, but the divine purposes displayed through their means. Thus I come to the diviner and interpreter of these higher things ; and say, “Inspect the auguries for me : what is signified to me ?” Having taken, and inspected them, he thus interprets them. You have a free will, O man ! incapable of being restrained or compelled. This is written here in the auguries. I will show you this, first, in the faculty of assent. Can any one restrain you from assenting to truth ? No one. Can any one compel you to admit a falsehood ? No one. You see, then, that you have here a free will, incapable of being restrained, or compelled, or hindered. Well ; is it otherwise with regard to pursuit and desire ? What can displace one pursuit ? Another pursuit. What, desire and aversion ? Another desire and another aversion. “If you offer *death* as an alternative,” say you, you compel me. No ; not the alternative does it, but your conviction that it is better to do such a thing than to die. Here, again, you see that it is your own conviction which compels you ; that is, choice compels choice. For, if God had constituted that portion which he has separated from his own essence, and given to us, capable of being restrained or compelled, either by himself, or by any other, he would not have been God, nor have fitly cared for us.

These things, says the diviner, I find in the auguries. These things are announced to you. If you please, you are free. If you please, you will have no one to complain of, no one to accuse. All will be

equally according to your own mind, and to the mind of God.

For the sake of this oracle, I go to this diviner and philosopher ; admiring not alone him for his interpretation, but also the things which he interprets.

## CHAPTER XVIII.

### THAT WE OUGHT NOT TO BE ANGRY WITH THE ERRING.

**I**F what the philosophers say be true, that all men's actions proceed from one source ; that, as they assent, from a persuasion that a thing is so, and dissent, from a persuasion that it is not, and suspend their judgment, from a persuasion that it is uncertain ; so, likewise, they seek a thing, from a persuasion that it is for their advantage ; — and it is impossible to esteem one thing advantageous, and yet desire another ; to esteem one thing a duty, and yet pursue another ; — why, after all, should we be angry at the multitude ?

“They are thieves and robbers.”

What do you mean by thieves and robbers ? They are in an error concerning good and evil. Ought you, then, to be angry, or rather to pity them ? Do but show them their error, and you will see, that they will amend their faults ; but, if they do not see the error, they will rise no higher than their convictions.

“What, then, ought not this thief and this adulterer to be destroyed ?”

Nay, call him rather one who errs and is deceived in things of the greatest importance ; blinded, not in

the vision, that distinguishes white from black, but in the reason, that discerns good from evil ? By stating your question thus, you would see how inhuman it is ; and just as if you should say, “ Ought not this blind, or that deaf man, to be destroyed ? ” For, if the greatest hurt be a deprivation of the most valuable things, and the most valuable thing to every one be rectitude of will ; when any one is deprived of this, why, after all, are you angry ? You ought not to be affected, O man ! contrary to nature, by the evil deeds of another. Pity him rather. Yield not to hatred and anger ; nor say, as many do, “ What ! shall these execrable and odious wretches dare to act thus ? ” Whence have *you* so suddenly learnt wisdom ?

Why are we thus enraged ? Because we make idols of those things which such people take from us. Make not an idol of your clothes, and you will not be enraged with the thief. Make not an idol of a woman’s beauty, and you will not be enraged with an adulterer. Know, that thief and adulterer cannot reach the things that are properly your own ; but those only which belong to others, and are not within your power. If you can give up these things, and look upon them as not essential, with whom will you any longer be enraged ? But while you idolize them, be angry with yourself, rather than with others. Consider the case : you have a fine suit of clothes ; your neighbor has not. You have a casement ; you want to air them. He knows not in what the good of man consists, but imagines it is in a fine suit of clothes ; just as you imagine. Shall he not come and take them away ? When you show a cake to greedy people, and are devouring it all yourself ;

would not you have them snatch it from you? Do not tempt them. Do not have a casement. Do not expose your clothes. I, too, the other day, had an iron lamp burning before my household deities. Hearing a noise at the window, I ran. I found my lamp was stolen. I considered, that he who took it away did nothing unaccountable. What then? I said, to-morrow you shall find an earthen one; for a man loses only what he has.—“I have lost my coat.” Ay; because you had a coat. “I have a pain in my head.” You certainly can have none in your horns. Why then are you out of humor? For loss and pain can be only of such things as are possessed.

But the tyrant will chain—what? A leg. He will take away—what? A head. What is there, then, that he can neither chain nor take away? The free will. Hence the advice of the ancients,—Know thyself.

“What then ought we to do?”

Practise yourself, for heaven’s sake, in little things; and thence proceed to greater. “I have a pain in my head.” Do not lament. “I have a pain in my ear.” Do not lament. I do not say you may never groan; but do not groan in spirit; or, if your servant be a long while in bringing you something to bind your head, do not croak and go into hysterics, and say, “Everybody hates me.” For, who would not hate such a one?

Relying for the future on these principles, walk erect and free; not trusting to bulk of body, like a wrestler; for one should not be unconquerable in the sense that an ass is.

Who then is unconquerable? He whom the inev-

itable cannot overcome. For such a person I imagine every trial, and watch him as an athlete in each. He has been victorious in the first encounter. What will he do in the second ? What, if he should be exhausted by the heat ? What, if the field be Olympia ? And so in other trials. If you throw money in his way, he will despise it. Is he proof against the seductions of women ? What if he be tested by fame, by calumny, by praise, by death ? He is able to overcome them all.—If he can bear sunshine and storm, discouragement and fatigue, I pronounce him an athlete unconquered indeed.

## CHAPTER XIX.

## OF THE RIGHT TREATMENT OF TYRANTS.

WHEN a person is possessed of some personal advantage, either real or imaginary, he will necessarily be puffed up with it, unless he has been well instructed. A tyrant openly says, “I am supreme over all.” And what can you bestow on me ? Can you exempt my desires from disappointment ? How should you ? For do you never incur what you shun ? Are your own aims infallible ? Whence came you by that privilege ? Pray, on shipboard, do you trust to yourself, or to the pilot ? In a chariot, to whom but the driver ? And to whom in all other arts ? Just the same. In what, then, does your power consist ?

“ All men pay regard to me.”

So do I to my desk. I wash it, and wipe it ; and drive a nail for my oil-flask.

"What, then, are these things to be valued beyond me?"

No; but they are of some use to me, and therefore I pay regard to them. Why, do I not pay regard to an ass? Do I not wash his feet? Do I not clean him? Do not you know, that every one pays such regard even to himself; and that he does it to you, just as he does to an ass? For who pays regard to you as a man? Show that. Who would wish to be like you? Who would desire to imitate you, as he would Socrates?

"But I can take off your head?"

You say rightly. I had forgot, that one is to pay regard to you as to a fever, or the cholera; and that there should be an altar erected to you, as there is to the goddess Fever at Rome.

What is it, then, that disturbs and terrifies the multitude? The tyrant and his guards? By no means. What is by nature free, cannot be disturbed or restrained by anything but itself. But its own convictions disturb it. Thus, when the tyrant says to any one, "I will chain your leg," he who chiefly values his leg, cries out for pity; while he who chiefly values his own free will, says, "If you imagine it for your interest, chain it."

"What! do not you care?"

No; I do not care.

"I will show you that I am master."

You? How should you? Zeus has set me free. What! do you think he would suffer his own son to be enslaved? You are master of my carcass; take it.

"So that, when you come into my presence, you pay no regard to me?"

No, but to myself; or, if you will have me recognize you also, I will do it as if you were a piece of furniture. This is not selfish vanity; for every animal is so constituted, as to do everything for itself. Even the sun does all for himself; and for that matter so does even Zeus himself. But when he would be styled the dispenser of rain and plenty, and the father of gods and men, you see that he cannot attain these offices and titles, unless he contributes to the common good. And he has universally so constituted the nature of every reasonable creature, that no one can attain its own good without contributing something for the good of all. And thus it becomes not selfish to do everything for one's self. For, do you expect, that a man should desert himself, and his own concerns; when all beings have one and the same original instinct, self-preservation? What follows then? That where we recognize those absurd convictions, which treat things outward as if they were the true good or evil of life, there must necessarily be a regard paid to tyrants; and I wish it were to tyrants only, and not to the very officers of their bed-chamber too. For how wise doth a man grow on a sudden, when Cæsar has made him his flunkey? How immediately we say, "Felicio talked very sensibly to me!" I wish he were turned out of office, that he might once more appear to you the fool he is.

Epaphroditus owned a shoemaker; whom, because he was good for nothing, he sold. This very fellow being, by some strange luck, bought by a courtier, became shoemaker to Cæsar. Then you might have seen how Epaphroditus honored him. "How is good Felicio, pray?" And, if any of us asked, what the

great man himself was about, it was answered, “He is consulting about affairs with Felicio.” Did not he sell him previously as good for nothing? Who then, has all on a sudden, made a wise man of him? This it is to reverence externals.

Is any one exalted to the office of tribune? All who meet him congratulate him. One kisses his eyes, another his neck, and the slaves his hands. He goes to his house; finds it illuminated. He ascends the capitol; offers a sacrifice. Now, who ever offered a sacrifice for having good desires? For conforming his aims to Nature? Yet we thank the gods for that wherein we place our good.

A person was talking with me to-day about applying for the priesthood in the temple of Augustus. I said to him, let the thing alone, friend; you will be at great expense for nothing. “But my name,” said he, “will be written in the annals.” Will you stand by, then, and tell those who read them, “I am the person whose name is written there?” And even if you could tell every one so now, what will you do when you are dead?—“My name will remain.”—Write it upon a stone, and it will remain just as well. And, pray, what remembrance will there be of you out of Nicopolis?—“But I shall wear a crown of gold.”—If your heart is quite set upon a crown, make and put on one of roses; for it will make the prettier appearance.

## CHAPTER XX.

IN WHAT MANNER REASON CONTEMPLATES ITSELF.

EVERY art, and every faculty, contemplates certain things as its principal objects. Whenever, therefore, it is of the same nature with the objects of its contemplation, it necessarily contemplates itself too. But, where it is of a different nature, it cannot contemplate itself. The art of shoemaking, for instance, is exercised upon leather; but is itself entirely distinct from the materials it works upon; therefore it does not contemplate itself. Again, grammar is exercised on articulate speech. Is the art of grammar itself, then, articulate speech? By no means. Therefore it cannot contemplate itself. To what purpose, then, is reason appointed by nature? To a proper use of the phenomena of existence. And what is reason? The art of systematizing these phenomena. Thus, by its nature, it becomes contemplative of itself too.

Again; what subjects of contemplation belong to prudence? Good and evil, and that which is indifferent. What, then, is prudence itself? Good. What imprudence? Evil.

You see, then, that it necessarily contemplates both itself and its contrary. Therefore, the first and greatest work of a philosopher is, to try and distinguish the phenomena of existence; and to admit none untried. Even in money, where our interest seems to be concerned, you see what an art we have invented, and how many ways an assayer uses to try its value. By the sight, the touch, the smell, and, lastly, the

hearing. He throws the piece down, and attends to the jingle ; and is not contented with its jingling only once ; but, by frequent attention to it, trains his ear for sound. So when we think it of consequence whether we are deceived or not, we use the utmost attention to discern those things, which may deceive us. But, yawning and slumbering over our poor neglected reason, we are imposed upon by every appearance, nor know the mischief done. Would you know, then, how very languidly you are affected by good and evil, and how vehemently by things indifferent ; consider how you feel with regard to bodily blindness, and how with regard to being deceived ; and you will find, that you are far from being moved, as you ought, in relation to good and evil.

“ But trained powers, and much labor, and learning, are here needed.”

What, then ? Do you expect the greatest of arts to be acquired by slight endeavors ? And yet the principal doctrine of the philosophers is in itself short. If you have a mind to know it, read Zeno, and you will see. It is not a long story to say, “ Our end is to serve the gods,” and “ The essence of good consists in the proper use of the phenomena of existence.” If you say, what then is God ? What are phenomena ? What is particular, what universal nature ? Here the long story comes in. And so, if Epicurus should come and say, that good lies in the body ; here, too, it will be a long story, and it will be necessary to hear, what is the principal, and substantial, and essential part in us. It is unlikely, that the good of a snail should be placed in the shell ; and, is it likely, that the good of a man should ? You yourself, Epicurus, have in you something superior to this.

What is that in you, which deliberates, which examines, which recognizes the body as the principal part? Why light your lamp, and labor for us, and write so many books? That we may not be ignorant of the truth? But what are we? What are we to you? Thus the doctrine becomes a long story.

## CHAPTER XXI.

## OF THE DESIRE OF ADMIRATION.

WHEN one maintains his proper attitude in life, he does not long after externals. What would you have, O man?

“I am contented, if my desires and aversions are conformable to nature; if I seek and shun that which I ought, and thus regulate my purposes, my efforts, and my opinions.”

Why, then, do you walk as if you had swallowed a ramrod?

“Because I could wish moreover to have all who meet me, admire me, and all who follow me, cry out, what a great philosopher!”

Who are those, by whom you would be admired? Are they not the very people, who, you used to say, were mad? What, then, would you be admired by madmen?

## CHAPTER XXII.

## OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES.

THE same general principles are common to all men, nor does one such principle contradict another. For which of us does not admit, that good is advantageous and eligible, and in all cases to be pursued and followed ? Who does not admit that justice is fair and becoming ? Where, then, arises the dispute ? In adapting these principles to particular cases. As, when one cries, " Such a person has acted well ; he is a gallant man " ; and another, " No ; he has acted like a fool." Hence arises dispute among men. This is the dispute between Jews, and Syrians, and Egyptians, and Romans ; not whether the right be preferable to all things, and in every instance to be sought ; but whether the eating swine's flesh be consistent with right, or not. This, too, you will find to have been the dispute between Achilles and Agamemnon. For call them forth. What say you, Agamemnon. Ought not that to be done, which is fit and right ? — " Yes, surely." — Achilles, what say you ? Is it not agreeable to you, that what is right should be done ? — " Yes ; I desire it beyond everything." Apply your principles then. Here begins the dispute. One says, " It is not fit that I should restore Chryseis to her father." The other says, " Yes ; but it is." One or the other of them, certainly, makes a wrong conception of the principle of fitness. Again, the one says : " If it be fit that I should give up Chryseis, it is fit, too, that I should take some of your prizes." The other answers,

"What, that you should take my mistress?"—  
"Ay; yours."—"What, mine only? Must I only, then, lose my prize?"

What then is it to be properly educated? To learn how to apply the principles of natural right to particular cases, and, for the rest, to distinguish that some things are in our power, while others are not. In our own power are the will, and all voluntary actions; out of our power, the body and its parts, property, parents, brothers, children, country; and, in short, all our fellow-beings. Where, then, shall we place good? In what shall we define it to consist? In things within our own power. "But are not health, and strength, and life, good? And are not children, parents, country? You talk unreasonably."

Let us, then, try another point of view. Can he who suffers evil, and is disappointed of good, be happy? He cannot. And can he preserve a right behavior with regard to society? How is it possible that he should? For I am naturally led to seek my own highest good: If, therefore, it is my highest good to have an estate, it is for my good likewise to take it away from my neighbor. If it is my highest good to have a suit of clothes, it is for my good likewise to steal it wherever I find it. Hence wars, seditions, tyranny, unjust invasions. How shall I, if this be the case, be able, any longer, to do my duty towards Zeus? If I suffer evil, and am disappointed, he takes no care of me. And, what is he to me, if he cannot help me; or, again, what is he to me, if he chooses I should be in the condition that I am? Then I begin to hate him. What, then, do we build temples, do we raise statues, to Zeus, as to evil demons, as to the goddess Fever? How then is he the

preserver ; and how the dispenser of rain and plenty ? If we place the essence of good on any such ground, all this will follow. What, then, shall we do ?

This is the inquiry which interests him who philosophizes in earnest, and to some result. Do I not now see what is good, and what is evil, or am I mad ? Suppose I place good only in things dependent on my own will ? Why, every one will laugh at me. Some gray-headed old fellow will come, with his fingers covered with gold rings, and will shake his head, and say ; " Hark ye, child, it is fit you should learn philosophy ; but it is fit, too, you should have common-sense. All this is nonsense. You learn syllogisms from philosophers ; but how you are to act, you know better than they." Then, what displeases you if I do know ? What can I say to this unfortunate ? If I make no answer, he will burst ; so I must answer thus : " Bear with me, as with lovers. Granted ; I am not myself. I have lost my senses."

### CHAPTER XXIII.

#### AGAINST EPICURUS.

EVEN Epicurus is sensible that we are by nature sociable beings ; but having once placed our good in the mere outward shell, he can say nothing afterwards inconsistent with that. For again, he strenuously maintains, that we ought not to admire, or accept, anything separated from the nature of good. And he is in the right to maintain it. But how, then, arise any affectionate anxieties, unless there be such a thing as natural affection towards our

offspring? Then why do you, Epicurus, dissuade a wise man from bringing up children? Why are you afraid, that, upon their account, he may fall into anxieties? Does he fall into any for a mouse, that feeds within his house? What is it to him, if a little mouse bewails itself there? But Epicurus knew, that, if once a child is born, it is no longer in our power not to love and be solicitous for it. On the same grounds he says, that a wise man will not engage himself in public business, knowing very well what must follow. If men are only so many flies, why should he not engage in it?

And does he, who knows all this, dare to forbid us to bring up children? Not even a sheep, or a wolf, deserts its offspring; and shall man? What would you have? That we should be as silly as sheep? Yet even these do not desert their offspring. Or as savage as wolves? Neither do these desert them. Pray, who would mind *you*, if he saw his child fallen upon the ground and crying? For my part, I am of opinion, that your father and mother, even if they could have foreseen that you would have been the author of such doctrines, would not have thrown you away.

#### CHAPTER XXIV.

##### HOW WE OUGHT TO STRUGGLE WITH DIFFICULTIES.

**D**IFFICULTIES are things that show what men are. For the future, in case of any difficulty, remember, that God, like a gymnastic trainer, has pitted you against a rough antagonist. For what end? That you may be an Olympic conqueror; and

this cannot be without toil. No man, in my opinion, has a more profitable difficulty on his hands than you have; provided you will but use it, as an athletic champion uses his antagonist.

Suppose we were to send you as a scout to Rome. But no one ever sends a timorous scout, who, when he only hears a noise, or sees a shadow, runs back frightened, and says, "The enemy is at hand." So now, if you should come and tell us: "Things are in a fearful way at Rome; death is terrible, banishment terrible, calumny terrible, poverty terrible; run, good people, the enemy is at hand"; — we will answer: Get you gone, and prophesy for yourself; our only fault is, that we have sent such a scout. Diogenes was sent a scout before you, but he told us other tidings. He says that death is no evil, for it is nothing base; that calumny is only the noise of madmen. And what account did this spy give us of pain, of pleasure, of poverty? He says, that to be naked is better than a purple robe; to sleep upon the bare ground, the softest bed; and gives a proof of all he says by his own courage, tranquillity, and freedom; and, moreover, by a healthy and robust body. "There is no enemy near," he says. "All is profound peace." How so, Diogenes? "Look upon me," he says. "Am I hurt? Am I wounded? Have I run away from any one?" This is a scout worth having. But you come, and tell us one thing after another. Go back and look more carefully, and without fear.

"What shall I do, then?"

What do you do when you come out of a ship? Do you take away with you the rudder, or the oars? What do you take, then? Your own, your bundle and your flask. So, in the present case, if you will

but remember what is your own, you will not covet what belongs to others. If some tyrant bids you put off your consular robe ? “ Well, I am in my equestrian robe.” Put off that too. “ I have only my coat.” Put off that too. “ Well, I am naked.” I am not yet satisfied. “ Then e'en take my whole body. If I can throw off a paltry body, am I any longer afraid of a tyrant ? ”

“ But such a one will not leave me his heir.” What, then, have I forgotten, that such things are never really mine ? How then do we call them ours ? As with a bed, in an inn. If the landlord, when he dies, leaves you the bed, well and good ; but if to another, it will be his, and you will seek one elsewhere ; and, consequently, if you do not find one, you will sleep upon the ground ; only sleep fearlessly and profoundly, and remember, that tragedies find their theme among the rich, and kings, and tyrants. No poor man fills any other place in one, than as part of the chorus ; whereas kings begin, indeed, with prosperity : “ Crown the palace ” ; — but continue about the third and fourth act : “ Alas, Citheron ! Why didst thou receive me ! ” \* Where are thy crowns, wretch ; where is thy diadem ? Cannot thy guards help thee ?

Whenever you are brought into any such society, think then that you meet a tragic actor, or rather, not an actor, but OEdipus himself. “ But such a one is happy. He walks with a numerous train.” Well ; I too walk with a numerous train.

But remember the principal thing ; that the door is open. Do not be more fearful than children ; but as they, when the play does not please them, say, “ I

\* Sophocles, OEdipus Tyrannus, V. 1391. — H.

will play no longer"; so do you, in the same case, say, "I will play no longer"; and go; but, if you stay, do not complain.

## CHAPTER XXV.

## ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

IF these things are true; and if we are not stupid, or insincere, when we say, that the good or ill of man lies within his own will, and that all beside is nothing to us; why are we still troubled? Why do we still fear? What truly concerns us is in no one's power: what is in the power of others concerns not us. What embarrassment have we left?

"But you must direct me."

Why should I direct you? Has not Zeus directed you? Has he not given you what is your own, incapable of restraint or hindrance; and what is not your own, liable to both? What directions, then, what orders, have you brought from him? "By all means guard what is your own: what belongs to others do not covet. Honesty is your own: a sense of virtuous shame is your own. Who, then, can deprive you of these? Who can restrain you from making use of them, but yourself? And how do you do it? When you make that your concern which is not truly your own, you lose that which is." Having such precepts and directions from Zeus, what sort do you still want from me? Am I better than He, or more worthy of credit? If you observe these precepts, what others do you need? Are not these His? Apply the recognized principles; apply the demon-

strations of philosophers ; apply what you have often heard, and what you have said yourself ; what you have read, and what you have carefully studied.

How long is it right to devote one's self to these things and not break up the game ?

As long as it goes on well. A king is chosen at the Saturnalian Festival, supposing that it was agreed to play at that game : he orders : " Do you drink ; you mix the wine ; you sing ; you go ; you come." I obey ; that the game may not be broken up by my fault.

[Then he orders] " I bid you think yourself to be unhappy." I do not think so ; and who shall compel me to think so ?

Again ; suppose we agreed to play Agamemnon and Achilles. He who is appointed for Agamemnon says to me, " Go to Achilles, and force away Bri-seis." I go. " Come." I come. We should deal with life as with these imaginary orders.

" Suppose it to be night." Well ; suppose it. " Is it day then ? " No : for I admitted the hypothesis, that it was night. " Suppose that you think it to be night." Well ; suppose it. " But you must really think that it is night." That by no means follows from the hypothesis. Thus it is in the case illustrated. Suppose you have ill luck. Suppose it. " Are you then unlucky ? " Yes. " Are you thoroughly unfortunate ? " Yes. " Well ; but you must really regard yourself as miserable." But this is no part of the assumption, and there is a power who forbids me to admit that.

How far then are we to carry such analogies ? As far as is useful ; that is, till we go farther than is reasonable and fit.

Moreover, some are peevish and fastidious, and say, I cannot dine with such a fellow, to be obliged to hear him all day recounting how he fought in Mysia. “I told you, my friend, how I gained the eminence.” There I begin to suffer another siege. But another says, “I had rather get a dinner, and hear him prate as much as he pleases.”

Do you decide between these opinions ; but do not let it be with depression and anxiety, and the assumption that you are miserable ; for no one compels you to that. Is there smoke in my house ? If it be moderate, I will stay ; if very great, I will go out. For you must always remember, and hold to this, that the door is open. “You are forbidden to live at Nicopolis.” I will not live there. “Nor at Athens.” Well, nor at Athens. “Nor at Rome.” Nor at Rome. “But you shall live at Gyaros.”\* I will live there. But suppose that living at Gyaros seems to me like living in a great smoke. I can then retire where no one can forbid me to live, for it is an abode open to all ; and put off my last garment, this poor body of mine ; beyond this, no one has any power over me.

Thus Demetrius said to Nero : “ You sentence me to death ; and Nature you.” If I prize my body first, I have surrendered myself as a slave ; if my estate, the same ; for I at once betray where I am vulnerable. Just as when a reptile pulls in his head, I bid you strike that part of him which he guards ; and be you assured, that wherever you show a desire to guard yourself, there your master will attack you.

\* An island in the *Ægean Sea*, to which the Romans used to banish criminals.—C.

Remember but this, and whom will you any longer flatter or fear ?

“ But I want to sit where the senators do.”

Do not you see, that by this you incommoded and torment yourself ?

“ Why, how else shall I see the show in the Amphitheatre advantageously ? ”

Do not insist on seeing it, O man ! and you will not be incommoded. Why do you vex yourself ? Or wait a little while ; and when the show is over, go sit in the senators' places, and sun yourself. For remember, that this holds universally ; we incommoded and torment ourselves ; that is, our own preconceived notions do it for us. What is it to be reviled, for instance ? Stand by a stone, and revile it ; and what will you get by it ? If you, therefore, would listen only as a stone, what would your reviler gain ? But, if the reviler has the weakness of the reviled for a vantage-ground, then he carries his point.

“ Strip him,” [bids the tyrant]. What mean you by *him* ? Take my clothes, strip them, at your pleasure. “ I meant only to insult you.” Much good may it do you.

These things were the study of Socrates ; and, by these means, he always preserved the same countenance. Yet we had rather exercise and study anything, than how to become unrestrained and free. “ But the philosophers talk paradoxes.” And are there not paradoxes in other arts ? What is more paradoxical, than to prick any one's eye, that he may see ? Should one tell this to one ignorant of surgery, would not he laugh at him ? What wonder then, if, in philosophy also, many truths appear paradoxes to the ignorant ?

## CHAPTER XXVI.

## WHAT THE RULE OF LIFE IS.

**A**S some one was reading hypothetical propositions, Epictetus remarked that it was a rule in these to admit whatever was in accordance with the hypothesis; but much more a rule in life, to do what was in accordance with nature. For, if we desire in every matter and on every occasion to conform to nature; we must, on every occasion, evidently make it our aim, neither to omit anything thus conformable, nor to admit anything inconsistent. Philosophers, therefore, first exercise us in theory, which is the more easy task, and then lead us to the more difficult; for in theory, there is nothing to hinder our following what we are taught; but in life there are many things to draw us aside. It is ridiculous then to say, we must begin with these applications, for it is not easy to begin with the most difficult; and this excuse children should make to those parents who dislike that they should study philosophy. "Am I to blame then, sir, and ignorant of my duty, and of what is incumbent on me? If this is neither to be learned, nor taught, why do you find fault with me? If it is to be taught, pray teach me yourself; or, if you cannot, let me learn it from those who profess to understand it. For what think you; that I voluntarily fall into evil, and miss good? Heaven forbid! What, then, is the cause of my faults? Ignorance. Are you not willing, then, that I should get rid of my ignorance? Who was ever taught the art of music, or navigation, by anger? Do you ex-

pect, then, that your anger should teach me the art of living?"

This, however, can properly be said only by one who is really in earnest. But he who reads these things, and applies to the philosophers, merely for the sake of showing, at some entertainment, that he understands hypothetical reasonings; what aim has he but to be admired by some senator, who happens to sit near him?\* Great possessions may be won by such aims as that, but what we hold as wealth passes there for folly. It is hard, therefore, to overcome by appearances, where vain things thus pass for great.

I once saw a person weeping and embracing the knees of Epaphroditus; and deplored his hard fortune, that he had not more than 150,000 drachmæ left. What said Epaphroditus then? Did he laugh at him, as we should do? No; but cried out with astonishment: "Poor man! How could you be silent under it? How could you bear it?"

The first step, therefore, towards becoming a philosopher, is to be sensible in what state the ruling faculty of the mind is; for on knowing it to be weak, no person will immediately employ it in great attempts. But, for want of this, some, who can scarce digest a crumb, will yet buy and swallow whole treatises; and so they throw them up again, or cannot digest them; and then come colics, fluxes, and fevers. Such persons ought to consider what they can bear. Indeed, it is easy to convince an ignorant person, so far as concerns theory; but in matters relating to

\* This passage is omitted as inexplicable by Mrs. Carter. Schweig-haeuser says, "Tentare interpretationem possum; praestare non possum." A passage just below I also have omitted, as the text is admitted to be in a hopeless state.—H.

life, no one offers himself to conviction, and we hate those who have convinced us. Socrates used to say, that we ought not to live a life unexamined.\*

## CHAPTER XXVII.

OF THE VARIED APPEARANCES OF THINGS TO THE MIND,  
AND WHAT MEANS ARE AT HAND BY WHICH TO REGU-  
LATE THEM.

A PPEARANCES to the mind are of four kinds. Things either are what they appear to be; or they neither are, nor appear to be; or they are, and do not appear to be; or they are not, and yet appear to be. Rightly to aim, in all these cases, is the wise man's task. Whatever unduly constrains us, to that a remedy must be applied. If the sophistries of Pyrrhonism, or the Academy, constrain us, the remedy must be applied there; if specious appearances, by which things seem to be good which are not so, let us seek for a remedy there. If it be custom which constrains us, we must endeavor to find a remedy against that.

“What remedy is to be found against custom?”

Establish a contrary custom. You hear the vulgar say, “Such a one, poor soul! is dead.” Well, his father died: his mother died. “Ay, but he was cut off in the flower of his age, and in a foreign land.” Observe these contrary ways of speaking; and abandon such expressions. Oppose to one custom, a contrary custom; to sophistry, the art of reasoning, and the frequent use and exercise of it.

\* Plato, *Apologia*, I. 28. — H.

Against specious appearances we must set clear convictions, bright and ready for use. When death appears as an evil, we ought immediately to remember, that evils are things to be avoided, but death is inevitable. For what can I do, or where can I fly from it? Let me suppose myself to be Sarpedon, the son of Jove, that I may speak as nobly. "I go either to excel, or to give another the occasion to excel."\* If I can achieve nothing myself, I will not grudge another his achievement.

But suppose this to be a strain too high for us; do not these following thoughts befit us? Whither shall I fly from death? Show me the place, show me the people, to whom I may have recourse, whom death does not overtake. Show me the charm to avoid it. If there be none, what would you have me do? I cannot escape death; but cannot I escape the dread of it? Must I die trembling, and lamenting? For the very origin of the disease lies in wishing for something that is not obtained. Under the influence of this, if I can make outward things conform to my own inclination, I do it; if not, I feel inclined to tear out the eyes of whoever hinders me. For it is the nature of man not to endure the being deprived of good; not to endure the falling into evil. And so, at last, when I can neither control events, nor tear out the eyes of him who hinders me, I sit down, and groan, and revile him whom I can; Zeus, and the rest of the gods. For what are they to me, if they take no care of me?

"Oh! but then you will be impious."

What then? Can I be in a worse condition than I am now? In general, remember this, that unless we

\* Imitated from Iliad, xii. 328.—H.

place our religion and our treasure in the same thing, religion will always be sacrificed.

Have these things no weight? Let a Pyrrhonist, or an Academic, come and oppose them. For my part, I have neither leisure nor ability to stand up as an advocate for common sense. Even if the business were concerning an estate, I should call in another advocate. To what advocate, then, shall I now appeal? I will leave it to any one who may be upon the spot. Thus I may not be able to explain how sensation takes place, whether it be diffused universally, or reside in a particular part; for I find perplexities in either case; but that you and I are not the same person, I very exactly know.

“How so?”

Why, I never, when I have a mind to swallow anything, carry it to your mouth; but my own. I never, when I wanted bread, seized a broom instead, but went directly to the bread as I needed it. You who deny all evidence of the senses, do you act otherwise? Which of you, when he wished to go into a bath, ever went into a mill?

“Why then, must not we, to the utmost, defend these points? stand by common sense; be fortified against everything that opposes it?” \*

Who denies that? But it must be done by him who has ability and leisure to spare; but he, who is

\* This seems to be said by one of the hearers, who wanted to have the absurdities of the sceptics confuted and guarded against by regular argument. Epictetus allows this to be right, for such as have abilities and leisure; but recommends in others the more necessary task of curing their own moral disorders, and insinuates that the mere common occurrences of life are sufficient to overthrow the notions of the Pyrrhonists.—C.

full of trembling and perturbation, and inward disorders of heart, must first employ his time about something else.

### CHAPTER XXVIII.

THAT WE OUGHT NOT TO BE ANGRY WITH MANKIND.

WHAT THINGS ARE LITTLE, WHAT GREAT, AMONG MEN.

**W**HAT is the cause of assent to anything? Its appearing to be true. It is not possible, therefore, to assent to what appears to be not true. Why? Because it is the very nature of the understanding to agree to truth, to be dissatisfied with falsehood, and to suspend its belief, in doubtful cases.

What is the proof of this?

Persuade yourself, if you can, that it is now night. Impossible. Dissuade yourself from the belief that it is day. Impossible. Persuade yourself that the number of the stars is even or odd. Impossible.

When any one, then, assents to what is false, be assured that he doth not wilfully assent to it, as false; for, as Plato affirms, the soul is unwillingly deprived of truth;\* but what is false appears to him to be true. Well, then; have we, in actions, anything correspondent to this distinction between true and false?

Right and wrong; advantageous and disadvantageous; desirable and undesirable; and the like.

A person then, cannot think a thing truly advantageous to him, and not choose it?

\* This is not a literal quotation from Plato, but similar passages are to be found in his *Laws*, ix. 5; *Sophist*, § 29; *Protagoras*, § 87, etc. — H.

He cannot. But how says Medea ?

“ I know what evils wait upon my purpose ;  
But wrath is stronger than this will of mine.” \*

Was it that she thought the very indulgence of her rage, and the punishing her husband, more advantageous than the preservation of her children ? Yes ; but she is deceived. Show clearly to her that she is deceived, and she will forbear ; but, till you have shown it, what has she to follow, but what appears to herself ? Nothing.

Why, then, are you angry with her, that the unhappy woman is deceived in the most important points, and instead of a human creature, becomes a viper ? Why do not you rather, as we pity the blind and lame, so likewise pity those who are blinded and lamed in their superior faculties ? Whoever, therefore, duly remembers, that the appearance of things to the mind is the standard of every action to man ; that this is either right or wrong, and, if right, he is without fault, if wrong, he himself suffers punishment ; for that one man cannot be the person deceived, and another the only sufferer ;— such a person will not be outrageous and angry at any one ; will not revile, or reproach, or hate, or quarrel with any one.

“ So then, have all the great and dreadful deeds, that have been done in the world, no other origin than [true or false] appearances ? ”

Absolutely, no other. The Iliad consists of nothing but such appearances and their results. It seemed to Paris that he should carry off the wife of Menelaus. It seemed to Helen, that she should fol-

\* Euripides, Medea, 1087.—H.

low him. If, then, it had seemed to Menelaus, that it was an advantage to be robbed of such a wife, what could have happened ? Not only the Iliad had been lost, but the Odyssey too.

“ Do such great events, then, depend on so small a cause ? ”

What events, then, call you great ?

“ Wars and seditions ; the destruction of numbers of men, and the overthrow of cities.”

And what in all this is great ? Nothing. What is great in the death of numbers of oxen, numbers of sheep, or in the burning or pulling down numbers of nests of storks or swallows ?

“ Are these things then similar ? ”

They are. The bodies of men are destroyed, and the bodies of sheep and oxen. The houses of men are burnt, and the nests of storks. What is there so great or fearful in all this ? Pray, show me what difference there is between the house of a man and the nest of a stork, considered as a habitation, except that houses are built with beams, and tiles, and bricks ; and nests with sticks and clay ?

“ What, then, are a stork and a man similar ? What do you mean ? ”

Similar in body.

“ Is there no difference, then, between a man and a stork ? ”

Yes, surely ; but not in these things.

“ In what then ? ”

Inquire ; and you will find, that the difference lies in something else. See whether it be not in rationality of action, in social instincts, fidelity, honor, providence, judgment.

“ Where then is the real good or evil of man ? ”

Just where this difference lies. If this distinguishing trait is preserved, and remains well fortified, and neither honor, fidelity, nor judgment is destroyed, then he himself is likewise saved ; but when any one of these is lost or demolished, he himself is lost also. In this do all great events consist. Paris, they say, was undone, because the Greeks invaded Troy, and laid it waste, and his family were slain in battle. By no means ; for no one is undone by an action not his own. All that was only like laying waste the nests of storks. But his true undoing was, when he lost modesty, faith, honor, virtue. When was Achilles undone ? When Patroclus died ? By no means. But when he gave himself up to rage ; when he wept over a girl ; when he forgot, that he came there, not to win mistresses, but to fight. This is human undoing ; this is the siege ; this the overthrow ; when right principles are ruined and destroyed.

“ But when wives and children are led away captives, and the men themselves killed, are not these evils ? ”

Whence do you conclude them such ? Pray inform me, in my turn.

“ Nay ; but whence do you affirm that they are not evils ? ”

Recur to the rules. Apply your principles. One cannot sufficiently wonder at what happens among men. When we would judge of light and heavy, we do not judge by guess ; nor when we judge of straight and crooked ; and, in general, when it concerns us to know the truth on any special point, no one of us will do anything by guess. But where the first and principal source of right or wrong action is concerned, of being prosperous or unprosperous,

happy or unhappy ; there only do we act rashly, and by guess. Nowhere anything like a balance ; nowhere anything like a rule ; but something seems thus or so to me, and I at once act accordingly. For am I better than Agamemnon or Achilles ; that they, by following what seemed best to them, should do and suffer so many things, and yet that seeming should not suffice me ? And what tragedy hath any other origin ? The Atreus of Euripides, what is it ? Seeming. The Oedipus of Sophocles ? Seeming. The Phœnix ? The Hippolytus ? All seeming. Who then, think you, can escape this influence ? What are they called who follow every seeming ? Madmen. Yet do we, then, behave otherwise ?

## CHAPTER XXIX.

## OF COURAGE.

**T**H E essence of good and evil is a certain disposition of the will.

What are things outward then ?

Materials on which the will may act, in attaining its own good or evil.

How, then, will it attain good ?

If it be not dazzled by its own materials ; for right principles concerning these materials keep the will in a good state ; but perverse and distorted principles, in a bad one. This law hath God ordained, who says, "If you wish for good, receive it from yourself." You say, No ; but from another. "Nay ; but from yourself."

Accordingly, when a tyrant threatens, and sends for

me, I say, Against what is your threatening pointed ? If he says, "I will chain you"; I answer, It is my hands and feet that you threaten. If he says, "I will cut off your head"; I answer, It is my head that you threaten. If he says, "I will throw you into prison"; I answer, It is the whole of this paltry body that you threaten ; and, if he threatens banishment, just the same.

" Does not he threaten *you*, then ? "

If I am persuaded, that these things are nothing to me, he does not ; but, if I fear any of them, it is me that he threatens. Who is it, after all, that I fear ? The master of what ? Of things in my own power ? Of these no one is the master. Of things not in my power ? And what are these to me ?

" What, then ! do you philosophers teach us a contempt of kings ? "

By no means. Which of us teaches any one to contend with them, about things of which they have the command ? Take my body ; take my possessions ; take my reputation ; take away even my friends. If I persuade any one to claim these things as his own, you may justly accuse me. " Ay ; but I would command your principles too." And who hath given you that power ? How can you conquer the principle of another ? " By applying terror, I will conquer it." Do not you see, that what conquers itself, is not conquered by another ? And nothing but itself can conquer the will. Hence, too, the most excellent and equitable law of God ; that the better should always prevail over the worse. Ten are better than one.

" For what purpose ? "

For chaining, killing, dragging where they please ; for taking away an estate. Thus ten conquer one, in the cases wherein they are better.

“In what, then, are they worse?”

When the one has right principles, and the others have not. For can they conquer in this case? How should they? If we were weighed in a scale, must not the heavier outweigh?

“How then came Socrates to suffer such things from the Athenians?”

O foolish man! what mean you by Socrates? Express the fact as it is. Are you surprised that the mere body of Socrates should be carried away, and dragged to prison, by such as were stronger; that it should be poisoned by hemlock and die? Do these things appear wonderful to you? These things unjust? Is it for such things as these that you accuse God? Had Socrates, then, no compensation for them? In what, then, to him, did the essence of good consist? Whom shall we regard; you, or him? And what says he? “Anytus and Melitus may indeed kill; but hurt me they cannot.” And again: “If it so pleases God, so let it be.”

But show me, that he who has the worse principles can get the advantage over him who has the better. You never will show it, nor anything like it; for the Law of Nature and of God is this,—let the better always prevail over the worse.

“In what?”

In that wherein it is better. One body may be stronger than another; many, than one; and a thief, than one who is not a thief. Thus I, for instance, lost my lamp; because the thief was better at keeping awake than I. But for that lamp he paid the price of becoming a thief; for that lamp he lost his virtue and became like a wild beast. This seemed to him a good bargain; and so let it be!

But some one takes me by the collar, and drags me to the forum ; and then all the rest cry out, “ Philosopher, what good do your principles do you ? See, you are being dragged to prison ; see, you are going to lose your head ! ” And, pray, what rule of philosophy could I contrive, that, when a stronger than myself lays hold on my collar, I should not be dragged ? Or that, when ten men pull me at once, and throw me into prison, I should not be thrown there ? But have I learned nothing, then ? I have learned to know, whatever happens, that, if it concerns not my will, it is nothing to me. Have my principles, then, done me no good ? What, then ! do I seek for anything else to do me good, but what I have learned ? Afterwards, as I sit in prison, I say, He who has made all this disturbance neither recognizes any guidance, nor heeds any teaching, nor is it any concern to him, to know what philosophers say, or do. Let him alone.

“ Come forth again from prison.” If you have no further need for me in prison, I will come out ; if you want me again, I will return. “ For how long ? ” Just so long as reason requires I should continue in this body ; when that is over, take it, and fare ye well. Only let us not act inconsiderately, nor from cowardice, nor on slight grounds, since that would be contrary to the will of God ; for he hath need of such a world, and such beings to live on earth. But, if he sounds a retreat, as he did to Socrates, we are to obey him when he sounds it, as our General.

“ Well ; but can these things be explained to the multitude ? ”

“ To what purpose ? Is it not sufficient to be convinced one’s self ? When children come to us clap-

ping their hands, and saying, “To-morrow is the good feast of Saturn”; do we tell them that good doth not consist in such things? By no means; but we clap our hands also. Thus, when you are unable to convince any one, consider him as a child, and clap your hands with him; or, if you will not do that, at least hold your tongue. These things we ought to remember; and, when we are called to any trial, to know, that an opportunity is come of showing whether we have been well taught. For he who goes from a philosophical lecture to a difficult point of practice, is like a young man who has been studying to solve syllogisms. If you propose an easy one, he says, “Give me rather a fine intricate one, that I may try my strength.” Thus athletic champions are displeased with a slight antagonist. “He cannot lift me,” says one. Is this a youth of spirit? No; for when the occasion calls upon him, he may begin crying, and say, “I wanted to learn a little longer first.” Learn what? If you did not learn these things to show them in practice, why did you learn them?

I trust there must be some one among you, sitting here, who feels secret pangs of impatience, and says: “When will such a trial come to my share, as hath now fallen to his? Must I sit wasting my life in a corner, when I might be crowned at Olympia? When will any one bring the news of such a combat, for me?” Such should be the disposition of you all. Even among the gladiators of Cæsar, there are some who bear it very ill, that they are not brought upon the stage, and matched; and who offer vows to God, and address the officers, begging to fight. And will none among you appear such? I would willingly take a voyage on purpose to see how a champion of mine acts; how he meets his occasion.

This is not the contest I would choose, say you. Is it in your power, then, to make the selection? Such a body is given you, such parents, such brothers, such a country, and such a rank in it; and then you come to me, to change the conditions! Have you not abilities to manage that which is given you? You should say to me, "It is your business to propose; mine, to treat the subject well." No; but you say, "Do not meet me with such a perplexity, but such a one; do not offer such an obstacle to me, but such a one." There will be a time, I suppose, when tragedians will fancy themselves to be mere masks, and buskins, and long train. These things are your materials, man, and your stage-properties. Speak something; that we may know whether you are a tragedian, or a buffoon; for both have all the rest in common. Suppose any one should take away his buskins and his mask, and bring him upon the stage, in his common dress, is the tragedian lost, or does he remain? If he has a voice, he remains. "Here, this instant, take upon you the command." I take it; and, taking it, I show how a skilful man performs the part. "Now lay aside your robe; put on rags, and come upon the stage in that character." What then? Is it not in my power to express the character by a suitable voice?

"In what character do you now appear?" As a witness summoned by God. "Come you, then, and bear witness for me; for you are a fit witness to be produced by me. Is anything which is inevitable, to be classed as either good or evil? Do I hurt any one? Have I made the good of each individual to rest on any one, but himself? What evidence do you give for God?"

“I am in a miserable condition, O Lord ; I am undone : no mortal cares for me ; no mortal gives me anything ; all blame me ; all speak ill of me.”

Is this the evidence you are to give ? And will you bring disgrace upon his summons, who hath conferred such an honor upon you, and thought you worthy of being produced as a witness in such a cause ?

But some one in authority has given a sentence. “I judge you to be impious and profane.” What has befallen you ?—I have been judged to be impious and profane.—Anything else ?—Nothing.—Suppose he had passed his judgment upon any process of reasoning, and pronounced it to be a false conclusion, that, if it be day, it is light ; what would have befallen the proposition ? In this case, who is judged, who condemned ; the proposition, or he who cannot understand it ? Does he know, who claims the power of ruling in your case, what pious or impious means ? Has he made it his study or learned it ? Where ? From whom ? A musician would not regard him, if he pronounced bass to be treble ; nor a mathematician, if he passed sentence, that lines drawn from the centre to the circumference, are not equal. And shall he, who is instructed in the truth, respect an ignorant man, when he pronounces upon pious and impious, just and unjust ?

“O the persecutions to which the wise are exposed !” Is it *here* that you have learned this talk ? Why do not you leave such pitiful discourse to idle, pitiful fellows ; and let them sit in a corner, and receive some little mean pay ; or grumble, that nobody gives them anything ? But do you come, and make some use of what you have learned. It is not

reasonings that are wanted now, for there are books stuffed full of stoical reasonings.

“What is wanted, then ?”

The man who shall apply them ; whose actions may bear testimony to his doctrines. Assume this character for me, that we may no longer make use in the schools of the examples of the ancients, but may have some examples of our own.

“To whom, then, does the contemplation of these abstractions belong ?”

To any one who has leisure for them. For man is a being fond of contemplation. But it is shameful to take only such view of things as truant slaves take of a play. We ought to sit calmly, and listen, whether to the actor, or to the musician ; and not do like those poor fellows, who come in and admire the actor, constantly glancing about them, and then, if any one happens to name their master, run frightened away. It is shameful for a philosopher, thus to contemplate the works of nature. What, in this parallel case, stands for the master ? Man is not the master of man ; but death, and life, and pleasure, and pain ; for without these, bring even Cæsar to me, and you will see how intrepid I shall be. But, if he comes thundering and lightening with these, and these are the objects of my terror ; what do I else, but, like the truant slave, acknowledge my master ? While I have any respite from these, as the truant comes into the theatre, so I bathe, drink, sing ; but all with terror and anxiety. But, if I free myself from my masters, that is, from such things as render a master terrible, what trouble, what master have I remaining ?

“Shall we then insist upon these things with all men ?”

No. But make allowance for the ignorant, and say, This poor man advises me to what he thinks good for himself. I excuse him; for Socrates, too, excused the jailer, who wept when he was to drink the poison; and said, "How heartily he sheds tears for us." Was it to him that Socrates said, "For this reason we sent the women out of the way"? No; but to his friends; to such as were capable of hearing it; while he humored the other, as a child.

## CHAPTER XXX.

## WEAPONS READY FOR DIFFICULT OCCASIONS.

WHEN you are going before any of the great, remember, that there is another, who sees from above, what passes, and whom you ought to please, rather than man. He, therefore, asks you:

"In the schools, what did you use to call exile, and prison, and chains, and death, and calumny?"

I? Indifferent things.

"What, then, do you call them now? Are they at all changed?"

No.

"Are you changed, then?"

No.

"Tell me, then, what things are indifferent."

Things not dependent on our own will.

"What is the inference?"

Things not dependent on my own will are nothing to me.

"Tell me, likewise, what appeared to be the good of man."

Rectitude of will, and to understand the appearances of things.

“ What his end ? ”

To follow Thee.

“ Do you say the same things now, too ? ”

Yes. I do say the same things, even now.

Well, go in then boldly, and mindful of these things ; and you will show the difference between the instructed and the ignorant. I protest, I think you will then have such thoughts as these : “ Why do we provide so many and great resources for nothing ? Is the power, the antechamber, the attendants, the guards, no more than this ? Is it for these, that I have listened to so many dissertations ? These are nothing ; and yet I had qualified myself as for some great encounter.”

## BOOK II.

## C H A P T E R I.

THAT COURAGE IS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH CAUTION.

THERE is an assertion of the philosophers which may perhaps appear a paradox to many ; yet let us fairly examine whether it be true : — that it is possible in all things, to act at once with caution and courage. For caution seems, in some measure, contrary to courage ; and contraries are by no means consistent. The appearance of a paradox in the present case seems to me to arise as follows. If indeed we assert, that courage and caution are to be used in the same instances, we might justly be accused of uniting contradictions ; but, in the way that we affirm it, where is the absurdity ? For, if what has been so often said, and so often demonstrated, be certain, that the essence of good and evil consists in the use of things as they appear, and that things inevitable are not to be classed either as good or evil, what paradox do the philosophers assert, if they say, “ Where events are inevitable, meet them with courage, but otherwise, with caution ” ? For in these last cases only, if evil lies in a perverted will, is caution to be used. And if things inevitable and uncontrollable are nothing to us, in these we are to make use of courage. Thus we shall be at once cautious and courageous ; and, indeed, courageous on account of this very caution ; for by using caution, with regard

to things really evil, we shall gain courage, with regard to what are not so.

But we are in the same condition with deer ; when these in a fright fly from the plumes [which hunters wave], whither do they turn, and to what do they retire for safety ? To the nets. And thus they are undone, by inverting the objects of fear and confidence. Thus we, too. When do we yield to fear ? About things inevitable. When, on the other hand, do we behave with courage, as if there were nothing to be dreaded ? About things that might be controlled by will. To be deceived then, or to act rashly or imprudently, or to indulge a scandalous desire, we treat as of no importance, in our effort to bring about things which we cannot, after all, control. But where death, or exile, or pain, or ignominy, is concerned, then comes the retreat, the flutter, and the fright. Hence, as it must be with those who err in matters of the greatest importance, we turn what should be courage into rashness, desperation, recklessness, effrontery ; and what should be caution becomes timid, base, and full of fears and perturbations. Let one apply his spirit of caution to things within the reach of his own will, then he will have the subject of avoidance within his own control ; but if he transfers it to that which is inevitable, trying to shun that which he cannot control and others can, then he must needs fear, be harassed and be disturbed. For it is not death or pain that is to be dreaded, but the *fear* of pain or death. Hence we command him who says :

“ Death is no ill, but *shamefully to die.*” \*

Courage, then, ought to be opposed to death, and caution to the *fear* of death ; whereas we, on the con-

\* Euripides, Fragments. — H.

trary, oppose to death, flight ; and to these our false convictions concerning it, recklessness, and desperation, and assumed indifference.

Socrates used, very properly, to call these things masks ; for, as masks appear shocking and formidable to children, from their inexperience ; so we are thus affected with regard to things, for no other reason. For what constitutes a child ? Ignorance. What constitutes a child ? Want of instruction ; for they are our equals, so far as their degree of knowledge permits. What is death ? A mask. Turn it on the other side and be convinced. See, it doth not bite. This little body and spirit must be again, as once, separated, either now or hereafter ; why, then, are you displeased if it be now ? For if not now it will be hereafter. Why ? To fulfil the course of the universe ; for that hath need of some things present, others to come, and others already completed.

What is pain ? A mask. Turn it and be convinced.

This weak flesh is sometimes affected by harsh, sometimes by smooth impressions. If suffering be beyond endurance, the door is open ; till then, bear it. It is fit that the final door should be open against all accidents, since thus we escape all trouble.

What, then, is the fruit of these principles ? What it ought to be ; the most noble, and the most suitable to the wise,—tranquillity, security, freedom. For in this case, we are not to give credit to the many, who say, that none ought to be educated but the free ; but rather to the philosophers, who say, that the wise alone are free.

“ How so ? ”

Thus : is freedom anything else than the power of living as we like ?

“ Nothing else.”

Well ; tell me then, do you like to live in error ?

“ We do not. No one, who lives in error, is free.”

Do you like to live in fear ? Do you like to live in sorrow ? Do you like to live in perturbation ?

“ By no means.”

No one, therefore, in a state of fear, or sorrow, or perturbation, is free ; but whoever is delivered from sorrow, fear, and perturbation, by the same means is delivered likewise from slavery. How shall we believe you, then, good legislators, when you say, “ We allow none to be educated but the free ” ? For the philosophers say, “ We allow none to be free but the wise ” ; that is, God doth not allow it.

“ What, then, when any person hath turned his slave about, before the consul,\* has he done nothing ? ”

Yes, he has.

“ What ? ”

He has turned his slave about, before the consul.

“ Nothing more ? ”

Yes. He pays a fine for him.

“ Well, then ; is not the man, who has gone through this ceremony, rendered free ? ”

Only so far as he is emancipated from perturbation. Pray, have you, who are able to give this freedom to others, no master of your own ? Are you not a slave to money ? To a girl ? To a boy ? To a tyrant ? To some friend of a tyrant ? Else, why do you tremble when any one of these is in question ? Therefore, I so often repeat to you, let this be your study and constant pursuit, to learn in what it is necessary to be courageous, and in what cautious ; courageous against the inevitable, cautious so far as your will can control.

\* The prescribed form of manumission. — H.

"But have I not read my essay to you? Do not you know what I am doing?"

In what?

"In my essays."

Show me in what state you are, as to desires and aversions; whether you do not fail of what you wish, and incur what you would avoid; but, as to these commonplace essays, if you are wise, you will take them, and destroy them.

"Why, did not Socrates write?"

Yes; who so much? But how? As he had not always one at hand, to argue against his principles, or be argued against in his turn, he argued with and examined himself; and always made practical application of some one great principle at least. These are the things which a philosopher writes; but such commonplaces as those of which I speak, he leaves to the foolish, or to the happy creatures whom idleness furnishes with leisure; or to such as are too weak to regard consequences. And yet will you, when opportunity offers, come forward to exhibit and read aloud such things, and take a pride in them?

"Pray, see how I compose dialogues."

Talk not of that, man, but rather be able to say, See how I accomplish my purposes; see how I avert what I wish to shun. Set death before me; set pain, a prison, disgrace, doom, and you will know me. This should be the pride of a young man come out from the schools. Leave the rest to others. Let no one ever hear you waste a word upon them, nor suffer it, if any one commends you for them; but admit that you are nobody, and that you know nothing. Appear to know only this, never to fail nor fall. Let others study cases, problems, and syllogisms. Do

you rather contemplate death, change, torture, exile ; and all these with courage, and reliance upon Him, who hath called you to them, and judged you worthy a post in which you may show what reason can do, when it encounters the inevitable. And thus, this paradox ceases to be a paradox, that we must be at once cautious and courageous ; courageous against the inevitable ; and cautious, when events are within our own control.

## CHAPTER II.

## OF TRANQUILLITY.

CONSIDER, you who are going to take your trial, what you wish to preserve, and in what to succeed. For if you wish to preserve a will in harmony with nature, you are entirely safe ; everything goes well ; you have no trouble on your hands. While you wish to preserve that freedom which belongs to you, and are contented with that, for what have you longer to be anxious ? For who is the master of things like these ? Who can take them away ? If you wish to be a man of modesty and fidelity, who shall prevent you ? If you wish not to be restrained or compelled, who shall compel you to desires contrary to your principles ; to aversions, contrary to your opinion ? The judge, perhaps, will pass a sentence against you, which he thinks formidable ; but can he likewise make you receive it with shrinking ? Since, then, desire and aversion are in your own power, for what have you to be anxious ? Let this be your introduction ; this your narration ; this

your proof ; this your conclusion ; this your victory ; and this your applause. Thus said Socrates to one who put him in mind to prepare himself for his trial : “ Do you not think that I have been preparing myself for this very thing, my whole life long ? ” — By what kind of preparation ? — “ I have attended to my own work.” — What mean you ? — “ I have done nothing unjust, either in public, or in private life.”

But if you wish to make use of externals too, your body, your estate, your dignity ; I advise you immediately to prepare yourself by every possible preparation ; and besides, to consider the disposition of your judge, and of your adversary. If it be necessary to embrace his knees, do so ; if to weep, weep ; if to groan, groan. For when you have once made yourself a slave to externals, be a slave wholly ; do not struggle, and be alternately willing and unwilling, but be simply and thoroughly the one or the other ; free, or a slave ; instructed, or ignorant ; a game-cock, or a craven ; either bear to be beaten till you die, or give out at once ; and do not be soundly beaten first, and then give out at last.

If both alternatives be shameful, learn immediately to distinguish where good and evil lie. They lie where truth likewise lies. Where truth and nature dictate, there exercise caution or courage. Why, do you think that, if Socrates had concerned himself about externals, he would have said, when he appeared at his trial, “ Anytus and Melitus may indeed kill, but hurt me they cannot” ? Was he so foolish as not to see that this way did not lead to safety, but the contrary ? What, then, is the reason, that he not only disregarded, but defied, his judges ? Thus my friend Heraclitus, in a trifling suit, about a little es-

tate at Rhodes, after having proved to the judges that his cause was good, when he came to the conclusion of his speech, "I will not entreat you," said he ; "nor be anxious as to what judgment you give ; for it is rather you who are to be judged, than I." And thus he lost his suit. What need was there of this ? Be content not to entreat ; yet do not proclaim that you will not entreat ; unless it be a proper time to provoke the judges designedly, as in the case of Socrates. But if you too are preparing such a speech as his, what do you wait for ? Why do you consent to be tried ? For if you wish to be hanged, have patience, and the gibbet will come. But if you choose rather to consent, and make your defence as well as you can, all the rest is to be ordered accordingly ; with a due regard, however, to the preservation of your own proper character.

For this reason it is absurd to call upon me for specific advice. How should I know what to advise you ? Ask me rather to teach you to accommodate yourself to whatever may be the event. The former is just as if an illiterate person should say, "Tell me how to write down some name that is proposed to me" ; and I show him how to write the name of Dion ; and then another comes, and asks him to write the name, not of Dion, but of Theon ;— what will be the consequence ? What will he write ? Whereas, if you make writing your study, you are ready prepared for whatever word may occur ; if not, how can I advise you ? For, if the actual case should suggest something else, what will you say, or how will you say, or how will you act ? Remember, then, the general rule, and you will need no special suggestions ; but if you are absorbed in externals, you must neces-

sarily be tossed up and down, according to the inclination of your master.

Who is your master? He who controls those things which you seek or shun.

### CHAPTER III.

#### CONCERNING SUCH AS RECOMMEND PERSONS TO THE PHILOSOPHERS

DIOGENES rightly answered one who desired letters of recommendation from him: "At first sight he will know you to be a man; and whether you are a good or a bad man, if he has any skill in distinguishing, he will know likewise; and, if he has not, he will never know it, though I should write a thousand times." Just as if you were a piece of coin, and should desire to be recommended to any person as good, in order to be tried;—if it be to an assayer, he will know your value, for you will recommend yourself.

We ought, therefore, in life also, to have something analogous to this skill in gold; that one may be able to say, like the assayer, Bring me whatever piece you will, and I will find out its value; or, as I would say with regard to syllogisms, Bring me whomsoever you will, and I will distinguish for you, whether he knows how to solve syllogisms, or not. Why? Because I can do that myself, and have that faculty which is necessary for one, who can discern persons skilled in such solutions. But how do I act in life? I sometimes call a thing good; at other times, bad. What is the cause of this? Something contrary to

what occurs to me in syllogisms,— ignorance, and inexperience.

## CHAPTER IV.

### CONCERNING A MAN WHO HAD BEEN GUILTY OF ADULTERY.

JUST as he was once saying, that man is made for fidelity, and that whoever subverts this, subverts the peculiar property of man; there entered one of the so-called literary men, who had been found guilty of adultery, in that city.—But, continued Epictetus, if, laying aside that fidelity for which we were born, we form designs against the wife of our neighbor, what do we? What else but destroy and ruin—what? Fidelity, honor, and sanctity of manners. Only these? And do not we ruin neighborhood? Friendship? Our country? In what rank do we then place ourselves? How am I to consider you, sir? As a neighbor? A friend? What sort of one? As a citizen? How shall I trust you? Indeed, if you were some potsher'd, so noisome that no use could be made of you, you might be thrown on a dunghill, and no mortal would take the trouble to pick you up; but if, being a man, you cannot fill any one place in human society, what shall we do with you? For, suppose you cannot hold the place of a friend, can you hold even that of a slave? And who will trust you? Why, then, should not you also be contented to be thrown upon some dunghill, as a useless vessel, and indeed as worse than that? Will you say, after this, Has no one any regard for me, a

man of letters ? Why, you are wicked, and fit for no use. Just as if wasps should take it ill that no one has any regard for them ; but all shun, and whoever can, beats them down. You have such a sting, that whoever you strike with it, is thrown into troubles and sorrows. What would you have us do with you ? There is nowhere to place you.

“What, then, are not women made by nature common ?”

I admit it ; and so is food at table common to those who are invited. But, after it is distributed, will you go and snatch away the share of him who sits next you ; or slyly steal it, or stretch out your hand, and taste ; and, if you cannot tear away any of the meat, dip your fingers and lick them ? A fine companion ! A Socratic guest indeed ! Again ; is not the theatre common to all the citizens ? Therefore come, when all are seated, if you dare, and turn any one of them out of his place. In this sense, only, are women common by nature ; but when the laws, like a good host, have distributed them, cannot you, like the rest of the company, be contented with your own share, but must you pilfer, and taste what belongs to another ?

“But I am a man of letters, and understand Archedemus.”

With all your understanding of Archedemus, then, you will be an adulterer, and a rogue ; and instead of a man, a wolf or an ape. For where is the difference ?

## CHAPTER V.

## HOW NOBLENESSE OF MIND MAY BE CONSISTENT WITH PRUDENCE.

THE materials of action are variable, but the use we make of them should be constant.

How, then, shall one combine composure and tranquillity with energy ; doing nothing rashly, nothing carelessly ?

By imitating those who play at games. The dice are variable ; the pieces are variable. How do I know what will fall out ? But it is my business, to manage carefully and dexterously whatever happens. Thus in life too, this is the chief business, to consider and discriminate things ; and say, “ Externals are not in my power ; choice is. Where shall I seek good and evil ? Within ; in what is my own.” But in what is controlled by others, count nothing good or evil, profitable or hurtful, or any such thing.

What, then, are we to treat these in a careless way ?

By no means ; for this, on the other hand, would be a perversion of the will, and so contrary to nature. But we are to act with care, because the use of our materials is not indifferent ; and at the same time with calmness and tranquillity, because the materials themselves are uncertain. For where a thing is not uncertain, there no one can restrain or compel me. Where I am capable of being restrained or compelled, the acquisition does not depend upon me ; nor is it either good or evil. The use of it, indeed, is either good or evil ; but that *does* depend upon me. It is difficult, I own, to blend and unite tranquillity in

accepting, and energy in using, the facts of life ; but it is not impossible ; if it be, it is impossible to be happy. How do we act in a voyage ? What is in my power ? To choose the pilot, the sailors, the day, the hour. Afterwards comes a storm. What have I to care for ? My part is performed. This matter belongs to another, to the pilot. But the ship is sinking ; what then have I to do ? That which alone I can do ; I submit to being drowned, without fear, without clamor, or accusing God ; but as one who knows, that what is born, must likewise die. For I am not eternity, but a man ; a part of the whole, as an hour is of the day. I must come like an hour, and like an hour must pass away. What signifies it whether by drowning, or by a fever ? For, in some way or other, pass I must.

This you may see to be the practice of those who play skilfully at ball. No one contends for the ball itself, as either a good or an evil ; but how he may throw and catch it again. Here lies the address, here the art, the nimbleness, the skill ; lest I fail to catch it, even when I open my breast for it, while another catches it, whenever I throw it. But if we catch or throw it, in fear and trembling, what kind of play will this be ? How shall we keep ourselves steady ; or how see the order of the game ? One will say, throw : another, do not throw : a third, you have thrown once already. This is a mere quarrel ; not a play. Therefore Socrates well understood playing at ball.

“ What do you mean ? ”

When he joked at his trial. “ Tell me,” said he, “ Anytus, how can you say that I do not believe in a God ? What do you think demons are ? Are they

not either the offspring of the gods, or compounded of gods and men?" — Yes. — "Do you think, then, that one can believe there are mules, and not believe that there are asses?" This was just as if he had been playing at ball. And what was the ball he had to play with? Life, chains, exile, a draught of poison, separation from a wife, and leaving his children orphans. These were what he had to play with; and yet he did play, and threw the ball with address. Thus we should be careful as to the play, but indifferent as to the ball. We are by all means to manage our materials with art; not taking them for the best; but showing our art about them, whatever they may happen to be. Thus a weaver does not make the wool, but employs his art upon what is given him. It is another who gives you food, and property; and may take them away, and your paltry body too. Do you, however, work upon the materials you have received; and then, if you come off unhurt, others, no doubt, who meet you, will congratulate you on your escape. But he who has a clearer insight into such things, will praise and congratulate you if he sees you to have done well; but if you owe your escape to any unbecoming action, he will do the contrary. For where there is a reasonable cause for rejoicing, there is cause likewise for congratulation.

How, then, are some external circumstances said to be according to nature; others contrary to it?

Only when we are viewed as isolated individuals. I will allow that it is natural for the foot, (for instance,) to be clean. But if you take it as a foot, and not as a mere isolated thing, it will be fit that it should walk in the dirt, and tread upon thorns; and sometimes that it should even be cut off, for the good

of the whole ; otherwise it is no longer a foot. We should reason in some such manner concerning ourselves. Who are you ? A man. If then, indeed, you consider yourself isolatedly, it is natural that you should live to old age, should be prosperous and healthy ; but if you consider yourself as a man, and as a part of the whole, it will be fit, in view of that whole, that you should at one time be sick ; at another, take a voyage, and be exposed to danger ; sometimes be in want ; and possibly die before your time. Why, then, are you displeased ? Do not you know, that otherwise, just as the other ceases to be a foot, so you are no longer a man ? For what is a man ? A part of a commonwealth ; first and chiefly of that which includes both gods and men ; and next, of that to which you immediately belong, which is a miniature of the universal city.

What, then, must I, at one time, go before a tribunal ; must another, at another time, be scorched by a fever ; another be exposed to the sea ; another die ; another be condemned ?

Yes ; for it is impossible, in such a body, in such a world, and among such companions, but that some one or other of us must meet with such circumstances. Your business, then, is simply to say what you ought, to order things as the case requires. After this comes some one and says, “I pronounce that you have acted unjustly.” Much good may it do you ; I have done my part. You are to look to it, whether you have done yours ; for you may as well understand that there is some danger in that quarter also.

## CHAPTER VI.

## OF CIRCUMSTANCES.\*

A PROCESS of reasoning may be an indifferent thing ; but our judgment concerning it is not indifferent ; for it is either knowledge, or opinion, or mistake. So the events of life occur indifferently, but the use of it is not indifferent. When you are told, therefore, that these things are indifferent, do not, on that account, ever be careless ; nor yet, when you are governed by prudence, be abject, and dazzled by externals. It is good to know your own qualifications and powers ; that, where you are not qualified, you may be quiet, and not angry that others have there the advantage of you. For you too will think it reasonable, that you should have the advantage in the art of reasoning ; and, if others should be angry at it, you will tell them, by way of consolation, “ This I have learned, and you have not.” Thus too, wherever practice is necessary, do not pretend to what can only be attained by practice ; but leave the matter to those who are practised, and do you be contented in your own serenity.

“ Go, for instance, and pay your court to such a person.” — How ? I will not do it abjectly. So I find myself shut out ; for I have not learned to get in at the window, and finding the door shut, I must necessarily either go back, or get in at the window. — “ But speak to him at least.” I am willing. “ In

\* This discourse is supposed to have been addressed to a pupil, who feared to remain at Rome, because of the persecutions aimed by Domitian at the philosophers. — H.

what manner?" Not basely at any rate. "Well, you have failed." This is not your business, but his. Why do you claim what belongs to another? Always remember what is your own, and what is another's, and you will never be disturbed.

Hence Chrysippus rightly says: While consequences are uncertain, I will keep to those things which will bring me most in harmony with nature; for God himself hath formed me to choose this. If I knew, that it was inevitable for me to be sick, I would conform my inclinations that way; for even the foot, if it had understanding, would be inclined to get into the dirt. For why are ears of corn produced, if it be not to ripen? and why do they ripen, if not to be reaped? For they are not isolated, individual things. If they were capable of sense, do you think they would wish never to be reaped? It would be a curse upon ears of corn not to be reaped, and we ought to know that it would be a curse upon man not to die; like that of not ripening, and not being reaped. Since, then, it is necessary for us to be reaped, and we have, at the same time, understanding to know it, are we angry at it? This is only because we neither know what we are, nor have we studied what belongs to man, as jockies do what belongs to horses. Yet Chrysantas, when he was about to strike an enemy, on hearing the trumpet sound a retreat, drew back his hand; for he thought it more eligible to obey the command of his general, than his own inclination.\* But not one of us, even when necessity calls, is ready and willing to

\* In a speech which Cyrus made to his soldiers, after the battle with the Assyrians, he mentioned Chrysantas, one of his captains, with particular honor, for this instance of obedience. Xenoph. Cyrop. IV. 1.—C.

obey it; but we weep and groan over painful events, calling them our “circumstances.” What circumstances, man? For if you call what surrounds you circumstances, everything is a circumstance; but, if by this you mean hardships, where is the hardship, that whatever is born must die? The instrument is either a sword, or a wheel, or the sea, or a tile, or a tyrant. And what does it signify to you by what way you descend to Hades? All are equal; but, if you would hear the truth, the shortest is that by which a tyrant sends you. No tyrant was ever six months in cutting any man’s throat; but a fever often takes a year. All these things are mere sound, and the rumor of empty names.

“My life is in danger from Cæsar.”

And am I not in danger, who dwell at Nicopolis, where there are so many earthquakes? And when you yourself recross the Adriatic, what is then in danger? Is it not your life?

“Ay, and my convictions also.”

What, your own? How so? Can any one compel you to have any convictions contrary to your own inclination?

“But the convictions of others too.”

And what danger is it of yours, if others have false convictions?

“But I am in danger of being banished.”

What is it to be banished? only to be somewhere else than at Rome.

“Yes? but what if I should be sent to Gyaros?”

If it be thought best for you, you will go; if not, there is another place than Gyaros whither you are sure to go,—where he who now sends you to Gyaros must go likewise, whether he will or not. Why, then,

do you come to these, as to great trials ? They are not equal to your powers. So that an ingenuous young man would say, it was not worth while for this, to have read and written so much, and to have sat so long listening to this old man. Only remember the distinction between what is your own, and what is not your own, and you will never claim what belongs to others. Judicial bench or dungeon, each is but a place, one high, the other low ; but your will is equal to either condition, and if you have a mind to keep it so, it may be so kept. We shall then become imitators of Socrates, when, even in a prison, we are able to write hymns of praise ;\* but as we now are, consider whether we could even bear to have another say to us in prison, “ Shall I read you a hymn of praise ? ” — “ Why do you trouble me ; do you not know my sad situation ? In such circumstances, am I able to hear hymns ? ” — What circumstances ? — “ I am going to die.” — And are all other men to be immortal ?

## CHAPTER VII.

## OF DIVINATION.

FROM an unseasonable regard to divination, we omit many duties : for what can the diviner contemplate besides death, danger, sickness, and such matters. When it is necessary, then, to expose one's self to danger for a friend, or even a duty to die for him, what occasion have I for divination ? Have not I a diviner within, who has told me the essence of

\* Diogenes Laertius in his life of Socrates (c. 42) gives the first verse of a hymn thus composed by him.—H.

good and evil ; and who explains to me the indications of both ? What further need, then, have I of signs or auguries. Can I tolerate the other diviner, when he says, " This is for your interest " ? For does he know what is for my interest ? Does he know what good is ? Has he learned the indications of good and evil, as he has those of the victims ? If so, he knows the indications likewise of fair and base, just and unjust. You may predict to me, sir, what is to befall me ; life or death, riches or poverty. But whether these things are for my interest, or not, I shall not inquire of you. " Why ? " Because you cannot even give an opinion about points of grammar ; and do you give it here, in things about which all men differ and dispute ? Therefore the lady, who was going to send a month's provision to Gratilla,\* in her banishment, made a right answer to one, who told her that Domitian would seize it. " I had rather," said she, " that he should seize it, than I not send it."

What, then, is it, that leads us so often to divination ? Cowardice ; the dread of events. Hence we flatter the diviners. " Pray, sir, shall I inherit my father's estate ? " — " Let us see : let us sacrifice upon the occasion." — " Nay, sir, just as fortune pleases." Then if he predicts that we shall inherit it, we give him thanks, as if we received the inheritance from *him*. The consequence of this is, that they impose upon us.

What, then, is to be done ?

We should come without previous desire or aversion ; as a traveller inquires the road of the person he meets, without any desire for that which turns to

\* A lady of high rank at Rome, banished from Italy, among many noble persons, by Domitian.—C.

the right hand, more than for that to the left ; for he wishes for neither of these, but only for that road which leads him properly. Thus we should come to God, as to a guide. Just as we make use of our eyes ; not persuading them to show us one object rather than another, but receiving such as they present to us. But now we conduct the augury with fear and trembling ; and in our invocations to God, entreat him : “ Lord have mercy upon me, suffer me to come off safe.” Foolish man ! would you have anything then but what is best ? And what is best but what pleases God ? Why would you then, so far as in you lies, corrupt your judge and seduce your adviser ?

## CHAPTER VIII.

## WHEREIN CONSISTS THE ESSENCE OF GOOD.

GOOD is beneficial. Good is also beneficial. It should seem, then, that where the essence of God is, there too is the essence of good. What then is the essence of God ? Flesh ? By no means. An estate ? Fame ? By no means. Intelligence ? Knowledge ? Right reason ? Certainly. Here, then, without more ado, seek the essence of good. For do you seek that quality in a plant ? No. Or in a brute ? No. If, then, you seek it only in a rational subject, why do you seek it anywhere but in what distinguishes that from things irrational ? Plants make no voluntary use of things ; and therefore you do not apply the term of *good* to them.— *Good*, then, implies such use. And nothing else ? If so, you may say, that good, and happiness, and unhappiness, belong to

mere animals. But this you do not say, and you are right; for, how much soever they have the use of things, they have not the intelligent use; and with good reason; for they are made to be subservient to others, and not of primary importance. Why was an ass made? Was it as being of primary importance? No; but because we had need of a back, able to carry burdens. We had need too that he should be capable of locomotion; therefore he had the voluntary use of things added; otherwise he could not have moved. But here his endowments end; for, if an understanding of that use had been likewise added, he would not, in reason, have been subject to us, nor have done us these services; but would have been like and equal to ourselves. Why will you not, therefore, seek the essence of good in that without which you cannot say that there is good in anything?

What then? Are not all these likewise the works of the gods? They are; but not primary existences, nor parts of the gods. But you are a primary existence. You are a distinct portion of the essence of God; and contain a certain part of him in yourself. Why then are you ignorant of your noble birth? Why do not you consider whence you came? why do not you remember, when you are eating, who you are who eat; and whom you feed? When you are in the company of women; when you are conversing; when you are exercising; when you are disputing; do not you know, that it is the Divine you feed; the Divine you exercise? You carry a God about with you, poor wretch, and know nothing of it. Do you suppose I mean some god without you of gold or silver? It is within yourself that you carry him; and

you do not observe that you profane him by impure thoughts and unclean actions. If the mere external image of God were present, you would not dare to act as you do ; and when God himself is within you, and hears and sees all, are not you ashamed to think and act thus ; insensible of your own nature, and at enmity with God ?

Why then are we afraid, when we send a young man from the school, into active life, that he should behave indecently, eat indecently, converse indecently with women ; that he should either debase himself by slovenliness, or clothe himself too finely ? Knows he not the God within him ? Knows he not in what company he goes ? It is provoking to hear him say [to his instructor], “I wish to have *you* with me.” Have you not God ? Do you seek any other, while you have him ? Or will He tell you any other things than these ? If you were a statue of Phidias, as Zeus or Minerva, you would remember both yourself and the artist ; and, if you had any sense, you would endeavor to be in no way unworthy of him who formed you, nor of yourself ; nor to appear in an unbecoming manner to spectators. And are you now careless how you appear, when you are the workmanship of Zeus himself ? And yet, what comparison is there, either between the artists, or the things they have formed ? What work of any artist has conveyed into its structure those very faculties which are shown in shaping it ? Is it anything but marble, or brass, or gold, or ivory ? And the Minerva of Phidias, when its hand is once extended, and a *Victory* placed in it, remains in that attitude forever. But the works of God are endowed with motion, breath, the powers of use and judgment. Being, then, the work of such an

artist, will you dishonor him,—especially, when he hath not only formed you, but given your guardianship to yourself? Will you not only be forgetful of this, but, moreover, dishonor the trust? If God had committed some orphan to your charge, would you have been thus careless of him? He has delivered yourself to your care; and says, “I had no one fitter to be trusted than you: preserve this person for me, such as he is by nature; modest, faithful, noble, unterrified, dispassionate, tranquil.” And will you not preserve him?

But it will be said: “What need of this lofty look, and dignity of face?”

I answer, that I have not yet so much dignity as the case demands. For I do not yet trust to what I have learned, and accepted. I still fear my own weakness. Let me but take courage a little, and then you shall see such a look, and such an appearance, as I ought to have. Then I will show you the statue, when it is finished, when it is polished. Do you think I will show you a supercilious countenance? Heaven forbid? For Olympian Zeus doth not haughtily lift his brow; but keeps a steady countenance, as becomes him who is about to say,

“My promise is irrevocable, sure.”\*

Such will I show myself to you; faithful, modest, noble, tranquil.

“What, and immortal too, and exempt from age and sickness?”

No. But sickening and dying as becomes the divine within me. This is in my power; this I can do. The other is not in my power, nor can I do it.

\* Iliad, I. 526.—H.

Shall I show you the muscular training of a philosopher?

“What muscles are those?”

A will undisappointed; evils avoided; powers duly exerted; careful resolutions; unerring decisions. These you shall see.

## CHAPTER IX.

THAT SOME PERSONS, FAILING TO FULFIL WHAT THE CHARACTER OF A MAN IMPLIES, ASSUME THAT OF A PHILOSOPHER.

**I**T were no slight attainment, could we merely fulfil what the nature of man implies. For what is man? A rational and mortal being. Well; from what are we distinguished by reason? From wild beasts. From what else? From sheep, and the like.

Take care, then, to do nothing like a wild beast; otherwise you have destroyed the man; you have not fulfilled what your nature promises. Take care too, to do nothing like cattle; for thus likewise the man is destroyed.

In what do we act like cattle?

When we act gluttonously, lewdly, rashly, sordidly, inconsiderately, into what are we sunk? Into cattle. What have we destroyed? The rational being.

When we behave contentiously, injuriously, passionately, and violently, into what have we sunk? Into wild beasts.

And further; some of us are wild beasts of a larger size; others, little mischievous vermin; such as suggest the proverb, Let me rather be eaten by a lion.

By all these means, that is destroyed which the nature of man implies.

For, when is a conjunctive proposition sustained ? When it fulfils what its nature implies. So then the sustaining of such a proposition consists in this : that its several parts remain a series of truths.

When is a disjunctive proposition sustained ? When it fulfils what its nature implies.

When is a flute, a harp, a horse, or a dog, preserved in existence ? While each fulfils what its nature implies.

Where is the wonder, then, that manhood should be preserved or destroyed in the same manner ? All things are preserved and improved by exercising their proper functions ; as a carpenter, by building ; a grammarian, by grammar : but if he permit himself to write ungrammatically, his art will necessarily be spoiled and destroyed. Thus modest actions preserve the modest man, and immodest ones destroy him ; faithful actions preserve the faithful man, and the contrary destroy him. On the other hand, the contrary actions heighten the contrary characters. Thus the practice of immodesty develops an immodest character ; knavery, a knavish one ; slander, a slanderous one ; anger, an angry one ; and fraud, a covetous one.

For this reason, philosophers advise us not to be contented with mere learning ; but to add meditation likewise, and then practice. For we have been long accustomed to perverse actions, and have practised upon wrong opinions. If, therefore, we do not likewise habituate ourselves to practise upon right opinions, we shall be nothing more than expositors of the abstract doctrines of others. For who among us is

not already able to discourse, according to the rules of art, upon good and evil ? " That some things are good, some evil, and others indifferent : the good include the virtues and all things appertaining ; the evil comprise the contrary ; and the indifferent include riches, health, reputation " ;— and then, if, while we are saying all this, there should happen some more than ordinary noise, or one of the by-standers should laugh at us, we are disconcerted. Philosopher, what is become of what you were saying ? Whence did it proceed ? Merely from your lips ? Why then, do you confound the remedies which might be useful to others ? Why do you trifle on the most important subjects ? It is one thing to hoard up provision in a storehouse, and another to eat it. What is eaten is assimilated, digested, and becomes nerves, flesh, bones, blood, color, breath. Whatever is hoarded is ready indeed, whenever you desire to show it ; but is of no further use to you than in the mere knowledge that you have it.

For what difference does it make whether you discourse on these doctrines, or those of the heterodox ? Sit down and comment skilfully on Epicurus, for instance ; perhaps you may comment more profitably than himself. Why then do you call yourself a Stoic ? Why do you act like a Jew, when you are a Greek ? Do not you see on what terms each is called a Jew, a Syrian, an Egyptian ? And when we see any one wavering, we are wont to say, This is not a Jew, but only acts like one. But, when he assumes the sentiments of one who has been baptized and circumcised, then he both really is, and is called, a Jew. Thus we, falsifying our profession, may be Jews in name, but are in reality something else. We are inconsistent with

our own discourse ; we are far from practising what we teach, and what we pride ourselves on knowing. Thus, while we are unable to fulfil what the character of a man implies, we are ready to assume besides so vast a weight as that of a philosopher. As if a person, incapable of lifting ten pounds, should endeavor to heave the same stone with Ajax.

## CHAPTER X.

### HOW WE MAY INFER THE DUTIES OF LIFE FROM ITS NOMINAL FUNCTIONS.

CONSIDER who you are. In the first place, a man ; that is, one who recognizes nothing superior to the faculty of free will, but all things as subject to this ; and this itself as not to be enslaved or subjected to anything. Consider then, from what you are distinguished by reason. You are distinguished from wild beasts : you are distinguished from cattle. Besides, you are a citizen of the universe, and a part of it ; not a subordinate, but a principal part. You are capable of comprehending the Divine economy ; and of considering the connections of things. What then does the character of a citizen imply ? To hold no private interest ; to deliberate of nothing as a separate individual, but rather like the hand or the foot, which, if they had reason, and comprehended the constitution of nature, would never pursue, or desire, but with a reference to the whole. Hence the philosophers rightly say, that, if it were possible for a wise and good man to foresee what was to happen, he might co-operate in bringing on himself

sickness, and death, and mutilation, being sensible that these things are appointed in the order of the universe ; and that the whole is superior to a part, and the city to the citizen. But, since we do not foreknow what is to happen, it becomes our duty to hold to what is more agreeable to our choice, for this too is a part of our birthright.

Remember next, that perhaps you are a son ; and what does this character imply ? To esteem everything that is his, as belonging to his father ; in every instance to obey him ; not to revile him to any one ; not to say or do anything injurious to him ; to give way and yield in everything ; co-operating with him to the utmost of his power.

After this, know likewise that you are a brother too ; and that to this character it belongs, to make concessions ; to be easily persuaded ; to use gentle language ; never to claim, for yourself, any non-essential thing ; but cheerfully to give up these, to be repaid by a larger share of things essential. For consider what it is, instead of a lettuce, for instance, or a chair, to procure for yourself a good temper. How great an advantage gained !

If, beside this, you are a senator of any city, demean yourself as a senator ; if a youth, as a youth ; if an old man, as an old man. For each of these names, if it comes to be considered, always points out the proper duties. But, if you go and revile your brother, I tell you that you have forgotten who you are, and what is your name. If you were a smith, and made an ill use of the hammer, you would have forgotten the smith ; and if you have forgotten the brother, and are become, instead of a brother, an enemy, do you imagine you have made no change of

one thing for another, in that case ? If, instead of a man, a gentle, social creature, you have become a wild beast, mischievous, insidious, biting ; have you lost nothing ? Is it only the loss of money which is reckoned damage ; and is there no other thing, the loss of which damages a man ? If you were to part with your skill in grammar, or in music, would you think the loss of these a damage ; and yet, if you part with honor, decency, and gentleness, do you think that no matter ? Yet the first may be lost by some cause external and inevitable ; but the last only by our own fault. There is no shame in not having, or in losing the one ; but either not to have, or to lose the other, is equally shameful, and reproachful, and unhappy. What does the debauchee lose ? Manhood. What does he lose, who made him such ? Many things, but manhood also. What does an adulterer lose ? The modest, the chaste character ; the good neighbor. What does an angry person lose ? A coward ? Each loses his portion. No one is wicked without some loss, or damage. Now if, after all, you treat the loss of money as the only damage, all these are unhurt and uninjured. Nay, they may be even gainers ; as, by such practices, their money may possibly be increased. But consider ; if you refer everything to money, then a man who loses his nose is not hurt. Yes, say you ; he is maimed in his body. Well, but does he who loses his sense of smell itself lose nothing ? Is there, then, no faculty of the soul, which benefits the possessor, and which it is an injury to lose ?

“ Of what sort do you mean ? ”

Have we not a natural sense of honor ?

“ We have.”

Does he, who loses this, suffer no damage ? Is he deprived of nothing ? Does he part with nothing that belongs to him ? Have we no natural fidelity ? No natural affection ? No natural disposition to mutual usefulness, to mutual forbearance ? Is he, then, who carelessly suffers himself to be damaged in these respects, still safe and uninjured ?

“ What, then, shall not I injure him who has injured me ? ”

Consider first what injury is ; and remember what you have heard from the philosophers. For, if both good and evil lie in the will, see whether what you say does not amount to this : “ Since he has hurt himself, by injuring me, shall I not hurt myself by injuring him ? ” Why do we not make to ourselves some such representation as this ? Are we hurt, when any detriment happens to our bodily possessions ; and are we not at all hurt, when our will is depraved ? He who has erred, or injured another, has indeed no pain in his head ; nor loses an eye, nor a leg, nor an estate ; and we wish for nothing beyond these. Whether our will be habitually humble and faithful, or shameless and unfaithful, we regard as a thing indifferent, except only in the discussions of the schools. In that case, all the improvement we make reaches only to words ; and beyond them is absolutely nothing.

## CHAPTER XI.

## THE BEGINNING OF PHILOSOPHY.

THE beginning of philosophy, at least to such as enter upon it in a proper way, and by the door, is a consciousness of our own weakness and inability in necessary things. For we came into the world without any natural idea of a right-angled triangle ; of a diesis, or a semitone, in music ; but we learn each of these things by some artistic instruction. Hence, they who do not understand them, do not assume to understand them. But who ever came into the world without an innate idea of good and evil ; fair and base ; becoming and unbecoming ; happiness and misery ; proper and improper ; what ought to be done, and what not to be done ? Hence we all make use of the terms, and endeavor to apply our impressions to particular cases. “ Such a one hath acted well, not well ; right, not right ; is unhappy, is happy ; is just, is unjust.” Which of us refrains from these terms ? Who defers the use of them, till he has learnt it ; as those do, who are ignorant of lines and sounds ? The reason of this is, that we come instructed, in some degree, by nature, upon these subjects ; and from this beginning, we go on to add self-conceit. “ For why,” say you, “ should I not know what fair or base is ? Have I not the idea of it ? ” You have. “ Do I not apply this idea to the particular instance ? ” You do. “ Do I not apply it rightly then ? ” Here lies the whole question ; and here arises the self-conceit. Beginning from these acknowledged points, men proceed, by applying them

improperly, to reach the very position most questionable. For, if they knew how to apply them also, they would be all but perfect.

If you think that you know how to apply your general principles to particular cases, tell me on what you base this application.

“Upon its seeming so to me.”

But it does not seem so to another ; and does not he too think that he makes a right application ?

“He does.”

Is it possible, then, that each of you should rightly apply your principles, on the very subjects about which your opinions conflict ?

“It is not.”

Have you anything to show us, then, for this application, beyond the fact of its seeming so to you ? And does a madman act any otherwise than seems to him right ? Is this then a sufficient criterion for him too ?

“It is not.”

Come, therefore, to some stronger ground than seeming.

“What is that ?”

The beginning of philosophy is this ; the being sensible of the disagreement of men with each other ; an inquiry into the cause of this disagreement ; and a disapprobation, and distrust of what merely seems ; a careful examination into what seems, whether it seem rightly ; and the discovery of some rule which shall serve like a balance, for the determination of weights ; like a square, for distinguishing straight and crooked. This is the beginning of philosophy.

Is it possible that all things which seem right to all persons, are so ? Can things contradictory be right ?

We say not all things ; but all that seem so to *us*. And why more to *you* than to the Syrians, or Egyptians? Than to me, or to any other man ? Not at all more.

Therefore what seems to each man, is not sufficient to determine the reality of a thing. For even in weights and measures we are not satisfied with the bare appearance ; but for everything we find some rule. And is there then, in the present case, no rule preferable to what seems ? Is it possible, that what is of the greatest necessity in human life, should be left incapable of determination and discovery ?

There must be some rule. And why do we not seek and discover it, and, when we have discovered, ever after make use of it, without fail, so as not even to move a finger without it. For this, I conceive, is what, when found, will cure those of their madness, who make use of no other measure, but their own perverted way of thinking. Afterwards, beginning from certain known and determinate points, we may make use of general principles, properly applied to particulars.

Thus, what is the subject that falls under our inquiry ? Pleasure. Bring it to the rule. Throw it into the scale. Must good be something in which it is fit to confide, and to which we may trust ? Yes. Is it fit to trust to anything unstable ? No. Is pleasure, then, a stable thing ? No. Take it, then, and throw it out of the scale, and drive it far distant from the place of good things.

But, if you are not quick-sighted, and one balance is insufficient, bring another. Is it fit to be elated by good ? Yes. Is it fit, then, to be elated by a present pleasure ? See that you do not say it is ;

otherwise I shall not think you so much as worthy to use a scale. Thus are things judged, and weighed, when we have the rules ready. This is the part of philosophy, to examine, and fix the rules ; and to make use of them, when they are known, is the business of a wise and good man.

## CHAPTER XII.

## OF DISPUTATION.

WHAT things are to be learned, in order to the right use of reason, the philosophers of our sect have accurately taught ; but we are altogether unpractised in the due application of them. Only give to any one of us whom you will, some illiterate person for an antagonist, and he will not find out how to treat him. But when he has a little moved the man, if he happens to answer at cross purposes, the questioner knows not how to deal with him any further, but either reviles or laughs at him, and says : “ He is an illiterate fellow ; there is no making anything of him.” Yet a guide, when he perceives his charge going out of the way, does not revile and ridicule, and then leave him ; but leads him into the right path. Do you also show your antagonist the truth, and you will see that he will follow. But till you show it, do not ridicule him ; but rather be sensible of your own incapacity.

How, then, did Socrates use to act ? He obliged his antagonist himself to bear testimony to him ; and wanted no other witness. Hence he might well say : \*

\* Plato, Gorgias, § 69, and elsewhere. — H.

“ I give up all the rest, and am always satisfied with the testimony of my opponent ; and I call in no one to vote, but my antagonist alone.” For he rendered the arguments drawn from natural impressions so clear, that every one saw and avoided the contradiction.—“ Does an envious man rejoice ? ”—“ By no means ; he rather grieves.” (This he moves him to say, by proposing the contrary.)—“ Well ; and do you think envy to be a grief caused by evils ? ”—“ And who ever envied evils ? ”—(Therefore he makes the other say, that envy is a grief caused by things good.)—“ Does any one envy those things which are nothing to him ? ”—“ No, surely.” Having thus fully drawn out his idea, he then leaves that point ; not saying, “ Define to me what envy is ” ; and after he has defined it, “ You have defined it wrong ; for the definition does not correspond to the thing defined.”

There are phrases repulsive and obscure to the illiterate, which yet we cannot dispense with. But we have no capacity at all to move them, by such arguments as might lead them, in following the methods of their own minds, to admit or abandon any position. And, from a consciousness of this incapacity, those among us, who have any modesty, give the matter entirely up ; but the greater part, rashly entering upon these debates, mutually confound and are confounded ; and, at last, reviling and reviled, walk off. Whereas it was the principal and most peculiar characteristic of Socrates, never to be provoked in a dispute, nor to throw out any reviling or injurious expression ; but to bear patiently with those who reviled him, and thus put an end to the controversy. If you would know how great abilities he had

in this particular, read Xenophon's Banquet, and you will see how many controversies he ended. Hence, even among the poets, this is justly mentioned with the highest commendation,

“Wisely at once the greatest strife to still.”\*

But what then? This is no very safe affair now, and especially at Rome. For he who does it, must not do it in a corner; but go to some rich consular senator, for instance, and question him. Pray, sir, can you tell me to whom you intrust your horses? “Yes, certainly.” Is it then, to any one indifferently, though he be ignorant of horsemanship? “By no means.” To whom do you intrust your gold, or your silver, or your clothes? “Not to any one indifferently.” And did you ever consider to whom you committed the care of your body? “Yes, surely.” To one skilled in exercise, or medicine, I suppose. “Without doubt.” Are these things your chief good; or are you possessed of something better than all of them? “What do you mean?” Something which makes use of these; and deliberates and counsels about each of them? “What then, do you mean the soul?” You have guessed rightly; for indeed I do mean that. “I do really think it a much better possession than all the rest.” Can you show us, then, in what manner you have taken care of this soul? For it is not probable, that a person of your wisdom and approved character in the state, would carelessly suffer the most excellent thing that belongs to you to be neglected and lost. “No, certainly.” But do you take care of it yourself? And is it done by the instructions of another, or by your own ability? — Here,

\* Hesiod, Theogony, 87. — H.

now, comes the danger, that he may first say, “ Pray, good sir, what business is that of yours ; what are you to me ? ” Then, if you persist in troubling him, he may lift up his hand, and give you a box on the ear. I myself was once a great admirer of this method of instruction, till I fell into such kind of adventures.

## CHAPTER XIII.

## OF ANXIETY.

WHEN I see any one anxious, I say, what does this man mean ? Unless he wanted something or other, not in his own power, how could he still be anxious ? A musician, for instance, feels no anxiety, while he is singing by himself, but when he appears upon the stage he does ; even if his voice be ever so good, or he plays ever so well. For what he wishes is not only to sing well, but likewise to gain applause. But this is not in his own power. In short, where his skill lies, there is his courage. Bring any ignorant person, and he does not mind him. But in the point which he neither understands, nor has studied, there he is anxious.

“ What point is that ? ”

He does not understand what a multitude is, nor what the applause of a multitude. He has learnt, indeed, how to sound bass and treble ; but what the applause of the many is, and what force it has in life, he neither understands, nor has studied. Hence he must necessarily tremble, and turn pale. I cannot indeed say, that a man is no musician, when I see him afraid ; but I can say something else, and

indeed many things. And, first of all, I call him a stranger, and say, this man does not know in what country he is ; and though he has lived here so long, he is ignorant of the laws and customs of the state, and what is permitted, and what not ; nor hath he ever consulted any legal adviser, who might tell and explain to him the laws. But no man writes a will, without knowing how it ought to be written, or consulting some one who knows ; nor does he rashly sign a bond, or give security. Yet he indulges his desires and aversions, exerts his pursuits, intentions, and resolutions, without consulting any legal adviser about the matter.

“ How do you mean, without a legal adviser ? ”

He knows not, when he chooses what is not allowed him, and does not choose what is necessary ; and he knows not what is his own, and what belongs to others ; for if he did know, he would never be hindered, would never be restrained, would never be anxious.

“ How so ? ”

Why ? does any one fear things that are not evils ?

“ No.”

Does any one fear things, that seem evils indeed, but which it is in his own power to prevent ?

“ No, surely.”

If, then, the things independent of our will are neither good nor evil ; and all things that do depend on will, are in our own power, and can neither be taken away from us, nor given to us, unless we please ; what room is there left for anxiety ? But we are anxious about this paltry body or estate of ours, or about what Cæsar thinks ; and not at all about anything internal. Are we ever anxious not to take up a false opinion ? No ; for this is within

our own power. Or not to follow any pursuit contrary to nature? No; nor this. When, therefore, you see any one pale with anxiety, just as the physician pronounces from the complexion, that such a patient is disordered in the spleen, and another in the liver; so do you likewise say, this man is disordered in his desires and aversions; he cannot walk steadily; he is in a fever. For nothing else changes the complexion, or causes trembling, or sets the teeth chattering.

“He crouching walks, or squats upon his heels.” \*

Therefore Zeno,† when he was to meet Antigonus, felt no anxiety. For over that which he prized, Antigonus had no power: and those things over which he had power, Zeno did not regard. But Antigonus felt anxiety when he was to meet Zeno; and with reason, for he was desirous to please him; and this was external ambition. But Zeno was not solicitous to please Antigonus; for no one skilful in any art is solicitous to please a person unskilful.

“I am solicitous to please you.”

For what? Do you know the rules, by which one man judges of another? Have you studied to understand what a good, and what a bad man is; and how each becomes such? Why then are not you yourself a good man?

“In what respect am I not?”

\* Homer, Iliad, xiii. 281.—H.

† Antigonus Gonatas, king of Macedon, had so great an esteem for Zeno, that he often took a journey to Athens to visit him; and endeavored, by magnificent promises, to allure him to his court, but without success. He gave it as a reason for the distinguished regard which he paid him, that, though he had made him many, and very considerable offers, Zeno never appeared either mean or insolent.—C.

Because no good man laments, or sighs, or groans; no good man turns pale, and trembles, and says, "How will such a one receive me; how will he hear me?" — As he thinks fit, foolish man. Why do you trouble yourself about what belongs to others? Is it not his fault, if he receives you ill?

"Yes, surely."

And can one person be in fault, and another the sufferer?

"No."

Why then are you anxious about what belongs to others?

"Well; but I am anxious how I shall speak to him."

What then, cannot you speak to him as you will?

"But I am afraid I shall be disconcerted."

If you were going to write down the name of Dion, should you be afraid of being disconcerted?

"By no means."

What is the reason? Is it because you have learned how to write?

"Yes."

And if you were going to read, would it not be exactly the same?

"Exactly."

What is the reason?

"Because every art gives a certain assurance and confidence, on its own ground."

Have you not learned, then, how to speak? And what else did you study at school?

"Syllogisms, and convertible propositions."

For what purpose? Was it not in order to talk properly? And what is that, but to talk seasonably, and discreetly, and intelligently, and without flutter

or hesitation ; and by means of all this, with courage ?

“ Very true.”

When, therefore, you go into the field on horseback, are you anxious on being matched against one who is on foot ? you being practised and he unpractised ?

“ Ay, but the person has power to kill me.”

Then speak the truth, O ! unfortunate ! and be not arrogant, nor take the philosopher upon you, nor conceal from yourself who are your masters ; but while you are thus to be held by the body, follow the strongest. Socrates, indeed, had studied how to speak, who talked in such a manner to tyrants and judges, and in prison. Diogenes \* had studied how to speak, who talked in such a manner to Alexander, to Philip, to the pirates, to the person who bought him. This belonged to those who had studied the matter ; who had courage. But do you go where you belong and remain there. Retire into some corner, and there sit and weave syllogisms, and propose them to others. For there is not in you a man who can rule the city.

\* When Diogenes was sailing to *Ægina*, he was taken by pirates, and carried to Crete, and there exposed to sale. Being asked what he could do, he answered, “ Govern men ” ; and pointing to a well-dressed Corinthian, who was passing by, “ Sell me,” said he, “ to him ; for he wants a master.” The Corinthian, whose name was Xeniades, bought him, and appointed him the tutor to his children ; and Diogenes perfectly well discharged his trust. — C.

## CHAPTER XIV.

## CONCERNING NASO.

WHEN a certain Roman came to him with his son, and had heard one lesson,—“This,” said Epictetus, “is the method of teaching”; and ceased. When the other desired him to go on, he answered, Every art seems tedious, when it is delivered to a person ignorant and unskilful in it. The things performed by the common arts, quickly manifest the use for which they were made; and most of them have something attractive and agreeable. Thus the trade of a shoemaker, as one seeks to learn it, is an unpleasant thing; but the shoe is useful, and not unpleasing to the eye. The trade of a smith is extremely unattractive to an ignorant observer, but the work shows the usefulness of the art. You will see this much more strongly in music; for if you stand by, while a person is learning, it will appear to you of all sciences the most unpleasant; but the effects are agreeable and delightful, even to those who do not understand it.

So here we take it to be the work of one who studies philosophy, to bring his will into harmony with events; so that none of the things which happen may happen against our inclination, nor those which do not happen be desired by us. Hence they, who have settled this point, have it in their power never to be disappointed in what they seek, nor to incur what they shun; but to lead their own lives without sorrow, fear, or perturbation; and in society to preserve all the natural or acquired relations of son, father, brother, citizen, husband, wife, neighbor, fellow-trav-

eller, ruler, or subject. Something like this is what we take to be the work of a philosopher. It remains to inquire, how it is to be effected. Now we see that a carpenter becomes a carpenter by learning certain things ; and a pilot, by learning certain things, becomes a pilot. Probably then it is not sufficient, in the present case, merely to be willing to be wise and good ; but it is moreover necessary that certain things should be learned. What these things are, is the question. The philosophers say, that we are first to learn that there is a God ; and that his providence directs the whole ; and that it is not merely impossible to conceal from him our actions, but even our thoughts and emotions. We are next to learn, what the gods are ; for such as they are found to be, such must he seek to be to the utmost of his power, who would please and obey them. If the Deity is faithful, he too must be faithful : if free, beneficent, and noble, he must be free, beneficent, and noble likewise ; in all his words and actions, behaving as an imitator of God.

“ Whence, then, are we to begin ? ”

If you will give me leave, I will tell you. It is necessary, in the first place, that you should understand words.

“ So then ! I do not understand them now ? ”

No. You do not.

“ How is it, then, that I use them ? ”

Just as the illiterate use the words of the learned ; and as brutes use the phenomena of nature. For use is one thing, and understanding another. But if you think you understand them, bring whatever words you please, and let us see whether we understand them or not.

" Well ; but it is a grievous thing for a man to be confuted who has grown old ; and has perhaps served through his three campaigns to a senatorship."

I know it very well. For you now come to me, as if you wanted nothing. And how can it enter into your imagination, that there should be anything in which you are deficient ? You are rich ; and perhaps have a wife and children, and a great number of domestics. Cæsar takes notice of you : you have many friends at Rome : you render to all their dues : you know how to requite a favor, and revenge an injury. In what are you deficient ? Suppose then, I should prove to you, that you are deficient in what is most necessary and important to happiness ; and that hitherto you have taken care of everything, rather than your duty ; and, to complete all, that you understand not what God or man, or good or evil, means ? That you are ignorant of all the rest, perhaps, you may bear to be told ; but if I prove to you that you are ignorant even of yourself, how will you bear with me, and how will you have patience to stay and be convinced ? Not at all. You will immediately be offended, and go away. And yet what injury have I done you ; unless a looking-glass injures a person not handsome, when it shows him to himself, such as he is ? Or unless a physician can be thought to affront his patient, when he says to him : " Do you think, sir, that you are not ill ? You have a fever. Eat no meat to-day, and drink water." Nobody cries out here, " What an intolerable affront ! " But, if you say to any one : You exhibit feverishness in your desires, and low habits in what you shun ; your aims are contradictory, your pursuits not conformable to nature, your opinions rash, and mistaken ;

he presently goes away, and complains that he is affronted.

This is the position we assume. As, in a crowded fair, the horses and cattle are brought to be sold, and most men come either to buy or sell ; but there are a few, who come only to look at the fair, and inquire how it is carried on, and why in that manner, and who appointed it, and for what purpose ; — thus, in this fair [of the world] some, like cattle, trouble themselves about nothing but fodder. To all of you, who busy yourselves about possessions, and farms, and domestics, and public posts, these things are nothing else but mere fodder. But there are some few men, among the crowd, who are fond of looking on, and considering : “ What then, after all, is the world ? Who governs it ? Has it no governor ? How is it possible, when neither a city nor a house can remain, ever so short a time, without some one to govern and take care of it, that this vast and beautiful system should be administered in a fortuitous and disorderly manner ? Is there then a governor ? Of what sort is he ? And how does he govern ; and what are we, who are under him ? And for what designed ? Have we some connection and relation to him, or none ? ” In this manner are the few affected ; and apply themselves only to view the fair, and then depart. Well ; and they are laughed at by the multitude ? Why, so are the lookers-on, by the buyers and sellers ; and, if the cattle had any apprehension, they too would laugh at such as admired anything but fodder.

## CHAPTER XV.

CONCERNING THOSE WHO OBSTINATELY PERSIST IN WHAT-EVER THEY HAVE DETERMINED.

SOME, when they hear such discourses as these, “That we ought to be steadfast ; that the will is by nature free and unconstrained ; and that all else is liable to restraint, compulsion, slavery, and tyranny,” imagine that they must remain immutably fixed to everything which they have determined. But it is first necessary that the determination should be a wise one. I agree, that there should be sinews in the body, but such as in a healthy, an athletic body ; for if you show me that you exhibit the [convulsed] sinews of a lunatic, and value yourself upon that, I will say to you, Seek a physician, man ; this is not muscular vigor, but is really enervation. Such is the distemper of mind in those who hear these discourses in a wrong manner ; like an acquaintance of mine, who, for no reason, had determined to starve himself to death. I went the third day, and inquired what was the matter. He answered, “I am determined.” — Well ; but what is your motive ? For, if your determination be right, we will stay, and assist your departure ; but, if unreasonable, change it.— “We ought to keep our determinations.” — What do you mean, sir ? Not all of them ; but such as are right. Else, if you should fancy that it is night, if this be your principle, do not change, but persist, and say, “We ought to keep to our determinations.” What do you mean, sir ? Not to all of them. Why do you not begin by first laying the foundation, inquir-

ing whether your determination be a sound one, or not ; and then build your firmness and constancy upon it. For, if you lay a rotten and crazy foundation, you must not build ; since the greater and more weighty the superstructure, the sooner will it fall. Without any reason, you are withdrawing from us, out of life, a friend, a companion, a fellow-citizen both of the greater and the lesser city ; and while you are committing murder, and destroying an innocent person, you say, " We must keep to our determinations." Suppose, by any means, it should ever come into your head to kill me ; must you keep such a determination ?

With difficulty this person was, however, at last convinced ; but there are some at present, whom there is no convincing. So that now I think I understand, what before I did not, the meaning of that common saying, that a fool will neither bend nor break. May it never fall to my lot to have a wise, that is an untractable fool for my friend. " It is all to no purpose ; I am determined." So are madmen too ; but the more strongly they are determined upon absurdities, the more need have they of hellebore. Why will you not act like a sick person, and apply yourself to a physician ? " Sir, I am sick. Give me your assistance ; consider what I am to do. It is my part to follow your directions." So say in the present case : " I know not what I ought to do ; and I am come to learn." — " No ; but talk to me about other things ; for upon *this* I am determined." What other things ? What is of greater consequence, than to convince you that it is not sufficient to be determined, and to persist ? This is the vigor of a madman ; not of one in health. " I will die, if you com-

pel me to this." Why so, man ; what is the matter ? "I am determined." I have a lucky escape, that it is not your determination to kill me. "I will not be bribed [from my purpose.]" Why so ? "I am determined." Be assured, that with that very vigor which you now employ to refuse the bribe, you may hereafter have as unreasonable a propensity to take it ; and again to say, "I am determined." As, in a distempered and rheumatic body, the humor tends sometimes to one part, sometimes to another ; thus it is uncertain which way a sickly mind will incline. But if to its inclination and bent a spasmodic vigor be likewise added, the evil then becomes desperate and incurable.

## CHAPTER XVI.

THAT WE DO NOT STUDY TO MAKE USE OF THE ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES CONCERNING GOOD AND EVIL.

WHERE lies good ? In the will. Where evil ? In the will. Where neither good nor evil ? In things inevitable. What then ? Does any one of us remember these lessons out of the schools ? Does any one of us study how to answer for himself in the affairs of life, as in common questions ? "Is it day ?" — "Yes." — "Is it night, then ?" — "No." — "Is the number of stars even ?" — "I cannot tell." — When a bribe is offered you, have you learned to make the proper answer, that it is not a good ? Have you exercised yourself in such answers as these ; or only in sophistries ? Why do you wonder, then, that you improve in points which you have studied ; while

in those which you have not studied, there you remain the same? When an orator knows that he has written well; that he has committed to memory what he has written; and that he brings an agreeable voice with him; why is he still anxious? Because he is not contented with what he has studied. What does he want then? To be applauded by the audience. He has studied the power of speaking, then; but he has not studied censure and applause. For when did he hear from any one what applause, what censure is? What is the nature of each? What kind of applause is to be sought, and what kind of censure to be shunned? And when did he ever apply himself to study what follows from these lessons? Why do you wonder then, if, in what he has learned, he excels others; but, where he has not studied, he is the same with the rest of the world? Just as a musician knows how to play, sings well, and has the proper dress of his profession; yet trembles when he comes upon the stage. For the first he understands; but what the multitude is, or what mean the clamor and laughter of the multitude, he does not understand. Nor does he even know what anxiety itself is; whether it be our own affair, or that of others; or whether it be possible to suppress it, or not. Hence, if he is applauded, he is puffed up, when he makes his exit: but if he is laughed at, the inflation is punctured, and subsides.

Thus are we too affected. What do we admire? Externals. For what do we strive? Externals. And are we then in any doubt why we fear and are anxious? What is the consequence, then, when we esteem the things that are brought upon us to be evils? We cannot but fear; we cannot but be

anxious. And then we say, “O Lord God, how shall I avoid anxiety!” Have you not hands, foolish man? Hath not God made them for you? You might as well kneel and pray to be cured of your catarrh. Take care of your disease, rather; and do not murmur. Well; and hath he given you nothing in the present case? Hath he not given you patience? Hath he not given you magnanimity? Hath he not given you fortitude? When you have such hands as these, do you still seek for aid from another? But we neither study nor regard these things. For give me but one, who cares how he does anything, who does not regard the success of anything, but his own manner of acting. Who, when he is walking, regards his own action? Who, when he is deliberating, prizes the deliberation itself, and not the success that is to follow it? If it happens to succeed, he is elated; and cries: “How prudently have we deliberated! Did not I tell you, my dear friend, that it was impossible, when we considered about anything, that it should not happen right?” But if it miscarries, the poor wretch is dejected; and knows not what to say about the matter. Who among us ever, for such a purpose, consulted a diviner? Who of us ever slept in a temple, to be instructed [in a dream] concerning his manner of acting? I say, who? Show me one who is truly noble and ingenuous, that I may see what I have long sought. Show me either a young or an old man.

Why then are we still surprised, if, when we waste all our attention on the mere materials of action, we are, in the manner of action itself, low, sordid, unworthy, timid, wretched, and altogether failures? For we do not care about these things, nor make

them our study. If we had feared, not death or exile, but fear itself, we should have studied not to fall into what appears to us to be evil. But, as the case now stands, we are eager and loquacious in the schools; and, when any little question arises about any of these things, we are prepared to trace its consequences; but drag us into practice, and you will find us miserably shipwrecked. Let something of alarming aspect attack us, and you will perceive what we have been studying, and in what we are exercised. Besides, through this negligence, we always exaggerate, and represent things greater than the reality. In a voyage, for instance, casting my eyes down upon the ocean below, and looking round me, and seeing no land, I am beside myself, and imagine that, if I should be shipwrecked, I must swallow all that ocean; nor does it occur to me, that three pints are enough for me. What is it then, that alarms me? The ocean? No; but my own impressions. Again; in an earthquake, I imagine the city is going to fall upon me; but is not one little stone enough to knock my brains out? What is it then, that oppresses, and makes us beside ourselves? Why, what else but our own impressions? For what is it, but mere impressions, that distress him, who leaves his country, and is separated from his acquaintance, and friends, and place, and usual manner of life? When children cry, if their nurse happens to be absent for a little while, give them a cake, and they forget their grief. Shall we compare you to these children then?

“No, indeed. For I do not desire to be pacified by a cake; but by right impressions. And what are they?”

Such as a man ought to study all day long, so as

not to be absorbed in what does not belong to him ; neither friend, place, nor academy, nor even his own body ; but to remember the law, and to have that constantly before his eyes. And what is the divine law ? To preserve inviolate what is properly our own ; not to claim what belongs to others ; to use what is given us, and not desire what is not given us ; and, when anything is taken away, to restore it readily, and to be thankful for the time you have been permitted the use of it ; and not cry after it, like a child for its nurse and its mamma. For what does it signify, what gets the better of you, or on what you depend ? Which is the worthier, one crying for a doll, or for an academy ? You lament for the portico and the assembly of young people, and such entertainments. Another comes lamenting that he must no longer drink the water of Dirè.\* Why, is not the Marcian water as good ? "But I was used to that." And in time you will be used to the other. And, when you are attached to this too, you may weep again, and set yourself, in imitation of Euripides, to celebrate, in verse,

The baths of Nero, and the Marcian water.

Hence see the origin of Tragedy, when trifling accidents befall foolish men. "Ah, when shall I see Athens and the citadel again ?" Foolish man, are not you contented with what you see every day ? Can you see anything better than the sun, the moon, the stars, the whole earth, the sea ? But if, besides, you comprehend him who administers the whole, and carry him about within yourself, do you still

\* A beautiful clear river in Boeotia, flowing into the Ismenus. The Marcian water was conveyed by Ancus Marcius to Rome.—C.

long after certain stones, and a fine rock ? What will you do then, when you are to leave even the sun and moon ? Will you sit crying, like an infant ? What, then, have you been doing in the school ? What did you hear ? What did you learn ? Why have you written yourself down a philosopher, instead of writing the real fact ? "I have prepared some abstracts, and read over Chrysippus ; but I have not so much as approached the door of philosophy. For what pretensions have I in common with Socrates, who died and who lived in such a manner ? Or with Diogenes ? Do you observe either of these crying, or out of humor, that he is not to see such a man, or such a woman ; nor to live any longer at Athens, nor at Corinth ; but at Susa, for instance, or Ecbatana ? For does he stay and repine, who may at any time, if he will, quit the entertainment, and play no longer ? Why does he not stay, as children do, so long as he is amused ? Such a one, no doubt, will bear perpetual banishment and a sentence of death wonderfully well ! Why will not you be weaned, as children are ; and take more solid food ? Will you never cease to cry after your mammas and nurses, whom the old women about you have taught you to bewail ? "But if I go away, I shall trouble them also." You trouble them ! No ; it will not be you ; but that which troubles you too,— a mere impression. What have you to do then ? Rid yourself of that impression ; and, if they are wise, they will do the same for theirs ; or, if not, they must lament for themselves.

Boldly make a desperate push, man, as the saying is, for prosperity, for freedom, for magnanimity. Lift up your head at last, as being free from slavery.

Dare to look up to God, and say, “ Make use of me for the future as Thou wilt. I am of the same mind ; I am one with Thee. I refuse nothing which seems good to Thee. Lead me whither Thou wilt. Clothe me in whatever dress Thou wilt. Is it Thy will that I should be in a public or a private condition ; dwell here, or be banished ; be poor, or rich ? Under all these circumstances I will testify unto Thee before men. I will explain the nature of every dispensation.” No ? Rather sit alone, then, in safety, and wait till your mamma comes to feed you. If Hercules had sat loitering at home, what would he have been ? Eurystheus, and not Hercules. Besides, by travelling through the world, how many acquaintances and how many friends he made. But none more his friend than God ; for which reason he was believed to be the son of God ; and was so. In obedience to him, he went about extirpating injustice and lawless force. But you are not Hercules, nor able to extirpate the evils of others ; nor even Theseus, to extirpate the evils of Attica. Extirpate your own then. Expel, instead of Procrustes and Sciron,\* grief, fear, desire, envy, malevolence, avarice, effeminacy, intemperance. But these can be no otherwise expelled than by looking up to God alone, as your pattern ; by attaching yourself to him alone, and being consecrated to his commands. If you wish for anything else, you will, with sighs and groans, follow what is stronger than you ; always seeking prosperity without, and never able to find it. For you seek it where it is not, and neglect to seek it where it is.

\* Two famous robbers who infested Attica, and were at last killed by Theseus.—C.

## CHAPTER XVII.

HOW TO APPLY GENERAL PRINCIPLES TO PARTICULAR  
CASES.

WHAT is the first business of one who studies philosophy? To part with self-conceit. For it is impossible for any one to begin to learn what he thinks that he already knows. We all go to the philosophers, talking at random upon negative and positive duties; good and evil; fair and base. We praise, censure, accuse; we judge and dispute about fair and base enterprises. And yet for what do we go to the philosophers? To learn what we suppose ourselves not to know. And what is this? Propositions. We are desirous to hear what the philosophers say, for its elegance and acuteness; and some with a view only to gain. Now it is ridiculous to suppose, that a person will learn anything but what he desires to learn; or make an improvement, in what he does not learn. But most are deceived, in the same manner as Theopompus, the orator, when he blames Plato for defining everything. "For," he says, "did none of us, before you, use the words good and just; or did we utter them as empty sounds, without understanding what each of them meant?" Why, who tells you, Theopompus, that we had not natural ideas and general principles as to each of these? But it is not possible to apply principles in detail, without having minutely distinguished them, and examined what details appertain to each. You may make the same objection to the physicians. For who of us did not use the words wholesome and unwholesome, before

Hippocrates was born ; or did we utter them as empty sounds ? For we have some general conception of what is wholesome too ; but we cannot apply it. Hence one says, let the patient abstain from meat ; another, give it to him : one says, let him be bled ; another, cup him. And what is the reason, but not being able to adapt the general conception of wholesomeness to particular cases ? Thus, too, in life ; who of us does not talk of good or evil, advantageous and disadvantageous ; for who of us has not a general conception of each of these ? But is it then a distinct and perfect one ? Show me this.

“ How shall I show it ? ”

Apply it properly in detail. Plato, to go no further, puts definitions under the general head of useful ; but you, under that of useless. Can both of you be right ? How is it possible ? Again ; does not one man adapt the general conception of good, to riches ? Another, not to riches, but to pleasure, or health ? In general, unless we who use words employ them vaguely, or without proper care in discrimination, why do we differ ? Why do we wrangle ? Why do we censure each other ? But what occasion have I to mention this mutual contradiction ? If you yourself apply your principles properly, how comes it to pass, that you do not prosper ? Why do you meet with any hindrance ? Let us for the present omit our second point, concerning the *pursuits*, and the duties relative to them : let us omit the third too, concerning *assent*. I waive all these for you. Let us insist only on the first ; \* which affords almost a sensible proof, that you do not properly apply your principles. You desire what is possible in itself, and

\* The topic of the *Desires* and *Aversions*. — C.

possible for you. Why then are you hindered ? Why are not you in a prosperous way ? You do not shrink from the inevitable. Why then do you incur anything undesirable ? Why are you unfortunate ? When you desire anything, why does it not happen ? When you do not desire it, why happens it ? For this is the greatest proof of ill success and misery : “ I desire something and it does not happen ; and what is more wretched than I ? ” From such impatience Medea came to murder her own children ; a lofty action in this point of view alone, that she had a proper impression of what it was to fail of one’s aim. “ Thus I shall punish him who has injured and dishonored me ; and what is so wicked a wretch good for ? But how is this to be effected ? I will murder the children ; but that will be punishing myself. And what care I ? ” This is the error of a powerful soul. For she knew not where the fulfilment of our desires is to be found ; that it is not to be had from without, nor by altering the appointment of things. Do not demand the man for your husband, and nothing which you do desire will fail to happen. Do not desire to keep him to yourself. Do not desire to stay at Corinth, and, in a word, have no will, but the will of God ; and who shall restrain you ; who shall compel you, any more than Zeus ? When you have such a guide, and conform your will and inclinations to his, why need you fear being disappointed ? Fix your desire and aversion on riches, or poverty ; the one will be disappointed, the other incurred. Fix them on health, power, honors, your country, friends, children, in short, on anything beyond the control of your will, you will be unfortunate. But fix them on Zeus, on the gods. Give yourself up to these ; let these gov-

ern ; let your powers be ranged on the same side with these ; and how can you be any longer unprosperous ? But if, poor wretch, you envy, and pity, and are jealous, and tremble, and never cease a single day from complaining of yourself and the gods, why do you boast of your education ? What education, man ? That you have learned syllogisms ? Why do not you, if possible, unlearn all these, and begin again ; convinced that hitherto you have not even touched upon the essential point ? And, for the future, beginning from this foundation, proceed in order to the superstructure ; that nothing may happen which you do not wish, and that everything may happen which you desire. Give me but one young man, who brings this intention with him to the school ; who is a champion for this point, and says, "I yield up all the rest ; it suffices me, if once I become able to pass my life free from hindrance and grief; to stretch out my neck to all events as free ; and to look up to Heaven, as the friend of God, fearing nothing that can happen." Let any one of you show himself of such a disposition, that I may say, "Come into the place, young man, that is of right your own ; for you are destined to be an ornament to philosophy. Yours are these possessions ; yours these books ; yours these discourses." Then, when he has thoroughly mastered this first class, let him come to me again, and say : " I desire indeed to be free from passion, and perturbation ; but I desire too, as a pious, a philosophic, and a diligent man, to know what is my duty to God, to my parents, to my relations, to my country, and to strangers." Come into the second class too ; for this likewise is yours. "But I have now sufficiently studied the second class

too ; and I would willingly be secure, and unshaken by error and delusion, not only when awake, but even when asleep ; when warmed with wine ; when diseased with the spleen." You are becoming as a god, man ; your aims are sublime !

" Nay ; but I, for my part, desire to understand what Chrysippus says, in his logical treatise of the Pseudomenos." \* — Go hang yourself, pitiful man, with only such an aim as this ! What good will it do you ? You will read the whole, lamenting all the while ; and say to others, trembling, " Do as I do. Shall I read to you, my friend, and you to me ? You write amazingly well ; and you very finely imitate the style of Plato ; and you, of Xenophon ; and you, of Antisthenes." And thus, having related your dreams to each other, you return again to the same state. Your desires and aversions, your pursuits, your intentions, your resolutions, your wishes and endeavors, are just what they were. You do not so much as seek for one to advise you, but are offended when you hear such things as these ; and cry, " An ill-natured old man ! He never wept over me, when I was setting out, nor said, To what a danger are you going to be exposed ? If you come off safe, child, I will illuminate my house. This would have been the part of a man of feeling." Truly, it will be a mighty happiness, if you do come off safe : it will be worth while to make an illumination. For you ought to be immortal, and exempt from sickness, to be sure.

\* The "Pseudomenos" was a famous problem among the Stoics, and it is this. When a person says, *I lie*; does he lie, or does he not ? If he lies, he speaks truth : if he speaks truth, he lies. Chrysippus wrote six books upon it. — C.

Throwing away then, I say, this self-conceit, by which we fancy we have gained some knowledge of what is useful, we should come to philosophic reasoning as we do to mathematics and music; otherwise we shall be far from making any improvement, even if we have read over all the compends and commentaries, not only of Chrysippus, but of Antipater, and Archedemus too.

## CHAPTER XVIII.

### HOW THE SEMBLANCES OF THINGS ARE TO BE COMBATED.

EVERY habit and faculty is preserved and increased by correspondent actions; as the habit of walking, by walking; of running, by running. If you would be a reader, read; if a writer, write. But if you do not read for a month together, but do something else; you will see what will be the consequence. So, after sitting still for ten days, get up and attempt to take a long walk; and you will find how your legs are weakened. Upon the whole then, whatever you would make habitual, practise it; and, if you would not make a thing habitual, do not practise it, but habituate yourself to something else.

It is the same with regard to the operations of the soul. Whenever you are angry, be assured, that it is not only a present evil, but that you have increased a habit, and added fuel to a fire. When you are overcome by the seductions of a woman, do not consider it as a single defeat alone, but that you have fed, that you have increased, your dissoluteness. For it is in-

possible, but that habits and faculties must either be first produced, or strengthened and increased, by corresponding actions. Hence the philosophers derive the growth of all maladies. When you once desire money, for example, if reason be applied to produce a sense of the evil, the desire ceases, and the governing faculty of the mind regains its authority ; whereas, if you apply no remedy, it returns no more to its former state, but, being again similarly excited, it kindles at the desire more quickly than before ; and by frequent repetitions, at last becomes callous, and by this malady is the love of money fixed. For he who has had a fever, even after it has left him, is not in the same state of health as before, unless he was perfectly cured ; and the same thing happens in distempers of the soul likewise. There are certain traces and blisters left in it ; which, unless they are well effaced, whenever a new hurt is received in the same part, instead of blisters will become sores.

If you would not be of an angry temper, then, do not feed the habit. Give it nothing to help its increase. Be quiet at first, and reckon the days in which you have not been angry. I used to be angry every day ; now every other day ; then every third and fourth day ; and if you miss it so long as thirty days, offer a sacrifice of thanksgiving to God. For habit is first weakened, and then entirely destroyed. “I was not vexed to-day ; nor the next day ; nor for three or four months after ; but restrained myself under provocation.” Be assured, that you are in an excellent way. “To-day, when I saw a handsome person, I did not say to myself, O that I could possess her ! and how happy is her husband ” (for he who says this, says too, how happy is her gallant) ; “nor

did I go on to fancy her in my arms." On this I stroke my head, and say, Well done, Epictetus; thou hast solved a hard problem, harder than the chief syllogism. But, if even the lady should happen to be willing and give me intimations of it, and send for me, and press my hand, and place herself next to me; and I should then forbear, and get the victory; that would be a triumph beyond all the forms of logic. This is the proper subject for exultation, and not one's power in handling the syllogism.

How then is this to be effected? Be willing to approve yourself to yourself. Be willing to appear beautiful in the sight of God; be desirous to converse in purity with your own pure mind, and with God; and then, if any such semblance bewilders you, Plato directs you: "Have recourse to expiations; go a suppliant to the temples of the averting deities." It is sufficient, however, if you propose to yourself the example of wise and good men, whether alive or dead; and compare your conduct with theirs. Go to Socrates, and see him placed beside his beloved, yet not seduced by youth and beauty. Consider what a victory he was conscious of obtaining! What an Olympic triumph! How near does he rank to Hercules!\* So that, by Heaven, one might justly salute him; hail! wondrous victor! † instead of those sorry boxers and wrestlers, and the gladiators who resemble them.

By placing such an example before you, you will

\* Hercules is said to have been the author of the gymnastic games; and the first victor. Those who afterwards conquered in wrestling, and the pancratium, were numbered from him.—C.

† This pompous title was given to those who had been victors in all the Olympic games.—C.

conquer any alluring semblance, and not be drawn away by it. But in the first place, be not hurried away by excitement; but say, Semblance, wait for me a little. Let me see what you are, and what you represent. Let me try you. Then, afterwards, do not suffer it to go on drawing gay pictures of what will follow ; if you do, it will lead you wherever it pleases. But rather oppose to it some good and noble semblance, and banish this base one. If you are habituated to this kind of exercise, you will see what shoulders, what nerves, what sinews, you will have. But now it is mere trifling talk, and nothing more. He is the true athlete, who trains himself against such semblances as these. Stay, wretch, do not be hurried away. The combat is great, the achievement divine ; for empire, for freedom, for prosperity, for tranquillity. Remember God. Invoke him for your aid and protector ; as sailors do Castor and Pollux, in a storm. For what storm is greater than that which arises from these perilous semblances, contending to overset our reason ? Indeed what is the storm itself, but a semblance ? For, do but take away the fear of death, and let there be as many thunders and lightnings as you please, you will find, that to the reason all is serenity and calm ; but if you are once defeated, and say, you will get the victory another time, and then the same thing over again ; assure yourself that you will at last be reduced to so weak and wretched a condition, you will not so much as know when you do amiss ; but you will even begin to make defences for your behavior, and thus verify the saying of Hesiod :—

With constant ills, the dilatory strive.\*

\* Works and Days, v. 383. — H.

## CHAPTER XIX.

CONCERNING THOSE WHO EMBRACE PHILOSOPHY ONLY  
IN WORDS.

THE science of “the ruling argument” \* appears to have its rise from hence. Of the following propositions, any two imply a contradiction to the third. They are these. “That everything past is necessarily true”; “That an impossibility is not the consequence of a possibility”; and, “That something is a possibility, which neither is nor will be true.” Diodorus, perceiving this contradiction, combined the first two, to prove, that nothing is possible, which neither is nor will be true. Some again hold the second and third; “that something is possible, which neither is nor will be true”; and, “that an impossibility is not the consequence of a possibility”; and consequently assert, “That not everything past is necessarily true.” This way Cleanthes and his followers took; whom Antipater copiously defends. Others, lastly, maintain the first and third; “that something is possible, which neither is nor will be true”; and “that everything past is necessarily true”; but then, “that an impossibility may be the consequence of a possibility.” But all these three propositions cannot be at once maintained, because of their mutual contradiction.

If any one should ask me then, which of them I maintain; I answer him, that really I cannot tell. But I have heard it related, that Diodorus held one opinion about them; the followers of Panthædes, I

\* A logical subtlety.—H.

think, and Cleanthes, another; and Chrysippus a third.

“What then is your opinion?”

I express none. I was born to examine things as they appear to my own mind; to compare what is said by others, and thence to form some conviction of my own on any topic. Of these things I have merely technical knowledge. Who was the father of Hector? Priam. Who were his brothers? Paris and Deiphobus. Who was his mother? Hecuba. This I have heard related. From whom? Homer. But I believe Hellanicus, and other authors, have written on the same subject. And what better account have I of “the ruling argument”? But, if I were vain enough, I might, especially at some entertainment, astonish all the company by an enumeration of authors relating to it. Chrysippus has written wonderfully, in his first Book of Possibilities. Cleanthes and Archedemus have each written separately on this subject. Antipater too has written, not only in his Treatise of Possibilities, but especially in a discourse on “the ruling argument.” Have you not read the work? “No.” Read it then. And what good will it do him? He will be more trifling and impertinent than he is already. For what else have you gained by reading it? What conviction have you formed upon this subject? But you tell us of Helen, and Priam, and the isle of Calypso, something which never was, nor ever will be. And in these matters, indeed, it is of no great consequence if you retain the story, without forming any principle of your own. But it is our misfortune to do so, much more, in morality, than upon such subjects as these.

“Talk to me concerning good and evil.”

Hear :

“Winds blew from Ilium to Ciconian shores.”\*

Of things, some are good, some evil, and some indifferent. Now the good are the virtues, and whatever partakes of them ; and the evil, vices, and what partakes of vice ; the indifferent lie between these, as riches, health, life, death, pleasure, pain.

“Whence do you know this ?”

[Suppose I say,] Hellanicus says it, in his Egyptian History. For what does it signify, whether one quotes the history of Hellanicus, or the ethies of Diogenes, or Chrysippus, or Cleanthes ? Have you then examined any of these things, and formed convictions of your own ? But show me, how you are used to exercise yourself on shipboard. Remember these distinctions, when the mast rattles, and some idle fellow stands by you, while you are screaming, and says : “For heaven’s sake, talk as you did a little while ago. Is it vice to suffer shipwreck ? Or does it partake of vice ?” Would you not take up a log, and throw it at his head ? “What have we to do with you, sir ? We are perishing, and you come and jest.” Again ; if Cæsar should summon you, to answer an accusation, remember these distinctions. If, when you are going in, pale and trembling, any one should meet you and say, “Why do you tremble, sir ? What is this affair you are engaged in ? Doth Cæsar, within there, give virtue and vice to those who approach him ?”—“What, do *you* too insult me, and add to my evils ?”—“Nay, but tell me, philosopher, why you tremble ? Is there any other danger,

\* Homer, *Odyssey*, IX. 39. The expression became proverbial, signifying “from bad to worse.” — H.

but death, or a prison, or bodily pain, or exile, or slander ? ” — “ Why, what else should there be ? ” — “ Are any of these vice ? Or do they partake of vice ? What, then, did you yourself use to say of these things ? ” — “ What have you to do with me, sir ? My own evils are enough for me.” — “ You say rightly. Your own evils are indeed enough for you ; your baseness, your cowardice, and that arrogance by which you were elated, as you sat in the schools. Why did you assume plumage not your own ? Why did you call yourself a Stoic ? ”

Observe yourselves thus in your actions, and you will find of what sect you are. You will find, that most of you are Epicureans ; a few Peripatetics, and those but loose ones. For by what action will you prove that you think virtue equal, and even superior, to all other things ? Show me a Stoic, if you have one. Where ? Or how should you ? You can show, indeed, a thousand who repeat the Stoic reasonings. But do they repeat the Epicurean less well ? Are they not just as perfect in the Peripatetic ? Who then is a Stoic ? As we call that a Phidian statue, which is formed according to the art of Phidias ; so show me some one person formed according to the principles which he professes. Show me one who is sick, and happy ; in danger, and happy ; dying, and happy ; exiled, and happy ; disgraced, and happy. Show him to me ; for, by Heaven, I long to see a Stoic. But you have not one fully developed ? Show me then one who is developing ; one who is approaching towards this character. Do me this favor. Do not refuse an old man a sight which he has never yet seen. Do you suppose that you are to show the Jupiter or Minerva of Phidias, a work of ivory or gold ? Let any of you

show me a human soul, desiring to be in unity with God ; not to accuse either God or man ; not to be disappointed of its desire, nor incur its aversion ; not to be angry ; not to be envious ; not to be jealous ; in a word, desiring from a man to become a god ; and, in this poor mortal body, aiming to have fellowship with Zeus. Show him to me. But you cannot. Why then do you impose upon yourselves, and play tricks with others ? Why do you put on a dress not your own ; and walk about in it, mere thieves and pilferers of names and things which do not belong to you ? I am now your preceptor, and you come to be instructed by me. And indeed my aim is to secure you from being restrained, compelled, hindered ; to make you free, prosperous, happy ; looking to God upon every occasion, great or small. And you come to learn and study these things. Why then do you not finish your work, if you have the proper aims, and I, besides the aim, the proper qualifications ? What is wanting ? When I see an artificer, and the materials lying ready, I await the work. Now here is the artificer ; here are the materials ; what is it we want ? Is not the thing capable of being taught ? It is. Is it not in our own power then ? The only thing of all others that is so. Neither riches, nor health, nor fame, nor, in short, anything else is in our power, except a right use of the semblances of things. This alone is, by nature, not subject to restraint, not subject to hindrance. Why then do not you finish it ? Tell me the cause. It must be my fault, or yours, or from the nature of the thing. The thing itself is practicable, and the only thing in our power. The fault then must be either in me, or in you, or, more truly, in both. Well then, shall we at length begin to carry

such an aim with us ? Let us lay aside all that is past. Let us begin. Only believe me, and you shall see.

## CHAPTER XX.

## CONCERNING THE EPICUREANS AND ACADEMICS.

THINGS true and evident must, of necessity, be recognized even by those who would contradict them. And perhaps one of the strongest proofs that there is such a thing as evidence, is the necessity which compels even those who contradict it to make use of it. If a person, for instance, should deny that anything is universally true, he will be obliged to assert the contrary, that nothing is universally true. Foolish man, not so. For what is this, but an universal statement ?\* Again ; suppose any one should come and say, "Know that there is nothing to be known ; but all things are uncertain" ; or another, "Believe me, for your good, that no man ought to be believed in anything" ; or a third, "Learn from me that nothing is to be learned ; I tell you this, and will teach the proof of it, if you please." Now what difference is there between such as these, and those who call themselves Academics, — who say to us, "Be convinced, that no one ever is convinced ; believe us, that nobody believes anybody" ?

Thus also, when Epicurus would destroy the natural tie between mankind, he makes use of the very thing he is destroying. For what says he ? "Be not deceived ; be not seduced and mistaken. There is no natural tie between reasonable beings. Believe

\* Translation conjectural. — H.

me. Those who say otherwise mislead and impose upon you." — Why are you concerned for us then? Let us be deceived. You will fare never the worse, if all the rest of us are persuaded, that there is a natural tie between mankind; and that it is by all means to be preserved. Nay, it will be much safer and better. Why do you give yourself any trouble about us, sir? Why do you break your rest for us? Why do you light your lamp? Why do you rise early? Why do you compose so many volumes? Is it that none of us should be deceived concerning the gods, as if they took any care of men? Or that we may not suppose the essence of good consists in anything but in pleasure? For if these things be so, lie down and sleep, and lead the life of which you judge yourself worthy; that of a mere worm. Eat, drink, debauch, snore. What is it to you, whether others think rightly or wrongly about these things? For what have you to do with us? You take care of sheep, because they afford their milk, their wool, and at last their flesh. And would it not be a desirable thing that men might be so lulled and enchanted by the Stoics as to give themselves up to be milked and fleeced by you, and such as you? Should not these doctrines be taught to your brother Epicureans only, and concealed from the rest of the world; who should by all means, above all things, be persuaded, that we have a natural tie with each other, and that self-command is a good thing, in order that all may be kept safe for *you*? Or is this tie to be preserved towards some and not towards others? Towards whom, then, is it to be preserved? Towards such as mutually preserve, or such as violate it? And who violate it more than you, who teach such doctrines?

What was it, then, that waked Epicurus from his sleep, and compelled him to write what he did ; what else, but that which is of all influences the most powerful among mankind, Nature ; which draws every one, however unwilling and reluctant, to its own purposes. For since, she says, you think that there is no tie between mankind, write out this doctrine, and leave it for the use of others ; and break your sleep upon that account ; and by your own practice confute your own principles. Do we say, that Orestes was roused from sleep because driven by the furies ; and was not Epicurus waked by sterner furies and avengers, which would not suffer him to rest, but compelled him to utter his own ills, as wine and madness do the priests of Cybele ? So strong and unconquerable a thing is human nature ! For how can a vine have the properties not of a vine, but of an olive-tree ? Or an olive-tree, not those of an olive-tree, but of a vine ? It is impossible. It is inconceivable. Neither, therefore, is it possible for a human creature entirely to lose human affections. But even those who have undergone a mutilation, cannot have their inclinations also mutilated ; and so Epicurus, when he had mutilated all the offices of a man, of a master of a family, of a citizen, and of a friend, did not mutilate the inclinations of humanity ; for this he could not do ; any more than the idle Academics can throw away or blind their own senses, though this be the point they chiefly labor. What a misfortune is it, when any one, after having received from Nature standards and rules for the knowledge of truth, does not strive to add to these, and make up their deficiencies ; but, on the contrary, endeavors to take away and destroy whatever truth may be known even by them.

What say you, philosopher ? What do you think of piety and sanctity ? — “ If you please, I will prove that they are good.” — Pray do prove it ; that our citizens may be converted, and honor the Deity, and may no longer neglect what is of the highest importance. “ Do you accept these demonstrations, then ? ” I have, and I thank you. “ Since you are so well pleased with this, then, learn these contrary propositions ; that there are no gods, or, if there are, that they take no care of mankind, neither have we any concern with them ; that this piety and sanctity, so much talked of by many, are only an imposition of boasting and sophistical men ; or, perhaps, of legislators, for a terror and restraint to injustice.” — Well done, philosopher. Our citizens are much the better for you. You have already brought back all the youth to a contempt of the Deity. “ What ! does not this please you, then ? Learn next, that justice is nothing ; that shame is folly ; that the paternal relation is nothing ; the filial, nothing.” Well said, philosopher ; persist, convince the youth ; that we may have many more, to think and talk like you. By such doctrines as these, no doubt, have our well-governed states flourished ! Upon these was Sparta founded ! Lycurgus, by his laws, and method of education, introduced such persuasions as these ; that it is not base to be slaves, rather than honorable ; nor honorable to be free, rather than base ! They who died at Thermopylæ, died from such principles as these ! And from what other doctrines did the Athenians leave their city ? \*

\* When the Athenians found themselves unable to resist the forces of the Persians, they left their city ; and, having removed their wives and children, and their movable effects, to Trœzen and Salamis,

And yet, they who talk thus marry, and produce children, and engage in public affairs, and get themselves made priests and prophets. Of whom? Of gods that have no existence. And they consult the Pythian priestess, only to hear falsehoods, and interpret the oracles to others. O! monstrous impudence and imposture!

What are you doing, man?\* You contradict yourself every day; and you will not give up these paltry cavils. When you eat, where do you put your hand? To your mouth, or to your eye? When you bathe, where do you go? Do you ever call a kettle a dish, or a spoon a spit? If I were a servant to one of these gentlemen, were it at the hazard of being flayed every day, I would plague him. “Throw some oil into the bath, boy.” I would take pickle, and pour upon his head. “What is this?” Really, sir, I was impressed by a certain semblance so like oil as not to be distinguished from it. “Give me the soup.” I would carry him a dish full of vinegar. “Did I not ask for the soup?” Yes, sir, this is the soup. “Is not this vinegar?” Why so, more than soup? “Take it and smell it, take it and taste it.” How do you know, then, but our senses deceive us? If I had three or four fellow-servants to join with me, I would make him either choke with passion and burst, or change his opinions. But now they insult us, by making use of the gifts of nature, while in words they destroy them. Those must be grateful and modest men, at least, who, while eating their daily

went on board their ships, and defended the liberty of Greece by their fleet.—C.

\* What follows is against the Academics, who denied the evidence of the senses.—C.

bread, dare to say, “ We do not know whether there be any such beings as Demeter, or Core, or Pluto.” Not to mention, that while they possess the blessings of night and day, of the annual seasons, of the stars, the earth and the sea, they are not the least affected by any of these things ; but only study to throw out some idle problem, and when they have thus relieved themselves, go and bathe ; but take not the least care what they say, nor on what subjects, nor to whom, nor what may be the consequence of their talk ; whether any well-disposed young man, on hearing such doctrines, may not be affected by them, and so affected as entirely to lose the seeds of his good disposition ; whether they may not furnish an adulterer with occasions of growing shameless in his guilt ; whether a public plunderer may not find excuses from these doctrines ; whether he, who neglects his parents, may not gain an additional confidence from them.

“ What things, then, in your opinion, are good and evil, fair and base ; such things, or such things ? ” But why should one argue any more with such as these, or interchange opinions, or endeavor to convince them ? By Zeus, one might sooner hope to convince the most unnatural debauchees, than those, who are thus deaf and blind to their own ills.

## CHAPTER XXI.

## OF INCONSISTENCY.

THERE are some things which men confess with ease ; and others with difficulty. No one, for instance, will confess himself a fool, or a blockhead ; but, on the contrary, you will hear every one say, "I wish my fortune were in proportion to my abilities." But they easily confess themselves fearful, and say, "I am somewhat timorous, I confess ; but in other respects you will not find me a fool." No one will easily confess himself intemperate in his desires ; upon no account dishonest, nor indeed very envious, or meddling ; but many confess themselves to have the weakness of being compassionate. What is the reason of all this ? The principal reason is, an inconsistency and confusion in what relates to good and evil. But different people have different motives, and in general, whatever they imagine to be base, they do not absolutely confess. Fear and compassion they imagine to belong to a well-meaning disposition ; but stupidity, to a slave. Offences against society they do not own ; but, in most faults, they are brought to a confession, chiefly from imagining that there is something involuntary in them ; as in fear and compassion. And, though a person should in some measure confess himself intemperate in his desires, he accuses his passion, and expects forgiveness, as for an involuntary fault. But dishonesty is not imagined to be, by any means, involuntary. In jealousy too, there is something they suppose involuntary ; and this, likewise, in some degree, they confess.

Conversing therefore with such men, thus confused, thus ignorant what they say, and what are or are not their ills, whence they have them, and how they may be delivered from them ; it is worth while, I think, to ask one's self continually, " Am I too one of these ? What do I imagine myself to be ? How do I conduct myself ? As a prudent, as a temperate man ? Do I, too, ever talk at this rate ; that I am sufficiently instructed for what may happen ? Have I that persuasion, that I know nothing, which becomes one who knows nothing ? Do I go to a master, as to an oracle, prepared to obey ; or do I also, like a mere driveller, enter the school, only to learn and understand books which I did not understand before ; or, perhaps, to explain them to others ? "

You have been fighting at home, with your manservant ; you have turned the house upside-down, and alarmed the neighborhood ; and do you come to me with a pompous show of wisdom, and sit and criticise how I explain a sentence, how I prate whatever comes into my head ? Do you come, envious and dejected, that nothing has come from home for you ; and in the midst of the disputationis, sit thinking on nothing, but how your father or your brother may treat you ? " What are they saying about me at home ? Now they think I am improving, and say, he will come back with universal knowledge. I wish I could learn everything before my return ; but this requires much labor, and nobody sends me anything. The baths are very bad at Nicopolis ; and things go very ill both at home, and here."

After all this, it is said, nobody is the better for the philosophic school. Why, who comes to the school ? I mean, who comes to be reformed ? Who, to sub-

mit his principles to correction ; who, with a sense of his wants ? Why do you wonder, then, that you bring back from the school the very thing you carried there ? For you do not come to lay aside, or correct, or change, your principles. How should you ? Far from it. Rather consider this, therefore, whether you have not what you have come for. You have come to talk about theorems. Well ; and are you not more impertinently talkative than you were ? Do not these paltry theorems furnish you with matter for ostentation ? Do you not solve convertible and hypothetical syllogisms ? Why, then, are you still displeased, if you have the very thing for which you came ?

“Very true ; but, if my child, or my brother should die ; or if I must die or be tortured myself, what good will these things do me ?” Why, did you come for *this* ? Did you attend upon me for *this* ? Was it upon any such account, that you ever lighted your lamp, or sat up at night ? Or did you, when you went into the walk, propose any delusive semblance to your own mind to be discussed, instead of a syllogism ? Did any of you ever go through such a subject jointly ? And, after all, you say, theorems are useless. To whom ? To such as apply them ill. For medicines for the eyes are not useless to those who apply them when and as they ought. Fomentations are not useless, dumb-bells are not useless ; but they are useless to some, and, on the contrary, useful to others. If you should ask me, now, are syllogisms useful ? I should answer, that they are useful ; and, if you please, I will show you how. “Will they be of service to me, then ?” Why, did you ask, man, whether they would be useful to *you*,

or in general? If any one in a dysentery should ask me, whether acids be useful; I should answer, they are. "Are they useful for *me*, then?" I say, no. First try to get the flux stopped, and the ulceration healed. Do you too first get your ulcers healed, your fluxes stopped. Quiet your mind, and bring it free from distraction to the school; and then you will know what force there is in reasoning.

## CHAPTER XXII.

## OF FRIENDSHIP.

TO whatever objects a person devotes his attention, these objects he probably loves. Do men ever devote their attention then, to [what they think] evils? By no means. Or even to things indifferent? No, nor this. It remains then, that good must be the sole object of their attention; and, if of their attention, of their love too. Whoever, therefore, understands good, is capable likewise of love; and he who cannot distinguish good from evil, and things indifferent from both, how is it possible that he can love? The wise person alone, then, is capable of loving.

"How so? I am not this wise person, yet I love my child."

I protest it surprises me, that you should, in the first place, confess yourself unwise. For in what are you deficient? Have not you the use of your senses? Do you not distinguish the semblances of things? Do you not provide such food and clothing and habitation as are suitable to you? Why then do you confess that you want wisdom? In truth, because you

are often struck and disconcerted by semblances, and their speciousness gets the better of you ; and hence you sometimes suppose the very same things to be good, then evil, and lastly, neither ; and, in a word, you grieve, you fear, you envy, you are disconcerted, you change. Is it from this that you confess yourself unwise ? And are you not changeable too in love ? Riches, pleasure, in short, the very same things, you sometimes esteem good, and at other times evil. And do you not esteem the same persons too, alternately as good and bad, at one time treating them with kindness, at another with enmity, at one time commanding, and at another censuring them ?

“ Yes. This too is the case with me.”

Well then, can he who is deceived in another, be his friend, think you ?

“ No, surely.”

Or does he, who loves him with a changeable affection, bear him genuine good will ?

“ Nor he, neither.”

Or he, who now vilifies, then admires him ?

“ Nor he.”

Do you not often see little dogs caressing, and playing with each other, so that you would say, nothing could be more friendly ; but, to learn what this friendship is, throw a bit of meat between them, and you will see. Do you too throw a bit of an estate betwixt you and your son, and you will see, that he will quickly wish you under ground, and you him ; and then you, no doubt, on the other hand will exclaim, What a son have I brought up ! He would bury me alive ! — Throw in a pretty girl, and the old fellow and the young one will both fall in love with her ; or let fame or danger intervene, the words of the father of Admetus will be yours :

“ You love to see the light. Doth not your father ?  
You fain would still behold it. Would not he ? ”\*

Do you suppose that he did not love his own child when it was little ? That he was not in agonies when it had a fever, and often wished to undergo that fever in its stead ? But, after all, when the trial comes home, you see what expressions he uses. Were not Eteocles and Polynices born of the same mother, and of the same father ? Were they not brought up, and did they not live, and eat, and sleep, together ? Did not they kiss and fondle each other ? So that any one, who saw them, would have laughed at all the paradoxes which philosophers utter about love. And yet, when a kingdom, like a bit of meat, was thrown betwixt them, see what they say.

*Polynices.* “ Where wilt thou stand before the towers ? ”

*Eteocles.* “ Why askest thou this of me ? ”

*Pol.* “ I will oppose myself to thee, to slay thee.”

*Et.* “ Me too the desire of this seizes.”†

Such are the prayers they offer. Be not therefore deceived. No living being is held by anything so strongly as by its own needs. Whatever therefore appears a hindrance to these, be it brother, or father, or child, or mistress, or friend, is hated, abhorred, execrated ; for by nature it loves nothing like its own needs. This motive is father, and brother, and family, and country, and God. Whenever, therefore, the Gods seem to hinder this, we vilify even them, and throw down their statues, and burn their temples ;

\* Euripides, Alcestis, v. [691] 701. The second line, as quoted by Epictetus, is not found in the received editions. Pheres, the father of Admetus, is defending himself for not consenting to die in place of his son. — H.

† Euripides, Phœnissæ, v. 630, 631.

as Alexander ordered the temple of *Aesculapius* to be burnt, because he had lost the man he loved.

When therefore any one identifies his interest with those of sanctity, virtue, country, parents, and friends, all these are secured ; but whenever he places his interest in anything else than friends, country, family, and justice, then these all give way, borne down by the weight of self-interest. For wherever *I* and *mine* are placed, thither must every living being gravitate. If in body, that will sway us ; if in our own will, that ; if in externals, these. If, therefore, I rest my personality in the will, then only shall I be a friend, a son, or a father, such as I ought. For, in that case, it will be for my interest to preserve the faithful, the modest, the patient, the abstinent, the beneficent character ; to keep the relations of life inviolate. But, if I place my personality in one thing, and virtue in another, the doctrine of Epicurus will stand its ground, that virtue is nothing, or mere opinion.

From this ignorance it was, that the Athenians and Lacedemonians quarrelled with each other, and the Thebans with both ; the Persian king with Greece, and the Macedonians with both ; and now the Romans with the Getes. And, in still remoter times the Trojan war arose from the same cause. Alexander [Paris] was the guest of Menelaus ; and whoever had seen the mutual proofs of good will, that passed between them, would never have believed that they were not friends. But a tempting bait, a pretty woman, was thrown in between them ; and thence came war. At present, therefore, when you see that dear brothers have, in appearance, but one soul, do not immediately pronounce upon their love ; not

though they should swear it, and affirm it was impossible to live asunder. For the governing faculty of a bad man is faithless, unsettled, undiscriminating, successively vanquished by different semblances. But inquire, not as others do, whether they were born of the same parents, and brought up together, and under the same preceptor ; but this thing only, in what they place their interest ; in externals, or in their own wills. If in externals, you can no more pronounce them friends, than you can call them faithful, or constant, or brave, or free ; nay, nor even truly men, if you are wise. For it is no principle of humanity, that makes them bite and vilify each other, and take possession of public assemblies, as wild beasts do of solitudes and mountains ; and convert courts of justice into dens of robbers ; that prompts them to be intemperate, adulterers, seducers ; or leads them into other offences, that men commit against each other,— all from that one single error, by which they risk themselves, and their own concerns, on things uncontrollable by will.

But if you hear, that these men in reality suppose good to be placed only in the will, and in a right use of things as they appear ; no longer take the trouble of inquiring if they are father and son, or old companions and acquaintances ; but boldly pronounce that they are friends, and also that they are faithful and just. For where else can friendship be met, but joined with fidelity and modesty, and the intercommunication of virtue alone ?

“ Well ; but such a one paid me the utmost regard, for so long a time, and did he not love me ? ”

How can you tell, foolish man, if that regard be any other than he pays to his shoes, or his horse,

when he cleans them ? And, how do you know but that when you cease to be a necessary utensil, he may throw you away, like a broken stool ?

“ Well ; but it is my wife, and we have lived together many years.”

And how many did Eriphyle live with Amphiaraus ; and was the mother of children, not a few ? But a bauble came between them. What was this bauble ? A false conviction concerning certain things. This turned her into a savage animal ; this cut asunder all love, and suffered neither the wife nor the mother to continue such.\*

Whoever therefore, among you, studies either to be or to gain a friend, let him cut up all false convictions by the root, hate them, drive them utterly out of his soul. Thus, in the first place, he will be secure from inward reproaches and contests ; from vacillation and self-torment. Then with respect to others ; to every like-minded person, he will be without disguise ; to such as are unlike, he will be patient, mild, gentle, and ready to forgive them, as failing in points of the greatest importance ; but severe to none, being fully convinced of Plato’s doctrine, that the soul is never willingly deprived of truth. Without all this, you may, in many respects, live as friends do ; and drink, and lodge, and travel together, and even be born of the same parents ; and so may serpents too ; but neither they nor you can ever be really friends, while your accustomed principles remain brutal and execrable.

\* Amphiaraus married Eriphyle, the sister of Adrastus, king of Argos, and was betrayed by her for a golden chain. — C.

## CHAPTER XXIII.

## OF ELOQUENCE.

A BOOK will always be read with more pleasure and ease, if it be written in fair characters ; and so every one will the more easily attend to discourses likewise, if ornamented with proper and beautiful expressions. It ought not then to be said, that there is no such thing as the faculty of eloquence ; for this would be at once the part of an impious and timid person. Impious, because he dishonors the gifts of God ; just as if he should deny any use in the faculties of sight, hearing, and speech itself. Hath God then given you eyes in vain ? Is it in vain, that he hath infused into them such a strong and active spirit, as to be able to represent the forms of distant objects ? What messenger is so quick and diligent ? Is it in vain, that he hath made the intermediate air so yielding and elastic, that sight penetrates through it ? And is it in vain, that he hath made the light, without which all the rest would be useless ? Man, be not ungrateful, nor, on the other hand, unmindful of your superior advantages ; but for sight, and hearing, and indeed for life itself, and the supports of it, as fruits, and wine, and oil, be thankful to God ; but remember that He hath given you another thing, superior to them all, which uses them, proves them, estimates the value of each. For what is it that pronounces upon the value of each of these faculties ? Is it the faculty itself ? Did you ever perceive the faculty of sight or hearing, to say anything concerning itself ? Or wheat, or barley, or horses, or dogs ?

No. These things are appointed as instruments and servants, to obey that which is capable of using things as they appear. If you inquire the value of anything ; of what do you inquire ? What is the faculty that answers you ? How then can any faculty be superior to this, which uses all the rest as instruments, and tries and pronounces concerning each of them ? For which of them knows what itself is ; and what is its own value ? Which of them knows, when it is to be used, and when not ? Which is it, that opens and shuts the eyes, and turns them away from improper objects ? Is it the faculty of sight ? No ; but that of Will. Which is it, that opens and shuts the ears ? Which is it, by which they are made curious and inquisitive ; or on the contrary deaf, and unaffected by what is said ? Is it the faculty of hearing ? No ; but that of Will. This, then, recognizing itself to exist amidst other faculties, all blind and deaf, and unable to discern anything but those offices, in which they are appointed to minister and serve ; itself alone sees clearly, and distinguishes the value of each of the rest. Will this, I say, inform us, that anything is supreme, but itself ? What can the eye, when it is opened, do more than see ? But whether we ought to look upon the wife of any one, and in what manner, what is it that decides us ? The faculty of Will. Whether we ought to believe, or disbelieve what is said ; or whether, if we do believe, we ought to be moved by it, or not, what is it that decides us ? Is it not the faculty of Will ? Again ; the very faculty of eloquence, and that which ornaments discourse, if any such peculiar faculty there be, what does it more than merely ornament and arrange expressions, as curlers do the hair ? But

whether it be better to speak, or to be silent ; or better to speak in this, or in that manner ; whether this be decent, or indecent ; and the season and use of each ; what is it that decides for us, but the faculty of Will ? What then, would you have it appear, and bear testimony against itself ? What means this ? If the case be thus, then that which serves may be superior to that to which it is subservient ; the horse to the rider ; the dog to the hunter ; the instrument to the musician ; or servants to the king. What is it that makes use of all the rest ? The Will. What takes care of all ? The Will. What destroys the whole man, at one time, by hunger ; at another, by a rope, or a precipice ? The Will. Has man, then, anything stronger than this ? And how is it possible, that what is liable to restraint should be stronger than what is not ? What has a natural power to restrain the faculty of sight ? The Will and its workings. And it is the same with the faculties of hearing and of speech. And what has a natural power of restraining the Will ? Nothing beyond itself, only its own perversion. Therefore in the Will alone is vice : in the Will alone is virtue.

Since, then, the Will is such a faculty, and placed in authority over all the rest, suppose it to come forth and say to us, that the body is, of all things, the most excellent ! If even the body itself pronounced itself to be the most excellent, it could not be borne. But now, what is it, Epicurus, that pronounces all this ? What was it, that composed volumes concerning "the End," "the Nature of things," "the Rule" ; that assumed a philosophic beard ; that, as it was dying, wrote, that it was "then spending its last and happiest day"?\* Was this the body, or was

\* These words are part of a letter written by Epicurus, when he was

it the faculty of Will? And can you, then, without madness, admit anything to be superior to this? Are you in reality so deaf and blind? What, then, does any one dishonor the other faculties? Heaven forbid! Does any one assert that there is no use or excellence in the faculty of sight? Heaven forbid! It would be stupid, impious, and ungrateful to God. But we render to each its due. There is some use in an ass, though not so much as in an ox; and in a dog, though not so much as in a servant: and in a servant, though not so much as in the citizens; and in the citizens, though not so much as in the magistrates. And though some are more excellent than others, those uses, which the last afford, are not to be despised. The faculty of eloquence has thus its value, though not equal to that of the Will. When therefore I talk thus, let not any one suppose, that I would have you neglect eloquence, any more than your eyes, or ears, or hands, or feet, or clothes, or shoes. But if you ask me what is the most excellent of things, what shall I say? I cannot say, eloquence, but a right Will; for it is this which makes use of that, and of all the other faculties, whether great or small. If this be set right, a bad man becomes good; if it be wrong, a good man becomes wicked. By this we are unfortunate or fortunate; we disapprove or approve each other. In a word, it is this which, neglected, forms unhappiness; and, well cultivated, happiness.

But to take away the faculty of eloquence, and to say, that it is in reality nothing, is not only ungrateful to those who gave it, but cowardly too. For such a person seems to me to be afraid, that, if there be dying, to one of his friends. Diog. Laert. X. 22.—C. The titles previously given are those of treatises by Epicurus.—H.

any such faculty, we may, on occasion, be compelled to respect it. Such are they too, who deny any difference between beauty and deformity. Was it possible, then, to be affected in the same manner by seeing Thersites, as by Achilles ; by Helen, as by any other woman ? These, also, are the foolish and clownish notions of those who are ignorant of the nature of things ; and afraid that whoever perceives such a difference must presently be carried away, and overcome. But the great point is to leave to each thing its own proper faculty ; and then to see what the value of that faculty is, to learn what is the principal thing, and, upon every occasion, to follow that, and to make it the chief object of our attention ; to consider other things as trifling in comparison with this, and yet, so far as we are able, not to neglect even these. We ought, for instance, to take care of our eyes ; yet not as of the principal thing, but only on account of that which is principal ; because that can no otherwise preserve its own nature, than by making a due estimate of the rest, and preferring some to others. What is the usual practice then ? That of a traveller, who, returning into his own country, and meeting on the way with a good inn, being pleased with the inn, should remain there. Have you forgotten your intention, man ? You were not travelling to this place, but only through it. "But this is a fine place." And how many other fine inns are there, and how many pleasant fields, yet they are simply as a means of passage. What is the real business ? To return to your country ; to relieve the anxieties of your family ; to perform the duties of a citizen ; to marry, have children, and go through the public offices. For you did not travel

in order to choose the finest places ; but to return, to live in that where you were born, and of which you are appointed a citizen.

Such is the present case. Because by speech and such instruction, we are to perfect our education, and purify our own will, and rectify that faculty which deals with things as they appear ; and, because, for the statement of theorems, a certain diction, and some variety and subtilty of discourse are needful ; many, captivated by these very things, one by diction, another by syllogisms, a third by convertible propositions, just as our traveller was by the good inn, go no further ; but sit down and waste their lives shamefully there, as if amongst the sirens. Your business, man, was to prepare yourself for such use of the semblances of things as nature demands ; not to fail in what you seek, or incur what you shun ; never to be disappointed or unfortunate, but free, unrestrained, uncomelled ; conformed to the Divine Administration, obedient to that ; finding fault with nothing ; but able to say, from your whole soul, the verses which begin,

“Conduct me, Zeus ; and thou, O Destiny.” \*

While you have such a business before you, will you be so pleased with a pretty form of expression, or a few theorems, as to choose to stay and live with them, forgetful of your home ; and say, “They are fine things !” Why, who says they are not fine things ? But only as a means ; as an inn. For what hinders one speaking like Demosthenes from being miserable ? What hinders a logician equal to Chrysippus from being wretched, sorrowful, envious,

\* A Fragment of Cleanthes, quoted in full in Enchiridion, c. 52. — H.

vexed, unhappy ? Nothing. You see, then, that these are merely unimportant inns, and what concerns you is quite another thing. When I talk thus to some, they suppose that I am setting aside all care about eloquence, and about theorems ; but I do not object to that ; only the dwelling on these things incessantly, and placing our hopes there. If any one, by maintaining this, hurts his hearers, place me amongst those hurtful people ; for I cannot, when I see one thing to be the principal and most excellent, call another so, to please you.

## CHAPTER XXIV.

CONCERNING A PERSON WHOM HE TREATED WITH  
DISREGARD.

WHEN a certain person said to him, “I have often come to you, with a desire of hearing you, and you have never given me any answer ; but now, if possible, I entreat you to say something to me ” ;— do you think, replied Epictetus, that, as in other things, so in speaking, there is an art, by which he, who understands it, speaks skilfully, and he, who does not, unskilfully ?

“ I do think so.”

He, then, who by speaking both benefits himself, and is able to benefit others, must speak skilfully ; but he who injures and is injured, must be unskilful in this art. For you may find some speakers injured, and others benefited. And are all hearers benefited by what they hear ? Or will you find some benefited, and some hurt ?

“ Both.”

Then those who hear skilfully are benefited, and those who hear unskilfully, hurt.

“ Granted.”

Is there any art of hearing, then, as well as of speaking ?

“ It seems so.”

If you please, consider it thus too. To whom think you that the practice of music belongs ?

“ To a musician.”

To whom the proper formation of a statue ?

“ To a sculptor.”

And do you not imagine some art necessary even to view a statue skilfully ?

“ I do.”

If, therefore, to speak properly belongs to one who is skilful, do you not see, that to hear profitably belongs likewise to one who is skilful ? For the present, however, if you please, let us say no more of doing things perfectly and profitably, since we are both far enough from anything of that kind ; but this seems to be universally confessed, that he, who would hear philosophers, needs some kind of exercise in hearing. Is it not so ? Tell me, then, on what I shall speak to you ? On what subject are you able to hear me ?

“ On good and evil.”

The good and evil of what ? Of a horse ?

“ No.”

Of an ox ?

“ No.”

What then, of a man ?

“ Yes.”

Do we know, then, what man is ? What is his nature, what our idea of him, and how far our ears are

open in this respect to him ? Nay, do you understand what Nature is ; or are you able, in any degree, to comprehend me, when I come to say, “ But I must use demonstration to you ? ” How should you ? Do you comprehend what demonstration is, or how a thing is demonstrated, or by what methods ; or what resembles a demonstration, and yet is not a demonstration ? Do you know what true or false is ? What is consequent upon anything, and what contradictory ; suitable, or dissonant ? But I must excite you to study philosophy. How shall I show you that contradiction, among the generality of mankind, by which they differ concerning good and evil, profitable and unprofitable, when you know not what *contradiction* means ? Show me, then, what I shall gain, by discoursing with you ? Excite an inclination in me, as a proper pasture excites an inclination to eating, in a sheep : for if you offer him a stone, or a piece of bread, he will not be excited. Thus we too have certain natural inclinations to speaking, when the hearer appears to be somebody, when he gives us encouragement ; but if he sits by, like a stone, or a tuft of grass, how can he excite any desire in a man ? Does a vine say to an husbandman, “ Take care of me ? ” No ; but invites him to take care of it, by showing him, that, if he does, it will reward him for his care. Who is there, whom bright and agreeable children do not attract to play, and creep, and prattle with them ? But who was ever taken with an inclination to divert himself, or bray with an ass ; for, be the creature ever so little, it is still a little ass.

“ Why then do you say nothing to me ? ”

I have only this to say to you ; that whoever is utterly ignorant what he is, and wherefore he was born,

and in what kind of a universe, and in what society ; what things are good, and what evil, what fair, and what base ; who understands neither discourse, nor demonstration, nor what is true, nor what is false, nor is able to distinguish between them ; such a one will neither exert his desires, nor aversions, nor pursuits, conformably to Nature ; he will neither aim, nor assent, nor deny, nor suspend his judgment, conformably to Nature ; but will wander up and down, entirely deaf and blind, supposing himself to be somebody, while he is nobody. Is there anything new in all this ? Is not this ignorance the cause of all the errors that have happened, from the very origin of mankind ? Why did Agamemnon and Achilles differ ? Was it not for want of knowing what is advantageous, what disadvantageous ? Does not one of them say, it is advantageous to restore Chryseis to her father ; the other, that it is not ? Does not one say, that he ought to take away the prize of the other ; the other, that he ought not ? Did they not, by these means, forget who they were, and for what purpose they had come there ? Why, what did you come for, man ; to win mistresses, or to fight ?— “To fight.”— With whom ; Trojans or Greeks ?— “With the Trojans.”— Leaving Hector, then, do you draw your sword upon your own king ? And do you, good sir, forgetting the duties of a king,

“Intrusted with a nation and its cares,”\*

go to squabbling, about a girl, with the bravest of your allies ; whom you ought, by every method, to conciliate and preserve ? And will you be inferior to a subtle priest, who pays his court anxiously to

\* Homer, Iliad, II. 25.

you fine gladiators? — You see the effects produced by ignorance of what is truly advantageous.

“ But I am rich, as well as other people.” — What, richer than Agamemnon? — “ But I am handsome too.” — What, handsomer than Achilles? — “ But I have fine hair too.” — Had not Achilles finer and brighter? Yet he never combed it exquisitely, nor curled it. — “ But I am strong too.” — Can you lift such a stone, then, as Hector or Ajax? — “ But I am of a noble family too.” — Is your mother a goddess, or your father descended from Zeus? And what good did all this do Achilles, when he sat crying for a girl? — “ But I am an orator.” — And was not he? Do you not see how he treated the most eloquent of the Greeks, Odysseus and Phœnix? How he struck them dumb? This is all I have to say to you; and even this against my inclination.

“ Why so?”

Because you have not excited me to it. For what can I see in you, to excite me, as spirited horses their riders? Your person? That you disfigure. Your dress? That is effeminate. Your behavior? Your look? Absolutely nothing. When you would hear a philosopher, do not say to him, “ You tell me nothing”; but only show yourself fit and worthy to hear; and you will find how you will move him to speak.

## CHAPTER XXV.

## THAT LOGIC IS NECESSARY.

WHEN one of the company said to him, "Convince me that logic is necessary," — Would you have me, he said, demonstrate it to you? "Yes." Then I must use a demonstrative form of argument. "Granted." And how will you know, then, whether I argue sophistically? On this, the man being silent, You see, says he, that, even by your own confession, logic is necessary; since without it, you cannot even learn whether it be necessary or not.

## CHAPTER XXVI.

## WHAT IS THE TEST OF ERROR.

EVERY error implies a contradiction; for, since he who errs does not wish to err, but to be in the right, it is evident, that he acts contrary to his wish. What does a thief desire to attain? His own interest. If, then, thieving be really against his interest he acts contrary to his own desire. Now every rational soul is naturally averse to self-contradiction; but so long as any one is ignorant that it is a contradiction, nothing restrains him from acting contradictorily; but, whenever he discovers it, he must as necessarily renounce and avoid it, as any one must dissent from a falsehood whenever he perceives it to be a falsehood; only while this does not appear, he assents to it as to a truth.

He, then, is gifted in speech, and excels at once in exhortation and conviction, who can disclose to each man the contradiction by which he errs, and prove clearly to him, that what he would he doth not ; and what he would not, that he doth. For, if that be shown, he will depart from it of his own accord ; but, till you have shown it, be not surprised that he remains where he is ; for he proceeds on the semblance of acting rightly. Hence Socrates, relying on this faculty, used to say, “ It is not my custom to cite any other witness for my assertions ; but I am always contented with my opponent. I call and summon him for my witness ; and his single evidence serves instead of all others.” For he knew that, if a rational soul be moved by anything, the scale must turn, whether it will or no. Show the governing faculty of Reason a contradiction, and it will renounce it ; but till you have shown it, rather blame yourself than him who remains unconvinced.

## BOOK III.

## CHAPTER I.

## OF PERSONAL ADORNMENT.

**A**CERTAIN young rhetorician coming to him with his hair too elaborately ornamented, and his dress very fine ; tell me, said Epictetus, whether you do not think some horses and dogs beautiful ; and so of all other animals ?

“I do.”

Are some men, then, likewise beautiful, and others deformed ?

“Certainly.”

Do we pronounce all these beautiful the same way then, or each in some way peculiar to itself ? You will judge of it by this ; since we see a dog naturally formed for one thing, a horse for another, and a nightingale, for instance, for another, therefore in general, it will be correct to pronounce each of them beautiful, so far as it is developed suitably to its own nature ; but, since the nature of each is different, I think each of them must be beautiful in a different way. Is it not so ?

“Agreed.”

Then what makes a dog beautiful makes a horse deformed ; and what makes a horse beautiful makes a dog deformed ; if their natures are different.

“So it seems.”

For, I suppose, what makes a good Pancratiast \*

\* These are the names of combatants in the Olympic games. A

makes no good wrestler, and a very ridiculous racer ; and the very same person who appears well as a Pentathlete, might make a very ill figure in wrestling.

“ Very true.”

What, then, makes a man beautiful ? Is it on the same principle that a dog or a horse is beautiful ?

“ The same.”

What is it then, that makes a dog beautiful ?

“ That excellence which belongs to a dog.”

What a horse ?

“ The excellence of a horse.”

What a man ? Must it not be the excellence belonging to a man ? If then you would appear beautiful, young man, strive for human excellence.

“ What is that ? ”

Consider whom you praise, when unbiassed by partiality ; is it the honest or dishonest ?

“ The honest.”

The sober, or the dissolute ?

“ The sober.”

The temperate, or the intemperate ?

“ The temperate.”

Then, if you make yourself such a character, you know that you will make yourself beautiful ; but, while you neglect these things, though you use every contrivance to appear beautiful, you must necessarily be deformed.

I know not how to say anything further to you ; for if I speak what I think, you will be vexed, and perhaps go away and return no more. And if I do not speak, consider what I am doing. You come to

Pancratiast was one who united the exercises of wrestling and boxing. A Pentathlete, one who contended on all the five games of leaping, running, throwing the discus, darting, and wrestling. — C.

me to be improved, and I do not improve you ; and you come to me as to a philosopher, and I do not speak like a philosopher. Besides, how could it be consistent with my duty towards yourself, to pass you by as incorrigible ? If, hereafter, you should come to have sense, you will accuse me with reason : “ What did Epictetus observe in me, that, when he saw me come to him in such a shameful condition, he overlooked it, and never said so much as a word about it ? Did he so absolutely despair of me ? Was I not young ? Was I not able to hear reason ? How many young men, at that age, are guilty of many such errors ? I am told of one Polemo, who, from a most dissolute youth, became totally changed.\* Suppose he did not think I should become a Polemo, he might nevertheless have set my locks to rights, he might have stripped off my bracelets and rings, he might have prevented my depilating my person. But when he saw me dressed like a — what shall I say ? — he was silent.” I do not say like what ; when you come to your senses, you will say it yourself, and will know what it is, and who they are who adopt such a dress.

If you should hereafter lay this to my charge, what excuse could I make ? “ Ay ; but if I do speak, he will not regard me.” Why, did Laius regard Apollo ? Did not he go and get intoxicated, and bid farewell to the oracle ? What then ? Did this hinder Apollo from telling him the truth ? Now, I am uncertain, whether you will regard me, or not ; but Apollo positively knew, that Laius would not regard him, and yet he spoke.† And why did he speak ? You may

\* By accidentally visiting the school of Xenocrates. — H.

† Laius, king of Thebes, petitioned Apollo for a son. The oracle

as well ask, why is he Apollo ; why doth he deliver oracles ; why hath he placed himself in such a post as a prophet, and the fountain of truth, to whom the inhabitants of the world should resort ? Why is KNOW THYSELF inscribed on the front of his temple, when no one heeds it ?

Did Socrates prevail upon all who came to him, to take care of themselves ? Not upon the thousandth part ; but being, as he himself declares, divinely appointed to such a post, he never deserted it. What said he even to his judges ? “ If you would acquit me, on condition that I should no longer act as I do now, I would not accept it, nor desist ; but I will accost all I meet, whether young or old, and interrogate them in just the same manner ; but particularly you, my fellow-citizens, since you are more nearly related to me.” — “ Are you so curious and officious, Socrates ? What is it to you, how we act ? ” — “ What say you ? While you are of the same community and the same kindred with me, will you be careless of yourself, and show yourself a bad citizen to the city, a bad kinsman to your kindred, and a bad neighbor to your neighborhood ? ” — “ Why, who are you ? ” Here one ought nobly to say, “ I am he who ought to take care of mankind.” For it is not every little paltry heifer that dares resist the lion ; but if the bull should come up, and resist him, would you say to him, “ Who are you ? What business is it of yours ? ” In every species, man, there is some one quality which by nature excels ; in oxen, in dogs, in bees, in horses. Do not say to whatever excels, “ Who are you ? ” If you do, it will, somehow or

answered him, that if Laius became a father, he should perish by the hand of his son. The prediction was fulfilled by Oedipus. — C.

other, find a voice to tell you ; “ I am like the purple thread in a garment. Do not expect me to be like the rest ; nor find fault with my nature, which has distinguished me from others.”

“ What then, am I such a one ? How should I be ? ” Indeed, are you such a one as to be able to hear the truth ? I wish you were. But however, since I am condemned to wear a gray beard and a cloak, and you come to me as a philosopher, I will not treat you cruelly, nor as if I despaired of you ; but will ask you, Who is it, young man, whom you would render beautiful ? Know, first, who you are ; and then adorn yourself accordingly.

You are a human being ; that is, a mortal animal, capable of a rational use of things as they appear. And what is this rational use ? A perfect conformity to Nature. What have you, then, particularly excellent ? Is it the animal part ? No. The mortal ? No. That which is capable of the mere use of these things ? No. The excellence lies in the rational part. Adorn and beautify this ; but leave your hair to Him who formed it as he thought good.

Well ; what other appellations have you ? Are you a man, or a woman ? A man. Then adorn yourself as a man, not as a woman. A woman is naturally smooth and delicate ; and, if hairy, is a monster, and shown among the monsters at Rome. It is the same thing in a man, *not to be hairy* ; and, if he is by nature not so, he is a monster. But if he depilates himself, what shall we do with him ? Where shall we show him ; and how shall we advertise him ? “ A man to be seen, who would rather be a woman.” What a scandalous show ! Who would not wonder at such an advertisement ? I believe, indeed, that these

very persons themselves would ; not apprehending, that it is the very thing of which they are guilty.

Of what have you to accuse your nature, sir, that it has made you a man ? Why, were all to be born women then ? In that case what would have been the use of your finery ? For whom would you have made yourself fine, if all were women ? But the whole affair displeases you. Go to work upon the whole then. Remove your manhood itself, and make yourself a woman entirely, that we may be no longer deceived, nor you be half man, half woman. To whom would you be agreeable ? To the women ? Be agreeable to them as a man.

“ Ay ; but they are pleased with fops.”

Go hang yourself. Suppose they were pleased with every debauchery, would you consent ? Is this your business in life ? Were you born to please dissolute women ? Shall we make such a one as you, in the Corinthian republic for instance, governor of the city, master of the youth, commander of the army, or director of the public games ? Will you pursue the same practices when you are married ? For whom, and for what ? Will you be the father of children, and introduce them into the state, such as yourself ? O what a fine citizen, and senator, and orator ! Surely, young man, we ought to pray for a succession of young men disposed and bred like you !

Now, when you have once heard this discourse, go home, and say to yourself, It is not Epictetus who has told me all these things,—for how should he ?—but some propitious God through him ; for it would never have entered the head of Epictetus, who is not used to dispute with any one. Well ; let us obey God then, that we may not incur the Divine displeas-

ure. If a crow has signified anything to you by his croaking, it is not the crow that signifies it, but God, through him. And, if you have anything signified to you through the human voice, doth He not cause that man to tell it to you, that you may know the Divine power which acts thus variously, and signifies the greatest and principal things through the noblest messenger? What else does the poet mean, when he says,

“ Since we forewarned him,  
    Sending forth Hermes, watchful Argicide,  
Neither to slay,—nor woo another’s wife.” \*

Hermes, descending from heaven, was to warn him; and the Gods now, likewise, send a Hermes the Argicide as messenger to warn you, not to invert the well-appointed order of things, nor be absorbed in fopperies; but suffer a man to be a man, and a woman to be a woman; a beautiful man, to be beautiful, as a man; a deformed man, to be deformed, as a man; for your personality lies not in flesh and hair, but in the Will. If you take care to have this beautiful, you will be beautiful. But all this while, I dare not tell you, that you are deformed; for I fancy you would rather hear anything than this. But consider what Socrates says to the most beautiful and blooming of all men, Alcibiades. “ Endeavor to make yourself beautiful.” What does he mean to say to him? “ Curl your locks, and depilate your legs?” Heaven forbid! But rather, “ Regulate your Will; throw away your wrong principles.”

“ What is to be done with the poor body then?”

Leave it to nature. Another hath taken care of such things. Give them up to Him.

\* Homer, *Odyssey*, I. 37.

"What, then, must one be a sloven?"

By no means; but act in conformity to your nature. A man should care for his body, as a man; a woman, as a woman; a child, as a child. If not, let us pick out the mane of a lion, that he may not be slovenly; and the comb of a cock, for he too should be tidy. Yes, but let it be as a cock; and a lion, as a lion; and a hound, as a hound.

## CHAPTER II.

IN WHAT A WELL-TRAINED MAN SHOULD EXERCISE HIMSELF; AND THAT WE NEGLECT THE PRINCIPAL THINGS.

THERE are three topics in philosophy, in which he who would be wise and good must be exercised. That of the *desires* and *aversions*, that he may not be disappointed of the one, nor incur the other. That of the *pursuits* and *avoidances*, and, in general, the duties of life; that he may act with order and consideration, and not carelessly. The third includes integrity of mind and prudence, and, in general, whatever belongs to the judgment.

Of these points, the principal and most urgent is that which reaches the passions; for passion is produced no otherwise than by a disappointment of one's desires and an incurring of one's aversions. It is this which introduces perturbations, tumults, misfortunes, and calamities; this is the spring of sorrow, lamentation, and envy; this renders us envious and emulous, and incapable of hearing reason.

The next topic regards the duties of life. For I

am not to be undisturbed by passions, in the same sense as a statue is; but as one who preserves the natural and acquired relations; as a pious person, as a son, as a brother, as a father, as a citizen.

The third topic belongs to those scholars who are now somewhat advanced; and is a security to the other two, that no bewildering semblance may surprise us, either in sleep, or wine, or in depression. This, say you, is beyond us. Yet our present philosophers, leaving the first and second topics, employ themselves wholly about the third; dealing in the logical subtleties. For they say that we must, by engaging in these subjects, take care to guard against deception. Who must? A wise and good man. Is this really, then, the thing you need? Have you mastered the other points? Are you not liable to be deceived by money? When you see a fine girl, do you oppose the seductive influence? If your neighbor inherits an estate, do you feel no vexation? Is it not steadfastness which you chiefly need? You learn even these very things, slave, with trembling, and a solicitous dread of contempt; and are inquisitive to know what is said of you. And if any one comes and tells you that, in a dispute as to which was the best of the philosophers, one of the company named a certain person as the only philosopher, that little soul of yours grows to the size of two cubits instead of an inch. But if another comes and says, "You are mistaken, he is not worth hearing; for what does he know? He has the first rudiments, but nothing more"; you are thunderstruck; you presently turn pale, and cry out, "I will show what I am; that I am a great philosopher." You exhibit by these very things what you are aiming to show in other ways.

Do not you know that Diogenes exhibited some sophist in this manner, by pointing with his middle finger;\* and when the man was mad with rage, "This," said Diogenes, "is the very man; I have exhibited him to you." For a man is not shown by the finger in the same sense as a stone, or a piece of wood, but whoever points out his principles, shows him as a man.

Let us see your principles too. For is it not evident that you consider your own Will as nothing: but are always aiming at something beyond its reach? As, what such a one will say of you, and what you shall be thought; whether a man of letters; whether to have read Chrysippus, or Antipater; and if Archedemus too, you have everything you wish. Why are you still solicitous, lest you should not show us what you are? Shall I tell you, what you have shown yourself? A mean, discontented, passionate, cowardly person; complaining of everything; accusing everybody; perpetually restless; good for nothing. This you have shown us. Go now and read Archedemus; and then, if you hear but the noise of a mouse, you are a dead man; for you will die some such kind of death as — Who was it? Crinis;† who valued himself extremely too, that he understood Archedemus.

Wretch, why do you not let alone things that do not belong to you? These things belong to such as are able to learn them without perturbation; who can say, "I am not subject to anger, or grief, or

\* Extending the middle finger, with the ancients, was a mark of the greatest contempt. — C.

† Crinis was a Stoic philosopher. The circumstances of his death are not now known. — C.

envy. I am not restrained; I am not compelled. What remains for me to do? I am at leisure; I am at ease. Let us now see how logical inversions are to be treated; let us consider, when an hypothesis is laid down, how we may avoid a contradiction." To such persons do these things belong. They who are safe may light a fire, go to dinner, if they please, and sing and dance; but you are for spreading sail just when your ship is going down.

### CHAPTER III.

WHAT IS THE CHIEF CONCERN OF A GOOD MAN; AND IN  
WHAT WE CHIEFLY OUGHT TO TRAIN OURSELVES.

THE chief concern of a wise and good man is his own Reason. The body is the concern of a physician, and of a gymnastic trainer; and the fields, of the husbandman. The business of a wise and good man is, to use the phenomena of existence, conformably to Nature. Now, every soul, as it is naturally formed for an assent to truth, a dissent from falsehood, and a suspense of judgment with regard to things uncertain; so it is moved by a desire of good, an aversion from evil, and an indifference to what is neither good nor evil. For, as a money-changer, or a gardener, is not at liberty to reject Cæsar's coin; but when once it is shown, is obliged, whether he will or not, to deliver his wares in exchange for it; so is it with the soul. Apparent good at first sight attracts, and evil repels. Nor will the soul any more reject an evident appearance of good, than Cæsar's coin.

Hence depends every movement, both of God and man ; and hence good is preferred to every obligation, however near. My connection is not with my father ; but with good.— Are you so hard-hearted ?— Such is my nature, and such is the coin which God hath given me. If therefore good is interpreted to be anything but what is fair and just, away go father, and brother, and country, and everything. What ! Shall I overlook my own good, and give it up to you ? For what ? “I am your father.” But not my good. “I am your brother.” But not my good. But, if we place it in a rightly trained Will, good must then consist in an observance of the several relations of life ; and then, he who gives up mere externals, acquires good. Your father deprives you of your money ; but he does not hurt you. He will possess more land than you, as much more as he pleases ; but will he possess more honor ? More fidelity ? More affection ? Who can deprive you of this possession ? Not even Zeus ; for he did not will it so, since he has put this good into my own power, and given it me, like his own, uncomelled, unrestrained, and unhindered. But when any one deals in coin different from this, then whoever shows it to him, may have whatever is sold for it, in return. A thievish proconsul comes into the province. What coin does he use ? Silver. Show it him, and carry off what you please. An adulterer comes. What coin does he use ? Women. Take the coin, says one, and give me this trifle. “Give it me, and it is yours.” Another is addicted to other debauchery ; give him but his coin, and take what you please. Another is fond of hunting ; give him a fine pony or puppy, and he will sell you for it what you will, though it be

with sighs and groans. For there is that within which controls him, and assumes this to be current coin.

In this manner ought every one chiefly to train himself. When you go out in the morning, examine whomsoever you see, or hear ; and answer as if to a question. What have you seen ? A handsome person ? Apply the rule. Is this a thing controllable by Will, or uncontrollable ? Uncontrollable. Then discard it. What have you seen ? One in agony for the death of a child. Apply the rule. Death is inevitable. Banish this despair then. Has a consul met you ? Apply the rule. What kind of thing is the consular office ? Controllable by Will, or uncontrollable ? Uncontrollable. Throw aside this too. It will not pass. Cast it away. It is nothing to you.

If we acted thus, and practised in this manner from morning till night, by Heaven, something would be done. Whereas now, on the contrary, we are allured by every semblance, half asleep ; and, if we ever awake, it is only a little in the school ; but as soon as we go out, if we meet any one grieving, we say, “ He is undone.” If a consul, “ How happy is he ! ” If an exile, “ How miserable.” If a poor man, “ How wretched ; he has nothing to eat ! ”

These miserable prejudices then are to be lopped off ; and here is our whole strength to be applied. For what is weeping and groaning ? Prejudice. What is misfortune ? Prejudice. What is sedition, discord, complaint, accusation, impiety, levity ? All these are prejudices, and nothing more ; and prejudices concerning things uncontrollable by Will, as if they could be either good or evil. Let any one transfer these convictions to things controllable by

Will, and I will engage that he will preserve his constancy, whatever be the state of things about him.

The soul is like a vase filled with water; while the semblances of things fall like rays upon its surface. If the water is moved, the ray will seem to be moved likewise, though it is in reality without motion. When, therefore, any one is seized with a giddiness in his head, it is not the arts and virtues that are bewildered, but the mind in which they lie; when this recovers its composure, so will they likewise.

#### CHAPTER IV.

##### CONCERNING ONE WHO MADE HIMSELF IMPROPERLY CONSPICUOUS IN THE THEATRE.

WHEN the Governor of Epirus had exerted himself with improper eagerness in favor of a comedian, and was upon that account publicly railed at; and, when he came to hear it, was highly displeased with those who railed at him; Why, what harm, said Epictetus, have these people done? They have shown favoritism; which is just what you did.

“ Is this a proper manner then, of expressing their favor? ”

Seeing you, their governor, and the friend and vicegerent of Cæsar, express it thus, was it not to be expected that they would express it thus too? For, if this zealous favoritism is not right, do not show it yourself; and if it is, why are you angry at them for imitating you? For whom have the many to imitate, but you, their superiors? From whom are they to take example, when they come into the theatre, but

from you? “Do but look how Cæsar’s vicegerent sees the play? Has he cried out? I will cry out too. Has he leaped up from his seat? I too will leap up from mine. Do his slaves sit in different parts of the house, making an uproar? I indeed have no slaves; but I will make as much uproar as I can unaided.”

You ought to consider, then, that when you appear in the theatre, you appear as a rule and example to others, how they ought to see the play. Why is it that they have railed at you? Because every man hates what hinders him. They would have one actor crowned; you, another. They hindered you; and you them. You proved the stronger. They have done what they could; they have railed at the person who hindered them. What would you have, then? Would you do as you please, and not have them even talk as they please? Where is the wonder of all this? Does not the husbandman rail at Zeus when he is hindered by him? Does not the sailor? Do men ever cease railing at Cæsar? What then, is Zeus ignorant of this? Are not the things that are said reported to Cæsar? How then does he act? He knows that, if he were to punish all railers, he would have nobody left to command.

When you enter the theatre, then, ought you to say, “Come, let Sophron be crowned?” No. But rather, “Come, let me at this time regulate my Will in a manner conformable to Nature. No one is dearer to me than myself. It is ridiculous, then, that because another man gains the victory as a player, I should be hurt. Whom do I wish to gain the victory? Him who does gain it; and thus he will always be victorious whom I wish to be so.”—

“But I would have Sophron crowned.” — Why, celebrate as many games as you will at your own house, Nemean, Pythian, Isthmian, Olympic, and proclaim him victor in all ; but in public do not arrogate more than your due, nor seek to monopolize what belongs to all ; or if otherwise, bear to be railed at, for if you act like the mob, you reduce yourself to an equality with them.

## CHAPTER V.

## CONCERNING THOSE WHO PLEAD SICKNESS.

“**I** AM sick here,” said one of the scholars. “I will return home.”

Were you never sick at home then ? Consider whether you are doing anything here conducive to the regulation of your Will ; for if you make no improvement, it was to no purpose that you came. Go home then, and take care of your domestic affairs. For if your Reason cannot be brought into conformity to nature, your land may. You may increase your money, support the old age of your father, mix in the public assemblies, and rule as badly as you have lived, and do other such things. But if you are conscious to yourself that you are casting off some of your wrong principles, and taking up different ones in their room, and that you have transferred your scheme of life from things not controllable by will to those controllable ; and that if you do sometimes cry *alas*, it is not for what concerns your father, or your brother, but yourself ; why do you any longer plead sickness ? Do not you know that both sickness and death must overtake us ? At what employment ?

The husbandman at his plough; the sailor on his voyage. At what employment would you be taken? For, indeed, at what employment ought you to be taken? If there is any better employment at which you can be taken, follow that. For my own part, I would be found engaged in nothing but in the regulation of my own Will; how to render it undisturbed, unrestrained, uncomelled, free. I would be found studying this, that I may be able to say to God, "Have I transgressed Thy commands? Have I perverted the powers, the senses, the instincts, which Thou hast given me? Have I ever accused Thee, or censured Thy dispensations? I have been sick, because it was Thy pleasure, like others; but I willingly. I have been poor, it being Thy will; but with joy. I have not been in power, because it was not Thy will; and power I have never desired. Hast Thou ever seen me saddened because of this? Have I not always approached Thee with a cheerful countenance; prepared to execute Thy commands and the indications of Thy will? Is it Thy pleasure that I should depart from this assembly? I depart. I give Thee all thanks that Thou hast thought me worthy to have a share in it with Thee; to behold Thy works, and to join with Thee in comprehending Thy administration." Let death overtake me while I am thinking, while I am writing, while I am reading such things as these.

"But I shall not have my mother to hold my head when I am sick."

Get home then to your mother; for you are most fit to have your head held when you are sick.

"But I used at home to lie on a fine couch."

Get to this couch of yours; for you are fit to lie

upon such a one, even in health; so do not miss doing that for which you are qualified. But what says Socrates? “As one man rejoices in the improvement of his estate, another of his horse, so do I daily rejoice in perceiving myself to grow better.”\*

“In what? In pretty speeches?”

Use courteous words, man.

“In trifling theorems? What do they signify? Yet, indeed, I do not see that the philosophers are employed in anything else.”

Do you think it nothing, to accuse and censure no one, God nor man? Always to carry abroad and bring home the same countenance? These were the things which Socrates knew; and yet he never professed to know, or to teach anything; but if any one wanted pretty speeches, or little theorems, he brought him to Protagoras, to Hippias; just as, if any one had come for potsherds, he would have taken him to a gardener. Which of you, then, earnestly sets his heart on this? If you had, you would bear sickness and hunger and death with cheerfulness. If any one of you has truly loved, he knows that I speak truth.

## CHAPTER VI.

### MISCELLANEOUS.

WHEN he was asked, how it came to pass, that though the art of reasoning might be now more studied, yet the improvements made were formerly greater? In what instance, answered he, is it now more studied; and in what were the improve-

\* Xenophon, Mem. I. 6.—H.

ments greater? For in what now is most studied, in that will be found likewise the improvements. The present study is the solution of syllogisms, and in this improvements are made. But formerly the study was to harmonize the Reason with Nature; and improvement was made in that. Therefore do not confound things, nor, when you study one thing, expect improvement in another; but see whether any one of us, who applies himself to think and act conformably to Nature, ever fails of improvement. Depend upon it, you will not find one.

A good man is invincible; for he does not contend where he is not superior. If you would have his land, take it; take his servants, take his office, take his body. But you will never frustrate his desire, nor make him incur his aversion. He engages in no combat but what concerns objects within his own control. How then can he fail to be invincible?

Being asked, what common sense was, he answered: As that may be called a common ear which distinguishes only sounds, but that which distinguishes notes, an artistic one; so there are some things which men, not totally perverted, discern by their common natural powers; and such a disposition is called common sense.

It is not easy to gain the attention of effeminate young men,—for you cannot take up custard by a hook,—but the ingenuous, even if you discourage them, are the more eager for learning. Hence Rufus, for the most part, did discourage them; and made use of that as a criterion of the ingenuous and disingenuous. For, he used to say, as a stone, even if you throw it up, will, by its own propensity be carried downward, so an ingenuous mind, the more it is

forced from its natural bent, will incline towards it the more strongly.

## CHAPTER VII.

### CONCERNING A CERTAIN GOVERNOR WHO WAS AN EPICUREAN.

WHEN the Governor, who was an Epicurean, came to him ; "It is fit," said he, "that we ignorant people should inquire of you philosophers what is the most valuable thing in the world ; as those who come into a strange city do of the citizens, and such as are acquainted with it ; that, after this inquiry, we may go and take a view of it, as they do in cities. Now, almost every one admits that there are three things belonging to man,— soul, body, and externals. It belongs to such as you to answer which is the best. What shall we tell mankind ? Is it the flesh ?"

And was it for this that Maximus took a voyage in winter as far as Cassiope to accompany his son ? Was it to gratify the flesh ?

"No, surely."

Is it not fit, then, to study what is best ?

"Yes, beyond all other things."

What have we, then, better than flesh ?

"The soul."

Are we to prefer the good of the better, or of the worse ?

"Of the better."

Does the good of the soul consist in things controllable by Will, or uncontrollable ?

“In things controllable.”

Does the pleasure of the soul then depend on the Will?

“It does.”

And whence does this pleasure arise? From itself? This is unintelligible. For there must exist some principal essence of good, in the attainment of which, we shall enjoy this pleasure of the soul.

“This too is granted.”

In what then consists this pleasure of the soul? If it be in mental objects, the essence of good is found. For it is impossible that good should lie in one thing, and rational enjoyment in another; or that, if the cause is not good, the effect should be good. For, to make the effect reasonable, the cause must be good. But this you cannot reasonably allow; for it would be to contradict both Epicurus and the rest of your principles. It remains then, that the pleasures of the soul must consist in bodily objects; and that there must be the cause and the essence of good. Maximus, therefore, did foolishly, if he took a voyage for the sake of anything but his body; that is, for the sake of what is best. A man does foolishly, too, if he refrains from what is another's, when he is a judge and able to take it. We should consider only this, if you please, how it may be done secretly and safely, and so that no one may know it. For Epicurus himself does not pronounce stealing to be evil, only the being found out in it; and prohibits it for no other reason, but because it is impossible to insure ourselves against discovery. But I say to you that, if it be done dexterously and cautiously, we shall not be discovered. Besides we have powerful friends of both sexes at Rome; and the Greeks are weak; and

nobody will dare to go up to Rome on such an affair. Why do you refrain from your own proper good? It is madness; it is folly. But if you were to tell me that you do refrain, I would not believe you. For, as it is impossible to assent to an apparent falsehood, or to deny an apparent truth, so it is impossible to abstain from an apparent good. Now, riches are a good; and, indeed, the chief instrument of pleasures. Why do not you acquire them? And why do not we corrupt the wife of our neighbor, if it can be done secretly? And if the husband should happen to be impertinent, why not cut his throat too, if you have a mind to be such a philosopher as you ought to be, a complete one,—to be consistent with your own principles. Otherwise you will not differ from us who are called Stoics. For we, too, say one thing and do another; we talk well and act ill; but you will be perverse in a contrary way, teaching bad principles, and acting well.

For Heaven's sake represent to yourself a city of Epicureans. "I do not marry." "Nor I. For we are not to marry nor have children; nor to engage in public affairs." What will be the consequence of this? Whence are the citizens to come? Who will educate them? Who will be the governer of the youth? Who the master of their exercises? What then will he teach them? Will it be what used to be taught at Athens, or Lacedemon? Take a young man; bring him up according to your principles. These principles are wicked, subversive of a state, pernicious to families, nor becoming even to women. Give them up, sir. You live in a capital city. You are to govern and judge uprightly, and to refrain from what belongs to others. No one's wife or child,

or silver or gold plate, is to have any charms for you, except your own. Provide yourself with principles consonant to these truths ; and, setting out thence, you will with pleasure refrain from things so persuasive to mislead and conquer. But, if to their own persuasive force, we can add such a philosophy as hurries us upon them, and confirms us in them, what will be the consequence ?

In a sculptured vase, which is the best ; the silver, or the workmanship ? In the hand the substance is flesh ; but its operations are the principal thing. Accordingly, its functions are threefold ; relating to its existence, to the manner of its existence, and to its principal operations. Thus, likewise, do not set a value on the mere materials of man, the flesh ; but on the principal operations which belong to him.

“ What are these ? ”

Engaging in public business, marrying, the production of children, the worship of God, the care of parents, and, in general, the regulation of our desires and aversions, our pursuits and avoidances, in accordance with our nature.

“ What is our nature ? ”

To be free, noble spirited, modest. For what other animal blushes ? What other has the idea of shame ? But pleasure must be subjected to these, as an attendant and handmaid, to call forth our activity, and to keep us constant in natural operations.

“ But I am rich and want nothing.”

Then why do you pretend to philosophize ? Your gold and silver plate is enough for you. What need have you of principles ?

“ Besides, I am Judge of the Greeks.”

Do you know how to judge ? Who has imparted this knowledge to you ?

"Cæsar has given me a commission."

Let him give you a commission to judge of music; what good will it do you? But how were you made a Judge? Whose hand have you kissed? That of Symphorus, or Numenius? Before whose door have you slept? To whom have you sent presents? After all, do you not perceive that the office of Judge puts you in the same rank with Numenius?

"But I can throw whom I please into a prison."

So you may a stone.

"But I can beat whom I will too."

So you may an ass. This is not a government over men. Govern us like reasonable creatures. Show us what is best for us, and we will pursue it; show us what is otherwise, and we will avoid it. Like Socrates, make us imitators of yourself. He was properly a governor of men, who controlled their desires and aversions, their pursuits, their avoidances. "Do this; do not that, or I will throw you into prison." This is not a government for reasonable creatures. But "Do as Zeus hath commanded, or you will be punished, and be a loser."

"What shall I lose?"

Simply your own right action, your fidelity, honor, decency. You can find no losses greater than these.

## CHAPTER VIII.

## HOW WE ARE TO EXERCISE OURSELVES AGAINST THE SEMBLANCES OF THINGS.

**I**N the same manner as we exercise ourselves against sophistical questions, we should exercise ourselves likewise in relation to such semblances as every day occur; for these, too, offer questions to us. Such a one's son is dead. What think you of it? Answer; it is a thing inevitable, and therefore not an evil. Such a one is disinherited by his father. What think you of it? It is inevitable, and so not an evil. Cæsar has condemned him. This is inevitable, and so not an evil. He has been afflicted by it. This is controllable by Will; it is an evil. He has supported it bravely. This is within the control of Will; it is a good.

If we train ourselves in this manner we shall make improvement; for we shall never assent to anything but what the semblance itself includes. A son is dead. What then? A son is dead. Nothing more? Nothing. A ship is lost. What then? A ship is lost. He is carried to prison. What then? He is carried to prison. That he is *unhappy* is an addition that every one must make for himself. "But Zeus does not order these things rightly." Why so. Because he has made you to be patient? Because he has made you to be brave? Because he has made them to be no evils? Because it is permitted you, while you suffer them, to be happy? Because he has opened you the door whenever they do not suit you? Go out, man, and do not complain!

If you would know how the Romans treat philosophers, hear. Italicus, esteemed one of the greatest philosophers among them, being in a passion with his own people, when I was by, said, as if he had suffered some intolerable evil, “I cannot bear it ; you are the ruin of me ; you will make me just like *him*” ; pointing to me.

## CHAPTER IX.

CONCERNING A CERTAIN ORATOR, WHO WAS GOING TO ROME ON A LAWSUIT.

A PERSON came to him who was going to Rome on a lawsuit in which his dignity was concerned ; and, after telling him the occasion of his journey, asked him what he thought of the affair ? If you ask me, says Epictetus, what will happen to you at Rome, and whether you shall gain or lose your cause, I have no suggestion as to that. But if you ask me, how you shall fare ; I can answer, If you have right principles, well ; if wrong ones, ill. For every action turns upon its principle. What was the reason that you so earnestly desired to be chosen Governor of the Gnossians ? Principle. What is the reason that you are now going to Rome ? Principle. And in winter too ; and with danger, and expense ? Why, because it is necessary. What tells you so ? Your principle. If, then, principles are the source of all our actions, wherever any one has bad principles the effect will correspond to the cause. Well then ; are all our principles sound ? Are both yours and your antagonist's ? How then do you differ ? Or are yours better than his ? Why ? You think so ; and so thinks he

of his ; and so do madmen. This is a bad criterion. But show me that you have given some attention and care to your principles. As you now take a voyage to Rome for the government of the Gnossians, and are not contented to stay at home with the honors you before enjoyed, but desire something greater and more illustrious ; did you ever take such a voyage in order to examine your own principles, and to throw away the bad ones, if you happened to have any ? Did you ever apply to any one upon this account ? What time did you ever appoint to yourself for it ? What age ? Run over your years. If you are ashamed of me, do it for yourself. Did you examine your principles when you were a child ? Did not you act then as now ? When you were a youth, and frequented the schools of the orators, and yourself made declamations, did you ever imagine that you were deficient in anything ? And when you became a man, and entered upon public business, pleaded causes, and acquired credit, whom did you then recognize as your equal ? How would you have borne that any one should examine whether your principles were bad ? What, then, would you have me say to you ?

“ Assist me in this affair.”

I have no suggestion to offer for that. Neither are you come to me, if it be upon that account you came, as to a philosopher ; but as you would come to an herb-seller or a shoemaker.

“ For what purposes, then, can the philosophers give suggestions ? ”

For preserving and conducting the Reason conformably to Nature, whatever happens. Do you think this a small thing ?

“ No ; but the greatest.”

Well ; and does it require but a short time ? and may it be taken as you pass by ? If you can, take it then ; and so you will say, " I have visited Epictetus." Ay ; just as you would visit a stone or a statue. For you have seen me, and nothing more. But he visits a man, as a man, who learns his principles ; and, in return, shows his own. Learn my principles. Show me yours. Then say you have visited me. Let us confute each other. If I have any bad principle, take it away. If you have any, bring it forth. This is visiting a philosopher. No ; but " It lies in our way ; and, while we are about hiring a ship, we may call on Epictetus. Let us see what he says." And then when you are gone, you say " Epictetus is nothing. His language was inaccurate, was barbarous." For what else did you come to criticise ? " Well ; but if I employ myself in these things, I shall be without an estate, like you ; without plate, without equipage, like you." Nothing, perhaps, is necessary to be said to this, but that I do not want them. But, if you possess many things, you still want others ; so that whether you will or not, you are poorer than I.

" What then do I need ? "

What you have not ; constancy ; a mind conformable to Nature ; and a freedom from perturbation. Patron, or no patron, what care I ? But you do. I am richer than you. I am not anxious what Cæsar will think of me. I flatter no one on that account. This I have, instead of silver and gold plate. You have your vessels of gold ; but your discourse, your principles, your opinions, your pursuits, your desires, are of mere earthen ware. When I have all these conformable to Nature, why should not I bestow

some study upon my reasoning too ? I am at leisure. My mind is under no distraction. In this freedom from distraction, what shall I do ? Have I anything more becoming a man than this ? You, when you have nothing to do, are restless ; you go to the theatre, or perhaps to bathe. Why should not the philosopher polish his reasoning ? You have fine crystal and myrrhine vases ; \* I have acute forms of arguing. To you, all you have appears little ; to me all I have seems great. Your appetite is insatiable ; mine is satisfied. When children thrust their hand into a narrow jar of nuts and figs, if they fill it, they cannot get it out again ; then they begin crying. Drop a few of them, and you will get out the rest. And do you too drop your desire ; do not demand much, and you will attain.

## CHAPTER X.

## IN WHAT MANNER WE OUGHT TO BEAR SICKNESS.

WE should have all our principles ready for use on every occasion. At dinner, such as relate to dinner ; in the bath, such as relate to the bath ; in the bed, such as relate to the bed.

“ Let not the stealing god of sleep surprise,  
Nor creep in slumbers on thy weary eyes,

\* “ And how they quaff in gold,  
Crystal and myrrhine cups, imbossed with gems.”

*Paradise Regained*, IV. 181.

Myrrhine cups were probably a kind of agate described by Pliny, which, when burnt, had the smell of myrrh. See *Teatro Critico*, Tom. 6, disc. 4, § 6.—C.

Ere every action of the former day  
 Strictly thou dost, and righteously survey.  
 What have I done ? In what have I transgressed ?  
 What good, or ill, has this day's life expressed ?  
 Where have I failed, in what I ought to do ?  
 If evil were thy deeds, repent and mourn,  
 If good, rejoice." \*

We should retain these verses so as to apply them to our use ; not merely to say them by rote, as we do with verses in honor of Apollo.

Again ; in a fever, we should have such principles ready as relate to a fever ; and not, as soon as we are taken ill, forget all. Provided I do but act like a philosopher, let what will happen. Some way or other depart I must from this frail body, whether a fever comes or not. What is it to be a philosopher ? Is it not to be prepared against events ? Do you not comprehend that you then say, in effect, " If I am but prepared to bear all events with calmness, let what will happen " ; otherwise, you are like an athlete, who, after receiving a blow, should quit the combat. In that case, indeed, you might leave off without a penalty. But what shall we get by leaving off philosophy ?

What, then, ought each of us to say upon every difficult occasion ? " It was for this that I exercised ; it was for this that I trained myself." God says to you, give me a proof if you have gone through the preparatory combats according to rule ; if you have followed a proper diet and proper exercise ; if you have obeyed your master ;— and, after this, do you faint at the very time of action ?

\* Pythagoras, Golden Verses, 40—44. This is Rowe's translation, as quoted by Mrs. Carter, but not precisely as given in Dacier's Pythagoras (London, 1707), p. 165.—H.

Now is your time for a fever. Bear it well. For thirst ; bear it well. For hunger ; bear it well. Is it not in your power ? Who shall restrain you ? A physician may restrain you from drinking ; but he cannot restrain you from bearing your thirst well. He may restrain you from eating ; but he cannot restrain you from bearing hunger well. “But I cannot follow my studies.” And for what end do you follow them, slave ? Is it not that you may be prosperous ? That you may be constant ? that you may think and act conformably to Nature ? What restrains you, but that, in a fever, you may keep your Reason in harmony with Nature ? Here is the test of the matter. Here is the trial of the philosopher ; for a fever is a part of life, as is a walk, a voyage, or a journey. Do you read when you are walking ? No ; nor in a fever. But when you walk well, you attend to what belongs to a walker ; so, if you bear a fever well, you have everything belonging to one in a fever. What is it to bear a fever well ? Not to blame either God or man ; not to be afflicted at what happens ; to await death in a right and becoming manner ; and to do what is to be done. When the physician enters, not to dread what he may say ; nor, if he should tell you that you are doing well, to be too much rejoiced ; for what good has he told you ? When you were in health, what good did it do you ? Not to be dejected when he tells you that you are very ill ; for what is it to be very ill ? To be near the separation of soul and body. What harm is there in this, then ? If you are not near it now, will you not be near it hereafter ? What, will the world be quite overturned when you die ? Why, then, do you flatter your physician ? Why do you say, “If you please, sir, I shall do well” ? Why

do you furnish an occasion to his pride? Why do not you treat a physician, with regard to an insignificant body,— which is not yours, but by nature mortal,— as you do a shoemaker about your foot, or a carpenter about a house? It is the season for these things, to one in a fever. If he fulfils these, he has what belongs to him. For it is not the business of a philosopher to take care of these mere externals, of his wine, his oil, or his body; but of his Reason. And how with regard to externals? Not to behave inconsiderately about them.

What occasion is there, then, for fear? What occasion for anger, for desire, about things that belong to others, or are of no value? For two rules we should always have ready,— *that there is nothing good or evil save in the Will*; and *that we are not to lead events, but to follow them*. “My brother ought not to have treated me so.” Very true; but he must see to that. However he treats me, I am to act rightly with regard to him; for the one is my own concern, the other is not; the one cannot be restrained, the other may.

## CHAPTER XI.

### MISCELLANEOUS.

**T**HREE are some punishments appointed, as by a law, for such as disobey the Divine administration. Whoever shall esteem anything good, except what depends on the Will, let him envy, let him covet, let him flatter, let him be full of perturbation. Whoever esteems anything else to be evil, let him grieve, let him mourn, let him lament, let him be

wretched. And yet, though thus severely punished, we cannot desist.

Remember what the poet says, of a guest.

“It were not lawful to affront a guest,  
Even did the worst draw nigh.”\*

This, too, you should be prepared to say with regard to a father, It is not lawful for me to affront you, father, even if a worse than you had come ; for all are from paternal Zeus. And so of a brother ; for all are from kindred Zeus. And thus we shall find Zeus to be the superintendent of all the other relations.

## CHAPTER XII.

### OF TRAINING.

**W**E are not to carry our training beyond Nature and Reason ; for thus we, who call ourselves philosophers, shall not differ from jugglers. For it is no doubt difficult to walk upon a rope ; and not only difficult, but dangerous. Ought we too, for that reason, to make it our study to walk upon a rope, or balance a pole,† or grasp a statue ?‡ By no means. It is not everything difficult or dangerous that is a

\* Homer, *Odyssey*, XIV. 54. — H.

† A phrase occurs here, which has greatly puzzled the commentators, but which evidently refers to the gymnastic exercise known as the “perche-pole,” where a pole is balanced by one performer and ascended by another. — H.

‡ Diogenes used, in winter, to grasp statues, when they were covered with snow, as an exercise, to inure himself to hardship. **DIOGENES LAERTIUS.** — C.

proper training ; but such things as are conducive to what lies before us to do.

“ And what is it that lies before us to do ? ”

To have our desires and aversions free from restraint.

“ How is that ? ”

Not to be disappointed of our desire, nor incur our aversion. To this ought our training to be directed. For, without vigorous and steady training, it is not possible to preserve our desire undisappointed and our aversion unincurred ; and, therefore, if we suffer it to be externally employed on things uncontrollable by Will, be assured that your desire will neither gain its object, nor your aversion avoid it.

And because habit has a powerful influence, and we are habituated to apply our desire and aversion to externals only, we must oppose one habit to another ; and where the semblances are most treacherous, there oppose the force of training. I am inclined to pleasure. I will bend myself, even unduly, to the other side, as a matter of training. I am averse to pain. I will strive and wrestle with these semblances, that I may cease to shrink from any such object. For who is truly in training ? He who endeavors totally to control desire, and to apply aversion only to things controllable by Will, and strives for it most in the most difficult cases. Hence different persons are to be trained in different ways. What signifies it, to this purpose, to balance a pole, or to go about with tent and implements [of exhibition] ? If you are hasty, man, let it be your training to bear ill language patiently ; and, when you are affronted, not to be angry. Thus, at length, you may arrive at such a proficiency as, when any one strikes you, to say to

yourself, "Let me suppose this to be like grasping a statué." Next, train yourself to make but a moderate use of wine,—not to drink a great deal, to which some are so foolish as to train themselves,—but to abstain from this first; and then to abstain from women and from gluttony. Afterwards you will venture into the lists at some proper season, by way of trial, if at all, to see whether these semblances get the better of you, as much as they used to do. But, at first, fly from what is stronger than you. The contest between a fascinating woman and a young man just initiated into philosophy is unequal. The brass pot and the earthen pitcher, as the fable says, are an unfair match.

Next to the desires and aversions, is the second class, of the pursuits and avoidances; that they may be obedient to reason; that nothing may be done improperly, in point of time and place, or in any other respect.

The third class relates to the faculty of assent and to what is plausible and persuasive. As Socrates said, that we are not to lead a life, which is not tested, so neither are we to admit an untested semblance; but to say, "Stop; let me see what you are, and whence you come," just as the police say, "Show me your pass." "Have you that indorsement from Nature which is necessary to the acceptance of every semblance?"

In short, whatever things are applied to the body by those who train it, so may these be used in our training if they any way affect desire or aversion. But if this be done for mere ostentation, it belongs to one who looks and seeks for something external, and strives for spectators to exclaim, "What a great

man!" Hence Apollonius said well, "If you have a mind to train yourself for your own benefit, when you are choking with heat, take a little cold water in your mouth, and spit it out again, and hold your tongue."

### CHAPTER XIII.

#### WHAT SOLITUDE IS; AND WHAT A SOLITARY PERSON.

IT is solitude to be in the condition of a helpless person. For he who is alone is not therefore solitary, any more than one in a crowd is the contrary. When, therefore, we lose a son, or a brother, or a friend, on whom we have been used to repose, we often say we are left solitary, even in the midst of Rome, where such a crowd is continually meeting us; where we live among so many, and where we have, perhaps, a numerous train of servants. For he is understood to be solitary who is helpless, and exposed to such as would injure him. Hence, in a journey especially, we call ourselves solitary when we fall among thieves; for it is not the sight of a man that removes our solitude, but of an *honest* man, a man of honor, and a helpful companion. If merely being alone is sufficient for solitude, Zeus may be said to be solitary at the great conflagration,\* and bewail himself that he hath neither Here, nor Athene, nor Apollo, nor brother, nor son, nor descendant, nor relation. This, some indeed say, he doth when he is alone at the conflagration. Such as these, moved by some natural principle, some natural desire of soci-

\* The Stoics held to successive conflagrations at destined periods; in which all beings were reabsorbed into the Deity.—C.

ety, and mutual love, and by the pleasure of conversation, do not rightly consider the state of a person who is alone. But none the less should we be prepared for this also, to suffice unto ourselves, and to bear our own company. For as Zeus converses with himself, acquiesces in himself, and contemplates his own administration, and is employed in thoughts worthy of himself ; so should we too be able to talk with ourselves, and not to need the conversation of others, nor suffer ennui ; to attend to the divine administration ; to consider our relation to other beings ; how we have formerly been affected by events, how we are affected now ; what are the things that still press upon us ; how these too may be cured, how removed ; if anything wants completing, to complete it according to reason. You perceive that Cæsar has procured us a profound peace ; there are neither wars nor battles, nor great robberies nor piracies ; but we may travel at all hours, and sail from east to west. But can Cæsar procure us peace from a fever too ? From a shipwreck ? From a fire ? From an earthquake ? From a thunder storm ? Nay, even from love ? He cannot. From grief ? From envy ? No ; not from any one of these. But the doctrine of philosophers promises to procure us peace from these too. And what doth it say ? “ If you will attend to me, O mortals ! wherever you are, and whatever you are doing, you shall neither grieve, nor be angry, nor be compelled, nor restrained ; but you shall live serene, and free from all.” Shall not he who enjoys this peace proclaimed, not by Cæsar (for how should *he* have it to proclaim ?) but by God, through Reason, — be contented when he is alone, reflecting and considering : “ To me there can now no ill happen ;

there is no thief, no earthquake. All is full of peace, all full of tranquillity; every road, every city, every assembly, neighbor, companion, is powerless to hurt me." Another whose care it is, provides you with food, with clothes, with senses, with ideas. Whenever He doth not provide what is necessary, He sounds a retreat; He opens the door, and says to you, "Come." Whither? To nothing dreadful; but to that whence you were made; to what is friendly and congenial, to the elements. What in you was fire goes away to fire; what was earth, to earth; what air, to air; what water, to water. There is no Hades, nor Acheron, nor Coeytus, nor Pyriphlegethon; but all is full of gods and divine beings. He who can have such thoughts, and can look upon the sun, moon, and stars, and enjoy the earth and sea, is no more solitary than he is helpless. "Well; but suppose any one should come and murder me when I am alone." Foolish man; not you; but that insignificant body of yours.

What solitude is there then left? What destitution? Why do we make ourselves worse than children? What do they do when they are left alone? They take up shells and dust; they build houses, then pull them down; then build something else; and thus never want amusement. Suppose you were all to sail away; am I to sit and cry because I am left alone and solitary? Am I so unprovided with shells and dust? But children do this from folly; and shall we be wretched through wisdom?

Every great gift is dangerous to a beginner. Study first how to live like a person in sickness; that in time you may know how to live like one in health. Abstain from food. Drink water. Totally repress your

desire, for some time, that you may at length use it according to reason ; and, if so, when you are stronger in virtue, you will use it well. No ; but we would live immediately as men already wise ; and be of service to mankind. Of what service ? What are you doing ? Why ; have you been of so much service to yourself that you would exhort them ? *You exhort !* Would you be of service to them, show them by your own example what kind of men philosophy makes ; and do not trifle. When you eat, be of service to those who eat with you ; when you drink, to those who drink with you. Be of service to them by giving way to all, yielding to them, bearing with them ; and not by venting upon them your own ill humor.

## CHAPTER XIV.

## MISCELLANEOUS.

**A**S bad performers cannot sing alone, but in a chorus ; so some persons cannot walk alone. If you are anything, walk alone ; talk by yourself ; and do not skulk in the chorus. Think a little at last ; look about you ; sift yourself that you may know what you are.

If a person drinks water, or does anything else for the sake of training, upon every occasion he tells all he meets, “I drink water.” Why, do you drink water merely for the sake of drinking it ? If it does you any good to drink it, do so ; if not, you act ridiculously. But, if it is for your advantage that you drink it, say nothing about it before those who would criticise. Yet can it be possible that these are the very people you wish to please ?

Of actions, some are performed on their own account; others from circumstances, others from complaisance, others upon system.

Two things must be rooted out of men, conceit and diffidence. Conceit lies in thinking that you want nothing; and diffidence in supposing it impossible that under such adverse circumstances, you should ever succeed. Now conceit is removed by confutation; and of this Socrates set the example. And consider and ascertain that the undertaking is not impracticable. The inquiry itself will do you no harm; and it is almost being a philosopher to inquire how it is possible to employ our desire and aversion without hindrance.

“I am better than you; for my father has been consul.”—“I have been a tribune,” says another, “and you not.” If we were horses, would you say, “My father was swifter than yours? I have abundance of oats and hay and fine trappings?” What now, if, while you were saying this, I should answer: “Be it so. Let us run a race then.” Is there nothing in man analogous to a race in horses, by which it may be decided which is better or worse? Is there not honor, fidelity, justice? Show yourself the better in these, that you may be the better as a man. But if you only tell me that you can kick violently, I will tell you again that you value yourself on what is the property of an ass.

## CHAPTER XV.\*

THAT EVERYTHING IS TO BE UNDERTAKEN WITH  
CIRCUMSPECTION.

IN every affair consider what precedes and follows, and then undertake it. Otherwise you will begin with spirit indeed, careless of the consequences, and when these are developed, you will shamefully desist. "I would conquer at the Olympic Games." But consider what precedes and follows, and, then, if it be for your advantage, engage in the affair. You must conform to rules, submit to a diet, refrain from dainties; exercise your body, whether you choose it or not, at a stated hour, in heat and cold; you must drink no cold water, and sometimes no wine. In a word, you must give yourself up to your trainer as to a physician. Then, in the combat, you may be thrown into a ditch, dislocate your arm, turn your ankle, swallow abundance of dust, receive stripes [for negligence]; and after all, lose the victory. When you have reckoned up all this, if your inclination still holds, set about the combat. Otherwise, take notice, you will behave like children who sometimes play wrestlers, sometimes gladiators; sometimes blow a trumpet, and sometimes act a tragedy, when they happen to have seen and admired these shows. Thus you too will be at one time a wrestler, at another a gladiator; now a philosopher, now an orator; but nothing in earnest. Like an ape you mimic all you see, and one thing after another is sure

\* This fifteenth chapter makes the twenty-ninth of the Enchiridion; but with some varieties of reading.—C

to please you ; but is out of favor as soon as it becomes familiar.. For you have never entered upon anything considerately, nor after having surveyed and tested the whole matter ; but carelessly, and with a half-way zeal. Thus some, when they have seen a philosopher, and heard a man speaking like Euphrates,\* — though indeed who can speak like him ?— have a mind to be philosophers too. Consider first, man, what the matter is, and what your own nature is able to bear. If you would be a wrestler, consider your shoulders, your back, your thighs ; for different persons are made for different things. Do you think that you can act as you do and be a philosopher ? That you can eat, drink, be angry, be discontented, as you are now ? You must watch, you must labor, you must get the better of certain appetites ; must quit your acquaintances, be despised by your servant, be laughed at by those you meet ; come off worse than others in everything, in offices, in honors, before tribunals. When you have fully considered all these things, approach, if you please ; if, by parting with them, you have a mind to purchase serenity, freedom, and tranquillity. If not, do not come hither ; do not, like children, be now a philosopher, then a publican, then an orator, and then one of Cæsar's officers. These things are not consistent. You must be one man either good or bad. You must cultivate either your own Reason or else externals ; apply yourself either to things within or without you ; that is, be either a philosopher, or one of the mob.

\* Euphrates was a philosopher of Syria, whose character is described, with the highest encomiums, by Pliny. See L. I. Ep. x.—C.

## CHAPTER XVI.

THAT CAUTION SHOULD BE USED, AS TO PERSONAL  
FAMILIARITY.

**H**E who frequently mingles with others, either in conversation or at entertainments, or in any familiar way of living, must necessarily either become like his companions, or bring them over to his own way. For, if a dead coal be applied to a live one, either the first will quench the last, or the last kindle the first. Since, then, the danger is so great, caution must be used in entering into these familiarities with the crowd ; remembering that it is impossible to touch a chimney-sweeper without being partaker of his soot. For what will you do, if you have to discuss gladiators, horses, wrestlers, and, what is worse, men ? “ Such a one is good, another bad ; this was well, that ill done.” Besides, what if any one should sneer, or ridicule, or be ill-natured ? Are any of you prepared, like a harper, who, when he takes his harp, and tries the strings, finds out which notes are discordant, and knows how to put the instrument in tune ? Have any of you such a faculty as Socrates had ; who in every conversation, could bring his companions to his own purpose ? Whence should you have it ? You must therefore be carried along by the crowd. And why are they more powerful than you ? Because they utter their corrupt discourses from sincere opinion, and you your good ones only from your lips. Hence they are without strength or life ; and it is disgusting to hear your exhortations and your poor miserable virtue proclaimed up hill and

down. Thus it is that the crowd gets the better of you ; for sincere opinion is always strong, always invincible. Therefore before wise sentiments are fixed in you, and you have acquired some power of self-defence, I advise you to be cautious in popular intercourse, otherwise, if you have any impressions made on you in the schools, they will melt away daily like wax before the sun. Get away then, far from the sun, while you have these waxen opinions.

It is for this reason that the philosophers advise us to leave our country ; because habitual practices draw the mind aside, and prevent the formation of new habits. We cannot bear that those who meet us should say, “ Hey-day! such a one is turned philosopher, who was formerly thus and so.” Thus physicians send patients with lingering distempers to another place and another air ; and they do right. Do you too import other manners instead of those you carry out. Fix your opinions, and exercise yourself in them. No ; but you go hence to the theatre, to the gladiators, to the walks, to the circus ; then hither again, then back again ;—just the same persons all the while ! No good habit, no criticism, no animadversion upon ourselves. No observation what use we make of the appearances presented to our minds ; whether it be conformable, or contrary to Nature ; whether we interpret them rightly or wrongly. Can I say to the inevitable that it is nothing to me ? If this be not yet your case, fly from your former habits : fly from the crowd if you would ever begin to be anything.

## CHAPTER XVII.

## OF PROVIDENCE.

**W**HENEVER you lay anything to the charge of Providence, do but reflect, and you will find that it has happened agreeably to Reason.

“ Well ; but a dishonest man has the advantage.”

In what ?

“ In money.”

Here he ought to surpass you ; because he flatters, he is shameless, he keeps awake. Where is the wonder ? But look whether he has the advantage of you in fidelity or in honor. You will find he has not ; but that wherever it is best for you to have the advantage of him, there you have it. I once said to one who was full of indignation at the good fortune of Philostorgus, “ Why, would you be willing to sleep with Sura ? ” \* Heaven forbid, said he, that day should ever come ! Why then are you angry that he is paid for what he sells ; or how can you call him happy in possessions acquired by means which you detest ? Or what harm does Providence do in giving the best things to the best men ? Is it not better to have a sense of honor than to be rich ? “ Granted.” Why then are you angry, man, if you have what is best ? Always remember, then, and have it in mind that a better man has the advantage of a worse in that direction in which he is better ; and you will never have any indignation.

\* This person is not known. One of his name is mentioned in the *Acts of Ignatius*, as being consul at the time when he suffered martyrdom. — C. a Hindu god.

“ But my wife treats me ill.”

Well ; if you are asked what is the matter, answer,  
“ My wife treats me ill.”

“ Nothing more ? ”

Nothing.

“ My father gives me nothing.” But to denominate this an evil, some external and false addition must be made. We are not therefore to get rid of poverty, but of our impressions concerning it ; and we shall do well.

When Galba was killed, somebody said to Rufus, “ Now, indeed, the world is governed by Providence.” I had never thought, answered Rufus, of extracting through Galba the slightest proof that the world was governed by Providence.

## CHAPTER XVIII.

THAT WE OUGHT NOT TO BE ALARMED, BY ANY NEWS  
THAT IS BROUGHT US.

WHEN any alarming news is brought you, always have it ready in mind that no news can be brought you concerning what is within the power of your own Will. Can any one bring you news that your opinions or desires are ill conducted ? By no means ; only that such a person is dead. What is that to *you* then ? — That somebody speaks ill of you. And what is that to *you* then ? — That your father is perhaps forming some contrivance or other. Against what ? Against your Will ? How can he ? No ; but against your body, against your estate ? You are very safe ; this is not against *you*. — But the Judge

has pronounced you guilty of impiety. And did not the Judges pronounce the same of Socrates ? Is his pronouncing a sentence any business of yours ? No. Then why do you any longer trouble yourself about it ? There is a duty incumbent on your father, which unless he performs, he loses the character of a father, of natural affection, of tenderness. Do not desire him to lose anything else, by this ; for every man suffers precisely where he errs. Your duty, on the other hand, is to meet the case with firmness, modesty, and mildness ; otherwise you forfeit piety, modesty, and nobleness. Well ; and is your Judge free from danger ? No. He runs an equal hazard. Why, then, are you still afraid of his decision ? What have you to do with the ills of another ? Meeting the case wrongly would be your own ill. Let it be your only care to avoid that ; but whether sentence is passed on you, or not, as it is the business of another, so the ill belongs to him. “ Such a one threatens you.” *Me?* No. “ He censures you.” Let him look to it, how he does his own duty. “ He will give an unjust sentence against you.” Poor wretch !

## CHAPTER XIX.

## WHAT IS THE COMPARATIVE CONDITION OF THE PHILOSOPHER, AND OF THE CROWD.

THE first difference between one of the crowd and a philosopher is this ; the one says, “ I am undone on the account of my child, my brother, my father ” ; but the other, if ever he be obliged to say, “ I am undone ! ” reflects, and adds, “ on account of

myself." For the Will cannot be restrained or hurt by anything to which the Will does not extend, but only by itself. If, therefore, we always would incline this way, and, whenever we are unsuccessful, would lay the fault on ourselves, and remember that there is no cause of perturbation and inconstancy, but wrong principles, I pledge myself to you that we should make some proficiency. But we set out in a very different way from the very beginning. In infancy, for example, if we happen to stumble, our nurse does not chide *us*, but beats the stone. Why; what harm has the stone done? Was it to move out of its place for the folly of your child? Again; if we do not find something to eat when we come out of the bath, our tutor does not try to moderate our appetite, but beats the cook. Why; did we appoint you tutor of the cook, man? No; but of our child. It is he whom you are to correct and improve. By these means, even when we are grown up, we appear children. For an unmusical person is a child in music; an illiterate person, a child in learning; and an untaught one, a child in life.

## CHAPTER XX.

THAT SOME ADVANTAGE MAY BE GAINED FROM EVERY  
OUTWARD CIRCUMSTANCE.

IN considering sensible phenomena, almost all persons admit good and evil to lie in ourselves and not in externals. No one says it is good to be day; evil to be night; and the greatest evil that three should be four; but what? That knowledge is good

and error evil. Even in connection with falsehood itself there may be one good thing ; the knowledge that it is falsehood. Thus, then, should it be in life also. "Health is a good ; sickness an evil." No, sir. But what ? A right use of health is a good ; a wrong one, an evil. So that, in truth, it is possible to be a gainer even by sickness. And is it not possible by death too ? By mutilation ? Do you think Menæceus\* an inconsiderable gainer by death ? "May whoever talks thus be such a gainer as he was !" Why, pray, sir, did not he preserve his patriotism, his magnanimity, his fidelity, his gallant spirit ? And, if he had lived on, would he not have lost all these ? Would not cowardice, baseness, and hatred of his country, and a wretched love of life, have been his portion ? Well now ; do not you think him a considerable gainer by dying ? No ; but I warrant you the father of Admetus was a great gainer by living on in so mean-spirited and wretched a way as he did ! For did not he die at last ? For Heaven's sake cease to be thus deluded by externals. Cease to make yourselves slaves ; first, of things, and, then, upon their account, of the men who have the power either to bestow, or to take them away. Is there any advantage, then, to be gained from these men ? From all ; even from a reviler. What advantage does a wrestler gain from him with whom he exercises himself before the combat ? The greatest. And just in the same manner I exercise myself with this man. He exercises me in patience, in gentleness, in meekness. I am to suppose, then, that I gain an advantage from him

\* The son of Creon,—who killed himself, after he had been informed by an oracle that his death would procure a victory to the Thebans.—C.

who exercises my neck, and puts my back and shoulders in order ; so that the trainer may well bid me grapple him, with both hands, and the heavier he is the better for me ; and yet it is no advantage to me when I am exercised in gentleness of temper ! This is not to know how to gain an advantage from men. Is my neighbor a bad one ? He is so to himself ; but a good one to me. He exercises my good-temper, my moderation. Is my father bad ? To himself ; but not to me. “This is the rod of Hermes. Touch with it whatever you please, and it will become gold.” No ; but bring whatever you please, and I will turn it into *good*. Bring sickness, death, want, reproach, trial for life. All these, by the rod of Hermes, shall turn to advantage. “What will you make of death ?” Why, what but an ornament to you ? what but a means of your showing, by action, what that man is who knows and follows the will of Nature. “What will you make of sickness ?” I will show its nature. I will make a good figure in it ; I will be composed and happy ; I will not beseech my physician, nor yet will I pray to die. What need you ask further ? Whatever you give me, I will make it happy, fortunate, respectable, and eligible.

No, but, “take care not to be sick ; — it is an evil.” Just as if one should say, “Take care that the semblance of three being four does not present itself to you. It is an evil.” How an evil, man ? If I think as I ought about it, what hurt will it any longer do me ? Will it not rather be even an advantage to me ? If then I think as I ought of poverty, of sickness, of political disorder, is not that enough for me ? Why then must I any longer seek good or evil in externals ?

But how is it? These truths are admitted *here*; but nobody carries them home, for immediately every one is in a state of war with his servant, his neighbors, with those who sneer and ridicule him. Many thanks to Lepsius for proving every day that I know nothing.

## CHAPTER XXI.

CONCERNING THOSE WHO READILY SET UP FOR  
SOPHISTS.

THEY who have merely received bare maxims are presently inclined to throw them up, as a sick stomach does its food. Digest it, and then you will not throw it up; otherwise it will be crude and impure, and unfit for nourishment. But show us, from what you have digested, some change in your ruling faculty; as wrestlers do in their shoulders, from their exercise and their diet; as artificers, in their skill, from what they have learnt. A carpenter does not come and say, "Hear me discourse on the art of building"; but he hires a building, and fits it up, and shows himself master of his trade. Let it be your business likewise to do something like this; be manly in your ways of eating, drinking, dressing; marry, have children, perform the duty of a citizen; bear reproach; bear with an unreasonable brother; bear with a father; bear with a son, a neighbor, a companion, as becomes a man. Show us these things, that we may see that you have really learned something from the philosophers. No; but "come and hear me repeat commentaries." Get you gone, and seek somebody else upon whom to bestow them.

"Nay, but I will explain the doctrines of Chrysippus to you as no other person can ; I will elucidate his style in the clearest manner." And is it for this, then, that young men leave their country, and their own parents, that they may come and hear you explain words ? Ought they not to return patient, active, free from passion, free from perturbation ; furnished with such a provision for life, that, setting out with it, they will be able to bear all events well, and derive ornament from them ? But how should you impart what you have not ? For have you yourself done anything else, from the beginning, but spend your time in solving syllogisms and convertible propositions and interrogatory arguments. "But such a one has a school, and why should not I have one ?" Foolish man, these things are not brought about carelessly and at haphazard. But there must be a fit age, and a method of life, and a guiding God. Is it not so ? No one quits the port, or sets sail, till he hath sacrificed to the gods, and implored their assistance ; nor do men sow without first invoking Ceres. And shall any one who has undertaken so great a work attempt it safely without the gods ? And shall they who apply to such a one, apply to him with success ? What are you doing else, man, but divulging the mysteries ? As if you said, "There is a temple at Eleusis, and here is one too. There is a priest, and I will make a priest here ; there is a herald, and I will appoint a herald too ; there is a torch-bearer, and I will have a torch-bearer ; there are torches, and so shall there be here. The words said, the things done, are the same. Where is the difference betwixt one and the other ?" Most impious man ! is there no difference ? Are these things of use, out

of place, and out of time ? A man shoulc come with sacrifices and prayers, previously purified, and his mind affected by the knowledge that he is approaching sacred and ancient rites. Thus the mysteries become useful ; thus we come to have an idea that all these things were appointed by the ancients for the instruction and correction of life. But you divulge and publish them without regard to time and place, without sacrifices, without purity ; you have not the garment that is necessary for a priest, nor the fitting hair nor girdle ; nor the voice, nor the age, nor have you purified yourself like him. But, when you have got the words by heart, you say, "The mere words are sacred of themselves." These things are to be approached in another manner. It is a great, it is a mystical affair ; not given by chance, or to every one indifferently. Nay, mere wisdom, perhaps, is not a sufficient qualification for the care of youth. There ought to be likewise a certain readiness and aptitude for this, and indeed a particular physical temperament : and, above all, a counsel from God to undertake this office, as he counselled Socrates to undertake the office of confutation ; Diogenes, that of authoritative reproof ; Zeno, that of dogmatical instruction. But you set up for a physician, provided with nothing but medicines, and without knowing, or having studied, where or how they are to be applied. "Why, such a one had medicines for the eyes, and I have the same." Have you also, then, a faculty of making use of them ? Do you at all know when, and how, and to whom, they will be of service ? Why then do you act at hazard ? Why are you careless in things of the greatest importance ? Why do you attempt a mat-

ter unsuitable to you? Leave it to those who can perform it and do it honor. Do not you too bring a scandal upon philosophy by your means; nor be one of those who cause the thing itself to be calumniated. But if mere theorems delight you, sit quietly and turn them over by yourself; but never call yourself a philosopher, nor suffer another to call you so; but say: he is mistaken; for my desires are not different from what they were; nor my pursuits directed to other objects; nor my assents otherwise given; nor have I at all made any change from my former condition in the use of things as they appear. Think and speak thus of yourself, if you would think as you ought; if not, act at random, and do as you do; for it is appropriate to you.

## CHAPTER XXII.

## OF THE CYNIC PHILOSOPHY.

WHEN one of his scholars, who seemed inclined to the Cynic philosophy, asked him what a Cynic must be, and what was the general plan of that sect? Let us examine it, he said, at our leisure. But thus much I can tell you now, that he who attempts so great an affair without divine guidance is an object of divine wrath, and would only bring public dishonor upon himself. For in a well-regulated house no one comes and says to himself, "I ought to be the manager here." If he does, and the master returns and sees him insolently giving orders, he drags him out, and has him punished. Such is the case likewise in this great city. For

here, too, is a master of the family who orders everything. “*You* are the sun ; you can, by making a circuit, form the year and the seasons, and increase and nourish the fruits ; you can raise and calm the winds, and give an equable warmth to the bodies of men. Go ; make your circuit, and thus move everything from the greatest to the least. *You* are a calf ; when the lion appears act accordingly, or you will suffer for it. *You* are a bull ; come and fight ; for that is incumbent on you, and becomes you, and you can do it. *You* can lead an army to Troy ; be you Agamemnon. *You* can engage in single combat with Hector ; be you Achilles.” But if Thersites had come and claimed the command, either he would not have obtained it ; or, if he had, he would have disgraced himself before so many more witnesses.

Do you, too, carefully deliberate upon this undertaking ; it is not what you think it. “I wear an old cloak now, and I shall have one then. I sleep upon the hard ground now, and I shall sleep so then. I will moreover take a wallet and a staff, and go about, and beg of those I meet, and begin by rebuking them ; and, if I see any one using effeminate practices, or arranging his curls, or walking in purple, I will rebuke him.” If you imagine this to be the whole thing, avaunt ; come not near it : it belongs not to you. But, if you imagine it to be what it really is, and do not think yourself unworthy of it, consider how great a thing you undertake.

First, with regard to yourself ; you must no longer, in any instance, appear as now. You must accuse neither God nor man. You must altogether control desire ; and must transfer aversion to such things only as are controllable by Will. You must have

neither anger, nor resentment, nor envy, nor pity. Neither boy, nor girl, nor fame, nor dainties, must have charms for you. For you must know that other men indeed fence themselves with walls, and houses, and darkness, when they indulge in anything of this kind, and have many concealments; a man shuts the door, places somebody before the apartment: "Say that he is out; say that he is engaged." But the Cynic, instead of all this, must fence himself with virtuous shame; otherwise he will be improperly exposed in the open air. This is his house, this his door, this his porter, this his darkness. He must not wish to conceal anything relating to himself; for, if he does, he is gone; he has lost the Cynic character, the openness, the freedom; he has begun to fear something external; he has begun to need concealment; nor can he get it when he will. For where shall he conceal himself, or how? For if this tutor, this pedagogue of the public, should happen to slip, what must he suffer? Can he then, who dreads these things, be thoroughly bold within, and prescribe to other men? Impracticable, impossible.

In the first place, then, you must purify your own ruling faculty, to match this method of life. Now the material for me to work upon is my own mind; as wood is for a carpenter, or leather for a shoemaker; and my business is, a right use of things as they appear. But body is nothing to me: its parts nothing to me. Let death come when it will; either of the whole body or of part. "Go into exile." And whither? Can any one turn me out of the universe? He cannot. But wherever I go, there is the sun, the moon, the stars, dreams, auguries, communication with God. And even this preparation is by no

means sufficient for a true Cynic. But it must further be known that he is a messenger sent from Zeus to men, concerning good and evil ; to show them that they are mistaken, and seek the essence of good and evil where it is not, but do not observe it where it is ; that he is a spy, like Diogenes, when he was brought to Philip, after the battle of Chæronea. For, in effect, a Cynic is a spy to discover what things are friendly, what hostile, to man ; and he must, after making an accurate observation, come and tell them the truth ; not be struck with terror, so as to point out to them enemies where there are none ; nor, in any other instance, be disconcerted or confounded by appearances.

He must, then, if it should so happen, be able to lift up his voice, to come upon the stage, and say, like Socrates : “ O mortals, whither are you hurrying ? What are you about ? Why do you tumble up and down, O miserable wretches ! like blind men ? You are going the wrong way, and have forsaken the right. You seek prosperity and happiness in a wrong place, where they are not ; nor do you give credit to another, who shows you where they are. Why do you seek this possession without ? It lies not in the body ; if you do not believe me, look at Myro, look at Ofellius. It is not in wealth ; if you do not believe me, look upon Croesus ; look upon the rich of the present age, how full of lamentation their life is. It is not in power ; for otherwise, they who have been twice and thrice consuls must be happy ; but they are not. To whom shall we give heed in these things ? To you who look only upon the externals of their condition, and are dazzled by appearances,— or to themselves ? What do they say ? Hear them when they groan,

when they sigh, when they pronounce themselves the more wretched and in more danger from these very consulships, this glory and splendor. It is not in empire ; otherwise Nero and Sardanapalus had been happy. But not even Agamemnon was happy, though a better man than Sardanapalus or Nero. But, when others sleep soundly what is he doing ?

“Forth by the roots he rends his hairs.”\*

And what does he himself say ?

“I wander bewildered ; my heart leaps forth from my bosom.”

Why ; which of your affairs goes ill, poor wretch ? Your possessions ? No. Your body ? No. But you have gold and brass in abundance. What then goes ill ? That part of you is neglected and corrupted, whatever it be called, by which we desire, and shrink ; by which we pursue, and avoid. How neglected ? It is ignorant of that for which it was naturally formed, of the essence of good, and of the essence of evil. It is ignorant what is its own, and what another's. And, when anything belonging to others goes ill, it says, “I am undone ; the Greeks are in danger !” (Poor ruling faculty ! which alone is neglected, and has no care taken of it.) “They will die by the sword of the Trojans !” And, if the Trojans should not kill them, will they not die ? “Yes, but not all at once.” Why, where is the difference ? For if it be an evil to die, then whether it be all at once or singly, it is equally an evil. Will anything more happen than the separation of soul and body ? “Nothing.” And, when the Greeks perish, is the door shut against you ? Is it not in your power to die ? “It is.” Why then do you lament, while you

\* Homer, Iliad, X. 15; 91-5.—H.

are a king and hold the sceptre of Zeus ? A king is no more to be made unfortunate than a god. What are you, then ? You are a mere shepherd, truly so called ; for you weep, just as shepherds do when the wolf seizes any of their sheep ; and they who are governed by you are mere sheep. But why do you come hither ? Was your desire in any danger ? Your aversion ? Your pursuits ? Your avoidances ? "No," he says, "but my brother's wife has been stolen." Is it not great good luck, then, to be rid of an adulterous wife ? "But must we be held in contempt by the Trojans ?" What are they ? Wise men, or fools ? If wise, why do you go to war with them ? If fools, why do you heed them ?

Where, then, does our good lie, since it does not lie in these things ? Tell us, sir, you who are our messenger and spy. Where you do not think, nor are willing to seek it. For, if you were willing, you would find it in yourselves ; nor would you wander abroad, nor seek what belongs to others, as your own. Turn your thoughts upon yourselves. Consider the impressions which you have. What do you imagine good to be ? What is prosperous, happy, unhindered. Well ; and do you not naturally imagine it great ? Do you not imagine it valuable ? Do you not imagine it incapable of being hurt ? Where then, must you seek prosperity and exemption from hindrance ? In that which is enslaved, or free ? "In the free." Is your body, then, enslaved, or free ? We do not know. Do you not know that it is the slave of fever, gout, defluxion, dysentery ; of a tyrant ; of fire, steel ; of everything stronger than itself ? "Yes, it is a slave." How, then, can anything belonging to the body be unhindered ? And how can that be great

or valuable, which is by nature lifeless, earth, clay ? What, then, have you nothing free ? “ Possibly nothing.” Why, who can compel you to assent to what appears false ? No one. Or who, not to assent to what appears true ? No one. Here, then, you see that there is something in you naturally free. But which of you can desire or shun, or use his active powers of pursuit or avoidance, or prepare or plan anything, unless he has been impressed by an appearance of its being for his advantage or his duty ? No one. You have then, in these too, something unrestrained and free. Cultivate this, unfortunates ; take care of this ; seek for good here. “ But how is it possible that a man destitute, naked, without house or home, squalid, unattended, an outcast, can lead a prosperous life ? ” See ; God hath sent us one, to show in practice that it is possible. “ Take notice of me that I am without a country, without a house, without an estate, without a servant ; I lie on the ground ; have no wife, no children, no coat ; but have only earth and heaven and one poor cloak. And what need I ? Am not I without sorrow, without fear ? Am not I free ? Did any of you ever see me disappointed of my desire, or incurring my aversion ? Did I ever blame God or man ? Did I ever accuse any one ? Have any of you seen me look discontented ? How do I treat those whom you fear and of whom you are struck with awe ? Is it not like poor slaves ? Who that sees me does not think that he sees his own king and master ? ” This is the language, this the character, this the undertaking, of a Cynic. No, [but you think only of] the wallet and the staff and a large capacity of swallowing and appropriating whatever is given you ; abusing unseasona-

bly those you meet, or showing your bare arm. Do you consider how you shall attempt so important an undertaking? First take a mirror. View your shoulders, examine your back, your loins. It is the Olympic Games, man, for which you are to be entered; not a poor slight contest. In the Olympic Games a champion is not allowed merely to be conquered and depart; but must first be disgraced in the view of the whole world, not of the Athenians alone, or Spartans, or Nicopolitans; and, then, he who has prematurely departed must be whipped too; and, before that, must have suffered thirst, and heat, and have swallowed an abundance of dust.

Consider carefully, know yourself, consult the Divinity; attempt nothing without God; for, if he counsels you, be assured that it is his will, whether that you should become eminent, or that you should suffer many a blow. For there is this fine circumstance connected with the character of a Cynic, that he must be beaten like an ass, and yet, when beaten, must love those who beat him as the father, as the brother of all.

“No, to be sure; but, if anybody beats you, stand publicly and roar out ‘O! Cæsar, am I to suffer such things in breach of your peace? Let us go before the Proconsul.’”

But what is Cæsar to a Cynic, or what is the Proconsul, or any one else, but Zeus, who hath deputed him, and whom he serves. Does he invoke any other but him? And is he not persuaded that, whatever he suffers of this sort, it is Zeus who doth it to exercise him? Now Hercules, when he was exercised by Eurystheus, did not think himself miserable; but executed with alacrity all that was to be done. And

shall he who is appointed to the combat, and exercised by Zeus, cry out and take offence at things? A worthy person, truly, to bear the sceptre of Diogenes! Hear what he in a fever, said to those who were passing by.\* “Foolish men, why do you not stay? Do you take such a journey to Olympia to see the destruction or combat of the champions; and have you no inclination to see the combat between a man and a fever?” Such a one, who took a pride in difficult circumstances, and thought himself worthy to be a spectacle to those who passed by, was a likely person indeed to accuse God, who had deputed him, as treating him unworthily! For what subject of accusation shall he find? That he preserves a decency of behavior? With what does he find fault? That he sets his own virtue in a clearer light? Well; and what does he say of poverty? Of death? Of pain? How did he compare his happiness with that of the Persian king; or rather, thought it beyond comparison! For amidst perturbations, and griefs, and fears, and disappointed desires, and incurred aversions, how can there be any entrance for happiness? And where there are corrupt principles, there must all these things necessarily be.

—The same young man inquiring, whether, if a

\* St. Jerome, cited by Mr. Upton, gives the following, somewhat different account of this matter. Diogenes, as he was going to the Olympic Games, was taken with a fever, and laid himself down in the road; his friends would have put him into some vehicle; but he refused it, and bid them go on to the show. “This night,” said he, “I will either conquer, or be conquered. If I conquer the fever, I will come to the games; if it conquers me, I will descend to Hades.”

—C.

[“Si febrim vicero, ad Agonem veniam:  
Si me vicerit, ad inferna descendam”]

Jerome adv. Jovianum, Lib. II.—H.]

friend should desire to come to him and take care of him when he was sick, he should comply? And where, says Epictetus, will you find me the friend of a Cynic? For to be worthy of being numbered among his friends, a person ought to be such another as himself; he ought to be a partner of the sceptre and the kingdom, and a worthy minister, if he would be honored with his friendship; as Diogenes was the friend of Antisthenes; as Crates, of Diogenes. Do you think that he who only comes to him, and salutes him, is his friend; and that he will think him worthy of being entertained as such? If such a thought comes into your head, rather look round you for some desirable dunghill to shelter you in your fever from the north wind, that you may not perish by taking cold. But you seem to me to prefer to get into somebody's house, and to be well fed there awhile. What business have you then, even to attempt so important an undertaking as this?

"But," said the young man, "will marriage and parentage be recognized as important duties by a Cynic?"

Grant me a community of sages, and no one there, perhaps, will readily apply himself to the Cynic philosophy. For on whose account should he there embrace that method of life? However, supposing he does, there will be nothing to restrain him from marrying and having children. For his wife will be such another as himself; his father-in-law such another as himself; and his children will be brought up in the same manner. But as the state of things now is, like that of an army prepared for battle, is it not necessary that a Cynic should be without distraction;\*

\* It is remarkable, that Epictetus here uses the same word (*ἀπειρωτάστως*) with St. Paul, 1 Cor. vii. 35, and urges the same consid-

entirely attentive to the service of God ; at liberty to walk among mankind, not tied down to common duties, nor entangled in relations, which if he transgresses, he will no longer keep the character of a wise and good man ; and which if he observes, there is an end of him, as the messenger, and spy, and herald of the gods ? For consider, there are some offices due to his father-in-law ; some to the other relations of his wife ; some to his wife herself : besides, after this, he is confined to the care of his family when sick, and to providing for their support. At the very least, he must have a vessel to warm water in, to bathe his child ; there must be wool, oil, a bed, a cup, for his wife, after her delivery ; and thus the furniture increases ; more business, more distraction. Where, for the future, is this king whose time is devoted to the public good ?

“ To whom the people are trusted, and many a care.” \*

Who ought to superintend others, married men, fathers of children ; — whether one treats his wife well or ill ; who quarrels ; which family is well regulated ; which not ; — like a physician who goes about and feels the pulse of his patients : “ You have a fever ; you the headache ; you the gout. Do you abstain from food ; do you eat ; do you omit bathing ; you must have an incision made : you be cauterized.” Where shall he have leisure for this who is tied down to common duties ? Must he not provide clothes for his children ; and send them with pens, and ink, and paper, to a schoolmaster ? Must he not provide aeration, of applying wholly to the service of God, to dissuade from marriage. — C.

\* Homer, Iliad, II. 25. — H.

bed for them,—for they cannot be Cynics from their very birth?—Otherwise, it would have been better to expose them, as soon as they were born, than to kill them thus. Do you see to what we bring down our Cynic? How we deprive him of his kingdom? “Well, but Crates\* was married.” The case of which you speak was a particular one, arising from love; and the woman was another Crates. But we are inquiring about ordinary and common marriages; and in this inquiry we do not find the affair much suited to the condition of a Cynic.

“How then shall he keep up society?”

For Heaven’s sake, do they confer a greater benefit upon the world, who leave two or three brats in their stead, than those who, so far as possible, oversee all mankind; what they do, how they live; what they attend to, what they neglect, in spite of their duty. Did all those who left children to the Thebans do them more good than Epaminondas, who died childless? And did Priam who was the father of fifty profligates, or Danaus, or *Aeolus*, conduce more to the advantage of society than Homer? Shall a military command, or any other post, then, exempt a man from marrying and becoming a father, so that he shall be thought to have made sufficient amends for the want of children; and shall not the kingdom of a Cynic be a proper compensation for it? Perhaps we do not understand his grandeur, nor duly represent to ourselves the character of Diogenes; but we think of Cynics as they are now, who stand

\* Crates, a rich Theban, gave away a large fortune, and assumed the wallet and staff of a Cynic philosopher. Hipparchia, a Thracian lady, forsook wealth and friends to share his poverty, in spite of his advice to the contrary. Diogenes Laertius: Crates.—H.

like dogs watching at tables, and who have only the lowest things in common with the others ; else things like these would not move us, nor should we be astonished that a Cynic will not marry nor have children. Consider, sir, that he is the father of mankind ; that all men are his sons, and all women his daughters. Thus he attends to all ; thus takes care of all. What ! do you think it is from impertinence that he rebukes those he meets ? He does it as a father, as a brother, as a minister of the common parent, Zeus.

Ask me, if you please, too, whether a Cynic will engage in the administration of the commonwealth. What commonwealth do you inquire after, foolish man, greater than what he administers ? Why should he harangue among the Athenians about revenues and taxes, whose business it is to debate with all mankind ; with the Athenians, Corinthians, and Romans, equally ; not about taxes and revenues, or peace and war, but about happiness and misery, prosperity and adversity, slavery and freedom. Do you ask me whether a man engages in the administration of the commonwealth who administers such a commonwealth as this ? Ask me, too, whether he will accept any command ? I will answer you again, What command, foolish one, is greater than that which he now exercises ?

But he has need of a constitution duly qualified ; for, if he should appear consumptive, thin, and pale, his testimony has no longer the same authority. For he must not only give a proof to the vulgar, by the constancy of his mind, that it is possible to be a man of weight and merit without those things that strike *them* with admiration ; but he must show, too, by his body, that a simple and frugal diet, under the open

air, does no injury to the constitution. “ See, I and my body bear witness to this.” As Diogenes did ; for he went about in hale condition, and gained the attention of the many by his mere physical aspect. But a Cynic in poor condition seems a mere beggar ; all avoid him, all are offended at him ; for he ought not to appear slovenly, so as to drive people from him ; but even his indigence should be clean and attractive.

Much natural tact and acuteness are likewise necessary in a Cynic (otherwise he is almost worthless) ; that he may be able to give an answer, readily and pertinently, upon every occasion. So Diogenes, to one who asked him, “ are you that Diogenes who does not believe there are any gods ? ” — How so, replied he, when I think *you* odious to them ? Again ; when Alexander surprised him sleeping, and repeated,

“ To sleep all the night becomes not a man who gives counsel ” ; \*

before he was quite awake, he responded,

“ To whom the people are trusted, and many a care.”

But, above all, the reason of the man must be clearer than the sun ; otherwise he must necessarily be a common cheat and a rascal, if, while himself guilty of some vice, he reproves others. For consider how the case stands. Arms and guards give a power to common kings and tyrants of reproving and of punishing delinquents, though they be wicked themselves ; but to a Cynic, instead of arms and guards, conscience gives this power ; when he knows that he has watched and labored for mankind ; that he has slept pure, and waked still purer ; and that he hath

\* Homer, Iliad, II. 24, 25. — H.

regulated all his thoughts as the friend, as the minister of the gods, as a partner of the empire of Zeus ; that he is ready to say, upon all occasions,

“ Conduct me, Zeus, and thon, O Destiny.”\*

And, “ if it thus pleases the gods, thus let it be.” Why should he not dare to speak boldly to his own brethren, to his children ; in a word, to his kindred ? Hence he, who is thus qualified, is neither impertinent nor a busybody : for he is not busied about the affairs of others, but his own, when he oversees the transactions of men. Otherwise call a general a busybody, when he oversees, inspects, and watches his soldiers and punishes the disorderly. But, if you reprove others, at the very time that you have booty under your own arm, I will ask you, if you had not better go into a corner, and eat up what you have stolen ? But what have you to do with the concerns of others ? For what are *you* ? Are you the bull in the herd, or the queen of the bees ? Show me such ensigns of empire, as she has from nature. But, if you are a drone, and arrogate to yourself the kingdom of the bees, do you not think that your fellow-citizens will drive you out, just as the bees do the drones ?

A Cynic must, besides, have so much patience as to seem insensible and like a stone to the vulgar. No one reviles, no one beats, no one affronts *him* ; but he has surrendered his body to be treated at pleasure by any one who will. For he remembers that the inferior, in whatever respect it is the inferior, must be conquered by the superior ; and the body is inferior to the multitude, the weaker to the stronger. He never, therefore, enters into a combat where he can

\* Cleanthes, in Diogenes Laertius. — H.

be conquered ; but immediately gives up what belongs to others ; he does not claim what is slavish and dependent ; but in what concerns Will and the use of things as they appear, you will see that he has so many eyes, you would say Argus was blind to him. Is his assent ever precipitate ? His pursuits ever rash ? His desire ever disappointed ? His aversion ever incurred ? His aim ever fruitless ? Is he ever querulous, ever dejected, ever envious ? Here lies all his attention and application. With regard to other things, he enjoys profound quiet. All is peace. There is no robber, no tyrant for the Will. But there is for the body ? Yes. The estate ? Yes. Magistracies and honors ? Yes. And what cares he for these ? When any one, therefore, would frighten him with them, he says ; “ Go look for children ; masks are frightful to them ; but *I* know they are only shells, and have nothing within.”

Such is the affair about which you are deliberating ; therefore, if you please, for Heaven’s sake, defer it, and first consider how you are prepared for it. Observe what Hector says to Andromache :

“ War is the sphere for all men, and for me.” \*

Thus conscious was he of his own qualifications and of her weakness.

\* Homer, Iliad, VI. 492, 493.—H.

## CHAPTER XXIII.

CONCERNING SUCH AS READ AND DISPUTE  
OSTENTATIOUSLY.

FIRST, say to yourself what you would be ; and then do what you have to do. For in almost everything we see this to be the practice. Olympic champions first determine what they would be, and then act accordingly. To a racer, in a longer course, there must be one kind of diet, walking, anointing, and training ; to one in a shorter, all these must be different ; and to a Pentathlete, still more different. You will find the case the same in the manual arts. If a carpenter, you must have such and such things ; if a smith, such other. For if we do not refer each of our actions to some end, we shall act at random ; if to an improper one, we shall miss our aim. Further ; there is a general and a particular end. The first is, to act as a man. What is comprehended in this ? To be gentle, yet not sheepish ; not to be mischievous, like a wild beast. But the particular end relates to the study and choice of each individual. A harper is to act as a harper ; a carpenter, as a carpenter ; a philosopher, as a philosopher ; an orator, as an orator. When, therefore, you say, "Come, and hear me read," observe, first, not to do this at random ; and, in the next place, after you have found to what end you refer it, consider whether it be a proper one. Would you be useful,—or be praised ? You presently hear him say, "What do I value the praise of the multitude ?" And he says well ; for this is nothing to a musician, or a geome-

trician, as such. You would be useful then. In what ? Tell us, that we too may run to make part of your audience. Now, is it possible for any one to benefit others, who has received no benefit himself ? No ; for neither can he who is not a carpenter, or a shoemaker, benefit any one in respect to those arts. Would you know, then, whether you have received benefit ? Produce your principles, philosopher. What is the aim and promise of desire ? Not to be disappointed. What of aversion ? Not to be incurred. Come, do we fulfil this promise ? Tell me the truth ; but, if you falsify, I will tell it to *you*. The other day, when your audience came but coldly together, and did not receive what you said with acclamations of applause, you went away dejected. Again ; the other day when you were praised, you went about asking everybody, "What did you think of me ?"—"Upon my life, sir, it was prodigious."—"But how did I express myself upon that subject ?"—"Which ?"—"Where I gave a description of Pan and the Nymphs."\*—"Most excellently." And do you tell me, after this, that you regulate your desires and aversions conformably to Nature ? Get you gone ! Persuade somebody else.

Did not you, the other day, praise a man contrary to your own opinion ? Did not you flatter a certain senator ? Yet would you wish your own children to be like him ? "Heaven forbid !" Why then did you praise and cajole him ? "He is an ingenuous young man, and attentive to discourses." How so ? "He admires *me*." Now indeed you have produced your proof.

\* Mr. Upton observes that these florid descriptions were the principal study of the Sophists.—C.

After all, what do you think ? Do not these very people secretly despise you ? When a man conscious of no good action or intention finds some philosopher saying, " You are a great genius, and of a frank and candid disposition " ; what do you think he says, but, " This man has some need of me." Pray tell me what mark of a great genius he has shown. You see he has long conversed with you, has heard your discourses, has attended your lectures. Has he turned his attention to himself ? Has he perceived his own faults ? Has he thrown off his conceit ? Does he seek an instructor ? " Yes, he does." An instructor how to live ? No, fool, but how to talk ; for it is upon this account that he admires you. Hear what he says : " This man writes with very great art, and much more finely than Dion." That is quite another thing. Does he say, This is a modest, faithful, calm person ? But if he said this too, I would ask him, if he is faithful, what it is to be faithful ? And if he could not tell, I would add, " First learn the meaning of what you say, and then speak."

While you are in this bad disposition, then, and gaping after applauders, and counting your hearers, can you be of benefit to others ? " To-day I had many more hearers." — " Yes, many ; we think there were five hundred." — " You say nothing ; estimate them at a thousand." — " Dion never had so great an audience." — " How should he ? " — " And they have a fine taste for discourses." — " What is excellent, sir, will move even a stone." — Here is the language of a philosopher ! Here is the disposition of one who is to be beneficial to mankind ! Here is the man, attentive to discourses ! Who has read the works of the Socratic philosophers, as such ; not as if they were

the writings of orators, like Lysias and Isocrates. “I have often wondered by what arguments —”\* No ; “By what argument”; that is the more perfectly accurate expression. Is this to have read them any otherwise than as you read little pieces of poetry ? If you read them as you ought, you would not dwell on such trifles, but would rather consider such a passage as this : “Anytus and Melitus may kill, but they cannot hurt me.” And “I am always so disposed as to defer to none of my friends, but to that reason which, after examination, appears to me to be the best.”† Hence, who ever heard Socrates say, “I know, or teach anything”? But he sent different people to different instructors ; they came to him, desiring to be introduced to the philosophers ; and he took them and introduced them. No ; but [you think] as he accompanied them he used to give them such advice as this : “Hear *me* discourse to-day at the house of Quadratus.” Why should I hear you ? Have you a mind to show me how finely you put words together, sir ? And what good does that do you ? “But praise me.” What do you mean by praising you ? “Say, Incomparable ! prodigious !” Well ; I do say it. But if praise be that which the philosophers call by the appellation of *good*, what have I to praise you for ? If it be good to speak well, teach me, and I will praise you. “What, then, ought these things to be heard without pleasure ?” By no means. I do not hear even a harper without pleasure ; but am I therefore to devote myself to playing

\* These words are the beginning of Xenophon’s Memoirs of Socrates ; and it was a debate among the minute critics, whether *argument* or *arguments* was the proper reading. — C.

† Plato, *Apology*, § 18; *Crito*, § 6.—H.

upon the harp? Hear what Socrates says to his judges. "It would not be decent for me to appear before you, at this age, composing speeches like a boy."\* Like a boy, he says. For it is, without doubt, a pretty accomplishment to select words and place them together, and then to read or speak them gracefully in public; and in the midst of the discourse to observe that "he vows by all that is good, there are but few capable of these things." But does a philosopher apply to people to hear him? Does he not attract those who are fitted to receive benefit from him, in the same manner as the sun or their necessary food does? What physician applies to anybody to be cured by him? (Though now indeed I hear that the physicians at Rome apply for patients; but in my time they were applied to.) "I apply to you to come and hear that you are in a bad way, and that you take care of everything but what you ought; that you know not what is good or evil, and are unfortunate and unhappy." A fine application! And yet, unless the discourse of a philosopher has this effect, both that and the speaker are lifeless.

Rufus used to say, "If you are at leisure to praise me, I speak to no purpose." And indeed he used to speak in such a manner, that each of us who heard him supposed that some person had accused us to him; he so precisely hit upon what was done by us, and placed the faults of every one before his eyes.

The school of a philosopher is a surgery. You are not to go out of it with pleasure, but with pain; for you do not come there in health; but one of you has a dislocated shoulder; another, an abscess; a third, a fistula; a fourth, the headache. And am I,

\* Plato, *Apology*, § 1. — H.

then, to sit uttering pretty, trifling thoughts and little exclamations, that, when you have praised me, you may each of you go away with the same dislocated shoulder, the same aching head, the same fistula, and the same abscess that you brought? And is it for this that young men are to travel? And do they leave their parents, their friends, their relations, and their estates, that they may praise you while you are uttering little exclamations? Was this the practice of Socrates? Of Zeno? Of Cleanthes?

What then! is there not in speaking a style and manner of exhortation? Who denies it? Just as there is a manner of confutation and of instruction. But who ever, therefore, added that of *ostentation* for a fourth? For in what doth the hortatory manner consist? In being able to show, to one and all, the contradictions in which they are involved; and that they care for everything rather than what they mean to care for: for they mean the things conducive to happiness, but they seek them where they are not to be found. To effect this, must a thousand seats be placed, and an audience invited; and you, in a fine robe or cloak, ascend the rostrum, and describe the death of Achilles? Forbear, for Heaven's sake, to bring, so far as you are able, good works and practices into disgrace. Nothing, to be sure, gives more force to exhortation, than when the speaker shows that he has need of the hearers; but tell me who, when he hears you reading or speaking, is solicitous about *himself*? Or turns his attention upon himself? Or says, when he is gone away, "The philosopher hit me well." Instead of this, even though you are in high vogue, one hearer merely remarks to another, "He spoke finely about Xerxes!" — "No," says the

other ; “ but on the battle of Thermopylæ ! ” Is this the audience for a philosopher ?

## CHAPTER XXIV.

THAT WE OUGHT NOT TO BE AFFECTED BY THINGS  
NOT IN OUR OWN POWER.

LET not another’s disobedience to Nature become an ill to you ; for you were not born to be depressed and unhappy with others, but to be happy with them. And if any is unhappy, remember that he is so for himself ; for God made all men to enjoy felicity and peace. He hath furnished all with means for this purpose ; having given them some things for their own ; others, not for their own. Whatever is subject to restraint, compulsion, or deprivation is not their own ; whatever is not subject to restraint is their own. And the essence of good and evil He has placed in things which are our own ; as it became Him who provides for, and protects us, with paternal care.

“ But I have parted with such a one, and he is therefore in grief.”

And why did he esteem what belonged to another his own ? Why did he not consider, while he was happy in seeing you, that you are mortal, that you are liable to change your abode ? Therefore he bears the punishment of his own folly. But to what purpose, or for what cause, do you too suffer depression of spirits ? Have *you* not studied these things ? Like trifling, silly women, have you regarded the things you took delight in, the places, the persons, the con-

versations, as if they were to last for ever ; and do you now sit crying, because you do not see the same people, nor live in the same place ? Indeed, you deserve to be so overcome, and thus to become more wretched than ravens or crows, which, without groaning or longing for their former state, can fly where they will, build their nests in another place, and cross the seas.

“ Ay, but this happens from their want of reason.”

Was reason then given to us by the gods, for the purpose of unhappiness and misery, to make us live wretched and lamenting ? O, by all means, let every one be deathless ! Let nobody go from home ! Let us never go from home ourselves, but remain rooted to a spot, like plants ! And if any of our acquaintance should quit his abode, let us sit and cry ; and when he comes back, let us dance and clap our hands like children. Shall we never wean ourselves, and remember what we have heard from the philosophers,—unless we have heard them only as juggling enchanters ;—that the universe is one great city, and the substance one of which it is formed ; that there must necessarily be a certain rotation of things ; that some must give way to others, some be dissolved, and others rise in their stead ; some remain in the same situation, and others be moved ; but that all is full of beloved ones, first of the gods, and then of men, by nature endeared to each other ; that some must be separated, others live together, rejoicing in the present, and not grieving for the absent : and that man, besides a natural greatness of mind and contempt of things independent on his own will, is likewise formed not to be rooted to the earth, but to go at different times to different places ; sometimes on

urgent occasions, and sometimes merely for the sake of observation. Such was the case of Odysseus, who

“Saw the cities and watched the habits of various men.” \*

And, even before him, of Hercules, to travel over the habitable world,

“Observing manners, good or ill, of men.”

To expel and clear away the one, and, in its stead, to introduce the other. Yet how many friends do you not think he must have at Thebes? How many at Argos? How many at Athens? And how many did he acquire in his travels? He married, too, when he thought it a proper time, and became a father, and then quitted his children; not lamenting and longing for them, nor as if he had left them orphans; for he knew that no human creature is an orphan, but that there is a father, who always, and without intermission, takes care of all. For he had not merely heard it as matter of talk, that Zeus was the Father of Mankind; but he esteemed and called him his own Father, and performed all that he did with a view to Him. Hence he was, in every place, able to live happy. But it is never possible to make happiness consistent with a longing after what is not present. For true happiness implies the possession of all which is desired, as in case of satiety with food; there must be no thirst, no hunger.

“But Odysseus longed for his wife, and sat weeping on a rock.”

Why do you regard Homer and his fables in everything? Or, if Odysseus really did weep, what was he but a wretched man? But what wise and good man

\* Homer, *Odyssey*, I. 3. Afterwards, XV. 487.—H.

is wretched? The universe is surely but ill governed, if Zeus does not take care that his subjects may be happy like himself. But these are unlawful and profane thoughts; and Odysseus, if he did indeed cry and bewail himself, was not a good man. For who can be a good man who does not know what he is? And who knows this, and yet forgets that all things made are perishable; and that it is not possible for man and man always to live together? What then? To desire impossibilities is base and foolish: it is the behavior of a stranger [to the world]; of one who fights against God in the only way he can, by holding false principles.

"But my mother grieves when she does not see me."

And why has not she learned these doctrines? I do not say that care ought not to be taken that she may not lament; but that we are not to insist absolutely upon what is not in our own power. Now the grief of another is not in my power; but my own grief is. I will therefore absolutely suppress my own, for that is in my power; and I will endeavor to suppress another's grief so far as I am able; but I will not insist upon it absolutely, otherwise I shall fight against God; I shall resist Zeus, and oppose him in the administration of the universe. And not only my children's children will bear the punishment of this disobedience and fighting against God, but I myself too; starting, and full of perturbation, both in the day-time and in my nightly dreams; trembling at every message, and having my peace dependent on intelligence from others. "Somebody is come from Rome." "I trust no harm has happened." Why, what harm can happen to you where you are not?

"From Greece." — "No harm, I hope." Why, at this rate, every place may be the cause of misfortune to you. Is it not enough for you to be unfortunate where you are, but it must happen beyond sea, too, and by letters? Such is the security of your condition!

"But what if my friends there should be dead?"

What, indeed, but that those are dead who were born to die? Do you at once wish to grow old, and yet not to see the death of any one you love? Do you not know that, in a long course of time, many and various events must necessarily happen? That a fever must get the better of one; a highwayman, of another; a tyrant, of a third? For such is the world we live in; such they who live in it with us. Heats and colds, improper diet, journeys, voyages, winds, and various accidents destroy some, banish others; destine one to an embassy, another to a camp. And now, pray, will you sit in consternation about all these things; lamenting, disappointed, wretched, dependent on another; and not on one or two only, but ten thousand times ten thousand!

Is this what you have heard from the philosophers? This what you have learned? Do you not know what sort of a thing warfare is? One must keep guard, another go out for a spy, another even to battle. It is neither possible, nor indeed desirable, that all should be in the same place; but you, neglecting to perform the orders of your General, complain whenever anything a little hard is commanded; and do not consider what influence you have on the army, so far as lies in your power. For, if all should imitate you, nobody will dig a trench, or throw up a rampart, or stand guard, or expose himself to dan-

ger, but every one will appear useless to the expedition. Again ; if you were a sailor in a voyage, suppose you were to fix upon one place, and there remain ? If it should be necessary to climb the mast, refuse to do it ; if to run to the bow of the ship, refuse to do it ! And what captain would tolerate you ? Would he not throw you overboard as a useless piece of goods and mere luggage, and a bad example to the other sailors ? Thus, also, in the present case ; every one's life is a warfare, and that long and various. You must observe the duty of a soldier, and perform everything at the nod of your General, and even, if possible, divine what he would have done. For there is no comparison between the above-mentioned General and this whom you now obey, either in power or excellence of character. You are placed in an extensive command, and not in a mean post ; your life is a perpetual magistracy ? Do you not know that such a one must spend but little time on his affairs at home ; but be much abroad, either commanding or obeying ; attending on the duties either of a magistrate, a soldier, or a judge ? And now, pray, would you be fixed and rooted on the same spot, like a plant ?

“ Why ; it is pleasant.”

Who denies it ? And so is a ragout pleasant, and a fine woman is pleasant. Is not this just what they say who make pleasure their end ? Do you not perceive whose language you have spoken ? That of Epicureans and debauchees. And while you follow their practices and hold their principles, do you talk to us of the doctrines of Zeno and Socrates ? Why do you not throw away as far as possible those assumed traits which belong to others, and with which you have

nothing to do ? What else do the Epicureans desire than to sleep without hindrance, and rise without compulsion ; and when they have risen, to yawn at their leisure and wash their faces ; then write and read what they please ; then prate about some trifles or other, and be applauded by their friends, whatever they say ; then go out for a walk, and, after they have taken a turn, bathe, and then eat, and then to bed ; in what manner they spend their time there, why should one say ? For it is easily guessed. Come now ; do *you* also tell me what course of life *you* desire to lead, who are a zealot for truth, and Diogenes, and Socrates ? What would you do at Athens ? These very same things ? Why then do you call yourself a Stoic ? They who falsely pretend to the Roman citizenship are punished severely ; and must those be dismissed with impunity who falsely claim so great a thing, and so venerable a title, as you ? Or is not this impossible ; and is there not a divine, and powerful, and inevitable law, which exacts the greatest punishments from those who are guilty of the greatest offences ? For what says this law ? — Let him who claims what belongs not to him be arrogant, be vainglorious, be base, be a slave ; let him grieve, let him envy, let him pity ; and in a word, let him lament and be miserable.

“ What then ! would you have me pay my court to such a one ? Would you have me frequent his door ? ”

If reason requires it for your country, for your relations, for mankind, why should you not go ? You are not ashamed to go to the door of a shoemaker when you want shoes ; nor of a gardener when you want lettuce. Why then in regard to the rich, when you have some similar want ?

“ Ay ; but I need not be awed before a shoemaker.”

Nor before a rich man.

“ I need not flatter a gardener.”

Nor a rich man.

“ How, then, shall I get what I want ? ”

Why, do I bid you go in expectation of getting it ?  
No ; only that you may do your duty.

“ Why, then, after all, should I go ? ”

That you may have gone ; that you may have discharged the duties of a citizen, of a brother, of a friend. And, after all, remember, that you are going as if to a shoemaker, to a gardener, who has no monopoly of anything great or respectable, though he should sell it ever so dear. You are going as if to buy lettuces, worth an obolus, but by no means worth a talent. So here too, if the matter is worth going to his door about, I will go ; if it is worth talking with him about, I will talk with him. But if one must kiss his hand, too, and cajole him with praise ; that is paying too dear. It is not expedient for myself, nor my country, nor my fellow-citizens, nor my friends, to destroy what constitutes the good citizen and the friend.

“ But one will appear not to have set heartily about the business, if one thus fails.”

What, have you again forgotten why you went ? Do you not know that a wise and good man does nothing for appearance ; but everything for the sake of having acted well ?

“ What advantage is it, then, to him, to have acted well ? ”

What advantage is it to one who writes down the name of Dion without a blunder ? The having written it.

“ Is there no reward, then ? ”

Why ; do you seek any greater reward for a good man than the doing what is fair and just ? And yet, at Olympia, you desire nothing else ; but think it enough to be crowned victor. Does it appear to you so small and worthless a thing to be just, good, and happy ? Besides ; being introduced by God into this Great City [the world] and bound to discharge at this time the duties of a man, do you still want nurses and a mamma ; and are you conquered and effeminated by the tears of poor weak women ? Are you thus determined never to cease being an infant ? Do not you know that, if one acts like a child, the older he is, so much the more he is ridiculous ?

Did you never visit any one at Athens at his own house ?

“ Yes ; whomsoever I pleased.”

Why ; now you are here, be willing to visit this person, and you will still see whom you please ; only let it be without meanness, without undue desire or aversion, and your affairs will go well ; but their going well, or not, does not consist in going to the house and standing at the door, or the contrary ; but lies within, in your own principles ; when you have acquired a contempt for things uncontrollable by Will, and esteem none of them your own, but hold that what belongs to you is only to judge and think, to exert rightly your aims, your desires, and aversions. What further room is there after this for flattery, for meanness ? Why do you still long for the quiet you elsewhere enjoyed ; for places familiar to you ? Stay a little, and these will become familiar to you in their turn ; and, then, if you are so mean-spirited, you may weep and lament again on leaving these.

"How, then, am I to preserve an affectionate disposition?"

As becomes a noble-spirited and happy person. For reason will never tell you to be dejected and broken-hearted ; or to depend on another ; or to reproach either God or man. Be affectionate in such a manner as to observe all this. But if, from affection, as you call it, you are to be a slave and miserable, it is not worth your while to be affectionate. And what restrains you from loving any one as a mortal,—as a person who may be obliged to quit you ? Pray did not Socrates love his own children ? But it was as became one who was free, and mindful that his first duty was, to gain the love of the gods. Hence he violated no part of the character of a good man, either in his defence or in fixing a penalty on himself.\* Nor yet before, when he was a senator, or a soldier. But *we* make use of every pretence to be mean-spirited ; some, on account of a child ; some, of a mother ; and some, of a brother. But it is not fit to be unhappy on account of any one ; but happy on account of all ; and chiefly of God, who has constituted us for this purpose. What ! did Diogenes love nobody ; who was so gentle and benevolent as cheerfully to undergo so many pains and

\* It was the custom at Athens, in cases where no fixed punishment was appointed by the law, before the judges gave sentence, to ask the criminal himself what penalty he thought he deserved. Socrates refused either to comply with this form himself, or suffer any of his friends to do it for him ; alleging that the naming a penalty was a confession of guilt. When the judges therefore asked him what penalty he thought he deserved, he answered, "The highest honors and rewards, and to be maintained in the Prytaneum at the public expense." An answer which so extremely irritated his judges, that they immediately condemned him to death. — C.

miseries of body for the common good of mankind ? Yes, he did love them ; but how ? As became a minister of Zeus ; at once caring for men, and obedient to God. Hence the whole earth, not any particular place, was his country. And when he was taken captive he did not long for Athens and his friends and acquaintance there ; but made himself acquainted with the pirates, and endeavored to reform them ; and when he was at last sold into captivity, he lived at Corinth just as before at Athens ; and, if he had gone to the Perrhoebeans,\* he would have been exactly the same. Thus is freedom acquired. Hence he used to say, “ Ever since Antisthenes made me free † I have ceased to be a slave.” How did *he* make him free ? Hear what he says. “ He taught me what was my own and what not. An estate is not my own. Kindred, domestics, friends, reputation, familiar places, manner of life, all belong to another.” — “ What is your own then ? ” — “ The right use of the phenomena of existence. He showed me that I have *this*, not subject to restraint or compulsion ; no one can hinder or force me in this, any otherwise than as I please. Who, then, after this, has any power over me ? Philip, or Alexander, or Perdiccas, or the Persian king ? Whence should they have it ? For he that is to be subdued by man must first be subdued by things. He, therefore, of whom neither pleasure, nor pain, nor fame, nor riches, can get the better ; and he who is able, whenever he thinks fit, to abandon his whole body with contempt and depart, whose slave can he ever be ? To whom is he subject ? ” But if Diogenes had taken pleasure

\* A people towards the extremity of Greece. — C.

† Diogenes was the disciple of Antisthenes. — C.

in living at Athens, and had been subdued by that manner of life, his affairs would have been at every one's disposal ; and whoever was stronger would have had the power of grieving him. How would he have flattered the pirates, think you, to make them sell him to some Athenian, that he might see again the fine Piræus, the Long Walls, and the Citadel ? How would you see them ? As a slave and a miserable wretch ? And what good would that do you ? "No ; but as free." How free ? See, somebody lays hold on you, takes you away from your usual manner of life, and says : " You are my slave ; for it is in my power to restrain you from living as you like. It is in my power to afflict and humble you. Whenever I please you may be cheerful once more ; and set out elated for Athens." What do you say to him who thus enslaves you ? What rescuer can you find ? Or dare you not so much as look up at him ; but, without making many words, do you supplicate to be dismissed ? Why, you ought even to go to prison, man, with alacrity, with speed, outstripping your conductors. Instead of this do you regret living at Rome and long for Greece ? And, when you must die, will you then, too, come crying to us, that you shall no more see Athens, nor walk in the Lyceum ? Is it for this that you have travelled ? Is it for this that you have been seeking for somebody to do you good ? What good ? That you may the more easily solve syllogisms and manage hypothetical arguments ? And is it for this reason you left your brother, your country, your friends, your family, that you might carry back such acquirements as these ? So that you did not travel to learn constancy nor tranquillity ; nor that, secured from harm, you might complain of

no one, accuse no one ; that no one might injure you ; and that thus you might preserve your human relations, without impediment. You have made a fine traffic of it, to carry home hypothetical arguments and convertible propositions ! If you please, too, sit in the market, and cry them for sale, as mountebanks do their medicines. Why will you not rather deny that you know even what you have learned ; for fear of bringing a scandal upon such theorems as useless ? What harm has philosophy done you,—in what has Chrysippus injured you,—that you should demonstrate by your actions that such studies are of no value ? Had you not evils enough at home ? How many causes for grief and lamentation had you there, even if you had not travelled ? But you have added more ; and, if you ever get any new acquaintance and friends, you will find fresh causes for groaning ; and, in like manner, if you attach yourself to any other country. To what purpose, therefore, do you live ? To heap sorrow upon sorrow, to make you wretched ? And then you tell me this is affection. What affection, man ? If it be good, it cannot be the cause of any ill ; if ill, I will have nothing to do with it. I was born for my own good, not ill.

“ What, then, is the proper training for these cases ? ”

First, the highest and principal means, and as obvious as if at your very door, is this,—that when you attach yourself to anything, it may not be as to a secure possession.

“ How then ? ”

As to something brittle as glass or earthenware ; that, when it happens to be broken, you may not lose

your self-command. So here, too; when you embrace your child, or your brother, or your friend, never yield yourself wholly to the fair semblance, nor let the passion pass into excess; but curb it, restrain it,—like those who stand behind triumphant victors, and remind them that they are men. Do you likewise remind yourself that you love what is mortal; that you love what is not your own. It is allowed you for the present, not irrevocably, nor forever; but as a fig, or a bunch of grapes, in the appointed season. If you long for these in winter you are foolish. So, if you long for your son, or your friend, when you cannot have him, remember that you are wishing for figs in winter. For as winter is to a fig, so is every accident in the universe to those things with which it interferes. In the next place, whatever objects give you pleasure, call before yourself the opposite images. What harm is there, while you kiss your child, in saying softly, “To-morrow you may die”; and so to your friend, “To-morrow either you or I may go away, and we may see each other no more.”

“But these sayings are ominous.”

And so are some incantations; but, because they are useful, I do not mind it; only let them be useful. But do you call anything ominous except what implies some ill? Cowardice is ominous; baseness is ominous; lamentation, grief, shamelessness. These are words of bad omen; and yet we ought not to shrink from using them, as a guard against the things they mean. But do you tell me that a word is ominous which is significant of anything natural? Say, too, that it is ominous for ears of corn to be reaped; for this signifies the destruction of the corn; but not

of the world. Say, too, that the fall of the leaf is ominous ; and that confectionery should be produced from figs, and raisins from grapes. For all these are changes from a former state into another ; not a destruction, but a certain appointed economy and administration. Such is absence, a slight change ; such is death, a greater change ; not from what now is nothing, but to what now is not.

“ What, then, shall I be no more ? ”

True ; but you will be something else, of which at present the world has no need ; for even *you* were not produced when you pleased, but when the world had need of you. Hence a wise and good man, mindful who he is and whence he came, and by whom he was produced, is attentive only how he may fill his post regularly and dutifully before God. “ Dost Thou wish me still to live ? Let me live free and noble, as Thou desirest ; for Thou hast made me incapable of restraint in what is my own. But hast Thou no farther use for me ? Farewell ! I have staid thus long through Thee alone, and no other ; and now I depart in obedience to Thee.” — “ How do you depart ? ” — “ Still as Thou wilt ; as one free, as thy servant, as one sensible of thy commands and thy prohibitions. But, while I am employed in thy service, what wouldst Thou have me to be ? A prince, or a private man ; a senator, or a plebeian ; a soldier, or a general ; a preceptor, or a master of a family ? Whatever post or rank Thou shalt assign me,— like Socrates, I will die a thousand times rather than desert it. *Where* wouldst thou have me to be ? At Rome, or at Athens ; at Thebes, or at Gyaros ? Only remember me there. If Thou shalt send me where men cannot live conformably to nature, I will not

depart unbidden, but upon a recall as it were sounded by Thee. Even then I do not desert Thee ; Heaven forbid ! but I perceive that Thou hast no use for me. If a life conformable to nature be granted, I will seek no other place but that in which I am ; nor any other company but those with whom I dwell.”

Let these things be ready at hand, night and day. These things write ; these things read ; of these things talk both to yourself and others. [Ask them,] “Have you any assistance to give me for this purpose ?” And, again, go and ask another and another. Then, if any of those things should happen that are called disagreeable, this will surely be a relief to you ; in the first place, that it was not unexpected. For it is much to be able always to say, “I knew that I begot one born to die.”\* Thus do you say too, “I knew that I was liable to die, to travel, to be exiled, to be imprisoned.” If afterwards you turn to yourself, and seek from what quarter the event proceeds, you will presently recollect : “It is from things uncontrollable by will, not from what is my own. What then is it to me ?” Then, farther, which is the chief point : “Who sent this ? The commander, the general, the city, the public law ? Give it to me, then, for I must always obey the law in all things.”

Farther yet ; when any delusive appearance molests you (for this may not depend on you,) strive against it, and conquer it through reason. Do not suffer it to gain strength, nor to lead you indefinitely on, beguiling you at its own will. If you are at Gyaros, do not represent to yourself the manner of living at

\* This was said by Xenophon, when news was brought him that his son Gryllus was killed in a battle. — C.

Rome ; how many pleasures you used to find there, and how many would attend your return ; but dwell rather on this point ; how he, who must live at Gyaros, may live there nobly. And if you are at Rome, do not represent to yourself the manner of living at Athens ; but consider only how you ought to live where you are.

Lastly, for all other pleasures substitute the consciousness that you are obeying God, and performing not in word, but in deed, the duty of a wise and good man. How great a thing is it to be able to say to yourself : “ What others are now solemnly arguing in the schools, and can state in paradoxes, this I put in practice. Those qualities which are there discoursed, disputed, celebrated, I have made mine own. Zeus hath been pleased to let me recognize this within myself, and himself to discern whether he hath in me one fit for a soldier and a citizen, and to employ me as a witness to other men, concerning things uncontrollable by will. See that your fears were vain, your appetites vain. Seek not good from without : seek it within yourselves, or you will never find it. For this reason he now brings me hither, now sends me thither ; sets me before mankind, poor, powerless, sick ; banishes me to Gyaros ; leads me to prison ; not that he hates me,—Heaven forbid ! For who hates the most faithful of his servants ? Nor that he neglects me, for he neglects not one of the smallest things ; but to exercise me, and make use of me as a witness to others. Appointed to such a service, do I still care where I am, or with whom, or what is said of me,—instead of being wholly attentive to God and to his orders and commands ? ”

Having these principles always at hand, and prac-

tising them by yourself, and making them ready for use, you will never want any one to comfort and strengthen you. For shame does not consist in having nothing to eat, but in not having wisdom enough to exempt you from fear and sorrow. But if you once acquire that exemption, will a tyrant, or his guards, or courtiers, be anything to you? Will offices or office-seekers disturb you, who have received so great a command from Zeus? Only do not make a parade over it, nor grow insolent upon it. But show it by your actions; and though no one else should notice it, be content that you are well and blessed.

## CHAPTER XXV.

## CONCERNING THOSE WHO WAVER IN THEIR PURPOSE.

CONSIDER which of your undertakings you have fulfilled, which not, and wherefore; which give you pleasure, which pain, in the reflection; and, if possible, recover yourself where you have failed. For the champions in this greatest of combats must not grow weary; but should even contentedly bear chastisement. For this is no combat of wrestling or boxing, where both he who succeeds and he who fails may possibly be of very great worth or of little; indeed may be very fortunate or very miserable; but this combat is for good fortune and happiness itself. What is the case, then? Here even if we have renounced the contest, no one restrains us from renewing it; nor need we wait for another four years for the return of another Olympiad; but recollecting and recovering yourself, and returning with the same

zeal, you may renew it immediately ; and even if you should again yield, you may again begin ; and if you once get the victory, you become like one who has never yielded. Only do not begin, by forming the habit of this, to do it with pleasure, and then, like quails that have fled the fighting-pit, go about as if you were a brave champion, although you have been conquered throughout all the games. "I am conquered in presence of a girl. But what of it ? I have been thus conquered before." — "I am excited to wrath against some one. But I have been in anger before." You talk to us just as if you had come off unhurt. As if one should say to his physician, who had forbidden him to bathe, "Why, did not I bathe before ?" Suppose the physician should answer him, "Well, and what was the consequence of your bathing ? Were you not feverish ? Had you not the headache ?" So, when you before railed at somebody, did you not act like an ill-natured person ; like an impertinent one ? Have not you fed this habit of yours by corresponding actions ? When you were conquered by a pretty girl, did you come off with impunity ? Why, then, do you talk of what you have done before ? You ought to remember it, I think, as slaves do whipping, so as to refrain from the same faults. "But the case is unlike ; for there it is pain that causes the remembrance : but what is the pain, what the punishment, of my committing these faults ? For when was I ever thus trained to the avoidance of bad actions ?" Yet the pains of experience, whether we will or not, have their beneficial influence.

## CHAPTER XXVI.

CONCERNING THOSE WHO ARE IN DREAD OF WANT.

**A**RE not you ashamed to be more fearful and mean-spirited than fugitive slaves? To what estates, to what servants, do they trust, when they run away and leave their masters? Do they not, after carrying off a little with them for the first days, travel over land and sea, contriving first one, then another method of getting food? And what fugitive ever died of hunger? But *you* tremble, and lie awake at night, for fear you should want necessaries. Foolish man! are you so blind? Do not you see the way whither the want of necessaries leads?

“Why, whither does it lead?”

Whither a fever, or a falling stone may lead,—to death. Have you not, then, often said this to your companions? Have you not read, have you not written, many things on this point? And how often have you arrogantly boasted that you are undisturbed by fears of death.

“Ay; but my family, too, will perish with hunger.”

What then? Does their hunger lead any other way than yours? Is there not the same descent? The same state below? Will you not then, in every want and necessity, look with confidence there, where even the most rich and powerful, and kings and tyrants themselves, must descend? You indeed may descend hungry, perhaps; and they, full of indigestion and drunkenness. For have you often seen a beggar who did not live to old age, nay, to extreme

old age? Chilled by day and night, lying on the ground, and eating only what is barely necessary, they yet seem almost to become incapable of dying. But cannot you write? Cannot you keep a school? Cannot you be a watchman at somebody's door?

“But it is shameful to come to this necessity.”

First, therefore, learn what things are shameful, and then claim to be a philosopher; but at present do not suffer even another to call you so. Is that shameful to you which is not your own act? Of which you are not the cause? Which has happened to you by accident, like a fever or the head-ache? If your parents were poor, or left others their heirs, or though living, do not assist you, are these things shameful for you? Is this what you have learned from the philosophers? Have you never heard that what is shameful is blamable; and what is blamable must be something which deserves to be blamed? Whom do you blame for an action not his own, which he has not himself performed? Did you, then, make your father such as he is? Or is it in your power to mend him? Is that permitted you? What, then, must you desire what is not permitted; and when you fail of it be ashamed? Are you thus accustomed, even when you are studying philosophy, to depend on others, and to hope nothing from yourself? Sigh, then, and groan and eat in fear that you shall have no food to-morrow. Tremble, lest your servants should rob you, or run away from you, or die. Thus live on forever, whoever you are, who have applied yourself to philosophy in name only, and as much as in you lies have disgraced its principles, by showing that they are unprofitable and useless to those who profess them. You have never made con-

stancy, tranquillity, and serenity the object of your desires; have sought no teacher for this knowledge, but many for mere syllogisms. You have never, by yourself, confronted some delusive semblance with—“Can I bear this, or can I not bear it? What remains for me to do?” But, as if all your affairs went safe and well, you have aimed only to secure yourself in your present possessions. What are they? Cowardice, baseness, worldliness, desires unaccomplished, unavailing aversions. These are the things which you have been laboring to secure. Ought you not first to have acquired something by the use of reason, and then to have provided security for that? Whom did you ever see building a series of battlements without placing them upon a wall? And what porter is ever set, where there is no door? But *you* study! Can you show me what you study?

“Not to be shaken by sophistry.”

Shaken from what? Show me first, what you have in your custody; what you measure, or what you weigh; and then accordingly show me your weights and measures; and to what purpose you measure that which is but dust. Ought you not to show what makes men truly happy, what makes their affairs proceed as they wish? How we may blame no one, accuse no one; how acquiesce in the administration of the universe? Show me these things. “See, I do show them,” say you; “I will solve syllogisms to you.” This is but the measure, O unfortunate! and not the thing measured. Hence you now pay the penalty due for neglecting philosophy. You tremble, you lie awake; you advise with everybody, and if the result of the advice does not please everybody, you think that you have been ill-advised.

Then you dread hunger, as you fancy ; yet it is not hunger that you dread ; but you are afraid that you will not have some one to cook for you ; some one else for a butler ; another to pull off your shoes ; a fourth to dress you ; others to rub you ; others to follow you : that when you have undressed yourself in the bathing-room, and stretched yourself out, like a man crucified, you may be rubbed here and there ; and the attendant may stand by, and say, “ Come this way ; give your side ; take hold of his head ; turn your shoulder ” ; and that when you are returned home from the bath you may cry out, “ Does nobody bring anything to eat ? ” And then, “ Take away ; wipe the table.” This is your dread, that you will not be able to lead the life of a sick man. But learn the life of those in health ; how slaves live, how laborers, how those who are genuine philosophers ; how Socrates lived, even with a wife and children ; how Diogenes ; how Cleanthes, at once studying and drawing water [for his livelihood]. If these are the things you would have, you can possess them everywhere, and with a fearless confidence.

“ In what ? ”

In the only thing that can be confided in ; in what is sure, incapable of being restrained or taken away ; your own will.

But why have you contrived to make yourself so useless and good for nothing, that nobody will receive you into his house ; nobody take care of you : but although, if any sound useful vessel be thrown out of doors, whoever finds it will take it up and prize it as something gained ; yet nobody will take *you* up, but everybody esteem you a loss. What, cannot you so much as perform the office of a dog or a cock ? Why,

then, do you wish to live any longer if you are so worthless ? Does any good man fear that food should fail him ? It does not fail the blind ; it does not fail the lame. Shall it fail a good man ? A paymaster is always to be found for a soldier, or a laborer, or a shoemaker, and shall one be wanting to a good man ? Is God so negligent of his own institutions, of his servants, of his witnesses, whom alone he uses for examples to the uninstructed, to show that He exists, and that he administers the universe rightly, and doth not neglect human affairs ; and that no evil can happen to a good man, either living or dead ? What, then, is the case, when he doth not bestow food ? What else than that, like a good general, he hath made me a signal of retreat ? I obey, I follow ; speaking well of my leader, praising his works. For I came when it seemed good to him, and, again, when it seems good to him, I depart ; and in life it was my business to praise God within myself and to every auditor, and to the world. Doth he grant me but few things ? Doth he refuse me affluence ? It is not his pleasure that I should live luxuriously ; for he did not grant that even to Hercules, his own son ; but another reigned over Argos and Mycene, while he obeyed, labored, and strove. And Eurystheus was just what he was ; neither truly king of Argos, nor of Mycene ; not being indeed king over himself. But Hercules was ruler and governor of the whole earth and seas ; the expeller of lawlessness and injustice ; the introducer of justice and sanctity. And this he effected naked and alone. Again ; when Ulysses was shipwrecked and cast away, did his helpless condition at all deject him ? Did it break his spirit ? No : but how did he go to Nausicaa and her attendants, to ask

those necessaries which it seems most shameful to beg from another ?

“ As some lion, bred in the monntains, confiding in strength.” \*

Confiding in what ? Not in glory, or in riches, or in dominion, but in his own strength ; that is, in his knowledge of what is within him and without him. For this alone is what can render us free and incapable of restraint ; can raise the heads of the humble, and make them look, with unaverted eyes, full in the face of the rich and of the tyrants ; and this is what philosophy bestows. But *you* will not even set forth with confidence ; but all trembling about such trifles as clothes and plate. Foolish man ! have you thus wasted your time till now ?

“ But what if I should be sick ? ”

It will then be for the best that *you* should be sick.

“ Who will take care of me ? ”

God and your friends.

“ I shall lie in a hard bed.”

But like a man.

“ I shall not have a convenient room.”

Then you will be sick in an inconvenient one.

“ Who will provide food for me ? ”

They who provide for others, too ; you will be sick like Manes.†

“ But what will be the conclusion of my sickness ? Any other than death ? ”

Why, do you not know, then, that the origin of all human evils, and of baseness, and cowardice, is not

\* Homer, Odyssey, VI. 130.—H.

† The name of a slave, particularly of a slave who once belonged to Diogenes ; and perhaps this expression alludes to some story about him, which is now unknown.—C.

death ; but rather the fear of death ? Fortify yourself, therefore, against this. Hither let all your discourses, readings, exercises, tend. And then you will know that thus alone are men made free.

## BOOK IV.

## CHAPTER I.

## OF FREEDOM,

**H**E is free who lives as he likes ; who is not subject to compulsion, to restraint, or to violence ; whose pursuits are unhindered, his desires successful, his aversions unincurred. Who, then, would wish to lead a wrong course of life ? "No one." Who would live deceived, erring, unjust, dissolute, discontented, dejected ? "No one." No wicked man, then, lives as he likes ; therefore no such man is free. And who would live in sorrow, fear, envy, pity, with disappointed desires and unavailing aversions ? "No one." Do we then find any of the wicked exempt from these evils ? "Not one." Consequently, then, they are not free.

If some person who has been twice consul should hear this, he will forgive you, provided you add, "but you are wise, and this has no reference to you." But if you tell him the truth, that, in point of slavery, he does not necessarily differ from those who have been thrice sold, what but chastisement can you expect ? "For how," he says, "am I a slave ? My father was free, my mother free. Besides, I am a senator, too, and the friend of Cæsar, and have been twice consul, and have myself many slaves." In the first place, most worthy sir, perhaps your father too was a slave of the same kind ; and your mother, and your grandfather, and all your series of ancestors. But even

were they ever so free, what is that to you? For what if they were of a generous, you of a mean spirit; they brave, and you a coward; they sober, and you dissolute?

“But what,” he says, “has this to do with my being a slave.” Is it no part of slavery to act against your will, under compulsion, and lamenting? “Be it so. But who can compel me but the master of all, Cæsar?” By your own confession, then, you have *one* master; and let not his being, as you say, master of all, give you any comfort; for then you are merely a slave in a large family. Thus the Nicopolitans, too, frequently cry out, “By the genius of Cæsar we are *free!*”

For the present, however, if you please, we will let Cæsar alone. But tell me this. Have you never been in love with any one, either of a servile or liberal condition? “Why, what has that to do with being slave or free?” Were you never commanded anything by your mistress that you did not choose? Have you never flattered your fair slave? Have you never kissed her feet? And yet if you were commanded to kiss Cæsar’s feet, you would think it an outrage and an excess of tyranny. What else is this than slavery? Have you never gone out by night where you did not desire? Have you never spent more than you chose? Have you not sometimes uttered your words with sighs and groans? Have you never borne to be reviled and shut out of doors? But if you are ashamed to confess your own follies, see what Thrasonides\* says, and does; who, after having fought more battles perhaps than you, went

\* A character in one of the Comedies of Menander, called *The Hated Lover*. — C.

out by night, when [his slave] Geta would not dare to go ; nay, had he been compelled to do it by him, would have gone bewailing and lamenting the bitterness of servitude. And what says he afterwards ? “A contemptible girl has enslaved *me*, whom no enemy ever enslaved.” Wretch ! to be the slave of a girl and a contemptible girl too ! Why, then, do you still call yourself free ? Why do you boast your military expeditions ? Then he calls for a sword, and is angry with the person who, out of kindness, denies it ; and sends presents to her who hates him ; and begs, and weeps, and then again is elated on every little success. But what elation ? Is he raised above desire or fear ?

Consider in animals what is our idea of freedom. Some keep tame lions, and feed them and even lead them about ; and who will say that any such lion is free ? Nay, does he not live the more slavishly the more he lives at ease ? And who that had sense and reason would wish to be one of those lions ? Again, how much will caged birds suffer in trying to escape ? Nay, some of them starve themselves rather than undergo such a life ; others are saved only with difficulty and in a pining condition ; and the moment they find any opening, out they go. Such a desire have they for their natural freedom, and to be at their own disposal, and unrestrained. “And what harm can this confinement do you ? ” — “What say you ? I was born to fly where I please, to live in the open air, to sing when I please. You deprive me of all this, and then ask, what harm I suffer ? ”

Hence we will allow those only to be free who will not endure captivity ; but so soon as they are taken, die and so escape. Thus Diogenes somewhere says

that the only way to freedom is to die with ease. And he writes to the Persian king, "You can no more enslave the Athenians than you can fish."—"How? Can I not get possession of them?"—"If you do," said he, "they will leave you, and be gone like fish. For catch a fish, and it dies. And if the Athenians, too, die as soon as you have caught them, of what use are your warlike preparations?" This is the voice of a free man who had examined the matter in earnest; and, as it might be expected, found it all out. But if you seek it where it is not, what wonder if you never find it?

A slave wishes to be immediately set free. Think you it is because he is desirous to pay his fee [of manumission] to the officer? No, but because he fancies that, for want of acquiring his freedom, he has hitherto lived under restraint and unprofitably. "If I am once set free," he says, "it is all prosperity; I care for no one; I can speak to all as being their equal and on a level with them. I go where I will, I come when and how I will." He is at last made free, and presently having nowhere to eat he seeks whom he may flatter, with whom he may sup. He then either submits to the basest and most infamous degradation; and if he can obtain admission to some great man's table, falls into a slavery much worse than the former; or perhaps, if the ignorant fellow should grow rich, he doats upon some girl, laments, and is unhappy, and wishes for slavery again. "For what harm did it do me? Another clothed me, another shod me, another fed me, another took care of me when I was sick. It was but in a few things, by way of return, I used to serve him. But now, miserable wretch! what do I suffer, in be-

ing a slave to many, instead of one! Yet, if I can be promoted to equestrian rank, I shall live in the utmost prosperity and happiness." In order to obtain this, he first deservedly suffers; and as soon as he has obtained it, it is all the same again. "But, then," he says, "if I do but get a military command, I shall be delivered from all my troubles." He gets a military command. He suffers as much as the vilest rogue of a slave; and, nevertheless, he asks for a second command, and a third; and when he has put the finishing touch, and is made a senator, then he is a slave indeed. When he comes into the public assembly, it is then that he undergoes his finest and most splendid slavery.

[It is needful] not to be foolish, but to learn what Socrates taught, the nature of things; and not rashly to apply general principles to particulars. For the cause of all human evils is the not being able to apply general principles to special cases. But different people have different grounds of complaint; one, for instance, that he is sick. That is not the trouble, it is in his principles. Another, that he is poor; another, that he has a harsh father and mother; another, that he is not in the good graces of Cæsar. This is nothing else but not understanding how to apply our principles. For who has not an idea of evil, that it is hurtful? That it is to be avoided? That it is by all means to be prudently guarded against? One principle does not contradict another, except when it comes to be applied. What, then, is this evil,—thus hurtful and to be avoided? "Not to be the friend of Cæsar," says some one. He is gone; he has failed in applying his principles; he is embarrassed; he seeks what is nothing to the purpose. For if he comes to be Cæsar's

friend, he is still no nearer to what he sought. For what is it that every man seeks ? To be secure, to be happy, to do what he pleases without restraint and without compulsion. When he becomes the friend of Cæsar, then does he cease to be restrained ? To be compelled ? Is he secure ? Is he happy ? Whom shall we ask ? Whom can we better credit than this very man who has been his friend ? Come forth and tell us whether you sleep more quietly now than before you were the friend of Cæsar ? You presently hear him cry, “Leave off, for Heaven’s sake, and do not insult me. You know not the miseries I suffer ; there is no sleep for me ; but one comes and says that Cæsar is already awake ; another, that he is just going out. Then follow perturbations, then cares.” Well ; and when did you use to sup the more pleasantly,—formerly, or now ? Hear what he says about this, too. When he is not invited, he is distracted ; and if he is, he sups like a slave with his master, solicitous all the while not to say or do anything foolish. And what think you ? Is he afraid of being whipped like a slave ? No such easy penalty. No ; but rather, as becomes so great a man, Cæsar’s friend, of losing his head. And when did you bathe the more quietly ; when did you perform your exercises the more at your leisure ; in short, which life would you rather wish to live, your present, or the former ? I could swear there is no one so stupid and insensible as not to deplore his miseries, in proportion as he is the more the friend of Cæsar.

Since, then, neither they who are called kings nor the friends of kings live as they like, who, then, after all, is free ? Seek, and you will find ; for you are furnished by nature with means for discovering the

truth. But if you are not able by these alone to find the consequence, hear them who have sought it. What do they say? Do you think freedom a good? "The greatest." Can any one, then, who attains the greatest good, be unhappy or unsuccessful in his affairs? "No." As many, therefore, as you see unhappy, lamenting, unprosperous,—confidently pronounce them not free. "I do." Henceforth, then, we have done with buying and selling, and such like stated conditions of becoming slaves. For if these concessions hold, then, whether the unhappy man be a great or a little king,—of consular or bi-consular dignity,—he is not free. "Agreed."

Further, then, answer me this; do you think freedom to be something great and noble and valuable? "How should I not?" Is it possible, then, that he who acquires anything so great and valuable and noble should be of an abject spirit? "It is not." Whenever, then, you see any one subject to another, and flattering him contrary to his own opinion, confidently say that he too is not free; and not only when he does this for a supper, but even if it be for a government, nay, a consulship. Call those indeed little slaves who act thus for the sake of little things; and call the others as they deserve, great slaves. "Be this, too, agreed." Well; do you think freedom to be something independent and self-determined? "How can it be otherwise?" Him, then, whom it is in the power of another to restrain or to compel, affirm confidently to be by no means free. And do not heed his grandfathers or great-grandfathers; or inquire whether he has been bought or sold; but if you hear him say from his heart and with emotion, "my master," though twelve Lictors should march

before him, call him a slave. And if you should hear him say, “Wretch, that I am! what do I suffer!” call him a slave. In short, if you see him wailing, complaining, unprosperous, call him a slave, even in purple.

“Suppose, then, that he does nothing of all this.” Do not yet say that he is free; but learn whether his principles are in any event liable to compulsion, to restraint, or disappointment; and if you find this to be the case, call him a slave, keeping holiday during the Saturnalia. Say that his master is abroad; that he will come presently; and you will know what he suffers. “Who will come?” Whoever has the power either of bestowing or of taking away any of the things he desires.

“Have we so many masters, then?” We have. For, prior to all such, we have the *things* themselves for our masters. Now they are many; and it is through these that the men who control the things inevitably become our masters too. For no one fears Cæsar himself; but death, banishment, confiscation, prison, disgrace. Nor does any one love Cæsar unless he be a person of great worth; but we love riches, the tribunate, the prætorship, the consulship. When we love or hate or fear such things, they who have the disposal of them must necessarily be our masters. Hence we even worship them as gods. For we consider that whoever has the disposal of the greatest advantages is a deity; and then further reason falsely, “but such a one has the control of the greatest advantages; therefore he is a deity.” For if we reason falsely, the final inference must be also false.

What is it, then, that makes a man free and independent? For neither riches, nor consulship, nor

the command of provinces, nor of kingdoms, can make him so ; but something else must be found.” What is it that keeps any one from being hindered and restrained in penmanship, for instance ? “ The science of penmanship.” In music ? “ The science of music.” Therefore in life too, it must be the science of living. As you have heard it in general, then, consider it likewise in particulars. Is it possible for him to be unrestrained who desires any of those things that are within the power of others ? “ No.” Can he avoid being hindered ? “ No.” Therefore neither can he be free. Consider, then, whether we have nothing or everything in our own sole power,—or whether some things are in our own power and some in that of others. “ What do you mean ? ” When you would have your body perfect, is it in your own power, or is it not ? “ It is not.” When you would be healthy ? “ It is not.” When you would be handsome ? “ It is not.” When you would live or die ? “ It is not.” Body then is not our own ; but is subject to everything that proves stronger than itself. “ Agreed.” Well ; is it in your own power to have an estate when you please, and such a one as you please ? “ No.” Slaves ? “ No.” Clothes ? “ No.” A house ? “ No.” Horses ? “ Indeed none of these.” Well ; if you desire ever so earnestly to have your children live, or your wife, or your brother, or your friends, is it in your own power ? “ No, it is not.”

Will you then say that there is *nothing* independent, which is in your own power alone, and unalienable ? See if you have anything of this sort. “ I do not know.” But, consider it thus : can any one make you assent to a falsehood ? “ No one.” In

the matter of assent, then, you are unrestrained and unhindered. "Agreed." Well, and can any one compel you to exert your aims towards what you do not like? "He can. For when he threatens me with death, or fetters, he thus compels me." If, then, you were to despise dying or being fettered, would you any longer regard him? "No." Is despising death, then, an action in our power, or is it not? "It is." Is it therefore in your power also to exert your aims towards anything, or is it not? "Agreed that it is. But in whose power is my avoiding anything?" This, too, is in your own. "What then if, when I am exerting myself to walk, any one should restrain me?" What part of you can he restrain? Can he restrain your assent? "No, but my body." Ay, as he may a stone. "Be it so. But still I cease to walk." And who claimed that walking was one of the actions that cannot be restrained? For I only said that your exerting yourself towards it could not be restrained. But where there is need of body and its assistance, you have already heard that nothing is in your power. "Be this, too, agreed." And can any one compel you to desire against your will? "No one." Or to propose, or intend, or, in short, not to be beguiled by the appearances of things? "Nor this. But when I desire anything, he can restrain me from obtaining what I desire." If you desire anything that is truly within your reach, and that cannot be restrained, how can he restrain you? "By no means." And pray who claims that he who longs for what depends on another will be free from restraint?

"May I not long for health, then?" By no means; nor anything else that depends on another; for what

is not in your own power, either to procure or to preserve when you will, *that* belongs to another. Keep off not only your hands from it, but even more than these, your desires. Otherwise you have given yourself up as a slave ; you have put your neck under the yoke, if you admire any of the things which are not your own, but which are subject and mortal, to which of them soever you are attached. “Is not my hand my own ?” It is a part of you, but it is by nature clay, liable to restraint, to compulsion ; a slave to everything stronger than itself. And why do I say, your hand ? You ought to hold your whole body but as a useful ass, with a pack-saddle on, so long as may be, so long as it is allowed you. But if there should come a military conscription, and a soldier should lay hold on it, let it go. Do not resist, or murmur ; otherwise you will be first beaten and lose the ass after all. And since you are thus to regard even the body itself, think what remains to do concerning things to be provided for the sake of the body. If that be an ass, the rest are but bridles, pack-saddles, shoes, oats, hay, for him. Let these go, too. Quit them yet more easily and expeditiously. And when you are thus prepared and trained to distinguish what belongs to others from your own, what is liable to restraint from what is not ; to esteem the one your own property, but not the other ; to keep your desire, to keep your aversion carefully regulated by this point ; whom have you any longer to fear ? “No one.” For about what should you be afraid ? About what is your own, in which consists the essence of good and evil ? And who has any power over *this* ? Who can take it away ? Who can hinder you, any more than God can be hindered. But are you afraid for body, for

possessions, for what belongs to others, for what is nothing to you ? And what have you been studying all this while, but to distinguish between your own and that which is not your own ; what is in your power and what is not in your power ; what is liable to restraint and what is not ? And for what purpose have you applied to the philosophers ? That you might nevertheless be disappointed and unfortunate ? No doubt you will be exempt from fear and perturbation ! And what is grief to you ? For whatsoever we anticipate with fear, we endure with grief. And for what will you any longer passionately wish ? For you have a temperate and steady desire of things dependent on will, since they are accessible and desirable ; and you have no desire of things uncontrollable by will, so as to leave room for that irrational, and impetuous, and precipitate passion.

Since then you are thus affected with regard to *things*, what man can any longer be formidable to you ? What has man that he can be formidable to man, either in appearance, or speech, or mutual intercourse ? No more than horse to horse, or dog to dog, or bee to bee. But *things* are formidable to every one, and whenever any person can either give these to another, or take them away, he becomes formidable too. “ How, then, is this citadel to be destroyed ? ” Not by sword or fire, but by principle. For if we should demolish the visible citadel, shall we have demolished also that of some fever, of some fair woman, in short, the citadel [of temptation] within ourselves ; and have turned out the tyrants to whom we are subject upon all occasions and every day, sometimes the same, sometimes others ? From hence we must begin ; hence demolish the citadel,

and turn out the tyrants ; — give up body, members, riches, power, fame, magistracies, honors, children, brothers, friends ; esteem all these as belonging to others. And if the tyrants be turned out from hence, why should I besides demolish the external citadel, at least on my own account ? For what harm to *me* from its standing ? Why should I turn out the guards ? For in what point do they affect me ? It is against others that they direct their fasces, their staves, and their swords. Have I ever been restrained from what I willed, or compelled against my will ? Indeed, how is this possible ? I have placed my pursuits under the direction of God. Is it His will that I should have a fever ? It is my will too. Is it His will that I should pursue anything ? It is my will, too. Is it His will that I should desire ? It is my will too. Is it His will that I should obtain anything ? It is mine too. Is it not His will ? It is not mine. Is it His will that I should be tortured ? Then it is my will to be tortured. Is it His will that I should die ? Then it is my will to die. Who can any longer restrain or compel me, contrary to my own opinion ? No more than Zeus.

It is thus that cautious travellers act. Does some one hear that the road is beset by robbers ? He does not set out alone, but waits for the retinue of an ambassador, or quæstor, or proconsul ; and when he has joined himself to their company, goes along in safety. Thus does the prudent man act in the world. There are many robberies, tyrants, storms, distresses, losses of things most dear. Where is there any refuge ? How can he go alone unattacked ? What retinue can he wait for, to go safely through his journey ? To what company shall he join himself ? To some

rich man ? To some consular senator ? And what good will that do me ? He may be robbed himself, groaning and lamenting. And what if my fellow-traveller himself should turn against me and rob me ? What shall I do ? I say, I will be the friend of Cæsar. While I am his companion, no one will injure me. Yet before I can become illustrious enough for this, what must I bear and suffer ! How often, and by how many, must I be robbed ! And, then, if I do become the friend of Cæsar, he too is mortal ; and if, by any accident, he should become my enemy, where can I best retreat ? To a desert ? Well ; and may not a fever come there ? What can be done then ? Is it not possible to find a fellow-traveller, safe, faithful, brave, incapable of being surprised ? A person who reasons thus, understands and considers that, if he joins himself to God, he shall go safely through his journey.

“How do you mean, join himself?” That whatever is the will of God may be *his* will too : that whatever is not the will of God may not be his. “How, then, can this be done ?” Why, how otherwise than by considering the workings of God’s power and his administration ? What has he given me to be my own, and independent ? What has he reserved to himself ? He has given me whatever depends on will. The things within my power he has made incapable of hindrance or restraint. But how could he make a body of clay incapable of hindrance ? Therefore he has subjected possessions, furniture, house, children, wife, to the revolutions of the universe. Why, then, do I fight against God ? Why do I will to retain that which depends not on will ? That which is not granted absolutely ; but how ? In such

a manner, and for such a time as was thought proper. But he who gave takes away. Why, then, do I resist? Besides being a fool, in contending with a stronger than myself, I shall be unjust, which is a more important consideration. For whence had I these things, when I came into the world? My father gave them to me. And who gave them to him? And who made the sun? Who the fruits? Who the seasons? Who their connection and relations with each other? And after you have received all, and even your very self from another, are you angry with the giver; and do you complain if He takes anything away from you? Who are you; and for what purpose did you come? Was it not He who brought you here? Was it not He who showed you the light? Hath not He given you companions? Hath not He given you senses? Hath not He given you reason? And as whom did He bring you here? Was it not as a mortal? Was it not as one to live with a little portion of flesh upon earth, and to see his administration; to behold the spectacle with Him, and partake of the festival for a short time? After having beheld the spectacle and the solemnity, then, as long as it is permitted you, will you not depart when He leads you out, adoring and thankful for what you have heard and seen? "No; but I would enjoy the feast still longer." So would the initiated [in the mysteries], too, be longer in their initiation; so, perhaps, would the spectators at Olympia see more combatants. But the solemnity is over. Go away. Depart like a grateful and modest person; make room for others. Others, too, must be born as you were; and when they are born must have a place, and habitations, and necessaries. But if the first do

not give way, what room is there left? Why are you insatiable, unconscionable? Why do you crowd the world?

“Ay, but I would have my wife and children with me too.” Why, are they *yours*? Are they not the Giver’s? Are they not His who made *you* also? Will you not then quit what belongs to another? Will you not yield to your Superior? “Why, then, did he bring me into the world upon these conditions?” Well; if it is not worth your while, depart. He hath no need of a discontented spectator. He wants such as will share the festival; make part of the chorus; who will extol, applaud, celebrate the solemnity. He will not be displeased to see the wretched and fearful dismissed from it. For when they were present they did not behave as at a festival nor fill a proper place, but lamented, found fault with the Deity, with their fortune, with their companions. They were insensible both of their advantages and of the powers which they received for far different purposes; the powers of magnanimity, nobleness of spirit, fortitude, and that which now concerns us, freedom. “For what purpose, then, have I received these things?” To use them. “How long?” As long as He who lent them pleases. If, then, they are not necessary, do not make an idol of them, and they will not be so; do not tell yourself that they are necessary, when they are not.

This should be our study from morning till night, beginning with the least and frailest things, as with earthen-ware, with glass-ware. Afterwards, proceed to a suit of clothes, a dog, a horse, an estate; thence to yourself, body, members, children, wife, brothers. Look everywhere around you, and be able to detach

yourself from these things. Correct your principles. Permit nothing to cleave to you that is not your own; nothing to grow to you that may give you agony when it is torn away. And say, when you are daily training yourself as you do here, not that you act the philosopher, which may be a presumptuous claim, but that you are asserting your freedom. For this is true freedom. This is the freedom that Diogenes gained from Antisthenes; and declared it was impossible that he should ever after be a slave to any one. Hence, when he was taken prisoner, how did he treat the pirates? Did he call any of them master? I do not mean the name, for I am not afraid of a word, but of the disposition from whence the word proceeds. How did he reprove them for feeding their prisoners ill? How was he sold? Did he seek a master? No; but a slave. And when he was sold, how did he converse with his lord? He immediately disputed with him whether he ought to be dressed or shaved in the manner he was; and how he ought to bring up his children. And where is the wonder? For if the same master had bought some one to instruct his children in gymnastic exercises, would he in those exercises have treated him as a servant or as a master? And so if he had bought a physician or an architect? In every department the skilful must necessarily be superior to the unskilful. What else, then, can he be but master, who possesses the universal knowledge of life? For who is master in a ship? The pilot. Why? Because whoever disobeys him is a loser. "But a master can put me in chains." Can he do it then, without being a loser? "I think not, indeed." But because he must be a loser, he evidently must not do it; for no one acts

unjustly without being a loser.—“And how does he suffer, who puts his own slave in chains?” What think you? From the very fact of chaining him. This you yourself must grant, if you would hold to the doctrine that man is not naturally a wild, but a gentle animal. For when is it that a vine is in a bad condition? “When it is in a condition contrary to its nature.” How is it with a cock? “The same.” It is therefore the same with a man also. What is his nature? To bite, and kick, and throw into prison, and cut off heads? No, but to do good, to assist, to indulge the wishes of others. Whether you will or not, then, he is in a bad condition whenever he acts unreasonably. “And so was not Socrates in a bad condition?” Ne, but his judges and accusers. “Nor Helvidius, at Rome?” No, but his murderer. “How do you talk?” Why, just as you do. You do not call that cock in a bad condition which is victorious, and yet wounded; but that which is conquered and comes off unhurt. Nor do you call a dog happy which neither hunts nor toils; but when you see him perspiring, and distressed, and panting with the chase. In what do we talk paradoxes? If we say that the evil of everything consists in what is contrary to its nature, is this a paradox? Do you not say it with regard to other things? Why, therefore, in the case of man alone, do you take a different view? But further; it is no paradox to say that by nature man is gentle and social, and faithful. “This is none.” How then [is it a paradox to say] that, when he is whipped, or imprisoned, or beheaded, he is not hurt? If he suffers nobly does he not come off even the better and a gainer? But he is the person hurt who suffers the most miserable and shameful evils; who,

instead of a man, becomes a wolf, a viper, or a hornet.

Come, then ; let us recapitulate what has been granted. The man who is unrestrained, who has all things in his power as he wills, is free ; but he who may be restrained, or compelled, or hindered, or thrown into any condition against his will, is a slave. "And who is unrestrained ?" He who desires none of those things that belong to others. "And what are those things, which belong to others ?" Those which are not in our own power, either to have or not to have ; or to have them thus or so. Body, therefore, belongs to another ; its parts to another ; property to another. If, then, you attach yourself to any of these as your own, you will be punished, as he deserves who desires what belongs to others. This is the way that leads to freedom ; this the only deliverance from slavery ; to be able at length to say, from the bottom of one's soul :

"Conduct me, Zeus, and thou, O destiny,  
Wherever your decrees have fixed my lot." \*

But what say you, philosopher ? A tyrant calls upon you to speak something unbecoming you. Will you say it, or will you not ? "Stay, let me consider.". Would you consider now ? And what did you use to consider when you were in the schools ? Did you not study what things were good and evil, and what indifferent ? "I did." Well ; and what were the opinions which pleased us ?—"That just and fair actions were good ; unjust and base ones, evil." Is living a good ? "No." Dying, an evil ?

\* A Fragment of Cleanthes, before quoted ; and given in full in Enchiridion, c. 52.—H.

“No.” A prison? “No.” And what did a mean and dishonest speech, the betraying a friend, or the flattering a tyrant, appear to us? “Evils.” Why, then, are you still considering, and have not already considered and come to a resolution? For what sort of a consideration is this:—“Whether I ought, when it is in my power, to procure myself the greatest good, instead of procuring myself the greatest evil.” A fine and necessary consideration, truly, and deserving mighty deliberation! Why do you trifle with us, man? No one ever needed to consider any such point; nor, if you really imagined things fair and honest to be good, things base and dishonest to be evil, and all other things indifferent, would you ever be in such a perplexity as this, or near it; but you would presently be able to distinguish by your understanding as you do by your sight. For do you ever have to consider whether black is white; or whether light is heavy? Do you not follow the plain evidence of your senses? Why, then, do you say that you are now considering whether things indifferent are to be avoided, rather than evils? The truth is, you have no principles; for things indifferent do not impress you as such, but as the greatest evils; and these, on the other hand, as things of no importance.

For thus has been your practice from the first. “Where am I? If I am in the school and there is an audience, I talk as the philosophers do. But if I am out of the school, then away with this stuff that belongs only to scholars and fools.” This man is accused by the testimony of a philosopher, his friend; this philosopher turns parasite; another hires himself out for money; a third does that in the very senate. When one is not governed by appearances, then his

principles speak for themselves. You are a poor cold lump of prejudice, consisting of mere phrases, on which you hang as by a hair. You should preserve yourself firm and practical, remembering that you are to deal with real things. In what manner do you hear,—I will not say that your child is dead, for how could you possibly bear that?—but that your oil is spilled, your wine consumed? Would that some one, while you are bawling, would only say this: “Philosopher, you talk quite otherwise when in the schools. Why do you deceive us? Why, when you are a worm, do you call yourself a man?” I should be glad to be near one of these philosophers, while he is revelling in debauchery, that I might see how he demeans himself, and what sayings he utters; whether he remembers the title he bears and the discourses which he hears, or speaks, or reads.

“And what is all this to freedom?” It lies in nothing else but this; whether you rich people approve or not. “And who is your evidence of this?” Who, but yourselves? You who have a powerful master, and live by his motion and nod, and faint away if he does but look sternly upon you, who pay your court to old men and old women, and say, “I cannot do this or that, it is not in my power.” Why is it not in your power? Did not you just now contradict me, and say you were free? “But Aprylla has forbidden me.” Speak the truth, then, slave, and do not run away from your masters nor deny them, nor dare to assert your freedom, when you have so many proofs of your slavery. One might indeed find some excuse for a person compelled by love to do something contrary to his opinion, even when at the same time he sees what is best without

having resolution enough to follow it, since he is withheld by something overpowering, and in some measure divine. But who can bear you, who are in love with old men and old women ; and perform menial offices for them, and bribe them with presents, and wait upon them like a slave when they are sick ; at the same time wishing they may die, and inquiring of the physician whether their distemper be yet mortal ? And again, when for these great and venerable magistracies and honors you kiss the hands of the slaves of others ; so that you are the slave of those who are not free themselves ! And then you walk about in state, a prætor or a consul. Do I not know how you came to be prætor ; whence you received the consulship ; who gave it to you ? For my own part, I would not even live, if I must live by Felicio's means, and bear his pride and slavish insolence. For I know what a slave is, blinded by what he thinks good fortune.

"Are you free yourself, then ?" you may ask. By Heaven, I wish and pray for it. But I own I cannot yet face my masters. I still pay a regard to my body, and set a great value on keeping it whole ; though, for that matter, it is not whole. But I can show you one who was free, that you may no longer seek an example. Diogenes was free. "How so ?" Not because he was of free parents, for he was not ; but because he was so in himself ; because he had cast away all which gives a handle to slavery ; nor was there any way of getting at him, nor anywhere to lay hold on him, to enslave him. Everything sat loose upon him, everything only just hung on. If you took hold on his possessions, he would rather let them go than follow you for them ; if on his leg, he

let go his leg ; if his body, he let go his body ; acquaintance, friends, country, just the same. For he knew whence he had them, and from whom, and upon what conditions he received them. But he would never have forsaken his true parents, the gods, and his real country [the universe] ; nor have suffered any one to be more dutiful and obedient to them than he ; nor would any one have died more readily for his country than he. For he never had to inquire whether he should act for the good of the whole universe ; for he remembered that everything that exists belongs to that administration, and is commanded by its ruler. Accordingly, see what he himself says and writes. “Upon this account,” said he, “O Diogenes, it is in your power to converse as you will with the Persian monarch and with Archidamus, king of the Lacedemonians.” Was it because *he* was born of free parents ? Or was it because *they* were descended from slaves, that all the Athenians, and all the Lacedemonians, and Corinthians, could not converse with them as they pleased ; but feared and paid court to them ? Why then is it in your power, Diogenes ? “Because I do not esteem this poor body as my own. Because I want nothing. Because this, and nothing else is a law to me.” These were the things that enabled him to be free.

And that you may not urge that I show you the example of a man clear of incumbrances, without a wife or children, or country, or friends, or relations, to bend and draw him aside ; — take Socrates, and consider him, who had a wife and children, but held them not as his own ; had a country, friends, relations, but held them only so long as it was proper, and in the manner that was proper ; submitting all

these to the law and to the obedience due to it. Hence, when it was proper to fight, he was the first to go out, and exposed himself to danger without the least reserve. But when he was sent by the thirty tyrants to apprehend Leon,\* because he esteemed it a base action, he did not even deliberate about it; though he knew that, perhaps, he might die for it. But what did that signify to him? For it was something else that he wanted to preserve, not his mere flesh; but his fidelity, his honor free from attack or subjection. And afterwards, when he was to make a defence for his life, does he behave like one having children? Or a wife? No; but like a single man. And how does he behave, when required to drink the poison? When he might escape and Crito would have him escape from prison for the sake of his children, what says he? Does he esteem it a fortunate opportunity? How should he? But he considers what is becoming, and neither sees nor regards anything else. "For I am not desirous," he says, "to preserve this pitiful body; but that part which is improved and preserved by justice, and impaired and destroyed by injustice." Socrates is not to be basely preserved. He who refused to vote for what the Athenians commanded; he, who contemned the thirty tyrants; he, who held such discourses on virtue and moral beauty; such a man is not to be pre-

\* Socrates, with four other persons, was commanded by the thirty tyrants of Athens to fetch Leon from the isle of Salamis, in order to be put to death. His companions executed their commission; but Socrates remained at home, and chose rather to expose his life to the fury of the tyrants, than be accessory to the death of an innocent person. He would most probably have fallen a sacrifice to their vengeance, if the Oligarchy had not shortly after been dissolved. See PLATO's *Apology*. — C.

served by a base action, but is preserved by dying, instead of running away. For even a good actor is preserved as such by leaving off when he ought, not by going on to act beyond his time. “What then will become of your children?”—“If I had gone away into Thessaly, you would have taken care of them; and will there be no one to take care of them when I am departed to Hades?”\* You see how he ridicules and plays with death. But if it had been you or I, we should presently have proved by philosophical arguments, that those who act unjustly are to be repaid in their own way; and should have added, “If I escape I shall be of use to many; if I die, to none.” Nay, if it had been necessary, we should have crept through a mouse-hole to get away. But how should *we* have been of use to any? For where must they have dwelt? If we were useful alive, should we not be of still more use to mankind by dying when we ought and as we ought? And now the remembrance of the death of Socrates is not less, but even more useful to the world than that of the things which he did and said when alive.

Study these points, these principles, these discourses; contemplate these examples if you would be free, if you desire the thing in proportion to its value. And where is the wonder that you should purchase so good a thing at the price of others, so many, and so great? Some hang themselves, others break their necks, and sometimes even whole cities have been destroyed for that which is reputed freedom; and will not you for the sake of the true and secure and inviolable freedom, repay God what he hath given when he demands it? Will you not study

\* Plato, Crito. I. 15.—H.

not only, as Plato says, how to die, but how to be tortured and banished and scourged ; and, in short, how to give up all that belongs to others. If not, you will be a slave among slaves, though you were ten thousand times a consul ; and even though you should rise to the palace you will never be the less so. And you will feel that, though philosophers (as Cleanthes says) do, perhaps, talk contrary to common opinion, yet it is not contrary to reason. For you will find it true, in fact, that the things that are eagerly followed and admired are of no use to those who have gained them ; while they who have not yet gained them imagine that, if they are acquired, every good will come along with them ; and, then, when they are acquired, there is the same feverishness, the same agitation, the same nausea, and the same desire for what is absent. For freedom is not procured by a full enjoyment of what is desired, but by controlling the desire. And in order to know that this is true, take the same pains about these which you have taken about other things. Hold vigils to acquire a set of principles that will make you free. Instead of a rich old man pay your court to a philosopher. Be seen about his doors. You will not get any disgrace by being seen there. You will not return empty or unprofited if you go as you ought. However, try at least. The trial is not dishonorable.

## CHAPTER II.

## OF COMPLAISANCE.

TO this point you must attend before all others; **T** not to be so attached to any one of your former acquaintances or friends as to condescend to behavior like his ; otherwise you will undo yourself. But if it comes into your head, “ I shall appear odd to him, and he will not treat me as before,” remember, that there is nothing to be had for nothing ; nor is it possible that he who acts in the same manner as before, should not be the same person. Choose, then, whether you will be loved by those who formerly loved you, and be like your former self ; or be better, and not meet with the same treatment. For if this is preferable, immediately incline altogether this way, and let no other kinds of reasoning draw you aside ; for no one can improve while he is wavering. If, then, you prefer this to everything, if you would be fixed only on this, and employ all your pains about it, give up everything else. Otherwise this wavering will affect you in both ways ; you will neither make a due improvement, nor preserve the advantages you had before. For before, by setting your heart entirely on things of no value, you were agreeable to your companions. But you cannot excel in both styles ; you must necessarily lose as much of the one as you partake of the other. If you do not drink with those with whom you used to drink, you cannot appear equally agreeable to them. Choose, then, whether you would be a drunkard, and agreeable to them,— or sober, and disagreeable to them. If you

do not sing with those with whom you used to sing, you cannot be equally dear to them. Here too, then, choose which you will. For if it is better to be modest and decent than to have it said of you "*what an agreeable fellow,*" give up the rest; renounce it; withdraw yourself; have nothing to do with it. But if this does not please you, incline with your whole force the contrary way. Be one of the debauchees; one of the adulterers. Act all that is consistent with such a character, and you will obtain what you would have. Jump up in the theatre, too, and roar out in praise of the dancer. But characters so different are not to be confounded. You cannot act both Thersites and Agamemnon. If you would be Thersites, you must be hump-backed and bald; if Agamemnon, great and noble, and faithful to those who are under your care.

### CHAPTER III.

#### WHAT THINGS ARE TO BE EXCHANGED FOR OTHERS.

WHEN you have lost anything external, have always at hand the consideration of what you have got instead of it; and if that be of more value, do not by any means call yourself a loser; whether it be a horse for an ass; an ox for a sheep; a good action for a piece of money; a due composure of mind for a dull jest; or modesty for indecent talk. By continually remembering this, you will preserve your character such as it ought to be. Otherwise, consider that you are spending your time in vain; and all that to which you are now applying your mind,

you are about to spill and overturn. And there needs but little, merely a small deviation from reason, to destroy and overset all. A pilot does not need so much apparatus to overturn a ship as to save it ; but if he exposes it a little too much to the wind, it is lost ; even if he should not do it by design, but only for a moment be thinking of something else, it is lost. Such is the case here, too. If you do but nod a little, all that you have hitherto accomplished is gone. Take heed, then, to the appearances of things. Keep yourself watchful over them. It is no inconsiderable matter that you have to guard ; but modesty, fidelity, constancy, docility, innocence, fearlessness, serenity ; in short, freedom. For what will you sell these ? Consider what the purchase is worth. " But shall I not get such a thing instead of it ? " Consider, if you do not get it, what it is that you have instead. Suppose I have decency, and another the office of tribune ; I have modesty, and he the prætorship ? But I do not applaud where it is unbecoming ; I will pay no undeserved honor ; for I am free, and the friend of God, so as to obey him willingly ; but I must not value anything else, neither body, nor possessions, nor fame ; in short, nothing. For it is not His will that I should value them. For if this had been His pleasure, He would have placed in them my good, which now He hath not done ; therefore I cannot transgress his commands. Seek in all things your own highest good,— and for other aims, recognize them as far as the case requires, and in accordance with reason, contented with this alone. Otherwise you will be unfortunate, disappointed, restrained, hindered." These are the established laws, these the statutes. Of these one ought to be an expositor, and

to these obedient, rather than to those of Masurius and Cassius.\*

## CHAPTER IV.

CONCERNING THOSE WHO EARNESTLY DESIRE A LIFE  
OF REPOSE.

REMEMBER that it is not only the desire of riches and power that debases us and subjects us to others, but even that of quiet, leisure, learning, or travelling. For, in general, reverence for any external thing whatever makes us subject to others. Where is the difference, then, whether you desire to be a senator or not to be a senator? Where is the difference, whether you desire power or to be out of power? Where is the difference, whether you say "I am in a wretched way, I have nothing to do; but am tied down to books, as inactive as if I were dead"; — or, "I am in a wretched way, I have no leisure to read?" For as levees and power are among things external and uncontrollable by will, so, likewise is a book. For what purpose would you read? Tell me. For if you rest merely in being amused and learning something, you are insignificant and miserable. But if you refer it to the proper end, what is that but a life truly prosperous? And if reading does not procure you a prosperous life, of what use is it. "But it does procure a prosperous life (say you); and therefore I am uneasy at being deprived of it." And what sort of prosperity is that which everything can hinder; — I do not say Cæsar alone, or Cæsar's friend, but a crow, a man practis-

\* Two famous lawyers.—C.

ing the flute, a fever, or ten thousand other things ? But nothing is so essential to prosperity as that it should be permanent and unhindered. Suppose I am now called to do something. I now go, therefore, and will be attentive to the bounds and measures which ought to be observed ; that I may act modestly, steadily, and without desire or aversion as to externals. In the next place, I am attentive to other men ; what they say, and how they are moved ; and that not from ill-nature, nor that I may have an opportunity for censure or ridicule ; but I turn to myself. "Am I also guilty of the same faults ; and how then shall I leave them off ?" or, "I once thus erred, but, God be thanked, not now." Well ; when you have done thus, and been employed on such things, have you not done as good a work as if you had read a thousand lines or written as many ? For are you uneasy at not reading while you are eating ? When you eat, or bathe, or exercise, are you not satisfied with doing it in a manner corresponding to what you have read ? Why, then, do you not reason in like manner about everything ? When you approach Cæsar or any other person, if you preserve yourself dispassionate, fearless, sedate ; if you are rather an observer of what is done than the subject of observation ; if you do not envy those who are preferred to you ; if you are not overcome by the occasion, what need you more ? Books ? How, or to what end ? For these are not the real preparation for living, but living is made up of things very different. Just as if a champion, when he enters the lists, should begin crying because he is not still exercising without. It was for this that you were exercised. For this were the dumb-bells, the dust, and your

young antagonists. And do you now seek for these when it is the time for actual business ? This is just as if, in forming our opinions, when perplexed between true and false semblances, we should, instead of practically distinguishing between them, merely peruse dissertations on evidence.

What, then, is the trouble ? That we have neither learned by reading, nor by writing, how to deal practically with the semblances of things, according to the laws of nature. But we stop at learning what is said, and, being able to explain it to others, at solving syllogisms and arranging hypothetical arguments. Hence where the study is, there, too, is the hindrance. Do you desire absolutely what is out of your power ? Be restrained then, be hindered, be disappointed. But if we were to read dissertations about the exertion of our efforts, not merely to see what might be said about our efforts, but to exert them well ; on desire and aversion, that we might not be disappointed of our desires, nor incur our aversions ; on the duties of life, that, mindful of our relations, we might do nothing irrational nor inconsistent with them ; then we should not be provoked at being hindered in our reading ; but should be contented with the performance of actions suitable to us, and should learn a new standard of computation. Not, "To-day I have perused so many lines ; I have written so many" ; but, " To-day I have used my efforts as the philosophers direct. I have restrained my desires absolutely ; I have applied my aversion only to things controllable by will. I have not been terrified by such a one, nor put out of countenance by such another. I have exercised my patience, my abstinence, my beneficence." And thus we should thank God for what we ought to thank him.

But now we resemble the crowd in another way also, and do not know it. One is afraid that he shall not be in power ; you, that you shall. By no means be afraid of it, man ; but as you laugh at him, laugh at yourself. For there is no difference, whether you thirst like one in a fever, or dread water like him who is bit by a mad dog. Else how can you say, like Socrates, “ If it so pleases God, so let it be ? ” Do you think that Socrates, if he had fixed his desires on the leisure of the lyceum or the academy, or the conversation of the youth there, day after day, would have made so many campaigns as he did, so readily ? Would not he have lamented and groaned : “ How wretched am I ! now must I be miserable here, when I might be sunning myself in the lyceum ? ” Was that your business in life, then, to sun yourself ? Was it not to be truly successful ? To be unrestrained and free ? And how could he have been Socrates, if he had lamented thus ? How could he after that have written Pæans in a prison ?

In short, then, remember this, that so far as you prize anything external to your own will, you impair that will. And not only power is external to it, but the being out of power too ; not only business, but leisure too. “ Then must I live in this tumult now ? ” What do you call a tumult ? “ A multitude of people.” And where is the hardship ? Suppose it to be the Olympic Games. Think it a public assembly. There, too, some bawl out one thing, some another ; some push the rest. The baths are crowded. Yet who of us is not pleased with these assemblies, and does not grieve to leave them ? Do not be hard to please, and squeamish at what happens. “ Vinegar is disagreeable, for it is sour. Honey is disagreeable,

for it disorders my constitution. I do not like vegetables." "So I do not like retirement, it is a desert; I do not like a crowd, it is a tumult." Why, if things are so disposed, that you are to live alone or with few, call this condition repose, and make use of it as you ought. Talk with yourself, judge of the appearances presented to your mind; train your mental habits to accuracy. But if you happen on a crowd, call it one of the public games, a grand assembly, a festival. Endeavor to share in the festival with the rest of the world. For what sight is more pleasant to a lover of mankind than a great number of men? We see companies of oxen or horses with pleasure. We are highly delighted to see a great many ships. Who is sorry to see a great many men? "But they stun me with their noise." Then your hearing is hindered; and what is that to you? Is your faculty of making a right use of the appearances of things hindered too? Or who can restrain you from using your desire and aversion, your powers of pursuit and avoidance, conformably to nature? What tumult is sufficient for this?

Do but remember the general rules. What is mine? What not mine? What is allotted me? What is it the will of God that I should do now? What is not his will? A little while ago it was His will that you should be at leisure, should talk with yourself, write about these things, read, hear, prepare yourself. You have had sufficient time for this. At present, He says to you, "Come now to the combat. Show us what you have learned; how you have wrestled." How long would you exercise by yourself? It is now the time to show whether you are of the number of those champions who merit victory, or of those who go

about the world conquered in all the circle of games. Why, then, are you out of humor? There is no combat without a tumult. There must be many preparatory exercises, many acclamations, many masters, many spectators. "But I would live in quiet." Why, then, lament and groan as you deserve. For what greater punishment is there to those who are uninstructed and disobedient to the orders of God, than to grieve, to mourn, to envy; in short, to be disappointed and unhappy? Are you not willing to deliver yourself from all this? "And how shall I deliver myself?" Have you not heard that you must absolutely control desire, and apply aversion to such things only as are controllable by will? That you must consent to resign all, body, possessions, fame, books, tumults, power, exemption from power? For to whichever your disposition is, you are a slave; you are under subjection; you are made liable to restraint, to compulsion; you are altogether the property of others. But have that maxim of Cleanthes always ready,

"Conduct me, Zeus; and thou, O destiny."

Is it your will that I should go to Rome? Conduct me to Rome. To Gyaros?—To Gyaros. To Athens?—To Athens. To prison?—To prison. If you once say, "When may I go to Athens?" you are undone. This desire, if it be unaccomplished, must necessarily render you disappointed; and, if fulfilled, vain respecting what ought not to elate you;—if, on the contrary, you are hindered, then you are wretched through incurring what you do not like. Therefore give up all these things.

"Athens is a fine place." But it is a much finer

thing to be happy, serene, tranquil, not to have your affairs dependent on others. "Rome is full of tumults and visits." But prosperity is worth all difficulties. If, then, it be a proper time for these, why do not you withdraw your aversion from them? What necessity is there for you to be made to carry your burden, by being cudgelled like an ass? Otherwise, consider that you must always be a slave to him who has the power to procure your discharge,—to every one who has the power of hindering you;—and must worship him like your evil genius.

The only way to real prosperity (let this rule be at hand morning, noon, and night) is a resignation of things uncontrollable by will; to esteem nothing as property; to deliver up all things to our tutelar genius and to fortune; to leave the control of them to those whom Zeus hath made such; to be ourselves devoted to that only which is really ours; to that which is incapable of restraint; and whatever we read, or write, or hear, to refer all to this.

Therefore I cannot call any one industrious, if I hear only that he reads or writes; nor do I call him so even if he adds the whole night to the day, unless I know to what he applies it. For not even you would call him industrious who sits up for the sake of a girl; nor, therefore, in the other case do I. But if he does it for fame, I call him ambitious; if for money, avaricious; if from the desire of learning, bookish; but not industrious. But if he applies his labor to his ruling faculty, in order to treat and regulate it conformably to nature, then only I call him industrious. Never praise or blame any person on account of outward actions that are common to all; but only on account of principles. These are the

peculiar property of each individual, and the things which make actions good or bad.

Mindful of this, enjoy the present and accept all things in their season. If you meet in action any of those things which you have made a subject of study, rejoice in them. If you have laid aside ill-nature and reviling ; if you have lessened your harshness, indecent language, inconsiderateness, effeminacy ; if you are not moved by the same things as formerly, or if not in the same manner as formerly ;—you may keep a perpetual festival, to-day for success in one affair, to-morrow for another. How much better a reason for sacrifice is this than obtaining a consulship or a government ? These things you have from yourself and from the gods. Remember this, who it is that gave them, and to whom and for what purpose. Habituated once to these reasonings, can you still think that it makes any difference what place God allots you ? Are not the gods everywhere at the same distance ? Do not they everywhere see equally what is doing ?

## CHAPTER V.

### CONCERNING THE QUARRELSOME AND FEROIOUS.

A WISE and good person neither quarrels with any one himself, nor, as far as possible, suffers another to do so. The life of Socrates affords us an example of this too, as well as of other things ; since he not only everywhere avoided quarrelling himself, but did not even suffer others to quarrel. See in Xenophon's Banquet how many quarrels he ended ;

how, again, he bore with Thrasymachus, with Polus, with Callicles ; how with his wife, how with his son, who attempted to confute him, and cavilled at him. For he well remembered that no one is master of the ruling faculty of another ; and therefore he desired nothing but what was his own. "And what is that?" Not that any particular person should be dealt with conformably to nature ; for that belongs to others ; but that while they act in their own way, as they please, he should nevertheless live conformably to nature, only doing what belongs to himself, in order to make them live conformably to nature also. For this is the point that a wise and good person has in view. To have the command of an army ? No ; but if it be allotted him, to properly apply his own powers in that sphere. To marry ? No ; but if marriage be allotted him, to act in this sphere also, according to the laws of nature. But if he expects perfection in his wife or his child, then he asks to have that for his own which really belongs to others. And wisdom consists in this very point, to learn what things are our own and what belong to others.

What room is there then for quarrelling, to a person thus disposed ? For does he wonder at anything that happens ? Does it appear strange to him ? Does he not prepare for worse and more grievous injuries from bad people than actually happen to him ? Does he not reckon it so much gained if they come short of the last extremities ? Such a one has reviled you. You are much obliged to him that he has not struck you. But he has struck you too. You are much obliged to him that he has not wounded you too. But he has wounded you too. You are much obliged to him that he has not killed you. For when did he

ever learn, or from whom, that he is a gentle, that he is a social animal ; that the very injury itself is a great mischief to him who inflicts it ? As, then, he has not learned these things, nor believes them, why should he not follow what appears to be for his interest ? Your neighbor has thrown stones. What then ? Is it any fault of yours ? But your goods are broken. What then ? Are you a piece of furniture ? No ; but your essence consists in the faculty of will. What behavior then is assigned you in return ? If you consider yourself as a wolf,—then, to bite again, to throw more stones. But if you ask the question as a man, then examine your treasure ; see what faculties you have brought into the world with you. Are they fitted for ferocity ? For revenge ? When is a horse miserable ? When he is deprived of his natural faculties. Not when he cannot crow, but when he cannot run. And a dog ? Not when he cannot fly, but when he cannot hunt. Is not a man, then, also unhappy in the same manner ? Not he who cannot strangle lions or perform athletic feats, (for he has received no faculties for this purpose from nature) ; but who has lost his rectitude of mind, his fidelity. This is he who ought to receive public condolence for the misfortunes into which he is fallen ; not, by Heaven, either he who has the misfortune to be born or to die ; but he whom it has befallen while he lives to lose what is properly his own. Not his paternal possessions, his paltry estate or his house, his lodging or his slaves, for none of these are a man's own ; but all these belong to others, are servile, dependent, and very variously assigned by the disposers of them. But his personal qualifications as a man, the impressions which he brought into the world stamped

upon his mind ; such as we look for in money, accepting or rejecting it accordingly. “ What impression has this piece of money ? ” — “ Trajan’s.” — “ Give it me.” — “ Nero’s.” \* Throw it away. It is false ; it is good for nothing. So in the other case. “ What stamp have his principles ? ” — “ Gentleness, social affection, patience, good-nature.” Bring them hither. I receive them. I make such a man a citizen ; I receive him for a neighbor, a fellow-traveller. Only see that he have not the Neronian stamp. Is he passionate ? Is he resentful ? Is he querulous ? Would he, if he took the fancy, break the heads of those who fell in his way ? Why then do you call him a man ? For is everything determined by a mere outward form ? Then say, just as well, that a piece of wax is an apple, or that it has the smell and taste, too. But the external figure is not enough ; nor, consequently, is it sufficient to constitute a man, that he has a nose and eyes, if he have not the proper principles of a man. Such a one does not understand reason, or apprehend when he is confuted. He is like an ass. Another is dead to the sense of shame. He is a worthless creature ; anything rather than a man. Another seeks whom he may kick or bite : so that he is neither sheep nor ass. But what then ? He is a wild beast.

“ Well ; but would you have me despised, then ? ” By whom ? By those who know you ? And how can they despise you who know you to be gentle and modest ? But, perhaps, by those who do not know you ? And what is that to you ? For no other artist troubles himself about those ignorant of art. “ But people

\* Nero being declared an enemy by the Senate, his coin was, in consequence of this, prohibited and destroyed.—C.

will be much readier to attack me." Why do you say *me*? Can any one hurt your will, or restrain you from treating, conformably to nature, the phenomena of existence? Why, then, are you disturbed and desirous to make yourself appear formidable? Why do you not make public proclamation that you are at peace with all mankind, however they may act; and that you chiefly laugh at those who suppose they can hurt you? "These wretches neither know who I am, nor in what consist my good and evil; nor how little they can touch what is really mine." Thus the inhabitants of a fortified city laugh at the besiegers. "What trouble, now, are these people giving themselves for nothing? Our wall is secure; we have provisions for a very long time, and every other preparation." These are what render a city fortified and impregnable; but nothing but its principles render the human soul so. For what wall is so strong, what body so impenetrable, what possession so unalienable, what dignity so secured against stratagems? All things else, everywhere else, are mortal, easily reduced; and whoever in any degree fixes his mind upon them, must necessarily be subject to perturbation, despair, terrors, lamentations, disappointed desires, and unavailing aversions.

And will we not fortify, then, the only citadel that is granted us; and, withdrawing ourselves from what is mortal and servile, diligently improve what is immortal and by nature free? Do we not remember that no one either hurts or benefits another; but only the principles which we hold concerning everything? It is this that hurts us; this that overturns us. Here is the fight, the sedition, the war. It was nothing else that made Eteocles and Polynices ene-

mies, but their principles concerning empire, and their principles concerning exile ; that the one seemed the extremest evil, the other, the greatest good. Now the very nature of every one is to pursue good, to avoid evil ; to esteem him as an enemy and betrayer who deprives us of the one, and involves us in the other, though he be a brother, or a son, or father. For nothing is more nearly related to us than good. So that if good and evil consist in externals, there is no affection between father and son, brother and brother ; but all is everywhere full of enemies, betrayers, sycophants. But if a right choice be the only good, and a wrong one the only evil, what further room is there for quarrelling, for reviling ? About what can it be ? About what is nothing to us. Against whom ? Against the ignorant, against the unhappy, against those who are deceived in the most important respects.

Mindful of this, Socrates lived in his own house, patiently bearing a furious wife, a senseless son. For what were the effects of her fury ? The throwing as much water as she pleased on his head, the trampling \* a cake under her feet. “ And what is this to me, if I think such things nothing to me ? This very point is my business ; and neither a tyrant, nor a master, shall restrain my will ; nor multitudes, though I am a single person ; nor one ever so strong, though I am ever so weak. For this is given by God to every one, free from restraint.”

These principles make friendship in families, con-

\* Alcibiades sent a fine great cake as a present to Socrates ; which so provoked the jealousy of the meek Xantippe, that she threw it down, and stamped upon it. Socrates only laughed, and said, “ Now you will have no share in it yourself.” — C.

cord in cities, peace in nations. They make a person grateful to God, everywhere courageous, as dealing with things merely foreign and of minor importance. But we, alas! are able indeed to write and read these things, and to praise them when they are read; but very far from being convinced by them. In that case, what is said of the Lacedemonians,

"Lions at home, foxes at Ephesus,"

may be applied to us, too; lions in the school, but foxes out of it.

## CHAPTER VI.

### CONCERNING THOSE WHO ARE ANNOYED AT BEING PITIED.

IT vexes me, say you, to be pitied. Is this your affair, then, or theirs who pity you? And further, how is it in your power to prevent it? "It is, if I show them that I do not need pity." But are you now in such a condition as not to need pity, or are you not? "I think I am. But these people do not pity me for what, if anything, would deserve pity, my faults; but for poverty, and want of power, and sicknesses, and deaths, and other things of that kind." Are you, then, prepared to convince the world that none of these things is in reality an evil; but that it is possible for a person to be happy, even when he is poor, and without honors and power? Or are you prepared to put on the appearance of being rich and powerful? The last of these is the part of an arrogant, silly, worthless fellow. Observe, too, by what means this fiction must be carried on. You must

hire some poor slaves, and get possessed of a few little pieces of plate, and often show them in public ; and though they are the same, endeavor to conceal that they are the same ; you must have gay clothes and other finery, and make a show of being honored by your great people ; and endeavor to sup with them, or be thought to sup with them ; and use some vile arts with your person, to make it appear handsomer and genteeler than it really is. All this you must contrive, if you would take the second way not to be pitied. And the first is impracticable as well as tedious, to undertake the very thing that Zeus himself could not do ; to convince all mankind what things are really good and evil. Is this granted you ? The only thing granted you is to convince yourself ; and you have not yet done that ; and yet do you undertake to convince others ? Why, who has lived so long with you as you have with yourself ? Who is so likely to have faith in you, in order to be convinced by you, as yourself ? Who is more truly a well-wisher or a friend to you than yourself ? How is it, then, that you have not yet convinced yourself ? Should you not now revolve these things ? What you were studying was this ; to learn to be exempt from grief, perturbation, and meanness, and to be free. Have you not heard, then, that the only way that leads to this is, to give up what is beyond the control of will ; to withdraw from it, and confess that it belongs to others ? To what order of things belongs another's opinion about you ? "Things uncontrollable by will." Is it nothing then to you ? "Nothing." While you are still piqued and disturbed about it, then, do you consider that you are convinced concerning good and evil ?

Letting others alone, then, why will you not be your own scholar and teacher? Let others look to it, whether it be for their advantage to think and act contrary to nature; but no one is nearer to me than myself. What means this? I have heard the reasonings of philosophers, and assented to them; yet, in fact, I am not the more relieved. Am I so stupid? And yet, in other things to which I had an inclination, I was not found very stupid; but I quickly learned grammar and the exercises of the palæstra, and geometry, and the solution of syllogisms. Has not reason, then, convinced me? And yet there is no one of the other things that I so much approved or liked from the very first. And now I read concerning these subjects, I hear discourses upon them, I write about them, and I have not yet found any principle more sure than this. What, then, do I need? Is not this the difficulty, that the contrary principles are not removed out of my mind? Is it not that I have not strengthened these opinions by exercise, nor practised them in action? but, like arms thrown aside, they are grown rusty, and do not suit me? Yet neither in the palæstra, nor writing, nor reading, nor solving syllogisms, am I contented with merely learning; but I apply in every way the forms of arguments which are presented to me, and I invent others; and the same of convertible propositions. But the necessary principles by which I might become exempted from fear, grief, and passion, and be unrestrained and free, I do not exercise, nor bestow on them the proper care. And, then, I trouble myself what others will say of me; whether I shall appear to them worthy of regard; whether I shall appear happy. Will you not see, foolish man, what

you can say of *yourself*? What sort of person you appear to *yourself* in your opinions, in your desires, in your aversions, in your pursuits, in your preparation, in your intention, in the other proper works of a man? But instead of that, do you trouble yourself whether others pity you? "Very true. But I am pitied without reason." Then are you not pained by this? And is not he who is in pain to be pitied? "Yes." How, then, are you pitied without reason? For you render yourself worthy of pity by what you suffer upon being pitied.

What says Antisthenes, then? Have you never heard? "It is kingly, O Cyrus, to do well and to be ill spoken of." My head is well, and all around me think it aches. What is that to me? I am free from a fever; and they compassionate me as if I had one. "Poor soul, what a long while have you had this fever!" I say, too, with a dismal countenance, Ay, indeed, it is now a long time that I have been ill. "What can be the consequence, then?" What pleases God. And at the same time I secretly laugh at those who pity me. What forbids, then, but that the same may be done in the other case? I am poor, but I have right principles concerning poverty. What is it to me, then, if people pity me for my poverty? I am not in power and others are; but I have such opinions as I ought to have concerning power and the want of power. Let them see to it who pity me. I am neither hungry, nor thirsty, nor cold. But because they are hungry and thirsty, they suppose me to be so too. What can I do for them? Am I to go about making proclamation, and saying, Do not deceive yourselves, good people, I am very well; I care for neither poverty, nor want of power, nor anything

else but right principles ? These I possess unrestrained, and care for nothing further.

But what trifling is this ? How have I right principles when I am not contented to be what I am ; but am in agony, how I shall appear ? “ But others will get more, and be preferred to me.” Well, what is more reasonable, than that they who take pains for anything should get most in that particular direction, in which they take pains ? They have taken pains for power ; you, for right principles : they, for riches ; you, for a proper use of the phenomena of existence. See whether they have the advantage of you in that for which you have taken pains, and which they neglect ; if they judge better concerning the natural bounds and limits of things ; if their desires are less often disappointed than yours, their aversions less often incurred ; if they aim better in their intentions, in their purposes, in their pursuits ; if they preserve a becoming behavior as men, as sons, as parents, and so on with the other relations of life. But if they are in power, and you not, why will you not speak the truth to yourself ; that you do nothing for the sake of power, but that they do everything ? It were very reasonable that he who carefully seeks anything, should be less successful than he who neglects it ! “ No ; but since I take care to have right principles, it is more reasonable that I should excel.” Yes, in respect to what you take pains about, your principles. But give up to others the things in which they have taken more pains than you. Else it is just as if, because you have right principles, you should expect to aim an arrow better than an archer, or to forge better than a smith. Therefore cease to take pains about principles, and apply yourself to those things which

you wish to possess, and then begin crying, if you do not succeed ; for you deserve to cry. But now you claim that you are engaged and absorbed in other things ; and they say well that no man can be of two trades. One man, as soon as he rises and goes out, seeks to whom he may pay his compliments, whom he may flatter, to whom he may send a present, how he may please the favorite ; how, by doing mischief to one, he may oblige another. Whenever he prays, he prays for things like these ; whenever he sacrifices, he sacrifices for things like these. To these he transfers the Pythagorean precept :

“Let not the stealing god of Sleep surprise.”

\* *Where have I failed in point of flattery ? What have I done ? Anything like a free, brave-spirited man ? If he should find anything of this sort, he rebukes and accuses himself. “What business had you to say that ? For could you not have lied ? Even the philosophers say there is no objection against telling a lie.”*

But, on the other hand, if you have in reality been careful about nothing else but to make a right use of the phenomena of existence ; then, as soon as you are up in the morning, consider what you need in order to be free from passion ? What, to enjoy tranquillity ? “In what do I consist ? Merely in body, in estate, in reputation ? None of these. What, then ? I am a reasonable creature. What, then, is required of me ?” Meditate upon your actions. *Where have I failed in any requisite for prosperity ? What have I done, either unfriendly or unsocial ?*

\* See the Pythagorean verses (quoted in B. III. c. 10) of which these questions are a parody.—C.

*What have I omitted that was necessary in these points?*

Since there is so much difference, then, in your desires, your actions, your wishes, would you yet have an equal share with others in those things about which you have not taken pains, and they have? And do you wonder, after all, and are you out of humor if they pity you? But they are not out of humor, if you pity them. Why? Because they are convinced that they are in possession of their proper good; but you are not convinced that you are. Hence you are not contented with your own condition, but desire theirs; whereas they are contented with theirs, and do not desire yours. For if you were really convinced that it is you who are in possession of what is good, and that they are mistaken, you would not so much as think what they say about you.

## CHAPTER VII.

### OF FEARLESSNESS.

**W**HAT makes a tyrant formidable? His guards, say you, and their swords; they who protect his bedchamber; and they who keep out intruders. Why, then, if you bring a child to him amidst these guards, is it not afraid? Is it because the child does not know what they mean? Suppose, then, that any one knows what is meant by guards, and that they are armed with swords; and for that very reason comes in the tyrant's way, being desirous, on account of some misfortune, to die, and seeking to die easily by the hand of another. Does such a man

fear the guards ? No ; for he desires the very thing that renders them formidable. Well, then ; if any one being without an absolute desire to live or die, but indifferent to it, comes in the way of a tyrant, what prevents his approaching him without fear ? Nothing. If, then, another should think concerning his estate, or wife, or children, as this man thinks concerning his body ; and, in short, from some madness or folly should be of such a disposition as not to care whether he has them or not ; but just as children, playing with shells, are busied with the play, but not with the shells, so he should pay no regard to these affairs, except to carry on the play with them, what tyrant, what guards or swords are any longer formidable to such a man ?

And is it possible that any one should be thus disposed towards these things from madness ; and the Galileans from mere habit ; yet that no one should be able to learn, from reason and demonstration, that God made all things in the world, and made the whole world itself unrestrained and perfect ; and all its parts for the use of the whole ? All other creatures are indeed excluded from a power of comprehending the administration of the world ; but a reasonable being has abilities for the consideration of all these things : both that itself is a part, and what part ; and that it is fit the parts should submit to the whole. Besides, being by nature constituted noble, magnanimous, and free, it sees that of the things which relate to it some are unrestrained and in its own power, some restrained and in the power of others : the unrestrained, such as depend on will ; the restrained, such as do not depend on it. And for this reason, if it esteems its good and its interest to

consist in things unrestrained and in its own power, it will be free, prosperous, happy, safe, magnanimous, pious, thankful to God for everything, never finding fault with anything, never censuring anything that is brought about by him. But if it esteems its good and its interest to consist in externals, and things uncontrollable by will, it must necessarily be restrained, be hindered, be enslaved to those who have the power over those things which it admires and fears ; it must necessarily be impious, as supposing itself injured by God, and unjust, as claiming more than its share ; it must necessarily, too, be abject and base.

Why may not he who discerns these things live with an easy and light heart, quietly awaiting whatever may happen, and bearing contentedly what has happened ? Shall it be poverty ? Bring it ; and you shall see what poverty is when it is met well. Would you have power ? Bring toils too along with it. Banishment ? Wherever I go, it will be well with me there ; for it was well with me here, not on account of the place, but of the principles which I shall carry away with me ; for no one can deprive me of these ; on the contrary, they alone are my property, and cannot be taken away ; and their possession suffices me wherever I am, or whatever I do.

“But it is now time to die.” What is that you call dying ? Do not talk of the thing in a tragedy strain ; but state the thing as it is, that it is time for your material part to revert whence it came. And where is the terror of this ? What part of the world is going to be lost ? What is going to happen that is new or prodigious ? Is it for this that a tyrant is formidable ? Is it on this account that the swords of his

guards seem so large and sharp ? Try these things upon others. For my part, I have examined the whole. No one has authority over me. God hath made me free ; I know his commands ; after this no one can enslave me. I have a proper vindicator of my freedom ; proper judges. Are you the master of my body ? But what is that to me ? Of my little estate ? But what is that to me ? Of banishment and chains ? Why all these again, and my whole body, I give up to you ; make a trial of your power whenever you please, and you will find how far it extends.

Whom, then, can I any longer fear ? Those who guard the chamber ? Lest they should do — what ? Shut me out ? If they find me desirous to come in, let them. “Why do you come to the door, then ?” Because it is fitting for me, that while the play lasts I should play too. “How then are you incapable of being shut out ?” Because, if I am not admitted, I would not wish to go in ; but would much rather that things should be as they are, for I esteem what God wills to be better than what I will. To Him I yield myself as a servant and a follower. My pursuits, my desires, my very will, must coincide with His. Being shut out does not affect me ; but those who push to get in. Why, then, do not I push too ? Because I know that there is no really good thing distributed to those who get in. But when I hear any one congratulated on the favor of Caesar, I ask what he has got. “A province.” Has he the needed wisdom also ? “A public office.” Has he with it the knowledge how to use it ? If not, why should I push my way in ?

Some one scatters nuts and figs. Children scram-

ble and quarrel for them; but not men, for they think them trifles. But if any one should scatter shells, not even children would scramble for these. Provinces are being distributed. Let children look to it. Money. Let children look to it. Military command, a consulship. Let children scramble for them. Let these be shut out, be beaten, kiss the hands of the giver, or of his slaves. But to me they are mere figs and nuts. "What, then, is to be done?" If you miss them while he is throwing them, do not trouble yourself about it; but if a fig should fall into your lap, take it, and eat it; for one may pay so much regard even to a fig. But if I am to stoop and throw down one [rival] or be thrown down by another, and flatter those who succeed, a fig is not worth this, nor is any other of those things which are not really good, and which the philosophers have persuaded me not to esteem as good.

Show me the swords of the guards. "See how large and how sharp they are." What, then, can these great and sharp swords do? "They kill." And what can a fever do? "Nothing else." And a [falling] tile? "Nothing else." Do you then wish me to be bewildered by all these things, and to worship them, and to go about as a slave to them all? Heaven forbid! But having once learned that everything that is born must likewise die, (that the world may not be at a stand, nor the course of it hindered,) I no longer see any difference, whether this be effected by a fever, or a tile, or a soldier; but if any comparison is to be made, I know that the soldier will effect it with less pain and more speedily. Since then I neither fear any of those things which he can inflict upon me, nor covet anything which he can bestow,

why do I stand any longer in awe of a tyrant? Why am I amazed at him? Why do I fear his guards? Why do I rejoice, if he speaks kindly to me, and receives me graciously; and why boast to others of my reception? For is he Socrates or Diogenes, that his praise should show what I am? Or have I set my heart on imitating his manners? But to keep up the play I go to him and serve him, so long as he commands nothing unreasonable or improper. But if he should say to me, "Go to Salamis, and bring Leon,"\* I bid him seek another, for I play no longer. "Lead him away." I follow as a part of the play. "But your head will be taken off." And will his own remain on forever; or yours, who obey him? "But you will be thrown out unburied." If I am identical with my corpse, I shall be thrown out; but if I am something else than the corpse, speak more handsomely, as the thing is, and do not think to frighten me. These things are frightful to children and fools. But if any one, who has once entered into the school of a philosopher, knows not what he himself is, then he deserves to be frightened, and to flatter the last object of flattery; if he has not yet learnt that he is neither flesh, nor bones, nor nerves, but is that which makes use of these, and regulates and comprehends the phenomena of existence.

"Well; but these reasonings make men despise the laws." And what reasonings, then, render those who use them more obedient to the laws? But the law of fools is no law. And yet, see how these reasonings render us properly disposed, even towards such persons, since they teach us not to assert against them any claim wherein they can surpass us. They

\* As with Socrates; see note, *ante*, p. 314.

teach us to give up body, to give up estate, children, parents, brothers, to yield everything, to let go everything, excepting only principles ; which even Zeus hath excepted and decreed to be every one's own property. What unreasonableness, what breach of the laws, is there in this ? Where you are superior and stronger, there I give way to you. Where, on the contrary, I am superior, do you submit to me ; for this has been my study, and not yours. Your study has been to walk upon a mosaic floor, to be attended by your servants and clients, to wear fine clothes, to have a great number of hunters, fiddlers, and players. Do I lay any claim to these ? On the other hand, have you made a study of principles, or even of your own reason ? Do you know of what parts it consists ? How they are combined and joined, and with what powers ? Why, then, do you take it amiss, if another, who has studied them, has the advantage of you in these things ? " But they are of all things the greatest." Well ; and who restrains you from being conversant with them, and attending to them ever so carefully ? Or who is better provided with books, with leisure, with assistants ? Only turn your thoughts now and then to these matters ; bestow but a little time upon your own ruling faculty. Consider what is the power you have, and whence it came, that uses all other things, that examines them all, that chooses, that rejects. But while you employ yourself merely about externals, you will possess those indeed beyond all rivals ; but all else will be, just as you elect to have it, sordid and neglected.

## CHAPTER VIII.

CONCERNING SUCH AS HASTILY ASSUME THE  
PHILOSOPHIC DRESS.

NEVER commend or censure any one for common actions, nor attribute to them either skilfulness or unskilfulness ; and thus you will at once be free both from rashness and ill-nature. Such a one bathes hastily. Does he therefore do it ill ? Not at all. But what ? Hastily. “ Is everything well done, then ? ” By no means. But what is done from good principles is well done ; what from bad ones, ill. Till you know from what principle any one acts, neither commend nor censure the action. But the principle is not easily discerned from the external appearance. Such a one is a carpenter. Why ? He uses an axe. What proof is that ? Such a one is a musician, for he sings. What proof is that ? Such a one is a philosopher. Why ? Because he wears a cloak and long hair. What then do mountebanks wear ? And so, when people see any of these acting indecently, they presently say, “ See what the philosopher does.” But they ought rather, from his acting indecently, to say that he is no philosopher. For, if indeed the essence of philosophic pursuits is to wear a cloak and long hair, they say right ; but if it be rather to keep himself free from faults, since he does not fulfil his profession, why do not they deprive him of his title ? For this is the way with regard to other arts. When we see any one handle an axe awkwardly, we do not say, “ Where is the use of this art ? See how poorly carpenters acquit themselves.” But we say the very

contrary, “This man is no carpenter ; for he handles an axe awkwardly.” So, if we hear any one sing badly, we do not say, “Observe how musicians sing,” but rather, “This fellow is no musician.” It is with regard to philosophy alone, that people are thus affected. When they see any one acting inconsistently with the profession of a philosopher, they do not take away his title ; but assuming that he is a philosopher, and then reasoning from his improper behavior, they infer that philosophy is of no use.

“What, then, is the reason of this ?” Because we pay some regard to the idea which we have of a carpenter and a musician, and so of other artists, but not of a philosopher ; which idea being thus vague and confused, we judge of it only from external appearances. And of what other art do we form our opinion from the dress or the hair ? Has it not principles too, and materials, and an aim ? What, then, are the materials of a philosopher ? A cloak ? No, but reason. What his aim ? To wear a cloak ? No, but to have his reason in good order. What are his principles ? Are they how to get a great beard, or long hair ? No, but rather, as Zeno expresses it,—to know the elements of reason, what is each separately and how linked together, and what their consequences.

Why, then, will you not first see, whether when acting improperly he fulfils his profession, ere you proceed to blame the study ? Whereas now, when acting soberly yourself, you say, in regard to whatever he appears to do amiss, “Observe the philosopher !” As if it were proper to call a person, who does such things, a philosopher. And again, “This is philosophical !” But you do not say, “Observe

the carpenter, or observe the musician," when you know one of them to be an adulterer, or see him to be a glutton. So, in some small degree, even you perceive what the profession of a philosopher is; but are misled and confounded by your own carelessness. And, indeed, even those called philosophers enter upon their profession by commonplace beginnings. As soon as they have put on the cloak and let their beards grow, they cry, "I am a philosopher." Yet no one says, "I am a musician," merely because he has bought a fiddle and fiddlestick: nor, "I am a smith," because he is dressed in the cap and apron. But they take their name from their art, not from their garb.

For this reason, Euphrates was in the right to say, "I long endeavored to conceal my embracing the philosophic life; and it was of use to me. For, in the first place, I knew that whatever I did right I did not for spectators, but for myself. I eat in a seemly manner, for my own approbation. I preserved composure of look and manner, all for God and myself. Then, as I contended alone, I alone was in danger. Philosophy was in no danger, on my doing anything shameful or unbecoming; nor did I hurt the rest of the world, which, by offending as a philosopher, I might have done. For this reason, they who were ignorant of my intention, used to wonder that while I conversed and lived entirely with philosophers, I never took up the character. And where was the harm, that I should be discovered to be a philosopher by my actions, rather than by the usual badges? See how I eat, how I drink, how I sleep, how I bear, how I forbear; how I assist others; how I make use of my desires, how of my aversions; how I preserve

the natural and acquired relations, without confusion and without obstruction. Judge of me hence, if you can. But if you are so deaf and blind that you would not suppose Vulcan himself to be a good smith, unless you saw the cap upon his head, where is the harm in not being found out by so foolish a judge?"

It was thus, too, that Socrates concealed himself from the multitude; and some even came and desired him to introduce them to philosophers. Was he accustomed to be displeased, then, like us; and to say, What! do not you take *me* for a philosopher? No, he took them and introduced them; contented with merely being a philosopher, and rejoicing in feeling no annoyance, that he was not thought one. For he remembered his business; and what is the business of a wise and good man? To have many scholars? By no means. Let those see to it who have made this their study. Well, then, is it to be a perfect master of difficult theorems? Let others see to that, too. What, then, was his position, and what did he desire to be? What constituted his hurt or advantage? "If," said he, "any one can still hurt me, I am accomplishing nothing. If I depend for my advantage upon another, I am nothing. Have I any wish unaccomplished? Then I am unhappy." To such a combat he invited every one, and, in my opinion, yielded to no one. But do you think it was by making proclamation, and saying, "I am such a one?" Far from it: but by being such a one. For it is folly and insolence to say, "I am passive and undisturbed. Be it known to you, mortals, that while you are disturbed and vexed about things of no value, I alone am free from all perturbation."

Are you then so little satisfied with your exemption from pain that you must needs make proclamation : “ Come hither all you who have the gout, or the headache, or a fever, or are lame, or blind ; and see *me*, free from every distemper.” This is vain and shocking, unless you can show, like *Æsculapius*, by what method of cure they may presently become as free from distempers as yourself, and can bring your own health as a proof of it.

Such is the Cynic honored with the sceptre and diadem from Zeus ; who says, “ That you may see, O mankind, that you do not seek happiness and tranquillity where it is, but where it is not, behold, I am sent an example to you from God ;— who have neither estate, nor house, nor wife, nor children,— nor even a bed, coat, or furniture. And yet see how in what good condition I am. Try me ; and if you see me free from perturbation, hear the remedies, and by what means I was cured.” This now is benevolent and noble. But consider whose business it is. That of Zeus, or his whom he judges worthy of this office ; that he may never show to the world anything to impeach his own testimony for virtue and against externals.

“ Neither pallid of hue, nor wiping tears from his cheek.” \*

And not only this, but he does not desire or seek for company, or place, or amusement, as boys do the vintage time, or holidays ;— being always fortified by virtuous shame, as others are by walls, and gates, and sentinels.

But now they who have only such an inclination to philosophy as weak stomachs have to some kinds

\* Homer, *Odyssey*, XI. 528, 529.—H.

of food, of which they will presently grow sick, expect to hasten to the sceptre, to the kingdom. They let their hair grow, assume the cloak, bare the shoulder, wrangle with all they meet ; and if they see any one in a thick, warm coat, must needs wrangle with him. First harden yourself against all weather, man. Consider your inclination ; whether it be not that of a weak stomach, or of a longing woman. First study to conceal what you are ; philosophize a little while by yourself. Fruit is produced thus. The seed must first be buried in the ground, lie hid there some time, and grow up by degrees, that it may come to perfection. But if it produces the ear before the stalk has its proper joints, it is imperfect, and of the garden of Adonis.\* Now *you* are a poor plant of this kind. You have blossomed too soon : the winter will kill you. See what countrymen say about seeds of any sort, when the warm weather comes too early. They are in great anxiety for fear the seeds should shoot out too luxuriantly ; and then one frost taking them may show how prejudicial their forwardness was. Beware you too, O man. You have shot out luxuriantly ; you have sprung forth towards a trifling fame, before the proper season. You seem to be somebody, as a fool may among fools. You will be taken by the frost ; or rather, you are already frozen downward at the root ; you still blossom indeed a little at the top, and therefore you think you are still alive and flourishing.

\* At the feast of Adonis there were carried about little earthen pots filled with mould, in which grew several sorts of herbs. These were called gardens ; and from thence the gardens of Adonis came to be proverbially applied to things unfruitful or fading ; because those herbs were only sowed so long before the festival as to sprout forth and be green at that time, and then were presently cast into the water. — C.

Let us, at least, ripen naturally. Why do you lay us open? Why do you force us? We cannot yet bear the air. Suffer the root to grow; then the first, then the second, then the third joint of the stalk to spring from it; and thus nature will force out the fruit, whether I will or not. For who that is charged with such principles, but must perceive, too, his own powers, and strive to put them in practice. Not even a bull is ignorant of his own powers, when any wild beast approaches the herd, nor waits he for any one to encourage him; nor does a dog when he spies any game. And if I have the powers of a good man, shall I wait for you to qualify me for my own proper actions? But believe me, I have them not quite yet. Why, then, would you wish me to be withered before my time, as you are?

## CHAPTER IX.

## CONCERNING A PERSON WHO HAD GROWN IMMODEST.

WHEN you see another in power, set this against it, that you have the advantage of not needing power. When you see another rich, see what you have instead of riches; for if you have nothing in their stead, you are miserable. But if you have the advantage of not needing riches, know that you have something more than he has, and of far greater value. Another possesses a handsome woman; you the happiness of not desiring a handsome woman. Do you think these are little matters? And what would not those very persons give, who are rich and powerful, and possess handsome women, if they were only able

to despise riches and power, and those very women whom they love and whom they possess ! Do not you know of what nature the thirst of one in a fever is ? It has no resemblance to that of a person in health. The latter drinks and is satisfied. But the other, after being delighted a very little while, is nauseated, the water becomes bile, he is sick at his stomach, and becomes more thirsty than ever. It is the same with avarice, ambition, lust. Presently comes jealousy, fear of loss, unbecoming words, designs, and actions.

“ And what,” say you, “ do I lose ? ” You were modest, man, and are so no longer. Have you lost nothing ? Instead of Chrysippus and Zeno, you read Aristides\* and Euenus.† Have you lost nothing, then ? Instead of Socrates and Diogenes, you admire him who can corrupt and seduce most women. You would be handsome, by decking your person, when you are not really so. You love to appear in fine clothes, to attract female eyes ; and, if you anywhere meet with a good perfumer, you esteem yourself a happy man. But formerly you did not so much as think of any of these things ; but only where you might find a decent discourse, a worthy person, a noble design. For this reason, you used to appear like a man both at home and abroad ; to wear a manly dress ; to hold discourses worthy of a man. And after this, do you tell me you have lost nothing ? What then, do men lose nothing but money ? Is not modesty to be lost ? Is not decency to be lost ? Or can he who loses these suffer no injury ? You indeed perhaps no longer think anything of this sort

\* An indecent poet of Miletus.—C.

† A writer of amorous verses.—C.

to be an injury. But there was once a time when you accounted this to be the only injury and hurt; when you were anxiously afraid lest any one should shake your regard from such discourses and actions. See, it is not shaken by another, but by yourself. Fight against yourself, recover yourself to decency, to modesty, to freedom. If you had formerly been told any of these things of me, that one prevailed on me to commit adultery, to wear such a dress as yours, or to be perfumed, would you not have gone and laid violent hands on the man who thus abused me? And will you not now help yourself? For how much easier is that sort of assistance? You need not kill, or fetter, or affront, or go to law with any one; but merely talk with yourself, the person who will most readily be persuaded by you, and with whom no one has greater weight than you. And, in the first place, condemn your actions; but when you have condemned them, do not despair of yourself, nor be like those poor-spirited people who, when they have once given way, abandon themselves entirely, and are carried along as by a torrent. Take example from the wrestling-masters. Has the boy fallen down? Get up again, they say; wrestle again, till you have acquired strength. Be you affected in the same manner. For be assured that there is nothing more tractable than the human mind. You need but will, and it is done, it is set right; as, on the contrary, you need but nod over the work, and it is ruined. For both ruin and recovery are from within.

“And, after all, what good will this do me?” What greater good do you seek? From being impudent, you will become modest; from indecent, decent; from dissolute, sober. But if you seek any

greater things than these, do as you are doing. It is no longer in the power of any God to save you.

## CHAPTER X.

## WHAT THINGS WE ARE TO DESPISE, AND WHAT CHIEFLY TO VALUE.

THE doubts and perplexities of all men are concerning externals;—what they shall do,—how it will be,—what will be the event,—whether this thing will happen, or that? All this is the talk of persons engaged in things uncontrollable by will. For who says, How shall I do, not to assent to what is false? How, not to dissent from what is true? If any one is of such a good disposition as to be anxious about these things, I will remind him: “Why are you anxious? It is in your own power. Be assured. Do not hastily give your assent before you have applied those tests prescribed by nature.” Again, if he be anxious, for fear lest he should fail of what he seeks or incur what he shuns, I will first embrace him, because, slighting what others are fluttered and terrified about, he takes care of what is his own, where his very being is; then I will say to him: “If you would not fail of what you seek, or incur what you shun, desire nothing that belongs to others; shun nothing beyond your own power; otherwise you must necessarily be disappointed in what you seek, and incur what you shun.” Where is the doubt here? Where the room for, *How will it be?* *What will be the event?* And *Will this happen, or that?* Is not the event uncontrollable by will? “Yes.” And

does not the essence of good and evil consist in what is within the control of will? It is in your power, then, to treat every event conformably to nature? Can any one restrain you? "No one." Then do not say to me any more, *How will it be?* For, however it be, you will set it right, and the event to you will be auspicious.

Pray what would Hercules have been, if he had said, "What can be done to prevent a great lion, or a large boar, or savage men, from coming in my way?" Why, what is that to you? If a large boar should come in your way, you will fight the greater combat; if wicked men, you will deliver the world from wicked men. "But then if I should die by this means?" You will die as a good man, in the performance of a gallant action. For since, at all events, one must die, one must necessarily be found doing something, either tilling, or digging, or trading, or serving a consulship, or sick with indigestion or dysentery. At what employment, then, would you have death find you? For my part, I would have it to be some humane, beneficent, public-spirited, noble action. But if I cannot be found doing any such great things, yet, at least, I would be doing what I am incapable of being restrained from, what is given me to do,—correcting myself, improving that faculty which makes use of the phenomena of existence to procure tranquillity, and render to the several relations of life their due; and if I am so fortunate, advancing still further to the security of judging right. If death overtakes me in such a situation, it is enough for me if I can stretch out my hands to God, and say, "The opportunities which I have received from Thee of comprehending and obeying thy administration, I

have not neglected. As far as in me lay, I have not dishonored Thee. See how I have used my perceptions; how my convictions. Have I at any time found fault with Thee? Have I been discontented at Thy dispensations; or wished them otherwise? Have I transgressed the relations of life? I thank Thee that Thou hast brought me into being. I am satisfied with the time that I have enjoyed the things which thou hast given me. Receive them back again, and distribute them as thou wilt; for they were all Thine, and Thou gavest them to me."

Is it not enough to depart in this mood of mind? And what life is better and more becoming than that of such a one? Or what conclusion happier? But in order to attain these advantages, there are no inconsiderable risks to be encountered. You cannot seek a consulship and these things too, nor toil for an estate and these things too, nor take charge of your slaves and yourself too. But if you insist on anything of what belongs to others, then what is your own is lost. This is the nature of the affair. Nothing is to be had for nothing. And where is the wonder? If you would be consul, you must watch, run about, kiss hands, be wearied down with waiting at the doors of others, must say and do many slavish things, send gifts to many, daily presents to some. And for what result? Twelve bundles of rods;\* to sit three or four times on the tribunal; to give the games of the circus, and suppers in baskets to all the world; or let any one show me what there is in it more than this. Will you, then, employ no expense and no pains to acquire peace and tranquillity, to sleep sound while you do sleep, to be thoroughly

\* The ensigns of the consular office. — C.

awake while you are awake, to fear nothing, to be anxious for nothing ? But if anything belonging to you be lost or idly wasted, while you are thus engaged, or another gets what you ought to have had, will you immediately begin fretting at what has happened ? Will you not compare the exchange you have made ? How much for how much ? But you would have such great things for nothing, I suppose. And how can you ? Two trades cannot be combined ; you cannot bestow your care both upon externals and your own ruling faculty. But if you would have the former, let the latter alone ; or you will succeed in neither, while you are drawn in different ways by the two. On the other hand, if you would have the latter, let the former alone. “The oil will be spilled, the furniture will be spoiled ” ;—but still I shall be free from passion. “There will be a fire when I am out of the way, and the books will be destroyed ” ;—but still I shall make a right use of the phenomena of existence. “But I shall have nothing to eat.” If I am so unlucky, dying is a safe harbor. That is the harbor for all, death ; that is the refuge ; and for that reason there is nothing difficult in life. You may go out of doors when you please, and be troubled with smoke no longer.

Why, then, are you anxious ? Why break your rest ? Why do you not calculate where your good and evil lie ; and say, “They are both in my own power ; nor can any deprive me of the one, nor involve me against my will in the other.” Why, then, do not I lay myself down and sleep ? What is my own is safe. Let what belongs to others look to itself, who carries it off, how it is distributed by him who hath the disposal of it. Who am I, to will that it

should be so and so? For is the option given to me? Has any one made me the dispenser of it? What I have in my own disposal is enough for me. I must make the best I can of this. Other things must be as their master pleases.

Does any one who has these things before his eyes lie sleepless, and shift from side to side? What would he have, or what needs he? Patroclus,\* or Antilochus, or Menelaus? Why, did he ever think any one of his friends immortal? When was it not obvious that on the morrow, or the next day, he himself or that friend might die? "Ay, very true," he says; "but I reckoned that he would survive me, and bring up my son." Because you were a fool, and reckoned upon uncertainties. Why, then, do you not blame yourself, instead of sitting in tears, like a girl? "But he used to set my dinner before me." Because he was alive, foolish man; but now he cannot. But Automedon will set it before you; and if he should die, you will find somebody else. What if the vessel in which your meat used to be cooked should happen to be broken; must you die with hunger because you have not your old vessel? Do you not send and buy a new one?

"What greater evil could afflict my breast?"

Is *this* your evil, then? And, instead of removing it, do you accuse your mother, that she did not foretell it to you, that you might have spent your whole life in grieving from that time forward?

Do you not think now that Homer composed all this on purpose to show us that the noblest, the

\* This whole paragraph refers to the lament of Achilles over Patroclus. Iliad, XIX. 315, etc.—H.

strongest, the richest, the handsomest of men may nevertheless be the most unfortunate and wretched, if they have not the principles they need ?

## CHAPTER XI.

## OF PURITY.

SOME doubt whether the love of society be comprehended in the nature of man ; and yet these very persons do not seem to me to doubt but that purity is by all means comprehended in it ; and that by this, if by anything, it is distinguished from brute animals. When, therefore, we see any animal cleaning itself, we are apt to cry with wonder, that it is like a human creature. On the contrary, if an animal is censured, we are presently apt to say, by way of excuse, that it is not a human creature. Such excellence do we suppose to be in man, which we first received from the Gods. For as they are by nature pure and uncorrupt, in proportion as men approach to them by reason, they are tenacious of purity and incorruption. But since it is impracticable that their essence, composed of such materials, should be absolutely pure, it is the office of reason to endeavor to render it as pure as possible.

The first and highest purity or impurity, then, is that which is formed in the soul. But you will not find the impurity of the soul and body to be alike. For what stain can you find in the soul, unless it be something which renders it impure in its operations ? Now the operations of the soul are its pursuits and avoidances, its desires, aversions, preparations, inten-

tions, assents. What, then, is that which renders it defiled and impure in these operations? Nothing else than its perverse judgments. So that the impurity of the soul consists in wicked principles, and its purification in forming right principles; and that is pure which has right principles, for that alone is unmixed and undefiled in its operations.

Now we should, as far as possible, endeavor after something like this in the body, too. It is impossible but that in such a composition as man, there must be a discharge of superfluous phlegm. For this reason, Nature has made hands, and the nostrils themselves as channels to let out the moisture; nor can this be neglected with propriety. It was impossible but that the feet should be bemired and soiled from what they pass through. Therefore Nature has prepared water and hands. It was impossible but that some uncleanness must cleave to the teeth from eating. Therefore, she says, rinse your teeth. Why? That you may be a man, and not a wild beast, or a swine. It was impossible but that, from perspiration and the pressure of the clothes, something dirty and necessary to be cleaned should remain upon the body. For this there is water, oil, hands, towels, brushes, soap, and other necessary apparatus for its purification. But no; a smith indeed will get the rust off his iron, and have proper instruments for that purpose; and you yourself will have your plates washed before you eat, unless you are quite dirty and slovenly; but you will not wash nor purify your body. "Why should I?" say you. I tell you again, in the first place, that you may be like a man; and, in the next, that you may not offend those with whom you converse. Do you think it fitting to smell offensively?

Be it so. But is it fitting as regards those who sit near you? Who are placed at the table with you? Who salute you? Either go into a desert, as you deserve, or live solitary at home, and be the only sufferer. But to what sort of character does it belong to live in a city, and behave so carelessly and inconsiderately? If Nature had trusted even a horse to your care, would you have overlooked and neglected him? Yet now, without being sensible of it, you do something like this. Consider your body as committed to you, instead of a horse. Wash it, rub it, take care that it may not be any one's aversion, nor disgust any one. Who is not more disgusted at a foul, unwholesome-looking sloven, than at a person who has been accidentally rolled in filth? The stench of the one is adventitious, from without; but that which arises from want of care is a kind of inward putrefaction. "But Socrates bathed but seldom." Yet his person looked clean, and was so agreeable and pleasing, that the most beautiful and noble youths were fond of him, and desired rather to sit by him than by those who had the finest persons. He might have omitted both bathing and washing, if he had pleased; and yet his amount of bathing had its effect. Cold water may supply the place of the warm bath. "But Aristophanes calls him one of the pallid, barefooted philosophers."<sup>\*</sup> Why, so he says, too, that he walked in the air, and stole clothes from the Palæstra. Besides, all who have written of Socrates, affirm quite the contrary; that he was not only agreeable in his conversation, but in his person too. And, again, they write the same of Diogenes. For we ought not to frighten the world from philosophy by the appear-

\* *Clouds*, I. 103. — H.

ance of our persons; but to show our serenity of mind, as in all other ways, so in the care of our persons. "See, all of you, that I have nothing; that I want nothing. Without house, without city, and an exile (if that happens to be the case), and without a home, I live more easily and prosperously than the noble and rich. Look upon my person, too, that it is not injured by coarse fare." But if any one should tell me this, bearing the habit and the visage of a condemned criminal, what God should persuade me to come near philosophy, while it renders men such figures? Heaven forbid! I would not do it, even if I was sure to become a wise man for my pains. I declare, for my own part, I would rather that a young man, on his first inclination to philosophy, should come to me finically dressed, than with his hair spoiled and dirty. For there appears in him some idea of beauty and desire of decency; and where he imagines it to be, there he applies his endeavors. One has nothing more to do but to point it out to him, and say, "You seek beauty, young man, and you do well. Be assured, then, that it springs from the rational part of you. Seek it there, where the pursuits and avoidances, the desires and aversions, are concerned. Herein consists your excellence; but the paltry body is by nature clay. Why do you trouble yourself, to no purpose, about it? You will be convinced by time, if not otherwise, that it is nothing." But if he should come to me soiled and dirty, with moustaches drooping to his knees, what can I say to him? By what similitude allure him? For what has he studied which has any resemblance to beauty, that I may transfer his attention, and say that beauty is not there, but here?

Would you have me tell him that beauty consists not in filth, but in reason ? For has he any desire of beauty ? Has he any appearance of it ? Go, and argue with a hog not to roll in the mire.

It was in the quality of a young man who loved beauty, that Polemo was touched by the discourses of Xenocrates. For he entered with some incentives to the study of beauty, though he sought in the wrong place. And, indeed, Nature hath not made the very brutes dirty which live with man. Does a horse wallow in the mire ? Or a good dog ? But swine, and dirty geese, and worms, and spiders, which are banished to the greatest distance from human society. Will you, then, who are a man, choose not to be even one of the animals that are conversant with man ; but rather a worm or a spider ? Will you not bathe sometimes, be it in whatever manner you please ? Will you never use water to wash yourself ? Will you not come clean, that they who converse with you may have some pleasure in you ? But will you accompany us, in your uncleanness, even to the temples, where all unclean ways are forbidden ?

What, then, would anybody have you adorn yourself to the utmost ? By no means, except in those things where our nature requires it, in reason, principles, actions ; but in our persons, only so far as neatness requires, so far as not to give offence. But if you hear that it is not right to wear purple, you must go, I suppose, and roll your cloak in the mud, or tear it. "But how can I have a fine cloak ?" You have water, man ; wash it. What an amiable youth is here ! How worthy this old man, to love and be loved ! A fit person to be trusted with the

instruction of our sons and daughters, and attended by young people as occasion may require,—to read them lectures from a dunghill! Every deterioration takes its origin from something human; but this almost dehumanizes a man.

## CHAPTER XII.

## OF TAKING PAINS.

WHEN you cease to take pains for a little while, do not fancy you may recommence whenever you please, but remember this, that by means of the fault of to-day, your affairs must necessarily be in a worse condition for the future. The first and worst evil is that there arises a habit of neglect; and then a habit of postponing effort, and constantly procrastinating as to one's successes and good behavior and orderly thought and action. Now if procrastination as to anything is advantageous, it must be still more advantageous to omit it altogether; but if it be not advantageous, why do you not take pains all the time? "I would play to-day." What then? Ought you not to take proper pains about it? "I would sing." But why not take proper pains about it? For there is no part of life exempted, about which pains are not needed. For will you do anything the worse by taking pains, and the better by neglect? What else in life is best performed by heedless people? Does a smith forge the better by heedlessness? Does a pilot steer more safely by heedlessness? Or is any other, even of the minutest operations, best performed heedlessly? Do you not perceive that,

when you have let your mind loose, it is no longer in your power to call it back, either to propriety, or modesty, or moderation? But you do everything at haphazard; you merely follow your inclinations.

“To what, then, am I to direct my pains.”

Why, in the first place, to those universal maxims which you must always have at hand; and not sleep, or arise, or drink, or eat, or converse without them:—that no one is the master of another’s will; and that it is in the will alone that good and evil lie. No one, therefore, is my master, either to procure me any good, or to involve me in any evil; but I alone have the disposal of myself with regard to these things. Since these, then, are secured to me, what need have I to be troubled about externals? What tyrant is formidable? What disease? What poverty? What offence? “I have not pleased such a one.” Is he my concern then? Is he my conscience? “No.” Why, then, do I trouble myself any further about him? “But he is thought to be of some consequence.” Let him look to that; and they who think him so. But I have One whom I must please, to whom I must submit, whom I must obey; God, and those who surround Him. He has intrusted me with myself, and made my will subject to myself alone, having given me rules for the right use of it. If I follow the proper rules in syllogisms, in convertible propositions, I do not heed or regard any one who says anything contrary to them. Why, then, am I vexed at being censured in matters of greater consequence? What is the reason of this perturbation? Nothing else, but that in this instance I want practice. For every science despises ignorance and the ignorant; and not only the sciences,

but even the arts. Take any shoemaker, take any smith you will, and he may laugh at the rest of the world, so far as his own business is concerned.

In the first place, then, these are the maxims we must have ready, and do nothing without them, but direct the soul to this mark. To pursue nothing external, nothing that belongs to others, but as He who hath the power hath appointed. Things controllable by will are to be pursued always ; and the rest as may be permitted. Besides this, we must remember who we are, and what name we bear, endeavoring to use all the circumstances of life in their proper relations ; what is the proper time for singing, what for play, and in what company ; what will be the consequence of our performance ; whether our companions will despise us, or we ourselves ; when to employ railing, and whom to ridicule ; upon what occasions to comply, and with whom ; and then, in complying, how to preserve our own character.

Wherever you deviate from any of these rules, the damage is immediate ; not from anything external, but from the very action itself. "What, then, is it possible by these means to be faultless ?" Impracticable ; but this is possible, to use a constant endeavor to be faultless. For we shall have cause to be satisfied, if, by never remitting our pains, we shall be exempt at least from a few faults. But now, when you say you will begin to take pains to-morrow, be assured that it is the same thing as if you said, "To-day I will be shameless, impudent, base, it shall be in the power of others to grieve me ; I will be passionate, I will be envious to-day." See to how many evils you give yourself up. "But all will be well to-morrow." How much better to-day ? If it be for

your interest to-morrow, how much more to-day, that it may be in your power to-morrow too, and that you may not again defer it until the third day.

## CHAPTER XIII.

## CONCERNING SUCH AS ARE TOO COMMUNICATIVE.

WHEN any one appears to us to discourse frankly of his own affairs, we too are somehow tempted to disclose our secrets to him; and we consider this to be acting with frankness. First, because it seems unfair that when we have heard the affairs of our neighbor, we should not in return communicate ours to him; and besides we think that we shall not appear of a frank character, in concealing what belongs to ourselves. Indeed it is often said, "I have told you all my affairs; and will you tell me none of yours? How happens this?" Lastly, it is supposed that we may safely trust him who has already trusted us; for we imagine that he will never discover our affairs, for fear we should in turn discover his. It is thus that the inconsiderate are caught by the soldiers at Rome. A soldier sits by you in a civilian's dress, and begins to speak ill of Cæsar. Then you, as if you had received a pledge of his fidelity, by his first beginning the abuse, say likewise what you think; and so you are led away in chains to execution.

Something like this is the case with us in general. But when one has safely intrusted his secrets to me, shall I, in imitation of him, trust mine to any one who comes in my way? The case is different. I indeed

hold my tongue (supposing me to be of such a disposition); but he goes and discovers them to everybody; and then, when I come to find it out, if I happen to be like him, from a desire of revenge, I discover his; and asperse and am aspersed. But if I remember that one man does not hurt another; but that every one is hurt or profited by his own actions, I may indeed keep to this, not to do anything like him; yet, by my own talkative folly, I suffer what I do suffer.

“Ay; but it is unfair, when you have heard the secrets of your neighbor, not to communicate anything to him in return.” Why, did I ask you to do it, sir? Did you tell me your affairs upon condition that I should tell you mine in return? If you are a gossip, and take all you meet for friends, would you have me too become like you? But what if the case be this; that you did right in trusting your affairs to me, but it is not right that I should trust you? Would you have me run headlong, and fall? This is just as if I had a sound barrel, and you a leaky one; and you should come and deposit your wine with me, to be put into my barrel; and then should take it ill, that, in my turn, I did not trust you with my wine. No. You have a leaky barrel. How, then, are we any longer upon equal terms? You have intrusted your affairs to an honest man, and a man of honor; one who finds his help or harm in his own actions alone, and in nothing external. Would you have me intrust mine to you, who have dis-honored your own will, and who would get a paltry sum, or a post of power or preferment at court, even if it required you to kill your own children, like Medea? Where is the fairness in this? But show

me that you are faithful, honorable, steady ; show me that you have principles conducive to friendship ; show me that your vessel is not leaky, and you shall see that I will not wait for you to intrust your affairs to me, but I will come and entreat you to hear mine. For who would not make use of a good vessel ? Who despises a benevolent and friendly adviser ? Who will not gladly receive one to share the burden, as it were, of his difficulties ; and by sharing, to make it lighter ? " Well ; but I trust you, and you do not trust me." In the first place, you do not really trust me ; but you are a gossip, and therefore can keep nothing in. For if the former be the case, trust only me. But now, whenever you see a man at leisure, you sit down by him, and say : " My dear friend, there is not a man in the world who wishes me better, or has more kindness for me, than you ; I entreat you to hear my affairs." And this you do to those with whom you have not the least acquaintance. But if you do trust me, it is plainly as a man of fidelity and honor, and not because I have told you my affairs. Let me alone, then, till I reciprocate this opinion. Convince me that, if a person has told his affairs to any one, it is a proof of his being a man of fidelity and honor. For if this were the case, I would go about and tell my affairs to the whole world, if I could thus become a man of fidelity and honor. But that is no such matter ; for it demands of a man to have no ordinary principles.

If, then, you see any one taking pains for things that belong to others, and subjecting his will to them, be assured that this man has a thousand things to compel and restrain him. He has no need of burning pitch, or the torturing wheel, to make him tell

what he knows ; but the nod of a girl, for instance, will shake his purpose ; the good-will of a courtier, the desire of an office, of an inheritance ; ten thousand other things of that sort. It must therefore be remembered in general, that confidential discourses require fidelity and a certain sort of principles. And where, at this time, are these easily to be found ? Pray let any one show me a person of such a disposition as to say, I concern myself only for those things which are my own, incapable of restraint, and by nature free. This I esteem the essence of good. Let the rest be as it may happen ; it makes no difference to me.

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**THE ENCHIRIDION, OR MANUAL.**



## THE ENCHIRIDION.

## I.

THERE are things which are within our power, and there are things which are beyond our power. Within our power are opinion, aim, desire, aversion, and, in one word, whatever affairs are our own. Beyond our power are body, property, reputation, office, and, in one word, whatever are not properly our own affairs.

Now the things within our power are by nature free, unrestricted, unhindered; but those beyond our power are weak, dependent, restricted, alien. Remember then, that, if you attribute freedom to things by nature dependent, and take what belongs to others for your own; you will be hindered, you will lament, you will be disturbed, you will find fault both with Gods and men. But if you take for your own only that which is your own, and view what belongs to others just as it really is, then no one will ever compel you, no one will restrict you, you will find fault with no one, you will accuse no one, you will do nothing against your will; no one will hurt you, you will not have an enemy, nor will you suffer any harm.

Aiming therefore at such great things, remember that you must not allow yourself any inclination, however slight, towards the attainment of the others; but that you must entirely quit some of them, and

for the present postpone the rest. But if you would have these, and possess power and wealth likewise, you may miss the latter in seeking the former ; and you will certainly fail of that, by which alone happiness and freedom are procured.

Seek at once, therefore, to be able to say to every unpleasing semblance, " You are but a semblance and by no means the real thing." And then examine it by those rules which you have ; and first and chiefly, by this : whether it concerns the things which are within our own power, or those which are not ; and if it concerns anything beyond our power, be prepared to say that it is nothing to you.

## II.

Remember that desire demands the attainment of that of which you are desirous ; and aversion demands the avoidance of that to which you are averse ; that he who fails of the object of his desires, is disappointed ; and he who incurs the object of his aversion, is wretched. If, then, you shun only those undesirable things which you can control, you will never incur anything which you shun. But if you shun sickness, or death, or poverty, you will run the risk of wretchedness. Remove aversion, then, from all things that are not within our power, and transfer it to things undesirable, which are within our power. But for the present altogether restrain desire ; for if you desire any of the things not within our own power, you must necessarily be disappointed ; and you are not yet secure of those which are within our power, and so are legitimate objects of desire. Where it is practically necessary for you to pursue or avoid anything, do even this with discretion, and gentleness, and moderation.

## III.

With regard to whatever objects either delight the mind, or contribute to use, or are tenderly beloved, remind yourself of what nature they are, beginning with the merest trifles: if you have a favorite cup, that it is a cup of which you are fond; for thus, if it is broken, you can bear it: if you embrace your child, or your wife, that you embrace a mortal; and thus, if either of them dies, you can bear it.

## IV.

When you set about any action, remind yourself of what nature the action is. If you are going to bathe, represent to yourself the incidents usual in the bath; some persons pouring out, others pushing in, others scolding, others pilfering. And thus you will more safely go about this action, if you say to yourself, "I will now go to bathe, and keep my own will in harmony with nature." And so with regard to every other action. For thus, if any impediment arises in bathing, you will be able to say, "It was not only to bathe that I desired, but to keep my will in harmony with nature; and I shall not keep it thus, if I am out of humor at things that happen."

## V.

Men are disturbed not by things, but by the views which they take of things. Thus death is nothing terrible, else it would have appeared so to Socrates. But the terror consists in our notion of death, that it is terrible. When, therefore, we are hindered, or disturbed, or grieved, let us never impute it to others, but to ourselves; that is, to our own views. It is the action of an uninstructed person to reproach

others for his own misfortunes ; of one entering upon instruction, to reproach himself ; and of one perfectly instructed, to reproach neither others nor himself.

## VI.

Be not elated at any excellence not your own. If a horse should be elated, and say, "I am handsome," it might be endurable. But when you are elated, and say, "I have a handsome horse," know that you are elated only on the merit of the horse. What, then, is your own ? The use of the phenomena of existence. So that when you are in harmony with nature in this respect, you will be elated with some reason ; for you will be elated at some good of your own.

## VII.

As in a voyage, when the ship is at anchor, if you go on shore to get water, you may amuse yourself with picking up a shell-fish or a truffle in your way ; but your thoughts ought to be bent towards the ship, and perpetually attentive, lest the captain should call ; and then you must leave all these things, that you may not have to be carried on board the vessel, bound like a sheep. Thus likewise in life, if, instead of a truffle or shell-fish, such a thing as a wife or a child be granted you, there is no objection ; but if the captain calls, run to the ship, leave all these things, and never look behind. But if you are old, never go far from the ship, lest you should be missing when called for.

## VIII.

Demand not that events should happen as you wish ; but wish them to happen as they do happen, and you will go on well.

## IX.

Sickness is an impediment to the body, but not to the will, unless itself pleases. Lameness is an impediment to the leg, but not to the will ; and say this to yourself with regard to everything that happens. For you will find it to be an impediment to something else, but not truly to yourself.

## X.

Upon every accident, remember to turn towards yourself and inquire what faculty you have for its use. If you encounter a handsome person, you will find continence the faculty needed ; if pain, then fortitude ; if reviling, then patience. And when thus habituated, the phenomena of existence will not overwhelm you.

## XI.

Never say of anything, “I have lost it”; but, “I have restored it.” Has your child died ? It is restored. Has your wife died ? She is restored. Has your estate been taken away ? That likewise is restored. “But it was a bad man who took it.” What is it to you, by whose hands He who gave it hath demanded it again ? While He permits you to possess it, hold it as something not your own ; as do travellers at an inn.

## XII.

If you would improve, lay aside such reasonings as these : “If I neglect my affairs, I shall not have a maintenance ; if I do not punish my servant, he will be good for nothing.” For it were better to die of hunger, exempt from grief and fear, than to live in affluence with perturbation ; and it is better that your servant should be bad than you unhappy.

Begin therefore with little things. Is a little oil spilt or a little wine stolen ? Say to yourself, "This is the price paid for peace and tranquillity ; and nothing is to be had for nothing." And when you call your servant, consider that it is possible he may not come at your call ; or, if he does, that he may not do what you wish. But it is not at all desirable for him, and very undesirable for you, that it should be in his power to cause you any disturbance.

## XIII.

If you would improve, be content to be thought foolish and dull with regard to externals. Do not desire to be thought to know anything ; and though you should appear to others to be somebody, distrust yourself. For be assured, it is not easy at once to keep your will in harmony with nature, and to secure externals ; but while you are absorbed in the one, you must of necessity neglect the other.

## XIV.

If you wish your children, and your wife, and your friends, to live forever, you are foolish ; for you wish things to be in your power which are not so ; and what belongs to others, to be your own. So likewise, if you wish your servant to be without fault, you are foolish ; for you wish vice not to be vice, but something else. But if you wish not to be disappointed in your desires, that is in your own power. Exercise, therefore, what is in your power. A man's master is he who is able to confer or remove whatever that man seeks or shuns. Whoever then would be free, let him wish nothing, let him decline nothing, which depends on others ; else he must necessarily be a slave.

## XV.

Remember that you must behave as at a banquet. Is anything brought round to you? Put out your hand, and take a moderate share. Does it pass by you? Do not stop it. Is it not yet come? Do not yearn in desire towards it, but wait till it reaches you. So with regard to children, wife, office, riches; and you will some time or other be worthy to feast with the Gods. And if you do not so much as take the things which are set before you, but are able even to forego them, then you will not only be worthy to feast with the Gods, but to rule with them also. For, by thus doing, Diogenes and Heraclitus, and others like them, deservedly became divine, and were so recognized.

## XVI.

When you see any one weeping for grief, either that his son has gone abroad, or that he has suffered in his affairs; take care not to be overcome by the apparent evil. But discriminate, and be ready to say, "What hurts this man is not this occurrence itself, for another man might not be hurt by it;—but the view he chooses to take of it." As far as conversation goes, however, do not disdain to accommodate yourself to him, and if need be, to groan with him. Take heed, however, not to groan inwardly too.

## XVII.

Remember that you are an actor in a drama of such sort as the author chooses. If short, then in a short one; if long, then in a long one. If it be his pleasure that you should act a poor man, see that you act it well; or a cripple, or a ruler, or a pri-

vate citizen. For this is your business, to act well the given part; but to choose it, belongs to another.

## XVIII.

When a raven happens to croak unluckily, be not overcome by appearances, but discriminate, and say, "Nothing is portended to *me*; but either to my paltry body, or property, or reputation, or children, or wife. But to *me* all portents are lucky, if I will. For whatsoever happens, it belongs to me to derive advantage therefrom."

## XIX.

You can be unconquerable, if you enter into no combat, in which it is not in your own power to conquer. When, therefore, you see any one eminent in honors or power, or in high esteem on any other account, take heed not to be bewildered by appearances and to pronounce him happy; for if the essence of good consists in things within our own power, there will be no room for envy or emulation. But, for your part, do not desire to be a general, or a senator, or a consul, but to be free; and the only way to this is, a disregard of things which lie not within our own power.

## XX.

Remember that it is not he who gives abuse or blows who affronts; but the view we take of these things as insulting. When, therefore, any one provokes you, be assured that it is your own opinion which provokes you. Try, therefore, in the first place, not to be bewildered by appearances. For if you once gain time and respite, you will more easily command yourself.

## XXI.

Let death and exile, and all other things which appear terrible, be daily before your eyes, but death chiefly; and you will never entertain any abject thought, nor too eagerly covet anything.

## XXII.

If you have an earnest desire towards philosophy, prepare yourself from the very first to have the multitude laugh and sneer, and say, "He is returned to us a philosopher all at once"; and "Whence this supercilious look?" Now for your part, do not have a supercilious look indeed; but keep steadily to those things which appear best to you, as one appointed by God to this particular station. For remember that, if you are persistent, those very persons who at first ridiculed, will afterwards admire you. But if you are conquered by them, you will incur a double ridicule.

## XXIII.

If you ever happen to turn your attention to externals, for the pleasure of any one, be assured that you have ruined your scheme of life. Be contented, then, in everything, with being a philosopher; and, if you wish to seem so likewise to any one, appear so to yourself, and it will suffice you.

## XXIV.

Let not such considerations as these distress you: "I shall live in discredit, and be nobody anywhere." For if discredit be an evil, you can no more be involved in evil through another, than in baseness. Is it any business of yours, then, to get power, or to be admitted to an entertainment? By no means. How

then, after all, is this discredit ? And how is it true that you will be nobody anywhere ; when you ought to be somebody in those things only which are within your own power, in which you may be of the greatest consequence ? "But my friends will be unassisted." What do you mean by unassisted ? They will not have money from you ; nor will you make them Roman citizens. Who told you, then, that these are among the things within our own power ; and not rather the affairs of others ? And who can give to another the things which he himself has not ? "Well, but get them, then, that we too may have a share." If I can get them with the preservation of my own honor, and fidelity, and self-respect, show me the way, and I will get them ; but if you require me to lose my own proper good, that you may gain what is no good, consider how unreasonable and foolish you are. Besides, which would you rather have, a sum of money, or a faithful and honorable friend ? Rather assist me, then, to gain this character, than require me to do those things by which I may lose it. Well, but my country, say you, as far as depends upon me, will be unassisted. Here again, what assistance is this you mean ? It will not have porticos nor baths of your providing ? And what signifies that ? Why, neither does a smith provide it with shoes, nor a shoemaker with arms. It is enough if every one fully performs his own proper business. And were you to supply it with another faithful and honorable citizen, would not he be of use to it ? Yes. Therefore neither are you yourself useless to it. "What place then," say you, "shall I hold in the state ?" Whatever you can hold with the preservation of your fidelity and honor. But if, by de-

siring to be useful to that, you lose these, how can you serve your country, when you have become faithless and shameless ?

## XXV.

Is any one preferred before you at an entertainment, or in courtesies, or in confidential intercourse ? If these things are good, you ought to rejoice that he has them ; and if they are evil, do not be grieved that you have them not. And remember that you cannot be permitted to rival others in externals, without using the same means to obtain them. For how can he, who will not haunt the door of any man, will not attend him, will not praise him, have an equal share with him who does these things ? You are unjust, then, and unreasonable, if you are unwilling to pay the price for which these things are sold, and would have them for nothing. For how much are lettuces sold ? An obolus, for instance. If another, then, paying an obolus takes the lettuces, and you, not paying it, go without them, do not imagine that he has gained any advantage over you. For as he has the lettuces, so you have the obolus which you did not give. So, in the present case, you have not been invited to such a person's entertainment; because you have not paid him the price for which a supper is sold. It is sold for praise ; it is sold for attendance. Give him, then, the value, if it be for your advantage. But if you would at the same time not pay the one, and yet receive the other, you are unreasonable and foolish. Have you nothing, then, in place of the supper ? Yes, indeed you have ; not to praise him whom you do not like to praise ; not to bear the insolence of his lackeys.

## XXVI.

The will of Nature may be learned from things upon which we are all agreed. As, when our neighbor's boy has broken a cup, or the like, we are ready at once to say, "These are casualties that will happen." Be assured, then, that when your own cup is likewise broken, you ought to be affected just as when another's cup was broken. Now apply this to greater things. Is the child or wife of another dead? There is no one who would not say, "This is an accident of mortality." But if any one's own child happens to die, it is immediately, "Alas! how wretched am I!" It should be always remembered how we are affected on hearing the same thing concerning others.

## XXVII.

As a mark \* is not set up for the sake of missing the aim, so neither does the nature of evil exist in the world.

## XXVIII.

If a person had delivered up your body to some passer-by, you would certainly be angry. And do you feel no shame in delivering up your own mind to any reviler, to be disconcerted and confounded?

XXIX.†

## XXX.

Duties are universally measured by relations. Is a certain man your father? In this are implied, tak-

\* Happiness, the effect of virtue, is the mark which God hath set up for us to aim at. Our missing it is no work of His; nor so properly anything real, as a mere negative and failure of our own.—C.

† This chapter, except some very trifling differences, is the same with the fifteenth of the third book of the Discourses, and therefore unnecessary to be repeated here.—C.

ing care of him; submitting to him in all things; patiently receiving his reproaches, his correction. But he is a bad father. Is your natural tie, then, to a *good* father? No, but to a father. Is a brother unjust? Well, preserve your own just relation towards him. Consider not what *he* does; but what *you* are to do, to keep your own will in a state conformable to nature. For another cannot hurt you, unless you please. You will then be hurt when you consent to be hurt. In this manner, therefore, if you accustom yourself to contemplate the relations of neighbor, citizen, commander, you can deduce from each the corresponding duties.

## XXXI.

Be assured that the essence of piety towards the Gods lies in this, to form right opinions concerning them, as existing, and as governing the universe justly and well. And fix yourself in this resolution, to obey them, and yield to them, and willingly follow them amidst all events, as being ruled by the most perfect wisdom. For thus you will never find fault with the Gods, nor accuse them of neglecting you. And it is not possible for this to be effected in any other way, than by withdrawing yourself from things which are not within our own power, and by making good or evil to consist only in those which are. For if you suppose any other things to be either good or evil, it is inevitable that, when you are disappointed of what you wish, or incur what you would avoid, you should reproach and blame their authors. For every creature is naturally formed to flee and abhor things that appear hurtful, and that which causes them; and to pursue and admire those which appear

beneficial, and that which causes them. It is impracticable, then, that one who supposes himself to be hurt, should rejoice in the person who, as he thinks hurts him ; just as it is impossible to rejoice in the hurt itself. Hence, also, a father is reviled by his son, when he does not impart the things which seem to be good ; and this made Polynices and Eteocles mutually enemies, that empire seemed good to both. On this account the husbandman reviles the Gods ;—the sailor, the merchant, or those who have lost wife or child. For where our interest is, there too is piety directed. So that whoever is careful to regulate his desires and aversions as he ought, is thus made careful of piety likewise. But it also becomes incumbent on every one to offer libations, and sacrifices, and first-fruits, according to the customs of his country, purely, and not heedlessly nor negligently nor avariciously, nor yet extravagantly.

## XXXII.

When you have recourse to divination, remember that you know not what the event will be, and you come to learn it of the diviner ; but of what nature it is you knew before coming ; at least, if you are of philosophic mind. For if it is among the things now within our own power, it can by no means be either good or evil. Do not, therefore, bring with you to the diviner either desire or aversion,—else you will approach him trembling,—but first clearly understand, that every event is indifferent, and nothing to *you*, of whatever sort it may be ; for it will be in your power to make a right use of it, and this no one can hinder. Then come with confidence to the Gods as your counsellors ; and afterwards, when any coun-

sel is given you, remember what counsellors you have assumed, and whose advice you will neglect, if you disobey. Come to divination, as Socrates prescribed, in cases of which the whole consideration relates to the event, and in which no opportunities are afforded by reason, or any other art, to discover the matter in view. When, therefore, it is our duty to share the danger of a friend or of our country, we ought not to consult the oracle as to whether we shall share it with them or not. For though the diviner should forewarn you that the auspices are unfavorable, this means no more than that either death or mutilation or exile is portended. But we have reason within us; and it directs us, even with these hazards, to stand by our friend and our country. Attend, therefore, to the greater diviner, the Pythian God, who once cast out of the temple him who neglected to save his friend.\*

### XXXIII.

Begin by prescribing to yourself some character and demeanor, such as you may preserve both alone and in company.

Be mostly silent; or speak merely what is needful, and in few words. We may, however, enter sparingly into discourse sometimes, when occasion calls for it; but let it not run on any of the common subjects, as gladiators, or horse-races, or athletic champions, or food, or drink,—the vulgar topics of conversation; and especially not on men, so as either to blame, or praise, or make comparisons. If you are

\* This refers to an anecdote given in full by Simplicius, in his commentary on this passage, of a man assaulted and killed, on his way to consult the oracle, while his companion, deserting him, took refuge in the temple, till cast out by the Deity.—H.

able, then, by your own conversation, bring over that of your company to proper subjects ; but if you happen to find yourself among strangers, be silent.

Let not your laughter be loud, frequent, or abundant.

Avoid taking oaths, if possible, altogether ; at any rate, so far as you are able.

Avoid public and vulgar entertainments ; but if ever an occasion calls you to them, keep your attention upon the stretch, that you may not imperceptibly slide into vulgarity. For be assured that if a person be ever so pure himself, yet, if his companion be corrupted, he who converses with him will be corrupted likewise.

Provide things relating to the body no farther than absolute need requires ; as meat, drink, clothing, house, retinue. But cut off everything that looks towards show and luxury.

Before marriage, guard yourself with all your ability from unlawful intercourse with women ; yet be not uncharitable or severe to those who are led into this, nor frequently boast that you yourself do otherwise.

If any one tells you that such a person speaks ill of you, do not make excuses about what is said of you, but answer : "He was ignorant of my other faults, else he would not have mentioned these alone."

It is not necessary for you to appear often at public spectacles ; but if ever there is a proper occasion for you to be there, do not appear more solicitous for any other, than for yourself ; that is, wish things to be only just as they are, and only the best man to win ; for thus nothing will go against you. But abstain entirely from acclamations, and derision, and

violent emotions. And when you come away, do not discourse a great deal on what has passed, and what contributes nothing to your own amendment. For it would appear by such discourse that you were dazzled by the show.

Be not prompt or ready to attend private recitations; but if you do attend, preserve your gravity and dignity, and yet avoid making yourself disagreeable.

When you are going to confer with any one, and especially with one who seems your superior, represent to yourself how Socrates or Zeno would behave in such a case, and you will not be at a loss to meet properly whatever may occur.

When you are going before any one in power, fancy to yourself that you may not find him at home, that you may be shut out, that the doors may not be opened to you, that he may not notice you. If, with all this, it be your duty to go, bear what happens, and never say to yourself, "It was not worth so much." For this is vulgar, and like a man bewildered by externals.

In society, avoid a frequent and excessive mention of your own actions and dangers. For however agreeable it may be to yourself to allude to the risks you have run, it is not equally agreeable to others to hear your adventures. Avoid likewise an endeavor to excite laughter. For this may readily slide you into vulgarity, and, besides, may be apt to lower you in the esteem of your acquaintance. Approaches to indecent discourse are likewise dangerous. Therefore when anything of this sort happens, use the first fit opportunity to rebuke him who makes advances that way; or, at least, by silence, and blushing, and

a serious look, show yourself to be displeased by such talk.

#### XXXIV.

If you are dazzled by the semblance of any promised pleasure, guard yourself against being bewildered by it ; but let the affair wait your leisure, and procure yourself some delay. Then bring to your mind both points of time ; that in which you shall enjoy the pleasure, and that in which you will repent and reproach yourself, after you have enjoyed it ; and set before you, in opposition to these, how you will rejoice and applaud yourself, if you abstain. And even though it should appear to you a seasonable gratification, take heed that its enticements and allurements and seductions may not subdue you ; but set in opposition to this, how much better it is to be conscious of having gained so great a victory.

#### XXXV.

When you do anything from a clear judgment that it ought to be done, never shrink from being seen to do it, even though the world should misunderstand it ; for if you are not acting rightly, shun the action itself ; if you are, why fear those who wrongly censure you ?

#### XXXVI

As the proposition, *either it is day, or it is night,* has much force in a disjunctive argument, but none at all in a conjunctive one ; so, at a feast, to choose the largest share, is very suitable to the bodily appetite, but utterly inconsistent with the social spirit of the entertainment. Remember, then, when you eat with another, not only the value to the body of those things which are set before you, but also the value of proper courtesy towards your host.

## XXXVII.

If you have assumed any character beyond your strength, you have both demeaned yourself ill in that, and quitted one which you might have supported.

## XXXVIII.

As in walking you take care not to tread upon a nail, or turn your foot, so likewise take care not to hurt the ruling faculty of your mind. And if we were to guard against this in every action, we should enter upon action more safely.

## XXXIX.

The body is to every one the proper measure of its possessions, as the foot is of the shoe. If, therefore, you stop at this, you will keep the measure; but if you move beyond it, you must necessarily be carried forward, as down a precipice; as in the case of a shoe, if you go beyond its fitness to the foot, it comes first to be gilded, then purple, and then studded with jewels. For to that which once exceeds the fit measure there is no bound.

## XL.

Women from fourteen years old are flattered by men with the title of mistresses. Therefore, perceiving that they are regarded only as qualified to give men pleasure, they begin to adorn themselves, and in that to place all their hopes. It is worth while, therefore, to try that they may perceive themselves honored only so far as they appear beautiful in their demeanor, and modestly virtuous.

## XL.I.

It is a mark of want of intellect, to spend much time in things relating to the body; as to be immoderate in exercises, in eating and drinking, and in the discharge of other animal functions. These things should be done incidentally and our main strength be applied to our reason.

## XL.II.

When any person does ill by you, or speaks ill of you, remember that he acts or speaks from an impression that it is right for him to do so. Now, it is not possible that he should follow what appears right to you, but only what appears so to himself. Therefore, if he judges from false appearances, he is the person hurt; since he too is the person deceived. For if any one takes a true proposition to be false, the proposition is not hurt, but only the man is deceived. Setting out, then, from these principles, you will meekly bear with a person who reviles you; for you will say upon every occasion, "It seemed so to him."

## XL.III.

Everything has two handles: one by which it may be borne; another by which it cannot. If your brother acts unjustly, do not lay hold on the affair by the handle of his injustice; for by that it cannot be borne: but rather by the opposite, that he is your brother, that he was brought up with you; and thus you will lay hold on it as it is to be borne.

## XL.IV.

These reasonings have no logical connection: "I am richer than you; therefore I am your superior":

"I am more eloquent than you ; therefore I am your superior." The true logical connection is rather this : "I am richer than you ; therefore my possessions must exceed yours" : "I am more eloquent than you ; therefore my style must surpass yours." But you, after all, consist neither in property nor in style.

## XLV.

Does any one bathe hastily ? Do not say, that he does it ill, but hastily. Does any one drink much wine ? Do not say that he does ill, but that he drinks a great deal. For unless you perfectly understand his motives, how should you know if he acts ill ? Thus you will not risk yielding to any appearances but such as you fully comprehend.

## XLVI.

Never proclaim yourself a philosopher ; nor make much talk among the ignorant about your principles, but show them by actions. Thus, at an entertainment, do not discourse how people ought to eat ; but eat as you ought. For remember that thus Socrates also universally avoided all ostentation. And when persons came to him, and desired to be introduced by him to philosophers, he took them and introduced them ; so well did he bear being overlooked. So if ever there should be among the ignorant any discussion of principles, be for the most part silent. For there is great danger in hastily throwing out what is undigested. And if any one tells you that you know nothing, and you are not nettled at it, then you may be sure that you have really entered on your work. For sheep do not hastily throw up the grass, to show the shepherds how much they have eaten ;

but, inwardly digesting their food, they produce it outwardly in wool and milk. Thus, therefore, do you not make an exhibition before the ignorant of your principles ; but of the actions to which their digestion gives rise.

#### XLVII.

When you have learned to nourish your body frugally, do not pique yourself upon it ; nor, if you drink water, be saying upon every occasion, “ I drink water.” But first consider how much more frugal are the poor than we, and how much more patient of hardship. But if at any time you would inure yourself by exercise to labor and privation, for your own sake and not for the public, do not attempt great feats ; but when you are violently thirsty, just rinse your mouth with water, and tell nobody.

#### XLVIII.

The condition and characteristic of a vulgar person is, that he never looks for either help or harm from himself, but only from externals. The condition and characteristic of a philosopher is, that he looks to himself for all help or harm. The marks of a proficient are, that he censures no one, praises no one, blames no one, accuses no one ; says nothing concerning himself as being anybody, or knowing anything : when he is in any instance hindered or restrained, he accuses himself ; and if he is praised, he smiles to himself at the person who praises him ; and if he is censured, he makes no defence. But he goes about with the caution of a convalescent, careful of interference with anything that is doing well, but not yet quite secure. He restrains desire ; he transfers

his aversion to those things only which thwart the proper use of our own will ; he employs his energies moderately in all directions ; if he appears stupid or ignorant, he does not care ; and, in a word, he keeps watch over himself as over an enemy and one in ambush.

## XLIX.

When any one shows himself vain, on being able to understand and interpret the works of Chrysippus, say to yourself: “ Unless Chrysippus had written obscurely, this person would have had nothing to be vain of. But what do I desire ? To understand Nature, and follow her. I ask, then, who interprets her ; and hearing that Chrysippus does, I have recourse to him. I do not understand his writings. I seek, therefore, one to interpret *them*.” So far there is nothing to value myself upon. And when I find an interpreter, what remains is, to make use of his instructions. This alone is the valuable thing. But if I admire merely the interpretation, what do I become more than a grammarian, instead of a philosopher ? Except, indeed, that instead of Homer I interpret Chrysippus. When any one, therefore, desires me to read Chrysippus to him, I rather blush, when I cannot exhibit actions that are harmonious and consonant with his discourse.

## L.

Whatever rules you have adopted, abide by them as laws, and as if you would be impious to transgress them ; and do not regard what any one says of you, for this, after all, is no concern of yours. How long, then, will you delay to demand of yourself the noblest improvements, and in no instance to transgress

the judgments of reason ? You have received the philosophic principles with which you ought to be conversant; and you have been conversant with them. For what other master, then, do you wait as an excuse for this delay in self-reformation ? You are no longer a boy, but a grown man. If, therefore, you will be negligent and slothful, and always add procrastination to procrastination, purpose to purpose, and fix day after day in which you will attend to yourself, you will insensibly continue to accomplish nothing, and, living and dying, remain of vulgar mind. This instant, then, think yourself worthy of living as a man grown up and a proficient. Let whatever appears to be the best, be to you an inviolable law. And if any instance of pain or pleasure, glory or disgrace, be set before you, remember that now is the combat, now the Olympiad comes on, nor can it be put off; and that by one failure and defeat honor may be lost — or won. Thus Socrates became perfect, improving himself by everything ; following reason alone. And though you are not yet a Socrates, you ought, however, to live as one seeking to be a Socrates.

## LI.

The first and most necessary topic in philosophy is the practical application of principles ; as, *We ought not to lie*: the second is that of demonstrations ; as, *Why it is that we ought not to lie*: the third, that which gives strength and logical connection to the other two ; as, *Why this is a demonstration*. For what is demonstration ? What is a consequence ? What a contradiction ? What truth ? What falsehood ? The third point is then necessary on account of the second ; and the second on account of the first. But

the most necessary, and that whereon we ought to rest, is the first. But we do just the contrary. For we spend all our time on the third point, and employ all our diligence about that, and entirely neglect the first. Therefore, at the same time that we lie, we are very ready to show how it is demonstrated that lying is wrong.

## LII

Upon all occasions we ought to have these maxims ready at hand :—

Conduct me, Zeus, and thou, O Destiny,  
Wherever your decrees have fixed my lot.  
I follow cheerfully; and, did I not,  
Wicked and wretched, I must follow still.\*  
  
Whoe'er yields properly to Fate is deemed  
Wise among men, and knows the laws of Heaven.†

And this third :—

“ O Crito, if it thus pleases the gods, thus let it be.” “ Anytus and Melitus may kill me indeed; but hurt me they cannot.”‡

\* Cleanthes, in Diogenes Laertius, quoted also by Seneca, Epistle 107.—H.

† Euripides, Fragments.—H.

‡ Plato, Crito, § 17; Apology, § 18.—H.

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**F R A G M E N T S   O F   E P I C T E T U S .**

**645**

## FRAGMENTS OF EPICTETUS

FROM

STOBÆUS, ANTONIUS, AND MAXIMUS.\*



## I.

**A**LIFE at odds with Fortune resembles a wintry torrent; for it is turbulent and muddy and difficult to pass, and violent and noisy and brief.

A soul conversant with virtue resembles a perpetual fountain; for it is clear and gentle and agreeable and sweet and serviceable and rich and harmless and innocent.

## II.

If you would be good, first believe that you are bad.

## III.

It is better sometimes frankly to offend, and act often wisely, than to say we seldom err and offend frequently.

## IV.

Chastise your passions, that they may not chastise you.

\* Stobæus lived early in the fifth century, Maximus in the seventh, and Antonius, surnamed Melissa, or the Bee, in the eighth. Their collections are printed together. Many of these sayings are merely traditional.—H.

## V.

Be not so much ashamed of what is inglorious, as studious to shun what is untruthful.

## VI.

If you would be well spoken of, learn to speak well of others. And when you have learned to speak well, endeavor likewise to do well; and thus you will reap the fruit of being well spoken of.

## VII.

Freedom and slavery are merely names of virtue and of vice; and both these are matters of will. But neither of them belongs to things in which will has no share. But Fortune is accustomed to dispose at her pleasure of the body, and those things relating to the body in which will has no share. For no one is a slave whose will is free.

Fortune is an evil chain to the body, and vice to the soul. For he whose body is unbound, and whose soul is chained, is a slave. On the contrary, he whose body is chained, and his soul unbound, is free. The chain of the body, Nature unbinds by death, or baseness for money; the chain of the soul, virtue unbinds by wisdom and experience and philosophic training.

## VIII.

If you would live tranquil and contented, endeavor that all who live with you may be good. And you can have them good by instructing the willing and dismissing the unwilling. For sin and bondage will fly with those who leave you, and with those who remain with you will virtue and liberty be left.

## IX.

It is scandalous, that he who sweetens his drink by the gift of the bees, should by vice embitter reason, the gift of the Gods.

## X.

No one who is a lover of money, a lover of pleasure, or a lover of glory, is likewise a lover of mankind ; but only he who is a lover of virtue.

## XI.

As you would not wish to sail in a large and elegant and gilded ship, and sink ; so neither is it desirable to inhabit a grand and sumptuous house, and be in a tumult.

## XII.

When we are invited to an entertainment we take what we find ; and if any one should bid the master of the house set fish or tarts before him, he would be thought absurd. Yet in the world we ask the Gods for what they do not give us ; and that, though there are so many things which they have given us.

## XIII.

They are pretty fellows indeed, said he, who value themselves on things not in our own power. I am a better man than you, says one ; for I have many estates, and you are pining with hunger. I have been consul, says another ; I am a ruler, says a third ; and I have a fine head of hair, says a fourth. Yet one horse does not say to another, “I am better than you ; for I have a great deal of hay and a great deal of oats ; and I have a gold bridle and embroidered trappings ” ; but only, “I am swifter than you.” And every creature is better or worse from its own

good or bad qualities. Is man, then, the only creature which has no natural good quality ? And must we take account of hair, and clothes, and ancestors ?

## XIV.

Patients are displeased with a physician who does not prescribe to them ; and think he gives them over. And why are none so affected towards a philosopher as to conclude that he despairs of their recovery to a right way of thinking, if he tells them nothing for their good ?

## XV.

They who have a good constitution of body can bear heat and cold ; and so they who have a right constitution of soul can meet anger and grief and immoderate joy and the other passions.

## XVI.

Examine yourself, whether you had rather be rich or happy ; and if rich, be assured that this is neither a good, nor altogether in your own power ; but if happy, that this is both a good, and in your own power ; since the one is a temporary loan of Fortune, and the other depends on will.

## XVII.

As when you see a viper, or an asp, or a scorpion, in a box of ivory or gold, you do not love it or think it happy because of the magnificence of the material in which it is enclosed ; but you shun and detest it, because it is of a pernicious nature : so, likewise, when you see vice lodged in the midst of wealth, and the swelling pride of fortune, be not struck by the splendor of the material with which it is surrounded ; but despise the base alloy of its manners.

## XVIII.

Riches are not among the number of things which are good ; prodigality is of the number of those which are evil ; modesty of those which are good. Now modesty invites to frugality and the acquisition of things that are good ; but riches invite to prodigality and seduce from modesty. It is difficult, therefore, for a rich person to be modest, or a modest person rich.

## XIX.

If you had been born and bred in a ship, you would not be impatient to become the pilot. For you are not necessarily identified with the ship there, nor with riches here ; but with reason everywhere. That therefore which is natural and congenial to you, reason, think likewise to be peculiarly your own, and take care of it.

## XX.

If you were born in Persia, you would not endeavor to live in Greece ; but to be happy in the place where you were. Why, then, if you are born in poverty, do you yearn to be rich, and not rather to be happy in the condition where you are ?

## XXI.

As it is better to lie straitened for room upon a little couch, in health, than to toss upon a wide bed in sickness, so it is better to contract yourself within the compass of a small fortune, and be happy, than to have a great one and be wretched.

## XXII.

It is not poverty that causes sorrow, but covetous desires ; nor do riches deliver from fear, but only rea-

soning. If therefore you acquire a habit of reasoning, you will neither desire riches, nor complain of poverty.

#### XXIII.

A horse is not elated, and does not value himself on his fine stable or trappings or saddle-cloths, nor a bird on the warm materials of its nest; but the former on the swiftness of his feet, and the latter of its wings. Do not you, therefore, glory in your food or dress; or in short any external advantage; but in integrity and beneficence.

#### XXIV.

There is a difference between living well and living profusely. The one arises from contentment and order and propriety and frugality; the other from dissoluteness and luxury and disorder and indecency. In short, to the one belongs true praise; to the other, censure. If therefore you would live well, do not seek to be praised for profuseness.

#### XXV.

Let the first satisfaction of appetite be always the measure to you of eating and drinking; and appetite itself the sauce and the pleasure. Thus you will never take more than is necessary, nor will you want cooks; and you will be contented with whatever drink falls in your way.

#### XXVI.

Consider that you do not thrive merely by the food in your stomach; but by the elevation of your soul. For the former, as you see, is evacuated and carried off altogether; but the latter, though the soul be parted, remains uncorrupted through all things.

## XXVII.

In every feast remember that there are two guests to be entertained, the body and the soul; and that what you give the body you presently lose, but what you give the soul remains forever.

## XXVIII.

Do not mingle anger with profusion, and set them before your guests. Profusion, when it has made its way through the body, is quickly gone; but anger, when it has penetrated the soul, abides for a long time. Take care not to pay a great price merely to be transported with anger, and affront your guests; but rather delight them at a cheap rate by gentle behavior.

## XXIX.

Take care at your meals that the attendants be not more in number than those whom they are to attend. For it is absurd that many persons should wait on a few chairs.

## XXX.

It would be best if, both while you are personally making your preparations and while you are feasting at table, you could give among the servants part of what is before you. But if such a thing be difficult at that time, remember that you, who are not weary, are attended by those who are; you who are eating and drinking, by those who are not; you who are talking, by those who are silent; you who are at ease, by those who are under constraint: and thus you will never be heated into any unreasonable passion yourself, nor do any mischief by provoking another.

XXXI.

Strife and contention are always absurd, but particularly unbecoming at table conversations. For a person warmed with wine will never either teach, or be convinced by, one who is sober. And wherever sobriety is wanting, the end will show that you have exerted yourself to no purpose.

XXXII.

Grasshoppers are musical ; but snails are dumb. The latter rejoice in being wet ; and the former in being warm. Then the dew calls out the one race, and for this they come forth ; but, on the contrary, the noonday sun awakens the others, and in this they sing. If therefore you would be a musical and harmonious person, whenever the soul is bedewed with wine at drinking-parties, suffer her not to go forth and defile herself. But when in rational society she glows by the beams of reason, then command her to speak from inspiration, and utter the oracles of justice.

XXXIII.

Consider him with whom you converse in one of these three ways ; either as your superior, or inferior, or equal. If superior, you ought to hear him and be convinced ; if inferior, to convince him ; if equal, to agree with him ; and thus you will never be led into the love of strife.

XXXIV.

It is better, by yielding to truth, to conquer prejudice, than by yielding to principle to be defeated by truth.

XXXV.

If you seek truth, you will not seek merely victory

at all hazards ; and when you have found truth, you will have a security against being conquered.

#### XXXVI.

Truth conquers by itself ; prejudice, by appealing to externals.

#### XXXVII.

It is better, through living with one free person, to be fearless and free, than to be a slave in company with many.

#### XXXVIII.

What you avoid suffering yourself, seek not to impose on others. You avoid slavery, for instance ; take care not to enslave. For if you can bear to exact slavery from others, you appear to have been yourself a slave. For vice has nothing in common with virtue, nor freedom with slavery. As a person in health would not wish to be attended by the sick, nor to have those who live with him in a state of sickness ; so neither would a person who is free bear to be served by slaves, nor to have those who live with him in a state of slavery.

#### XXXIX.

Whoever you are that would live apart from slaves, deliver yourself from slavery. And you will be free if you deliver yourself from appetite. For neither was Aristides called just, nor Epaminondas divine, nor Lycurgus a preserver, because they were rich and slave-holders ; but because, being poor, they delivered Greece from slavery.

#### XL.

If you would have your house securely inhabited,

imitate the Spartan Lycurgus. And as he did not enclose his city with walls, but fortified the inhabitants with virtue, and preserved the city always free ; so do you, likewise, not surround yourself with a great court-yard, nor raise high towers, but strengthen those who live with you by benevolence, and fidelity, and friendship. And thus nothing hurtful will enter, even if the whole band of wickedness be set in array against it.

## XL.I.

Do not hang your house round with tablets and pictures ; but adorn it with virtue. For those are merely foreign and a fading deception of the eyes ; but this, a congenial and indelible and perpetual ornament to the house.

## XL.II.

Instead of herds of oxen, endeavor to assemble flocks of friends about your house.

## XL.III.

As a wolf resembles a dog, so much does a flatterer, an adulterer, a parasite, resemble a friend. Take heed therefore, that instead of guardian dogs, you do not inadvertently admit ravening wolves.

## XL.IV.

To seek admiration by adorning one's house with stucco belongs to a tasteless man ; but to adorn our characters by the charm of an amiable nature shows at once a lover of beauty and a lover of man.

## XL.V.

If you chiefly admire little things, you will never

be held worthy of great ones ; but if you are above little things, you will be held greatly worthy.

## XLVI.

Nothing is meaner than the love of pleasure, the love of gain, and insolence. Nothing is nobler than magnanimity, meekness, and philanthropy.

## XLVII.

[We represent] those intractable philosophers who do not think pleasure to be in itself the natural state of man ; but merely an incident of those things in which his natural state consists,—justice, moderation, and freedom. Why, then, should the soul rejoice and be glad in the minor blessings of the body, as Epicurus says, and not be pleased with its own good, which is the very greatest? And yet Nature has given me likewise a sense of shame ; and I am covered with blushes when I think I have uttered any indecent expression. This emotion will not suffer me to recognize pleasure as a good and the end of life.

## XLVIII.

The ladies at Rome have Plato's Republic in their hands, because he allows a community of wives ; for they attend merely to the words of the author, and not to his sense. For he does not first order one man and one woman to marry and live together, and then allow a community of wives ; but he abolishes that system of marriage, and introduces one of another kind. And, in general, men are pleased in finding out excuses for their own faults. Yet philosophy says, it is not fit even to move a finger without some reason.

## XLIX.

It is the rarest pleasures which especially delight us.

## L.

Once exceed moderation, and the most delightful things may become the most undelightful.

## LI.

Agrippinus was justly entitled to praise on this account, that, though he was a man of the highest worth, he never praised himself; but blushed, even if another praised him. And he was a man of such a character, as to commend every untoward event that befell him: if he was feverish, the fever; if disgraced, the disgrace; if banished, the banishment. And, when once, as he was going to dine, a messenger brought him word that Nero ordered him to banishment; Well then, said Agrippinus, let us dine at Aricia.\*

## LII.

Diogenes affirmed no labor to be good, unless the end were a due state and tone of the soul, and not of the body.

## LIII.

As a true balance is neither set right by a true one, nor judged by a false one; so likewise a just person has neither to be set right by just persons, nor to be judged by unjust ones.

## LIV.

As what is straight needs no straightness, so what is just needs [to borrow] no justice.

\* The first stage on his journey into banishment. See note, *ante*, p. 7.—H.

## LV.

Give no judgment from another tribunal before you have yourself been judged at the tribunal of absolute justice.

## LVI.

If you would give a just decision, heed neither parties nor pleaders, but the cause itself.

## LVII.

You will commit the fewest faults in judging, if you are faultless in your own life.

## LVIII.

It is better, by giving a just judgment, to be blamed by him who is deservedly condemned, than by giving an unjust judgment, to be justly censured by Nature.

## LIX.

As the touchstone which tries gold, but is not itself tried by the gold; such is he, who has the standard of judgment.

## LX.

It is scandalous for a judge to have to be judged by others.

## LXI.

As nothing is straighter than absolute straightness, so nothing is juster than absolute justice.

## LXII.

Who among you does not admire the action of Lycurgus the Lacedemonian? For when he had been deprived of one of his eyes by one of the citizens, and the people had delivered the young man to

him, to be punished in whatever manner he should think proper, Lycurgus forbore to give him any punishment. But having instructed him, and rendered him a good man, he brought him into the theatre; and while the Lacedemonians were struck with admiration: "I received," said he, "this person from you, dangerous and violent, and I restore him to you gentle and a good citizen."

## LXIII.

When Pittacus had been unjustly treated by some person, and had the power of chastising him, he let him go, saying, "Forgiveness is better than punishment; for the one is the proof of a gentle, the other of a savage nature."

## LXIV.

This, above all, is the business of nature, to connect and apply the active powers to what appears fit and beneficial.

## LXV.

It is the character of the most mean-spirited and foolish men, to suppose that they shall be despised by others, unless they somehow strike the first blow at their enemies.

## LXVI.

When you are going to attack any one with vehemence and threatening, remember to say first to yourself, that you are constituted gentle, and that by doing nothing violent, you will live without the need of repentance, and irreproachable.

## LXVII.

We ought to know that it is not easy for a man to form his principles of action, unless he daily reiter-

ates and hears the same things, and at the same time applies them in action.

#### LXVIII.

Nicias was so intent on business, that he often asked his domestics whether he had bathed, and whether he had dined.

#### LXIX.

While Archimedes was intent on his diagrams, his servants drew him away by violence, and anointed \* him, and after his body was anointed, he traced his figures upon that.

#### LXX.

When Lampis, the naval commander, was asked how he acquired wealth; he answered, that great wealth cost but little trouble, but that a little wealth [at the beginning] cost a great deal.

#### LXXI.

When Solon was silent at an entertainment, and was asked by Periander, whether he was silent for want of words, or from folly: "No fool," answered he, "can be silent at a feast."

#### LXXII.

Consult nothing so much, upon every occasion, as discretion. Now it is more discreet to be silent than to speak; and to omit speaking whatever is not accompanied with sense and reason.

#### LXXIII.

As light-houses in harbors, by kindling a great

\* The ancients anointed the body every day.—C.

flame from a few faggots, afford a considerable assistance to ships wandering on the sea ; so an illustrious person, in a state harassed by storms, confers great benefits on his fellow-citizens, when himself contented with little.

LXXIV.

You would certainly, if you undertook to steer a ship, learn the steersman's art. And as in that case, you can steer the whole ship ; so in another case, the whole state.

LXXV.

If you have a mind to adorn your city by consecrated monuments, first consecrate in yourself the most beautiful monument, — of gentleness, and justice, and benevolence.

LXXVI.

You will confer the greatest benefits on your city, not by raising its roofs, but by exalting its souls. For it is better that great souls should live in small habitations, than that abject slaves should burrow in great houses.

LXXVII.

Do not variegate the structure of your walls with Eubœan and Spartan stone ; but adorn both the minds of the citizens and of those who govern them by the Greek culture. For cities are made good habitations by the sentiments of those who live in them, not by wood or stone.

LXXVIII.

As, if you were to breed lions, you would not be solicitous about the magnificence of their dens, but about the qualities of the animals ; so, if you undertake to preside over your fellow-citizens, be not so

solicitous about the magnificence of the buildings, as careful of the nobleness of those who inhabit them

#### LXXIX.

As a skilful manager of horses does not feed the good colts, and suffer the unruly ones to starve ; but feeds them both alike, chastising the one more, to make him draw equally with his fellow ; so a man of foresight and administrative skill endeavors to do good to the well-disposed citizens, but not at once to destroy those that are otherwise. He by no means denies subsistence to either of them ; only he disciplines and urges on, with the greater vehemence, him who resists reason and the laws.

#### LXXX.

As a goose is not alarmed by hissing, nor a sheep by bleating ; so neither be you terrified by the voice of a senseless multitude.

#### LXXXI.

As you do not comply with a multitude, when it unreasonably asks of you any part of your own property ; so neither be disconcerted before a mob, demanding of you any unjust compliance.

#### LXXXII.

Pay in advance your dues to the public, and you will never be asked for what is not due.

#### LXXXIII.

As the sun waits not for prayers and incantations to be prevailed on to rise, but immediately shines forth, and is received with universal salutation ; so

neither do you wait for applauses and shouts and praises in order to do good ; but be a voluntary benefactor, and you will be beloved like the sun.

#### LXXXIV.

A ship ought not to be held by one anchor, nor life by a single hope.

#### LXXXV.

We ought not to stretch either our legs or our hopes for a point they cannot reach.

#### LXXXVI.

Thales, being asked what was the most universal possession, answered, "Hope ; for they have it who have nothing else."

#### LXXXVII.

It is more necessary for the soul to be healed than the body ; for it is better to die than to live ill.

#### LXXXVIII.

Pyrrho used to say, "There is no difference between living and dying." A person asked him, Why then do you not die ? "Because," answered Pyrrho, "there is no difference."

#### LXXXIX.

Nature is admirable, and, as Xenophon says, avaricious of life. Hence we love and tend the body, which is of all things the most unpleasant and squalid. For if we were obliged, for only five days, to take care of our neighbor's body, we would not endure it. For only consider what it would be, when we rise in the morning, to clean the teeth of others,

and do all requisite offices besides. In reality, it is wonderful that we should love a thing which every day demands so much attendance. I stuff this sack, and then I empty it again. What is more troublesome? But I must obey God. Therefore I remain, and endure to wash and feed and clothe this poor body. When I was younger, he demanded of me still more, and I bore it. And when Nature, which gave the body, takes it away, will you not bear that? "I love it," say you. This is what I have just been observing; and this very love has Nature given you, but she also says, "Now let it go, and have no further trouble."

## XC.

When a young man dies, some one blames the Gods that, at the time when he himself ought to be at rest, he is still encumbered with the troubles of life. Yet when death approaches, he wishes to live, and sends for the physician, and entreats him to omit no care or pains. It is marvellous that men should not be willing either to live or die.

## XCI.

To a longer and worse life, a shorter and better is by all means to be preferred by every one.

## XCII.

When we are children, our parents deliver us to the care of a tutor; who is continually to watch over us that we get no hurt. When we are become men, God delivers us to the guardianship of an implanted conscience. We ought by no means, then, to despise this guardian; for it will both displease God, and we shall be enemies to our own conscience.

## XCIII.

Riches ought to be used as the means to some end, and not lavished on every occasion.

## XCIV.

All men should wish rather for virtue than for wealth, which is dangerous to the foolish, since vice is increased by riches. And in proportion as any one is foolish, he becomes the more profuse, through having the means of gratifying his passion for pleasure.

## XCV.

What ought not to be done, do not even think of doing.

## XCVI.

Deliberate much before you speak or act; for what is once said or done you cannot recall.

## XCVII.

Every place is safe to him who dwells with justice.

## XCVIII.

Crows pick out the eyes of the dead, when they are no longer of any use. But flatterers destroy the souls of the living by blinding their eyes.

## XCIX.

The anger of a monkey and the threats of a flatterer deserve equal regard.

## C.

Kindly receive those who are willing to give good advice; but not those who upon every occasion are eager to flatter. For the former truly see what is

advantageous ; but the latter consider only the opinions of their superiors ; and imitate the shadows of bodies, nodding assent to what they say.

## CL

An adviser ought, in the first place, to have a regard to the delicacy and sense of shame of the person admonished. For they who are beyond blushing are incorrigible.

## CII.

It is better to advise than reproach ; for the one is mild and friendly, the other stern and severe ; the one corrects the erring, the other only convicts them.

## CIII.

Impart to strangers and persons in need according to your ability. For he who gives nothing to the needy shall receive nothing in his own need.

## CIV.

A person once brought clothes to a pirate, who had been cast ashore, and almost killed by the severity of the weather ; then carried him to his house, and furnished him with all necessaries. Being reproached by some one for doing good to the evil ; “ I have paid this regard,” answered he, “ not to the man, but to humanity.”

## CV.

We ought not to choose every pleasure ; but that whose end is good.

## CVI.

It belongs to a wise man to resist pleasure ; and to a fool to be enslaved by it.

## CVII.

In all vice; pleasure, being presented like a bait,  
draws sensual minds to the hook of perdition.

## CVIII.

Choose rather to punish your appetites than to be  
punished by them.

## CIX.

No one is free who commands not himself.

## CX.

The vine bears three clusters; the first of pleasure,  
the second of intoxication, the third of outrage.

## CXI.

Do not talk much over wine to show your learning;  
for your discourse will be unpleasing.

## CXII.

He is a drunkard who takes more than three  
glasses; and though he be not drunk, he has ex-  
ceeded moderation.

## CXIII.

Let discourse of God be renewed every day more  
surely than our food.

## CXIV.

Think of God oftener than you breathe.

## CXV.

If you always remember that God stands by as a  
witness of whatever you do, either in soul or body,  
you will never err, either in your prayers or actions,  
and you will have God abiding with you.

## CXVI.

As it is pleasant to view the sea from the shore, so it is pleasant to one who has escaped, to remember his past labors.

## CXVII.

Law aims to benefit human life ; but it cannot, when men themselves choose to suffer, for it manifests its proper virtue on condition of obedience.

## CXVIII.

As physicians are the preservers of the sick, so are the laws, of the injured.

## CXIX.

The justest laws are the truest.

## CXX.

It is decent to yield to a law, to a ruler, and to a wiser man.

## CXXI.

Things done contrary to law are to be regarded as undone.

## CXXII.

In prosperity it is very easy to find a friend ; in adversity, nothing is so difficult.

## CXXIII.

Time delivers fools from grief ; and reason, wise men.

## CXXIV.

He is a man of sense who does not grieve for what he has not, but rejoices in what he has.

## CXXV.

Epictetus being asked how a person might grieve his enemy, answered, “By doing as well as possible himself.”

## CXXVI.

Let no wise man estrange himself from the government of the state ; for it is both wicked to withdraw from being useful to the needy, and cowardly to give way to the worthless. For it is foolish to choose rather to be governed ill than to govern well.

## CXXVII.

Nothing is more becoming a ruler, than to despise no one, nor be insolent, but to preside over all impartially.

## CXXVIII.

Any person may live happy in poverty, but few in wealth and power. So great is the advantage of poverty, that no wise man would exchange it for disreputable wealth ; unless indeed Themistocles, the son of Neocles, the most wealthy of the Athenians, but poor in virtue, was better than Aristides and Socrates. But both himself and his wealth are perished, and without a name. For a bad man loses all in death ; but virtue is eternal.

## CXXIX.

[Remember] that such is, and was, and will be, the nature of the world, nor is it possible that things should be otherwise than they now are ; and that not only men and other creatures upon earth partake of this change and transformation, but diviner things also. For indeed even the four elements are transformed and metamorphosed ; and earth becomes wa-

ter, and water air, and this again is transformed into other things. And the same manner of transformation happens from things above to those below. Whoever endeavors to turn his mind towards these points, and persuade himself to receive with willingness what cannot be avoided, will pass his life in moderation and harmony.

## CXXX.

He who is discontented with things present and allotted, is unskilled in life. But he who bears them, and the consequences arising from them, nobly and rationally, is worthy to be esteemed a good man.

## CXXXI.

All things serve and obey the [laws of the] universe ; the earth, the sea, the sun, the stars, and the plants and animals of the earth. Our body likewise obeys the same, in being sick and well, young and old, and passing through the other changes decreed. It is therefore reasonable that what depends on ourselves, that is, our own understanding, should not be the only rebel. For the universe is powerful and superior, and consults the best for us by governing us in conjunction with the whole. And further ; opposition, besides that it is unreasonable, and produces nothing except a vain struggle, throws us into pain and sorrows.

*The following Fragments are ascribed jointly to Epictetus and other authors.*

### I.

Moderation, as it is a short and agreeable way, brings much delight and little trouble.

### II.

Fortify yourself with moderation; for this is an impregnable fortress.

### III.

Prefer nothing to truth, not even the choicest friendship, since this borders on those passions by which justice is both confounded and darkened.

### IV.

Truth is an immortal and an eternal thing. It bestows not a beauty which time will wither, nor a courage which may quail before a human tribunal; but only things just and lawful, from which it divides and destroys all that is unjust.

### V.

We should have neither a blunt sword nor a pointless speech.

### VI.

Nature has given man one tongue, but two ears, that we may hear twice as much as we speak.

### VII.

Nothing is in reality either pleasant or unpleasant by nature; but all things become such through habit.

## VIII.

Choose the best life ; for habit will make it pleasant.

## IX.

Choose rather to leave your children well instructed than rich. For the hopes of the wise are better than the riches of the ignorant.

## X.

A daughter is to a father a possession which is not his own.

## XI.

The same person advised to bequeath modesty to children, rather than gold.

## XII.

The reproof of a father is an agreeable medicine ; for the profit is greater than the pain.

## XIII.

He who is fortunate in a son-in-law, finds a son ; he who is unfortunate in one, loses likewise a daughter.

## XIV.

The worth of instruction, like that of gold, passes current in every place.

## XV.

He who cultivates wisdom cultivates the knowledge of God.

## XVI.

There is no creature so beautiful as a man adorned by instruction.

## XVII.

We ought to flee the friendship of the wicked, and the enmity of the good.

## XVIII.

Misfortunes test friends, and detect enemies.

## XIX.

We ought to do well by our friends, when they are present; and speak well of them, when they are absent.

## XX.

Let him not think himself loved by any, who loves none.

## XXI.

We ought to choose, both for a physician and for a friend, not the most agreeable, but the most useful.

## XXII.

If you would lead a life without sorrow, regard things which will happen, as if they had already happened.

## XXIII.

Be exempt from grief; not like irrational creatures, from insensibility, nor from inconsiderateness, like fools; but like a man of virtue, making reason the remedy for grief.

## XXIV.

They whose minds are the least grieved by calamities, and who best meet them in action, are the greatest both in public and in private life.

## XXV.

They who are well instructed, like those who are

exercised in the Palæstra, if they happen to fall quickly and dexterously rise again from misfortunes.

#### XXVI.

We ought to call in reason, like a good physician, to our assistance in misfortune.

#### XXVII.

Too much intoxication from good fortune, as from drinking, makes a fool more senseless.

#### XXVIII.

Envy is the adversary of the fortunate.

#### XXIX.

He who remembers what man is, can be discontented at nothing which happens.

#### XXX.

A pilot and a fair wind are necessary to a happy voyage; reason and art, to a happy life.

#### XXXI.

Of good fortune, as of ripe fruit, we must make the most while it lasts.

#### XXXII.

He is unreasonable who quarrels with events which happen from natural necessity.

*The following Fragments are omitted by Mr. Upton; but as they stand under the name of Arrian, and seem to be in the spirit of Epictetus, they are added here.*

## I.

\* **W**HAT does it signify to me, said he, whether the universe is composed of atoms or uncompounded substances, — or of fire and earth? Is it not sufficient to know the essence of good and evil, and the proper bounds of the desires and aversions, and of the active powers; and by making use of these as so many certain rules, to order the conduct of life, and let go these things which are above us; which, perhaps, are incomprehensible to human understanding, but if one should suppose them ever so comprehensible, are still of doubtful benefit when comprehended. And must it not be said that he gives himself trouble to no purpose who attributes these things as essential to the character of a philosopher? “What, then, is the Delphic admonition, *Know thyself*, superfluous?” “No, surely,” said he. “What, then, does it mean?” If any one should admonish a performer in a chorus to know himself, would he not take it as a hint to improve his motions?

## II.

† The same person being asked, “Wherein do the diligent have the advantage of the slothful?” answered, “Wherein the pious have the advantage of the impious: — in good hopes.”

\* Stobæus *de Düs.* Serm. 211, p. 714, ed. Francof., 1581. — C.

† Maximus, περὶ φιλοποιίας. Serm. 118, p. 374. — C.

## III.

\* Walls give to cities, and education to minds, ornament and security.

## IV.

† When a young man was giving himself airs in a public place, and saying, that he had grown wise by conversing with many wise men : "I have conversed too," answered somebody, "with many rich men, but I have not grown rich."

## V.

‡ Socrates, being sent for by Archelaus, as designing to make him a rich man, returned him this answer : "Four quarts of meal are sold at Athens for five denarii, and the fountains run with water. If what I have is not sufficient for me, yet I am sufficiently able to make a shift with that; and thus it becomes sufficient for me. Do you not perceive that it makes no difference in the goodness of Polus's voice, whether he performs the part of OEdipus in his regal state, or whether he is a wanderer and a beggar at Colonus ? And shall a brave man appear worse than Polus, and not perform well in whatever part is imposed upon him by the Deity ? Shall he not imitate Odysseus, who made no worse figure in rags than in a fine purple robe ? "

\* Ant. and Max. *de Disciplinâ*. *Serm.* 210, p. 704.—C.

† *Ibid.*—C.

‡ Stobæus, *Compar. Paupertatis et Divitiarum.* *Serm.* 237, p. 778.—C.

## VI.

\* There are some persons who are calmly of a high spirit, and do all the same things quietly, and as it were without anger, which those do who are hurried with strong passion. We are to guard, therefore, against the faults of such persons, as being much worse than those of violent anger. For people of the latter character are quickly satiated with vengeance; whereas the others, like persons in a slow fever, extend the excitement over a longer time.

\* Stobæus, *Quod Eventus, &c.*, pp. 324, 329.—C.

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THE END.

**681**  
SENECA'S MORALS

OF

A HAPPY LIFE, BENEFITS, ANGER  
AND CLEMENCY.

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TRANSLATED BY SIR ROGER L'ESTRANGE.

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NEW EDITION.

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# SENECA OF BENEFITS.

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## CHAPTER I.

### OF BENEFITS IN GENERAL.

IT is, perhaps, one of the most pernicious errors of a rash and inconsiderate life, the common ignorance of the world in the matter of exchanging *benefits*. And this arises from a mistake, partly in the person that we would oblige, and partly in the thing itself. To begin with the latter: “A benefit is a good office, done with intention and judgment;” that is to say, with a due regard to all the circumstances of *what*, *how*, *why*, *when*, *where*, *to whom*, *how much*, and the like; or otherwise: “It is a voluntary and benevolent action that delights the giver in the comfort it brings to the receiver.” It will be hard to draw this subject, either into method or compass: the one, because of the infinite variety and complication of cases; the other, by reason of the large extent of it: for the whole business (almost) of mankind in society falls under this head; the duties of kings and subjects, husbands and wives, parents and children, masters and servants, natives and strangers, high and low, rich and poor, strong and weak, friends and enemies.

The very meditation of it breeds good blood and generous thoughts; and instructs us in honor, humanity, friendship, piety, gratitude, prudence, and justice. In short, the art and skill of conferring benefits, is, of all human duties, the most absolutely necessary to the well-being, both of reasonable nature, and of every individual; as the very cement of all communities, and the blessing of particulars. He that does good to another man does good also to himself; not only in the consequence, but in the very act of doing it; for the conscience of well-doing is an ample reward.

Of benefits in general, there are several sorts; as *necessary*, *profitable*, and *delightful*. Some things there are, without which we *cannot* live; others without which we *ought not* to live; and some, again, without which we *will not* live. In the first rank are those which deliver us from capital dangers, or apprehensions of death: and the favor is rated according to the hazard; for the greater the extremity, the greater seems the obligation. The next is a case wherein we may indeed live, but we had better die; as in the question of liberty, modesty, and a good conscience. In the third place, follow those things which custom, use, affinity, and acquaintance, have made dear to us; as husbands, wives, children, friends, etc., which an honest man will preserve at his utmost peril. Of things profitable there is a large field, as money, honor, etc., to which might be added, matters of superfluity and pleasure. But we shall open a way to the circumstances of a benefit by some previous and more general deliberations upon the thing itself.

## CHAPTER II.

## SEVERAL SORTS OF BENEFITS.

WE shall divide *benefits* into *absolute* and *vulgar*, the one appertaining to good life, the other is only matter of commerce. The former are the more excellent, because they can never be made void; whereas all material benefits are tossed back and forward, and change their master. There are some offices that look like benefits, but are only desirable conveniences, as wealth, etc., and these a wicked man may receive from a good, or a good man from an evil. Others, again, that bear the face of injuries, which are only benefits ill taken; as cutting, lancing, burning, under the hand of a surgeon. The greatest benefits of all are those of good education, which we receive from our parents, either in the state of ignorance or perverseness; as, their care and tenderness in our infancy; their discipline in our childhood, to keep us to our duties by fear; and, if fair means will not do, their proceeding afterwards to severity and punishment, without which we should never have come to good. There are matters of great value, many times, that are but of small price; as instructions from a tutor, medicine from a physician, etc. And there are small matters again, which are of great consideration to us: the gift is small, and the consequence great; as a cup of cold water in

a time of need may save a man's life. Some things are of great moment to the giver, others to the receiver: one man gives me a house; another snatches me out when it is falling upon my head; one gives me an estate; another takes me out of the fire, or casts me out a rope when I am sinking. Some good offices we do to friends, others to strangers; but those are the noblest that we do without pre-desert. There is an obligation of bounty, and an obligation of charity; this in case of necessity, and that in point of convenience. Some benefits are common, others are personal; as if a prince (out of pure grace) grant a privilege to a city, the obligation lies upon the community, and only upon every individual as a part of the whole; but if it be done particularly for my sake, then am I singly the debtor for it. The cherishing of strangers is one of the duties of hospitality, and exercises itself in the relief and protection of the distressed. There are benefits of good counsel, reputation, life, fortune, liberty, health, nay, and of superfluity and pleasure. One man obliges me out of his pocket; another gives me matter of ornament and curiosity; a third, consolation. To say nothing of negative benefits; for there are that reckon it an obligation if they do a body no hurt; and place it to account, as if they saved a man, when they do not undo him. To shut up all in one word; as benevolence is the most sociable of all virtues, so it is of the largest extent; for there is not any man, either so great or so little, but he is yet capable of giving and of receiving benefits.

## CHAPTER III.

## A SON MAY OBLIGE HIS FATHER, AND A SERVANT HIS MASTER.

The question is (in the first place) whether it may not be possible for a father to owe more to a son, in other respects, than the son owes to his father for his being? That many sons are both greater and better than their fathers, there is no question; as there are many other things that derive their beings from others, which yet are far greater than their original. Is not the tree larger than the seed? the river than the fountain? The foundation of all things lies hid, and the superstructure obscures it. If I owe all to my father, because he gives me life, I may owe as much to a physician that saved his life; for if my father had not been cured, I had never been begotten: or, if I stand indebted for all that I am to my beginning, my acknowledgment must run back to the very original of all human beings. My father gave me the benefit of life: which he had never done, if his father had not first given it to him. He gave me life, not knowing to whom; and when I was in a condition neither to feel death nor to fear it. That is the great benefit, to give life to one that knows how to use it, and that is capable of the apprehension of death. It is true, that without a father I could never have had a being; and so, without a nurse, that being had never been improved:

but I do not therefore owe my virtue either to my nativity or to her that gave me suck. The generation of me was the last part of the benefit: for to live is common with brutes; but to live well is the main business; and that virtue is all my own, saving what I drew from my education. It does not follow that the *first* benefit must be the *greatest*, because without the first the greatest could never have been. The father gives life to the son but once; but if the son save the father's life often, though he do but his duty, it is yet a greater benefit. And again, the benefit that a man receives is the greater, the more he needs it; but the living has more need of life than he that is not yet born; so that the father receives a greater benefit in the continuance of his life than the son in the beginning of it. What if a son deliver his father from the rack; or, which is more, lay himself down in his place? The giving of him a being was but the office of a father; a simple act, a benefit given at a venture: beside that, he had a participant in it, and a regard to his family. He gave only a single life, and he received a happy one. My mother brought me into the world naked, exposed, and void of reason; but my reputation and my fortune are advanced by my virtue. Scipio (as yet in his minority) rescued his father in a battle with Hannibal, and afterward from the practices and persecution of a powerful faction; covering him with consulary honors, and the spoils of public enemies. He made himself as eminent for his moderation as for his piety and military knowledge: he was the defender and the establisher of his country: he left the empire without a competitor, and made himself as well the ornament of Rome as the security of it:

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and did not Scipio, in all this, more than requite his father barely for begetting of him? Whether did Anchises more for *Aeneas*, in dandling the child in his arms; or *Aeneas* for his father, when he carried him upon his back through the flames of Troy, and made his name famous to future ages among the founders of the Roman Empire? T. Manlius was the son of a sour and imperious father, who banished him from his house as a blockhead, and a scandal to the family. This Manlius, hearing that his father's life was in question, and a day set for his trial, went to the tribune that was concerned in his cause, and discoursed with him about it: the tribune told him the appointed time, and withal (as an obligation upon the young man) that his cruelty to his son would be part of his accusation. Manlius, upon this, takes the tribune aside, and presenting a poniard to his breast, "Swear," says he, "that you will let this cause fall, or you shall have this dagger in the heart of you; and now it is at your choice which way you will deliver my father." The tribune swore and kept his word, and made a fair report of the whole matter to the council. He that makes himself famous by his eloquence, justice, or arms, illustrates his extraction, let it be never so mean; and gives inestimable reputation to his parents. We should never have heard of Sophroniscus, but for his son Socrates; nor for Aristo and Gryllus, if it had not been for Xenophon and Plato.

This is not to discountenance the veneration we owe to parents; nor to make children the worse, but the better; and to stir up generous emulations: for, in contests of good offices, both parties are happy; as well the vanquished as those that overcome. It is the only honorable dispute that can arise betwixt

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a father and son, which of the two shall have the better of the other in the point of benefits.

In the question betwixt a master and a servant, we must distinguish betwixt benefits, duties, and actions ministerial. By *benefits*, we understand those good offices that we receive from strangers, which are voluntary, and may be forborne without blame. *Duties* are the parts of a son and wife, and incumbent upon kindred and relations. *Offices ministerial* belong to the part of a servant. Now, since it is the *mind*, and not the *condition* of a person, that prints the value upon the benefit, a servant may oblige his master, and so may a subject his sovereign, or a common soldier his general, by doing more than he is expressly bound to do. Some things there are, which the law neither commands nor forbids; and here the servant is free. It would be very hard for a servant to be chastised for doing less than his duty, and not thanked for it when he does more. His body, it is true, is his master's, but his mind is his own: and there are many commands which a servant ought no more to obey than a master to impose. There is no man so great, but he may both need the help and service, and stand in fear of the power and unkindness, even of the meanest of mortals. One servant kills his master; another saves him, nay, preserves his master's life, perhaps, with the loss of his own: he exposes himself to torment and death; he stands firm against all threats and batteries: which is not only a benefit in a servant, but much the greater for his being so.

When Domitius was besieged in Corfinium, and the place brought to great extremity, he pressed his servant so earnestly to poison him, that at last he was prevailed upon to give him a potion; which, it

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seems, was an innocent opiate, and Domitius outlived it: Cæsar took the town, and gave Domitius his life, but it was his servant that gave it him first.

There was another town besieged, and when it was upon the last pinch, two servants made their escape, and went over to the enemy: upon the Romans entering the town, and in the heat of the soldiers' fury, these two fellows ran directly home, took their mistress out of her house, and drove her before them, telling every body how barbarously she had used them formerly, and that they would now have their revenge; when they had her without the gates, they kept her close till the danger was over; by which means they gave their mistress her life, and she gave them their freedom. This was not the action of a servile mind, to do so glorious a thing, under an appearance of so great a villainy; for if they had not passed for deserters and parricides, they could not have gained their end.

With one instance more (and that a very brave one) I shall conclude this chapter.

In the civil wars of Rome, a party coming to search for a person of quality that was proscribed, a servant put on his master's clothes, and delivered himself up to the soldiers as the master of the house; he was taken into custody, and put to death, without discovering the mistake. What could be more glorious, than for a servant to die for his master, in that age, when there were not many servants that would not betray their masters? So generous a tenderness in a public cruelty; so invincible a faith in a general corruption; what could be more glorious, I say, than so exalted a virtue, as rather to choose death for the reward of his fidelity, than the greatest advantages he might otherwise have had for the violation of it?

## CHAPTER IV.

IT IS THE INTENTION, NOT THE MATTER, THAT MAKES THE BENEFIT.

THE *good-will* of the benefactor is the fountain of all benefits; nay it is the benefit itself, or, at least, the stamp that makes it valuable and current. Some there are, I know, that take the matter for the benefit, and tax the obligation by weight and measure. When anything is given them, they presently cast it up; "What may such a house be worth? such an office? such an estate?" as if that were the benefit which is only the sign and mark of it: for the obligation rests in the mind, not in the matter; and all those advantages which we see, handle, or hold in actual possession by the courtesy of another, are but several modes or ways of explaining and putting the good-will in execution. There needs no great subtlety to prove, that both benefits and injuries receive their value from the intention, when even brutes themselves are able to decide this question. Tread upon a dog by chance, or put him to pain upon the dressing of a wound; the one he passes by as an accident; and the other, in his fashion, he acknowledges as a kindness: but, offer to strike at him, though you do him no hurt at all, he flies yet in the face of you, even for the mischief that you barely meant him.

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It is further to be observed, that all benefits are good; and (like the distributions of Providence) made up of wisdom and bounty; whereas the gift itself is neither good nor bad, but may indifferently be applied, either to the one or to the other. The benefit is immortal, the gift perishable: for the benefit itself continues when we have no longer either the use or the matter of it. He that is dead was alive; he that has lost his eyes, did see; and, whatsoever is done, cannot be rendered undone. My friend (for instance) is taken by pirates; I redeem him; and after that he falls into other pirates' hands; his obligation to me is the same still as if he had preserved his freedom. And so, if I save a man from any misfortune, and he falls into another; if I give him a sum of money, which is afterwards taken away by thieves; it comes to the same case. Fortune may deprive us of the matter of a benefit, but the benefit itself remains inviolable. If the benefit resided in the matter, that which is good for one man would be so for another; whereas many times the very same thing, given to several persons, work contrary effects, even to the difference of life or death; and that which is one body's cure proves another body's poison. Beside that, the timing of it alters the value; and a crust of bread, upon a pinch, is a greater present than an imperial crown. What is more familiar than in a battle to shoot at an enemy and kill a friend? or, instead of a friend, to save an enemy? But yet this disappointment, in the event, does not at all operate upon the intention. What if a man cures me of a wen with a stroke that was designed to cut off my head? or, with a malicious blow upon my stomach, breaks an imposthume? or, what if he saves my life with a draught that was

prepared to poison me? The providence of the issue does not at all discharge the obliquity of the intent. And the same reason holds good even in religion itself. It is not the incense, or the offering, that is acceptable to God, but the purity and devotion of the worshipper: neither is the bare will, without action, sufficient, that is, where we have the means of acting; for, in that case, it signifies as little to *wish well*, without *well-doing*, as to *do good* without *willing it*. There must be effect as well as intention, to make me owe a benefit; but, to will against it, does wholly discharge it. In fine, the conscience alone is the judge, both of benefits and injuries.

It does not follow now, because the benefit rests in the good-will, that therefore the good-will should be always a benefit; for if it be not accompanied with government and discretion, those offices, which we call *benefits*, are but the works of passion, or of chance; and many times, the greatest of all injuries. One man does me good by mistake; another ignorantly; a third upon force: but none of these cases do I take to be an obligation; for they were neither directed to me, nor was there any kindness of intention: we do not thank the seas for the advantages we receive by navigation; or the rivers with supplying us with fish and flowing of our grounds; we do not thank the trees either for their fruits or shades, or the winds for a fair gale; and what is the difference betwixt a reasonable creature that does not know and an inanimate that cannot? A good *horse* saves one man's life; a good suit of *arms* another's; and a *man*, perhaps, that never intended it, saves a third. Where is the difference now betwixt the obligation of one and of the other? A man falls into a river, and the fright cures him of the ague; we

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may call this a kind of lucky mischance, but not a remedy. And so it is with the good we receive, either without, or beside, or contrary to intention. It is the mind, and not the event, that distinguishes a benefit from an injury.

## CHAPTER V.

THERE MUST BE JUDGMENT IN A BENEFIT, AS WELL AS MATTER  
AND INTENTION; AND ESPECIALLY IN THE CHOICE  
OF THE PERSON.

As it is the *will* that designs the benefit, and the *matter* that conveys it, so it is the *judgment* that perfects it; which depends upon so many critical nice-ties, that the least error, either in the person, the matter, the manner, the quality, the quantity, the time, or the place, spoils all.

The consideration of the *person* is a main point: for we are to give by choice, and not by hazard. My inclination bids me oblige one man; I am bound in duty and justice to serve another; here it is a charity, there it is pity; and elsewhere, perhaps, encouragement. There are some that want, to whom I would not give; because, if I did, they would want still. To one man I would barely offer a benefit; but I would press it upon another. To say the truth, we do not employ any more profit than that which we bestow; and it is not to our friends, our acquaintances or countrymen, nor to this or that condition of men, that we are to restrain our bounties; but wheresoever there is a man, there is a place and occasion for a benefit. We give to some that are good already; to others, in hope to make them so: but we must do all with discretion; for we are as well answerable for what we give as for what we receive;

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nay, the misplacing of a benefit is worse than the not receiving of it; for the one is another man's fault; but the other is mine. The error of the giver does oft-times excuse the ingratitude of the receiver: for a favor ill-placed is rather a profusion than a benefit. It is the most shameful of losses, an inconsiderate bounty. I will choose a man of integrity, sincere, considerate, grateful, temperate, well-natured, neither covetous nor sordid: and when I have obliged such a man, though not worth a groat in the world, I have gained my end. If we give only to receive, we lose the fairest objects of our charity: the absent, the sick, the captive, and the needy. When we oblige those that can never pay us again in kind, as a stranger upon his last farewell, or a necessitous person upon his death-bed, we make Providence our debtor, and rejoice in the conscience even of a fruitless benefit. So long as we are affected with passions, and distracted with hopes and fears, and (the most unmanly of vices) with our pleasures, we are incompetent judges where to place our bounties: but when death presents itself, and that we come to our last will and testament, we leave our fortunes to the most worthy. He that gives nothing, but in hopes of receiving, must die intestate. It is the honesty of another man's mind that moves the kindness of mine; and I would sooner oblige a grateful man than an ungrateful: but this shall not hinder me from doing good also to a person that is known to be ungrateful: only with this difference, that I will serve the one in all extremities with my life and fortune, and the other no farther than stands with my convenience. But what shall I do, you will say, to know whether a man will be grateful or not? I will follow probability, and hope the best. He that sows is not

sure to reap; nor the seaman to reach his port; nor the soldier to win the field: he that weds is not sure his wife shall be honest, or his children dutiful: but shall we therefore neither sow, sail, bear arms, nor marry? Nay, if I knew a man to be incurably thankless, I would yet be so kind as to put him in his way, or let him light a candle at mine, or draw water at my well; which may stand him perhaps in great stead, and yet not be reckoned as a benefit from me; for I do it carelessly, and not for his sake, but my own; as an office of humanity, without any choice or kindness.

## CHAPTER VI.

## THE MATTER OF OBLIGATIONS, WITH ITS CIRCUMSTANCES.

NEXT to the choice of the *person* follows that of the *matter*; wherein a regard must be had to time, place, proportion, quality; and to the very nicks of opportunity and humor. One man values his peace above his honor, another his honor above his safety; and not a few there are that (provided they may save their bodies) never care what becomes of their souls. So that good offices depend much upon construction. Some take themselves to be obliged, when they are not; others will not believe it, when they are; and some again take obligations and injuries, the one for the other.

For our better direction, let it be noted, "That a benefit is a common tie betwixt the giver and receiver, with respect to both;" wherefore it must be accommodated to the rules of discretion; for all things have their bounds and measures, and so must liberality among the rest; that it be neither too much for the one nor too little for the other; the excess being every jot as bad as the defect. Alexander bestowed a city upon one of his favorites; who modestly excusing himself, "That it was too much for him to receive." "Well, but," says Alexander, "it is not too much for me to give." A haughty certainly, and an imprudent speech; for that which was not fit

for the one to take could not be fit for the other to give. It passes in the world for greatness of mind to be perpetually giving and loading of people with bounties; but it is one thing to know how to *give*, and another thing not to know how to *keep*. Give me a heart that is easy and open, but I will have no holes in it; let it be bountiful with judgment, but I will have nothing run out of it I know not how. How much greater was he that refused the city than the other that offered it? Some men throw away their money as if they were angry with it, which is the error commonly of weak minds and large fortunes. No man esteems of anything that comes to him by chance; but when it is governed by reason, it brings credit both to the giver and receiver; whereas those favors are, in some sort, scandalous, that make a man ashamed of his patron.

It is a matter of great prudence, for the benefactor to suit the benefit to the condition of the receiver: who must be either his superior, his inferior, or his equal; and that which would be the highest obligation imaginable to the one, would perhaps be as great a mockery and affront to the other; as a plate of broken meat (for the purpose) to a rich man were an indignity, which to a poor man is a charity. The benefits of princes and of great men, are honors, offices, monies, profitable commissions, countenance, and protection: the poor man has nothing to present but good-will, good advice, faith, industry, the service and hazard of his person, an early apple, peradventure, or some other cheap curiosity: equals indeed may correspond in kind; but whatsoever the present be, or to whomsoever we offer it, this general rule must be observed, that we always design the good and satisfaction of the receiver, and never

**700** grant anything to his detriment. It is not for a man to say, I was overcome by importunity; for when the fever is off, we detest the man that was prevailed upon to our destruction. I will no more undo a man with his will, than forbear saving him against it. It is a benefit in some cases to grant, and in others to deny; so that we are rather to consider the advantage than the desire of the petitioner. For we may in a passion earnestly beg for (and take it ill to be denied too) that very thing, which, upon second thoughts, we may come to curse, as the occasion of a most pernicious bounty. Never give anything that shall turn to mischief, infamy, or shame. I will consider another man's want or safety; but so as not to forget my own; unless in the case of a very excellent person, and then I shall not much heed what becomes of myself. There is no giving of water to a man in a fever; or putting a sword into a madman's hand. He that lends a man money to carry him to a bawdy-house, or a weapon for his revenge, makes himself a partaker of his crime.

He that would make an acceptable present, will pitch upon something that is desired, sought for, and hard to be found; that which he sees nowhere else, and which few have; or at least not in that place or season; something that may be always in his eye, and mind him of his benefactor. If it be lasting and durable, so much the better; as plate, rather than money; statues than apparel; for it will serve as a monitor to mind the receiver of the obligation, which the presenter cannot so handsomely do. However, let it not be improper, as arms to a woman, books to a clown, toys to a philosopher: I will not give to any man that which he cannot receive, as if I threw a ball to a man without hands; but I will,

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make a *return*, though he cannot receive it; for my business is not to oblige him, but to free myself: nor anything that may reproach a man of his vice or infirmity; as false dice to a cheat; spectacles to a man that is blind. Let it not be unseasonable neither; as a furred gown in summer, an umbrella in winter. It enhances the value of the present, if it was never given to him by anybody else, nor by me to any other; for that which we give to everybody is welcome to nobody.

The particularity does much, but yet the same thing may receive a different estimate from several persons; for there are ways of marking and recommending it in such a manner, that if the same *good office* be done to twenty people, every one of them shall reckon himself peculiarly obliged as a cunning whore, if she has a thousand sweethearts, will persuade every one of them she loves him best. But this is rather the artifice of conversation than the virtue of it.

The citizens of Megara send ambassadors to Alexander in the height of his glory, to offer him, as a compliment, the freedom of their city. Upon Alexander's smiling at the proposal, they told him, that it was a present which they had never made but to Hercules and himself. Whereupon Alexander treated them kindly, and accepted of it; not for the presenters' sake, but because they had joined him with Hercules; now unreasonably soever; for Hercules conquered nothing for himself, but made his business to vindicate and to protect the miserable, without any private interest or design; but this intemperate young man (whose virtue was nothing else but a successful temerity) was trained up from his youth in the trade of violence; the common

**702** enemy of mankind, as well of his friends as of his foes, and one that valued himself upon being terrible to all mortals: never considering, that the dullest creatures are as dangerous and as dreadful, as the fiercest; for the poison of a toad, or the tooth of a snake, will do a man's business, as sure as the paw of a tiger.

## CHAPTER VII.

## THE MANNER OF OBLIGING.

THERE is not any benefit so glorious in itself, but it may yet be exceedingly sweetened and improved by the *manner* of conferring it. The virtue, I know, rests in the *intent*, the profit in the judicious application of the *matter*; but the beauty and ornament of an obligation lies in the *manner* of it; and it is then perfect when the dignity of the office is accompanied with all the charms and delicacies of humanity, good-nature, and address; and with dispatch too; for he that puts a man off from time to time, was never right at heart.

In the first place, whatsoever we give, let us do it *frankly*: a kind benefactor makes a man happy as *soon* as he can, and as *much* as he can. There should be no *delay* in a benefit but the modesty of the receiver. If we cannot foresee the request, let us, however, immediately grant it, and by no means suffer the repeating of it. It is so grievous a thing to say. *I BEG*; the very word puts a man out of countenance; and it is a double kindness to do the thing, and save an honest man the confusion of a blush. It comes too late that comes for the asking: for nothing costs us so dear as that we purchase with our prayers: it is all we give, even for heaven itself; and even there too, where our petitions are at the

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fairest, we choose rather to present them in secret ejaculations than by word of mouth. That is the lasting and the acceptable benefit that meets the receiver half-way. The rule is, we are to *give*, as we would *receive, cheerfully, quickly, and without hesitation*; for there is no grace in a benefit that sticks to the fingers. Nay, if there should be occasion for delay, let us, however, not *seem* to deliberate; for *demurring* is next door to *denying*; and so long as we suspend, so long are we unwilling. It is a court-humor to keep people upon the tenters; their injuries are quick and sudden, but their benefits are slow. Great ministers love to rack men with attendance, and account it an ostentation of their power to hold their suitors in hand, and to have many witnesses of their interest. A benefit should be made acceptable by all possible means, even to the end that the receiver, who is never to forget it, may bear it in his mind with satisfaction. There must be no mixture of sourness, severity, contumely, or reproof, with our obligations; nay, in case there should be any occasion for so much as an admonition, let it be referred to another time. We are a great deal apter to remember injuries than benefits; and it is enough to forgive an obligation that has the nature of an offence.

There are some that spoil a good office after it is done and others, in the very instant of doing it. There be so much entreaty and importunity; nay, if we do but suspect a petitioner, we put on a sour face; look another way; pretend haste, company, business; talk of other matters, and keep him off with artificial delays, let his necessities be never so pressing; and when we are put to it at last, it comes so hard from us that it is rather extorted than obtained; and

not so properly the giving of a bounty, as the quitting of a man's hold upon the tug, when another is too strong for him; so that this is but doing one kindness for me, and another for himself: he gives for his own quiet, after he has tormented me with difficulties and delays. The *manner* of *saying* or of *doing* any thing, goes a great way in the value of the thing itself. It was well said of him that called a good office, that was done harshly, and with an ill will, *a stony piece of bread*; it is necessary for him that is hungry to receive it, but it almost chokes a man in the going down. There must be no pride, arrogance of looks, or tumor of words, in the bestowing of benefits; no insolence of behavior, but a modesty of mind, and a diligent care to catch at occasions and prevent necessities. A pause, an unkind tone, word, look, or action, destroys the grace of a courtesy. It corrupts a bounty, when it is accompanied with state, haughtiness, and elation of mind, in the giving of it. Some have a trick of shifting off a suitor with a point of wit, or a cavil. As in the case of the Cynic that begged a talent of Antigonus: "That is too much," says he, "for a Cynic to ask;" and when he fell to a penny, "That is too little," says he, "for a prince to give." He might have found a way to have compounded this controversy, by giving him a *penny* as to a *Cynic* and a *talent* as from a *prince*. Whatsoever we bestow, let it be done with a frank and cheerful countenance: a man must not give with his hand, and deny with his looks. He that gives quickly, gives willingly.

We are likewise to accompany *good deeds* with *good words*, and say, (for the purpose.) "Why should you make such a matter of this? why did not you come to me sooner? why would you make use of

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any body else? I take it ill that you should bring me a recommendation; pray let there be no more of this, but when you have occasion hereafter, come to me upon your own account." That is the glorious bounty, when the receiver can say to himself; "What a blessed day has this been to me! never was any thing done so generously, so tenderly, with so good a grace. What is it I would not do to serve this man? A thousand times as much another way could not have given me this satisfaction." In such a case, let the benefit be never so considerable, the manner of conferring it is yet the noblest part. Where there is harshness of language, countenance, or behavior, a man had better be without it. A flat denial is infinitely before a vexatious delay: as a quick death is a mercy, compared with a lingering torment. But to be put to waitings and intercessions, after a promise is passed, is a cruelty intolerable. It is troublesome to stay long for a benefit, let it be never so great; and he that holds me needlessly in pain, loses two precious things, time, and the proof of friendship. Nay, the very hint of a man's want comes many times too late. "If I had money," said Socrates, "I would buy me a cloak." They that knew he wanted one should have prevented the very intimation of that want. It is not the value of the present, but the benevolence of the mind, that we are to consider. "He gave me but a little, but it was generously and frankly done; it was a little out of a little: he gave it me without asking; he pressed it upon me; he watched the opportunity of doing it, and took it as an obligation upon himself." On the other side, many benefits are great in show, but little or nothing perhaps in effect, when they come hard, slow, or at unawares. That which is given with

pride and ostentation. is rather an ambition than a bounty.

Some favors are to be conferred in *public*, others in *private*. In *public* the rewards of great actions; as honors, charges, or whatsoever else gives a man reputation in the world; but the good offices we do for a man in want, distress, or under reproach, these should be known only to those that have the benefit of them. Nay, not to them neither, if we can handsomely conceal it from whence the favor came; for the secrecy, in many cases, is a main part of the benefit. There was a good man that had a friend, who was both poor and sick, and ashamed to own his condition: he privately conveyed a bag of money under his pillow, that he might seem rather to find than receive it. Provided I know that I give it, no matter for his knowing from whence it comes that receives it. Many a man stands in need of help that has not the face to confess it: if the discovery may give offence, let it lie concealed; he that gives to be seen would never relieve a man in the dark. It would be too tedious to run through all the niceties that may occur upon this subject; but, in two words, he must be a wise, a friendly, and a well-bred man, that perfectly acquits himself in the art and duty of obliging: for all his actions must be squared according to the measures of *civility*, *good-nature* and *discretion*.

## CHAPTER VIII.

## THE DIFFERENCE AND VALUE OF BENEFITS.

WE have already spoken of *benefits* in *general*; the *matter* and the *intention*, together with the *manner* of conferring them. It follows now, in course, to say something of the *value* of them; which is rated, either by the good they do us, or by the inconvenience they save us, and has no other standard than that of a judicious regard to circumstance and occasion. Suppose I save a man from drowning, the advantage of life is all one to him, from what hand soever it comes, or by what means; but yet there may be a vast difference in the obligation. I may do it with hazard, or with security, with trouble, or with ease; willingly, or by compulsion; upon intercession, or without it: I may have a prospect of vain-glory or profit: I may do it in kindness to another, or an hundred *by-ends* to myself; and every point does exceedingly vary the case. Two persons may part with the same sum of money, and yet not the same benefit: the one had it of his *own*, and it was but a *little* out of a *great deal*; the other *borrowed* it, and bestowed upon me that which he wanted for himself. Two boys were sent out to fetch a certain person to their master: the one of them hunts up and down, and comes home again weary, without finding him; the other falls to play with his companions at the wheel of Fortune, sees

him by chance passing by, delivers him his errand, and brings him. He that found him by chance deserves to be punished; and he that sought for him, and missed him, to be rewarded for his good-will.

In some cases we value the *thing*, in others the *labor* and *attendance*. What can be more precious than good manners, good letters, life, and health? and yet we pay our physicians and tutors only for their service in the professions. If we buy things cheap, it matters not, so long as it is a bargain: it is no obligation from the seller, if nobody else will give him more for it. What would not a man give to be set ashore in a tempest? for a house in a wilderness? a shelter in a storm? a fire, or a bit of meat, when a man is pinched with hunger or cold? a defence against thieves, and a thousand other matters of moment, that cost but little? And yet we know that the skipper has but his freight for our passage; and the carpenters and bricklayers do their work by the day. Those are many times the greatest obligations in truth, which in vulgar opinions are the smallest: as comfort to the sick, poor captives; good counsel, keeping of people from wickedness, etc. Wherefore we should reckon ourselves to owe most for the noblest benefits. If the physician adds care and friendship to the duty of his calling, and the tutor to the common method of his business; I am to esteem them as the nearest of my relations: for to watch with me, to be troubled for me, and to put off all other patients for my sake, is a particular kindness: and so it is in my tutor, if he takes more pains with me than with the rest of my fellows. It is not enough, in this case, to pay the one his fees, and the other his salary; but I am indebted to them over and above for their friendship. The meanest

**710** of mechanics, if he does his work with industry and care, it is an usual thing to cast in something by way of reward more than the bare agreement: and shall we deal worse with the preservers of our lives, and the reformers of our manners? He that gives me himself (if he be worth taking) gives the greatest benefit: and this is the present which Æschines, a poor disciple of Socrates, made to his master, and as a matter of great consideration: "Others may have given you much," says, he, "but I am the only man that has left nothing to himself." "This gift," says Socrates, "you shall never repent of; for I will take care to return it better than I found it." So that a brave mind can never want matter for liberality in the meanest condition; for Nature has been so kind to us, that where we have nothing of Fortune's, we may bestow something of our own.

It falls out often, that a benefit is followed with an injury; let which will be foremost, it is with the latter as with one writing upon another; it does in a great measure hide the former, and keep it from appearing, but it does not quite take it away. We may in some cases divide them, and both requite the one, and revenge the other; or otherwise compare them, to know whether I am creditor or debtor. You have obliged me in my servant, but wounded me in my brother; you have saved my son, but have destroyed my father; in this instance, I will allow as much as piety, and justice, and good nature, will bear; but I am not willing to set an injury against a benefit. I would have some respect to the time: the obligation came first; and then, perhaps, the one was designed, the other against his will: under these considerations I would amplify the benefit, and lessen the injury; and extinguish the one with the

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other; nay, I would pardon the injury even *without* the benefit, but much more *after* it. Not that a man can be bound by one benefit to suffer all sorts of injuries; for there are some cases wherein we lie under no obligation for a benefit; because a greater injury absolves it: as, for example, a man helps me out of a law-suit, and afterwards commits a rape upon my daughter; where the following impiety cancels the antecedent obligation. A man lends me a little money, and then sets my house on fire; the debtor is here turned creditor, when the injury outweighs the benefit. Nay, if a man does but so much as repented the good office done, and grow sour and insolent upon it, and upbraid me with it; if he did it only for his own sake, or for any other reason than for mine, I am in some degree, more or less, acquitted of the obligation. I am not at all beholden to him that makes me the instrument of his own advantage. He that does me good for his own sake, I will do him good for mine.

Suppose a man makes suit for a place, and cannot obtain it, but upon the ransom of ten slaves out of the galleys. If there be ten, and *no more*, they owe him nothing for their redemption; but *they* are indebted to him for the choice, where he might have taken ten others as well as these. Put the case again, that by an act of grace so many prisoners are to be released, their names to be drawn by lot, and mine happens to come out among the rest: one part of my obligation is to him that put me in a capacity of freedom, and the other is to Providence for my being one of that number. The greatest benefits of all have no witnesses, but lie concealed in the conscience.

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There is a great difference betwixt a common obligation and a particular; he that lends my country money, obliges me only as a part of the whole. Plato crossed the river, and the ferry-man would take no money of him: he reflected upon it as honor done to himself; and told him, "That Plato was in debt." But Plato, when he found it to be no more than he did for others, recalled his words, "For," says he, "Plato will owe nothing in particular for a benefit in common; what I owe with others, I will pay with others."

Some will have it that the necessity of wishing a man well is some abatement to the obligation in the doing of him a good office. But I say, on the contrary, that it is the greater; because the good-will cannot be changed. It is one thing to say, that a man could not but do me this or that civility, because he was forced to do it; and another thing, that he could not quit the good-will of doing it. In the former case, I am a debtor to him that impositioneth the force, in the other to himself. The unchangeable good-will is an indispensable obligation: and, to say, that nature cannot go out of her course, does not discharge us of *what we owe to Providence*. Shall he be said to will, that may change his mind the next moment? and shall we question the will of the Almighty, whose nature admits no change? Must the stars quit their stations, and fall foul one upon another? must the sun stand still in the middle of his course, and heaven and earth drop into confusion? must a devouring fire seize upon the universe; the harmony of the creation be dissolved; and the whole frame of nature swallowed up in a dark abyss; and will nothing less than this serve to convince the world of their audacious and impertinent

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follies? It is not to say, that *these heavenly bodies are not made for us*; for in part they are so; and we are the better for their virtues and motions, whether we will or not; though, undoubtedly, the principal cause is the unalterable law of God. Providence is not moved by anything from without; but the Divine will is an everlasting law, an immutable decree; and the impossibility of variation proceeds from God's purpose of preserving; for he never repents of his first counsels. It is not with our heavenly as with our earthly father. God thought of us and provided for us, before he made us: (for unto him all future events are present.) Man was not the work of chance; his mind carries him above the slight of fortune, and naturally aspires to the contemplation of heaven and divine mysteries. How desperate a frenzy is it now to undervalue, nay, to contemn and to disclaim these divine blessings, without which we are utterly incapable of enjoying any other!

## CHAPTER IX.

AN HONEST MAN CANNOT BE OUTDONE IN COURTESY.

It passes in the world for a generous and magnificent saying, that “it is a shame for a man to be outdone in courtesy;” and it is worth the while to examine, both the truth of it, and the mistake. First, there can be no shame in a virtuous emulation; and, secondly, there can be no victory without crossing the cudgels, and yielding the cause. One man may have the advantage of strength, of means, of fortune; and this will undoubtedly operate upon the events of good purposes, but yet without any diminution to the virtue. The good will may be the same in both, and yet one may have the heels of the other; for it is not in a good office as in a course, where he wins the plate that comes first to the post: and even there also, chance has many times a great hand in the success. Where the contest is about benefits; and that the one has not only a *good will*, but *matter* to work upon, and a *power* to put that good intent in execution; and the other has barely a *good-will*, without either the *means*, or the *occasion*, of a requital; if he does but affectionately wish it, and endeavor it, the latter is no more overcome in courtesy than he is in courage that dies with his sword in his hand, and his face to the enemy, and without shrinking maintains his station: for where *fortune* is par-

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tial, it is enough that the *good-will* is *equal*. There are two errors in this proposition: first, to imply that a good man may be overcome; and then to imagine that anything shameful can befall him. The Spartans prohibited all those exercises where the victory was declared by the confession of the contendant. The 300 Fabii were never said to be *conquered*, but *slain*; nor Regulus to be *overcome*, though he was taken *prisoner* by the Carthaginians. The mind may stand firm under the greatest malice and iniquity of fortune; and yet the giver and receiver continue upon equal terms: as we reckon it a drawn battle, when two combatants are parted, though the one has lost more blood than the other. He that knows how to owe a courtesy, and heartily wishes that he could requite it, is invincible; so that every man may be as grateful as he pleases. It is your happiness to give, it is my fortune that I can only receive. What advantage now has your chance over my virtue? But there are some men that have philosophized themselves almost out of the sense of human affections; as Diogenes, that walked naked and unconcerned through the middle of Alexander's treasures, and was, as well in other men's opinions as in his own, even above Alexander himself, who at that time had the whole world at his feet: for there was more that the one scorned to take than that the other had it in his power to give: and it is a greater generosity for a beggar to refuse money than for a prince to bestow it. This is a remarkable instance of an immovable mind, and there is hardly any contending with it; but a man is never the less valiant for being worsted by an invulnerable enemy; nor the fire one jot the weaker for not consuming an incombustible body; nor a sword ever a whit the

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worse for not cleaving a rock that is impenetrable; neither is a grateful mind overcome for want of an answerable fortune. No matter for the inequality of the things given and received, so long as, in point of good affection, the two parties stand upon the same level. It is no shame not to overtake a man, if we follow him as fast as we can. That tumor of a man, the vain-glorious Alexander, was used to make his boast, that never any man went beyond him in benefits; and yet he lived to see a poor fellow in a tub, to whom there was nothing that he could give, and from whom there was nothing that he could take away.

Nor is it always necessary for a poor man to fly to the sanctuary of an invincible mind to quit scores with the bounties of a plentiful fortune; but it does often fall out, that the returns which he cannot make in *kind* are more than supplied in *dignity* and *value*. Archelaus, a king of Macedon, invited Socrates to his palace: but he excused himself, as unwilling to receive greater benefits than he was able to requite. This perhaps was not *pride* in Socrates, but *craft*; for he was afraid of being forced to accept of something which might possibly have been unworthy of him; beside, that he was a man of liberty, and loath to make himself a voluntary slave. The truth of it is, that Archelaus had more need of Socrates than Socrates of Archelaus; for he wanted a man to teach him the art of life and death, and the skill of government, and to read the book of Nature to him, and show him the light at noon-day: he wanted a man that, when the sun was in an eclipse, and he had locked himself up in all the horror and despair imaginable; he wanted a man, I say, to deliver him from his apprehensions, and to expound the

prodigy to him, by telling him, that there was no more in it than only that the *moon* was got betwixt the *sun* and the *earth*, and all would be well again presently. Let the world judge now, whether Archelaus' *bounty*, or Socrates' *philosophy*, would have been the greater present: he does not understand the value of wisdom and friendship that does not know a wise friend to be the noblest of presents. A rarity scarce to be found, not only in a family, but in an age; and nowhere more wanted than where there seems to be the greatest store. The greater a man is, the more need he has of him; and the more difficulty there is both of finding and of knowing him. Nor is it to be said, that "I cannot requite such a benefactor because I am poor, and have it not;" I can give good counsel; a conversation wherein he may take both delight and profit; freedom of discourse, without flattery; kind attention, where he deliberates; and faith inviolable where he trusts; I may bring him to a love and knowledge of truth; deliver him from the errors of his credulity, and teach him to distinguish betwixt friends and parasites.

## CHAPTER X.

THE QUESTION DISCUSSED, WHETHER OR NOT A MAN MAY GIVE  
OR RETURN A BENEFIT TO HIMSELF?

THERE are many cases, wherein a man speaks of himself as of another. As, for example, "I may thank myself for this; I am angry at myself; I hate myself for that." And this way of speaking has raised a dispute among the Stoics, "whether or not a man may give or return a benefit to himself?" For, say they, if I may hurt myself, I may oblige myself; and that which were a benefit to another body, why is it not so to myself? And why am I not as criminal in being ungrateful to myself as if I were so to another body? And the case is the same in flattery and several other vices; as, on the other side, it is a point of great reputation for a man to command himself. Plato thanked Socrates for what he had *learned* of him; and why might not Socrates as well thank Plato for that which he had *taught* him? "That which you want," says Plato, "borrow it of yourself." And why may not I as well give to myself as lend? If I may be angry with myself, I may thank myself; and if I chide myself, I may as well commend myself, and do myself good as well as hurt; there is the same reason of contraries: it is a common thing to say, "Such a man hath done himself an injury." If an injury, why not a benefit? But I say, that no man can be a debtor to

himself; for the benefit must naturally precede the acknowledgment; and a debtor can no more be without a creditor than a husband without a wife. Somebody must give, that somebody may receive; and it is neither giving nor receiving, the passing of a thing from one hand to the other. What if a man should be ungrateful in the case? there is nothing lost; for he that gives it has it: and he that gives and he that receives are one and the same person. Now, properly speaking, no man can be said to bestow any thing upon himself, for he obeys his nature, that prompts every man to do himself all the good he can. Shall I call him liberal, that gives to himself; or good-natured, that pardons himself; or pitiful, that is affected with his own misfortunes? That which were bounty, clemency, compassion, to another, to myself is nature. A benefit is a voluntary thing; but to do good to myself is a thing necessary. Was ever any man commended for getting out of a ditch, or for helping himself against thieves? Or what if I should allow, that a man might confer a benefit upon himself; yet he cannot owe it, for he returns it in the same instant that he receives it. No man gives, owes, or makes a return, but to another. How can one man do that to which two parties are requisite in so many respects? Giving and receiving must go backward and forward betwixt two persons. If a man give to himself, he may sell to himself; but to sell is to alienate a thing, and to translate the right of it to another; now, to make a man both the giver and the receiver is to unite two contraries. That is a benefit, which, when it is given, may possibly not be requited; but he that gives to himself, must necessarily receive what he gives; beside, that all benefits are given for the

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receiver's sake, but that which a man does for himself, is for the sake of the giver.

This is one of those subtleties, which, though hardly worth a man's while, yet it is not labor absolutely lost neither. There is more of trick and artifice in it than solidity; and yet there is matter of diversion too; enough perhaps to pass away a winter's evening, and keep a man waking that is heavy-headed.

## CHAPTER XI.

HOW FAR ONE MAN MAY BE OBLIGED FOR A BENEFIT DONE TO  
ANOTHER.

THE question now before us requires *distinction* and *caution*. For though it be both natural and generous to wish well to my friend's friend, yet a *second-hand benefit* does not bind me any further than to a *second-hand gratitude*: so that I may receive great satisfaction and advantage from a good office done to my friend, and yet lie under no obligation myself; or, if any man thinks otherwise, I must ask him, in the first place, Where it begins? and, How it extends? that it may not be boundless. Suppose a man obliges the son, does that obligation work upon the father? and why not upon the uncle too? the brother? the wife? the sister? the mother? nay, upon all that have any kindness for him? and upon all the lovers of his friends? and upon all that love them too? and so *in infinitum*. In this case we must have recourse, as is said heretofore, to the intention of the benefactor, and fix the obligation upon him unto whom the kindness was directed. If a man manures my ground, keeps my house from burning or falling, it is a benefit to me, for I am the better for it, and my house and land are insensible. But if he save the life of my son, the benefit is to my son; it is a joy and a comfort to me, but no obligation. I am as much concerned as I ought to be in

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the health, the felicity, and the welfare of my son, as happy in the enjoyment of him; and I should be as unhappy as is possible in his loss; but it does not follow that I must of necessity lie under an obligation for being either happier or less miserable, by another body's means. There are some benefits, which although conferred upon one man, may yet work upon others; as a sum of money may be given to a poor man for his own sake, which in the consequence proves the relief of his whole family; but still the immediate receiver is the debtor for it; for the question is not, to whom it comes afterward to be transferred, but who is the principal? and upon whom it was first bestowed? My son's life is as dear to me as my own; and in saving him you preserve me too: in this case I will acknowledge myself obliged to you, that is to say, in my son's name; for in my own, and in strictness, I am not; but I am content to make myself a voluntary debtor. What if he had borrowed money? my paying of it does not at all make it my debt. It would put me to the blush perhaps to have him taken in bed with another man's wife; but that does not make me an adulterer. It is a wonderful delight and satisfaction that I receive in his safety; but still this good is not a benefit. A man may be the better for an animal, a plant, a stone; but there must be a will, an intention, to make it an obligation. You save the son without so much as knowing the father, nay, without so much as thinking of him; and, perhaps you would have done the same thing even if you had hated him.

But without any futher alteration of dialogue, the conclusion is this; if you meant him the kindness, he is answerable for it, and I may enjoy the fruit of

it without being obliged by it: but if it was done for my sake, then I am accountable; or howsoever, upon any occasion, I am ready to do you all the kind offices imaginable; not as the return of a benefit, but as the earnest of a friendship; which you are not to challenge neither, but to entertain as an act of honor and of justice, rather than of gratitude. If a man find the body of my dead father in a desert, and give it a burial; if he did it as to my father, I am beholden to him: but if the body was unknown to him, and that he would have done the same thing for any other body, I am no farther concerned in it than as a piece of public humanity.

There are, moreover, some cases wherein an unworthy person may be obliged and for the sake of others: and the sottish extract of an ancient nobility may be preferred before a better man that is but of yesterday's standing. And it is but reasonable to pay a reverence even to the memory of eminent virtues. He that is not illustrious in himself, may yet be reputed so in the right of his ancestors: and there is a gratitude to be entailed upon the offspring of famous progenitors. Was it not for the *father's* sake that Cicero the *son* was made counsel? and was it not the eminence of one Pompey that raised and dignified the rest of his family? How came Caligula to be emperor of the world? a man so cruel, that he spilt blood as greedily as if he were to drink it; the empire was not given to himself, but to his father Germanicus. A brave man deserved that for him, which he could never have challenged upon his own merit. What was it that preferred Fabius Persicus, (whose very mouth was the uncleanest part about him,) what was it but the 300 of that family that so

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generously opposed the enemy for the safety of the commonwealth?

Nay, Providence itself is gracious to the wicked posterity of an honorable race. The counsels of heaven are guided by wisdom, mercy, and justice. Some men are made kings of their proper virtues, without any respect to their predecessors: others for their ancestors' sakes, whose virtues, though neglected in their lives, come to be afterward rewarded in their issues. And it is but equity, that our gratitude should extend as far as the influence of their heroical actions and examples.

## CHAPTER XII.

THE BENEFACTOR MUST HAVE NO BY-ENDS.

WE come now to the main point of the matter in question: that is to say, whether or not it be a thing desirable in itself, the giving and receiving of benefits? There is a sect of philosophers that accounts nothing valuable but what is profitable, and so makes all virtue mercenary; an unmanly mistake to imagine, that the hope of gain, or fear of loss, should make a man either the more or less honest. As who should say, “What will I get by it, and I will be an honest man?” Whereas, on the contrary, honesty is a thing in itself to be purchased at any rate. It is not for a body to say, “It will be a charge, a hazard, I shall give offence,” etc. My business is to do what I ought to do: all other considerations are foreign to the office. Whosoever my duty calls me, it is my part to attend, without scrupulizing upon forms or difficulties. Shall I see an honest man oppressed at the bar, and not assist him, for fear of a court faction? or not second him upon the highway against thieves, for fear of a broken head? and choose rather to sit still, the quiet spectator of fraud and violence? Why will men be just, temperate, generous, brave, but because it carries along with it fame and a good conscience? and for the same reason, and no other, (to apply it to the sub-

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ject in hand,) let a man also be bountiful. The school of Epicurus, I am sure, will never swallow this doctrine: (that effeminate tribe of lazy and voluptuous philosophers;) they will tell you, that virtue is but the servant and vassal of pleasure. "No," says Epicurus, "I am not for pleasure neither without virtue." But, why then for pleasure, say I, *before* virtue? Not that the stress of the controversy lies upon the *order* only; for the *power* of it, as well as the *dignity*, is now under debate. It is the office of virtue to superintend, to lead, and to govern; but the parts you have assigned it, are to submit, to follow, and to be under command. But this, you will say, is nothing to the purpose, so long as both sides are agreed, that there can be no happiness without *virtue*: "Take away that," says Epicurus, "and I am as little a friend to pleasure as you." The pinch, in short, is this, whether virtue itself be the supreme good or the only cause of it? It is not the inverting of the order that will clear this point; (though it is a very preposterous error, to set that first which should be last.) It does not half so much offend me; ranging of pleasure before virtue, as the very comparing of them; and the bringing of the two opposites, and professed enemies, into any sort of competition.

The drift of this discourse is, to support the cause of benefits; and to prove, that it is a mean and dishonorable thing to give for any other end than for giving's sake. He that gives for gain, profit, or any by-end, destroys the very intent of bounty; for it falls only upon those that do not want, and perverts the charitable inclinations of princes and of great men, who cannot reasonably propound to themselves any such end. What does the sun get by travelling about the universe; by visiting and comforting all

the quarters of the earth? Is the whole creation made and ordered for the good of mankind, and every particular man only for the good of himself? There passes not an hour of our lives, wherein we do not enjoy the blessings of Providence, without measure and without intermission. And what design can the Almighty have upon us, who is in himself full, safe, and inviolable? If he should give only for his own sake, what would become of poor mortals, that have nothing to return him at best but dutiful acknowledgments? It is putting out of a benefit to interest only to bestow where we may place it to advantage.

Let us be liberal then, after the example of our great Creator, and give to others with the same consideration that he gives to us. Epicurus's answer will be to this, that God gives no benefits at all, but turns his back upon the world; and without any concern for us, leaves Nature to take her course: and whether he does anything himself, or nothing, he takes no notice, however, either of the good or of the ill that is done here below. If there were not an ordering and an over-ruling Providence, how comes it (say I, on the other side) that the universality of mankind should ever have so unanimously agreed in the madness of worshipping a power that can neither hear nor help us? Some blessings are freely given us; others upon our prayers are granted us; and every day brings forth instances of great and of seasonable mercies. There never was yet any man so insensible as not to feel, see, and understand, a Deity in the ordinary methods of nature, though many have been so obstinately ungrateful as not to confess it; nor is any man so wretched as not to be a partaker in that divine bounty. Some benefits, it

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is true, may appear to be unequally divided; but it is no small matter yet that we possess in common: and which Nature has bestowed upon us in her very self. If God be not bountiful, whence is it that we have all that we pretend to? That which we give, and that which we deny, that which we lay up, and that which we squander away? Those innumerable delights for the entertainment of our eyes, our ears, and our understandings? nay, that copious matter even for luxury itself? For care is taken, not only for our necessities, but also for our pleasures, and for the gratifying of all our senses and appetites. So many pleasant groves; fruitful and salutary plants; so many fair rivers that serve us, both for recreation, plenty, and commerce: vicissitudes of seasons; varieties of food, by nature made ready to our hands, and the whole creation itself subjected to mankind for health, medicine and dominion. We can be thankful to a friend for a few acres, or a little money: and yet for the freedom and command of the whole earth, and for the great benefits of our being, as life, health, and reason, we look upon ourselves as under no obligation. If a man bestows upon us a house that is delicately beautified with paintings, statues, gildings, and marble, we make a mighty business of it, and yet it lies at the mercy of a puff of wind, the snuff of a candle, and a hundred other accidents, to lay it in the dust. And is it nothing now to sleep under the canopy of heaven, where we have the globe of the earth for our place of repose, and the glories of the heavens for our spectacle? How comes it that we should so much value what we have, and yet at the same time be so unthankful for it? Whence is it that we have our breath, the comforts of light and of heat, the very

blood that runs in our veins? the cattle that feed us, and the fruits of the earth that feed them? Whence have we the growth of our bodies, the succession of our ages, and the faculties of our minds? so many veins of metals, quarries of marble, etc. The seed of everything is in itself, and it is the blessing of God that raises it out of the dark into act and motion. To say nothing of the charming varieties of music, beautiful objects, delicious provisions for the palate, exquisite perfumes, which are cast in, over and above, to the common necessities of our being.

All this, says Epicurus, we are to ascribe to Nature. And why not to God, I beseech ye? as if they were not both of them one and the same power, working in the whole, and in every part of it. Or, if you call him the Almighty Jupiter; the Thunderer; the Creator and Preserver of us all: it comes to the same issue; some will express him under the notion of *Fate*; which is only a connexion of causes, and himself the uppermost and original, upon which all the rest depend. The Stoics represent the several *functions* of the *Almighty Power* under several *appellations*. When they speak of him as the father and the fountain of all beings, they call him *Bacchus*: and under the name of *Hercules*, they denote him to be *indefatigable* and *invincible*; and in the contemplation of him in the *reason, order, proportion*, and *wisdom* of his proceedings, they call him *Mercury*; so that which way soever they look, and under what name soever they couch their meaning, they never fail of finding him; for he is everywhere, and fills his own work. If a man should borrow money of Seneca, and say that he owes it to Annæus or Lucius, he may change the name but not his creditor; for let him take which of the three

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names he pleases, he is still a debtor to the same person. As justice, integrity, prudence, frugality, fortitude, are all of them goods of one and the same mind, so that whichever of them pleases us, we cannot distinctly say that it is this or that, but the mind.

But, not to carry this digression too far; that which God himself does, we are sure is well done; and we are no less sure, that for whatsoever he gives, he neither wants, expects, nor receives, anything, in return; so that the end of a benefit ought to be the advantage of the receiver; and that must be our scope without any by-regard to ourselves. It is objected to us, the singular caution we prescribe in the choice of the person: for it were a madness, we say, for a husbandman to sow the sand: which, if true, say they, you have an eye upon profit, as well in giving as in plowing and sowing. And then they say again, that if the conferring of a benefit were desirable in itself, it would have no dependence upon the choice of a man; for let us give it when, how, or wheresoever we please, it would be still a benefit. This does not at all affect our assertion; for the person, the matter, the manner, and the time, are circumstances absolutely necessary to the reason of the action: there must be a right judgment in all respects to make it a benefit. It is my duty to be true to a trust, and yet there may be a time or a place, wherein I would make little difference betwixt the renouncing of it and the delivering of it up; and the same rule holds in benefits; I will neither render the one, nor bestow the other, to the damage of the receiver. A wicked man will run all risks to do an injury, and to compass his revenge; and shall not an honest man venture as far to do a good office? All benefits must

be gratuitous. A merchant sells me the corn that keeps me and my family from starving; but he sold it for his interests, as well as I bought it for mine; and so I owe him nothing for it. He that gives for profit, gives to himself; as a physician or a lawyer, gives counsel for a fee, and only makes use of me for his own ends; as a grazier fats his cattle to bring them to a better market. This is more properly the driving of a trade than the cultivating of a generous commerce. This for that, is rather a truck than a benefit; and he deserves to be cozened that gives any thing in hope of a return. And in truth, what end should a man honorably propound? not *profit*; sure that is *vulgar* and *mechanic*; and he that does not contemn it can never be grateful. And then for *glory*, it is a mighty matter indeed for a man to boast of doing his duty. We are to *give*, if it were only to avoid *not giving*; if any thing comes of it, it is clear gain; and, at worst, there is nothing lost; beside, that one benefit well placed makes amends for a thousand miscarriages. It is not that I would exclude the benefactor neither for being himself the better for a good office he does for another. Some there are that do us good only for their own sakes; others for ours; and some again for both. He that does it for me in common with himself, if he had a prospect upon both in the doing it, I am obliged to him for it; and glad with all my heart that he had a share in it. Nay, I were ungrateful and unjust if I should not rejoice, that what was beneficial to me might be so likewise to himself.

To pass now to the matter of gratitude and ingratitude. There never was any man yet so wicked as not to approve of the one, and detest the other; as the two things in the whole world, the one to be

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the most abominated, the other the most esteemed. The very story of an ungrateful action puts us out of all patience, and gives us a loathing for the author of it. "That inhuman villain," we cry, "to do so horrid a thing:" not, "that inconsiderate fool for omitting so profitable a virtue;" which plainly shows the sense we naturally have, both of the one and of the other, and that we are led to it by a common impulse of reason and of conscience. Epicurus fancies God to be without power, and without arms; above fear himself, and as little to be feared. He places him betwixt the orbs, solitary and idle, out of the reach of mortals, and neither hearing our prayers nor minding our concerns; and allows him only such a veneration and respect as we pay to our parents. If a man should ask him now, why any reverence at all, if we have no obligation to him, or rather, why that greater reverence to his fortuitous atoms? his answer would be, that it was for their majesty and their admirable nature, and not out of any hope or expectation from them. So that by his proper confession, a thing may be desirable for its own worth. But, says he, gratitude is a virtue that has commonly profit annexed to it. And where is the virtue, say I, that has not? but still the virtue is to be valued for itself, and not for the profit that attends it. There is no question, but gratitude for benefits received is the ready way to procure more; and in requiting one friend we encourage many: but these accessions fall in by the by; and if I were sure that the doing of good offices would be my ruin, I would yet pursue them. He that visits the sick, in hope of a legacy, let him be never so friendly in all other cases, I look upon him in this to be no better than a raven, that watches a weak sheep only to

peck out the eyes of it. We never give with so much judgment or care, as when we consider the honesty of the action, without any regard to the profit of it; for our understandings are corrupted by fear, hope, and pleasure.

## CHAPTER XIII.

THERE ARE MANY CASES WHEREIN A MAN MAY BE MINDED OF A BENEFIT, BUT IT IS VERY RARELY TO BE CHALLENGED, AND NEVER TO BE UPBRAIDED.

If the world were wise, and as honest as it should be, there would be no need of caution or precept how to behave ourselves in our several stations and duties; for both the giver and the receiver would do what they ought to do on their own accord: the one would be bountiful, and the other grateful, and the only way of minding a man of one good turn would be the following of it with another. But as the case stands, we must take other measures, and consult the best we can, the common ease and relief of mankind.

As there are several sorts of ungrateful men, so there must be several ways of dealing with them, either by artifice, counsel, admonition, or reproof, according to the humor of the person, and the degree of the offence: provided always, that as well in the reminding a man of a benefit, as in the bestowing of it, the good of the receiver be the principal thing intended. There is a curable ingratitude, and an incurable; there is a slothful, a neglectful, a proud, a dissembling, a disclaiming, a heedless, a forgetful, and a malicious ingratitude; and the application must be suited to the matter we have to work upon. A gentle nature may be reclaimed by authority, ad-

vice, or reprehension; a father, a husband, a friend may do good in the case. There are a sort of lazy and sluggish people, that live as if they were asleep, and must be lugged and pinched to wake them. These men are betwixt grateful and ungrateful; they will neither deny an obligation nor return it, and only want quickening. I will do all I can to hinder any man from ill-doing, but especially a friend; and yet more especially from doing ill to me. I will rub up his memory with new benefits: if that will not serve, I will proceed to good counsel, and from thence to rebuke: if all fails, I will look upon him as a desperate debtor, and even let him alone in his ingratitude, without making him my enemy: for no necessity shall ever make me spend time in wrangling with any man upon that point.

Assiduity of obligation strikes upon the conscience as well as the memory, and pursues an ungrateful man till he becomes grateful: if one good office will not do it, try a second, and then a third. No man can be so thankless, but either shame, occasion, or example, will, at some time or other, prevail upon him. The very beasts themselves, even lions and tigers, are gained by good usage: beside, that one obligation does naturally draw on another; and a man would not willingly leave his own work imperfect. "I have helped him thus far, and I will even go through with it now." So that, over and above the delight and the virtue of obliging, one good turn is a shouting-horn to another. This, of all hints, is perhaps the most effectual, as well as the most generous.

In some cases it must be carried more home: as in that of Julius Cæsar, who, as he was hearing a cause, the defendant finding himself pinched; "Sir,"

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says he, “do not you remember a strain you got in your ankle when you commanded in Spain; and that a soldier lent you his cloak for a cushion, upon the top of a craggy rock, under the shade of a little tree, in the heat of the day?” “I remember it perfectly well,” says Cæsar, “and that when I was ready to choke with thirst, an honest fellow fetched me a draught of water in his helmet.” But that man, and that helmet,” says the soldier, “does Cæsar think that he could not know them again, if he saw them?” “The man, perchance, I might,” says Cæsar, somewhat offended, “but not the helmet. But what is the story to my business? you are none of the man.” “Pardon me, Sir,” says the soldier, “I am that very man; but Cæsar may well forget me: for I have been trepanned since, and lost an eye at the battle of Munda, where that helmet too had the honor to be cleft with a Spanish blade.” Cæsar took it as it was intended: and it was an honorable and a prudent way of refreshing his memory. But this would not have gone down so well with Tiberius: for when an old acquaintance of his began his address to him with, “You remember, Cæsar.” “No,” says Cæsar, (cutting him short,) “I do not remember what I WAS.” Now, with him, it was better to be forgotten than remembered; for an *old friend* was as bad as an *informer*. It is a common thing for men to hate the authors of their preferment, as the witnesses of their mean original.

There are some people well enough disposed to be grateful; but they cannot hit upon it without a prompter; they are a little like school-boys that have treacherous mémories; it is but helping them here and there with a word, when they stick, and they will go through with their lesson; they must be

taught to be thankful, and it is a fair step, if we can but bring them to be willing, and only offer at it. Some benefits we have neglected; some we are not willing to remember. He is ungrateful that disowns an obligation, and so is he that dissembles it, or to his power does not requite it; but the worst of all is he that forgets it. Conscience, or occasion, may revive the rest; but here the very memory of it is lost. Those eyes that cannot endure the light are weak, but those are stark blind that cannot see it. I do not love to hear people say, "Alas! poor man, he has forgotten it," as if that were the excuse of ingratitude, which is the very cause of it: for if he were not ungrateful, he would not be forgetful, and lay that out of the way which should be always uppermost and in sight. He that thinks as he ought to do, of requiting a benefit, is in no danger of forgetting it. There are, indeed, some benefits so great that they can never slip the memory; but those which are less in value, and more in number, do commonly escape us. We are apt enough to acknowledge that "such a man has been the making of us;" so long as we are in possession of the advantage he has brought us; but new appetites deface old kindnesses, and we carry our prospect forward to something more, without considering what we have obtained already. All that is past we give for lost; so that we are only intent upon the future. When a benefit is once out of sight, or out of use, it is buried.

It is the freak of many people, they cannot do a good office but they are presently boasting of it, drunk or sober: and about it goes into all companies what wonderful things they have done for this man, and what for the other. A foolish and a dangerous

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vanity, of a doubtful friend to make a certain enemy. For these reproaches and contempts will set everybody's tongue a walking; and people will conclude that these things would never be, if there were not something very extraordinary in the bottom of it. When it comes to that once, there is not any calumny but fastens more or less, nor any falsehood so incredible, but in some part or other of it, shall pass for a truth. Our great mistake is this, we are still inclined to make the most of what we give, and the least of what we receive; whereas we should do the clean contrary. "It might have been more, but he had a great many to oblige. It was as much as he could well spare; but he will make it up some other time," etc. Nay, we should be so far from making publication of our bounties, as not to hear them so much as mentioned without sweetening the matter: as, "Alas, I owe him a great deal more than that comes to. If it were in my power to serve him, I should be very glad of it." And this, too, not with the figure of a compliment, but with all humanity and truth. There was a man of quality, that in the triumviral proscription, was saved by one of Cæsar's friends, who would be still twitting him with it; who it was that preserved him, and telling him over and over, "you had gone to pot, friend, but for me." "Prythee," says the proscribed, "let me hear no more of this, or even leave me as you found me: I am thankful enough of myself to acknowledge that I owe you my life, but it is death to have it rung in my ears perpetually as a reproach; it looks as if you had only saved me to carry me about for a spectacle. I would fain forget the misfortune that I was once a prisoner, without being led in triumph every day of my life."

Oh! the pride and folly of a great fortune, that turns benefits into injuries! that delights in excesses, and disgraces every thing it does! Who would receive any thing from it upon these terms? the higher it raises us, the more sordid it makes us. Whatsoever it gives it corrupts. What is there in it that should thus puff us up? by what magic is it that we are so transformed, that we do no longer know ourselves? Is it impossible for greatness to be liberal without insolence? The benefits that we receive from our superiors are then welcome when they come with an open hand, and a clear brow; without either contumely or state; and so as to prevent our necessities. The benefit is never the greater for the making of a bustle and a noise about it: but the benefactor is much the less for the ostentation of his good deeds; which makes that odious to us, which would otherwise be delightful. Tiberius had gotten a trick, when any man begged money of him, to refer him to the senate, where all the petitioners were to deliver up the names of their creditors. His end perhaps was, to deter men from asking, by exposing the condition of their fortunes to an examination. But it was, however, a benefit turned unto a reprehension, and he made a reproach of a bounty.

But it is not enough yet to forbear the casting of a benefit in a man's teeth; for there are some that will not allow it to be so much as challenged. For an ill man, say they, will not make a return, though it be demanded, and a good man will do it of himself: and then the asking of it seems to turn it into a debt. It is a kind of injury to be too quick with the former: for to call upon him too soon reproaches him, as if he would not have done it otherwise. Nor would I

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recall a benefit from any man so as to force it, but only to receive it. If I let him quite alone, I make myself guilty of his ingratitude: and undo him for want of plain dealing. A father reclaims a disobedient son, a wife reclaims a dissolute husband; and one friend excites the languishing kindness of another. How many men are lost for want of being touched to the quick? So long as I am not pressed, I will rather desire a favor, than so much as mention a requital; but if my country, my family, or my liberty, be at stake, my zeal and indignation shall overrule my modesty, and the world shall then understand that I have done all I could, not to stand in need of an ungrateful man. And in conclusion the necessity of receiving a benefit shall overcome the shame of recalling it. Nor is it only allowable upon some exigents to put the receiver in mind of a good turn, but it is many times for the common advantage of both parties.

## CHAPTER XIV.

## HOW FAR TO OBLIGE OR REQUITE A WICKED MAN.

THERE are some benefits whereof a wicked man is wholly incapable; of which hereafter. There are others, which are bestowed upon him, not for his own sake, but for secondary reasons; and of these we have spoken in part already. There are, moreover, certain common offices of humanity, which are only allowed him as he is a man, and without any regard either to vice or virtue. To pass over the first point; the second must be handled with care and distinction, and not without some seeming exceptions to the general rule; as first, here is no *choice* or *intention* in the case, but it is a good office done him for some *by-interest*, or by *chance*. Secondly, There is no *judgment* in it neither, for it is to a *wicked man*. But to shorten the matter: without these circumstances it is not properly a benefit; or at least not to him; for it looks another way. I rescue a friend from thieves, and the other escapes for company. I discharge a debt for a friend, and the other comes off too: for they were both in a bond. The third is of a great latitude, and varies according to the degree of generosity on the one side, and of wickedness on the other. Some benefactors will supererogate, and do more than they are bound to do; and some men are so lewd, that it is dangerous to do

them any sort of good; no, not so much as by way of return or requital.

If the benefactor's bounty must extend to the bad as well as the good; put the case, that I promise a good office to an ungrateful man; we are first to distinguish (as I said before) betwixt a *common benefit* and a *personal*; betwixt what is given for *merit* and what for *company*. Secondly, Whether or not we know the person to be ungrateful, and can reasonably conclude, that this vice is *incurable*. Thirdly, A consideration must be had of the promise, how far that may oblige us. The two first points are cleared both in one: we cannot justify any particular kindness for one that we conclude to be a hopelessly wicked man: so that the force of the promise is in the single point in question. In the promise of a good office to a wicked or ungrateful man, I am to blame if I did it knowingly; and I am to blame nevertheless, if I did it otherwise: but I must yet make it good, (under due qualifications,) because I promised it; that is to say, matters continuing in the same state, for no man is answerable for accidents. I will sup at such a place though it be cold; I will rise at such an hour though I be sleepy; but if it prove tempestuous, or that I fall sick of a fever, I will neither do the one nor the other. I promise to second a friend in a quarrel, or to plead his cause; and when I come into the field, or into the court, it proves to be against my father or my brother: I promise to go a journey with him, but there is no traveling upon the road for robbing; my child is fallen sick; or my wife is in labor: these circumstances are sufficient to discharge me; for a promise against law or duty is void in its own nature.

The counsels of a wise man are certain, but events are uncertain: and yet if I have passed a rash promise, I will in some degree punish the temerity of making it with the damage of keeping it, unless it turn very much to my shame or detriment, and then I will be my own confessor in the point, and rather be once guilty of denying, than always of giving. It is not with a benefit as with a debt—it is one thing to trust an ill paymaster, and another thing to oblige an unworthy person—the one is an ill man, and the other only an ill husband.

There was a valiant fellow in the army, that Philip of Macedon took particular notice of, and he gave him several considerable marks of the kindness he had for him. This soldier put to sea and was cast away upon a coast where a charitable neighbor took him up half dead, carried him to the house, and there, at his own charge maintained and provided for him thirty days, until he was perfectly recovered, and, after all, furnished him over and above, with a viaticum at parting. The soldier told him the mighty matters that he would do for him in return, so soon as he should have the honor once again to see his master. To court he goes, tells Philip of the wreck, but not a syllable of his preserver, and begs the estate of this very man that kept him alive. It was with Philip as it was with many other princes, they give they know not what, especially in a time of war. He granted the soldier his request, contemplating at the same time, the impossibility of satisfying so many ravenous appetites as he had to please. When the good man came to be turned out of all, he was not so mealy-mouthed as to thank his majesty for not giving away his person too as well as his fortune; but in a bold, frank letter to Philip, made a

just report of the whole story. The king was so incensed at the abuse, that he immediately commanded the right owner to be restored to his estate, and the unthankful guest and soldier to be stigmatized for an example to others.

Should Philip now have kept this promise? First, he owed the soldier nothing. Secondly, it would have been injurious and impious; and, lastly, a precedent of dangerous consequence to human society; for it would have been little less than an interdiction of fire and water to the miserable, to have inflicted such a penalty upon relieving them; so that there must be always some tacit exception or reserve: *if I can, if I may; or, if matters continue as they were.*

If it should be my fortune to receive a benefit from one that afterwards betrays his country, I should still reckon myself obliged to him for such a requital as might stand with my public duty; I would not furnish him with arms, nor with money or credit, or levy or pay soldiers; but I should not stick to gratify him at my own expense with such curiosities as might please him one way without doing mischief another. I would not do any thing that might contribute to the support or advantage of his party. But what should I do now in the case of a benefactor, that should afterwards become not only mine and my country's enemy, but the common enemy of mankind! I would here distinguish betwixt the wickedness of a man and the cruelty of a beast—betwixt a limited or a particular passion and a sanguinary rage that extends to the hazard and destruction of human society. In the former case I would quit scores, that I might have no more to do with him; but if he comes once to delight in blood, and to act outrages with greediness—to study

and invent torments, and to take pleasure in them—the law of reasonable nature has discharged me of such a debt. But this is an impiety so rare that it might pass for a portent, and be reckoned among comets and monsters. Let us therefore restrain our discourse to such men as we detest without horror; such men as we see every day in courts, camps, and upon the seats of justice; to such wicked men I will return what I have received, without making any advantage of their unrighteousness.

It does not divert the Almighty from being still gracious, though we proceed daily in the abuse of his bounties. How many there are that enjoy the comfort of the light that do not deserve it; that wish they had never been born! and yet Nature goes quietly on with her work, and allows them a being, even in despite of their unthankfulness. Such a knave, we cry, was better used than I: and the same complaint we extend to Providence itself. How many wicked men have good crops, when better than themselves have their fruits blasted! Such a man, we say, has treated me very ill. Why, what should we do, but that very thing which is done by God himself? that is to say, give to the ignorant, and persevere to the wicked. All our ingratitude, we see, does not turn Providence from pouring down of benefits, even upon those that question whence they come. The wisdom of Heaven does all things with a regard to the good of the universe, and the blessings of nature are granted in common, to the worst as well as to the best of men; for they live promiscuously together; and it is God's will, that the wicked shall rather fare the better for the good, than that the good shall fare the worse for the wicked. It is true that a wise prince will confer peculiar hon-

ors only upon the worthy; but in the dealing of a public dole, there is no respect had to the manners of the man; but a thief or traitor shall put in for a share as well as an honest man. If a good man and a wicked man sail both in the same bottom, it is impossible that the same wind which favors the one should cross the other. The common benefits of laws, privileges, communities, letters, and medicines, are permitted to the bad as well as to the good; and no man ever yet suppressed a sovereign remedy for fear a wicked man might be cured with it. Cities are built for both sorts, and the same remedy works upon both alike. In these cases, we are to set an estimate upon the persons: there is a great difference betwixt the choosing of a man and the not excluding him: the law is open to the rebellious as well as to the obedient: there are some benefits which, if they were not allowed to all, could not be enjoyed by any. The sun was never made for me, but for the comfort of the world, and for the providential order of the seasons; and yet I am not without my private obligation also. To conclude, he that will oblige the wicked and the ungrateful, must resolve to oblige nobody; for in some sort or another we are all of us wicked, we are all of us ungrateful, every man of us.

We have been discoursing all this while how far a wicked man may be obliged, and the Stoics tell us at last, that he cannot be obliged at all. For they make him incapable of any good, and consequently of any benefit. But he has this advantage, that if he cannot be obliged, he cannot be ungrateful: for if he cannot receive, he is not bound to return. On the other side, a good man and an ungrateful, are a contradiction: so that at this rate there is no such

thing as ingratitude in nature. They compare a wicked man's mind to a vitiated stomach; he corrupts whatever he receives, and the best nourishment turns to the disease. But taking this for granted, a wicked man may yet so far be obliged as to pass for ungrateful, if he does not requite what he receives: for though it be not a perfect benefit, yet he receives something like it. There are goods of the mind, the body, and of fortune. Of the first sort, fools and wicked men are wholly incapable; to the rest they may be admitted. But why should I call any man ungrateful, you will say, for not restoring that which I deny to be a benefit? I answer, that if the receiver take it for a benefit, and fails of a return, it is ingratitude in him: for that which goes for an obligation among wicked men, is an obligation upon them: and they may pay one another in their own coin; the money is current, whether it be gold or leather, when it comes once to be authorized. Nay, Cleanthes carries it farther; he that is wanting, says he, to a kind office, though it be no benefit, would have done the same thing if it had been one; and is as guilty as a thief is, that has set his booty, and is already armed and mounted with a purpose to seize it, though he has not yet drawn blood. Wickedness is formed in the heart; and the matter of fact is only the discovery and the execution of it. Now, though a wicked man cannot either receive or bestow a benefit, because he wants the will of doing good, and for that he is no longer wicked, when virtue has taken possession of him; yet we commonly call it one, as we call a man illiterate that is not learned, and naked that is not well clad; not but that the one can read, and the other is covered.

## CHAPTER XV.

A GENERAL VIEW OF THE PARTS AND DUTIES OF THE  
BENEFACTOR.

THE three main points in the question of benefits are, first, a *judicious choice* in the *object*; secondly, in the *matter* of our benevolence; and thirdly, a grateful *felicity* in the *manner* of expressing it. But there are also incumbent upon the benefactor other considerations, which will deserve a place in this discourse.

It is not enough to do one good turn, and to do it with a good grace too, unless we follow it with more, and without either upbraiding or repining. It is a common shift, to charge that upon the ingratitude of the receiver, which, in truth, is most commonly the levity and indiscretion of the giver; for all circumstances must be duly weighed to consummate the action. Some there are that we find ungrateful; but what with our forwardness, change of humor and reproaches, there are more that we make so. And this is the business: we give with design, and most to those that are able to give most again. We give to the covetous, and to the ambitious; to those that can never be thankful, (for their desires are insatiable,) and to those that *will* not. He that is a tribune would be prætor; the prætor, a consul; never reflecting upon what he *was*, but only looking forward to what he *would* be. People are still comput-

ing, *Must I lose this or that benefit?* If it be lost, the fault lies in the ill bestowing of it; for rightly placed, it is as good as consecrated; if we be deceived in another, let us not be deceived in ourselves too. A charitable man will mend the matter: and say to himself, *Perhaps he has forgot it, perchance he could not, perhaps he will yet requite it.* A patient creditor will, of an ill pay-master, in time make a good one; an obstinate goodness overcomes an ill disposition, as a barren soil is made fruitful by care and tillage. But let a man be never so ungrateful or inhuman, he shall never destroy the satisfaction of my having done a good office.

But what if *others* will be wicked? does it follow that *we* must be so too? If *others* will be ungrateful, must *we* therefore be inhuman? To give and to lose, is nothing; but to lose and to give still, is the part of a great mind. And the others in effect is the greater loss; for the one does but lose his benefit, and the other loses himself. The light shines upon the profane and sacrilegious as well as upon the righteous. How many disappointments do we meet with in our wives and children, and yet we couple still? He that has lost one battle hazards another. The mariner puts to sea again after a wreck. An illustrious mind does not propose the profit of a good office, but the duty. If the world be wicked, we should yet persevere in well-doing, even among evil men. I had rather never receive a kindness than never bestow one: not to return a benefit is the *greater sin*, but not to *confer* it is the *earlier*. We cannot propose to ourselves a more glorious example than that of the Almighty, who neither needs nor expects anything from us; and yet he is continually showering down and distributing his mercies and

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his grace among us, not only for our necessities, but also for our delights; as fruits and seasons, rain and sunshine, veins of water and of metal; and all this to the wicked as well as to the good, and without any other end than the common benefit of the receivers. With what face then can we be mercenary one to another, that have received all things from Divine Providence *gratis*? It is a common saying, "I gave such or such a man so much money: I would I had thrown it into the sea," and yet the merchant trades again after a piracy, and the banker ventures afresh after a bad security. He that will do no good offices after a disappointment, must stand still, and do just nothing at all. The plow goes on after a barren year: and while the ashes are yet warm, we raise a new house upon the ruins of a former. What obligations can be greater than those which children receive from their parents? and yet should we give them over in their infancy, it were all to no purpose. Benefits, like grain, must be followed from the seed to the harvest. I will not so much as leave any place for ingratitude. I will pursue, and I will encompass the receiver with benefits; so that let him look which way he will, his benefactor shall be still in his eye, even when he would avoid his own memory: and then I will remit to one man because he calls for it; to another, because he does not; to a third, because he is wicked; and to a fourth, because he is the contrary. I will cast away a good turn upon a bad man, and I will requite a good one; the one because it is my duty, and the other that I may not be in debt.

I do not love to hear any man complain that he has met with a thankless man. If he has met but with one, he has either been very fortunate or very

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careful. And yet care is not sufficient: for there is no way to escape the hazard of losing a benefit but the not bestowing of it, and to neglect a duty to myself for fear another should abuse it. It is *another's* fault if he be ungrateful, but it is *mine* if I do not give. To find one thankful man, I will oblige a great many that are not so. The business of mankind would be at a stand, if we should do nothing for fear of miscarriages in matters of certain event. I will try and believe all things, before I give any man over, and do all that is possible that I may not lose a good office and a friend together. What do I know but *he may misunderstand the obligation? business may have put it out of his head, or taken him off from it: he may have slipt his opportunity.* I will say, in excuse of human weakness, that one man's memory is not sufficient for all things; it is but a limited capacity, so as to hold only so much, and no more: and when it is once full, it must let out part of what it had to take in anything beside; and the last benefit ever sits closest to us. In our youth we forget the obligations of our infancy, and when we are men we forget those of our youth. If nothing will prevail, let him keep what he has and welcome; but let him have a care of returning evil for good, and making it dangerous for a man to do his duty. I would no more give a benefit for such a man, than I would lend money to a beggarly spendthrift; or deposit any in the hands of a known *knight of the post.* However the case stands, an ungrateful person is never the better for a reproach; if he be already hardened in his wickedness, he gives no heed to it; and if he be not, it turns a doubtful modesty into an incorrigible impudence: beside that, he watches for all ill words to pick a quarrel with them.

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As the benefactor is not to upbraid a benefit, so neither to delay it: the one is tiresome, and the other odious. We must not hold men in hand, as physicians and surgeons do their patients, and keep them longer in fear and pain than needs, only to magnify the cure. A generous man gives easily, and receives as he gives, but never exacts. He rejoices in the return, and judges favorably of it whatever it be, and contents himself with bare thanks for a requital. It is a harder matter with some to get the benefit after it is promised than the first promise of it, there must be so many friends made in the case. One must be desired to solicit another; and he must be entreated to move a third; and a fourth must be at last besought to receive it; so that the author, upon the upshot, has the least share in the obligation. It is then welcome when it comes free, and without deduction; and no man either to intercept or hinder, or to detain it. And let it be of such a quality too, that it be not only delightful in the receiving, but after it is received; which it will certainly be, if we do but observe this rule, never to do any thing for another which we would not honestly desire for ourselves.

## CHAPTER XVI.

## HOW THE RECEIVER OUGHT TO BEHAVE HIMSELF.

THERE are certain rules in common betwixt the giver and the receiver. We must do both cheerfully, that the giver may receive the fruit of his benefit in the very act of bestowing it. It is a just ground of satisfaction to *see* a friend pleased; but it is much more to *make* him so. The intention of the one is to be suited to the intention of the other; and there must be an emulation betwixt them, whether shall oblige most. Let the one say, that he has received a benefit, and let the other persuade himself that he has not returned it. Let the one say, *I am paid*, and the other, *I am yet in your debt*; let the benefactor acquit the receiver, and the receiver bind himself. The frankness of the discharge heightens the obligation. It is in *conversation* as in a *tennis-court*; benefits are to be tossed like balls; the longer the rest, the better are the gamesters. The giver, in some respect, has the odds, because (as in a race) he starts first, and the other must use great diligence to overtake him. The return must be larger than the first obligation to come up to it; and it is a kind of ingratitude not to render it with interest. In a matter of money, it is a common thing to pay a debt out of course, and before it be due; but we account ourselves to owe nothing for a good office; whereas the

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benefit increases by delay. So insensible are we of the most important affair of human life! That man were doubtless in a miserable condition, that could neither see, nor hear, nor taste, nor feel, nor smell; but how much more unhappy is he then that, wanting a sense of benefits, loses the greatest comfort in nature in the bliss of giving and receiving them? He that takes a benefit as it is meant is in the right; for the benefactor has then his end, and his only end, when the receiver is grateful.

The more glorious part, in appearance, is that of the giver; but the receiver has undoubtedly the harder game to play in many regards. There are some from whom I would not accept of a benefit; that is to say, from those upon whom I would not bestow one. For why should I not scorn to receive a benefit where I am ashamed to own it? and I would yet be more tender too, where I receive, than where I give; for it is no torment to be in debt where a man has no mind to pay; as it is the greatest delight imaginable to be engaged by a friend, whom I should yet have a kindness for; if I were never so much disengaged. It is a pain to an honest and a generous mind to lie under a duty of affection against inclination. I do not speak here of wise men, that love to do what they ought to do; that have their passions at command; that prescribe laws to themselves, and keep them when they have done; but of men in a state of imperfection, that may have a good will perhaps to be honest, and yet be overborne by the contumacy of their affections. We must therefore have a care to whom we become obliged; and I would be much stricter yet in the choice of a creditor for benefits than for money. In the one case, it is but paying what I had, and the

debt is discharged; in the other, I do not only owe more, but when I have paid that, I am still in arrear: and this law is the very foundation of friendship. I will suppose myself a prisoner; and a notorious villain offers to lay down a good sum of money for my redemption. *First*, Shall I make use of this money or not? *Secondly*, If I do, what return shall I make him for it? To the first point, I will take it; but only as a debt; not as a benefit, that shall ever tie me to a friendship with him; and, secondly, my acknowledgment shall be only correspondent to such an obligation. It is a school question, whether or not Brutus, that thought Cæsar not fit to live, (and put himself at the head of a conspiracy against him,) could honestly have received his life from Cæsar, if he had fallen into Cæsar's power, without examining what reason moved him to that action? How great a man soever he was in other cases, without dispute he was extremely out in this, and below the dignity of his profession. For a Stoic to fear the name of a king, when yet monarchy is the best state of government; or there to hope for liberty, where so great rewards are pro pounded, both for tyrants and their slaves: for him to imagine ever to bring the laws to their former state, where so many thousand lives had been lost in the contest, not so much whether they should serve or not, but who should be their master: he was strangely mistaken, in the nature and reason of things, to fancy, that when Julius was gone, somebody else would not start up in his place, when there was yet a Tarquin found, after so many kings that were destroyed, either by sword or thunder: and yet the resolution is, that he might have received it, but not as a benefit; for at that rate I

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owe my life to every man that does not take it away.

Græcinus Julius (whom Caligula put to death out of a pure malice to his virtue) had a considerable sum of money sent him from Fabius Persicus (a man of great and infamous example) as a contribution towards the expense of plays and other public entertainments; but Julius would not receive it; and some of his friends that had an eye more upon the present than the presenter, asked him, with some freedom, what he meant by refusing it? "Why," says he, "do you think that I will take money where I would not take so much as a glass of wine?" After this Rebilus (a man of the same stamp) sent him a greater sum upon the same score. "You must excuse me," says he to the messenger, "for I would not take any thing of Persicus neither."

To match this scruple of receiving money with another of keeping it; and the sum not above three pence, or a groat at most. There was a certain Pythagorean that contracted with a cobbler for a pair of shoes, and some three or four days after, going to pay him his money, the shop was shut up; and when he had knocked a great while at the door, "Friend," says a fellow, "you may hammer your heart out there, for the man that you look for is dead. And when our friends are dead, we hear no more news of them; but yours, that are to live again, will shift well enough," (alluding to Pythagora's transmigration). Upon this the philosopher went away, with his money chinking in his hand, and well enough content to save it: at last, his conscience took check at it; and, upon reflection, "Though the man be dead," says he, "to others, he is alive to thee; pay him what thou owest him:" and

so he went back presently, and thrust it into his shop through the chink of the door. Whatever we owe, it is our part to find where to pay it, and to do it without asking too; for whether the creditor be good or bad, the debt is still the same.

If a benefit be forced upon me, as from a tyrant, or a superior, where it may be dangerous to refuse, this is rather obeying than receiving, where the necessity destroys the choice. The way to know what I have a mind to do, is to leave me at liberty whether I will do it or not; but it is yet a benefit, if a man does me good in spite of my teeth; as it is none, if I do any man good against my will. A man may both hate and yet receive a benefit at the same time; the money is never the worse, because a fool that is not read in coins refuses to take it. If the thing be good for the receiver, and so intended, no matter how ill it is taken. Nay, the receiver may be obliged, and not know it; but there can be no benefit which is unknown to the giver. Neither will I, upon any terms, receive a benefit from a worthy person that may do him a mischief: it is the part of an enemy to save himself by doing another man harm.

But whatever we do, let us be sure always to keep a grateful mind. It is not enough to say, what requital shall a poor man offer to a prince; or a slave to his patron; when it is the glory of gratitude that it depends only upon the good will? Suppose a man defends my fame; delivers me from beggary; saves my life; or gives me liberty, that is more than life; how shall I be grateful to that man? I will receive, cherish, and rejoice in the benefit. Take it kindly, and it is requited: not that the debt itself is discharged, but it is nevertheless a discharge of the

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conscience. I will yet distinguish betwixt the debtor that becomes insolvent by expenses upon whores and dice, and another that is undone by fire or thieves; nor do I take this gratitude for a payment, but there is no danger, I presume, of being arrested for such a debt.

In the return of benefits let us be ready and cheerful but not pressing. There is as much greatness of mind in the owing of a good turn as in doing of it; and we must no more force a requital out of season than be wanting in it. He that precipitates a return, does as good as say, "I am weary of being in this man's debt;" not but that the hastening of a requital, as a good office, is a commendable disposition, but it is another thing to do it as a discharge; for it looks like casting off a heavy and a troublesome burden. It is for the benefactor to say *when* he will receive it; no matter for the opinion of the world, so long as I gratify my own conscience; for I cannot be mistaken in myself, but another may. He that is over solicitous to return a benefit, thinks the other so likewise to receive it. If he had rather we should keep it, why should we refuse, and presume to dispose of his treasure, who may call it in, or let it lie out, at his choice? It is as much a fault to receive what I ought not, as not to give what I ought; for the giver has the privilege of choosing his own time of receiving.

Some are too proud in the conferring of benefits; others, in the receiving of them; which is, to say the truth, intolerable. The same rule serves both sides, as in the case of a father and a son; a husband and a wife; one friend or acquaintance and another, where the duties are known and common. There are some that will not receive a benefit but in pri-

vate, nor thank you for it but in your ear, or in a corner; there must be nothing under hand and seal, no brokers, notaries, or witnesses, in the case: that is not so much a scruple of modesty as a kind of denying the obligation, and only a less hardened ingratitude. Some receive benefits so coldly and indifferently, that a man would think the obligation lay on the other side: as who should say, "Well, since you will needs have it so, I am content to take it." Some again so carelessly, as if they hardly knew of any such thing, whereas we should rather aggravate the matter: "You cannot imagine how many you have obliged in this act: there never was so great, so kind, so seasonable a courtesy." Furinius never gained so much upon Augustus as by a speech, upon the getting of his father's pardon for siding with Antony: "This grace," says he, "is the only injury that ever Cæsar did me: for it has put me upon a necessity of living and dying ungrateful." It is safer to affront some people than to oblige them; for the better a man deserves, the worse they will speak of him: as if the possessing of open hatred to their benefactors were an argument that they lie under no obligation. Some people are so sour and ill-natured, that they take it for an affront to have an obligation or a return offered them, to the discouragement both of bounty and gratitude together. The not doing, and the not receiving, of benefits, are equally a mistake. He that refuses a new one, seems to be offended at an old one: and yet sometimes I would neither return a benefit, no, nor so much as receive it, if I might.

## CHAPTER XVII.

## OF GRATITUDE.

HE that preaches gratitude, pleads the cause both of God and man; for without it we can neither be sociable nor religious. There is a strange delight in the very purpose and contemplation of it, as well as in the action; when I can say to myself, “I love my benefactor; what is there in this world that I would not do to oblige and serve him?” Where I have not the *means* of a requital, the very *meditation* of it is sufficient. A man is nevertheless an artist for not having his tools about him; or a musician, because he wants his fiddle: nor is he the less brave because his hands are bound; or the worse pilot for being upon dry ground. If I have only *will* to be grateful, I *am* so. Let me be upon the wheel, or under the hand of the executioner; let me be burnt limb by limb, and my whole body dropping in the flames, a good conscience supports me in all extremes; nay, it is comfortable even in death itself; for when we come to approach that point, what care do we take to summon and call to mind all our benefactors, and the good offices they have done us, that we leave the world fair, and set our minds in order? Without gratitude, we can neither have security, peace, nor reputation: and it is not therefore the less desirable, because it draws many adventitious benefits along

with it. Suppose the sun, the moon, and the stars, had no other business than only to pass over our heads, without any effect upon our minds or bodies; without any regard to our health, fruits, or seasons; a man could hardly lift up his eyes towards the heavens without wonder and veneration, to see so many millions of radiant lights, and to observe their courses and revolutions, even without any respect to the common good of the universe. But when we come to consider that Providence and Nature are still at work when we sleep, with the admirable force and operation of their influences and motions, we cannot then but acknowledge their ornament to be the least part of their value; and that they are more to be esteemed for their virtues than for their splendor. Their main end and use is matter of life and necessity, though they may seem to us more considerable for their majesty and beauty. And so it is with gratitude; we love it rather for secondary ends, than for itself.

No man can be grateful without contemning those things that put the common people out of their wits. We must go into banishment; lay down our lives; beggar and expose ourselves to reproaches; nay, it is often seen, that loyalty suffers the punishment due to rebellion, and that treason receives the rewards of fidelity. As the benefits of it are many and great, so are the hazards; which is the case more or less of all other virtues: and it were hard, if this, above the rest, should be both painful and fruitless: so that though we may go currently on with it in a smooth way, we must yet prepare and resolve (if need be) to force our passage to it, even if the way were covered with thorns and serpents: and *fall back, fall edge*, we must be grateful still: grateful

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for the virtue's sake, and grateful over and above upon the point of interest; for it preserves old friends, and gains new ones. It is not our business to fish for one benefit with another; and by bestowing a little to get more; or to oblige for any sort of expedience, but because I ought to do it, and because I love it, and that to such a degree, that if I could not be grateful without appearing the contrary, if I could not return a benefit without being suspected of doing an injury; in despite of infamy itself, I would yet be grateful. No man is greater in my esteem than he that ventures the fame to preserve the conscience of an honest man; the one is but imaginary, the other solid and inestimable. I cannot call him grateful, who in the instant of returning one benefit has his eye upon another. He that is grateful for profit or fear, is like a woman that is honest only upon the score of reputation.

As gratitude is a necessary and a glorious, so it is also an obvious, a cheap, and an easy virtue; so obvious, that wheresoever there is a life there is a place for it—so cheap that the covetous man may be grateful without expense—and so easy that the sluggard may be so, likewise, without labor. And yet it is not without its niceties too; for there may be a time, a place or occasion wherein I ought not to return a benefit; nay, wherein I may better disown it than deliver it.

Let it be understood, by the way, that it is one thing to be grateful for a good office, and another thing to return it—the good will is enough in one case, being as much as the one side demands and the other promises; but the effect is requisite in the other. The physician that has done his best is acquitted though the patient dies, and so is the advo-

cate, though the client may lose his cause. The general of an army, though the battle be lost, is yet worthy of commendation, if he has discharged all the parts of a prudent commander; in this case, the one acquits himself, though the other be never the better for it. He is a grateful man that is always willing and ready: and he that seeks for all means and occasions of requiting a benefit, though without attaining his end, does a great deal more than the man that, without any trouble, makes an immediate return. Suppose my friend a prisoner, and that I have sold my estate for his ransom; I put to sea in foul weather, and upon a coast that is pestered with pirates; my friend happens to be redeemed before I come to the place; my gratitude is as much to be esteemed as if he had been a prisoner; and if I had been taken and robbed myself, it would still have been the same case. Nay, there is a gratitude in the very countenance; for an honest man bears his conscience in his face, and propounds the requital of a good turn in the very moment of receiving it; he is cheerful and confident; and, in the possession of a true friendship. delivered from all anxiety. There is this difference betwixt a thankful man and an unthankful, the one is *always* pleased in the good he has *done*. and the other only *once* in what he has *received*. There must be a benignity in the estimation even of the smallest offices; and such a modesty as appears to be obliged in whatsoever it gives. As it is indeed a very great benefit. the opportunity of doing a good office to a worthy man. He that attends to the present, and remembers what is past, shall never be ungrateful. But who shall judge in the case? for a man may be grateful without making a return, and ungrateful with

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it. Our best way is to help every thing by a fair interpretation; and wheresoever there is a doubt, to allow it the most favorable construction; for he that is exceptious at words, or looks, has a mind to pick a quarrel. For my own part, when I come to cast up my account, and know what I owe, and to whom, though I make my return sooner to some, and later to others, as occasion or fortune will give me leave, yet I will be just to all: I will be grateful to God, to man, to those that have obliged me: nay, even to those that have obliged my friends. I am bound in honor and in conscience to be thankful for what I have received; and if it be not yet full, it is some pleasure still that I may hope for more. For the requital of a favor there must be virtue, occasion, means, and fortune.

It is a common thing to screw up justice to the pitch of an injury. A man may be *over-righteous*; and why not *over-grateful* too? There is a mischievous excess, that borders so close upon ingratitude, that it is no easy matter to distinguish the one from the other: but, in regard that there is good-will in the bottom of it, (however distempered, for it is effectually but kindness out of the wits,) we shall discourse it under the title of *Gratitude mistaken.*

## CHAPTER XVIII.

## GRATITUDE MISTAKEN.

To refuse a good office, not so much because we do not need it, as because we would not be indebted for it, is a kind of fantastical ingratitude, and somewhat akin to that nicety of humor, on the other side, of being over-grateful; only it lies another way, and seems to be the more pardonable ingratitude of the two. Some people take it for a great instance of their good-will to be wishing their benefactors such or such a mischief; only, forsooth, that they themselves may be the happy instruments of their release.

These men do like extravagant lovers, that take it for a great proof of their affection to wish one another banished, beggared, or diseased, that they might have the opportunity of interposing to their relief. What difference is there betwixt such wishing and cursing? such an affection and a mortal hatred? The intent is good, you will say, but this is a misapplication of it. Let such a one fall into my power, or into the hands of his enemies, his creditors, or the common people, and no mortal be able to rescue him but myself: let his life, his liberty, and his reputation, lie all at stake, and no creature but myself in condition to succor him; and why all this, but because he has obliged me, and I would requite him? If this be gratitude to propound jails, shackles, slavery, war, beggary, to

the man that you would requite, what would you do where you are ungrateful? This way of proceeding, over and above that it is impious in itself, is likewise over-hasty and unseasonable: for he that goes too fast is as much to blame as he that does not move at all, (to say nothing of the injustice,) for if I had never been obliged, I should never have wished it.

There are seasons wherein a benefit is neither to be received nor requited. To press a return upon me when I do not desire it, is unmannly; but it is worse to force me to desire it. How rigorous would he be to exact a requital; who is thus eager to return it! To wish a man in distress that I may relieve him, is first to wish him miserable: to wish that he may stand in need of anybody, is *against him*; and to wish that he may stand in need of me, is *for myself*: so that my business is not so much a charity to my friend as the cancelling of a bond; nay, it is half-way the wish of an enemy. It is barbarous to wish a man in chains, slavery, or want, only to bring him out again: let me rather wish him powerful and happy, and myself indebted to him! By nature we are prone to mercy, humanity compassion; may we be excited to be more so by the number of the grateful! may their number increase, and may we have no need of trying them!

It is not for an honest man to make way to a good office by a crime: as if a pilot should pray for a tempest, that he might prove his skill: or a general wish his army routed, that he may show himself a great commander in recovering the day. It is throwing a man into a river to take him out again. It is an obligation, I confess, to cure a

wound or a disease; but to *make* that wound or disease on purpose to *cure* it, is a most perverse ingratitude. It is barbarous even to an enemy, much more to a friend; for it is not so much to do him a kindness, as to put him in need of it. Of the two, let me rather be a scar than a wound; and yet it would be better to have it neither. Rome had been little beholden to Scipio if he had prolonged the Punic war that he might have the finishing of it at last, or to the Decii for dying for their country, if they had first brought it to the last extremity of needing their devotion. It may be a good contemplation, but it is a lewd wish. Æneas had never been surnamed *the Pious*, if he had wished the ruin of his country, only that he might have the honor of taking his father out of the fire. It is the scandal of a physician to make work, and irritate a disease, and to torment his patient, for the reputation of his cure. If a man should openly imprecate poverty, captivity, fear, or danger, upon a person that he has been obliged to, would not the whole world condemn him for it? And what is the difference, but the one is only a private wish, and the other a public declaration? Rutilius was told in his exile, that, for his comfort, there would be ere-long a civil war, that would bring all the banished men home again. "God forbid," says he, "for I had rather my country should blush for my banishment than mourn for my return." How much more honorable it is to owe cheerfully, than to pay dishonestly? It is the wish of an enemy to take a town that he may preserve it, and to be victorious that he may forgive; but the mercy comes after the cruelty; beside that it is an injury both to God and man; for the man must be first afflicted by *Heaven* to be

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relieved by *me*. So that we impose the cruelty upon God, and take the compassion to ourselves; and at the best, it is but a curse that makes way for a blessing; the bare wish is an injury; and if it does not take effect, it is because Heaven has not heard our prayers; or if they should succeed, the fear itself is a torment; and it is much more desirable to have a firm and unshaken security. It is friendly to wish it in your power to oblige me, if ever I chance to need it; but it is unkind to wish me miserable that I may need it. How much more pious is it, and humane, to wish that I may never want the occasion of obliging, nor the means of doing it; nor ever have reason to repent of what I have done?

## CHAPTER XIX.

## OF INGRATITUDE.

INGRATITUDE is of all the crimes, that which we are to account the most venial in others, and the most unpardonable in ourselves. It is impious to the highest degree; for it makes us fight against our children and our altars. There are, there ever were, and there ever will be criminals of all sorts, as murderers, tyrants, thieves, adulterers, traitors, robbers and sacrilegious persons; but there is hardly any notorious crime without a mixture of ingratitude. It disunites mankind, and breaks the very pillars of society; and yet so far is this prodigious wickedness from being any wonder to us, that even thankfulness itself were much the greater of the two; for men are deterred from it by labor, expense, laziness, business; or else diverted from it by lust, envy, ambition, pride, levity, rashness, fear; nay, by the very shame of confessing what they have received. And the unthankful man has nothing to say for himself all this while, for there needs neither pains or fortune for the discharge of his duty, beside the inward anxiety and torment when a man's conscience makes him afraid of his own thoughts.

To speak against the ungrateful is to rail against mankind, for even those that complain are guilty: nor do I speak only of those that do not live up to

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the strict rule of virtue; but mankind itself is degenerated and lost. We live unthankfully in this world, and we go struggling and murmuring out of it, dissatisfied with our lot, whereas we should be grateful for the blessings we have enjoyed, and account that sufficient which Providence has provided for us; a little more time may make our lives longer but not happier, and whensoever it is the pleasure of God to call us, we must obey; and yet all this while we go on quarreling at the world for what we find in ourselves, and we are yet more unthankful to Heaven than we are to one another. What benefit can be great now to that man that despises the bounties of his Maker? We would be as strong as elephants, as swift as bucks, as light as birds—and we complain that we have not the sagacity of dogs, the sight of eagles, the long life of ravens—nay, that we are not immortal, and endued with the knowledge of things to come: nay, we take it ill that we are not gods upon earth, never considering the advantages of our condition, or the benignity of Providence in the comforts that we enjoy. We subdue the strongest of creatures and overtake the fleetest—we reclaim the fiercest and outwit the craftiest. We are within one degree of heaven itself, and yet we are not satisfied.

Since there is not any one creature which we had rather be, we take it ill that we cannot draw the united excellencies of all other creatures into ourselves. Why are we not rather thankful to that goodness which has subjected the whole creation to our use and service.

The principal causes of ingratitude are pride and self-conceit, avarice, envy, etc. It is a familiar exclamation, “It is true he did this or that for me, but

it came so late, and it was so little, I had even as good have been without it—if he had not given it to me, he must have given it to somebody else—it was nothing out of his pocket." Nay, we are so ungrateful, that he that gives us all we have, if he leaves any thing to himself, we reckon that he does us an injury.

It cost Julius Cæsar his life by the disappointment of his insatiable companions; and yet he reserved nothing of all that he got to himself but the liberty of disposing of it. There is no benefit so large but malignity will still lessen it; none so narrow, which a good interpretation will not enlarge. No man shall ever be grateful that views a benefit on the wrong side, or takes a good office by the wrong handle. The avaricious man is naturally ungrateful, for he never thinks he has enough, but, without considering what he has, only minds what he covets. Some pretend want of power to make a competent return, and you shall find in others a kind of graceless modesty, that makes a man ashamed of requiting an obligation, because it is a confession that he has received one.

Not to return one good office for another is inhuman; but to return evil for good is diabolical. There are too many even of this sort, who, the more they owe, the more they hate. There is nothing more dangerous than to oblige those people; for when they are conscious of not paying the debt, they wish the creditor out of the way. It is a mortal hatred, that which arises from the shame of an abused benefit. When we are on the asking side, what a deal of cringing there is, and profession! "Well, I shall never forget this favor, it will be an eternal obligation to me." But within a while the

note is changed, and we hear no more words of it, until, by little and little, it is all quite forgotten. So long as we stand in need of a benefit, there is nothing dearer to us; nor anything cheaper, when we have received it. And yet a man may as well refuse to deliver up a sum of money that is left him in trust without a suit, as not to return a good office without asking; and when we have no value any farther for the benefit, we do commonly care as little for the author. People follow their interest: one man is grateful for his convenience, and another man is ungrateful for the same reason.

Some are ungrateful to their own country, and their country no less ungrateful to others; so that the complaint of ingratitude reaches all men. Doth not the son wish for the death of his father, the husband for that of his wife, etc. But who can look for gratitude in an age of so many gaping and craving appetites, where all people take, and none give? In an age of license to all sorts of vanity and wickedness, as lust, gluttony, avarice, envy, ambition, sloth, insolence, levity, contumacy, fear, rashness, private discords and public evils, extravagant and groundless wishes, vain confidences, sickly affections, shameless impieties, rapine authorized, and the violation of all things, sacred and profane: obligations are pursued with sword and poison; benefits are turned into crimes, and that blood most seditiously spilt for which every honest man should expose his own. Those that should be the preservers of their country are the destroyers of it; and it is a matter of dignity to trample upon the government: the sword gives the law, and mercenaries take up arms against their masters. Among these turbulent and unruly motions, what hope is there of finding

honesty or good faith, which is the quietest of all virtues? There is no more lively image of human life than that of a conquered city; there is neither mercy, modesty, nor religion; and if we forget our lives, we may well forget our benefits. The world abounds with examples of ungrateful persons, and no less with those of ungrateful governments. Was not Catiline ungrateful? whose malice aimed, not only at the mastering of his country, but at the total destruction of it, by calling in an inveterate and vindictive enemy from beyond the Alps, to wreak their long-thirsted-for revenge, and to sacrifice the lives of as many noble Romans as might serve to answer and appease the ghosts of the slaughtered Gauls? Was not Marius ungrateful, that, from a common soldier, being raised up to a consul, not only gave the world for civil bloodshed and massacres, but was himself the sign of the execution; and every man he met in the streets, to whom he did not stretch out his right hand, was murdered? And was not Sylla ungrateful too? that when he had waded up to the gates in human blood, carried the outrage into the city, and there most barbarously cut two entire legions to pieces in a corner, not only after the victory, but most perfidiously after quarter given them? Good God! that ever any man should not only escape with impunity, but receive a reward for so horrid a villainy! Was not Pompey ungrateful too? who, after three consulships, three triumphs, and so many honors, usurped before his time, split the commonwealth into three parts, and brought it to such a pass, that there was no hope of safety but by slavery only; forsooth, to abate the envy of his power, he took other partners with him into the government, as if that which was not lawful for

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any one might have been allowable for more; dividing and distributing the provinces, and breaking all into a *triumvirate*, reserving still two parts of the three in his own family. And was not Cæsar ungrateful also, though to give him his due, he was a man of his word; merciful in his victories, and never killed any man but with his sword in his hand? Let us therefore forgive one another. Only one word more now for the shame of ungrateful Governments. Was not Camillus banished? Scipio dismissed? and Cicero exiled and plundered? But, what is all this to those who are so mad, and to dispute even the goodness of Heaven, which gives us all, and expects nothing again, but continues giving to the most unthankful and complaining?

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## CHAPTER XX.

## THERE CAN BE NO LAW AGAINST INGRATITUDE.

INGRATITUDE is so dangerous to itself, and so detestable to other people, that nature, one would think, had sufficiently provided against it, without need of any other law. For every ungrateful man is his own enemy, and it seems superfluous to compel a man to be kind to himself, and to follow in his own inclinations. This, of all wickedness imaginable, is certainly the vice which does the most divide and distract human nature. Without the exercise and the commerce of mutual offices, we can be neither happy nor safe for it is only society that secures us: take us one by one, and we are a prey even to brutes as well as to one another.

Nature has brought us into the world naked and unarmed; we have not the teeth or the paws of lions or bears to make ourselves terrible; but by the two blessings of reason and union, we secure and defend ourselves against violence and fortune. This it is that makes man the master of all other creatures, who otherwise were scarce a match for the weakest of them. This it is that comforts us in sickness, in age, in misery, in pains, and in the worst of calamities. Take away this combination, and mankind is dissociated, and falls to pieces. It is true, that there is no law established against this abominable vice;

but we cannot say yet that it escapes unpunished, for a public hatred is certainly the greatest of all penalties; over and above that we lose the most valuable blessings of life, in the not bestowing and receiving of benefits. If ingratitude were to be punished by a law, it would discredit the obligation; for a benefit to be given, not lent: and if we have no return at all, there is no just cause of complaint: for gratitude were no virtue, if there were any danger in being ungrateful. There are halters, I know, hooks and gibbets, provided for homicide poison, sacrilege, and rebellion; but ingratitude (here upon earth) is only punished in the schools; all farther pains and inflictions being wholly remitted to divine justice. And, if a man may judge of the conscience by the countenance the ungrateful man is never without a canker at his heart; his mind an aspect is sad and solicitous; whereas the other is always cheerful and serene.

As there are no laws extant against ingratitude, so is it utterly impossible to contrive any, that in all circumstances shall reach it. If it were actionable, there would not be courts enough in the whole world to try the causes in. There can be no setting a day for the requiting of benefits as for the payment of money, nor any estimate upon the benefits themselves; but the whole matter rests in the conscience of both parties: and then there are so many degrees of it, that the same rule will never serve all. Beside that, to proportion it as the benefit is greater or less, will be both impracticable and without reason. One good turn saves my life; another, my freedom, or peradventure my very soul. How shall any law now suit a punishment to an ingratitude under these differing degrees? It must not be said in benefits as in

bonds, *Pay what you owe*. How shall a man pay life, health, credit, security, in *kind*? There can be no set rule to bound that infinite variety of cases, which are more properly the subject of humanity and religion than of law and public justice. There would be disputes also about the benefit itself, which must totally depend upon the courtesy of the judge; for no law imaginable can set it forth. One man *gives* me an estate; another only *lends* me a sword, and that sword preserves my life. Nay, the very same thing, several ways done, changes the quality of the obligation. A word, a tone, a look, makes a great alteration in the case. How shall we judge then, and determine a matter which does not depend upon the fact itself, but upon the force and intention of it? Some things are reputed benefits, not for their value, but because we desire them: and there are offices of as much greater value, that we do not reckon upon at all. If ingratitude were liable to a law, we must never give but before witnesses, which would overthrow the dignity of the benefit: and then the punishment must either be equal where the crimes are unequal, or else it must be unrighteous, so that blood must answer for blood. He that is ungrateful for my saving his life must forfeit his own. And what can be more inhuman than that benefits should conclude in sanguinary events? A man saves my life, and I am ungrateful for it. Shall I be punished in my purse? that is too little; if it be less than the benefit, it is unjust, and it must be capital to be made equal to it. There are, moreover, certain privileges granted to parents, that can never be reduced to a common rule. Their injuries may be cognizable, but not their benefits. The diversity of cases is too large and intricate to be brought within the prospect

of a law: so that it is much more equitable to punish none than to punish all alike. What if a man follows a good office with an injury; whether or no shall this quit scores? or who shall compare them, and weigh the one against the other? There is another thing yet which perhaps we do not dream of: not one man upon the face of the earth would escape, and yet every man would expect to be his judge. Once again, we are all of us ungrateful; and the number does not only take away the shame, but gives authority and protection to the wickedness.

It is thought reasonable by some, that there should be a law against ingratitude; for, say they, it is common for one city to upbraid another, and to claim that of posterity which was bestowed upon their ancestors; but this is only clamor without reason. It is objected by others, as a discouragement to good offices, if men shall not be made answerable for them; but I say, on the other side, that no man would accept of a benefit upon those terms. He that gives is prompted to it by a goodness of mind, and the generosity of the action is lessened by the caution: for it is his desire that the receiver should please himself, and owe no more than he thinks fit. But what if this might occasion fewer benefits, so long as they would be franker? nor is there any hurt in putting a check upon rashness and profusion. In answer to this; men will be careful enough when they oblige without a law: nor is it possible for a judge ever to set us right in it; or indeed, anything else, but the faith of the receiver. The honor of a benefit is this way preserved, which is otherwise profaned, when it comes to the mercenary, and made matter of contention. We are even forward enough of ourselves to wrangle, without necessary

provocations. It would be well, I think, if moneys might pass upon the same conditions with other benefits, and the payment remitted to the conscience, without formalizing upon bills and securities: but human wisdom has rather advised with convenience than virtue; and chosen rather to *force* honesty than *expect* it. For every paltry sum of money there must be bonds, witnesses, counterparts, powers, etc., which is no other than a shameful confession of fraud and wickedness, when more credit is given to our seals than to our minds; and caution taken lest he that has received the money should deny it. Were it not better now to be deceived by some than to suspect all? what is the difference, at this rate, betwixt the benefactor and the usurer, save only that in the benefactor's case there is nobody stands bound?

# SENECA OF A HAPPY LIFE.

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## CHAPTER I.

### OF A HAPPY LIFE, AND WHEREIN IT CONSISTS.

THERE is not any thing in this world, perhaps, that is more talked of, and less understood, than the business of a *happy life*. It is every man's wish and design; and yet not one of a thousand that knows wherein that happiness consists. We live, however, in a blind and eager pursuit of it; and the more haste we make in a wrong way, the further we are from our journey's end. Let us therefore, *first*, consider "what it is we should be at;" and, *secondly*, "which is the readiest way to compass it." If we be right, we shall find every day how much we improve; but if we either follow the cry, or the track, of people that are out of the way, we must expect to be misled, and to continue our days in wandering in error. Wherefore, it highly concerns us to take along with us a skilful guide; for it is not in this, as in other voyages, where the highway brings us to our place of repose; or if a man should happen to be out, where the inhabitants might set him right again: but on the contrary, the beaten road is here

the most dangerous, and the people, instead of helping us, misguide us. Let us not therefore follow, like beasts, but rather govern ourselves by *reason*, than by *example*. It fares with us in human life as in a routed army; one stumbles first, and then another falls upon him, and so they follow, one upon the neck of another, until the whole field comes to be but one heap of miscarriages. And the mischief is, “that the number of the multitude carries it against truth and justice;” so that we must leave the crowd, if we would be happy: for the question of a *happy life* is not to be decided by vote: nay, so far from it, that plurality of voices is still an argument of the wrong; the common people find it easier to believe than to judge, and content themselves with what is usual, never examining whether it be good or not. By the *common people* is intended *the man of title* as well as the *clouted shoe*: for I do not distinguish them by the eye, but by the mind, which is the proper judge of the man. Worldly felicity, I know, makes the head giddy; but if ever a man comes to himself again, he will confess, that “whatsoever he has done, he wishes undone;” and that “the things he feared were better than those he prayed for.”

The true felicity of life is to be free from perturbations, to understand our duties towards God and man: to enjoy the present without any anxious dependence upon the future. Not to amuse ourselves with either hopes or fears, but to rest satisfied with what we have, which is abundantly sufficient; for he that is so, wants nothing. The great blessings of mankind are within us, and within our reach; but we shut our eyes, and, like people in the dark, we fall foul upon the very thing which we search for without finding it. “Tran-

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quillity is a certain equality of mind, which no condition of fortune can either exalt or depress." Nothing can make it less: for it is the state of human perfection: it raises us as high as we can go; and makes every man his own supporter; whereas he that is borne up by any thing else may fall. He that judges aright, and perseveres in it, enjoys a perpetual calm: he takes a true prospect of things; he observes an order, measure, a decorum in all his actions; he has a benevolence in his nature; he squares his life according to reason; and draws to himself love and admiration. Without a certain and an unchangeable judgment, all the rest is but fluctuation: but "he that always wills and nills the same thing, is undoubtedly in the right." Liberty and serenity of mind must necessarily ensue upon the mastering of those things which either allure or affright us; when instead of those flashy pleasures, (which even at the best are both vain and hurtful together,) we shall find ourselves possessed of joy transporting and everlasting. It must be a *sound mind* that makes a *happy man*; there must be a constancy in all conditions, a care for the things of this world, but without trouble; and such an indifference for the bounties of fortune, that either with them, or without them, we may live contentedly. There must be neither lamentation, nor quarrelling, nor sloth, nor fear; for it makes a discord in a man's life. "He that fears, serves." The joy of a wise man stands firm without interruption; in all places, at all times, and in all conditions, his thoughts are cheerful and quiet. As it never *came in* to him from *without*, so it will never leave him; but it is born within him, and inseparable from him. It is a solicitous life that is egged

on with the hope of any thing, though never so open and easy, nay, though a man should never suffer any sort of disappointment. I do not speak this either as a bar to the fair enjoyment of lawful pleasures, or to the gentle flatteries of reasonable expectations: but, on the contrary, I would have men to be always in good humor, provided that it arises from their own souls, and be cherished in their own breasts. Other delights are trivial; they may smooth the brow, but they do not fill and affect the heart. “True joy is a serene and sober motion;” and they are miserably out that take *laughing* for *rejoicing*. The seat of it is within, and there is no cheerfulness like the resolution of a brave mind, that has fortune under his feet. He that can look death in the face, and bid it welcome; open his door to poverty, and bridle his appetites; this is the man whom Providence has established in the possession of inviolable delights. The pleasures of the vulgar are ungrounded, thin, and superficial; but the others are solid and *eternal*. As the *body* itself is rather a *necessary thing*, than a *great*; so the comforts of it are but temporary and vain; beside that, without extraordinary moderation, their end is only pain and repentance; whereas a peaceful concience, honest thoughts, virtuous actions, and an indifference for casual events, are blessings without end, satiety, or measure. This consummated state of felicity is only a submission to the dictate of right nature; “The foundation of it is wisdom and virtue; the knowledge of what we ought to do, and the conformity of the will to that knowledge.”

## CHAPTER II.

HUMAN HAPPINESS IS FOUNDED UPON WISDOM AND VIRTUE;  
AND FIRST, OF WISDOM.

TAKING for granted that *human happiness* is founded upon *wisdom* and *virtue* we shall treat of these two points in order as they lie: and, *first*, of *wisdom*; not in the latitude of its various operations but as it has only a regard to good life, and the happiness of mankind.

Wisdom is a right understanding, a faculty of discerning good from evil; what is to be chosen, and what rejected; a judgment grounded upon the value of things, and not the common opinion of them; an equality of force, and a strength of resolution. It sets a watch over our words and deeds, it takes us up with the contemplation of the works of nature, and makes us invincible by either good or evil fortune. It is large and spacious, and requires a great deal of room to work in; it ransacks heaven and earth; it has for its object things past and to come, transitory and eternal. It examines all the circumstances of time; “what it is, when it began, and how long it will continue: and so for the mind; whence it came; what it is; when it begins; how long it lasts; whether or not it passes from one form to another, or serves only one and wanders when it leaves us; whether it abides in a state of separation, and what the action of it; what use it makes of its

liberty; whether or not it retains the memory of things past, and comes to the knowledge of itself." It is the habit of a perfect mind, and the perfection of humanity, raised as high as Nature can carry it. It differs from *philosophy*, as avarice and money; the one desires, and the other is desired; the one is the effect and the reward of the other. To be wise is the use of wisdom, as seeing is the use of eyes, and well-speaking the use of eloquence. He that is perfectly wise is perfectly happy; nay, the very beginning of wisdom makes life easy to us. Neither is it enough to know this, unless we print it in our minds by daily meditation, and so bring a *good-will* to a good habit. And we must practice what we preach: for *philosophy* is not a subject for popular ostentation; nor does it rest in words, but in things. It is not an entertainment taken up for delight, or to give a taste to our leisure; but it fashions the mind, governs our actions, tells us what we are to do, and what not. It sits at the helm, and guides us through all hazards; nay, we cannot be safe without it, for every hour gives us occasion to make use of it. It informs us in all duties of life, piety to our parents, faith to our friends, charity to the miserable, judgment in counsel; it gives us *peace* by fearing nothing, and *riches* by *coveting nothing*.

There is no condition of life that excludes a wise man from discharging his duty. If his fortune be good, he *tempers* it; if bad, he *masters* it; if he has an estate, he will exercise his virtue in plenty; if none, in poverty: if he cannot do it in his country, he will do it in banishment; if he has no command, he will do the office of a common soldier. Some people have the skill of reclaiming the fiercest of beasts; they will make a lion embrace his keeper, a

tiger kiss him, and an elephant kneel to him. This is the case of a wise man in the extremest difficulties; let them be never so terrible in themselves, when they come to him once, they are perfectly tame. They that ascribe the invention of tillage, architecture, navigation, etc., to wise men, may perchance be in the right, that they were invented by wise men, as *wise men*; for wisdom does not teach our fingers, but our minds: fiddling and dancing, arms and fortifications, were the works of luxury and discord; but wisdom instructs us in the way of nature, and in the arts of unity and concord, not in the instruments, but in the government of life; not to make us live only, but to live happily. She teaches us what things are good, what evil, and what only appear so; and to distinguish betwixt true greatness and tumor. She clears our minds of dross and vanity; she raises up our thoughts to heaven, and carries them down to hell: she discourses of the nature of the soul, the powers and faculties of it; the first principles of things; the order of Providence: she exalts us from things corporeal to things incorporeal, and retrieves the truth of all: she searches nature, gives laws to life; and tells us, "That it is not enough to God, unless we obey him:" she looks upon all accidents as acts of Providence: sets a true value upon things; delivers us from false opinions, and condemns all pleasures that are attended with repentance. She allows nothing to be good that will not be so forever; no man to be happy but that needs no other happiness than what he has within himself. This is the felicity of human life; a felicity that can neither be corrupted nor extinguished: it inquires into the nature of the heavens, the influence of the stars; how far they operate upon our minds and bodies: which

thoughts, though they do not form our manners, they do yet raise and dispose us for glorious things.

It is agreed upon all hands that “right reason is the perfection of human nature,” and wisdom only the dictate of it. The greatness that arises from it is solid and unmovable, the resolutions of wisdom being free, absolute and constant; whereas folly is never long pleased with the same thing, but still shifting of counsels and sick of itself. There can be no happiness without constancy and prudence, for a wise man is to write without a blot, and what he likes once he approves for ever. He admits of nothing that is either evil or slippery, but marches without staggering or stumbling, and is never surprised; he lives always true and steady to himself, and whatsoever befalls him, this great artificer of both fortunes turns to advantage; he that demurs and hesitates is not yet composed; but wheresoever virtue interposes upon the main, there must be concord and consent in the parts; for all virtues are in agreement, as well as all vices are at variance. A wise man, in what condition soever he is will be still happy, for he subjects all things to himself, because he submits himself to reason, and governs his actions by council, not by passion.

He is not moved with the utmost violence of fortune, nor with the extremities of fire and sword; whereas a fool is afraid of his own shadow, and surprised at ill accidents, as if they were all levelled at him. He does nothing unwillingly, for whatever he finds necessary, he makes it his choice. He proounds to himself the certain scope and end of human life: he follows that which conduces to it, and avoids that which hinders it. He is content with his lot whatever it be, without wishing what

he has not, though, of the two, he had rather abound than want. The great business of his life like that of nature, is performed without tumult or noise. He neither fears danger or provokes it, but it is his caution, not any want of courage—for captivity, wounds and chains, he only looks upon as false and lymphatic terrors. He does not pretend to go through with whatever he undertakes, but to do that well which he does. Arts are but the servants—wisdom commands—and where the matter fails it is none of the workman's fault. He is cautious in doubtful cases, in prosperity temperate, and resolute in adversity, still making the best of every condition and improving all occasions to make them serviceable to his fate. Some accidents there are, which I confess may affect him, but not overthrow him, as bodily pains, loss of children and friends, the ruin and desolation of a man's country. One must be made of stone or iron, not to be sensible of these calamities; and, beside, it were no virtue to *bear* them, if a body did not *feel* them.

There are *three degrees of proficients* in the school of wisdom. The *first* are those that come within sight of it, but not up to it—they have learned what they ought to do, but they have not put their knowledge in practice—they are past the hazard of a relapse, but they have still the grudges of a disease, though they are out of the danger of it. By a disease I do understand an obstinacy in evil, or an ill habit, that makes us over eager upon things which are either not much to be desired, or not at all. A *second* sort are those that have subjected their appetites for a season, but are yet in fear of falling back. A *third* sort are those that are clear of many vices but not of all. They are not covetous, but per-

haps they are choleric—nor lustful, but perchance ambitious; they are firm enough in some cases but weak enough in others: there are many that despise death and yet shrink at pain. There are diversities in wise men, but no inequalities—one is more affable, another more ready, a third a better speaker; but the felicity of them all is equal. It is in this as in heavenly bodies, there is a *certain state* in greatness.

In civil and domestic affairs, a wise man may stand in need of counsel, as of a physician, an advocate, a solicitor; but in greater matters, the blessing of wise men rests in the joy they take in the communication of their virtues. If there were nothing else in it, a man would apply himself to wisdom, because it settles him in a perfect tranquillity of mind.

## CHAPTER III.

## THERE CAN BE NO HAPPINESS WITHOUT VIRTUE.

VIRTUE is that perfect good which is the complement of a *happy life*; the only immortal thing that belongs to mortality—it is the knowledge both of others and itself—it is an invincible greatness of mind, not to be elevated or dejected with good or ill fortune. It is sociable and gentle, free, steady, and fearless, content within itself, full of inexhaustible delights, and it is valued for itself. One may be a good physician, a good governor, a good grammarian, without being a good man, so that all things from without are only accessories, for the seat of it is a pure and holy mind. It consists in a congruity of actions which we can never expect so long as we are distracted by our passions: not but that a man may be allowed to change color and countenance, and suffer such impressions as are properly a kind of natural force upon the body, and not under the dominion of the mind; but all this while I will have his judgment firm, and he shall act steadily and boldly, without wavering betwixt the motions of his body and those of his mind.

It is not a thing indifferent, I know, whether a man lies at ease upon a bed, or in torment upon a wheel—and yet the former may be the worse of the two if he suffer the latter with honor, and enjoy the

other with infamy. It is not the *matter*, but the *virtue*, that makes the action *good or ill*; and he that is led in triumph may be yet greater than his conqueror.

When we come once to value our flesh above our honesty we are lost: and yet I would not press upon dangers, no, not so much as upon inconveniences, unless where the man and the brute come in competition; and in such a case, rather than make a forfeiture of my credit, my reason, or my faith, I would run all extremities.

They are great blessings to have tender parents, dutiful children, and to live under a just and well-ordered government. Now, would it not trouble even a virtuous man to see his children butchered before his eyes, his father made a slave, and his country overrun by a barbarous enemy? There is a great difference betwixt the simple loss of a blessing and the succeeding of a great mischief in the place of it, over and above. The loss of health is followed with sickness, and the loss of sight with blindness; but this does not hold in the loss of friends and children, where there is rather something to the contrary to supply that loss: that is to say, *virtue*, which fills the mind, and takes away the desire of what we have not. What matters it whether the water be stopped or not, so long as the fountain is safe? Is a man ever the wiser for a multitude of friends, or the more foolish for the loss of them? so neither is he the happier, nor the more miserable. Short life, grief and pain are accessions that have no effect at all upon virtue. It consists in the action and not in the things we do—in the choice itself, and not in the subject-matter of it. It is not a despicable body or condition, nor

poverty, infamy or scandal, that can obscure the glories of virtue; but a man may see her through all oppositions: and he that looks diligently into the state of a wicked man will see the canker at his heart, through all the false and dazzling splendors of greatness and fortune. We shall then discover our *childishness*, in setting our hearts upon things trivial and contemptible, and in the selling of our very country and parents for a *rattle*. And what is the difference (in effect) betwixt *old men* and *children*, but that the *one* deals in *paintings* and *statues*, and the *other* in *babies*, so that we ourselves are only the more expensive fools.

If one could but see the mind of a good man, as it is illustrated with virtue; the beauty and the majesty of it, which is a dignity not so much as to be thought of without love and veneration—would not a man bless himself at the sight of such an object as at the encounter of some supernatural power—a power so miraculous that it is a kind of charm upon the souls of those that are truly affected with it. There is so wonderful a grace and authority in it that even the worst of men approve it, and set up for the reputation of being accounted virtuous themselves. They covet the fruit indeed, and the profit of wickedness; but they hate and are ashamed of the imputation of it. It is by an impression of Nature that all men have a reverence for virtue—they know it and they have a respect for it though they do not practice it—nay, for the countenance of their very *wickedness*, they miscall it *virtue*. Their injuries they call *benefits*, and expect a man should thank them for doing him a mischief — they cover their most notorious iniquities with a pretext of justice.

He that robs upon the highway had rather find his booty than force it; ask any of them that live upon rapine, fraud, oppression, if they had not rather enjoy a fortune honestly gotten, and their consciences will not suffer them to deny it. Men are vicious only for the proof of villainy; for at the same time that they commit it they condemn it; nay, so powerful is virtue, and so gracious is Providence, that every man has a light set up within him for a guide, which we do, all of us, both see and acknowledge, though we do not pursue it. This it is that makes the prisoner upon the torture happier than the executioner, and sickness better than health, if we bear it without yielding or repining—this it is that overcomes ill-fortune and moderates good—for it marches betwixt the one and the other, with an equal contempt for both. It turns (like fire) all things into itself, our actions and our friendships are tinctured with it, and whatever it touches becomes amiable.

That which is frail and mortal rises and falls, grows, wastes, and varies from itself; but the state of things divine is always the same; and so is virtue, let the matter be what it will. It is never the worse for the difficulty of the action, nor the better for the easiness of it. It is the same in a rich man as in a poor; in a sickly man as in a sound; in a strong as in a weak; the virtue of the besieged is as great as that of the besiegers. There are some virtues, I confess, which a good man cannot be without, and yet he had rather have no occasion to employ them. If there were any difference, I should prefer the virtues of patience before those of pleasure; for it is braver to break through difficulties than to temper our delights. But though the subject

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of virtue may possibly be against nature, as to be burnt or wounded, yet the virtue itself of *an invincible patience* is according to nature. We may seem, perhaps, to promise more than human nature is able to perform; but we speak with a respect to the mind, and not to the body.

If a man does not live up to his own rules, it is something yet to have virtuous meditations and good purposes, even without acting; it is generous, the very adventure of being good, and the bare proposal of an eminent course of life, though beyond the force of human frailty to accomplish. There is something of honor yet in the miscarriage; nay, in the naked contemplation of it. I would receive my own death with as little trouble as I would hear of another man's; I would bear the same mind whether I be rich or poor, whether I get or lose in the world; what I have, I will neither sordidly spare, or prodigally squander away, and I will reckon upon benefits well-placed as the fairest part of my possession: not valuing them by number or weight, but by the profit and esteem of the receiver; accounting myself never the poorer for that which I give to a worthy person. What I do shall be done for conscience, not ostentation. I will eat and drink, not to gratify my palate, or only to fill and empty, but to satisfy nature: I will be cheerful to my friends, mild and placable to my enemies: I will prevent an honest request if I can foresee it, and I will grant it without asking: I will look upon the whole world as my country, and upon the gods, both as the witnesses and the judges of my words and deeds. I will live and die with this testimony, that I loved good studies, and a good conscience; that I never invaded another man's liberty; and that I preserved my own. I will govern

my life and my thoughts as if the whole world were to see the one, and to read the other; for “what does it signify to make anything a secret to my neighbor, when to God (who is the searcher of our hearts) all our privacies are open.”

Virtue is divided into two parts, *contemplation* and *action*. The one is delivered by institution, the other by admonition: one part of virtue consists in discipline, the other in exercise: for we must first learn, and then practice. The sooner we begin to apply ourselves to it, and the more haste we make, the longer shall we enjoy the comforts of a rectified mind; nay, we have the fruition of it in the very act of forming it: but it is another sort of delight, I must confess, that arises from a contemplation of a soul which is advanced into the possession of wisdom and virtue. If it was so great a comfort to us to pass from the subjection of our childhood into a state of liberty and business, how much greater will it be when we come to cast off the boyish levity of our minds, and range ourselves among the philosophers? We are past our minority, it is true, but not our indiscretions; and, which is yet worse, we have the authority of seniors, and the weaknesses of children, (I might have said of infants, for every little thing frights the one, and every trivial fancy the other.) Whoever studies this point well will find that many things are the less to be feared the more terrible they appear. To think anything good that is not honest, were to reproach Providence; for good men suffer many inconveniences; but virtue, like the sun, goes on still with her work, let the air be never so cloudy, and finishes her course, extinguishing likewise all other splendors and oppositions; insomuch that calamity is no more to a virtuous mind,

than a shower into the sea. That which is right, is not to be valued by *quantity, number, or time*; a life of a day may be as honest as a life of a hundred years: but yet virtue in one man may have a larger field to show itself in than in another. One man, perhaps, may be in a station to administer unto cities and kingdoms; to contrive good laws, create friendships, and do beneficial offices to mankind;

For virtue is open to all; as well to servants and exiles, as to princes; it is profitable to the world and to itself, at all distances and in all conditions; and there is no difficulty can excuse a man from the exercise of it; and it is only to be found in a wise man, though there may be some faint resemblances of it in the common people. The Stoicks hold all virtues to be equal; but yet there is great variety in the matter they have to work upon, according as it is larger or narrower, illustrious or less noble, of more or less extent; as all good men are equal, that is to say, as they are good; but yet one may be young, another old; one may be rich, another poor; one eminent and powerful, another unknown and obscure. There are many things which have little or no grace in themselves, and are yet glorious and remarkable by virtue. Nothing can be good which gives neither greatness nor security to the mind; but, on the contrary, infects it with insolence, arrogance, and tumor: nor does virtue dwell upon the tip of the tongue, but in the temple of a purified heart. He that depends upon any other good becomes covetous of life, and what belongs to it; which exposes a man to appetites that are vast, unlimited, and intolerable. Virtue is free and indefatigable, and accompanied with concord and gracefulness; whereas pleasure is mean, servile, transitory, tiresome, and sickly and

scarce outlives the tasting of it: it is the good of the belly, and not of the man; and only the felicity of brutes. Who does not know that fools enjoy their pleasures, and that there is great variety in the entertainments of wickedness? Nay, the mind itself has its variety of perverse pleasures as well as the body: as insolence, self-conceit, pride, garrulity, laziness, and the abusive wit of turning everything into *ridicule*, whereas virtue weighs all this, and corrects it. It is the knowledge both of others and of itself; it is to be learned from itself; and the very will itself may be taught; which will cannot be right, unless the whole habit of the mind be right from whence the will comes. It is by the impulse of virtue that we love virtue, so that the very way to virtue, lies by virtue, which takes in also, at a view, the laws of human life.

Neither are we to value ourselves upon a day, or an hour, or any one action, but upon the whole habit of the mind. Some men do one thing bravely, but not another; they will shrink at infamy, and bear up against poverty: in this case, we commend the fact, and despise the man. The soul is never in the right place until it be delivered from the cares of human affairs; we must labor and climb the hill, if we will arrive at virtue, whose seat is upon the top of it. He that masters avarice, and is truly good, stands firm against ambition; he looks upon his last hour not as a punishment, but as the equity of a common fate; he that subdues his carnal lusts shall easily keep himself untainted with any other: so that reason does not encounter this or that vice by itself, but beats down all at a blow. What does he care for ignominy that only values himself upon conscience, and not opinion? Socrates looked a scan-

dalous death in the face with the same constancy that he had before practiced towards the thirty tyrants: his virtue consecrated the very dungeon: as Cato's repulse was Cato's honor, and the reproach of the government. He that is wise will take delight even in an ill opinion that is well gotten; it is ostentation, not virtue, when a man will have his good deeds published; and it is not enough to be just where there is honor to be gotten, but to continue so, in defiance of infamy and danger.

But virtue cannot lie hid, for the time will come that shall raise it again (even after it is buried) and deliver it from the malignity of the age that oppressed it: immortal glory is the shadow of it, and keeps it company whether we will or not; but sometimes the shadow goes before the substance, and other whiles it follows it; and the later it comes, the larger it is, when even envy itself shall have given way to it. It was a long time that Democritus was taken for a madman, and before Socrates had any esteem in the world. How long was it before Cato could be understood? Nay, he was affronted, contemned, and rejected; and the people never knew the value of him until they had lost him: the integrity and courage of mad Rutilius had been forgotten but for his sufferings. I speak of those that fortune has made famous for their persecutions: and there are others also that the world never took notice of until they were dead; as Epicurus and Metrodorus, that were almost wholly unknown, even in the place where they lived. Now, as the body is to be kept in upon the down-hill, and forced upwards, so there are some virtues that require the rein and others the spur. In *liberality, temperance, gentleness of nature,*

we are to check ourselves for fear of falling; but in *patience*, *resolutions*, and *perseverance*, where we are to mount the hill, we stand in need of encouragement. Upon this division of the matter, I had rather steer the smoother course than pass through the experiments of sweat and blood: I know it is my duty to be content in all conditions; but yet, if it were at my election, I would choose the fairest. When a man comes once to stand in need of fortune, his life is anxious, suspicious, timorous, dependent upon every moment, and in fear of all accidents. How can that man resign himself to God, or bear his lot, whatever it be, without murmuring, and cheerfully submit to Providence, that shrinks at every motion of pleasure or pain? It is virtue alone that raises us above griefs, hopes, fears and chances; and makes us not only patient, but willing, as knowing that whatever we suffer is according to the decree of Heaven. He that is overcome with pleasure, (so contemptible and weak an enemy) what will become of him when he comes to grapple with dangers, necessities, torments, death, and the dissolution of nature itself? Wealth, honor, and favor, may come upon a man by chance; nay, they may be cast upon him without so much as looking after them: but virtue is the work of industry and labor; and certainly it is worth the while to purchase that good which brings all others along with it. A good man is happy within himself, and independent upon fortune: kind to his friend, temperate to his enemy, religiously just, indefatigably laborious; and he discharges all duties with a constancy and congruity of actions.

## CHAPTER IV.

## PHILOSOPHY IS THE GUIDE OF LIFE.

If it be true, that the *understanding* and the *will*, are the *two eminent faculties of the reasonable soul*, it follows necessarily, that *wisdom* and *virtue*, (which are the best improvements of these two faculties,) must be the perfection also of our *reasonable being*; and consequently, *the undeniable foundation of a happy life*. There is not any duty to which Providence has not annexed a blessing; nor any institution of Heaven which, even in this life, we may not be the better for; not any temptation, either of fortune or of appetite, that is not subject to our reason; nor any passion or affliction for which virtue has not provided a remedy. So that it is our own fault if we either fear or hope for anything; which two affections are the root of all our miseries. From this general prospect of the *foundation* of our *tranquillity*, we shall pass by degrees to a particular consideration of the *means* by which it may be *procured*, and of the *impediments* that *obstruct* it; beginning with that *philosophy* which principally regards our manners, and instructs us in the measures of a *virtuous* and *quiet life*.

*Philosophy* is divided into *moral*, *natural*, and *rational*: the *first* concerns our *manners*; the *second* searches the works of *Nature*; and the *third* fur-

nishes us with propriety of *words* and *arguments*, and the faculty of *distinguishing*, that we may not be imposed upon with tricks and fallacies. The *causes* of things fall under *natural philosophy*, *arguments* under *rational*, and *actions* under *moral*. *Moral philosophy* is again divided into matter of *justice*, which arises from the estimation of things and of men; and into *affections* and *actions*; and a failing in any one of these, disorders all the rest: for what does it profit us to know the true value of things, if we be transported by our passion? or to master our appetites without understanding the *when*, the *what*, the *how*, and other circumstances of our proceedings? For it is one thing to know the rate and dignity of things, and another to know the little nicks and springs of acting. *Natural philosophy* is conversant about things *corporeal* and *incorporeal*; the disquisition of *causes* and *effects*, and the contemplation of the *cause of causes*. *Rational philosophy* is divided into *logic* and *rhetoric*; the one looks after *words*, *sense*, and *order*; the other treats barely of *words*, and the *significations* of them. Socrates places all *philosophy* in *morals*; and *wisdom* in the distinguishing of *good* and *evil*. It is the art and law of life, and it teaches us what to do in all cases, and, like good marksmen, to hit the white at any distance. The force of it is incredible; for it gives us in the weakness of a man the security of a *spirit*: in sickness it is as good as a remedy to us; for whatsoever eases the mind is profitable also to the body. The *physician* may prescribe diet and exercise, and accommodate his rule and medicine to the disease, but it is *philosophy* that must bring us to a contempt of death, which is the remedy of all diseases. In poverty it gives us riches, or such a state of mind as

makes them superfluous to us. It arms us against all difficulties: one man is pressed with death, another with poverty; some with envy, others are offended at Providence, and unsatisfied with the condition of mankind: but *philosophy* prompts us to relieve the prisoner, the infirm, the necessitous, the condemned; to show the ignorant their errors, and rectify their affections. It makes us inspect and govern our manners; it rouses us where we are faint and drowsy: it binds up what is loose, and humbles in us that which is contumacious: it delivers the mind from the bondage of the body, and raises it up to the contemplation of its divine original. Honors, monuments, and all the works of vanity and ambition are demolished and destroyed by time; but the reputation of wisdom is venerable to posterity, and those that were envied or neglected in their lives are adored in their memories, and exempted from the very laws of created nature, which has set bounds to all other things. The very shadow of *glory* carries a man of *honor* upon all dangers, to the contempt of fire and sword; and it were a shame if *right reason* should not inspire as generous resolutions into a man of *virtue*.

Neither is *philosophy* only profitable to the public, but one wise man helps another, even in the exercise of the virtues; and the one has need of the other, both for conversation and counsel; for they kindle a mutual emulation in good offices. We are not so perfect yet, but that many new things remain still to be found out, which will give us the reciprocal advantages of instructing one another: for as one wicked man is contagious to another, and the more vices are mingled, the worse it is, so is it on the contrary with good men and their virtues. As men of

letters are the most useful and excellent of friends, so are they the best of subjects; as being better judges of the blessings they enjoy under a well-ordered government, and of what they owe to the magistrate for their freedom and protection. They are men of sobriety and learning, and free from boasting and insolence; they reprove the vice without reproaching the person; for they have learned to be without either pomp or envy. That which we see in high mountains, we find in *philosophers*; they seem taller near at hand than at a distance. They are raised above other men, but their greatness is substantial. Nor do they stand upon tiptoe, that they may seem higher than they are, but, content with their own stature, they reckon themselves tall enough when fortune cannot reach them. Their laws are short, and yet comprehensive too, for they bind all.

It is the bounty of *nature* that we *live*; but of *philosophy* that we *live well*, which is in truth a greater benefit than life itself. Not but that *philosophy* is also the gift of Heaven, so far as to the faculty, but not to the science; for that must be the business of industry. No man is born wise; but wisdom and virtue require a tutor, though we can easily learn to be vicious without a master. It is *philosophy* that gives us a veneration for God, a charity for our neighbor, that teaches us our duty to Heaven, and exhorts us to an agreement one with another; it unmasks things that are terrible to us, assuages our lusts, refutes our errors, restrains our luxury, reproves our avarice, and works strangely upon tender natures. I could never hear Attalus (says Seneca) upon the vices of the age and the errors of life, without a compassion for mankind;

and in his discourses upon poverty, there was something methought that was more than human. "More than we use," says he, "is more than we need, and only a burden to the bearer.". That saying of his put me out of countenance at the superfluities of my own fortune. And so in his invectives against vain pleasures, he did at such a rate advance the felicities of a sober table, a pure mind, and a chaste body that a man could not hear him without a love for continence and moderation. Upon these lectures of his, I denied myself, for a while after, certain delicacies that I had formerly used: but in a short time I fell to them again, though so sparingly, that the proportion came little short of a total abstinence.

Now, to show you (says our author) how much earnester my entrance upon philosophy was than my progress, my tutor Sotion gave me a wonderful kindness for Pythagoras, and after him for Sextius: the former forbore shedding of blood upon his *metempsychosis*: and put men in fear of it, lest they should offer violence to the souls of some of their departed friends or relations. "Whether," says he, there be a transmigration or not; if it be true, there is no hurt; if false, there is frugality: and nothing is gotten by cruelty neither, but the cozening a wolf, perhaps, or a vulture, of a supper."

Now, Sextius abstained upon another account, which was, that he would not have men inured to hardness of heart by the laceration and tormenting of living creatures; beside, that Nature had sufficiently provided for the sustenance of mankind without blood." This wrought upon me so far that I gave over eating of flesh, and in one year I made it not only easy to me but pleasant; my mind methought was more at liberty, (and I

am still of the same opinion,) but I gave it over nevertheless; and the reason was this: it was imputed as a superstition to the Jews, the forbearance of some sorts of flesh, and my father brought me back again to my old custom, that I might not be thought tainted with their superstition. Nay, and I had much ado to prevail upon myself to suffer it too. I make use of this instance to show the aptness of youth to take good impressions, if there be a friend at hand to press them. Philosophers are the tutors of mankind; if they have found out remedies for the mind, it must be our part to employ them. I cannot think of Cato, Lelius, Socrates, Plato, without veneration: their very names are sacred to me. Philosophy is the health of the mind; let us look to that health first, and in the second place to that of the body, which may be had upon easier terms; for a strong arm, a robust constitution, or the skill of procuring this, is not a philosopher's business. He does some things as a *wise man*, and other things as he is *a man*; and he may have strength of body as well as of mind; but if he runs, or casts the sledge, it were injurious to ascribe that to his wisdom which is common to the greatest of fools. He studies rather to fill his mind than his coffers; and he knows that gold and silver were mingled with dirt, until avarice or ambition parted them. His life is ordinary, fearless, equal, secure; he stands firm in all extremities, and bears the lot of his humanity with a divine temper. There is a great difference betwixt the splendor of philosophy and of fortune; the one shines with an original light, the other with a borrowed one; beside that it makes us happy and immortal: for learning shall outlive palaces and monuments. The house of a wise man is safe, though

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narrow; there is neither noise nor furniture in it, no porter at the door, nor anything that is either vendible or mercenary, nor any business of fortune, for she has nothing to do where she has nothing to look after. This is the way to Heaven which Nature has chalked out, and it is both secure and pleasant; there needs no train of servants, no pomp or equipage, to make good our passage; no money or letters of credit, for expenses upon the voyage; but the graces of an honest mind will serve us upon the way, and make us happy at our journey's end.

To tell you my opinion now of *the liberal sciences*; I have no great esteem for any thing that terminates in profit or money; and yet I shall allow them to be so far beneficial, as they only *prepare* the understanding without *detaining* it. They are but the rudiments of wisdom, and only then to be learned when the mind is capable of nothing better, and the knowledge of them is better worth the keeping than the acquiring. They do not so much as pretend to the making of us virtuous, but only to give us an aptitude of disposition to be so. The *grammarians*' business lies in a *syntax* of speech; or if he proceed to *history*, or the measuring of a *verse*, he is at the end of his line; but what signifies a congruity of periods, the computing of syllables, or the modifying of numbers, to the taming of our passions, or the repressing of our lusts? The *philosopher* proves the body of the sun to be large, but for the true dimensions of it we must ask the *mathematician*: *geometry* and *music*, if they do not teach us to master our hopes and fears, all the rest is to little purpose. What does it concern us which was the elder of the two, Homer or Hesiod? or which was the taller,

Helen or Hecuba? We take a great deal of pains to trace Ulysses in his wanderings, but were it not time as well spent to look to ourselves that we may not wander at all? Are not we ourselves tossed with tempestuous passions? and both *assaulted* by terrible *monsters* on the one hand, and *tempted* by *syrens* on the other? Teach me my duty to my country, to my father, to my wife, to mankind. What is it to me whether Penelope was *honest* or not? teach me to know how to be so myself, and to live according to that knowledge. What am I the better for putting so many parts together in *music*, and raising a harmony out of so many different tones? teach me to tune my affections, and to hold constant to myself. *Geometry* teaches me the art of *measuring acres*; teach me to *measure my appetites*, and to know when I have enough; teach me to divide with my brother, and to rejoice in the prosperity of my neighbor. You teach me how I may hold my own, and keep my estate; but I would rather learn how I may lose it all, and yet be contented. "It is hard," you will say, "for a man to be forced from the fortune of his family." This estate, it is true, was my *father's*; but whose was it in the time of my *grandfather*? I do not only say, what *man's* was it? but what *nation's*? The *astrologer* tells me of Saturn and Mars in *opposition*; but I say, let them be as they will, their courses and their positions are ordered them by an unchangeable decree of fate. Either they produce and point out the effects of all things, or else they signify them; if the former, what are we the better for the knowledge of that which must of necessity come to pass? If the latter, what does it avail us to foresee what we cannot avoid? So that

whether we know or not know, the event will still be the same.

He that designs the institution of human life should not be over-curious of his words; it does not stand with his dignity to be solicitous about sounds and syllables, and to debase the mind of man with trivial things; placing wisdom in matters that are rather difficult than great. If it be *eloquent*, it is his *good fortune*, not his *business*. Subtle disputations are only the sport of wits, that play upon the catch, and are fitter to be contemned than resolved. Were not I a madman to sit wrangling about words, and putting of nice and impertinent questions, when the enemy has already made the breach, the town fired over my head, and the mine ready to play that shall blow me up into the air? were this a time for fooleries? Let me rather fortify myself against death and inevitable necessities; let me understand that the good of life does not consist in the length or space, but in the use of it. When I go to *sleep*, who knows whether I shall ever *wake* again? and when I *wake*, whether ever I shall *sleep* again? When I go *abroad*, whether ever I shall come *home* again? and when I *return*, whether ever I shall go *abroad* again? It is not at sea only that life and death are within a few inches one of another; but they are as near everywhere else too, only we do not take so much notice of it. What have we to do with frivolous and captious questions, and impertinent nice-ties? Let us rather study how to deliver ourselves from sadness, fear, and the burden of all our secret lusts: let us pass over all our most solemn levities, and make haste to a good life, which is a thing that presses us. Shall a man that goes for a midwife, stand gaping upon a post to see *what play to-day?*

or, when his house is on fire, stay the curling of a periwig before he calls for help? Our houses are on fire, our country invaded, our goods taken away, our children in danger; and, I might add to these, the calamities of earthquakes, shipwrecks, and whatever else is most terrible. Is this a time for us now to be playing fast and loose with idle questions, which are in effect so many unprofitable riddles? Our duty is the cure of the mind rather than the delight of it; but we have only the words of wisdom without the works; and turn philosophy into a pleasure that was given for a remedy. What can be more ridiculous than for a man to *neglect his manners* and *compose his style*? We are sick and ulcerous, and must be lanced and scarified, and every man has as much business within himself as a physician in a common pestilence. “Misfortunes,” in fine, “cannot be avoided; but they may be sweetened, if not overcome; and our lives may be made happy by philosophy.”

## CHAPTER V.

## THE FORCE OF PRECEPTS.

THERE seems to be so near an affinity betwixt *wisdom*, *philosophy*, and *good counsels*, that it is rather matter of curiosity than of profit to divide them; *philosophy*, being only a *limited wisdom*; and *good counsels* a *communication of that wisdom*, for the good of *others*, as well as of *ourselves*; and to *posterity*, as well as to the *present*. The *wisdom* of the *ancients*, as to the government of life, was no more than certain precepts, what to do and what not: and men were much better in that simplicity; for as they came to be more *learned*, they grew less careful of being *good*. That *plain* and *open virtue* is now turned into a *dark* and *intricate science*; and we are taught to *dispute* rather than to *live*. So long as wickedness was simple, simple remedies also were sufficient against it; but now it has taken root, and spread, we must make use of stronger.

There are some dispositions that embrace good things as soon as they hear them; but they will still need quickening by admonition and precept. We are rash and forward in some cases, and dull in others; and there is no repressing of the one humor, or raising of the other, but by removing the causes of them; which are (in one word) *false admiration* and *false fear*.

Every man knows his duty to his country, to his friends, to his guests; and yet when he is called upon to draw his sword for the one, or to labor for the other, he finds himself distracted betwixt his apprehensions and his delights: he knows well enough the injury he does his wife in the keeping of a wench, and yet his lust overrules him: so that it is not enough to give good advice, unless we can take away that which hinders the benefit of it. If a man does what he ought to do, he will never do it constantly or equally, without knowing why he does it: and if it be only chance or custom, he that does well by chance, may do ill so too. And farther, a precept may direct us what we *ought* to do, and yet fall short in the manner of doing it: an expensive entertainment may, in one case be extravagance or gluttony, and yet a point of honor and discretion in another. Tiberius Cæsar had a huge *mullet* presented him, which he sent to the market to be sold: “and now,” says he, “my masters,” to some company with him, “you shall see that either Apicius or Octavius will be the Chapman for this fish.” Octavius beat the price, and gave about thirty pounds sterling for it. Now, there was a great difference between Octavius, that bought it for his luxury, and the *other* that purchased it for a *compliment* to Tiberius. Precepts are idle, if we be not first taught what opinion we are to have of the matter in question; whether it be *poverty*, *riches*, *disgrace*, *sickness*, *banishment*, etc. Let us therefore examine them one by one; not what they are *called*, but what in truth they *are*. And so for the *virtues*; it is to no purpose to set a high esteem upon *prudence*, *fortitude*, *temperance*, *justice*, if we do not first

know *what virtue is*; whether *one or more*; or if he that has *one*, has *all*; or *how they differ*.

Precepts are of great weight; and a few useful ones at hand do more toward a happy life than whole volumes or cautions, that we know not where to find. These salutary precepts should be our daily meditation, for they are the rules by which we ought to square our lives. When they are contracted into *sentences*, they strike the *affections*: whereas *admonition* is only *blowing of the coal*; it moves the vigor of the mind, and excites virtue: we have the thing already, but we know not where it lies. It is by precept that the understanding is nourished and augmented: the offices of prudence and justice are guided by them, and they lead us to the execution of our duties. A *precept* delivered in *verse* has a much greater effect than in *prose*: and those very people that never think they have enough, let them but hear a sharp sentence against *avarice*, how will they clap and admire it, and bid open defiance to money? So soon as we find the affections struck, we must follow the blow; not with *syllogisms* or quirks of *wit*; but with *plain* and *weighty reason* and we must do it with *kindness* too, and *respect* for “there goes a blessing along with counsels and discourses that are bent wholly upon the good of the hearer:” and those are still the most efficacious that take reason along with them; and tell us as well *why* we are to do this or that, as *what* we are to do: for some understandings are weak, and need an instructor to expound to them what is good and what is evil. It is a great virtue to *love*, to *give*, and to *follow good counsel*; if it does not *lead* us to honesty, it does at least *prompt* us to it. As several parts make up but one *harmony*, and the most agreeable

music arises from discords; so should a wise man gather many acts, many precepts, and the examples of many arts, to inform his own life. Our fore-fathers have left us in charge to avoid three things; *hatred*, *envy*, and *contempt*; now, it is hard to avoid *envy* and not incur *contempt*; for in taking too much care not to usurp upon others, we become many times liable to be trampled upon ourselves. Some people are afraid of others, because it is possible that others may be afraid of them: but let us secure ourselves upon all hands; for *flattery* is as dangerous as *contempt*. It is not to say, in case of admonition, I knew this before, for we know many things, but we do not think of them; so that it is the part of a *monitor*, not so much to *teach* as to *mind* us of our duties. Sometimes a man oversees that which lies just under his nose; otherwhile he is careless, or pretends not to see it: we do all know that friendship is sacred, and yet we violate it; and the greatest libertine expects that his own wife should be honest.

Good *counsel* is the most needful service that we can do to mankind; and if we give it to *many*, it will be sure to profit *some*: for of many trials, some or other will undoubtedly succeed. He that places a man in the possession of himself does a great thing; for wisdom does not show itself so much in precept as in life; in a firmness of mind and a mastery of appetite: it teaches us to *do* as well as to *talk*: and to make our words and actions all of a color. If that fruit be pleasantest which we gather from a tree of our own planting, how much greater delight shall we take in the growth and increase of good manners of our own forming! It is an eminent mark of wisdom for a man to be always like him-

self. You shall have some that keep a thrifty table, and lavish out upon building; profuse upon themselves, and forbid to others; niggardly at home, and lavish abroad. This diversity is vicious, and the effect of a dissatisfied and uneasy mind; whereas every wise man lives by rule. This disagreement of purposes arises from hence, either that we do not propound to ourselves what we would be at; or if we do, that we do not pursue it, but pass from one thing to another; and we do not only *change* neither but return to the very thing which we had both quitted and condemned.

In all our undertakings, let us first examine our own strength; the enterprise next; and, thirdly, the persons with whom we have to do. The first point is most important; for we are apt to overvalue ourselves, and reckon that we can do more than indeed we can. One man sets up for a speaker, and is out as soon as he opens his mouth; another overcharges his estate, perhaps, or his body: a bashful man is not fit for public business: some again are too stiff and peremptory for the court: many people are apt to fly out in their anger, nay, and in a frolic too; if any sharp thing fall in their way, they will rather venture a neck than lose a jest. These people had better be quiet in the world than busy. Let him that is naturally choleric and impatient avoid all provocations, and those affairs also that multiply and draw on more; and those also from which there is no retreat. When we may come off at pleasure, and fairly hope to bring our matters to a period, it is well enough. If it so happen that a man be tied up to business, which he can neither loosen nor break off, let him imagine those shackles upon his mind to be irons upon his legs: they are troublesome

at first; but when there is no remedy but patience, custom makes them easy to us, and necessity gives us courage. We are all slaves to fortune: some only in loose and golden chains, others in strait ones, and coarser: nay, and *they that bind us are slaves too themselves*; some to honor, others to wealth; some to offices, and others to contempt; some to their superiors; others to themselves: nay, life itself is a servitude: let us make the best of it then, and with our philosophy mend our fortune. Difficulties may be softened, and heavy burdens disposed of to our ease. Let us covet nothing out of our reach, but content ourselves with things hopeful and at hand; and without envying the advantages of others; for greatness stands upon a craggy precipice, and it is much safer and quieter living upon a level. How many great men are forced to keep their station upon mere necessity; because they find there is no coming down from it but headlong? These men should do well to fortify themselves against ill consequences by such virtues and meditations as may make them less solicitous for the future. The surest expedient in this case is to bound our desires, and to leave nothing to fortune which we may keep in our own power. Neither will this course wholly compose us, but it shows us at worst the end of our troubles.

It is but a main point to take care that we propose nothing but what is hopeful and honest. For it will be equally troublesome to us, either not to succeed, or to be ashamed of the success. Wherefore let us be sure not to admit any ill design into our heart; that we may lift up pure hands to heaven and ask nothing which another shall be a loser by. Let us pray for a good mind, which is a wish to no

man's injury. I will remember always that I am a man, and then consider, that if I am *happy*, it will not last *always*; if *unhappy*, I may be *other* if I please. I will carry my life in my hand, and deliver it up readily when it shall be called for. I will have a care of being a slave to myself; for it is a perpetual, a shameful, and the heaviest of all servitudes: and this may be done by moderate desires. I will say to myself, "What is it that I labor, sweat, and solicit for, when it is but very little that I want, and it will not be long that I will need any thing?" He that would make a trial of the firmness of his mind, let him set certain days apart for the practice of his virtues. Let him mortify himself with fasting, coarse clothes, and hard lodging; and then say to himself, "Is this the thing now that I was afraid of?" In a state of security, a man may thus prepare himself against hazards, and in plenty fortify himself against want. If you will have a man resolute when he comes to the push, train him up to it beforehand. The soldier does duty in peace, that he may be in breath when he comes to battle. How many great and wise men have made experiment of their moderation by a practice of abstinence, to the highest degree of hunger and thirst; and convinced themselves that a man may fill his belly without being beholding to fortune; which never denies any of us wherewith to satisfy our necessities, though she be never so angry! It is as easy to *suffer* it *always* as to *try* it *once*; and it is no more than thousands of servants and poor people do every day in their lives. He that would live happily, must neither trust to good fortune nor submit to bad: he must stand upon his guard against all assaults; he must stick to himself, without any dependence upon other people.

Where the mind is tinctured with philosophy, there is no place for grief, anxiety, or superfluous vexations. It is prepossessed with virtue to the neglect of fortune, which brings us to a degree of security not to be disturbed. It is easier to give counsel than to take it; and a common thing for one choleric man to condemn another. We may be sometimes earnest in advising, but not violent or tedious. Few words, with gentleness and efficacy, are best: the misery is, that the wise do not need counsel, and fools will not take it. A good man, it is true, delights in it; and it is a mark of folly and ill-nature to hate reproof.

To a friend I would be always frank and plain; and rather fail in the success than be wanting in the matter of faith and trust. There are some precepts that serve in common both to the rich and poor, but they are too general; as “Cure your avarice, and the work is done.” It is one thing not to desire money, and another thing not to understand how to use it. In the choice of the persons we have to do withal, we should see that they be worth our while; in the choice of our business, we are to consult nature, and follow our inclinations. He that gives sober advice to a witty droll must look to have every thing turned into ridicule. “As if you philosophers,” says Marcellinus, “did not love your whores and your guts as well as other people:” and then he tells you of such and such that were taken in the manner. We are all sick, I must confess, and it is not for sick men to play the physicians; but it is yet lawful for a man in an hospital to discourse of the common condition and distempers of the place. He that should pretend to teach a madman how to speak, walk, and behave himself, were not he the most mad man of the two?

He that directs the pilot, makes him move the helm, order the sails so or so, and makes the best of a scant wind, after this or that manner. And so should we do in our counsels.

Do not tell me what a man should do in health or poverty, but show me the way to be either sound or rich. Teach me to master my vices: for it is to no purpose, so long as I am under their government, to tell me what I must do when I am clear of it. In case of an avarice a little eased, a luxury moderated, a temerity restrained, a sluggish humor quickened; precepts will then help us forward, and tutor us how to behave ourselves. It is the first and the main tie of a soldier his military oath, which is an engagement upon him both of religion and honor. In like manner, he that pretends to a happy life must first lay a foundation of virtue, as a bond upon him, to live and die true to that cause. We do not find felicity in the veins of the earth where we dig for gold, nor in the bottom of the sea where we fish for pearls, but in a pure and untainted mind, which, if it were not holy, were not fit to entertain the Deity. “ He that would be truly happy, must think his own lot best, and so live with men, as considering that God sees him, and so speak to God as if men heard him.”

## CHAPTER VI.

## NO FELICITY LIKE PEACE OF CONSCIENCE.

"A GOOD conscience is the testimony of a good life, and the reward of it." This is it that fortifies the mind against fortune, when a man has gotten the mastery of his passions; placed his treasure and security within himself; learned to be content with his condition; and that death is no evil in itself, but only the end of man. He that has dedicated his mind to virtue, and to the good of human society: whereof he is a member, has consummated all that is either profitable or necessary for him to know or to do toward the establishment of his peace. Every man has a judge and a witness within himself of all the good and ill that he does, which inspires us with great thoughts, and administers to us wholesome counsels. We have a veneration for all the works of Nature, the heads of rivers, and the springs of medicinal waters; the horrors of groves and of caves strike us with an impression of religion and worship. To see a man fearless in dangers, untainted with lusts, happy in adversity, composed in a tumult, and laughing at all those things which are generally either coveted or feared; all men must acknowledge that this can be nothing else but a beam of divinity that influences a mortal body. And this is it that carries us to the disquisition of things divine and

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human; what the state of the world was before the distribution of the first matter into parts; what power it was that drew order out of that confusion, and gave laws both to the whole, and to every particle thereof; what that space is beyond the world; and whence proceed the several operations of Nature.

Shall any man see the glory and order of the universe; so many scattered parts and qualities wrought into one mass; such a medley of things, which are yet distinguished: the world enlightened, and the disorders of it so wonderfully regulated; and shall he not consider the Author and Disposer of all this; and whither we ourselves shall go, when our souls shall be delivered from the slavery of our flesh? The whole creation we see conforms to the dictates of Providence, and follows God both as a governor and as a guide. A great, a good, and a right mind, is a kind of divinity lodged in flesh, and may be the blessing of a slave as well as of a prince; it came from heaven, and to heaven it must return; and it is a kind of heavenly felicity, which a pure and virtuous mind enjoys, in some degree, even upon earth: whereas temples of honor are but empty names, which, probably, owe their beginning either to ambition or to violence.

I am strangely transported with the thoughts of eternity; nay, with the belief of it; for I have a profound veneration for the opinions of great men, especially when they promise things so much to my satisfaction: for they do promise them, though they do not prove them. In the question of the immortality of the soul, it goes very far with me, a general consent to the opinion of a future reward and punishment; which meditation raises me to the con-

tempt of this life, in hopes of a better. But still, though we know that we have a soul; yet what the soul is, how, and from whence, we are utterly ignorant: this only we understand, that all the good and ill we do is under the dominion of the mind; that a clear conscience states us in an inviolable peace; and that the greatest blessing in Nature is that which every honest man may bestow upon himself. The body is but the clog and prisoner of the mind; tossed up and down, and persecuted with punishments, violences, and diseases; but the mind itself is sacred and eternal, and exempt from the danger of all actual impression.

Provided that we look to our consciences, no matter for opinion: let me deserve well, though I hear ill. The common people take stomach and audacity for the marks of magnanimity and honor; and if a man be soft and modest, they look upon him as an easy fop; but when they come once to observe the dignity of his mind in the equality and firmness of his actions; and that his external quiet is founded upon an internal peace, the very same people who have him in esteem and admiration; for there is no man but approves of virtue, though but few pursue it; we see where it is, but we dare not venture to come at it: and the reason is, we overvalue that which we must quit to obtain it.

A good conscience fears no witnesses, but a guilty conscience is solicitous even of solitude. If we do nothing but what is honest, let all the world know it; but if otherwise, what does it signify to have nobody else know it, so long as I know it myself? Miserable is he that slighteth that witness! Wickedness, it is true, may escape the law, but not the conscience; for a private conviction is the first and the

greatest punishment to offenders; so that sin plagues itself; and the fear of vengeance pursues even those that escape the stroke of it. It were ill for good men that iniquity may so easily evade the law, the judge, and the execution, if Nature had not set up torments and gibbets in the consciences of transgressors. He that is guilty lives in perpetual terror; and while he expects to be punished, he punishes himself; and whosoever deserves it expects it. What if he be not detected? he is still in apprehension yet that he may be so. His sleeps are painful, and never secure; and he cannot speak of another man's wickedness without thinking of his own, whereas a good conscience is a continual feast.

Those are the only certain and profitable delights, which arise from the consciousness of a well-acted life; no matter for noise abroad, so long as we are quiet within: but if our passions be seditious, that is enough to keep us waking without any other tumult. It is not the posture of the body, or the composure of the bed, that will give rest to an uneasy mind: there is an impatient sloth that may be roused by action, and the vices of laziness must be cured by business. True happiness is not to be found in excesses of wine, or of women, or in the largest prodigalities of fortune; what she has given to me, she may take away, but she shall not tear it from me; and, so long as it does not grow to me, I can part with it without pain. He that would perfectly know himself, let him set aside his money, his fortune, his dignity, and examine himself naked, without being put to learn from others the knowledge of himself.

It is dangerous for a man too suddenly, or too easily, to believe himself. Wherefore let us examine,

observe, and inspect our own hearts, for we ourselves are our own greatest flatterers: we should every night call ourselves to account, "What infirmity have I mastered to-day? what passion opposed? what temptation resisted? what virtue acquired?" Our vices will abate of themselves, if they be brought every day to the shrift. Oh the blessed sleep that follows such a diary! Oh the tranquillity, liberty, and greatness of that mind that is a spy upon itself, and a private censor of its own manners! It is my custom (says our author) every night, so soon as the candle is out, to run over all the words and actions of the past day; and I let nothing escape me; for why should I fear the sight of my own errors, when I can admonish and forgive myself? "I was a little too hot in such a dispute: my opinion might have been as well spared, for it gave offence, and did no good at all. The thing was true, but all truths are not to be spoken at all times; I would I had held my tongue, for there is no contending either with fools or our superiors. I have done ill, but it shall be so no more." If every man would but thus look into himself, it would be the better for us all. What can be more reasonable than this daily review of a life that we cannot warrant for a moment? Our fate is set, and the first breath we draw is only the first motion toward our last: one cause depends upon another; and the course of all things, public and private, is but a long connection of providential appointments. There is a great variety in our lives, but all tends to the same issue. Nature may use her own bodies as she pleases; but a good man has this consolation, that nothing perishes which he can call his own. It is a great comfort that we are only condemned to the same fate with

the universe; the heavens themselves are mortal as well as our bodies; Nature has made us passive, and to suffer is our lot. While we are in flesh, every man has his chain and his clog, only it is looser and lighter to one man than to another; and he is more at ease that takes it up and carries it, than he that drags it. We are born, to lose and to perish, to hope and to fear, to vex ourselves and others; and there is no antidote against a common calamity but virtue; for “the foundation of true joy is in the conscience.”

## CHAPTER VII.

A GOOD MAN CAN NEVER BE MISERABLE, NOR A WICKED MAN HAPPY.

THERE is not in the scale of nature a more inseparable connection of cause and effect, than in the case of happiness and virtue; nor anything that more naturally produces the one, or more necessarily presupposes the other. For what is it to be happy, but for a man to content himself with his lot, in a cheerful and quiet resignation to the appointments of God? All the actions of our lives ought to be governed with respect to good and evil: and it is only reason that distinguishes; by which reason we are in such manner influenced, as if a ray of the Divinity were dipt in a mortal body, and that is the perfection of mankind. It is true, we have not the eyes of eagles or the sagacity of hounds: nor if we had, could we pretend to value ourselves upon anything which we have in common with brutes. What are we the better for that which is foreign to us, and may be given and taken away? As the beams of the sun irradiate the earth, and yet remain where they were; so is it in some proportion with a holy mind that illustrates all our actions, and yet it adheres to its original. Why do we not as well commend a horse for his glorious trappings, as a man for his pompous additions? How much a braver

creature is a lion, (which by nature ought to be fierce and terrible) how much braver (I say) in his natural horror than in his chains? so that everything in its pure nature pleases us best. It is not health, nobility, riches, that can justify a wicked man: nor is it the want of all these that can discredit a good one. That is the sovereign blessing, which makes the possessor of it valuable without anything else, and him that wants it contemptible, though he had all the world besides. It is not the painting, gilding, or carving, that makes a good ship; but if she be a nimble sailer, tight and strong to endure the seas; that is her excellency. It is the edge and temper of the blade that makes a good sword, not the richness of the scabbard: and so it is not money or possessions, that makes a man considerable, but his virtue.

It is every man's duty to make himself profitable to mankind—if he can, to many—if not, to fewer—if not so neither, to his neighbor—but, however, to himself. There are two republics: a great one, which is human nature; and a less, which is the place where we were born. Some serve both at a time, some only the greater, and some again only the less. The greater may be served in privacy, solitude, contemplation, and perchance that way better than any other; but it was the intent of Nature, however, that we should serve both. A good man may serve the public, his friend, and himself in any station: if he be not for the sword, let him take the gown; if the bar does not agree with him, let him try the pulpit; if he be silenced abroad, let him give counsel at home, and discharge the part of a faithful friend and a temperate companion. When he is no longer a citizen, he is yet a man; but the

whole world is his country, and human nature never wants matter to work upon: but if nothing will serve a man in the *civil government* unless he be *prime minister*, or in the *field* but to *command in chief*, it is his own fault.

The common soldier where he cannot use his hands, fights with his looks, his example, his encouragement, his voice, and stands his ground even when he has lost his hands, and does service too with his very clamor, so that in any condition whatsoever, he still discharges the duty of a good patriot—nay, he that spends his time well even in a retirement, gives a great example.

We may enlarge, indeed, or contract, according to the circumstances of time, place, or abilities; but above all things we must be sure to keep ourselves in action, for he that is slothful is dead even while he lives. Was there ever any state so desperate as that of Athens under the thirty tyrants—where it was capital to be honest, and the senate-house was turned into a college of hangmen? Never was any government so wretched and so hopeless; and yet Socrates at the same time preached *temperance* to the *tyrants*, and courage to the rest, and afterwards died an eminent example of faith and resolution, and a sacrifice for the common good.

It is not for a wise man to stand shifting and fencing with fortune, but to oppose her barefaced, for he is sufficiently convinced that she can do him no hurt; she may take away his servants, possessions, dignity, assault his body, put out his eyes, cut off his hands, and strip him of all the external comforts of life. But what does all this amount to more than the recalling of a trust which he has received, with condition to deliver it up again upon

demand? He looks upon himself as precarious, and only lent to himself, and yet he does not value himself ever the less because he is not his own, but takes such care as an honest man should do of a thing that is committed to him in trust. Whensover he that lent me myself and what I have, shall call for all back again, it is not a loss but a restitution, and I must willingly deliver up what most undeservedly was bestowed upon me, and it will become me to return my mind better than I received it.

Demetrius, upon the taking of Megara, asked Stilpo, the philosopher what he had lost. "Nothing" said he, "for I had all that I could call my own about me." And yet the enemy had then made himself master of his patrimony, his chiidren, and his country; but these he looked upon as only adventitious goods, and under the command of fortune. Now, he that neither lost any thing nor feared any thing in a public ruin, but was safe and at peace in the middle of the flames, and in the heat of a mili-tary intemperance and fury—what violence or pro-vocation imaginable can put such a man as this out of the possession of himself? Walls and castles may be mined and battered, but there is no art or engine that can subvert a steady mind. "I have made my way," says Stilpo, "through fire and blood — what has become of my child-ren I know not; but these are transitory bles-sings, and servants that are bound to change their masters; what was my own before is my own still. Some have lost their estates, others their dear-bought mistresses, their commissions and offices: the usurers have lost their bonds and securities: but, Demetrius, for my part I have saved all, and do not

imagine after all this, either that Demetrius is a conqueror, or that Stilpo is overcome—it is only thy fortune has been too hard for mine."

Alexander took Babylon, Scipio took Carthage, the capitol was burnt; but there is no fire or violence that can discompose a generous mind; and let us not take this character either for a chimera, for all ages afford some, though not many, instances of this elevated virtue.

A good man does his duty, let it be never so painful, so hazardous, or never so great a loss to him; and it is not all the money, the power, and the pleasure in the world; not any force of necessity, that can make him wicked: he considers what he is to do, not what he is to suffer, and will keep on his course, though there should be nothing but gibbets and torments in the way. And in this instance of Stilpo, who, when he had lost his country, his wife, his children, the town on fire over his head, himself escaping very hardly and naked out of the flames; "I have saved all my goods," says he, "my justice, my courage, my temperance, my prudence;" accounting nothing his own, or valuable, and showing how much easier it was to overcome a nation than one wise man. It is a certain mark of a brave mind not to be moved by any accidents: the upper region of the air admits neither clouds nor tempests; the thunder, storms, and meteors, are formed below; and this is the difference betwixt a mean and an exalted mind; the former is rude and tumultuary; the latter is modest, venerable, composed, and always quiet in its station. In brief, it is the conscience that pronounces upon the man whether he be happy or miserable. But, though sacrilege and adultery be generally condemned, how many are there still that do

not so much as blush at the one, and in truth that take a glory in the other? For nothing is more common than for great thieves to ride in triumph when the little ones are punished. But let “wickedness escape as it may at the bar, it never fails of doing justice upon itself; for every guilty person is his own hangman.”

## CHAPTER VIII

THE DUE CONTEMPLATION OF DIVINE PROVIDENCE IS THE CERTAIN CURE OF ALL MISFORTUNES.

WHOEVER observes the world, and the order of it, will find all the motions in it to be only vicissitudes of falling and rising; nothing extinguished, and even those things which seem to us to perish are in truth but changed. The seasons go and return, day and night follow in their courses, the heavens roll, and Nature goes on with her work: all things succeed in their turns, storms and calms; the law of Nature will have it so, which we must follow and obey, accounting all things that are done to be well done; so that what we cannot mend we must suffer, and wait upon Providence without repining. It is the part of a cowardly soldier to follow his commander groaning: but a generous man delivers himself up to God without struggling; and it is only for a narrow mind to condemn the order of the world, and to propound rather the mending of Nature than of himself. No man has any cause of complaint against Providence, if that which is right pleases him. Those glories that appear fair to the eye, their lustre is but false and superficial; and they are only vanity and delusion: they are rather the goods of a dream than a substantial possession: they may cozen us at a distance, but bring them once to the touch, they are rotten and counterfeit. There are no

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greater wretches in the world than many of those which the people take to be happy. Those are the only true and incorruptible comforts that will abide all trials, and the more we turn and examine them, the more valuable we find them; and the greatest felicity of all is, not to stand in need of any. What is *poverty*? No man lives so poor as he was born. What is *pain*? It will either have an end itself, or make an end of us. In short, Fortune has no weapon that reaches the mind: but the bounties of Providence are certain and permanent blessings; and they are the greater and the better, the longer we consider them; that is to say, "the power of contemning things terrible, and despising what the common people covet." In the very methods of Nature we cannot but observe the regard that Providence had to the good of mankind, even in the disposition of the world, in providing so amply for our maintenance and satisfaction. It is not possible for us to comprehend what the Power is which has made all things: some few sparks of that Divinity are discovered, but infinitely the greater part of it lies hid. We are all of us, however, thus far agreed, first, in the acknowledgement and belief of that almighty Being; and, secondly, that we are to ascribe to it all majesty and goodness.

"If there be a Providence," say some, "how comes it to pass that good men labor under affliction and adversity, and wicked men enjoy themselves in ease and plenty?" My answer is, that God deals by us as a good father does by his children; he tries us, he hardens us, and fits us for himself. He keeps a strict hand over those that he loves; and by the rest he does as we do by our slaves; he lets them go on in license and boldness.

**833** As the master gives his most hopeful scholars the hardest lessons, so does God deal with the most generous spirits; and the cross encounters of fortune we are not to look upon as a cruelty, but as a contest: the familiarity of dangers brings us to the contempt of them, and that part is strongest which is most exercised: the seaman's hand is callous, the soldier's arm is strong, and the tree that is most exposed to the wind takes the best root: there are people that live in a perpetual winter, in extremity of frost and penury, where a cave, a lock of straw, or a few leaves, is all their covering, and wild beasts their nourishment; all this by custom is not only made tolerable, but when it is once taken up upon necessity, by little and little, it becomes pleasant to them. Why should we then count that condition of life a calamity which is the lot of many nations? There is no state of life so miserable but that there are in it remissions, diversions, nay, and delights too; such is the benignity of Nature towards us, even in the severest accidents of human life. There were no living if adversity should hold on as it begins, and keep up the force of the first impression. We are apt to murmur at many things as great evils, that have nothing at all of evil in them besides the complaint, which we should more reasonably take up against ourselves. If I be sick, it is part of my fate; and for other calamities, they are usual things; they ought to be; nay, which is more, they must be, for they come by divine appointment. So that we should not only submit to God, but assent to him, and obey him out of *duty*, even if there were no *necessity*. All those terrible appearances that make us groan and tremble are but the tribute of life; we are neither to

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wish, nor to ask, nor to hope to escape them; for it is a kind of dishonesty to pay a tribute unwillingly. Am I troubled with the stone, or afflicted with continual losses? nay, is my body in danger? All this is no more than what I prayed for when I prayed for old age. All these things are as familiar in a long life, as dust and dirt in a long way. Life is a warfare; and what brave man would not rather choose to be in a tent than in shambles? Fortune does like a swordsman, she scorns to encounter a fearful man: there is no honor in the victory where there is no danger in the way to it; she tries Mucius by *fire*; Rutilius by *exile*; Socrates by *poison*; Cato by *death*.

It is only in adverse fortune, and in bad times, that we find great examples. Mucius thought himself happier with his hand in the flame, than if it had been in the bosom of his mistress. Fabricius took more pleasure in eating the roots of his own planting than in all the delicacies of luxury and expense. Shall we call Rutilius miserable, whom his very enemies have adored? who, upon a glorious and a public principle, chose rather to lose his country than to return from banishment? the only man that denied any thing to Sylla the dictator, who recalled him. Nor did he only refuse to come, but drew himself further off: "Let them," says he, "that think banishment a misfortune, live slaves at Rome, under the imperial cruelties of Sylla: he that sets a price upon the heads of senators; and after a law of his own institution against cut-throats, becomes the greatest himself." Is it not better for a man to live in exile abroad than to be massacred at home? In suffering for virtue, it is not the torment but the cause, that we are to consider; and the more pain, the more renown. When any hardship befalls us,

we must look upon it as an act of Providence, which many times suffers particulars to be wounded for the conservation of the whole: beside that, God chastises some people under an appearance of blessing them, turning their prosperity to their ruin as a punishment for abusing his goodness. And we are further to consider, that many a good man is afflicted, only to teach others to suffer; for we are born for example; and likewise that where men are contumacious and refractory, it pleases God many times to cure greater evils by less, and to turn our miseries to our advantage.

How many casualties and difficulties are there that we dread as insupportable mischiefs, which, upon farther thoughts, we find to be mercies and benefits? as banishment, poverty, loss of relations, sickness, disgrace. Some are cured by the lance; by fire, hunger, thirst; taking out of bones, lopping off limbs, and the like: nor do we only fear things that are many times beneficial to us; but, on the other side, we hanker after and pursue things that are deadly and pernicious: we are poisoned in the very pleasure of our luxury, and betrayed to a thousand diseases by the indulging of our palate. To lose a child or a limb, is only to part with what we have received, and Nature may do what she pleases with her own. We are frail ourselves, and we have received things transitory—that which was given us may be taken away—calamity tries virtue as the fire does gold, nay, he that lives most at ease is only delayed, not dismissed, and his portion is to come. When we are visited with sickness or other afflictions we are not to murmur as if we were ill used—it is a mark of the general's esteem when he

puts us upon a post of danger: we do not say “My captain uses me ill,” but “he does me honor;” and so should we say that are commanded to encounter difficulties, for this is our case with God Almighty:

What was Regulus the worse, because Fortune made choice of him for an eminent instance both of faith and patience? He was thrown into a case of wood stuck with pointed nails, so that which way soever he turned his body, it rested upon his wounds; his eyelids were cut off to keep him waking; and yet Mecænas was not happier upon his *bed* than Regulus upon his *torments*. Nay, the world is not yet grown so wicked as not to prefer Regulus before Mecænas: and can any man take that to be an evil of which Providence accounted this brave man worthy? “It has pleased God,” says he, “to single me out for an experiment of the force of human nature.” No man knows his own strength or value but by being put to the proof. The pilot is tried in a storm; the soldier in a battle; the rich man knows not how to behave himself in poverty: he that has lived in popularity and applause, knows not how he would bear infamy and reproach: nor he that never had children how he would bear the loss of them. Calamity is the occasion of virtue, and a spur to a great mind. The very apprehension of a wound startles a man when he first bears arms; but an old soldier bleeds boldly, because he knows that a man may lose blood, and yet win the day. Nay, many times a calamity turns to our advantage; and great ruins have but made way to greater glories. The crying out of *fire* has many times quieted a fray, and the interposing of a wild beast has parted the thief and the traveller; for we are not at leisure for

less mischiefs while we are under the apprehensions of greater. One man's life is saved by a disease: another is arrested, and taken out of the way, just when his house was falling upon his head.

To show now that the favors or the crosses of fortune, and the accidents of sickness and of health, are neither good nor evil, God permits them indifferently both to good and evil men. "It is hard," you will say, "for a virtuous man to suffer all sorts of misery, and for a wicked man not only to go free, but to enjoy himself at pleasure." And is it not the same thing for men of prostituted impudence and wickedness to sleep in a whole skin, when men of honor and honesty bear arms; lie in the trenches, and receive wounds? or for the vestal virgins to rise in the night to their prayers, when common strumpets lie stretching themselves in their beds? We should rather say with Demetrius, "If I had known the will of Heaven before I was called to it, I would have offered myself." If it be the pleasure of God to take my children, I have brought them up to that end: if my fortune, any part of my body, or my life, I would rather present it than yield it up: I am ready to part with all, and to suffer all; for I know that nothing comes to pass but what God appoints: our fate is decreed, and things do not so much happen, as in their due time proceed, and every man's portion of joy and sorrow is predetermined.

There is nothing falls amiss to a good man that can be charged upon Providence; for wicked actions, lewd thoughts, ambitious projects, blind lusts, and insatiable avarice—against all these he is armed by the benefit of reason: and do we expect now that God should look to our luggage too? (I mean our

bodies.) Demetrius discharged himself of his treasure as the clog and burden of his mind: shall we wonder then if God suffers that to befall a good man which a good man sometimes does to himself? I lose a son, and why not, when it may sometimes so fall out that I myself may kill him? Suppose he be banished by an order of state, is it not the same thing with a man's voluntarily leaving his country never to return? Many afflictions may befall a good man, but no evil, for contraries will never incorporate—all the rivers in the world are never able to change the taste or quality of the sea. Prudence and religion are above accidents, and draw good out of every thing—affliction keeps a man in use, and makes him strong, patient, and hardy. Providence treats us like a generous father, and brings us up to labors, toils, and dangers; whereas the indulgence of a fond mother makes us weak and spiritless.

God loves us with a masculine love, and turns us loose to injuries and indignities: he takes delight to see a brave and a good man wrestling with evil fortune, and yet keeping himself upon his legs, when the whole world is in disorder about him. And are not we ourselves delighted, to see a bold fellow press with his lance upon a boar or lion? and the constancy and resolution of the action is the grace and dignity of the spectacle. No man can be happy that does not stand firm against all contingencies; and say to himself in all extremities, "I should have been content, if it might have been so or so, but since it is otherwise determined, God will provide better." The more we struggle with our necessities, we draw the knot the harder, and the worse it is with us: and the more a bird flaps and flutters in

the snare, the surer she is caught: so that the best way is to submit and lie still, under this double consideration, that “the proceedings of God are unquestionable, and his decrees are not to be resisted.”

## CHAPTER IX.

## OF LEVITY OF MIND, AND OTHER IMPEDIMENTS OF A HAPPY LIFE.

Now, to sum up what is already delivered, we have showed what happiness is, and wherein it consists: that it is founded upon wisdom and virtue; for we must first know what we ought to do, and then live according to that knowledge. We have also discoursed the helps of philosophy and precept toward a *happy life*; the blessing of a good conscience; that a good man can never be miserable, nor a wicked man happy; nor any man unfortunate that cheerfully submits to Providence. We shall now examine, how it comes to pass that, when the certain way to happiness lies so fair before us, men will yet steer their course on the other side, which as manifestly leads to ruin.

There are some that live without any design at all, and only pass in the world like straws upon a river; they do not go, but they are carried. Others only deliberate upon the parts of life, and not upon the whole, which is a great error: for there is no disposing of the circumstances of it, unless we first propound the main scope. How shall any man take his aim without a mark? or what wind will serve him that is not yet resolved upon his port? We live as it were by chance, and by chance we are governed. Some there are that torment themselves

afresh with the memory of what is past: "Lord! what did I endure? never was any man in my condition; everybody gave me over; my very heart was ready to break," etc. Others, again, afflict themselves with the apprehension of evils to come; and very ridiculously: for the *one* does not *now* concern us, and the *other* not *yet*: beside that, there may be remedies for mischiefs likely to happen; for they give us warning by signs and symptoms of their approach. Let him that would be quiet take heed not to provoke men that are in power, but live without giving offence; and if we cannot make all great men our friends, it will suffice to keep them from being our enemies. This is a thing we must avoid, as a mariner would do a storm.

A rash seaman never considers what wind blows, or what course he steers, but runs at a venture, as if he would brave the rocks and the eddies; whereas he that is careful and considerate, informs himself beforehand where the danger lies, and what weather it is like to be: he consults his compass, and keeps aloof from those places that are infamous for wrecks and miscarriages; so does a wise man in the common business of life; he keeps out of the way from those that may do him hurt: but it is a point of prudence not to let them take notice that he does it on purpose; for that which a man shuns he tacitly condemns. Let him have a care also of *listeners*, *newsmongers*, and *meddlers* in other people's matters; for their discourse is commonly of such things as are never profitable, and most commonly dangerous either to be spoken or heard.

Levity of mind is a great hindrance of repose, and the very change of wickedness is an addition to the wickedness itself; for it is inconstancy added to

iniquity; we relinquish the thing we sought, and then we take it up again; and so divide our lives between our lust and our repentances. From one appetite we pass to another, not so much upon choice as for change; and there is a check of conscience that casts a damp upon all our unlawful pleasures, which makes us lose the day in expectation of the night, and the night itself for fear of the approaching light.

Some people are *never* at quiet, others are *always* so, and they are both to blame: for that which looks like vivacity and industry in the one is only a restlessness and agitation; and that which passes in the other for moderation and reserve is but a drowsy and unactive sloth. Let motion and rest both take their turns, according to the order of Nature, which makes both the day and the night. Some are perpetually shifting from one thing to another; others, again, make their whole life but a kind of uneasy sleep: some lie tossing and turning until very weariness brings them to rest; others, again, I cannot so properly call inconstant as lazy. There are many proprieties and diversities of vice; but it is one never-failing effect of it to live displeased. We do all of us labor under inordinate desires; we are either timorous, and dare not venture, or venturing we do not succeed; or else we cast ourselves upon uncertain hopes, where we are perpetually solicitous, and in suspense. In this distraction we are apt to propose to ourselves things dishonest and hard; and when we have taken great pains to no purpose, we come then to repent of our undertakings: we are afraid to go on, and we can neither master our appetites nor obey them: we live and die restless and irresolute; and, which is worst of all,

when we grow weary of the public, and betake ourselves to solitude for relief, our minds are sick and wallowing, and the very house and walls are troublesome to us; we grow impatient and ashamed of ourselves, and suppress our inward vexation until it breaks our heart for want of vent. This is it that makes us sour and morose, envious of others, and dissatisfied with ourselves; until at last, betwixt our troubles for other people's successes and the despair of our own, we fall foul upon Fortune and the times, and get into a corner perhaps, where we sit brooding over our own disquiets. In these dispositions there is a kind of purgatorial fancy, that makes some people take delight in labor and uneasiness, like the clawing of an itch until the blood starts.

This is it that puts us upon rambling voyages; one while by land; but still disgusted with the present: the town pleases us to-day, the country to-morrow: the splendors of the court at one time, the horrors of a wilderness at another, but all this while we carry our plague about us; for it is not the place we are weary of, but ourselves. Nay, our weakness extends to everything; for we are impatient equally of toil and of pleasure. This trotting of the ring, and only treading the same steps over and over again, has made many a man lay violent hands upon himself. It must be the change of the mind, not of the climate, that will remove the heaviness of the heart; our vices go along with us, and we carry in ourselves the causes of our disquiets. There is a great weight lies upon us, and the bare shocking of it makes it the more uneasy; changing of countries, in this case, is not travelling, but wandering. We must keep on our course, if we would gain our journey's end. "He that cannot live happily any-

where, will live happily nowhere." What is a man the better for travelling? as if his cares could not find him out wherever he goes? Is there any retiring from the fear of death, or of torments? or from those difficulties which beset a man wherever he is? It is only philosophy that makes the mind invincible, and places us out of the reach of fortune, so that all her arrows fall short of us. This it is that reclaims the rage of our lusts, and sweetens the anxiety of our fears. Frequent changing of places or councils, shows an instability of mind; and we must fix the body before we can fix the soul. We can hardly stir abroad, or look about us, without encountering something or other that revives our appetites. As he that would cast off an unhappy love avoids whatsoever may put him in mind of the person, so he that would wholly deliver himself from his beloved lusts must shun all objects that may put them in his head again, and remind him of them. We travel, as children run up and down after strange sights, for novelty, not profit; we return neither the better nor the sounder; nay, and the very agitation hurts us. We learn to call towns and places by their names, and to tell stories of mountains and of rivers; but had not our time been better spent in the study of wisdom and of virtue? in the learning of what is already discovered, and in the quest of things not yet found out? If a man break his leg, or strain his ankle, he sends presently for a surgeon to set all right again, and does not take horse upon it, or put himself on ship-board; no more does the change of place work upon our disordered minds than upon our bodies. It is not the place, I hope, that makes either an orator or a physician. Will any man ask upon the road, Pray, which is the way to prudence, to jus-

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tice, to temperance, to fortitude? No matter whither any man goes that carries his affections along with him. He that would make his travels delightful must make himself a temperate companion.

A great traveller was complaining that he was never the better for his travels; "That is very true," said Socrates, "because you travelled with yourself." Now, had not he better have made himself another man than to transport himself to another place? It is no matter what manners we find anywhere; so long as we carry our own. But we have all of us a natural curiosity of seeing fine sights, and of making new discoveries, turning over antiquities, learning the customs of nations, etc. We are never quiet; to-day we seek an office, to-morrow we are sick of it. We divide our lives betwixt a dislike of the present and a desire of the future: but he that lives as he should, orders himself so, as neither to fear nor to wish for to-morrow; if it comes, it is welcome; but if not, there is nothing lost; for that which is come, is but the same over again with what is past. As levity is a pernicious enemy to quiet, so pertinacity is a great one too. The one changes nothing, the other sticks to nothing; and which of the two is the worse, may be a question. It is many times seen, that we beg earnestly for those things, which, if they were offered us, we would refuse; and it is but just to punish this easiness of asking with an equal facility of granting. There are some things we would be thought to desire, which we are so far from desiring that we dread them. "I shall tire you," says one, in the middle of a tedious story. "Nay, pray be pleased to go on," we cry, though we wish his tongue out at half-way: nay, we do not deal candidly even

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with God himself. We should say to ourselves in these cases, "This I have drawn upon myself. I could never be quiet until I had gotten this woman, this place, this estate, this honor, and now see what is come of it."

One sovereign remedy against all misfortunes is constancy of mind: the changing of parties and countenances looks as if a man were driven with the wind. Nothing can be above him that is above fortune. It is not violence, reproach, contempt, or whatever else from without, that can make a wise man quit his ground: but he is proof against calamities, both great and small: only our error is, that what we cannot do ourselves, we think nobody else can; so that we judge of the wise by the measures of the weak. Place me among princes or among beggars, the one shall not make me proud, nor the other ashamed. I can take as sound a sleep in a barn as in a palace, and a bundle of hay makes me as good a lodging as a bed of down. Should every day succeed to my wish, it should not transport me; nor would I think myself miserable if I should not have one quiet hour in my life. I will not transport myself with either pain or pleasure; but yet for all that, I could wish that I had an easier game to play, and that I were put rather to moderate my joys than my sorrows. If I were an imperial prince, I had rather take than be taken; and yet I would bear the same mind under the chariot of my conqueror that I had in my own. It is no great matter to trample upon those things that are most coveted or feared by the common people. There are those that will laugh upon the wheel, and cast themselves upon a certain death, only upon a transport of love, perhaps anger, avarice, or revenge; how much more then upon an

instinct of virtue, which is invincible and steady! If a short obstinacy of mind can do this, how much more shall a composed and deliberate virtue, whose force is equal and perpetual.

To secure ourselves in this world, first, we must aim at nothing that men count worth the wrangling for. Secondly, we must not value the possession of any thing which even a common thief would think worth the stealing. A man's body is no booty. Let the way be never so dangerous for robberies, the poor and the naked pass quietly. A plain-dealing sincerity of manners makes a man's life happy, even in despite of scorn and contempt, which is every clear man's fate. But we had better yet be contemned for simplicity than lie perpetually upon the torture of a counterfeit; provided that care be taken not to confound simplicity with negligence; and it is, moreover, an uneasy life that of a disguise; for a man to seem to be what he is not, to keep a perpetual guard upon himself, and to live in fear of a discovery. He takes every man that looks upon him for a spy, over and above the trouble of being put to play another man's part. It is a good remedy in some cases for a man to apply himself to civil affairs and public business; and yet, in this state of life too, what betwixt ambition and calumny, it is hardly safe to be honest. There are, indeed, some cases wherein a wise man will give way; but let him not yield over easily neither; if he marches off, let him have a care of his honor, and make his retreat with his sword in his hand, and his face to the enemy. Of all others, a studious life is the least tiresome: it makes us easy to ourselves and to others, and gains us both friends and reputation.

## CHAPTER X.

HE THAT SETS UP HIS REST UPON CONTINGENCIES SHALL NEVER BE QUIET.

NEVER pronounce any man happy that depends upon fortune for his happiness; for nothing can be more preposterous than to place the good of a reasonable creature in unreasonable things. If I have lost any thing, it was adventitious; and the less money, the less trouble; the less favor, the less envy; nay, even in those cases that put us out of their wits, it is not the loss itself, but the opinion of the loss, that troubles us. It is a common mistake to account those things necessary that are superfluous, and to depend upon fortune for the felicity of life, which arises only from virtue. There is no trusting to her smiles; the sea swells and rages in a moment, and the ships are swallowed at night, in the very place where they sported themselves in the morning. And fortune has the same power over princes that it has over empires, over nations that it has over cities, and the same power over cities that it has over private men. Where is that estate that may not be followed upon the heel with famine and beggary? that dignity which the next moment may not be laid in the dust? that kingdom that is secure from desolation and ruin? The period of all things is at hand, as well that which casts out the fortunate as the other that delivers the unhappy;

and that which may fall out at any time may fall out this very day. What *shall* come to pass I know not, but what *may* come to pass I know: so that I will despair of nothing, but expect everything; and whatsoever Providence remits is clear gain. Every moment, if it spares me, deceives me; and yet in some sort it does not deceive me; for though I know that any thing may happen, yet I know likewise that everything will not. I will hope the best, and provide for the worst. Methinks we should not find so much fault with Fortune for her inconstancy when we ourselves suffer a change every moment that we live; only other changes make more noise, and this steals upon us like the shadow upon a dial, every jot as certainly, but more insensibly.

The burning of Lyons may serve to show us that we are never safe, and to arm us against all surprises. The terror of it must needs be great, for the calamity is almost without example. If it had been fired by an enemy, the flame would have left some further mischief to have been done by the soldiers; but to be wholly consumed, we have not heard of many earthquakes so pernicious: so many rarities to be destroyed in one night; and in the depth of peace to suffer an outrage beyond the extremity of war; who would believe it? but twelve hours betwixt so fair a city and none at all! It was laid in ashes in less time than it would require to tell the story.

To stand unshaken in such a calamity is hardly to be expected, and our wonder can but be equal to our grief. Let this accident teach us to provide against all possibilities that fall within the power of fortune. All external things are under her dominion: one while she calls our hands to her assistance; another

while she contents herself with her own force, and destroys us with mischiefs of which we cannot find the author. No time, place, or condition, is excepted; she makes our very pleasures painful to us; she makes war upon us in the depth of peace, and turns the means of our security into an occasion of fear; she turns a friend into an enemy, and makes a foe of a companion; we suffer the effects of war without any adversary; and rather than fail, our felicity shall be the cause of our destruction. Lest we should either forget or neglect her power, every day produces something extraordinary. She persecutes the most temperate with sickness, the strongest constitutions with the phthisis; she brings the innocent to punishment, and the most retired she assaults with tumults. Those glories that have grown up with many ages, with infinite labor and expense, and under the favor of many auspicious providences, one day scatters and brings to nothing. He that pronounced a day, nay, an hour, sufficient for the destruction of the greatest empire, might have fallen to a moment.

It were some comfort yet to the frailty of mankind and of human affairs, if things might but decay as slowly as they rise; but they grow by degrees, and they fall to ruin in an instant. There is no felicity in anything either private or public; men, nations, and cities, have all their fates and periods; our very entertainments are not without terror, and our calamity rises there where we least expect it. Those kingdoms that stood the shock both of foreign wars and civil, come to destruction without the sight of an enemy. Nay, we are to dread our peace and felicity more than violence, because we are here taken unprovided; unless in a state of peace we do the

duty of men in war, and say to ourselves, *Whatsoever may be, will be.* I am to-day safe and happy in the love of my country; I am to-morrow banished: to-day in pleasure, peace, health; to-morrow broken upon a wheel, led in triumph, and in the agony of sickness. Let us therefore prepare for a shipwreck in the port, and for a tempest in a calm. One violence drives me from my country, another ravishes that from me; and that very place where a man can hardly pass this day for a crowd may be to-morrow a desert. Wherefore let us set before our eyes the whole condition of human nature, and consider as well what *may* happen as what commonly *does*. The way to make future calamities easy to us in the sufferance, is to make them familiar to us in the contemplation. How many cities in Asia, Achaia, Assyria, Macedonia, have been swallowed up by earthquakes? nay, whole countries are lost, and large provinces laid under water; but time brings all things to an end; for all the works of mortals are mortal; all possessions and their possessors are uncertain and perishable; and what wonder is it to lose anything at any time, when we must one day lose all?

That which we call our own is but lent us; and what we have received *gratis* we must return without complaint. That which Fortune gives us this hour she may take away the next; and he that trusts to her favors, shall either find himself deceived, or if he be not, he will at least be troubled, because he may be so. There is no defence in walls, fortifications, and engines, against the power of fortune; we must provide ourselves within, and when we are safe there, we are invincible; we may be battered, but not taken. She throws her gifts among us, and we sweat and scuffle for them: never considering how

few are the better for that which is expected by all. Some are transported with what they get; others tormented for what they miss; and many times there is a leg or an arm broken in a contest for a counter. She gives us honors, riches, favors, only to take them away again, either by violence or treachery: so that they frequently turn to the damage of the receiver. She throws out baits for us, and sets traps as we do for birds and beasts; her bounties are snares and lime-twigs to us; we think that we take, but we are taken. If they had any thing in them that was substantial, they would some time or other fill and quiet us; but they serve only to provoke our appetite without anything more than pomp and show to allay it. But the best of it is, if a man cannot mend his fortune, he may yet mend his manners, and put himself so far out of her reach, that whether she gives or takes, it shall be all one to us; for we are neither the greater for the one, nor the less for the other. We call this a dark room, or that a light one; when it is in itself neither the one nor the other, but only as the day and the night render it. And so it is in riches, strength of body, beauty, honor, command: and likewise in pain, sickness, banishment, death: which are in themselves middle and indifferent things, and only good or bad as they are influenced by virtue. To weep, lament, and groan, is to renounce our duty; and it is the same weakness on the other side to exult and rejoice. I would rather make my fortune than expect it; being neither depressed with her injuries, nor dazzled with her favors. When Zeno was told, that all his goods were drowned; "Why then," says he, "Fortune has a mind to make me a philosopher." It is a great matter for a man to advance

his mind above her threats or flatteries; for he that has once gotten the better of her is safe forever.

It is some comfort yet to the unfortunate, that great men lie under the lash for company; and that death spares the palace no more than the cottage, and that whoever is above me has a power also above him. Do we not daily see funerals without trouble, princes deposed, countries depopulated, towns sacked; without so much as thinking how soon it may be our own case? whereas, if we would but prepare and arm ourselves against the iniquities of fortune, we should never be surprised.

When we see any man banished, beggared, tortured, we are to account, that though the mischief fell upon another, it was levelled at us. What wonder is it if, of so many thousands of dangers that are constantly hovering about us, one comes to hit us at last? That which befalls any man, may befall every man; and then it breaks the force of a present calamity to provide against the future. Whatsoever our lot is, we must bear it: as suppose it be contumely, cruelty, fire, sword, pains, diseases, or a prey to wild beasts; there is no struggling, nor any remedy but moderation. It is to no purpose to bewail any part of our life, when life itself is miserable throughout; and the whole flux of it only a course of transition from one misfortune to another.

A man may as well wonder that he should be cold in winter, sick at sea, or have his bones clatter together in a wagon, as at the encounter of ill accidents and crosses in the passage of human life; and it is in vain to run away from fortune, as if there were any hiding-place wherein she could not find us; or to expect any quiet from her; for she makes life a perpetual state of war, without so much as any

respite or truce. This we may conclude upon, that her empire is but imaginary, and that whosoever serves her, makes himself a voluntary slave; for “the things that are often contemned by the inconsiderate, and always by the wise, are in themselves neither good nor evil:” as pleasure and pains; prosperity and adversity; which can only operate upon our outward condition, without any proper and necessary effect upon the mind.

## CHAPTER XI.

## A SENSUAL LIFE IS A MISERABLE LIFE.

THE sensuality that we here treat of falls naturally under the head of luxury; which extends to all the excesses of gluttony, lust, effeminacy of manners; and, in short, to whatsoever concerns the over-great care of the carcass.

To begin now with the pleasures of the palate, (which deal with us like Egyptian thieves, that strangle those they embrace), what shall we say of the luxury of Nomentanus and Apicius, that entertained their very souls in the kitchen: they have the choicest music for their ears; the most diverting spectacles for their eyes; the choicest variety of meats and drinks for their palates. What is all this, I say, but a *merry madness?* It is true, they have their delights, but not without heavy and anxious thoughts, even in their very enjoyments, beside that, they are followed with repentance, and their frolics are little more than the laughter of so many people out of their wits. Their felicities are full of disquiet, and neither sincere nor well grounded: but they have need of one pleasure to support another; and of new prayers to forgive the errors of their former. Their life must needs be wretched that get with great pains what they keep with greater.

One diversion overtakes another; hope excites hope; ambition begets ambition; so that they only change the matter of their miseries, without seeking any end of them; and shall never be without either prosperous or unhappy causes of disquiet. What if a body might have all the pleasures in the world for the asking? who would so much unman himself, as by accepting of them, to desert his soul, and become a perpetual slave to his senses? Those false and miserable palates, that judge of meats by the price and difficulty, not by the healthfulness of taste, they vomit that they may eat, and they eat that they may fetch it up again. They cross the seas for rarities, and when they have swallowed them, they will not so much as give them time to digest. Wheresoever Nature has placed men, she has provided them aliment: but we rather choose to irritate hunger by expense than to allay it at an easier rate.

What is it that we plow the seas for; or arm ourselves against men and beasts? To what end do we toil, and labor, and pile bags upon bags? We may enlarge our fortunes, but we cannot our bodies; so that it does but spill and run over, whatsoever we take more than we can hold. Our forefathers (by the force of whose virtues we are now supported in our vices) lived every jot as well as we, when they provided and dressed their own meat with their own hands; lodged upon the ground, and were not as yet come to the vanity of gold and gems; when they swore by their earthen gods, and kept their oath, though they died for it.

Did not our consuls live more happily when they cooked their own meat with those victorious hands that had conquered so many enemies and won so many laurels? Did they not live more happily, I

say, than our Apicius (that corrupter of youth, and plague of the age he lived in) who, after he had spent a prodigious fortune upon his belly, poisoned himself for fear of starving, when he had yet 250,000 crowns in his coffers? which may serve to show us, that it is the mind, and not the sum, that makes any man rich; when Apicius with all his treasure counted himself in a state of beggary, and took poison to avoid that condition, which another would have prayed for. But why do we call it poison, which was the wholesomest draught of his life? His daily gluttony was poison rather, both to himself and others. His ostentation of it was intolerable; and so was the infinite pains he took to mislead others by his example, who went even fast enough of themselves without driving.

It is a shame for a man to place his felicity in those entertainments and appetites that are stronger in brutes. Do not beasts eat with a better stomach? Have they not more satisfaction in their lusts? And they have not only a quicker relish of their pleasures, but they enjoy them without either scandal or remorse. If sensuality were happiness, beasts were happier than men; but human felicity is lodged in the soul, not in the flesh. They that deliver themselves up to luxury are still either tormented with too little, or oppressed with too much; and equally miserable, by being either deserted or overwhelmed: they are like men in a dangerous sea; one while cast a-dry upon a rock, and another while swallowed up in a whirlpool; and all this from the mistake of not distinguishing good from evil. The huntsman, that with which labor and hazard takes a wild beast, runs as great a risk afterwards in the keeping of him; for many times he tears out the throat of his

master; and it is the same thing with inordinate pleasures: the more in number, and the greater they are, the more general and absolute a slave is the servant of them. Let the common people pronounce him as happy as they please, he pays his liberty for his delights, and sells himself for what he buys.

Let any man take a view of our kitchens, the number of our cooks, and the variety of our meats; will he not wonder to see so much provision made for one belly? We have as many diseases as we have cooks or meats; and the service of the appetite is the study now in vogue. To say nothing of our trains of lackeys, and our troops of caterers and sewers: Good God! that ever one belly should employ so many people! How nauseous and fulsome are the surfeits that follow these excesses? Simple meats are out of fashion, and all are collected into one; so that the cook does the office of the stomach; nay, and of the teeth too; for the meat looks as if it were chewed beforehand: here is the luxury of all tastes in one dish, and liker a vomit than a soup. From these compounded dishes arise compounded diseases, which require compounded medicines. It is the same thing with our minds that it is with our tables; simple vices are curable by simple counsels, but a general dissolution of manners is hardly overcome; we are overrun with a public as well as with a private madness. The physicians of old understood little more than the virtue of some herbs to stop blood, or heal a wound; and their firm and healthful bodies needed little more before they were corrupted by luxury and pleasure; and when it came to that once, their business was not to allay hunger, but to provoke it by a thousand inventions and sauces. That which was aliment to a craving

stomach is become a burden to a full one. From hence came paleness, trembling, and worse effects from crudities than famine; a weakness in the joints, the belly stretched, suffusion of choler, the torpor of the nerves, and a palpitation of the heart. To say nothing of megrims, torments of the eyes and ears, head-ache, gout, scurvy, several sorts of fevers and putrid ulcers, with other diseases that are but the punishment of luxury. So long as our bodies were hardened with labor, or tired with exercise or hunting, our food was plain and simple; many dishes have made many diseases.

It is an ill thing for a man not to know the measure of his stomach, nor to consider that men do many things in their drink that they are ashamed of sober; drunkenness being nothing else but a voluntary madness. It emboldens men to do all sorts of mischiefs; it both irritates wickedness and discovers it; it does not make men vicious, but it shows them to be so. It was in a drunken fit that Alexander killed Clytus. It makes him that is insolent prouder, him that is cruel fiercer, it takes away all shame. He that is peevish breaks out presently into ill words and blows. The lecher, without any regard to decency or scandal, turns up his whore in the market-place. A man's tongue trips, his head runs round, he staggers in his pace. To say nothing of the crudities and diseases that follow upon this distemper, consider the public mischiefs it has done. How many warlike nations and strong cities, that have stood invincible to attacks and sieges, has drunkenness overcome! Is it not a great honor to drink the company dead? a magnificent virtue to swallow more wine than the rest, and yet at last to be outdone by a hogshead? What shall we say of those men that

invert the offices of day and night? as if our eyes were only given us to make use of in the dark? Is it day? "It is time to go to bed." Is it night? It is time to rise." Is it toward morning? "Let us go to supper." When other people lie down they rise, and lie till the next night to digest the debauch of the day before. It is an argument of clownery, to do as other people do.

Luxury steals upon us by degrees; first, it shows itself in a more than ordinary care of our bodies, it slips next into the furniture of our houses; and it gets then into the fabric, curiosity, and expense of the house itself. It appears, lastly, in the fantastical excesses of our tables. We change and shuffle our meats, confound our sauces, serve that in first that used to be last, and value our dishes, not for the taste, but for the rarity. Nay, we are so delicate, that we must be told when we are to eat or drink; when we are hungry or weary; and we cherish some vices as proofs and arguments of our happiness. The most miserable mortals are they that deliver themselves up to their palates, or to their lusts: the pleasure is short and turns presently nauseous, and the end of it is either shame or repentance. It is a brutal entertainment, and unworthy of a man, to place his felicity in the service of his senses. As to the wrathful, the contentious, the ambitious, though the distemper be great, the offence has yet something in it that is manly; but the basest of prostitutes are those that dedicate themselves wholly to lust; what with their hopes and fears, anxiety of thought, and perpetual disquiets, they are never well, full nor fasting.

What a deal of business is now made about our houses and diet, which was at first both obvious and

of little expense? Luxury led the way, and we have employed our wits in the aid of our vices. First we desired superfluities, our next step was to wickedness, and, in conclusion, we delivered up our minds to our bodies, and so became slaves to our appetites, which before were our servants, and are now become our masters. What was it that brought us to the extravagance of embroideries, perfumes, tire-women, etc. We passed the bounds of Nature, and launched out into superfluities; insomuch, that it is now-a-days only for beggars and clowns to content themselves with what is sufficient; our luxury makes us insolent and mad. We take upon us like princes, and fly out for every trifle, as though there were life and death in the case. What a madness is it for a man to lay out an estate upon a table or a cabinet, a patrimony upon a pair of pendants, and to inflame the price of curiosities according to the hazard either of breaking or losing of them? To wear garments that will neither defend a woman's body, nor her modesty: so thin that one could make a conscience of swearing she were naked: for she hardly shows more in the privacies of her amour than in public? How long shall we covet and oppress, enlarge our possessions, and account that too little for one man which was formerly enough for a nation? And our luxury is as insatiable as our avarice. Where is that lake, that sea, that forest, that spot of land; that is not ransacked to gratify our palate? The very earth is burdened with our buildings; not a river, not a mountain, escapes us. Oh, that there should be such boundless desires in our little bodies! Would not fewer lodgings serve us? We lie but in one, and where we are not, that is not properly ours. What with our hooks, snares, nets, dogs, etc., we are at war

with all living creatures; and nothing comes amiss but that which is either too cheap, or too common; and all this is to gratify a fantastical palate. Our avarice, our ambition, our lusts, are insatiable; we enlarge our possessions, swell our families, we rifle sea and land for matter of ornament and luxury. A bull contents himself with one meadow, and one forest is enough for a thousand elephants; but the little body of a man devours more than all other living creatures. We do not eat to satisfy hunger, but ambition; we are dead while we are alive, and our houses are so much our tombs, that a man might write our *epitaphs* upon our very doors.

A voluptuous person, in fine, can neither be a good man, a good patriot, nor a good friend; for he is transported with his appetites, without considering, that the lot of man is the law of Nature. A good man (like a good soldier) will stand his ground, receive wounds, glory in his scars, and in death itself love his master for whom he falls; with that divine precept always in his mind, "Follow good:" whereas he that complains, laments, and groans, must yield nevertheless, and do his duty though in spite of his heart. Now, what a madness is it for a man to choose rather to be luggered than to follow, and vainly to contend with the calamities of human life? Whatsoever is laid upon us by necessity, we should receive generously; for it is foolish to strive with what we cannot avoid. We are born subjects, and to obey God is perfect liberty. He that does this shall be free, safe, and quiet: all his actions shall succeed to his wish: and what can any man desire more than to want nothing from without, and to have all things desirable within himself? Pleasures

do but weaken our minds, and send us for our support to Fortune, who gives us money only as the wages of slavery. We must stop our eyes and our ears. Ulysses had but one rock to fear, but human life has many. Every city, nay, every man, is one; and there is no trusting even to our nearest friends. Deliver me from the superstition of taking those things which are light and vain for felicities.

## CHAPTER XII.

AVARICE AND AMBITION ARE INSATIABLE AND RESTLESS.

THE man that would be truly rich must not increase his fortune, but retrench his appetites: for riches are not only superfluous, but mean, and little more to the possessor than to the looker-on. What is the end of ambition and avarice, when at best we are but stewards of what we falsely call our own? All those things that we pursue with so much hazard and expense of blood, as well to keep as to get, for which we break faith and friendship, what are they but the mere *deposita* of Fortune? and not ours, but already inclining toward a new master. There is nothing our own but that which we give to ourselves, and of which we have a certain and an inexpugnable possession. Avarice is so insatiable, that it is not in the power of liberality to content it; and our desires are so boundless, that whatever we get is but in the way to getting more without end: and so long as we are solicitous for the increase of wealth, we lose the true use of it; and spend our time in putting out, calling in, and passing our accounts, without any substantial benefit, either to the world or to ourselves. What is the difference betwixt old men and children? the one cries for nuts and apples, and the other for gold and silver: the one sets up courts of justice, hears and determines, acquits and con-

demns, in jest; the other in earnest: the one makes houses of clay, the other of marble: so that the works of old men are nothing in the world but the progress and improvement of children's errors; and they are to be admonished and punished too like children, not in revenge for injuries received, but as a correction of injuries done, and to make them give over. There is some substance yet in gold and silver; but as to judgments and statutes, procuration and continuance-money, these are only the visions and dreams of avarice. Throw a crust of bread to a dog, he takes it open-mouthed, swallows it whole, and presently gapes for more: just so do we with the gifts of Fortune; down they go without chewing, and we are immediately ready for another chop. But what has avarice now to do with gold and silver, that is so much outdone by curiosities of a far greater value? Let us no longer complain that there was not a heavier load laid upon those precious metals, or that they were not buried deep enough, when we have found out ways by wax and parchments, and by bloody usurious contracts, to undo one another. It is remarkable, that Providence has given us all things for our advantage near at hand; but iron, gold, and silver, (being both the instrument of blood and slaughter, and the price of it) Nature has hidden in the bowels of the earth.

There is no avarice without some punishment, over and above that which it is to itself. How miserable is it in the desire! how miserable even in the attaining of our ends! For money is a greater torment in the possession than it is in the pursuit. The fear of losing it is a great trouble, the loss of it a greater, and it is made a greater yet by opinion. Nay, even in the case of no direct loss at all, the covetous man

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loses what he does not get. It is true, the people call the rich man a happy man, and wish themselves in his condition; but can any condition be worse than that which carries vexation and envy along with it? Neither is any man to boast of his fortune, his herds of cattle, his number of slaves, his lands and palaces; for comparing that which he has to that which he further covets, he is a beggar. No man can possess all things, but any man may contemn them; and the contempt of riches is the nearest way to the gaining of them.

Some magistrates are made for money, and those commonly are bribed with money. We are all turned merchants, and look not into the quality of things, but into the price of them; for reward we are pious, and for reward again we are impious. We are honest so long as we may thrive upon it; but if the devil himself gives better wages, we change our party. Our parents have trained us up into an admiration of gold and silver, and the love of it is grown up with us to that degree that when we would show our gratitude to Heaven, we make presents of those metals. This it is that makes poverty look like a curse and a reproach; and the poets help it forward; the chariot of the sun must be all of gold; the best of times must be the Golden Age, and thus they turn the greatest misery of mankind into the greatest blessings.

Neither does avarice make us only unhappy in ourselves, but malevolent also to mankind. The soldier wishes for war; the husbandman would have his corn dear; the lawyer prays for dissension; the physician for a sickly year; he that deals in curiosities, for luxury and excess, for he makes up his fortunes out of the corruptions of the age. High

winds and public conflagrations make work for the carpenter and bricklayer, and one man lives by the loss of another; some few, perhaps, have the fortune to be detected, but they are all wicked alike. A great plague makes work for the sexton; and, in one word, whosoever gains by the dead has not much kindness for the living. Demades of Athens condemned a fellow that sold necessaries for funerals, upon proof that he wished to make himself a fortune by his trade, which could not be but by a great mortality; but perhaps he did not so much desire to have many customers, as to sell dear, and buy cheap; besides, that all of that trade might have been condemned as well as he. Whatsoever whets our appetites, flatters and depresses the mind, and, by dilating it, weakens it; first blowing it up, and then filling and deluding it with vanity.

To proceed now from the most prostitute of all vices, sensuality and avarice, to that which passes in the world for the most generous, the thirst of glory and dominion. If they that run mad after wealth and honor, could but look into the hearts of them that have already gained these points, how would it startle them to see those hideous cares and crimes that wait upon ambitious greatness: all those acquisitions that dazzle the eyes of the vulgar are but false pleasures, slippery and uncertain. They are achieved with labor, and the very guard of them is painful. Ambition puffs us up with vanity and wind: and we are equally troubled either to see any body before us, or nobody behind us; so that we lie under a double envy; for whosoever envies another is also envied himself. What matters it how far Alexander extended his conquests, if he was not yet satisfied with what he had? Every man wants

as much as he covets; and it is lost labor to pour into a vessel that will never be full. He that had subdued so many princes and nations, upon the killing of Clytus (one friend) and the loss of Hyphestion (another) delivered himself up to anger and sadness; and when he was master of the world, he was yet a slave to his passions. Look into Cyrus, Cambyses, and the whole Persian line, and you shall not find so much as one man of them that died satisfied with what he had gotten. Ambition aspires from great things to greater; and propounds matters even impossible, when it has once arrived at things beyond expectation. It is a kind of dropsy; the more a man drinks, the more he covets. Let any man but observe the tumults and the crowds that attend palaces; what affronts must we endure to be admitted, and how much greater when we are in! The passage to virtue is fair, but the way to greatness is craggy and it stands not only upon a precipice, but upon ice too; and yet it is a hard matter to convince a great man that his station is slippery, or to prevail with him not to depend upon his greatness; but all superfluities are hurtful. A rank crop lays the corn; too great a burden of fruit breaks the bough; and our minds may be as well overcharged with an immoderate happiness. Nay, though we ourselves would be at rest, our fortune will not suffer it: the way that leads to honor and riches leads to troubles; and we find the source of our sorrows in the very objects of our delights.

What joy is there in feasting and luxury; in ambition and a crowd of clients; in the arms of a mistress, or in the vanity of an unprofitable knowledge? These short and false pleasures deceive us, and, like drunkenness, revenge the jolly madness of *one hour*.

with the nauseous and sad repentance of *many*. Ambition is like a gulf: everything is swallowed up in it and buried, beside the dangerous consequences of it; for that which one has taken from all, may be easily taken away again by all from one. It was not either virtue or reason, but the mad love of a deceitful greatness, that animated Pompey in his wars, either abroad or at home. What was it but his ambition that hurried him to Spain, Africa, and elsewhere, when he was too great already in everybody's opinion but his own? And the same motive had Julius Cæsar, who could not, even then, brook a superior himself, when the commonwealth had submitted unto two already.

Nor was it any instinct of virtue that pushed on Marius, who at the head of an army was himself led on under the command of ambition: but he came at last to the deserved fate of other wicked men, and to drink himself of the same cup that he had filled to others. We impose upon our reason, when we suffer ourselves to be transported with titles; for we know that they are nothing but a more glorious sound; and so for ornaments and gildings, though there be a lustre to dazzle our eyes, our understanding tells us that it is only outside, and the matter under it is only coarse and common.

I will never envy those that the people call great and happy. A sound mind is not to be shaken with a popular and vain applause; nor is it in the power of their pride to disturb the state of our happiness. An honest man is known now-a-days by the dust he raises upon the way, and it is become a point of honor to overrun people, and keep all at a distance; though he that is put out of the way may perchance be happier than he that takes it. He that would ex-

erice a power profitable to himself, and grievous to nobody else, let him practice it upon his passion. They that have burnt cities, otherwise invincible, driven armies before them, and bathed themselves in human blood, after they have overcome all open enemies, they have been vanquished by their lust, by their cruelty, and without any resistance.

Alexander was possessed with the madness of laying kingdoms waste. He began with Greece, where he was brought up; and there he quarried himself upon that in it which was the best; he enslaved Lacedemon, and silenced Athens: nor was he content with the destruction of those towns which his father Philip had either conquered or bought; but he made himself the enemy of human nature; and, like the worst of beasts, he worried what he could not eat.

Felicity is an unquiet thing; it torments itself, and puzzles the brain. It makes some people ambitious, others luxurious; it puffs up some, and softens others; only (as it is with wine) some heads bear it better than others; but it dissolves all. Greatness stands upon a precipice: and if prosperity carries a man never so little beyond his poise, it overbears and dashes him to pieces. It is a rare thing for a man in a great fortune to lay down his happiness gently; it being a common fate for a man to sink under the weight of those felicities that raise him. How many of the nobility did Marius bring down to herdsmen and other mean offices! Nay, in the very moment of our despising servants, we may be made so ourselves.

## CHAPTER XIII.

## HOPE AND FEAR ARE THE BANE OF HUMAN LIFE.

No man can be said to be perfectly happy that runs the risk of disappointment: which is the case of every man that *fears* or *hopes* for anything. For *hope* and *fear*, how distant soever they may seem to be the one from the other, they are both of them yet coupled in the same chain, as the guard and the prisoner; and the one treads upon the heels of the other. The reason of this is obvious, for they are passions that look forward, and are ever solicitous for the future; only *hope* is the more plausible weakness of the two, which in truth, upon the main, are inseparable; for the one cannot be without the other: but where the *hope* is stronger than the *fear*, or the *fear* than the *hope*, we call it the one or the other; for without *fear* it were no longer *hope*, but *certainty*; as without *hope* it were no longer *fear* but *despair*.

We may come to understand whether our disputes are vain or not, if we do but consider that we are either troubled about the *present*, the *future* or *both*. If the *present*, it is easy to judge, and the *future* is uncertain. It is a foolish thing to be miserable beforehand for fear of misery to come; for a man loses the *present*, which he might enjoy, in expectation of the *future*: nay, the fear of losing anything is as bad

as the loss itself. I will be as prudent as I can, but not timorous or careless; and I will bethink myself, and forecast what inconveniences may happen before they come. It is true, a man may fear, and yet not be fearful; which is no more than to have the affection of fear without the vice of it; but yet a frequent admittance of it runs into a habit. It is a shameful and an unmanly thing to be doubtful, timorous, and uncertain; to set one step forward, and another backward; and to be irresolute. Can there be any man so fearful, that had not rather fall once than hang always in suspense?

Our miseries are endless, if we stand in fear of all possibilities; the best way, in such a case, is to drive out one nail with another, and a little to qualify fear with hope; which may serve to palliate a misfortune; though not to cure it. There is not anything that we fear, which is so certain to come, as it is certain that many things which we do fear will not come; but we are loth to oppose our credulity when it begins to move us, and so to bring our fear to the test. Well! but “what if the thing we fear should come to pass?” Perhaps it will be the better for us. Suppose it be *death* itself, why may it not prove the glory of my life? Did not poison make Socrates famous? and was not Cato’s sword a great part of his honor? “Do we fear any misfortune to befall us?” We are not presently sure that it will happen. How many deliverances have come unlooked for? and how many mischiefs that we looked for have never come to pass? It is time enough to lament when it comes, and, in the *interim*, to promise ourselves the best. What do I know but something or other may delay or divert it? Some have escaped out of the fire; others, when a house has fallen over

their head, have received no hurt: one man has been saved when a sword was at his throat; another has been condemned, and outlived his headsman: so that ill-fortune, we see, as well as good, has her levities; peradventure it will be, peradventure not; and until it comes to pass, we are not sure of it: we do many times take words in a worse sense than they were intended, and imagine things to be worse taken than they are. It is time enough to bear a misfortune when it comes, without anticipating it.

He that would deliver himself from all apprehensions of the future, let him first take for granted, that all fears will fall upon him; and then examine and measure the evil that he fears, which he will find to be neither great nor long. Beside, that the ills which he fears he may suffer, he suffers in the very fear of them. As in the symptoms of an approaching disease, a man shall find himself lazy and listless: a weariness in his limbs, with a yawning and shuddering all over him; so it is in the case of a weak mind, it fancies misfortunes, and makes a man wretched before his time. Why should I torment myself at present with what, perhaps, may fall out fifty years hence? This humor is a kind of voluntary disease, and an industrious contrivance of our own unhappiness, to complain of an affliction that we do not feel. Some are not only moved with grief itself, but with the mere opinion of it; as children will start at a shadow, or at the sight of a deformed person. If we stand in fear of violence from a powerful enemy, it is some comfort to us, that whosoever makes himself terrible to others is not without fear himself: the least noise makes a lion start; and the fiercest of beasts, whatsoever

enrages them, makes them tremble too: a shadow, a voice, an unusual odor, rouses them.

The things most to be feared I take to be of three kinds; *want*, *sickness*, and those *violences* that may be imposed upon us by a *strong hand*. The last of these has the greatest force, because it comes attended with noise and tumult; whereas the incommodities of poverty and diseases are more natural, and steal upon us in silence, without any external circumstances of horror: but the other marches in pomp, with fire and sword, gibbets, racks, hooks; wild beasts to devour us; stakes to impale us; engines to tear us to pieces; pitched bags to burn us in, and a thousand other exquisite inventions of cruelty. No wonder then, if that be the most dreadful to us that presents itself in so many uncouth shapes; and by the very solemnity is rendered the most formidable. The more instruments of bodily pain the executioner shows us, the more frightful he makes himself: for many a man that would have encountered death in any generous form, with resolution enough, is yet overcome with the *manner* of it. As for the calamities of hunger and thirst, inward ulcers, scorching fevers, tormenting fits of the stone, I look upon these miseries to be at least as grievous as any of the rest; only they do not so much affect the fancy, because they lie out of sight. Some people talk high of danger at a distance; but (like cowards) when the executioner comes to do his duty, and show us the fire, the ax, the scaffold, and death at hand, their courage fails them upon the very pinch, when they have most need of it. Sickness, (I hope) captivity, fire, are no new things to us; the fall of houses, funerals, and conflagrations, are every day before our eyes. The man that I supped

with last night is dead before morning; why should I wonder then, seeing so many fall about me, to be hit at last myself? What can be greater madness than to cry out, "Who would have dreamed of this?" And why not, I beseech you? Where is that estate that may not be reduced to beggary? that dignity which may not be followed with banishment, disgrace, and extreme contempt? that kingdom that may not suddenly fall to ruin; change its master, and be depopulated? that prince that may not pass the hand of a common hangman? That which is one man's fortune may be another's; but the foresight of calamities to come breaks the violence of them.

## CHAPTER XIV.

IT IS ACCORDING TO THE TRUE OR FALSE ESTIMATE OF THINGS  
THAT WE ARE HAPPY OR MISERABLE.

How many things are there that the fancy makes terrible by night, which the day turns into ridiculous! What is there in labor, or in death, that a man should be afraid of? They are much slighter in act than in contemplation; and we *may* contemn them, but we *will* not: so that it is not because they are hard that we dread them, but they are hard because we are first afraid of them. Pains, and other violences of Fortune, are the same thing to us that goblins are to children: we are more scared with them than hurt. We take up our opinions upon trust, and err for company, still judging that to be best that has most competitors. We make a false calculation of matters, because we advise with opinion, and not with Nature; and this misleads us to a higher esteem for riches, honor, and power, than they are worth: we have been used to admire and recommend them, an a private error is quickly turned into a public. The greatest and the smallest things are equally hard to be comprehended; we account many things *great*, for want of understanding what effectually is so: and we reckon other things to be *small*, which we find frequently to be of the highest value. Vain things only move vain minds. The accidents that we so much boggle at are not terrible in themselves,

but they are made so by our infirmities; but we consult rather what we hear than what we feel, without examining, opposing, or discussing the things we fear; so that we either stand still and tremble, or else directly run for it, as those troops did, that, upon the raising of the dust, took a flock of sheep for the enemy. When the body and mind are corrupted, it is no wonder if all things prove intolerable; and not because they are so in truth, but because we are dissolute and foolish: for we are infatuated to such a degree, that, betwixt the common madness of men, and that which falls under the care of the physician, there is but this difference, the one labors of a disease, and the other of a false opinion.

The Stoics hold, that all those torments that commonly draw from us groans and ejaculations, are in themselves trivial and contemptible. But these high-flown expressions apart (how true soever) let us discourse the point at the rate of ordinary men, and not make ourselves miserable before our time; for the things we apprehend to be at hand may possibly never come to pass. Some things trouble us more than they should, other things sooner; and some things again disorder us that ought not to trouble us at all; so that we either enlarge, or create, or anticipate our disquiets. For the first part, let it rest as a matter in controversy; for that which I account light, another perhaps will judge insupportable! One man laughs under the lash, and another whines for a fillip. How sad a calamity is poverty to one man, which to another appears rather desirable than inconvenient? For the poor man, who has nothing to lose, has nothing to fear: and he that would enjoy himself to the satisfaction of his soul, must be either poor indeed, or at least look as if he were so. Some

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people are extremely dejected with sickness and pain; whereas Epicurus blessed his fate with his last breath, in the acutest torments of the stone imaginable. And so for banishment, which to one man is so grievous, and yet to another is no more than a bare change of place: a thing that we do every day for our health, pleasure, nay, and upon the account even of common business.

How terrible is death to one man, which to another appears the greatest providence in nature, even toward all ages and conditions! It is the wish of some, the relief of many, and the end of all. It sets the slave at liberty, carries the banished man home, and places all mortals upon the same level: insomuch, that life itself were a punishment without it. When I see tyrants, tortures, violences, the prospect of death is a consolation to me, and the only remedy against the injuries of life.

Nay, so great are our mistakes in the true estimate of things, that we have hardly done any thing that we have not had reason to wish undone; and we have found the things we feared to be more desirable than those we coveted. Our very prayers have been more pernicious than the curses of our enemies; and we must pray to have our former prayers forgiven. Where is the wise man that wishes to himself the wishes of his mother, nurse, or his tutor; the worst of enemies, with the intention of the best of friends. We are undone if their prayers be heard; and it is our duty to pray that they may not; for they are no other than well-meaning execrations. They take evil for good, and one wish fights with another: give me rather the contempt of all those things whereof they wish me the greatest plenty. We are equally hurt by some that pray for us, and by others that curse us; the one imprints in us a false fear, and the

other does us mischief by a mistake: so that it is no wonder if mankind be miserable, when we are brought up from the very cradle under the imprecations of our parents. We pray for trifles, without so much as thinking of the greatest blessings; and we are not ashamed many times to ask God for that which we should blush to own to our neighbor.

It is with us as with an innocent that my father had in his family; she fell blind on a sudden, and nobody could persuade her she was blind. "She could not endure the house," she cried, "it was so dark," and was still calling to go abroad. That which we laughed at in her we find to be true in ourselves, we are covetous and ambitious; but the world shall never bring us to acknowledge it, and we impute it to the place: nay, we are the worse of the two; for that blind fool called for a guide, and we wander about without one. It is a hard matter to cure those that will not believe they are sick. We are ashamed to admit a master, and we are too old to learn. Vice still goes before virtue: so that we have two works to do: we must cast off the one, and learn the other. By one evil we make way to another, and only seek things to be avoided, or those of which we are soon weary. That which seemed too much when we wished for it, proves too little when we have it; and it is not, as some imagine, that felicity is greedy, but it is little and narrow, and cannot satisfy us. That which we take to be very high at a distance, we find to be but low when we come at it. And the business is, we do not understand the true state of things: we are deceived by rumors; when we have gained the thing we aimed at, we find it to be either ill or empty; or perchance less than we expect, or otherwise perhaps great, but not good.

## CHAPTER XV.

## THE BLESSINGS OF TEMPERANCE AND MODERATION.

THERE is not anything that is necessary to us but we have it either *cheap* or *gratis*: and this is the provision that our heavenly Father has made for us, whose bounty was never wanting to our needs. It is true the belly craves and calls upon us, but then a small matter contents it: a little bread and water is sufficient, and all the rest is but superfluous. He that lives according to reason shall never be poor, and he that governs his life by opinion shall never be rich: for nature is limited, but fancy is boundless. As for meat, clothes, and lodging, a little feeds the body, and as little covers it; so that if mankind would only attend human nature, without gaping at superfluities, a cook would be found as needless as a soldier: for we may have necessaries upon very easy terms; whereas we put ourselves to great pains for excesses. When we are cold, we may cover ourselves with skins of beasts; and, against violent heats, we have natural grottoes; or with a few osiers and a little clay we may defend ourselves against all seasons. Providence has been kinder to us than to leave us to live by our wits, and to stand in need of invention and arts.

It is only pride and curiosity that involve us in difficulties: if nothing will serve a man but rich

clothes and furniture, statues and plate, a numerous train of servants, and the rarities of all nations, it is not Fortune's fault, but his own, that he is not satisfied: for his desires are insatiable, and this is not a thirst, but a disease; and if he were master of the whole world, he would be still a beggar. It is the mind that makes us rich and happy, in what condition soever we are; and money signifies no more to it than it does to the gods. If the religion be sincere, no matter for the ornaments it is only luxury and avarice that make poverty grievous to us; for it is a very small matter that does our business; and when we have provided against cold, hunger, and thirst, all the rest is but vanity and excess: and there is no need of expense upon foreign delicacies, or the artifices of the kitchen. What is he the worse for poverty that despises these things? nay, is he not rather the better for it, because he is not able to go to the price of them? for he is kept sound whether he will or not: and that which a man *cannot* do, looks many times as if he *would not*.

When I look back into the moderation of past ages, it makes me ashamed to discourse, as if poverty had need of any consolation; for we are now come to that degree of intemperance, that a fair patrimony is too little for a meal. Homer had but one servant, Plato three, and Zeno (the master of the masculine sect of Stoics) had none at all. The daughters of Scipio had their portions out of the common treasury, for their father left them not a penny: how happy were the husbands that had the people of Rome for their father-in-law! Shall any man now contemn poverty after these eminent examples, which are sufficient not only to justify but to recommend it? Upon Diogenes' only servant

running away from him, he was told where he was, and persuaded to fetch him back again: "What," says he, "can Manes live without Diogenes, and not Diogenes without Manes?" and so let him go.

The piety and moderation of Scipio have made his memory more venerable than his arms; and more yet after he left his country than while he defended it: for matters were come to that pass, that either Scipio must be injurious to Rome or Rome to Scipio. Coarse bread and water to a temperate man is as good as a feast; and the very herbs of the field yield a nourishment to man as well as to beasts. It was not by choice meats and perfumes that our forefathers recommended themselves, but in virtuous actions, and the sweat of honest, military, and of manly labors.

While Nature lay in common, and all her benefits were promiscuously enjoyed, what could be happier than the state of mankind, when people lived without avarice or envy? What could be richer than when there was not a poor man to be found in the world? So soon as this impartial bounty of Providence came to be restrained by covetousness, and that particulars appropriated to themselves that which was intended for all, then did poverty creep into the world, when some men, by desiring more than came to their share, lost their title to the rest; a loss never to be repaired; for though we may come yet to get much, we once had all. The fruits of the earth were in those days divided among the inhabitants of it, without either want or excess. So long as men contented themselves with their lot, there was no violence, no engrossing or hiding of those benefits for particular advantages, which were appointed for the commu-

nity; but every man had as much care for his neighbor as for himself. No arms or bloodshed, no war, but with wild beasts: but under the protection of a wood or a cave, they spent their days without cares, and their nights without groans; their innocence was their security and their protection. There were as yet no beds of state, no ornaments, of pearl or embroidery, nor any of those remorses that attend them; but the heavens were their canopy, and the glories of them their spectacle. The motions of the orbs, the courses of the stars, and the wonderful order of Providence, was their contemplation. There was no fear of the house falling, or the rustling of a rat behind the arras; they had no palaces then like cities; but they had open air, and breathing room, crystal fountains, refreshing shades, the meadows dressed up in their native beauty, and such cottages as were according to nature, and wherein they lived contentedly, without fear either of losing or of falling. These people lived without either solitude or fraud; and yet I must call them rather happy than wise.

That men were generally better before they were corrupted than after, I make no doubt; and I am apt to believe that they were both stronger and hardier too but their wits were not yet come to maturity; for Nature does not give virtue; and it is a kind of art to become good. They had not as yet torn up the bowels of the earth for gold, silver, or precious stones; and so far were they from killing any man, as we do, for a spectacle, that they were not as yet come to it, either in fear or anger; nay, they spared the very fishes. But, after all this, they were innocent because they were ignorant: and there is a great difference betwixt not knowing how to offend

and not being willing to do it. They had, in that rude life, certain images and resemblances of virtue, but yet they fell short of virtue itself, which comes only by institution, learning, and study, as it is perfected by practice. It is indeed the end for which we were born, but yet it did not come into the world with us; and in the best of men, before they are instructed, we find rather the matter and the seeds of virtue than the virtue itself. It is the wonderful benignity of Nature that has laid open to us all things that may do us good, and only hid those things from us that may hurt us; as if she durst not trust us with gold and silver, or with iron, which is the instrument of war and contention, for the other. It is we ourselves that have drawn out of the earth both the *causes* and the *instruments* of our dangers: and we are so vain as to set the highest esteem upon those things to which Nature has assigned the lowest place. What can be more coarse and rude in the mine than these precious metals, or more slavish and dirty than the people that dig and work them? and yet they defile our minds more than our bodies, and make the possessor fouler than the artificer of them. Rich men, in fine, are only the greater slaves; both the one and the other want a great deal.

Happy is that man that eats only for hunger, and drinks only for thirst; that stands upon his own legs, and lives by reason, not by example; and provides for use and necessity, not for ostentation and pomp! Let us curb our appetites, encourage virtue, and rather be beholden to ourselves for riches than to Fortune, who when a man draws himself into a narrow compass, has the least mark at him. Let my bed be plain and clean, and my clothes so too: my meat without much expense, or many waiters, and

neither a burden to my purse nor to my body, not to go out the same way it came in. That which is too little for luxury, is abundantly enough for nature. The end of eating and drinking is satiety; now, what matters it though one eats and drinks more, and another less, so long as the one is not a-hungry, nor the other athirst? Epicurus, who limits pleasure to nature, as the Stoicks do virtue, is undoubtedly in the right; and those that cite him to authorize their voluptuousness do exceedingly mistake him, and only seek a good authority for an evil cause: for their pleasures of sloth, gluttony, and lust, have no affinity at all with his precepts or meaning. It is true, that at first sight his philosophy seems effeminate; but he that looks nearer him will find him to be a very brave man only in a womanish dress.

It is a common objection, I know, that these philosophers do not live at the rate they talk; for they can flatter their superiors, gather estates, and be as much concerned at the loss of fortune, or of friends, as other people: as sensible of reproaches, as luxurious in their eating and drinking, their furniture, their houses; as magnificent in their plate, servants, and officers; as profuse and curious in their gardens, etc. Well! and what of all this, or if it were twenty times more? It is some degree of virtue for a man to condemn himself; and if he cannot come up to the best, to be yet better than the worst; and if he cannot wholly subdue his appetites, however to check and diminish them. If I do not live as I preach, take notice that I do not speak of myself, but of virtue, nor am I so much offended with other men's vices as with my own. All this was objected to Plato, Epicurus, Zeno; nor is any virtue so sacred as to escape malevolence. The Cynic Demetrius was a great in-

stance of severity and mortification; and one that imposed upon himself neither to possess anything, nor so much as to ask it: and yet he had this *scom* put upon him, that his profession was *poverty*, not *virtue*. Plato is blamed for *asking* money; Aristotle for *receiving* it; Democritus for *neglecting* it; Epicurus for *consuming* it. How happy were we if we could but come to imitate these men's vices; for if we knew our own condition, we should find work enough at home. But we are like people that are making merry at a play or a tavern when their own houses are on fire, and yet they know nothing of it. Nay, Cato himself was said to be a drunkard; but *drunkenness* itself shall sooner be proved to be no crime than Cato dishonest. They that demolish temples, and overturn altars, show their good-will, though they can do the gods no hurt, and so it fares with those that invade the reputation of great men.

If the professors of virtue be as the world calls them, avaricious, libidinous, ambitious—what are they then that have a detestation for the very name of it: but malicious natures do not want wit to abuse honester men than themselves. It is the practice of the multitude to bark at eminent men as little dogs do at strangers; for they look upon other men's virtues as the upbraiding of their own wickedness. We should do well to commend those that are good, if not, let us pass them over; but, however, let us spare ourselves: for beside the blaspheming of virtue, our rage is to no purpose. But to return now to my text.

We are ready enough to limit others but loth to put bonds and restraints upon ourselves, though we know that many times a greater evil is cured by a less; and the mind that will not be brought to virtue by precepts, comes to it frequently by necessity.

Let us try a little to eat upon a joint stool, to serve ourselves, to live within compass, and accommodate our clothes to the end they were made for. Occasional experiments of our moderation give us the best proof of our firmness and virtue. A well-governed appetite is a great part of liberty, and it is a blessed lot, that since no man can have all things that he would have, we may all of us forbear desiring what we have not. It is the office of temperance to overrule us in our pleasures; some she rejects, others she qualifies and keeps within bounds. Oh! the delights of rest when a man comes to be weary, and of meat when he is heartily hungry.

I have learned (says our author) by one journey how many things we have that are superfluous, and how easily they might be spared, for when we are without them upon necessity, we do not so much as feel the want of them. This is the second blessed day (says he) that my friend and I have travelled together: one wagon carries ourselves and our servants; my mattress lies upon the ground and I upon that: our diet answerable to our lodging, and never without our figs and our table-books. The muleteer without shoes, and the mules only prove themselves to be alive by their walking. In this equipage, I am not willing I perceive, to own myself, but as often as we happen into better company, I presently fall a blushing, which shows that I am not yet confirmed in those things which I approve and commend. I am not yet come to own my frugality, for he that is ashamed to be seen in a mean condition would be proud of a splendid one. I value myself upon what passengers think of me, and tacitly renounce my principles, whereas I should rather lift up my voice to be heard by mankind, and tell them

“You are all mad—your minds are set upon superfluities and you value no man for his virtues.”

I came one night weary home, and threw myself upon the bed with this consideration about me: “There is nothing ill that is well taken.” My baker tells me he has no bread; but, says he, I may get some of your tenants, though I fear it is not good. No matter, said I, for I will stay until it be better—that is to say until my stomach will be glad of worse. It is discretion sometimes to practice temperance and wont ourselves to a little, for there are many difficulties both of time and place that may force us upon it.

When we come to the matter of patrimony, how strictly do we examine what every man is worth before we will trust him with a penny! “Such a man,” we cry, “has a great estate, but it is shrewdly encumbered—a very fair house, but it was built with borrowed money—a numerous family, but he does not keep touch with his creditors—if his debts were paid he would not be worth a groat.” Why do we not take the same course in other things, and examine what every man is worth? It is not enough to have a long train of attendants, vast possessions, or an incredible treasure in money and jewels—a man may be poor for all this. There is only this difference at best—one man borrows of the *usurer*, and the other of *fortune*. What signifies the carving or gilding of the chariot; is the master ever the better of it?

We cannot close up this chapter with a more generous instance of moderation than that of Fabricius. Pyrrhus tempted him with a sum of money to betray his country, and Pyrrhus’s physician offered Fabricius, for a sum of money, to poison his

*master*; but he was too brave either to be overcome by gold, or to be overcome by poison, so that he refused the money, and advised Pyrrhus to have a care of treachery: and this too in the heat of a licentious war. Fabricius valued himself upon his poverty, and was as much above the thought of riches as of poison. "Live Pyrrhus," says he "by my friendship; and turn that to thy satisfaction which was before thy trouble:" that is to say that Fabricius could not be corrupted.

## CHAPTER XVI.

CONSTANCY OF MIND GIVES A MAN REPUTATION, AND MAKES  
HIM HAPPY IN DESPITE OF ALL MISFORTUNE.

THE whole duty of man may be reduced to the two points of *abstinen<sup>e</sup>*ce and *patience*; *temperance* in *prosperity*, and *courage* in *adversity*. We have already treated of the former: and the other follows now in course.

Epicurus will have it, that a wise man will *bear all injuries*; but the Stoicks will not allow those things to be *injuries* which Epicurus calls so. Now, betwixt *these two*, there is the same difference that we find betwixt two *gladiators*; the one receives wounds, but yet maintains his ground, the other tells the people, when he is in blood, that *it is but a scratch*, and will not suffer anybody to part them. An *injury* cannot be received, but it must be *done*; but it may be *done* and yet not *received*; as a man may be in the water, and not swim, but if he swims, it is presumed that he is in the water. Or if a blow or a shot be levelled at us, it may so happen that a man may miss his aim, or some accident interpose that may divert the mischief. That which is hurt is passive, and inferior to that which hurts it. But you will say, that Socrates was condemned and put to death, and so received an injury; but I answer, that the tyrants *did him an injury*, and yet he *received none*. He

that steals anything from me and hides it in my own house, though I have not lost it, yet he has stolen it. He that lies with his own wife, and takes her for another woman, though the woman be honest, the man is an adulterer. Suppose a man gives me a draught of poison and it proves not strong enough to kill me, his guilt is nevertheless for the disappointment. He that makes a pass at me is as much a murderer, though I put it by, as if he had struck me to the heart. It is the intention, not the effect, that makes the wickedness. He is a thief that has the will of killing and slaying, before his hand is dipt in blood; as it is sacrilege, the very intention of laying violent hands upon holy things. If a philosopher be exposed to torments, the ax over his head, his body wounded, his guts in his hands, I will allow him to groan; for virtue itself cannot divest him of the nature of a man; but if his mind stand firm, he has discharged his part. A great mind enables a man to maintain his station with honor; so that he only maks use of what he meets in his way, as a pilgrim that would fain be at his journey's end.

It is the excellency of a great mind to *ask* nothing, and to *want* nothing; and to say, "I will have nothing to do with fortune, that repulses Cato, and prefers Vatinius." He that quits his hold, and accounts anything good that is not honest, runs gaping after casualties, spends his days in anxiety and vain expectation, that man is miserable. And yet it is hard, you will say, to be banished or cast into prison: nay, what if it were to be burnt, or any other way destroyed? We have examples in all ages and cases, of great men that have triumphed over all misfortunes. Metellus suffered exile resolutely, Rutilius cheerfully; Socrates disputed in the dun-

geon; and though he might have made his escape, refused it; to show the world how easy a thing it was to subdue the two great terrors of mankind, *death and a jail*. Or what shall we say of Mucius Scevola, a man only of a military courage, and without the help either of philosophy or letters? who, when he found that he had killed the Secretary instead of Porsenna, (the prince,) burnt his right hand to ashes for the mistake; and held his arm in the flame until it was taken away by his very enemies. Porsenna did more easily pardon Mucius for his intent to kill him than Mucius forgave *himself* for missing of his aim. He might have a luckier thing, but never a braver.

Did not Cato, in the last night of his life, take Plato to bed with him, with his sword at his bed's head; the one that he might have death at his will, the other, that he might have it in his power; being resolved that no man should be able to say, either that he killed or that he saved Cato? So soon as he had composed his thoughts, he took his sword; "Fortune," says he, "I have hitherto fought for my country's liberty, and for my own, and only that I might live free among freemen; but the cause is now lost, and Cato safe." With that word he cast himself upon his sword; and after the physicians that pressed in upon him had bound up his wound, he tore it up again, and expired with the same greatness of soul that he lived. But these are the examples, you will say, of men famous in their generations.

Let us but consult history, and we shall find, even in the most effeminate of nations, and the most dissolute of times, men of all degrees, ages, and fortunes, nay, even women themselves, that have over-

come the fear of death: which, in truth, is so little to be feared, that duly considered, it is one of the greatest benefits of nature. It was as great an honor for Cato, when his party was broken, that he himself stood his ground, as it would have been if he had carried the day, and settled an universal peace: for, it is an equal prudence, to make the best of a bad game, and to manage a good one. The day that he was *repulsed*, he *played*, and the night that he *killed* himself, he *read*, as valuing the loss of his life, and the missing of an office at the same rate. People, I know, are apt to pronounce upon other men's infirmities by the measure of their own, and to think it impossible that a man should be content to be burnt, wounded, killed, or shackled, though in some cases he may. It is only for a great mind to judge of great things; for otherwise, that which is our infirmity will seem to be another body's, as a straight stick in the water appears to be crooked: he that yields, draws upon his own head his own ruin; for we are sure to get the better of Fortune, if we do but struggle with her. Fencers and wrestlers, we see what blows and bruises they endure, not only for honor, but for exercise. If we turn our backs once, we are routed and pursued; that man only is happy that draws good out of evil, that stands fast in his judgment, and unmoved by any external violence; or however, so little moved, that the keenest arrow in the quiver of Fortune is but as the prick of a needle to him rather than a wound; and all her other weapons fall upon him only as hail upon the roof of a house, that crackles and skips off again, without any damage to the inhabitant.

A generous and clear-sighted young man will take it for a happiness to encounter ill fortune. It is

nothing for a man to hold up his head in a calm; but to maintain his post when all others have quitted their ground, and there to stand upright where other men are beaten down, this is divine and praiseworthy. What ill is there in torments, or in those things which we commonly account grievous crosses? The great evil is the want of courage, the bowing and submitting to them, which can never happen to a wise man; for he stands upright under any weight; nothing that is to be borne displeases him; he knows his strength, and whatsoever may be any man's lot, he never complains of, if it be his own. Nature, he says, deceives nobody; she does not tell us whether our children shall be fair or foul, wise or foolish, good subjects or traitors, nor whether our fortune shall be good or bad. We must not judge of a man by his ornaments, but strip him of all the advantages and the impostures of Fortune, nay, of his very body too, and look into his mind. If he can see a naked sword at his eyes without so much as winking; if he make it a thing indifferent to him whether his life go out at his throat or at his mouth; if he can hear himself sentenced to torments or exiles, and under the very hand of the executioner, says thus to himself, "All this I am provided for, and it is no more than a man that is to suffer the fate of humanity." This is the temper of mind that speaks a man happy; and without this, all the confluences of external comforts signify no more than the personating of a king upon the stage; when the curtain is drawn, we are players again. Not that I pretend to exempt a wise man out of a number of men, as if he had no sense of pain; but I reckon him as compounded of body and soul; the body is irrational, and may be galled, burnt, tortured; but the rational part is

fearless, invincible, and not to be shaken. This it is that I reckon upon as the supreme good of man; which until it be perfected, is but an unsteady agitation of thought, and in the perfection an immovable stability. It is not in our contentions with Fortune as in those of the theatre, where we may throw down our arms, and pray for quarter; but here we must die firm and resolute. There needs no encouragement to those things which we are inclined to by a natural instinct, as the preservation of ourselves with ease and pleasure; but if it comes to the trial of our faith by torments, or of our courage by wounds, these are difficulties that we must be armed against by philosophy and precept; and yet all this is no more than what we were born to, and no matter of wonder at all; so that a wise man prepares himself for it, as expecting whatsoever *may be will be*. My body is frail, and liable not only to the impressions of violence, but to afflictions also, that naturally succeed our pleasures. Full meals bring crudities; whoring and drinking make the hands to shake and the knees to tremble. It is only the surprise and newness of the thing which makes that misfortune terrible, which, by premeditation, might be made easy to us: for that which some people make light by sufferance, others do by foresight. Whatsoever is necessary, we must bear patiently. It is no new thing to die, no new thing to mourn, and no new thing to be merry again. Must I be poor? I shall have company: in *banishment*? I will think myself born there. If I die, I shall be no more sick; and it is a thing I cannot do but once.

Let us never wonder at anything we are born to; for no man has reason to complain, where we are all in the same condition. He that escapes might have

suffered; and it is but equal to submit to the law of mortality. We must undergo the colds of winter, the heats of summer; the distempers of the air, and the diseases of the body. A wild beast meets us in one place, and a man that is more brutal in another; we are here assaulted by fire, there by water. Demetrius was reserved by Providence for the age he lived in, to show, that neither the times could corrupt him, nor he reform the people. He was a man of an exact judgment, steady to his purpose, and of a strong eloquence; not finical in his words, but his sense was masculine and vehement. He was so qualified in his life and discourse, that he served both for an example and a reproach. If fortune should have offered that man the government and possession of the whole world, upon condition not to lay it down again, I dare say he would have refused it: and thus have expostulated the matter with you: "Why should you tempt a freeman to put his shoulder under a burden; or an honest man to pollute himself with the dregs of mankind? Why do you offer me the spoils of princes, and of nations, and the price not only of your blood, but of your souls?"

It is the part of a great mind to be temperate in prosperity, resolute in adversity; to despise what the vulgar admire, and to prefer a mediocrity to an excess. Was not Socrates oppressed with poverty, labor, nay, the worst of wars in his own family, a fierce and turbulent woman for his wife? were not his children indocile, and like their mother? After seven-and-twenty years spent in arms, he fell under a slavery to the *thirty tyrants*, and most of them his bitter enemies: he came at last to be sentenced as "a violater of religion, a corrupter of youth, and a common enemy to God and man." After this he was

imprisoned, and put to death by poison, which was all so far from working upon his mind, that it never so much as altered his countenance. We are to bear ill accidents as unkind seasons, distempers, or diseases; and why may we not reckon the actions of wicked men even among those accidents; their deliberations are not counsels but frauds, snares, and inordinate motions of the mind; and they are never without a thousand pretences and occasions of doing a man mischief. They have their informers, their knights of the post; they can make an interest with powerful men, and one may be robbed as well upon the bench as upon the highway. They lie in wait for advantages, and live in perpetual agitation betwixt hope and fear; whereas he that is truly composed will stand all shocks, either of violences, flatteries, or menaces, without perturbation. It is an inward fear that makes us curious after what we hear abroad.

It is an error to attribute either *good* or *ill* to *Fortune*; but the *matter* of it we may; and we ourselves are the occasion of it, being in effect the artificers of our own happiness or misery: for the mind is above fortune; if that be evil, it makes everything else so too; but if it be right and sincere, it corrects what is wrong, and mollifies what is hard, with modesty and courage. There is a great difference among those that the world calls wise men. Some take up private resolutions of opposing Fortune, but they cannot go through with them; for they are either dazzled with splendor on the one hand, or affrighted with terrors on the other; but there are others that will close and grapple with Fortune, and still come off victorious.

Mucius overcame the fire; Regulus, the gibbet; Socrates, poison; Rutilius, banishment; Cato, death; Fabricius, riches; Tubero, poverty; and Sextius, honors. But there are some again so delicate, that they cannot so much as bear a scandalous report; which is the same thing as if a man should quarrel for being jostled in a crowd, or dashed as he walks in the streets. He that has a great way to go must expect a slip, to stumble, and to be tired. To the luxurious man frugality is a punishment; labor and industry to the sluggard; nay, study itself is a torment to him; not that these things are hard to us by nature, but we ourselves are vain and irresolute; nay, we wonder many of us, how any man can live without wine, or endure to rise so early in a morning.

A brave man must expect to be tossed; for he is to steer his course in the teeth of Fortune, and to work against wind and weather. In the suffering of torments, though there appears but one virtue, a man exercises many. That which is most eminent is patience, (which is but a branch of fortitude.) But there is prudence also in the choice of the action, and in the bearing what we cannot avoid; and there is constancy in bearing it resolutely: and there is the same concurrence also of several virtues in other generous undertakings.

When Leonidas was to carry his 300 men into the Straits of Thermopylæ, to put a stop to Xerxes's huge army: "Come, fellow-soldiers," says he, "eat your dinners here as if you were to sup in another world." And they answered his resolution. How plain and imperious was that short speech of Cæditius to his men upon a desperate action! and how glorious a mixture was there in it both of bravery and pru-

dence! "Soldiers," says he, "it is necessary for us to go, but it is not necessary for us to return." This brief and pertinent harangue was worth ten thousand of the frivolous cavils and distinctions of the schools, which rather break the mind than fortify it; and when it is once perplexed and pricked with difficulties and scruples, there they leave it. Our passions are numerous and strong, and not to be mastered with quirks and tricks, as if a man should undertake to defend the cause of God and man with a bulrush. It was a remarkable piece of honor and policy together, that action of Cæsar's upon the taking of Pompey's cabinet at the battle of Pharsalia: it is probable that the letters in it might have discovered who were his friends, and who his enemies; and yet he burnt it without so much as opening it; esteeming it the noblest way of pardoning, to keep himself ignorant both of the offender and of the offense. It was a brave presence of mind also in Alexander, who, upon advice that his physician Philip intended to poison him, took the letter of advice in one hand and the cup in the other; delivering Philip the letter to read while he himself drank the potion.

Some are of opinion that death gives a man courage to support pain, and that pain fortifies a man against death: but I say rather, that a wise man depends upon himself against both, and that he does not either suffer with patience, in hopes of death, or die willingly, because he is weary of life; but he bears the one, and waits for the other, and carries a divine mind through all the accidents of human life. He looks upon faith and honesty as the most sacred good of mankind, and neither to be forced by necessity nor corrupted by reward; kill, burn, tear him in

pieces, he will be true to his trust; and the more any man labors to make him discover a secret, the deeper will he hide it. Resolution is the inexpugnable defence of human weakness, and it is a wonderful Providence that attends it.

Horatius Cocles opposed his single body to the whole army until the bridge was cut down behind him and then leaped into the river with his sword in his hand and came off safe to his party. There was a fellow questioned about a plot upon the life of a tyrant, and put to the torture to declare his confederates: he named, by one and one, all the tyrant's friends that were about him: and still as they were named, they were put to death: the tyrant asked him at last if there were any more. "Yes," says he, "yourself were in the plot; and now you have never another friend left in the world:" whereupon the tyrant cut the throats of his own guards. "He is the happy man that is the master of himself, and triumphs over the fear of death, which has overcome the conquerors of the world."

## CHAPTER XVII.

OUR HAPPINESS DEPENDS IN A GREAT MEASURE UPON THE CHOICE OF OUR COMPANY.

THE comfort of life depends upon conversation. Good offices, and concord, and human society, is like the working of an arch of stone; all would fall to the ground if one piece did not support another. Above all things let us have a tenderness for blood; and it is yet too little not to hurt, unless we profit one another. We are to relieve the distressed; to put the wanderer into his way; and to divide our bread with the hungry: which is but the doing of good to ourselves; for we are only several members of one great body. Nay, we are all of a consanguinity; formed of the same materials, and designed to the same end; this obliges us to a mutual tenderness and converse; and the other, to live with a regard to equity and justice. The love of society is natural; but the choice of our company is matter of virtue and prudence. Noble examples stir us up to noble actions; and the very history of large and public souls, inspires a man with generous thoughts. It makes a man long to be in action, and doing something that the world may be the better for; as protecting the weak, delivering the oppressed, punishing the insolent. It is a great blessing the very conscience of giving a good

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example; beside, that it is the greatest obligation any man can lay upon the age he lives in.

He that converses with the proud shall be puffed up; a lustful acquaintance makes a man lascivious; and the way to secure a man from wickedness is to withdraw from the examples of it. It is too much to have them *near* us, but more to have them *within* us—ill examples, pleasure and ease, are, no doubt of it, great corrupters of manners.

A rocky ground hardens the horse's hoof; the mountaineer makes the best soldier; the miner makes the best pioneer, and severity of discipline fortifies the mind. In all excesses and extremities of good and of ill fortune, let us have recourse to great examples that have contemned both. “These are the best instructors that teach in their lives, and prove their words by their actions.”

As an ill air may endanger a good constitution, so may a place of ill example endanger a good man, nay, there are some places that have a kind of privilege to be licentious, and where luxury and dissolution of manners seem to be lawful; for great examples give both authority and excuse to wickedness. Those places are to be avoided as dangerous to our manners. Hannibal himself was unmanned by the looseness of Campania, and though a conqueror by his arms, he was overcome by his pleasures. I would as soon live among butchers as among cooks—not but a man may be temperate in any place—but to see drunken men staggering up and down everywhere, and only the spectacle of lust, luxury and excess before our eyes, it is not safe to expose ourselves to the temptation. If the victorious Hannibal himself could not resist it, what shall become of us then that are subdued, and give ground

to our lusts already? He that has to do with an enemy in his breast, has a harder task upon him than he that is to encounter one in the field; his hazard is greater if he loses ground, and his duty is perpetual, for he has no place or time for rest. If I give way to pleasure, I must also yield to grief, to poverty, to labor, ambition, anger, until I am torn to pieces by my misfortunes and lusts. But against all this philosophy propounds a liberty, that is to say, a liberty from the service of accidents and fortune. There is not anything that does more mischief to mankind than mercenary masters and philosophy, that do not live as they teach—they give a scandal to virtue. How can any man expect that a ship should steer a fortunate course, when the pilot lies wallowing in his own vomit? It is a usual thing first to learn to do ill ourselves, and then to instruct others to do so: but that man must needs be very wicked that has gathered into himself the wickedness of other people.

The best conversation is with the philosophers—that is to say, with such of them as teach us matter, not words—that preach to us things necessary and keep us to the practice of them. There can be no peace in human life without the contempt of all events. There is nothing that either puts better thoughts into a man, or sooner sets him right that is out of the way, than a good companion, for the example has the force of a precept, and touches the heart with an affection to goodness; and not only the frequent hearing and seeing of a wise man delights us, but the very encounter of him suggests profitable contemplation such as a man finds himself moved with when he goes into a holy place. I will

take more care with *whom* I eat and drink than *what*, for without a friend the table is a manger.

Writing does well, but personal discourse and conversation does better; for men give great credit to their ears, and take stronger impressions from example than precept. Cleanthes had never hit Zeno so to the life if he had not been in with him at all his privacies, if he had not watched and observed him whether or not he practised as he taught. Plato got more from Socrates' *manners* than from his *words*, and it was not the *school*, but the *company* and *familiarity* of Epicurus that made Metrodorus, Hermachus and Polyænus so famous.

Now, though it be by instinct that we covet society, and avoid solitude, we should yet take this along with us, that the more acquaintance the more danger: nay, there is not one man of a hundred that is to be trusted with himself. If company cannot alter us, it may interrupt us, and he that so much as stops upon the way loses a great deal of a short life, which we yet make shorter by our inconstancy. If an enemy were at our heels, what haste should we make!—but death is so, and yet we never mind it. There is no venturing of tender and easy natures among the people, for it is odds that they will go over to the major party. It would, perhaps, shake the constancy of Socrates, Cato, Lælius, or any of us all, even when our resolutions are at the height, to stand the shock of vice that presses upon us with a kind of public authority.

It is a world of mischief that may be done by one single example of avarice or luxury. One voluptuous palate makes a great many. A wealthy neighbor stirs up envy, and a fleering companion moves ill-nature wherever he comes. What will become of

those people then that expose themselves to a popular violence? which is ill both ways; either if they comply with the wicked, because they are many, or quarrel with the multitude because they are not principled alike. The best way is to retire, and associate only with those that may be the better for us, and we for them. These respects are mutual; for while we teach, we learn. To deal freely, I dare not trust myself in the hands of much company: I never go abroad that I come home again the same man I went out. Something or other that I had put in order is discomposed; some passion that I had subdued gets head again; and it is just with our minds as it is after a long indisposition with our bodies; we are grown so tender, that the least breath of air exposes us to a relapse. And it is no wonder if a numerous conversation be dangerous, where there is scarce any single man but by his discourse, example, or behavior, does either recommend to us, or imprint in us, or, by a kind of contagion, insensibly infect us with one vice or other; and the more people the greater is the peril. Especially let us have a care of public spectacles where wickedness insinuates itself with pleasure; and, above all others, let us avoid spectacles of cruelty and blood; and have nothing to do with those that are perpetually whining and complaining; there may be faith and kindness there, but no peace. People that are either sad or fearful, we do commonly, for their own sakes, set a guard upon them, for fear they should make an ill use of being alone; especially the imprudent, who are still contriving of mischief, either for others or for themselves, in cherishing their lusts, or forming their designs. So much for the choice of a *companion*; we shall now proceed to that of a *friend*.

## CHAPTER XVIII.

## THE BLESSINGS OF FRIENDSHIP.

OF all felicities, the most charming is that of a *firm and gentle friendship*. It sweetens all our cares, dispels our sorrows, and counsels us in all extremities. Nay, if there were no other comfort in it than the bare exercise of so generous a virtue, even for that single reason, a man would not be without it. Beside, that it is a sovereign antidote against all calamities, even against the fear of death itself.

But we are not to number our friends by the *visits* that are made us; and to confound the decencies of *ceremony* and *commerce* with the offices of *united affections*. Caius Gracchus, and after him Livius Drusus, were the men that introduced among the Romans the fashion of separating their visitants; some were taken into their *closet*, others were only admitted into the *canteachamber*: and some, again, were fain to wait in the *hall* perhaps, or in the *court*. So that they had their *first*, their *second*, and their *third rate* friends; but none of them true: only they are called so in course, as we salute strangers with some title or other of respect at a venture. There is no depending upon those men that only take their compliment in their turn, and rather slip through the door than enter at it. He will find himself in a

great mistake, that either seeks for a friend in a palace, or tries him at a feast.

The great difficulty rests in the choice of him; that is to say, in the first place, let him be virtuous, for vice is contagious, and there is no trusting the sound and the sick together; and he ought to be a wise man too, if a body knew where to find him; but in this case, he that is least ill is best, and the highest degree of human prudence is only the most venial folly. That friendship where men's affections are cemented by an equal and by a common love of goodness, it is not either hope or fear, or any private interest, that can ever dissolve it: but we carry it with us to our graves, and lay down our lives for it with satisfaction. Paulina's good and mine (says our author) were so wrapped up together, that in consulting her comfort I provided for my own; and when I could not prevail upon her to take less care for me, she prevailed upon me to take more care for myself.

Some people make it a question, whether is the greatest delight, the enjoying of an old friendship, or the acquiring of a new one? but it is in the preparing of a friendship, and in the possession of it, as it is with the husbandman in sowing and reaping; his delight is the hope of his labor in the one case, and the fruit of it in the other. My conversation lies among my books, but yet in the letters of a friend, methinks I have his company; and when I answer them, I do not only write, but speak: and, in effect, a friend is an eye, a heart, a tongue, a hand, at all distances. When friends see one another personally, they do not see one another as they do when they are divided, where the meditation dignifies the prospect; but they are effectually in a great

measure absent even when they are present. Consider their nights apart, their private studies, their separate employments, and necessary visits; and they are almost as much together divided as present. True friends are the whole world to one another; and he that is a friend to himself is also a friend to mankind. Even in my very studies, the greatest delight I take in what I learn is the teaching of it to others; for there is no relish, methinks, in the possession of anything without a partner; nay, if wisdom itself were offered me upon condition only of keeping it to myself, I should undoubtedly refuse it.

Lucilius tells me, that he was written to by a friend, but cautions me withal not to say anything to him of the affair in question; for he himself stands upon the same guard. What is this but to affirm and to deny the same thing in the same breath, in calling a man a friend, whom we dare not trust as our own soul? For there must be no reserves in friendship: as much deliberation as you please before the league is struck, but no doubtings or jealousies after. It is a preposterous weakness to love a man before we know him, and not to care for him after. It requires time to consider of a friendship, but the resolution once taken, entitles him to my very heart. I look upon my thoughts to be as safe in his breast as in my own: I shall, without any scruple, make him the confidant of my most secret cares and counsels.

It goes a great way toward the making of a man faithful, to let him understand that you think him so: and he that does but so much as suspect that I will deceive him gives me a kind of right to cozen him. When I am with my friend, methinks I am

alone, and as much at liberty to speak anything as to think it, and as our hearts are one, so must be our interest and convenience; for friendship lays all things in common, and nothing can be good to the one that is ill to the other. I do not speak of such a community as to destroy one another's propriety; but as the father and the mother have two children, not one apiece, but each of them two.

But let us have a care, above all things, that our kindness be rightfully founded; for where there is any other invitation to friendship than the friendship itself, that friendship will be bought and sold. He derogates upon the majesty of it that makes it only dependent upon good fortune. It is a narrow consideration for a man to please himself in the thought of a friend, "because," says he, "I shall have one to help me when I am sick, in prison, or in want." A brave man should rather take delight in the contemplation of doing the same offices for another. He that loves a man for his own sake is in an error. A friendship of interest cannot last any longer than the interest itself, and this is the reason that men in prosperity are so much followed, and when a man goes down the wind, nobody comes near him.

Temporary friends will never stand the test. One man is forsaken for fear of profit, another is betrayed. It is a negotiation, not a friendship, that has an eye to advantages; only, through the corruption of times, that which was formerly a friendship is now become a design upon a booty: alter your testament, and you lose your friend. But my end of friendship is to have one dearer to me than myself, and for the saving of whose life I would cheerfully lay down my own; taking this along with me, that

only wise men can be friends, others are but companions; and that there is a great difference also betwixt love and friendship; the one may sometimes do us hurt, the other always does us good, for the one friend is hopeful to another in all cases, as well in prosperity as in affliction. We receive comfort, even at a distance, from those we love, but then it is light and faint; whereas, presence and conversation touch us to the quick, especially if we find the man we love to be such a person as we wish.

It is usual with princes to reproach the living by commending the dead, and to praise those people for speaking truth from whom there is no longer any danger of hearing it. This is Augustus's case: he was forced to banish his daughter Julia for her common and prostituted impudence; and still upon fresh informations, he was often heard to say, "If Agrippa or Mecenas had been now alive, this would never have been." But yet where the fault lay may be a question; for perchance it was his own, that had rather complain for the want of them than seek for others as good. The Roman losses by war and by fire, Augustus could quickly supply and repair; but for the loss of two friends he lamented his whole life after.

Xerxes, (a vain and a foolish prince) when he made war upon Greece, one told him, "It would never come to a battle;" another, "That he would find only empty cities and countries, for they would not so much as stand the very fame of his coming;" others soothed him in the opinion of his *prodigious numbers*; and they all concurred to puff him up to his destruction; only Damaratus advised him not to depend too much upon his numbers, for he would rather find them a burden to him than

an advantage: and that three hundred men in the straits of the mountains would be sufficient to give a check to his whole army; and that such an accident would undoubtedly turn his vast numbers to his confusion. It fell out afterward as he foretold, and he had thanks for his fidelity. A miserable prince, that among so many thousand subjects had but one servant to tell him the truth!

## CHAPTER XIX.

HE THAT WOULD BE HAPPY MUST TAKE AN ACCOUNT  
OF HIS TIME.

IN THE distribution of human life, we find that a great part of it passes away in *evil doing*; a greater yet in doing just *nothing at all*: and effectually the whole in doing things *beside our business*. Some hours we bestow upon ceremony and servile attendances; some upon our pleasures, and the remainder runs at waste. What a deal of time is it that we spend in hopes and fears, love and revenge, in balls, treats, making of interests, suing for offices, soliciting of causes, and slavish flatteries! The shortness of life, I know, is the common complaint both of fools and philosophers; as if the time we have were not sufficient for our duties. But it is with our lives as with our estates, a good husband makes a little go a great way; whereas, let the revenue of a prince fall into the hands of a prodigal, it is gone in a moment. So that the time allotted us, if it were well employed, were abundantly enough to answer all the ends and purposes of mankind. But we squander it away in avarice, drink, sleep, luxury, ambition, fawning addresses, envy, rambling, voyages, impertinent studies, change of counsels, and the like; and when our portion is spent, we find the

want of it, though we gave no heed to it in the passage: insomuch, that we have rather *made* our life short than *found* it so. You shall have some people perpetually playing with their fingers, whistling, humming, and talking to themselves; and others consume their days in the composing, hearing, or reciting of songs and lampoons. How many precious morning hours do we spend in consultation with barbers, tailors, and tire-women, patching and painting betwixt the comb and the glass! A council must be called upon every hair we cut; and one curl amiss is as much as a body's life is worth. The truth is, we are more solicitous about our dress than our manners, and about the order of our periwigs than that of the government. At this rate, let us but discount, out of a life of a hundred years, that time which has been spent upon popular negotiations, frivolous amours, domestic brawls, sauntering up and down to no purpose, diseases that we have brought upon ourselves, and this large extent of life will not amount perhaps to the minority of another man. It is a *long being*, but perchance a *short life*. And what is the reason of all this? We live as we should never die, and without any thought of human frailty, when yet the very moment we bestow upon this man or thing, may, peradventure, be our last. But the greatest loss of time is delay and expectation, which depend upon the future. We let go the present, which we have in our own power; we look forward to that which depends upon Fortune; and so quit a certainty for an uncertainty. We should do by time as we do by a torrent, make use of it while we have it, for it will not last always.

The calamities of human nature may be divided into the *fear of death*, and the *miseries and errors*

*of life.* And it is the great work of mankind to master the one, and to rectify the other; and so live as neither to make life irksome to us, nor death terrible. It should be our care, before we are old, to live well, and when we are so, to die well; that we may expect our end without sadness: for it is the duty of life to prepare ourselves for death; and there is not an hour we live that does not mind us of our mortality.

Time runs on, and all things have their fate, though it lies in the dark. The period is certain to nature, but what am I the better for it if it be not so to me? We propound travels, arms, adventures, without ever considering that death lies in the way. Our term is set, and none of us know how near it is; but we are all of us agreed that the decree is unchangeable. Why should we wonder to have that befall us to-day which might have happened to us any minute since we were born? Let us therefore live as if every moment were to be our last, and set our accounts right every day that passes over our heads. We are not ready for death, and therefore we fear it, because we do not know what will become of us when we are gone, and that consideration strikes us with an inexplicable terror. The way to avoid this distraction is to contract our business and our thoughts—when the mind is once settled, a day or an age is all one to us; and the series of time, which is now our trouble will be then our delight; for he that is steadily resolved against all uncertainties, shall never be disturbed with the variety of them. Let us make haste, therefore, to live, since every day to a wise man is a new life—for he has done his business the day before, and so prepared himself for the

next, that if it be not his last, he knows yet that it might have been so. No man enjoys the true taste of life but he that is willing and ready to quit it.

The wit of man is not able to express the blindness of human folly in taking so much more care of our fortunes, our houses, and our money, than we do of our lives—everybody breaks in upon the one *gratis*, but we betake ourselves to fire and sword if any man invades the other. There is no dividing in the case of patrimony, but people share our time with us at pleasure, so profuse are we of that only thing whereof we may be honestly covetous. It is a common practice to ask an hour or two of a friend for such or such a business, and it is as easily granted, both parties only considering the occasion, and not the thing itself. They never put time to account, which is the most valuable of all precious things; but because they do not see it they reckon upon it as nothing: and yet these easy men when they come to die would give the whole world for those hours again which they so inconsiderately cast away before; but there is no recovering of them. If they could number their days that are yet to come as they can those that are already past, how would those very people tremble at the apprehension of death, though a hundred years hence, that never so much as think of it at present, though they know not but it may take them away the next immediate minute!

It is an usual saying “I would give my life for such or such a friend,” when, at the same time, we do give it without so much as thinking of it; nay. when that friend is never the better for it, and we ourselves the worse. Our time is set, and day and night we travel on. There is no baiting by the way,

and it is not in the power of either prince or people to prolong it. Such is the love of life, that even those decrepit dotards that have lost the use of it will yet beg the continuance of it, and make themselves younger than they are, as if they could cozen even Fate itself! When they fall sick, what promises of amendment if they escape that bout! What exclamations against the folly of their misspent time—and yet if they recover, they relapse. No man takes care to live well, but long; when yet it is in everybody's power to do the former, and in no man's to do the latter. We consume our lives in providing the very instruments of life, and govern ourselves still with a regard to the future, so that we do not properly live, but we are about to live. How great a shame is it to be laying new foundations of life at our last gasp, and for an old man (that can only prove his age by his beard,) with one foot in the grave, to go to school again! While we are young we may learn; our minds are tractable and our bodies fit for labor and study; but when age comes on, we are seized with languor and sloth, afflicted with diseases, and at last we leave the world as ignorant as we came into it—only we *die* worse than we were *born*, which is none of Nature's fault, but ours; for our fears, suspicions, perfidy, etc., are from ourselves.

I wish with all my soul that I had thought of my end sooner, but I must make the more haste now and spur on like those that set out late upon a journey—it will be better to learn late than not at all—though it be but only to instruct me how I may leave the stage with honor.

In the division of life, there is time *present, past,* and *to come.* What we *do* is *short*, what we *shall do*

is *doubtful*, but what we *have done* is *certain*, and out of the power of fortune. The passage of time is wonderfully quick, and a man must look backward to see it; and, in that retrospect, he has all past ages at a view; but the present gives us the slip unperceived. It is but a moment that we live, and yet we are dividing it into *childhood*, *youth*, *man's estate*, and *old age*, all which degrees we bring into that narrow compass. If we do not watch, we lose our opportunities; if we do not make haste, we are left behind; our best hours escape us, the worst are to come. The purest part of our life runs first, and leaves only the dregs at the bottom; and "that time which is good for nothing else, we dedicate to virtue;" and only propound to begin to live at an age that very few people arrive at. What greater folly can there be in the world than this loss of time, the future being so uncertain, and the damages so irreparable? If death be necessary, why should any man fear it? and if the time of it be uncertain, why should not we always expect it? We should therefore first prepare ourselves by a virtuous life against the dread of an inevitable death; and it is not for us to put off being good until such or such a business is over, for one business draws on another; and we do as good as sow it, one grain produces more. It is not enough to philosophize when we have nothing else to do, but we must attend wisdom even to the neglect of all things else; for we are so far from having time to spare, that the age of the world would be yet too narrow for our business; nor is it sufficient not to omit it, but we must not so much as intermit it.

There is nothing that we can properly call our own but our time, and yet every body fools us out of

it that has a mind to it. If a man borrows a paltry sum of money, there must be bonds and securities, and every common civility is charged upon account; but he that has my time, thinks he owes me nothing for it, though it be a debt that gratitude itself can never repay. I cannot call any man poor that has enough still left, be it never so little: it is good advice yet to those that have the world before them, to play the good husbands betimes, for it is too late to spare at the bottom, when all is drawn out to the lees. He that takes away a day from me, takes away what he can never restore me. But our time is either *forced away* from us, or *stolen* from us, or *lost*; of which the last is the foulest miscarriage. It is in life as in a journey; a book or a companion brings us to our lodging before we thought we were half-way. Upon the whole matter we consume ourselves one upon another, without any regard at all to our own particular. I do not speak of such as live in notorious scandal, but even those men themselves, whom the world pronounces happy, are smothered in their felicities, servants to their professions and clients, and drowned in their lusts. We are apt to complain of the haughtiness of *great men*, when yet there is hardly any of them all so proud but that, at some time or other, a man may yet have access to him, and perhaps a good word or look into the bargain. Why do we not rather complain of *ourselves*, for being of all others, even to ourselves, the most deaf and inaccessible.

Company and business are great devourers of time, and our vices destroy our lives as well as our fortunes. The present is but a moment, and perpetually in flux; the time past, we call to mind when we please, and it will abide the examination and in-

spection. But the busy man has not leisure to look back, or if he has, it is an unpleasant thing to reflect upon a life to be repented of, whereas the conscience of a good life puts a man into a secure and perpetual possession of a felicity never to be disturbed or taken away: but he that has led a wicked life is afraid of his own memory; and, in the review of himself, he finds only appetite, avarice, or ambition, instead of virtue. But still he that is not at leisure many times to live, must, when his fate comes, whether he will or not, be at leisure to die. Alas! what is time to eternity? the age of a man to the age of the world? And how much of this little do we spend in fears, anxieties, tears, childhood! nay, we sleep away the one half. How great a part of it runs away in luxury and excess: the ranging of our guests, our servants, and our dishes! As if we were to eat and drink not for satiety, but ambition. The nights may well seem short that are so dear bought, and bestowed upon wine and women; the day is lost in expectation of the night, and the night in the apprehension of the morning. There is a terror in our very pleasures; and this vexatious thought in the very height of them, that *they will not last always*: which is a canker in the delights, even of the greatest and the most fortunate of men.

## CHAPTER X X.

HAPPY IS THE MAN THAT MAY CHOOSE HIS OWN BUSINESS.

OH THE blessings of privacy and leisure! The wish of the powerful and eminent, but the privilege only of inferiors; who are the only people that live to themselves: nay, the very thought and hope of it is a consolation, even in the middle of all the tumults and hazards that attend greatness. It was Augustus' prayer, that he might live to retire and deliver himself from public business: his discourses were still pointing that way, and the highest felicity which this mighty prince had in prospect, was the divesting himself of that illustrious state, which, how glorious soever in show, had at the bottom of it only anxiety and care. But it is one thing to retire for pleasure, and another thing for virtue, which must be active even in that retreat, and give proof of what it has learned: for a good and a wise man does in privacy consult the well-being of posterity. Zeno and Chrysippus did greater things in their studies than if they had led armies, borne offices, or given laws; which in truth they did, not to one city alone, but to all mankind: their *quiet* contributed more to the common benefit than the *sweat* and *labor* of other people. That retreat is not worth the while which does not afford a man greater and nobler work than business. There

is no slavish attendance upon great officers, no canvassing for places, no making of parties, no disappointments in my pretension to this charge, to that regiment, or to such or such a title, no envy of any man's favor or fortune; but a calm enjoyment of the general bounties of Providence in company with a good conscience. A wise man is never so busy as in the solitary contemplation of God and the works of Nature. He withdraws himself to attend the service of future ages: and those counsels which he finds salutary to himself, he commits to writing for the good of after-times, as we do the receipts of sovereign antidotes or balsams. He that is well employed in his study, though he may seem to do nothing at all, does the greatest things yet of all others, in affairs both human and divine. To supply a friend with a sum of money, or give my voice for an office, these are only private and particular obligations: but he that lays down precepts for the governing of our lives and the moderating of our passions, obliges human nature not only in the present, but in all succeeding generations.

He that would be at quiet, let him repair to his philosophy, a study that has credit with all sorts of men. The eloquence of the bar, or whatsoever else addresses to the people, is never without enemies; but philosophy minds its own business, and even the worst have an esteem for it. There can never be such a conspiracy against virtue, the world can never be so wicked, but the very name of a *philosopher* shall still continue venerable and sacred. And yet philosophy itself must be handled modestly and with caution. But what shall we say of Cato then, for his meddling in the broil of a civil war, and in-

terposing himself in the quarrel betwixt two enraged princes? He that, when Rome was split into *two factions* betwixt Pompey and Cæsar, declared himself against *both*. I speak this of Cato's last part; for in his former time the commonwealth was made unfit for a wise man's administration. All he could do then was but bawling and beating of the air: one while he was lugged and tumbled by the rabble, spit upon and dragged out of the *forum*, and then again hurried out of the senate-house to prison. There are some things which we propound originally, and others which fall in as accessory to another proposition. If a wise man retire, it is no matter whether he does it because the commonwealth was wanting to him, or because he was wanting to it. But to what republic shall a man betake himself? Not to Athens, where Socrates was condemned, and whence Aristotle fled, for fear he should have been condemned too, and where virtue was oppressed by envy: not to Carthage, where thiere was nothing but tyranny, injustice, cruelty, and ingratitudo. There is scarce any government to be found that will either endure a wise man, or which a wise man will endure; so that privacy is made necessary, because the only thing which is better is nowhere to be had. A man may commend navigation, and yet caution us against those seas that are troublesome and dangerous: so that he does as good as command me not to weigh anchor that commands sailing only upon these terms. He that is a slave to business is the most wretched of slaves.

“But how shall I get myself at liberty? We can run any hazards for money: take any pains for

honor; and why do we not venture also something for leisure and freedom? without which we must expect to live and die in a tumult: for so long as we live in public, business breaks in upon us, as one billow drives on another; and there is no avoiding it with either modesty or quiet. It is a kind of whirlpool, that sucks a man in, and he can never disengage himself. A man of business cannot in truth be said to live, and not one of a thousand understands how to do it: for how to live, and how to die, is the lesson of every moment of our lives: all other arts have their masters.

As a busy life is always a miserable life, so it is the greatest of all miseries to be perpetually employed upon *other people's business*; for to sleep, to eat, to drink, at their hour; to walk their pace, and to love and hate as they do, is the vilest of servitudes. Now, though business must be quitted, let it not be done unseasonably; the longer we defer it, the more we endanger our liberty; and yet we must no more fly before the time than linger when the time comes: or, however, we must not love business for business' sake, nor indeed do we, but for the profit that goes along with it: for we love the reward of misery, though we hate the misery itself. Many people, I know, seek business without choosing it, and they are even weary of their lives without it for want of entertainment in their own thoughts; the hours are long and hateful to them when they are alone, and they seem as short on the other side in their debauches. When they are no longer *candidates*, they are *suffragants*; when they give over other people's business, they do their own; and pretend business, but they make it, and value themselves upon being thought men of employment.

Liberty is the thing which they are perpetually a-wishing, and never come to obtain: a thing never to be bought nor sold, but a man must ask it of himself, and give it to himself. He that has given proof of his virtue in public, should do well to make a trial of it in private also. It is not that solitude, or a country life, teaches innocence or frugality; but vice falls of itself, without witnesses and spectators, for the thing it designs is to be taken notice of. Did ever any man put on rich clothes not to be seen? or spread the pomp of his luxury where nobody was to take notice of it? If it were not for admirers and spectators there would be no temptations to excess: the very keeping of us from exposing them cures us of desiring them, for vanity and intemperance are fed with ostentation.

He that has lived at sea in a storm, let him retire and die in the haven; but let his retreat be without ostentation, and wherein he may enjoy himself with a good conscience, without the want, the fear, the hatred, or the desire, of anything, not out of malevolent detestation of mankind, but for satisfaction and repose. He that shuns both business and men, either out of envy, or any other discontent, his retreat is but to the life of a mole: nor does he live to himself, as a wise man does, but to his bed, his belly, and his lusts. Many people seem to retire out of a weariness of public affairs, and the trouble of disappointments; and yet ambition finds them out even in that recess into which fear and weariness had cast them; and so does luxury, pride, and most of the distempers of a public life.

There are many that lie close, not that they may live securely, but that they may transgress more privately: it is their conscience, not their states,

that makes them keep a porter; for they live at such a rate, that to be seen before they be aware is to be detected. Crates saw a young man walking by himself; "Have a care," says he "of lewd company." Some men are busy in idleness, and make peace more laborious and troublesome than war; nay, and more wicked too, when they bestow it upon such lusts, and other vices, which even the license of a military life would not endure. We cannot call these people men of leisure that are wholly taken up with their pleasures. A troublesome life is much to be preferred before a slothful one; and it is a strange thing, methinks, that any man should fear death that has buried himself alive; as privacy without letters is but the burying of a man quick.

There are some that make a boast of their retreat, which is but a kind of lazy ambition; they retire to make people talk of them, whereas I would rather withdraw to speak to myself. And what shall that be, but that which we are apt to speak of one another? I will speak ill of myself: I will examine, accuse, and punish my infirmities. I have no design to be cried up for a great man, that has renounced the world in a contempt of the vanity and madness of human life; I blame nobody but myself, and I address only to myself. He that comes to me for help is mistaken, for I am not a physician, but a patient: and I shall be well enough content to have it said, when any man leaves me, "I took him for a happy and a learned man, and truly I find no such matter." I had rather have my retreat pardoned than envied.

There are some creatures that confound their footing about their dens, that they may not be found out, and so should a wise man in the case of his

retirement. When the door is open, the thief passes it by as not worth his while; but when it is bolted and sealed, it is a temptation for people to be prying. To have it said "that such a one is never out of his study, and sees nobody," etc.; this furnishes matter for discourse. He that makes his retirement too strict and severe, does as good as call company to take notice of it.

Every man knows his own constitution; one eases his stomach by vomit — another supports it with good nourishment; he that has the gout forbears wine and bathing, and every man applies to the part that is most infirm. He that shows a gouty foot, a lame hand, or contracted nerves, shall be permitted to lie still and attend his cure; and why not so in the vices of his mind! We must discharge all impediments and make way for philosophy, as a study inconsistent with common business. To all other things we must deny ourselves openly and frankly, when we are sick refuse visits, keep ourselves close, and lay aside all public cares, and shall we not do as much when we philosophize? Business is the drudgery of the world, and only fit for slaves, but contemplation is the work of wise men. Not but that solitude and company may be allowed to take their turns: the one creates in us the love of mankind, the other that of ourselves; solitude relieves us when we are sick of company, and conversation when we are weary of being alone; so that the one cures the other. "There is no man," in fine, "so miserable as he that is at a loss how to spend his time." He is restless in his thoughts, unsteady in his counsels, dissatisfied with the present, solicitous for the future; whereas he that prudently computes

his hours and his business, does not only fortify himself against the common accidents of life, but improves the most rigorous dispensations of Providence to his comfort, and stands firm under all the trials of human weakness.

## CHAPTER XXI.

THE CONTEMPT OF DEATH MAKES ALL THE MISERIES OF LIFE  
EASY TO US.

It is a hard task to master the natural desire of life by a philosophical contempt of death, and to convince the world that there is no hurt in it, and crush an opinion that was brought up with us from our cradles. What help? what encouragement? what shall we say to human frailty, to carry it fearless through the fury of flames, and upon the points of swords? what rhetoric shall we use to bear down the universal consent of people to so dangerous an error? The captious and superfine subtleties of the schools will never do the work: these speak many things sharp, but utterly unnecessary, and void of effect. The truth of it is, there is but one chain that holds all the world in bondage, and that is the love of life. It is not that I propound the making of death so indifferent to us, as it is, whether a man's hairs be even or odd; for what with self-love, and an implanted desire in every being of preserving itself, and a long acquaintance betwixt the soul and body, friends may be loth to part, and death may carry an appearance of evil, though in truth it is itself no evil at all. Beside, that we are to go to a strange place in the dark, and under great uncertainties of our future state; so that people die in

terror, because they do not know whither they are to go, and they are apt to fancy the worst of what they do not understand: these thoughts are indeed sufficient to startle a man of great resolution without a wonderful support from above. And, moreover, our natural scruples and infirmities are assisted by the wits and fancies of all ages, in their infamous and horrid description of another world: nay, taking it for granted that there will be no reward and punishment, they are yet more afraid of an annihilation than of hell itself.

But what is it we fear? "Oh! it is a terrible thing to die." Well; and is it not better once to suffer it, than always to fear it? The earth itself suffers both *with* me, and *before* me. How many islands are swallowed up in the sea! how many towns do we sail over! nay, how many nations are wholly lost, either by inundations or earthquakes! and shall I be afraid of my little body? why should I, that am sure to die, and that all other things are mortal, be fearful of coming to my last gasp myself? It is the fear of death that makes us base, and troubles and destroys the life we would preserve; that aggravates all circumstances, and makes them formidable. We depend but upon a flying moment. Die we must; but when? what is that to us? It is the law of Nature, the tribute of mortals, and the remedy of all evils. It is only the disguise that affrights us; as children that are terrified with a vizor. Take away the instruments of death, the fire, the ax, the guards, the executioners, the whips, and the racks; take away the pomp, I say, and the circumstances that accompany it, and death is no more than what my slave yesterday contemned; the pain is nothing to a fit of the stone; if it be tolerable, it

is not great; and if intolerable, it cannot last long. There is nothing that Nature has made necessary which is more easy than death: we are longer a-coming into the world than going out of it; and there is not any minute of our lives wherein we may not reasonably expect it. Nay, it is but a moment's work, the parting of the soul and body. What a shame is it then to stand in fear of anything so long that is over so soon!

Nor is it any great matter to overcome this fear; for we have examples as well of the *meanest* of men as of the greatest that have done it. There was a fellow to be exposed upon the theatre, who in disdain thrust a stick down his own throat, and choked himself; and another on the same occasion, pretended to nod upon the chariot, as if he were asleep, cast his head betwixt the spokes of the wheel, and kept his seat until his neck was broken. Caligula, upon a dispute with Canius Julius; “Do not flatter yourself,” says he, “for I have given orders to put you to death.” “I thank your most gracious Majesty for it,” says Canius, giving to understand, perhaps, that under his government death was a mercy: for he knew that Caligula seldom failed of being as good as his word in that case. He was at play when the officer carried him away to his execution, and beckoning to the centurion, “Pray,” says he, “will you bear me witness, when I am dead and gone, that I had the better of the game?” He was a man exceedingly beloved and lamented, and, for a farewell, after he had preached moderation to his friends; “You,” says he, “are here disputing about the immortality of the soul, and I am now going to learn the truth of it. If I discover any thing upon that point, you shall hear of it.” Nay,

the most timorous of creatures, when they see there is no escaping, they oppose themselves to all dangers; the despair gives them courage, and the necessity overcomes the fear. Socrates was thirty days in prison after his sentence, and had time enough to have starved himself, and so to have prevented the poison: but he gave the world the blessing of his life as long as he could, and took that fatal draught in the meditation and contempt of death.

Marcellinus, in a deliberation upon death, called several of his friends about him: one was fearful, and advised what he himself would have done in the case; another gave the counsel which he thought Marcellinus would like best; but a friend of his that was a Stoic, and a stout man, reasoned the matter to him after this manner; Marcellinus do not trouble yourself, as if it were such a mighty business that you have now in hand; it is nothing to *live*; all your servants do it, nay, your very beasts too; but to die honestly and resolutely, that is a great point. Consider with yourself there is nothing pleasant in life but what you have tasted already, and that which is to come is but the same over again; and how many men are there in the world that rather choose to die than to suffer the nauseous tediousness of the repetition? Upon which discourse he fasted himself to death. It was the custom of Pacuvius to solemnize, in a kind of pageantry, every day his own funeral. When he had swilled and gormandized to a luxurious and beastly excess, he was carried away from supper to bed with this song and acclamation, "He has lived, he has lived." That which he did in lewdness, will become us to do in sobriety and prudence. If it shall please God to add another day to our lives, let us thankfully re-

ceive it; but, however, it is our happiest and securest course so to compose ourselves to-night, that we may have no anxious dependence on to-morrow. “He that can say, I have lived this day, makes the next clear again.”

Death is the worst that either the severity of laws or the cruelty of tyrants can impose upon us; and it is the utmost extent of the dominion of Fortune. He that is fortified against that, must, consequently, be superior to all other difficulties that are put in the way to it. Nay, and on some occasions, it requires more courage to live than to die. He that is not prepared for death shall be perpetually troubled, as well with vain apprehensions, as with real dangers. It is not death itself that is dreadful, but the fear of it that goes before it. When the mind is under a consternation, there is no state of life that can please us; for we do not so endeavor to avoid mischiefs as to run away from them, and the greatest slaughter is upon a flying enemy. Had not a man better breathe out his last once for all, than lie agonizing in pains, consuming by inches, losing of his blood by drops? and yet how many are there that are ready to betray their country, and their friends, and to prostitute their very wives and daughters, to preserve a miserable carcass! Madmen and children have no apprehension of death; and it were a shame that our reason should not do as much toward our security as their folly. But the great matter is to die considerately and cheerfully upon the foundation of virtue; for life in itself is irksome, and only eating and drinking in a circle.

How many are there that, betwixt the apprehensions of death and the miseries of life, are at their wits’ end what to do with themselves? Wherefore

let us fortify ourselves against those calamities from which the prince is no more exempt than the beggar. Pompey the Great had his head taken off by a boy and a eunuch, (young Ptolemy and Photinus.) Caligula commanded the tribune Dæcimus to kill Lepidus; and another tribune (Chæreus) did as much for Caligula. Never was a man so great but he was as liable to suffer mischief as he was able to do it. Has not a thief, or an enemy, your throat at his mercy? nay, and the meanest of servants has the power of life and death over his master; for whosoever contemns his own life may be master of another body's. You will find in story, that the displeasure of servants has been as fatal as that of tyrants: and what matters it the power of him we fear, when the thing we fear is in every body's power? Suppose I fall into the hands of an enemy, and the conqueror condemns me to be led in triumph; it is but carrying me thither whither I should have gone without him, that is to say, toward death, whither I have been marching ever since I was born. It is the fear of our last hour that disquiets all the rest. By the justice of all constitutions, mankind is condemned to a capital punishment; now, how despicable would that man appear, who, being sentenced to death in common with the whole world, should only petition that he might be the last man brought to the block?

Some men are particularly afraid of thunder, and yet extremely careless of other and of greater dangers: as if that were all they have to fear. Will not a sword, a stone, a fever, do the work as well? Suppose the bolt should hit us, it were yet braver to die with a stroke than with the bare apprehension of it: beside the vanity of imagining

that heaven and earth should be put into such a disorder only for the death of one man. A good and a brave man is not moved with lightning, tempest, or earthquakes; but perhaps he would voluntarily plunge himself into that gulf, where otherwise he should only fall. The cutting of a corn, or the swallowing of a fly, is enough to dispatch a man; and it is no matter how great that is that brings me to my death, so long as death itself is but little. Life is a small matter; but it is a matter of importance to condemn it. Nature, that begat us, expels us, and a better and a safer place is provided for us. And what is death but a ceasing to be what we were before? We are kindled and put out: to cease to be, and not to begin to be, is the same thing. We die daily, and while we are growing, our life decreases; every moment that passes takes away part of it; all that is past is lost; nay, we divide with death the very instant that we live. As the last sand in the glass does not measure the hour, but finishes it; so the last moment that we live does not make up death, but concludes. There are some that pray more earnestly for death than we do for life; but it is better to receive it cheerfully when it comes than to hasten it before the time.

“But what is it that we would live any longer for?” Not for our pleasures; for those we have tasted over and over, even to satiety: so that there is no point of luxury that is new to us. “But a man would be loth to leave his country and his friends behind him;” that is to say, he would have them go first; for that is the least part of his care. “Well; but I would fain live to do more good, and discharge myself in the offices of life;” as if to die were not the duty of every man that lives. We are loth to

leave our possessions; and no man swims well with his luggage. We are all of us equally fearful of death, and ignorant of life; but what can be more shameful than to be solicitous upon the brink of security? If death be at any time to be feared, it is always to be feared; but the way never to fear it, is to be often thinking of it. To what end is it to put off for a little while that which we cannot avoid? He that dies does but follow him that is dead. "Why are we then so long afraid of that which is so little awhile of doing? How miserable are those people that spend their lives in the dismal apprehensions of death! for they are beset on all hands, and every minute in dread of a surprise. We must therefore look about us, as if we were in an enemy's country; and consider our last hour, not as a punishment, but as the law of Nature: the fear of it is a continual palpitation of the heart, and he that overcomes that terror shall never be troubled with any other.

Life is a navigation; we are perpetually wallowing and dashing one against another; sometimes we suffer shipwreck, but we are always in danger and in expectation of it. And what is it when it comes, but either the end of a journey, or a passage? It is as great a folly to fear *death* as to fear *old age*; nay, as to fear life itself; for he that would not die ought not to live, since death is the condition of life. Beside that it is a madness to fear a thing that is certain; for where there is no doubt, there is no place for fear.

We are still chiding of Fate, and even those that exact the most rigorous justice betwixt man and man are yet themselves unjust to Providence. "Why was such a one taken away in the prime of

his years?" As if it were the number of years that makes death easy to us, and not the temper of the mind. He that would live a little longer to-day, would be as loth to die a hundred years hence. But which is more reasonable for us to obey Nature, or for Nature to obey us? Go we must at last, and no matter how soon. It is the work of Fate to make us live long, but it is the business of virtue to make a short life sufficient. Life is to be measured by action, not by time; a man may die old at thirty, and young at fourscore: nay, the one lives after death, and the other perished before he died. I look upon age among the effects of chance. How long I shall live is in the power of others, but it is in my own how well. The largest space of time is to live till a man is wise. He that dies of old age does no more than go to bed when he is weary. Death is the test of life, and it is that only which discovers what we are, and distinguishes betwixt ostentation and virtue. A man may dispute, cite great authorities, talk learnedly, huff it out, and yet be rotten at heart. But let us soberly attend our business: and since it is uncertain *when*, or *where*, we shall die, let us look for death in all places, and at all times: we can never study that point too much, which we can never come to experiment whether we know it or not. It is a blessed thing to dispatch the business of life before we die, and then to expect death in the possession of a happy life. He is the great man who is willing to die when his life is pleasant to him. An honest life is not a greater good than an honest death. How many brave young men, by an instinct of Nature, are carried on to great actions, and even to the contempt of all hazards!

It is childish to go out of the world groaning and wailing as we came into it. Our bodies must be thrown away, as the secundine that wraps up the infant, the other being only the covering of the soul; we shall then discover the secrets of Nature; the darkness shall be discussed, and our souls irradiated with light and glory: a glory without a shadow; a glory that shall surround us, and from whence we shall look down and see day and night beneath us. If we cannot lift up our eyes toward the lamp of heaven without dazzling, what shall we do when we come to behold the divine light in its illustrious original? That death which we so much dread and decline, is not the determination, but the intermission of a life, which will return again. All those things, that are the very cause of life, are the way to death: we fear it as we do fame; but it is a great folly to fear words. Some people are so impatient of life, that they are still wishing for death; but he that wishes to die does not desire it: let us rather wait God's pleasure, and pray for health and life. If we have a mind to live, why do we wish to die? If we have a mind to die, we may do it without talking of it. Men are a great deal more resolute in the article of *death* itself than they are about the circumstances of it: for it gives a man courage to consider that his fate is inevitable: the slow approaches of death are the most troublesome to us; as we see many a gladiator, who upon his wounds, will direct his adversary's weapon to his very heart, though but timorous perhaps in the combat. There are some that have not the heart either to live or die; that is a sad case. But this we are sure of, "the fear of death is a continual slavery, as the contempt of it is certain liberty."

## CHAPTER XXII.

CONSOLATIONS AGAINST DEATH, FROM THE PROVIDENCE AND  
THE NECESSITY OF IT.

THIS life is only a prelude to eternity, where we are to expect another original, and another state of things; we have no prospect of heaven here but at a distance; let us therefore expect our last and decretry hour with courage. The last (I say) to our bodies, but not to our minds: our luggage we leave behind us, and return as naked out of the world as we came into it. The day which we fear as our last is but the birth-day of our eternity; and it is the only way to it. So that what we fear as a rock, proves to be but a port, in many cases to be desired, never to be refused; and he that dies young has only made a quick voyage of it. Some are becalmed, others cut it away before wind; and we live just as we sail: first, we rub our childhood out of sight; our youth next; and then our middle age: after that follows old age, and brings us to the common end of mankind.

It is a great providence that we have more ways out of the world than we have into it. Our security stands upon a point, the very article of death. It draws a great many blessings into a very narrow compass: and although the fruit of it does not seem to extend to the defunct, yet the difficulty of it is more than balanced by the contemplation of the

future. Nay, suppose that all the business of this world should be forgotten, or my memory, traduced, what is all this to me? "I have done my duty." Undoubtedly that which puts an end to all other evils, cannot be a very great evil itself, and yet it is no easy thing for flesh and blood to despise life. What if death comes? If it does not stay with us why should we fear it? One hangs himself for a mistress; another leaps the garret-window to avoid a choleric master; a third runs away and stabs himself, rather than he will be brought back again. We see the force even of our infirmities, and shall we not then do greater things for the love of virtue? To suffer death is but the law of nature; and it is a great comfort that it can be done but once; in the very convulsions of it we have this consolation, that our pain is near an end, and that it frees us from all the miseries of life.

What it is we know not, and it were rash to condemn what we do not understand; but this we presume, either that we shall pass out of this into a better life, where we shall live with tranquillity and splendor, in diviner mansions, or else return to our first principles, free from the sense of any inconvenience. There is nothing immortal, nor many things lasting; by but divers ways everything comes to an end. What an arrogance is it then, when the world itself stands condemned to a dissolution, that man alone should expect to live forever! It is unjust not to allow unto the giver the power of disposing of his own bounty, and a folly only to value the present. Death is as much a debt as money, and life is but a journey towards it: some dispatch it sooner, others later, but we must all have the same period. The

thunderbolt is undoubtedly just that draws even from those that are struck with it a veneration.

A great soul takes no delight in staying with the body: it considers whence it came, and knows whither it is to go. The day will come that shall separate this mixture of soul and body, of divine and human; my body I will leave where I found it, my soul I will restore to heaven, which would have been there already, but for the clog that keeps it down: and beside, how many men have been the worse for longer living, that might have died with reputation if they had been sooner taken away! How many disappointments of hopeful youths, that have proved dissolute men! Over and above the ruins, shipwrecks, torments, prisons, that attend long life; a blessing so deceitful, that if a child were in condition to judge of it, and at liberty to refuse it, he would not take it.

What Providence has made necessary, human prudence should comply with cheerfully: as there is a necessity of death, so that necessity is equal and invincible. No man has cause of complaint for that which every man must suffer as well as himself. When we *should* die, we *will not*, and when we *would not* we *must*: but our fate is fixed, and unavoidable is the decree. Why do we then stand trembling when the time comes? Why do we not as well lament that we did not live a thousand years ago, as that we shall not be alive a thousand years hence? It is but traveling the great road, and to the place whither we must all go at last. It is but submitting to the law of Nature, and to that lot which the whole world has suffered that is gone before us; and so must they too that are to come after us. Nay, how many thousands, when our time

comes, will expire in the same moment with us! He that will not follow shall be drawn by force: and is it not much better now to do that willingly which we shall otherwise be made to do in spite of our hearts?

The sons of mortal parents must expect a mortal posterity—death is the end of great and small. We are born helpless, and exposed to the injuries of all creatures and of all weathers. The very necessaries of life are deadly to us; we meet with our fate in our dishes, in our cups, and in the very air we breathe; nay, our very birth is inauspicious, for we come into the world weeping, and in the middle of our designs, while we are meditating great matters, and stretching of our thoughts to after ages, death cuts us off, and our longest date is only the revolution of a few years. One man dies at the table; another goes away in his sleep, a third in his mistress's arms, a fourth is stabbed, another is stung with an adder, or crushed with the fall of a house. We have several ways to our end, but the end itself, which is death, is still the same. Whether we die by a sword, by a halter, by a potion, or by a disease, it is all but *death*. A child dies in the swaddling-clouts, and an old man at a hundred—they are both mortal alike, though the one goes sooner than the other. All that lies betwixt the cradle and the grave is uncertain. If we compute the *troubles*, the life even of a child is long: if the *sweetness* of the *passage*, that of an old man is short; the whole is slippery and deceitful, and only death certain; and yet all people complain of that which never deceived any man. Senecio raised himself from a small beginning to a vast fortune, being very well skilled in the faculties both of getting and of keeping, and either of them was sufficient for the doing of his business. He was

a man infinitely careful both of his patrimony and of his body. He gave me a morning's visit, (says our author,) and after that visit he went away and spent the rest of the day with a friend of his that was desperately sick. At night, he was merry at supper, and seized immediately after with a quinsy which dispatched him in a few hours. This man that had money at use in all places, and in the very course and height of his prosperity was thus cut off. How foolish a thing is it then for a man to flatter himself with long hopes, and to pretend to dispose of the future: nay, the very present slips through our fingers, and there is not that moment which we can call our own.

How vain a thing is it for us to enter upon projects, and to say to ourselves, "Well, I will go build, purchase, discharge such offices, settle my affairs, and then retire!" We are all of us born to the same casualties—all equally frail and uncertain of tomorrow. At the very altar where we pray for life, we learn to die, by seeing the sacrifices killed before us. But there is no need of a wound, or searching the heart for it, when the noose of a cord, or the smothering of a pillow will do the work. All things have their seasons—they begin, they increase, and they die. The heavens and the earth grow old, and are appointed their periods.

That which we call *death* is but a pause or suspension; and, in truth, a progress to life, only our thoughts look downward upon the body, and not forward upon things to come. All things under the sun are mortal—cities—empires—and the time will come when it shall be a question where they were, and, perchance, whether ever they had a being or not. Some will be destroyed by war, others by lux-

ury, fire, inundations, earthquakes—why should it trouble me then to die, as a forerunner of an universal dissolution? A great mind submits itself to God, and suffers willingly what the law of the universe will otherwise bring to pass upon necessity.

That good old man Bassus, (though with one foot in the grave,) how cheerful a mind does he bear. He lives in the view of death, and contemplates his own end with less concern of thought or countenance, than he would do another man's. It is a hard lesson, and we are a long time a learning of it, to receive our death without trouble, especially in the case of Bassus: in other deaths there is a mixture of hope—a disease may be cured, a fire quenched, a falling house either propped or avoided, the sea may swallow a man and throw him up again, a pardon may interpose twixt the ax and the body—but in the case of old age there is no place for either hope or intercession.

Let us live in our bodies, therefore, as if we were only to lodge in them this night, and to leave them to-morrow. It is the frequent thought of death that must fortify us against the necessity of it. He that has armed himself against poverty, may, perhaps; come to live in plenty. A man may strengthen himself against pain and yet live in a state of health; against the loss of friends, and never lose any, but he that fortifies himself against the fear of death shall most certainly have occasion to employ that virtue. It is the care of a wise and a good man to look to his manners and actions; and rather how well he lives than how long, for to die sooner or later is not the business, but to die well or ill, for “death brings us to immortality.”

## CHAPTER XXIII.

## AGAINST IMMODERATE SORROW FOR THE DEATH OF FRIENDS.

NEXT to the encounter of death in our own bodies, the most sensible calamity to an honest man is the death of a friend; and we are not in truth without some generous instances of those that have preferred a friend's life before their own; and yet this affliction, which by nature is so grievous to us, is by virtue and Providence made familiar and easy.

To lament the death of a friend is both natural and just; a sigh or a tear I would allow to his memory: but no profuse or obstinate sorrow. Clamorous and public lamentations are not so much the effects of grief as of vain-glory. He that is sadder in company than alone, shows rather the ambition of his sorrow than the piety of it. Nay, and in the violence of his passion there fall out twenty things that set him a-laughing. At the long-run, time cures all, but it were better done by moderation and wisdom. Some people do as good as set a watch upon themselves, as if they were afraid that their grief would make an escape. The ostentation of grief is many times more than the grief itself. When any body is within hearing, what groans and outcries! when they are alone and private, all is hush and quiet: so soon as any body comes in, they are at it again; and down they throw themselves upon the bed; fall to

wringing of their hands, and wishing of themselves dead; which they might have executed by themselves; but their sorrow goes off with the company. We forsake nature, and run over to the practices of the people, that never were the authors of anything that is good. If destiny were to be wrought upon by tears, I would allow you to spend your days and nights in sadness and mourning, tearing of your hair, and beating of your breast; but if Fate be inexorable, and death will keep what it has taken, grief is to no purpose. And yet I would not advise insensibility and hardness; it were inhumanity, and not virtue, not to be moved at the separation of familiar friends and relations: now, in such cases, we cannot command ourselves, we cannot forbear weeping, and we ought not to forbear: but let us not pass the bounds of affection, and run into imitation; within these limits it is some ease to the mind.

A wise man gives way to tears in some cases, and cannot avoid them in others. When one is struck with the surprise of ill-news, as the death of a friend, or the like; or upon the last embrace of an acquaintance under the hand of an executioner, he lies under a natural necessity of weeping and trembling. In another case, we may indulge our sorrow, as upon the memory of a dead friend's conversation or kindness, one may let fall tears of generosity and joy. We favor the one, and we are overcome by the other; and this is well: but we are not upon any terms to force them: they may flow of their own accord, without derogating from the dignity of a wise man; who at the same time both preserves his gravity, and obeys nature. Nay, there is a certain *decorum* even in weeping; for excess of sorrow is as foolish as profuse laughter. Why do we not as well

cry, when our trees that we took pleasure in, shed their leaves, as at the loss of our satisfactions; when the next season repairs them, either with the same again, or others in their places. We may accuse Fate, but we cannot alter it; for it is hard and inexorable, and not to be removed either with reproaches or tears. They may carry *us* to the *dead*, but never bring *them* back again to us. If reason does not put an end to our sorrows, fortune never will: one is pinched with poverty; another solicited with ambition, and fears the very wealth that he coveted. One is troubled for the loss of children; another for the want of them: so that we shall sooner want tears than matter for them; let us therefore spare that for which we have so much occasion. I do confess, that in the very parting of friends there is something of uneasiness and trouble; but it is rather voluntary than natural; and it is custom more than sense that affects us: we do rather impose a sorrow upon ourselves than submit to it; as people cry when they have company, and when nobody looks on, all is well again. To mourn without measure is folly, and not to mourn at all is insensibility. The best temper is betwixt piety and reason; to be sensible, but neither transported nor cast down. He that can put a stop to his tears and pleasures when he will is safe. It is an equal infelicity to be either too soft or too hard: we are overcome by the one, and put to struggle with the other. There is a certain intemperance in that sorrow that passes the rules of modesty; and yet great piety is, in many cases, a dispensation to good manners. The loss of a son or of a friend, cuts a man to the heart, and there is no opposing the first violence of his passion; but when a man comes once to deliver himself wholly up to

lamentations, he is to understand, that though some tears deserve compassion, others are yet ridiculous. A grief that is fresh finds pity and comfort, but when it is inveterate it is laughed at, for it is either counterfeit or foolish. Beside that, to weep excessively for the dead is an affront to the living. The most justifiable cause of mourning is to see good men come to ill ends, and virtue oppressed by the iniquity of Fortune. But in this case, too, they either suffer resolutely, and yield us delight in their courage and example, or meanly, and so give us the less trouble for the loss. He that dies cheerfully, dries up my tears; and he that dies wailingly, does not deserve them. I would bear the death of friends and children with the same constancy that I would expect my own, and no more lament the one than fear the other. He that bethinks himself, how often friends have been parted, will find more time lost among the living than upon the dead; and the most desperate mourners are they that cared least for their friends when they were living; for they think to redeem their credits, for want of kindness to the living, by extravagant ravings after the dead. Some (I know) will have grief to be only the perverse delight of a restless mind, and sorrows and pleasures to be near akin; and there are, I am confident, that find joy even in their tears. But which is more barbarous, to be insensible of grief for the death of a friend, or to fish for pleasure in grief, when a son perhaps is burning, or a friend expiring? To forget one's friend, to bury the memory with the body, to lament out of measure, is all inhuman. He that is gone either would not have his friend tormented, or does not know that he is so: if he does not feel it, it is superfluous; if he does, it is unacceptable to him.

If reason cannot prevail, reputation may; for immoderate mourning lessens a man's character: it is a shameful thing for a wise man to make the *weariness* of grieving the *remedy* of it. In time, the most stubborn grief will leave us, if in prudence we do not leave that first.

But do I grieve for my friend's sake or for my own? Why should I afflict myself for the loss of him that is either happy or not at all in being? In the one case it is envy, and in the other it is madness. We are apt to say, "What would I give to see him again, and to enjoy his conversation! I was never sad in his company: my heart leaped whenever I met him; I want him wherever I go." All that is to be said is, "The greater the loss, the greater is the virtue to overcome it." If grieving will do no good, it is an idle thing to grieve; and if that which has befallen one man remains to all, it is as unjust to complain. The whole world is upon the march towards the same point; why do we not cry for ourselves that are to follow, as well as for him that has gone first? Why do we not as well lament beforehand for that which we know will be, and can not possibly but be? He is not *gone*, but *sent before*. As there are many things that he has lost, so there are many things that he does not fear; as anger, jealousy, envy, etc. Is he not more happy in desiring nothing than miserable in what he has lost? We do not mourn for the absent, why then for the dead, who are effectually no other? We have lost one blessing, but we have many left; and shall not all these satisfactions support us against one sorrow?

The comfort of having a friend may be taken away, but not that of having had one. As there is a sharpness in some fruits, and a bitterness in some

wines that please us, so there is a mixture in the remembrance of friends, where the loss of their company is sweetened again by the contemplation of their virtues. In some respects, I have lost what I had, and in others, I retain still what I have lost. It is an ill construction of Providence to reflect only upon my friend's being taken away, without any regard to the benefit of his being once given me. Let us therefore make the best of our friends while we have them; for how long we shall keep them is uncertain. I have lost a hopeful son, but how many fathers have been deceived in their expectations! and how many noble families have been destroyed by luxury and riot! He that grieves for the loss of a son, what if he had lost a friend? and yet he that has lost a friend has more cause of joy that he once had him, than of grief that he is taken away. Shall a man bury his friendship with his friend? We are ungrateful for that which is past, in hope of what is to come; as if that which is to come would not quickly be past too. That which is past we are sure of. We may receive satisfaction, it is true, both from the future and what is already past; the one by expectation, and the other by memory; only the one may possibly not come to pass, and it is impossible to make the other not to have been.

But there is no applying of consolation to fresh and bleeding sorrow; the very discourse irritates the grief and inflames it. It is like an unseasonable medicine in a disease; when the first violence is over, it will be more tractable, and endure the handling. Those people whose minds are weakened by long felicity may be allowed to groan and complain, but it is otherwise with those that have

led their days in misfortunes. A long course of adversity has this good in it, that though it vexes a body a great while, it comes to harden us at last; as a raw soldier shrinks at every wound, and dreads the surgeon more than an enemy; whereas a *veteran* sees his own body cut and lamed with as little concern as if it were another's. With the same resolution should we stand the shock and cure of all misfortunes; we are never the better for our experience, if we have not yet learned to be miserable. And there is no thought of curing us by the diversion of sports and entertainments; we are apt to fall into relapses; wherefore we had better overcome our sorrow than delude it.

## CHAPTER XXIV.

## CONSOLATION AGAINST BANISHMENT AND BODILY PAIN.

It is a masterpiece to draw good out of evil; and, by the help of virtue, to improve misfortunes into blessings. “It is a sad condition,” you will say, “for a man to be barred the freedom of his own country.” And is not this the case of thousands that we meet every day in the streets? Some for ambition; others, to negotiate, or for curiosity, delight, friendship, study, experience, luxury, vanity, discontent: some to exercise their virtues, others their vices; and not a few to prostitute either their bodies or their eloquence? To pass now from pleasant countries into the worst of islands; let them be never so barren or rocky, the people never so barbarous, or the clime never so intemperate, he that is banished thither shall find many strangers to live there for their pleasure. The mind of man is naturally curious and restless; which is no wonder, considering their divine original; for heavenly things are always in motion: witness the stars, and the orbs, which are perpetually moving, rolling, and changing of place and according to the law and appointment of Nature. But here are no woods, you will say, no rivers, no gold nor pearl, no commodity for traffic or commerce; nay, hardly provision enough to keep the inhabitants from starving. It is very right; here

are no palaces, no artificial grottoes, or materials for luxury and excess; but we lie under the protection of Heaven; and a poor cottage for a retreat is more worth than the most magnificent temple, when that cottage is consecrated by an honest man under the guard of his virtue. Shall any man think banishment grievous, when he may take such company along with him! Nor is there any banishment but yields enough for our necessities, and no kingdom is sufficient for superfluities. It is the mind that makes us rich in a desert; and if the body be but kept alive, the soul enjoys all spiritual felicities in abundance. What signifies the being banished from one spot of ground to another, to a man that has his thoughts above, and can look forward and backward, and wherever he pleases; and that, wherever he is, has the same matter to work upon? The body is but the prison or the clog of the mind, subjected to punishments, robberies, diseases; but the mind is sacred and spiritual, and liable to no violence. Is it that, a man shall want garments or covering in banishment? The body is as easily clothed as fed; and Nature has made nothing hard that is necessary. But if nothing will serve us but rich embroideries and scarlet, it is none of Fortune's fault that we are poor, but our own. Nay, suppose a man should have all restored him back again that he has lost, it will come to nothing, for he will want more after that to satisfy his desires than he did before to supply his necessities. Insatiable appetites are not so much a thirst as a disease.

To come lower now; where is the people or nation that have not changed their place of abode? Some by the fate of war; others have been cast by tempests, shipwrecks, or want of provisions, upon un-

known coasts. Some have been forced abroad by pestilence, sedition, earthquakes, surcharge of people at home. Some travel to see the world, others for commerce; but, in fine, it is clear, that, upon some reason or other, the whole race of mankind have shifted their quarters; changed their very names as well as their habitations; insomuch that we have lost the very memorials of what they were. All these transports of people, what are they but public banishments? The very *founder* of the *Roman empire* was an *exile*: briefly, the whole world has been transplanted, and one mutation treads upon the heel of another. That which one man desires, turns another man's stomach; and he that proscribes me to-day, shall himself be cast out to-morrow. We have, however, this comfort in our misfortune; we have the same nature, the same Providence, and we carry our virtues along with us. And this blessing we owe to that almighty Power, call it what you will; either a *God*, or an *Incorporeal Reason*, a *Divine Spirit*, or *Fate*, and the *unchangeable Course* of causes and effects: it is, however, so ordered, that nothing can be taken from us but what we can well spare: and that which is most magnificent and valuable continues with us. Wherever we go, we have the heavens over our heads, and no farther from us than they were before; and so long as we can entertain our eyes and thoughts with those glories, what matter is it what ground we tread upon?

In the case of pain or sickness, it is only the body that is affected; it may take off the speed of a footman, or bind the hands of a cobbler, but the mind is still at liberty to hear, learn, teach, advise, and to do other good offices. It is an example of public

benefit, a man that is in pain and patient. Virtue may show itself as well in the bed as in the field; and he that cheerfully encounters the terrors of death and corporal anguish, is as great a man as he that most generously hazards himself in a battle. A disease, it is true, bars us of some pleasures, but procures us others. Drink is never so grateful to us as in a burning fever; nor meat, as when we have fasted ourselves sharp and hungry. The patient may be forbidden some sensual satisfaction, but no physician will forbid us the delight of the mind. Shall we call any sick man miserable, because he must give over his intemperance of wine and glut-tony, and betake himself to a diet of more sobriety, and less expense; and abandon his luxury, which is the distemper of the mind as well as of the body? It is troublesome, I know, at first, to abstain from the pleasures we have been used to, and to endure hunger and thirst; but in a little time we lose the very appetite, and it is no trouble then to be without that which we do not desire. In diseases there are great pains; but if they be long they remit, and give us some intervals of ease; if short and violent, either they dispatch *us*, or consume *themselves*; so that either their respites make them tolerable, or the extremity makes them short. So merciful is Almighty God to us, that our torments cannot be very sharp and lasting. The acutest pains are those that affect the nerves, but there is this comfort in them too, that they will quickly make us stupid and insensible. In cases of extremity, let us call to mind the most eminent instances of patience and courage, and turn our thoughts from our afflictions to the contemplation of virtue. Suppose it be the stone, the gout, nay, the rack itself; how many

have endured it without so much as a groan or word speaking; without so much as asking for relief, or giving an answer to a question! Nay, they have laughed at the tormentors upon the very torture, and provoked them to new experiments of their cruelty, which they have had still in derision. The *asthma* I look upon as of all diseases the most importunate; the physicians call it the *meditation of death*, as being rather an agony than a sickness; the fit holds one not above an hour, as nobody is long in expiring. Are there not three things grievous in sickness, the fear of death, bodily pain, and the intermission of our pleasures? the first is to be imputed to nature, not to the disease; for we do not die because we are sick, but because we live. Nay, sickness itself has preserved many a man from dying.

## CHAPTER XXV.

POVERTY TO A WISE MAN IS RATHER A BLESSING THAN A MISFORTUNE.

No man shall ever be poor that goes to himself for what he wants; and that is the readiest way to riches. Nature, indeed, will have her due; but yet whatsoever is beyond necessity is precarious, and not necessary. It is not her business to gratify the palate, but to satisfy a craving stomach. Bread, when a man is hungry, does his work, let it be never so coarse; and water when he is dry; let his thirst be quenched, and Nature is satisfied, no matter whence it comes, or whether he drinks in gold, silver, or in the hollow of his hand. To promise a man riches, and to teach him poverty, is to deceive him: but shall I call him poor that wants nothing; though he may be beholden for it to his patience, rather than to his fortune? Or shall any man deny him to be rich, whose riches can never be taken away. Whether is it better to have much or enough? He that has much desires more, and shows that he has not yet enough; but he that has enough is at rest. Shall a man be reputed the less rich for not having that for which he shall be banished; for which his very wife, or son, shall poison him: that which gives him security in war, and quiet in peace; which he possesses without danger, and disposes of

without trouble? No man can be poor that has enough; nor rich, that covets more than he has. Alexander, after all his conquests, complained that he wanted more worlds; he desired something more, even when he had gotten all: and that which was sufficient for human nature was not enough for one man. Money never made any man rich; for the more he had, the more he still coveted. The richest man that ever lived is poor in my opinion, and in any man's may be so: but he that keeps himself to the stint of Nature, does neither feel poverty nor fear it; nay, even in poverty itself there are some things superfluous. Those which the world calls happy, their felicity is a false splendor, that dazzles the eyes of the vulgar; but our rich man is glorious and happy within. There is no ambition in hunger or thirst: let there be food, and no matter for the table, the dish, and the servants, nor with what meats nature is satisfied. Those are the torments of luxury, that rather stuff the stomach than fill it: it studies rather to cause an appetite than to allay it. It is not for us to say, "This is not handsome; that is common; the other offends my eye." Nature provides for health, not delicacy. When the trumpet sounds a charge, the poor man knows that he is not aimed at; when they cry out *fire*, his body is all he has to look after: if he be to take a journey, there is no blocking up of streets, and thronging of passages, for a parting compliment: a small matter fills his belly, and contents his mind: he lives from hand to mouth, without caring or fearing for to-morrow. The temperate rich man is but his counterfeit; his wit is quicker and his appetite calmer.

No man finds poverty a trouble to him, but he that thinks it so; and he that thinks it so, makes it so.

Does not a rich man travel more at ease with less luggage, and fewer servants? Does he not eat many times as little and as coarse in the field as a poor man? Does he not for his own pleasure, sometimes, and for variety, feed upon the ground, and use only earthen vessels? Is not he a madman then, that always fears what he often desires, and dreads the thing that he takes delight to imitate: he that would know the worst of poverty, let him but compare the looks of the rich and of the poor, and he shall find the poor man to have a smoother brow, and to be more merry at heart; or if any trouble befalls him, it passes over like a cloud: whereas the other, either his good humor is counterfeit, or his melancholy deep and ulcerated, and the worse, because he dares not publicly own his misfortune; but he is forced to play the part of a happy man even with a cancer in his heart. His felicity is but personated; and if he were but stripped of his ornaments, he would be contemptible. In buying of a horse, we take off his clothes and his trappings, and examine his shape and body for fear of being cozened; and shall we put an estimate upon a man for being set off by his fortune and quality? Nay, if we see anything of ornament about him, we are to suspect him the more for some infirmity under it. He that is not content in poverty, would not be so neither in plenty; for the fault is not in the thing, but in the mind. If that be sickly, remove him from a kennel to a palace, he is at the same pass; for he carries his disease along with him.

What can be happier than the condition both of mind and of fortune from which we cannot fall—what can be a greater felicity than in a covetous, designing age, for a man to live safe among inform-

ers and thieves? It puts a poor man into the very condition of Providence, that gives all, without reserving anything to itself. How happy is he that owes nothing but to himself, and only that which he can easily refuse or easily pay! I do not reckon him poor that has but a little, but he is so that covets more—it is a fair degree of plenty to have what is necessary. Whether had a man better find satiety in want, or hunger in plenty? It is not the augmenting of our fortunes, but the abating of our appetites that makes us rich.

Why may not a man as well contemn riches in his own coffers as in another man's, and rather hear that they are his than feel them to be so, though it is a great matter not to be corrupted even by having them under the same roof. He is the greater man that is honestly poor in the middle of plenty—but he is the more secure that is free from the temptation of that plenty, and has the least matter for another to design upon. It is no great business for a poor man to preach the contempt of riches, or for a rich man to extol the benefits of poverty, because we do not know how either the one or the other would behave himself in the contrary condition. The best proof is the doing of it by choice and not by necessity; for the practice of poverty in jest is a preparation toward the bearing of it in earnest; but it is yet a generous disposition so to provide for the worst of fortunes as what may be easily borne—the premeditation makes them not only tolerable but delightful to us, for there is that in them without which nothing can be comfortable, that is to say, security. If there were nothing else in poverty but the certain knowledge of our friends, it were yet a most desirable blessing, when every man leaves us but those that

love us. It is a shame to place the happiness of life in gold and silver, for which bread and water is sufficient; or, at the worst, hunger puts an end to hunger.

For the honor of *poverty*, it was both the *foundation* and the *cause of the Roman empire*; and no man was ever yet so poor but he had enough to carry him to his journey's end.

All I desire is that my property may not be a burden to myself, or make me so to others; and that is the best state of fortune that is neither directly necessitous, nor far from it. A mediocrity of fortune with a gentleness of mind, will preserve us from fear or envy, which is a desirable condition, for no man wants power to do mischief. We never consider the blessing of coveting nothing, and the glory of being full in ourselves, without depending upon Fortune. With parsimony a little is sufficient and without it nothing; whereas frugality makes a poor man rich. If we lose an estate, we had better never have had it—he that has least to lose has least to fear, and those are better satisfied whom Fortune never favored, than those whom she has forsaken.

The state is most commodious that lies betwixt poverty and plenty. Diogenes understood this very well when he put himself into an incapacity of losing any thing. That course of life is most commodious which is both safe and wholesome—the body is to be indulged no farther than for health, and rather mortified than not kept in subjection to the mind. It is necessary to provide against hunger, thirst, and cold; and somewhat for a covering to shelter us against other inconveniences; but not a

pin matter whether it be of turf or of marble—a man may lie as warm and as dry under a thatched as under a gilded roof. Let the mind be great and glorious, and all other things are despicable in comparison. “The future is uncertain, and I had rather beg of myself not to desire any thing, than of Fortune to bestow it.”

## SENECA OF ANGER.

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### CHAPTER I.

ANGER DESCRIBED, IT IS AGAINST NATURE, AND ONLY TO BE FOUND IN MAN.

WE ARE here to encounter the most outrageous, brutal, dangerous, and intractable of all passions; the most loathsome and unmannerly; nay, the most ridiculous too; and the subduing of this monster will do a great deal toward the establishment of human peace. It is the method of *physicians* to begin with a description of the disease, before they meddle with the cure: and I know not why this may not do as well in the distempers of the mind as in those of the body.

The *Stoics* will have *anger* to be a “desire of punishing another for some injury done.” Against which it is objected, that we are many times angry with those that never did hurt us, but possibly may, though the harm be not as yet done. But I say, that they hurt us already in conceit: and the very purpose of it is an injury in thought before it breaks out into act. It is opposed again, that if anger were a *desire of punishing*, mean people

would not be angry with great ones that are out of their reach; for no man can be said to desire any thing which he judges impossible to compass. But I answer to this, That *anger* is the *desire*, not the *power* and *faculty* of *revenge*; neither is any man so low, but that the greatest man alive may peradventure lie at his mercy.

Aristotle takes *anger* to be, “a desire of paying sorrow for sorrow;” and of plaguing those that have plagued us. It is argued against both, that beasts are angry; though neither provoked by any injury, nor moved with a desire of any body’s grief or punishment. Nay, though they cause it, they do not design or seek it. Neither is *anger* (how unreasonable soever in itself) found anywhere but in reasonable creatures. It is true, the beasts have an impulse of rage and fierceness; as they are more affected also than men with some pleasures; but we may as well call them luxurious and ambitious as angry. And yet they are not without certain images of human affections. They have their likings and their loathings; but neither the passions of reasonable nature, nor their virtues, nor their vices. They are moved to fury by some objects; they are quieted by others; they have their terrors and their disappointments, but without reflection: and let them be never so much irritated or affrighted, so soon as ever the occasion is removed they fall to their meat again, and lie down and take their rest. Wisdom and thought are the goods of the mind, whereof brutes are wholly incapable; and we are as unlike them within as we are without: they have an odd kind of fancy, and they have a voice too; but inarticulate and confused, and incapable of those variations which are familiar to us.

Anger is not only a vice, but a vice point-blank against nature, for it divides instead of joining; and in some measure, frustrates the end of Providence in human society. One man was born to help another; anger makes us destroy one another; the one unites, the other separates; the one is beneficial to us, the other mischievous; the one succors even strangers, the other destroys even the most intimate friends; the one ventures all to save another, the other ruins himself to undo another. Nature is bountiful, but anger is pernicious: for it is not fear, but mutual love that binds up mankind.

There are some motions that look like anger, which cannot properly be called so; as the passion of the people against the *gladiators*, when they hang off, and will not make so quick a dispatch as the spectators would have them: there is something in it of the humor of children, that if they get a fall, will never leave bawling until the naughty ground is beaten, and then all is well again. They are angry without any cause or injury; they are deluded by an imitation of strokes, and pacified with counterfeit tears. A false and a childish sorrow is appeased with as false and as childish a revenge. They take it for a contempt, if the *gladiators* do not immediately cast themselves upon the sword's point. They look presently about them from one to another, as who should say; "Do but see, my masters, how these rogues abuse us."

To descend to the particular branches and varieties would be unnecessary and endless. There is a stubborn, a vindictive, a quarrelsome, a violent, a forward, a sullen, a morose kind of anger; and then we have this variety in complication too. One goes no

further than words; another proceeds immediately to blows, without a word speaking; a third sort breaks out into cursing and reproachful language; and there are that content themselves with chiding and complaining. There is a confiliable anger and there is an implacable; but in what form or degree soever it appears, all anger, without exception, is vicious.

## CHAPTER II.

## THE RISE OF ANGER.

THE question will be here, whether *anger* takes its rise from impulse or judgment; that is, whether it be moved of its own accord, or, as many other things are, from within us, that arise we know not how? The clearing of this point will lead us to greater matters.

The *first motion* of *anger* is in truth involuntary, and only a kind of menacing preparation towards it. The *second* deliberates; as who should say, “This injury should not pass without a revenge,” and there it stops. The *third* is impotent; and, right or wrong, resolves upon vengeance. The *first motion* is not to be avoided, nor indeed the *second*, any more than yawning for company; custom and care may lessen it, but reason itself cannot overcome it. The *third*, as it rises upon consideration, it must fall so too, for that motion which proceeds with judgment may be taken away with judgment. A man thinks himself injured, and hath a mind to be revenged, but for some reason lets it rest. This is not properly *anger*, but an *affection overruled by reason*; a kind of proposal disapproved—and what are reason and affection, but only changes of the mind for the better or for the worse? Reason deliberates before it judges; but anger passes sen-

tence without deliberation. Reason only attends the matter in hand; but anger is startled at every accident; it passes the bounds of reason, and carries it away with it. In short, “anger is an agitation of the mind that proceeds to the resolution of a revenge, the mind assenting to it.”

There is no doubt but anger is moved by the species of an injury; but whether that motion be voluntary or involuntary is the point in debate; though it seems manifest to me that *anger* does nothing but where the mind goes along with it, for, first, to take an offence, and then to meditate a revenge, and after that to lay both propositions together, and say to myself, “This injury ought not to have been done; but as the case stands, I must do myself right.” This discourse can never proceed without the concurrence of the will.

The first motion indeed is single; but all the rest is deliberation and superstructure—there is something understood and condemned—an indignation conceived and a revenge propounded. This can never be without the agreement of the mind to the matter in deliberation. The end of this question is to know the nature and quality of *anger*. If it be bred in us it will never yield to reason, for all involuntary motions are inevitable and invincible; as a kind of horror and shrugging upon the sprinkling of cold water; the hair standing on end at ill news; giddiness at the sight of a precipice; blushing at lewd discourse. In these cases reason can do no good, but *anger* may undoubtedly be overcome by caution and good counsel, for it is a *voluntary vice*, and not of the condition of those accidents that befall us as frailties of our humanity, amongst which must be reckoned the first motions of the mind

after the opinion of an injury received, which it is not in the power of human nature to avoid, and this is it that affects us upon the stage, or in a story.

Can any man read the death of Pompey, and not be touched with an indignation? The sound of a trumpet rouses the spirits and provokes courage. It makes a man sad to see the shipwreck even of an enemy; and we are much surprised by fear in other cases—all these motions are not so much affections as preludes to them. The clashing of arms or the beating of a drum excites a war-horse: nay, a song from Xenophantes would make Alexander take his sword in his hand.

In all these cases the mind rather suffers than acts, and therefore it is not an affection *to be moved*, but *to give way* to that motion, and to follow willingly what was started by chance—these are not affections, but impulses of the body. The bravest man in the world may look pale when he puts on his armor, his knees knock, and his heart work before the battle is joined: but these are only *motions*; whereas *anger* is an *excursion*, and proposes revenge or punishment, which cannot be without the mind. As fear flies, so anger assaults; and it is not possible to resolve, either upon violence or caution, without the concurrence of the will.

## CHAPTER III.

## ANGER MAY BE SUPPRESSED.

IT is an idle thing to pretend that we cannot govern our *anger*; for some things that we do are much harder than others that we ought to do; the wildest affections may be tamed by discipline, and there is hardly anything which the mind will do but it may do. There needs no more argument in this case than the instances of several persons, both powerful and impatient, that have gotten the absolute mastery of themselves in this point.

Thrasippus in his drink fell foul upon the cruelties of Pisistratus; who, when he was urged by several about him to make an example of him, returned this answer, “Why should I be angry with a man that stumbles upon me blindfold?” In effect most of our quarrels are of our own making, either by mistake or by aggravation. Anger comes sometimes upon us, but we go oftener to it, and instead of rejecting it we call it.

Augustus was a great master of his passion: for Timagenus, an historian, wrote several bitter things against his person and his family: which passed among the people plausibly enough, as pieces of rash wit commonly do. Cæsar advised him several times to forbear; and when that would not do, forbade him his roof. After this, Asinius Pollio gave

him entertainment; and he was so well beloved in the city, that every man's house was open to him. Those things that he had written in honor of Augustus, he recited and burnt, and publicly professed himself Cæsar's enemy. Augustus, for all this, never fell out with any man that received him; only once, he told Pollio, that he had taken a *snake* into his bosom: and as Pollio was about to excuse himself; "No," says Cæsar, interrupting him, "make your best of him." And offering to cast him off at that very moment, if Cæsar pleased: "Do you think," says Cæsar, "that I will ever contribute to the parting of you, that made you friends?" for Pollio was angry with him before, and only entertained him now because Cæsar had discarded him.

The moderation of Antigonus was remarkable. Some of his soldiers were railing at him one night, where there was but a hanging betwixt them. Antigonus overheard them, and putting it gently aside; "Soldiers," says he, "stand a little further off, for fear the king should hear you." And we are to consider, not only violent examples, but moderate, where there wanted neither cause of displeasure nor power of revenge: as in the case of Antigonus, who the same night hearing his soldiers cursing him for bringing them into so foul a way, he went to them, and without telling them who he was, helped them out of it. "Now," says he, "you may be allowed to curse him that brought you into the mire, provided you bless him that took you out of it."

It was a notable story that of Vadius Pallio, upon his inviting of Augustus to supper. One of his boys happened to break a glass: and his master, in a rage, commanded him to be thrown in a pond to

feed his lampreys. This action of his might be taken for *luxury*, though, in truth, it was cruelty. The boy was seized, but brake loose and threw himself at Augustus' feet, only desiring that he might not die that death. Cæsar, in abhorence of the barbarity, presently ordered all the rest of the glasses to be broken, the boy to be released, and the pond to be filled up, that there might be no further occasion for an inhumanity of that nature. This was an authority well employed. Shall the breaking of a glass cost a man his life? Nothing but a predominant fear could ever have mastered his choleric and sanguinary disposition. This man deserved to die a thousand deaths, either for eating human flesh at second-hand in his *lampreys*, or for keeping of his fish to be so fed.

It is written of Præxaspes (a favorite of Cambyses, who was much given to wine) that he took the freedom to tell this prince of his hard drinking, and to lay before him the scandal and the inconveniences of his excesses; and how that, in those dis tempers, he had not the command of himself. "Now," says Cambyses, "to show you your mistake, you shall see me drink deeper than ever I did, and yet keep the use of my eyes, and of my hands, as well as if I were sober." Upon this he drank to a higher pitch than ordinary, and ordered Præxaspes' son to go out, and stand on the other side of the threshold, with his left arm over his head; "And," says he, "If I have a good aim, have at the heart of him." He shot, and upon cutting up the young man, they found indeed that the arrow had struck him through the middle of the heart. "What do you think now," says Cambyses, "is my hand steady or not?" "Apollo him-

self," says Præxaspes, "could not have outdone it." It may be a question now, which was the greater impiety, the murder itself, or the commendation of it; for him to take the heart of his son, while it was yet reeking and panting under the wound, for an occasion of flattery: why was there not another experiment made upon the father, to try if Cambyses could not have yet mended his shot? This was a most unmanly violation of hospitality; but the approbation of the act was still worse than the crime itself. This example of Præxaspes proves sufficiently that a man may repress his anger; for he returned not one ill word, no not so much as a complaint; but he paid dear for his good counsel. He had been wiser, perhaps, if he had let the king alone in his cups, for he had better have drunk wine than blood. It is a dangerous office to give good advice to intemperate princes.

Another instance of anger suppressed, we have in Harpagus, who was commanded to expose Cyrus upon a mountain. But the child was preserved; which, when Astyages came afterwards to understand, he invited Harpagus to a dish of meat; and when he had eaten his fill, he told him it was a piece of his son, and asked him how he liked the seasoning. "Whatever pleases your Majesty," says Harpagus, "must please me:" and he made no more words of it. It is most certain, that we might govern our anger if we would; for the same thing that galls us at home gives us no offence at all abroad; and what is the reason of it, but that we are patient in one place, and froward in another?

It was a strong provocation that which was given to Philip of Macedon, the father of Alexander. The Athenians sent their ambassadors to him, and they

were received with this compliment, "Tell me, gentlemen," says Philip, "what is there that I can do to oblige the Athenians?" Democharas, one of the ambassadors, told him, that they would take it for a great obligation if he would be pleased to hang himself. This insolence gave an indignation to the bystanders; but Philip bade them not to meddle with him, but even to let that foul-mouthed fellow go as he came. "And for you, the rest of the ambassadors," says he, "pray tell the Athenians, that it is worse to speak such things than to hear and forgive them." This wonderful patience under contumelies was a great means of Philip's security.

## CHAPTER IV.

IT IS A SHORT MADNESS, AND A DEFORMED VICE.

HE WAS much in the right, whoever it was, that first called *anger* a *short madness*; for they have both of them the same symptoms; and there is so wonderful a resemblance betwixt the transports of *choler* and those of *frenzy*, that it is a hard matter to know the one from the other. A bold, fierce, and threatening countenance, as pale as ashes, and, in the same moment, as red as blood; a glaring eye, a wrinkled brow, violent motions, the hands restless and perpetually in action, wringing and menacing, snapping of the joints, stamping with the feet, the hair starting, trembling of the lips, a forced and squeaking voice; the speech false and broken, deep and frequent sighs, and ghastly looks; the veins swell, the heart pants, the knees knock; with a hundred dismal accidents that are common to both distempers. Neither is *anger* a bare resemblance only of madness, but many times an irrevocable transition into the thing itself. How many persons have we known, read, and heard of, that have lost their wits in a passion, and never came to themselves again? It is therefore to be avoided, not only for moderation's sake, but also for health. Now, if the outward appearance of anger be so foul and hideous, how deformed must that miserable mind be

that is harassed with it? for it leaves no place either for counsel or friendship, honesty or good manners; no place either for the exercise of reason, or for the offices of life. If I were to describe it, I would draw a tiger bathed in blood, sharp set, and ready to take a leap at his prey; or dress it up as the poets represent the furies, with whips, snakes, and flames; it should be sour, livid, full of scars, and wallowing in gore, raging up and down, destroying, grinning, bellowing, and pursuing; sick of all other things, and most of all, itself. It turns beauty into deformity, and the calmest counsels into fierceness: it dis-orders our very garments, and fills the mind with horror. How abominable is it in the soul then, when it appears so hideous even through the bones, the skin, and so many impediments! Is not he a madman that has lost the government of himself, and is tossed hither and thither by his fury as by a tempest? the executioner and the murderer of his nearest friends? The smallest matter moves it, and makes us unsociable and inaccessible. It does all things by violence, as well upon itself as others; and it is, in short; the master of all passions.

There is not any creature so terrible and dangerous by nature, but it becomes fiercer by anger. Not that beasts have human affections, but certain im-pulses they have which come very near them. The boar foams, champs, and whets his tusks; the bull tosses his horns in the air, bounds, and tears up the ground with his feet; the lion roars and swinges him-self with his tail; the serpent swells; and there is a ghastly kind of fellness in the aspect of a mad dog. How great a wickedness is it now to indulge a violence, that does not only turn a man into a beast, but makes even the most outrageous of beasts them-

selves to be more dreadful and mischievous! A vice that carries along with it neither pleasure nor profit, neither honor nor security; but on the contrary, destroys us to all the comfortable and glorious purposes of our reasonable being. Some there are, that will have the root of it to be the greatness of mind. And, why may we not as well entitle *impudence* to *courage*, whereas the one is proud, the other brave; the one is gracious and gentle, the other rude and furious? At the same rate we may ascribe magnanimity to avarice, luxury, and ambition, which are all but splendid impotences, without measure and without foundation. There is nothing great but what is virtuous, nor indeed truly great, but what is also composed and quiet. Anger, alas! is but a wild impetuous blast, an empty tumor, the very infirmity of woman and children; a brawling, clamorous evil: and the more noise the less courage; as we find it commonly, that the boldest tongues have the faintest hearts.

## CHAPTER V.

## ANGER IS NEITHER WARRANTABLE NOR USEFUL.

In the first place, Anger is *unwarrantable* as it is *unjust*: for it falls many times upon the wrong person, and discharges itself upon the innocent instead of the guilty: beside the disproportion of making the most trivial offences to be capital, and punishing an inconsiderate word perhaps with torments, fetters, infamy, or death. It allows a man neither time nor means for defence, but judges a cause without hearing it, and admits of no mediation. It flies into the face of truth itself, if it be of the adverse party; and turns obstinacy in an error, into an argument of justice. It does every thing with agitation and tumult; whereas reason and equity can destroy whole families, if there be occasion for it, even to the extinguishing of their names and memories, without any indecency, either of countenance or action.

Secondly, It is unsociable to the highest point; for it spares neither friend nor foe; but tears all to pieces, and casts human nature into a perpetual state of war. It dissolves the bond of mutual society, insomuch that our very companions and relations dare not come near us; it renders us unfit for the ordinary offices of life: for we can neither govern our tongues, our hands, nor any part of our body.

It tramples upon the laws of hospitality, and of nations, leaves every man to be his own carver, and all things, public and private, sacred and profane, suffer violence.

Thirdly, It is to no purpose. "It is a sad thing," we cry, "to put up with these injuries, and we are not able to bear them;" as if any man that can bear anger could not bear an *injury*, which is much more supportable. You will say that anger does some good yet, for it keeps people in awe, and secures a man from contempt; never considering, that it is more dangerous to be feared than despised. Suppose that an angry man could do as much as he threatens; the more terrible, he is still the more odious; and on the other side, if he wants power, he is the more despicable for his anger; for there is nothing more wretched than a choleric huff, that makes a noise, and nobody cares for it.

If anger would be valuable because men are afraid of it, why not an adder, a toad, or a scorpion as well? It makes us lead the life of gladiators; we live, and we fight together. We hate the happy, despise the miserable, envy our superiors, insult our inferiors, and there is nothing in the world which we will not do, either for pleasure or profit. To be angry at offenders is to make ourselves the common enemies of mankind, which is both weak and wicked; and we may as well be angry that our thistles do not bring forth apples, or that every pebble in our ground is not an oriental pearl. If we are angry both with young men and with old, because they do offend, why not with infants too, because they will offend? It is laudable to rejoice for anything that is well done; but to be transported for another man's doing

ill, is narrow and sordid. Nor is it for the dignity of virtue to be either angry or sad.

It is with a tainted mind as with an ulcer, not only the touch, but the very offer at it, makes us shrink and complain; when we come once to be carried off from our poise, we are lost. In the choice of a sword, we take care that it be wieldy and well mounted; and it concerns us as much to be wary of engaging in the excesses of ungovernable passions. It is not the speed of a horse altogether that pleases us unless we find that he can stop and turn at pleasure. It is a sign of weakness, and a kind of stumbling, for a man to run when he intends only to walk; and it behoves us to have the same command of our mind that we have of our bodies. Besides that the greatest punishment of an injury is the conscience of having done it; and no man suffers more than he that is turned over to the pain of a repentance. How much better is it to compose injuries than to revenge them? For it does not only spend time, but the revenge of one injury exposes to more. In fine, as it is unreasonable to be angry at a crime, it is as foolish to be angry without one.

But "may not an honest man then be allowed to be angry at the murder of his father, or the ravishing of his sister or daughter before his face?" No, not at all. I will defend my parents, and I will repay the injuries that are done them; but it is my piety and not my anger, that moves me to it. I will do my duty without fear or confusion, I will not rage, I will not weep; but discharge the office of a good man without forfeiting the dignity of a man. If my father be assaulted, I will endeavor to rescue him; if he be killed, I will do right to his memory; and all this, not in any transport of passion, but in

honor and conscience. Neither is there any need of anger where reason does the same thing.

A man may be temperate, and yet vigorous, and raise his mind according to the occasion, more or less, as a stone is thrown according to the discretion and intent of the caster. How outrageous have I seen some people for the loss of a monkey or a spaniel! And were it not a shame to have the same sense for a friend that we have for a puppy; and to cry like children, as much for a bauble as for the ruin of our country? This is not the effect of reason, but of infirmity. For a man indeed to expose his person for his prince, or his parents, or his friends, out of a sense of honesty, and judgment of duty, it is, without dispute, a worthy and a glorious action; but it must be done then with sobriety, calmness, and resolution.

It is high time to convince the world of the indignity and uselessness of this passion, when it has the authority and recommendation of no less than Aristotle himself, as an affection very much conducing to all heroic actions that require heat and vigor: now, to show, on the other side, that it is not in any case profitable, we shall lay open the obstinate and unbridled madness of it: a wickedness neither sensible of infamy nor of glory, without either modesty or fear; and if it passes once from anger into a hardened hatred, it is incurable. It is either stronger than reason, or it is weaker. If stronger, there is no contending with it; if weaker, reason will do the business without it. Some will have it that an angry man is good-natured and sincere; whereas, in truth, he only lays himself open out of heedlessness and want of caution. If it were in itself good the more of it the better; but in this case, the more the worse;

and a wise man does his duty, without the aid of anything that is ill. It is objected by some, that those are the most generous creatures which are the most prone to anger. But, first, *reason* in *man* is *impetuous* in *beasts*. Secondly, without discipline it runs into audaciousness and temerity; over and above that, the same thing does not help all. If anger helps the lion, it is fear that saves the stag, swiftness the hawk, and flight the pigeon: but man has God for his example (who is never angry) and not the *creatures*. And yet it is not amiss sometimes to counterfeit anger; as upon the stage; nay, upon the bench, and in the pulpit, where the imitation of it is more effectual than the thing itself.

But it is a great error to take this passion either for a companion or for an assistant to virtue; that makes a man incapable of those necessary counsels by which virtue is to govern herself. Those are false and inauspicious powers, and destructive of themselves, which arise only from the accession and fervor of disease. Reason judges according to right; anger will have every thing seem right, whatever it does, and when it has once pitched upon a mistake, it is never to be convinced, but prefers a pertinacity, even in the greatest evil, before the most necessary repentance.

Some people are of opinion that anger inflames and animates the soldier; that it is a spur to bold and arduous undertakings; and that it were better to moderate than to wholly suppress it, for fear of dissolving the spirit and force of the mind. To this I answer, that virtue does not need the help of vice; but where there is any ardor of mind necessary, we may rouse ourselves, and be more or less brisk and vigorous as there is occasion: but all without anger

still. It is a mistake to say, that we may make use of anger as a common soldier, but not as a commander; for if it hears reason, and follows orders, it is not properly anger; and if it does not, it is contumacious and mutinous. By this argument a man must be angry to be valiant; covetous to be industrious; timorous to be safe, which makes our reason confederate with our affections. And it is all one whether passion be inconsiderate without reason, or reason ineffectual without passion; since the one cannot be without the other. It is true, the less the passion, the less is the mischief; for a little passion is the smaller evil. Nay, so far is it from being of use or advantage in the field, that it is in place of all others where it is the most dangerous; for the actions of war are to be managed with order and caution, not precipitation and fancy; whereas anger is heedless and heady, and the virtue only of *barbarous nations*; which, though their bodies were much stronger and more hardened, were still worsted by the moderation and discipline of the Romans. There is not upon the face of the earth a bolder or a more indefatigable nation than the Germans; not a braver upon a charge, nor a hardier against colds and heats; their only delights and exercise is in arms, to the utter neglect of all things else: and, yet upon the encounter, they are broken and destroyed through their own undisciplined temerity, even by the most effeminate of men. The huntsman is not angry with the wild boar when he either pursues or receives him; a good swordsman watches his opportunity, and keeps himself upon his guard, whereas passion lays a man open: nay, it is one of the prime lessons in a fencing-school to learn not to be angry. If Fabius had been *choleric*, Rome had been *lost*;

and before he conquered *Hannibal* he overcame *himself*. If Scipio had been *angry*, he would never have left Hannibal and his army (who were the proper objects of his displeasure) to carry the war into Afric and so compass his end by a more temperate way. Nay, he was so slow, that it was charged upon him for want of mettle and resolution. And what did the *other* Scipio? (Africanus I mean:) how much time did he spend before Numantia, to the common grief both of his country and himself? Though he reduced it at last by so miserable a famine, that the inhabitants laid violent hands upon themselves, and left neither man, woman, nor child, to survive the ruins of it. If anger makes a man fight better, so does wine, frenzy, nay, and fear itself; for the greatest coward in despair does the greatest wonders. No man is courageous in his anger that was not so without it. But put the case, that anger by accident may have done some good, and so have fevers removed some distempers; but it is an odious kind of remedy that makes us indebted to a disease for a cure. How many men have been preserved by poison; by a fall from a precipice; by a shipwreck; by a tempest! does it therefore follow that we are to recommend the practice of these experiments?

“But in case of an exemplary and prostitute dissolution of manners, when Clodius shall be preferred, and Cicero rejected; when loyalty shall be broken upon the wheel, and treason sit triumphant upon the bench; is not this a subject to move the choicer of any virtuous man?” No, by no means, virtue will never allow of the correcting of one vice by another; or that anger, which is the greater crime of the two, should presume to punish the less.

It is the natural property of virtue to make a man serene and cheerful; and it is not for the dignity of a philosopher to be transported either with grief or anger; and then the end of anger is sorrow, the constant effect of disappointment and repentance. But, to my purpose. If a man should be angry at wickedness, the greater the wickedness is, the greater must be his anger; and, so long as there is wickedness in the world he must never be pleased: which makes his quiet dependent upon the humor or manners of others.

There passes not a day over our heads but he that is choleric shall have some cause or other of displeasure, either from men, accidents, or business. He shall never stir out of his house but he shall meet with criminals of all sorts; prodigal, impudent, covetous, perfidious, contentious, children persecuting their parents, parents cursing their children, the innocent accused, the delinquent acquitted, and the judge practicing that in his chamber which he condemns upon the bench. In fine, wherever there are men there are faults; and upon these terms, Socrates himself should never bring the same countenance home again that he carried out with him.

If anger was sufferable in any case, it might be allowed against an incorrigible criminal under the hand of justice: but punishment is not matter of anger but of caution. The law is without passion, and strikes malefactors as we do serpents and venomous creatures, for fear of greater mischief. It is not for the dignity of a judge, when he comes to pronounce the fatal sentence, to express any motions of anger in his looks, words, or gestures: for he condemns the vice, not the man; and looks upon the wickedness without anger, as he does upon the

prosperity of wicked men without envy. But though he be not angry, I would have him a little moved in point of humanity; but yet without any offence, either to his place or wisdom. Our passions vary, but reason is equal; and it were a great folly for that which is stable, faithful, and sound, to repair for succor to that which is uncertain, false, and distempered. If the offender be incurable, take him out of the world, that if he will not be good he may cease to be evil; but this must be without anger too. Does any man hate an arm, or a leg, when he cuts it off; or reckon *that* a passion which is only a miserable cure? We knock mad dogs on the head, and remove scabbed sheep out of the fold: and this is not anger still, but reason, to separate the sick from the sound. Justice cannot be angry; nor is there any need of an angry magistrate for the punishment of foolish and wicked men. The power of life and death must not be managed with passion. We give a horse the spur that is restive or jadish, and tries to cast his rider; but this is without anger too, and only to take down his stomach, and bring him, by correction, to obedience.

It is true, that correction is necessary, yet within reason and bounds; for it does not hurt, but profits us under an appearance of harm. Ill dispositions in the mind are to be dealt with as those in the body: the physician first tries purging and abstinence; if this will not do, he proceeds to bleeding, nay, to dismembering rather than fail; for there is no operation too severe that ends in health. The public magistrate begins with persuasion, and his business is to beget a detestation for vice, and a veneration for virtue; from thence, if need be, he advances to admonition and reproach, and then to punishments; but mod-

erate and revocable, unless the wickedness be incurable, and then the punishment must be so too. There is only this difference, the physician when he cannot save his patient's life, endeavors to make his death easy; but the magistrate aggravates the death of the criminal with infamy and disgrace; not as delighting in the severity of it, (for no good man can be so barbarous) but for example, and to the end that they that will do no good living may do some dead. The end of all correction is either the amendment of wicked men, or to prevent the influence of ill example: for men are punished with a respect to the future; not to expiate offenses committed, but for fear of worse to come. Public offenders must be a terror to others; but still, all this while, the power of life and death must not be managed with passion. The medicine, in the mean time must be suited to the disease; infamy cures one, pain another, exile cures a third, beggary a fourth; but there are some that are only to be cured by the gibbet. I would be no more angry with a thief, or a traitor, than I am angry with myself when I open a vein. All punishment is but a moral or civil remedy. I do not do anything that is very ill, but yet I transgress often. Try me first with a private reprobation, and then with a public; if that will not serve, see what banishment will do; if not that neither, load me with chains, lay me in prison: but if I should prove wicked for wickedness' sake, and leave no hope of reclaiming me, it would be a kind of mercy to destroy me. Vice is incorporated with me; and there is no remedy but the taking of both away together; but still without anger.

## CHAPTER VI.

## ANGER IN GENERAL, WITH THE DANGER AND EFFECTS OF IT.

THERE is no surer argument of a great mind than not to be transported to anger by any accident; the clouds and the tempests are formed below, but all above is quiet and serene; which is the emblem of a brave man, that suppresses all provocations, and lives within himself, modest, venerable, and composed: whereas anger is a turbulent humor, which, at first dash, casts off all shame, without any regard to order, measure, or good manners; transporting a man into misbecoming violences with his tongue, his hands, and every part of his body. And whoever considers the foulness and the brutality of this vice, must acknowledge that there is no such monster in Nature as one man raging against another, and laboring to sink that which can never be drowned but with himself for company. It renders us incapable either of discourse or of other common duties. It is of all passions the most powerful; for it makes a man that is in love to kill his mistress, the ambitious man to trample upon his honors, and the covetous to throw away his fortune.

There is not any mortal that lives free from the danger of it; for it makes even the heavy and the good-natured to be fierce and outrageous: it invades us like a pestilence, the lusty as well as the weak; and it is not either strength of body, or a good diet,

that can secure us against it; nay, the most learned, and men otherwise of exemplary sobriety, are infected with it. It is so potent a passion that Socrates durst not trust himself with it. "Sirrah," says he to his man, "now would I beat you, if I were not angry with you!" There is no age or sect of men that escapes it. Other vices take us one by one; but this, like an *epidemical contagion*, sweeps all: men, women, and children, princes and beggars, are carried away with it in shoals and troops as one man.

It was never seen that a whole nation was in love with one woman, or unanimously bent upon one vice: but here and there some particular men are tainted with some particular crimes; whereas in anger, a single word many times inflames the whole multitude, and men betake themselves presently to fire and sword upon it; the rabble take upon them to give laws to their governors; the common soldiers to their officers, to the ruin, not only of private families, but of kingdoms: turning their arms against their own leaders, and choosing their own generals. There is no public council, no putting things to the vote; but in a rage the mutineers divide from the senate, name their head, force the nobility in their own houses, and put them to death with their own hands. The laws of nations are violated, the persons of public ministers affronted, whole cities infected with a general madness, and no respite allowed for the abatement or discussing of this public tumor. The ships are crowded with tumultuary soldiers; and in this rude and ill-boding manner they march, and act under the conduct only of their own passions. Whatever comes next serves them for arms, until at last they pay for their licentious rash-

ness with the slaughter of the whole party: this is the event of a heady and inconsiderate war.

When men's minds are struck with the opinion of an injury, they fall on immediately wheresoever their passion leads them, without either order, fear, or caution: provoking their own mischief; never at rest till they come to blows; and pursuing their revenge, even with their bodies, upon the points of their enemies' weapons. So that the anger itself is much more hurtful for us than the injury that provokes it; for the one is bounded, but where the other will stop, no man living knows. There are no greater slaves certainly, than those that serve anger; for they improve their misfortunes by an impatience more insupportable than the calamity that causes it.

Nor does it rise by degrees, as other passions, but flashes like gunpowder, blowing up all in a moment. Neither does it only press to the mark, but overbears everything in the way to it. Other vices drive us, but this hurries us headlong; other passions stand firm themselves, though perhaps we cannot resist them; but this consumes and destroys itself: it falls like thunder or a tempest, with an irrevocable violence, that gathers strength in the passage, and then evaporates in the conclusion. Other vices are unreasonable, but this is unhealthful too; other dis tempers have their intervals and degrees, but in this we are thrown down as from a precipice: there is not anything so amazing to others, or so destructive to itself; so proud and insolent if it succeeds, or so extravagant if it be disappointed. No repulse discourages it, and, for want of other matter to work upon, it falls foul upon itself; and, let the ground be never so trivial, it is sufficient for the

wildest outrage imaginable. It spares neither age, sex, nor quality.

Some people would be luxurious perchance, but that they are poor; and others lazy, if they were not perpetually kept at work. The simplicity of a country life, keeps many men in ignorance of the frauds and impieties of courts and camps: but no nation or condition of men is exempt from the impressions of anger; and it is equally dangerous, as well in war as in peace. We find that elephants will be made familiar; bulls will suffer children to ride upon their backs, and play with their horns; bears and lions, by good usage, will be brought to fawn upon their masters; how desperate a madness is it then for men, after the reclaiming of the fiercest of beasts, and the bringing of them to be tractable and domestic, to become yet worse than beasts one to another! Alexander had two friends, Clytus and Lysimachus; the one he exposed to a lion, the other to himself; and he that was turned loose to the beast escaped. Why do we not rather make the best of a short life, and render ourselves amiable to all while we live, and desirable when we die?

Let us bethink ourselves of our mortality, and not squander away the little time that we have upon animosities and feuds, as if it were never to be at an end. Had we not better enjoy the pleasure of our own life than to be still contriving how to gall and torment another's? in all our brawlings and contentions never so much as dreaming of our weakness. Do we not know that these implacable enmities of ours lie at the mercy of a fever, or any petty accident, to disappoint? Our fate is at hand, and the very hour that we have set for another man's death may peradventure be prevented

by our own. What is it that we make all this bustle for, and so needlessly disquiet our minds? We are offended with our servants, our masters, our princes, our clients: it is but a little patience, and we shall be all of us equal; so that there is no need either of ambuses or of combats. Our wrath cannot go beyond death; and death will most undoubtedly come whether we be peevish or quiet. It is time lost to take pains to do that which will infallibly be done without us. But suppose that we would only have our enemy banished, disgraced, or damaged, let his punishment be more or less, it is yet too long, either for him to be inhumanly tormented, or for us ourselves to be most barbarously pleased with it. It holds in anger as in mourning, it must and it will at last fall of itself; let us look to it then betimes, for when it is once come to an ill habit, we shall never want matter to feed it; and it is much better to overcome our passions than to be overcome by them. Some way or other, either our parents, children, servants, acquaintance, or strangers, will be continually vexing us. We are tossed hither and thither by our affections, like a feather in a storm, and by fresh provocations the madness becomes perpetual. Miserable creatures! that ever our precious hours should be so ill employed! How prone and eager are we in our hatred, and how backward in our love! Were it not much better now to be making of friendships, pacifying of enemies, doing of good offices both public and private, than to be still meditating of mischief, and designing how to wound one man in his fame, another in his fortune, a third in his person? the one being so easy, innocent, and safe, and the other so difficult, impious, and hazardous. Nay, take a

man in chains, and at the foot of his oppressor; how many are there, who, even in this case, have maimed themselves in the heat of their violence upon others.

This untractable passion is much more easily kept out than governed when it is once admitted; for the stronger will give laws to the weaker; and make reason a slave to the appetite. It carries us headlong; and in the course of our fury, we have no more command of our minds, than we have of our bodies down a precipice: when they are once in motion, there is no stop until they come to the bottom. Not but that it is possible for a man to be warm in winter, and not to sweat in the summer, either by the benefit of the place, or the hardiness of the body: and in like manner we may provide against anger. But certain it is, that virtue and vice can never agree in the same subject; and one may as well be a sick man and a sound at the same time, as a good man, and an angry. Besides, if we will needs be quarrelsome, it must be either with our superior, our equal, or inferior. To contend with our superior is folly and madness: with our equals, it is doubtful and dangerous: and with our inferiors, it is base. For does any man know but that he that is now our enemy may come hereafter to be our friend, over and above the reputation of clemency and good nature? And what can be more honorable or comfortable, than to exchange a feud for a friendship? the people of Rome never had more faithful allies than those that were at first the most obstinate enemies; neither had the *Roman Empire* ever arrived at that height of power, if Providence had not mingled the vanquished with the conquerors.

There is an end of the contest when one side de-

serts it; so that the paying of anger with benefits puts a period to the controversy. But, however, if it be our fortune to transgress, let not our anger descend to the children, friends or relations, even of our bitterest enemies. The very cruelty of Sylla was heightened by that instance of incapacitating the issue of the proscribed. It is inhuman to entail the hatred we have for the father upon his posterity.

A good and a wise man is not to be an *enemy* of wicked men, but a *reprover* of them; and he is to look upon all the drunkards, the lustful, the thankless, covetous, and ambitious, that he meets with, not otherwise than as a physician looks upon his patients; for he that will be angry with *any man* must be displeased with *all*; which were as ridiculous as to quarrel with a body for stumbling in the dark; with one that is deaf, for not doing as you bid him; or with a school-boy for loving his play better than his book. Democritus *laughed*, and Heraclitus *wept*, at the folly and wickedness of the world, but we never read of any *angry philosopher*.

This is undoubtedly the most detestable of vices, even compared with the worst of them. Avarice scrapes and gathers together that which somebody may be the better for: but anger lashes out, and no man comes *off gratis*. An angry master makes one servant run away, and another hang himself; and his choler causes him a much greater loss than he suffered in the occasion of it. It is the cause of mourning to the father, and of divorce to the husband: it makes the magistrate odious, and gives the candidate a repulse. And it is worse than luxury too, which only aims at its proper pleasure; whereas the other is bent upon another body's pain.

The malevolent and the envious content themselves only to *wish* another man miserable; but it is the business of anger to *make* him so, and to wreck the mischief itself; not so much desiring the hurt of another, as to inflict it. Among the powerful, it breaks out into open war, and into a private one with the common people, but without force or arms. It engages us in treacheries, perpetual troubles and contentions: it alters the very nature of a man, and punishes itself in the persecution of others. Humanity excites us to love, this to hatred; that to be beneficial to others, this to hurt them: beside, that, though it proceeds from too high a conceit of ourselves, it is yet, in effect, but a narrow and contemptible affection; especially when it meets with a mind that is hard and impenetrable, and returns the dart upon the head of him that casts it.

To take a farther view, now, of the miserable consequences and sanguinary effects of this hideous distemper; from hence come slaughters and poisons, wars, and desolations, the razing and burning of cities; the unpeopling of nations, and the turning of populous countries into deserts, public massacres and regicides; princes led in triumph; some murdered in their bed-chambers; others stabbed in the senate or cut off in the security of their spectacles and pleasures. Some there are that take anger for a princely quality; as Darius, who, in his expedition against the Scythians, being besought by a nobleman, that had three sons, that he would vouchsafe to accept of two of them into his service, and leave the third at home for a comfort to his father. "I will do more for you than that," says Darius, "for you shall have them all three again;" so he ordered

them to be slain before his face, and left him their bodies. But Xerxes dealt a little better with Pythius, who had five sons, and desired only one of them for himself. Xerxes bade him take his choice, and he named the *eldest*, whom he immediately commanded to be cut in halves; and one half of the body to be laid on each side of the way when his army was to pass betwixt them; undoubtedly a most auspicious sacrifice; but he came afterward to the end that he deserved; for he lived to see that prodigious power scattered and broken: and instead of military and victorious troops, to be encompassed with carcasses. But these, you will say, were only barbarous princes that knew neither civility nor letters; and these savage cruelties will be imputed perchance to their rudeness of manners, and want of discipline. But what will you say then of Alexander the Great, that was trained up under the institution of Aristotle himself, and killed Clytus, his favorite and school-fellow, with his *own hand*, under his *own roof*, and *over the freedom of a cup of wine?* And what was his crime? He was loth to degenerate from a Macedonian *liberty* into a Persian *slavery*; that is to say, he could not *flatter*.

Lysimachus, another of his friends, he exposed to a lion; and this very Lysimachus, after he had escaped this danger, was never the more merciful when he came to reign himself; for he cut off the ears and nose of his friend Telesphorus; and when he had so disfigured him that he had no longer the face of a man, he threw him into a dungeon, and there kept him to be showed for a monster, as a strange sight. The place was so low that he was fain to creep upon all fours, and his sides were galled too with the straitness of it. In this misery he lay

half-famished in his own filth; so odious, so terrible, and so loathsome a spectacle, that the horror of his condition had even extinguished all pity for him. "Nothing was ever so unlike a man as the poor wretch that suffered this, saving the tyrant that acted it."

Nor did this merciless hardness only exercise itself among foreigners, but the fierceness of their outrages and punishments, as well as their vices, brake in upon the Romans. C. Marius, that had his statue set up everywhere, and was adored as a God, L. Sylla commanded his bones to be broken, his eyes to be pulled out, his hands to be cut off; and, as if every wound had been a several death, his body to be torn to pieces, and Catiline was the executioner. A *cruelty* that was only fit for Marius to *suffer*, Sylla to *command*, and Catiline to *act*; but most dishonorable and fatal to the commonwealth, to fall indifferently upon the sword's point both of citizens and of enemies.

It was a severe instance, that of Piso too. A soldier that had leave to go abroad with his comrade, came back to the camp at his time, but without his companion. Piso condemned him to die, as if he had killed him, and appoints a centurion to see the execution. Just as the headsman was ready to do his office, the other soldier appeared, to the great joy of the whole field, and the centurion bade the executioner hold his hand. Hereupon Piso, in a rage, mounts the *tribunal*, and sentences all three to death: the one because he was *condemned*, the *other* because it was for *his sake* that his fellow-soldier was *condemned*, the *centurion* for not obeying the *order* of his *superior*. An ingenious piece of in-

humanity, to contrive how to make three criminals, where effectively there were none.

There was a Persian king that caused the noses of a whole nation to be cut off, and they were to thank him that he spared their heads. And this, perhaps, would have been the fate of the Macrobi, (if Providence had not hindered it,) for the freedom they used to Cambyses' ambassadors, in not accepting the slavish terms that were offered them. This put Cambyses into such a rage, that he presently listed into his service every man that was able to bear arms; and, without either provisions or guides, marched immediately through dry and barren deserts, and where never any man had passed before him, to take his revenge. Before he was a third part of the way, his provisions failed him. His men, at first, made shift with the buds of trees, boiled leather, and the like; but soon after there was not so much as a root or a plant to be gotten, nor a living creature to be seen; and then by lot every tenth man was to die for a nourishment to the rest, which was still worse than the famine. But yet this passionate king went on so far, until one part of his army was lost, and the other devoured, and until he feared that he himself might come to be served with the same sauce. So that at last he ordered a retreat, wanting no delicacies all this while for himself, while his soldiers were taking their chance who should die miserably, or live worse. Here was an anger taken up against a whole nation, that neither deserved any ill from him, nor was so much as known to him.

## CHAPTER VII.

## THE ORDINARY GROUNDS AND OCCASIONS OF ANGER.

IN this wandering state of life we meet with many occasions of trouble and displeasure, both great and trivial; and not a day passes but, from men or things, we have some cause or other for offense; as a man must expect to be jostled, dashed, and crowded, in a populous city. One man deceives our expectation; another delays it; and a third crosses it; and if everything does not succeed to our wish, we presently fall out either with the person, the business, the place, our fortune, or ourselves. Some men value themselves upon their wit, and will never forgive anyone that pretends to lessen it; others are inflamed by wine: and some are distempered by sickness, weariness, watchings, love, care, etc. Some are prone to it, by heat of constitution; but moist, dry, and cold complexions are more liable to other affections; as suspicion, despair, fear, jealousy, etc. But most of our quarrels are of our own contriving. One while we suspect upon mistake; and another while we make a great matter of trifles. To say the truth, most of those things that exasperate us are rather subjects of disgust than of mischief: there is a large difference betwixt opposing a man's satisfaction and not assisting it: betwixt *taking away* and *not giving*; but we reckon upon

*denying* and *deferring* as the same thing; and interpret another's being *for himself* as if he were *against us*. Nay, we do many times entertain an ill opinion of well doing, and a good one of the contrary: and we hate a man for doing that very thing which we should hate him for on the other side, if he did not do it.

We take it ill to be opposed when there is a father perhaps, a brother, or a friend, in the case against us; when we should rather love a man for it; and only wish that he could be honestly of our party. We approve of the fact, and detest the doer of it. It is a base thing to hate the person whom we cannot but commend; but it is a great deal worse yet if we hate him for the very thing that deserves commendation. The things that we desire, if they be such as cannot be given to one without being taken away from another, must needs set those people together by the ears that desire the same thing. One man has a design upon my mistress, another upon mine inheritance; and that which should make friends makes enemies, our being all of a mind. The general cause of anger is the sense or opinion of an *injury*; that is, the opinion either of an injury simply done, or of an injury done, which we have not deserved. Some are naturally given to anger, others are provoked to it by occasion; the anger of women and children is commonly sharp, but not lasting: old men are rather querulous and peevish. Hard labor, diseases, anxiety of thought, and whatsoever hurts the body or the mind, disposes a man to be foward, but we must not add fire to fire.

He that duly considers the subject-matter of all our controversies and quarrels, will find them low

and mean, not worth the thought of a generous mind; but the greatest noise of all is about *money*. This is it that sets fathers and children together by the ears, husbands and wives; and makes way for sword and poison. This is it that tires out courts of justice, enrages princes, and lays cities in the dust, to seek for gold and silver in the ruins of them. This is it that finds work for the judge to determine which side is least in the wrong; and whose is the more plausible avarice, the plaintiff's or the defendant's. And what is it that we contend for all this while, but those baubles that make us cry when we should laugh? To see a rich old cuff, that has nobody to leave his estate to, break his heart for a handful of dirt; and a gouty usurer, that has no other use of his fingers left him but to count withal; to see him, I say in the extremity of his fit, wrangling for the odd money in his interest. If all that is precious in Nature were gathered into one mass, it were not worth the trouble of a sober mind. It were endless to run over all those ridiculous passions that are moved about meats and drinks, and the matter of our luxury; nay, about words, looks, actions, jealousies, mistakes, which are all of them as contemptible fooleries as those very baubles that children scratch and cry for. There is nothing great or serious in all that which we keep such a clutter about; the madness of it is, that we set too great a value upon trifles. One man flies out upon a salute, a letter, a speech, a question, a gesture, a wink, a look. An action moves one man; a word affects another; one man is tender of his family; another of his person; one sets up for an orator, another for a philosopher: this man will not bear pride, nor that man opposition. He that plays the tyrant at home,

is gentle as a lamb abroad. Some take offense if a man ask a favor of them, and others, if he does not. Every man has his weak side; let us learn which that is, and take a care of it; for the same thing does not work upon all men alike. We are moved like beasts at the idle appearances of things, and the fiercer the creature, the more is it startled. The sight of a red coat enrages a bull; a shadow provokes the asp; nay, so unreasonable are some men, that they take moderate benefits for injuries, and squabble about it with their nearest relations: "They have done this and that for others," they cry; "and they might have dealt better with us if they had pleased." Very good! and if it be less than we looked for, it may be yet more than we deserve. Of all unquiet humors this is the worst, that will never suffer any man to be happy, so long as he sees a happier man than himself. I have known some men so weak as to think themselves contemned if a horse did but play the jade with *them*, that is yet obedient to *another rider*. A brutal folly to be offended at a mute animal; for no injury can be done us without the concurrence of reason. A beast may hurt us, as a sword or a stone, and no otherwise. Nay, there are that will complain of "foul weather, a raging sea, a biting winter," as if it were expressly directed to them; and this they charge upon Providence, whose operations are all of them so far from being injurious, that they are beneficial to us.

How vain and idle are many of those things that make us stark mad! A resty horse, the overturning of a glass, the falling of a key, the dragging of a chair, a jealousy, a misconstruention. How shall that man endure the extremities of hunger and thirst that flies out into a rage for putting of a little

too much water in his wine? What haste is there to lay a servant by the heels, or break a leg or an arm immediately for it, as if he were not to have the same power over him an hour after, that he has at that instant? The answer of a servant, a wife, a tenant, puts some people out of all patience; and yet they can quarrel with the government, for not allowing them the same liberty in public, which they themselves deny to their own families. If they say nothing, it is contumacy: if they speak or laugh, it is insolence. As if a man had his ears given him only for music; whereas we must suffer all sorts of noises, good and bad, both of man and beast. How idle is it to start at the tinkling of a bell, or the creaking of a door, when, for all this delicacy, we must endure thunder! Neither are our eyes less curious and fantastical than our ears. When we are abroad, we can bear well enough with foul ways, nasty streets, noisome ditches; but a spot upon a dish at home, or an unswept hearth, absolutely distracts us. And what is the reason, but that we are patient in the one place, and fantastically peevish in the other? Nothing makes us more intemperate than luxury, that shrinks at every stroke, and starts at every shadow. It is death to some to have another sit above them, as if a body were ever the more or the less honest for the cushion. But they are only weak creatures that think themselves wounded if they be but touched. One of the Sybarites, that saw a fellow hard at work a digging, desired him to give over, for it made him weary to see him: and it was an ordinary complaint with him, that "he could take no rest because the rose-leaves lay double under him." When we are once weakened with our pleasures, everything grows intolerable.

ble. And we are angry as well with those things that cannot hurt us as with those that do. We tear a book because it is blotted; and our clothes, because they are not well made: things that neither deserve our anger nor feel it: the tailor, perchance, did his best, or, however, had no intent to displease us: if so, first, why should we be angry at all? Secondly, why should we be angry with the thing for the man's sake? Nay, our anger extends even to dogs, horses, and other beasts.

It was a blasphemous and a sottish extravagance, that of Caius Cæsar, who challenged Jupiter for making such a noise with his *thunder*, that he could not hear his mimics, and so invented a machine in imitation of it to oppose *thunder* to *thunder*; a brutal conceit, to imagine, either that he could reach the Almighty, or that the Almighty could not reach him!

And every jot as ridiculous, though not so impious, was that of Cyrus; who, in his design upon Babylon, found a river in his way that put a stop to his march: the current was strong, and carried away one of the horses that belonged to his own chariot: upon this he swore, that since it had obstructed *his* passage, it should never hinder any body's else; and presently set his whole army to work upon it, which diverted it into a hundred and fourscore channels, and laid it dry. In this ignoble and unprofitable employment he lost his time, and the soldiers their courage, and gave his adversaries an opportunity of providing themselves, while he was waging war with a river instead of an enemy.

## CHAPTER VIII.

## ADVICE IN THE CASES OF CONTUMELY AND REVENGE.

OF provocations to anger there are two sorts; there is an *injury*, and there is a *contumely*. The former in its own nature is the heavier; the other slight in itself, and only troublesome to a wounded imagination. And yet some there are that will bear blows, and death itself, rather than contumelious words. A contumely is an indignity below the consideration of the very law; and not worthy either of a revenge, or so much as a complaint. It is only the vexation and infirmity of a weak mind, as well as the practice of a haughty and insolent nature, and signifies no more to a wise and sober man than an idle dream, that is no sooner past than forgotten. It is true, it implies contempt; but what needs any man care for being contemptible to others, if he be not so to himself? For a child in the arms to strike the mother, tear her hair, claw the face of her, and call her names, that goes for nothing with us, because the child knows not what he does. Neither are we moved at the impudence and bitterness of a *buffoon*, though he fall upon his own master as well as the guests; but, on the contrary, we encourage and entertain the freedom.

Are we not mad then, to be delighted and displeased with the same thing, and to take that as an

*injury* from one man, which passes only for a *railery* from another? He that is wise will behave himself toward all men as we do to our children; for they are but children too, though they have gray hairs: they are indeed of a larger size, and their errors are grown up with them; they live without rule, they covet without choice, they are timorous and unsteady; and if at any time they happen to be quiet, it is more out of fear than reason. It is a wretched condition to stand in awe of everybody's tongue; and whosoever is vexed at a reproach would be proud if he were commended. We should look upon contumelies, slanders, and ill words, only as the clamor of enemies, or arrows shot at a distance, that make a clattering upon our arms, but do no execution. A man makes himself less than his adversary by fancying that he is contemned. Things are only ill that are ill taken; and it is not for a man of worth to think himself better or worse for the opinion of others. He that thinks himself injured, let him say, "Either I have deserved this, or I have not. If I have, it is a judgment; if I have not, it is an injustice: and the doer of it has more reason to be ashamed than the sufferers."

Nature has assigned every man his post, which he is bound in honor to maintain, let him be never so much pressed. Diogenes was disputing of anger, and an insolent young fellow, to try if he could put him beside his philosophy, spit in his face: "Young man," says Diogenes, "this does not make me angry yet; but I am in some doubt whether I should be so or not." Some are so impatient that they cannot bear a contumely, even from a woman; whose very beauty, greatness, and ornaments, are all of them little enough to vindicate her from any indecencies,

without much modesty and discretion; nay, they will lay it to heart even from the meanest of servants. How wretched is that man whose peace lies at the mercy of the people?

A physician is not angry at the intemperance of a mad patient; nor does he take it ill to be railed at by a man in a fever; just so should a wise man treat all mankind as a physician does his patient; and looking upon them only as sick and extravagant, let their words and actions, whether good or bad, go equally for nothing, attending still his duty even in the coarsest offices that may conduce to their recovery. Men that are proud, foward, and powerful, he values their scorn as little as their quality, and looks upon them no otherwise than as people in the excess of a fever. If a beggar worships him, or if he takes no notice of him, it is all one to him; and with a rich man he makes it the same case. Their honors and their injuries he accounts much alike; without rejoicing at the one, or grieving at the other.

In these cases, the rule is to pardon all offenses, where there is any sign of repentance, or hope of amendment. It does not hold in injuries as in benefits, the requiting of the one with the other; for it is a shame to overcome in the one, and in the other to be overcome. It is the part of a great mind to despise injuries; and it is one kind of revenge to neglect a man as not worth it: for it makes the first aggressor too considerable. Our philosophy, methinks, might carry us up to the bravery of a generous mastiff, that can hear the barking of a thousand curs without taking any notice of them. He that receives an injury from his superior, it is not enough for him to bear it with patience, and with-

out any thought of revenge, but he must receive it with a cheerful countenance, and look as if he did not understand it too; for if he appear too sensible, he shall be sure to have more of it. "It is a damned humor in great men, that whom they wrong they will hate."

It is well answered of an old courtier, that was asked how he kept so long in favor? "Why," says he, "by receiving injuries, and crying your humble servant for them." Some men take it for an argument of greatness to have revenge in their power; but so far is he that is under the dominion of anger from being great, that he is not so much as free. Not but that anger is a kind of pleasure to some in the act of revenge; but the very *word* is *inhuman*, though it may pass for *honest*. "Virtue," in short, "is impenetrable, and revenge is only the confession of an infirmity."

It is a fantastical humor, that the same jest in private should make us merry, and yet enrage us in public; nay, we will not allow the liberty that we take. Some railleries we account pleasant, others bitter: a conceit upon a *squint-eye*, a *hunch-back*, or any personal defect, passes for a reproach. And why may we not as well hear it as see it? Nay, if a man imitates our gait, speech, or any natural imperfection, it puts us out of all patience; as if the counterfeit were more grievous than the doing of the thing itself. Some cannot endure to hear of their age, nor others of their poverty; and they make the thing the more taken notice of the more they desire to hide it. Some bitter jest (for the purpose) was broken upon you at the table: keep better company then. In the freedom of cups, a sober man will hardly contain himself within bounds. It

sticks with us extremely sometimes, that the porter will not let us in to his great master. Will any but a madman quarrel with a cur for barking, when he may pacify him with a crust? What have we to do but to keep further off, and laugh at him? Fidus Cornelius (a tall slim fellow) fell downright a-crying in the senate-house at Corbulo's saying that "he looked like an ostrich." He was a man that made nothing of a lash upon his life and manners; but it was worse than death to him a reflection upon his person. No man was ever ridiculous to others that laughed at himself first: it prevents mischief, and it is a spiteful disappointment of those that take pleasure in such abuses. Vatinius; (a man that was made up for scorn and hatred, scurrilous and impudent to the highest degree, but most abusively witty and with all this he was diseased, and deformed to extremity), his way, was always to make sport with himself, and so he prevented the mockeries of other people. There are none more abusive to others than they that lie most open to it themselves; but the humor goes round, and he that laughs at me to-day will have somebody to laugh at him to-morrow, and revenge my quarrel. But, however, there are some liberties that will never go down with some men.

Asiaticus Valerius, (one of Caligula's particular friends, and a man of stomach, that would not easily digest an affront) Caligula told him in public what kind of bedfellow his wife was. Good God! that ever any man should hear this, or a prince speak it, especially to a man of consular authority, a friend, and a husband: and in such a manner too as at once to own his disgust and his adultery. The tribune Chærebas had a weak broken voice, like an hermaphrodite; when he came to Caligula for the

*word*, he would give him sometimes *Venus*, otherwhiles *Priapus*, as a slur upon him both ways. Valerius was afterwards the principal instrument in the conspiracy against him; and Chærebas, to convince him of his manhood, at one blow cleft him down the chin with his sword. No man was so forward as Caligula to *break a jest*, and no man so unwilling to *bear it*.

## CHAPTER I X.

CAUTIONS AGAINST ANGER IN THE MATTER OF EDUCATION, CONVERSE, AND OTHER GENERAL RULES OF PREVENTING IT,  
BOTH IN OURSELVES AND OTHERS.

ALL that we have to say in particular upon this subject lies under these two heads; first, that we do not *fall* into anger; and secondly, that we do not *transgress in it*. As in the case of our bodies, we have some medicines to preserve us when we are well, and others to recover us when we are sick; so it is one thing not to admit it, and another thing to overcome it. We are, in the first place, to avoid all provocations, and the beginnings of anger: for if we be once down, it is a hard task to get up again. When our passion has got the better of our reason, and the enemy is received into the gate, we cannot expect that the conqueror should take conditions from the prisoner. And, in truth, our reason, when it is thus mastered, turns effectually into passion. A careful education is a great matter; for our minds are easily formed in our youth, but it is a harder business to cure ill habits: beside that, we are inflamed by climate, constitution, company, and a thousand other accidents, that we are not aware of.

The choice of a good nurse, and a well-natured tutor, goes a great way: for the sweetness both of the blood and of the manners will pass into the

child. There is nothing breeds anger more than a soft and effeminate education; and it is very seldom seen that either the mother's or the school-master's darling ever comes to good. But *my young master*, when he comes into the world, behaves himself like a choleric coxcomb; for flattery, and a great fortune, nourish touchiness. But it is a nice point so to check the seeds of anger in a child as not to take off his edge, and quench his spirits; whereof a principal care must be taken betwixt license and severity, that he be neither too much emboldened nor depressed. Commendation gives him courage and confidence; but then the danger is, of blowing him up into insolence and wrath: so that when to use the bit, and when the spur, is the main difficulty. Never put him to a necessity of begging anything basely: or if he does, let him go without it. Inure him to a familiarity where he has any emulation; and in all his exercises let him understand that it is generous to overcome his competitor, but not to hurt him. Allow him to be pleased when he does well, but not transported; for that will puff him up into too high a conceit of himself. Give him nothing that he cries for till the dogged fit is over, but then let him have it when he is quiet; to show him that there is nothing to be gotten by being peevish. Chide him for whatever he does amiss, and make him betimes acquainted with the fortune that he was born to. Let his diet be cleanly, but sparing; and clothe him like the rest of his fellows: for by placing him upon that equality at first, he will be the less proud afterward: and, consequently the less waspish and quarrelsome.

In the next place, let us have a care of temptations that we cannot resist, and provocations that

we cannot bear; and especially of sour and exceptional company: for a cross humor is contagious. Nor is it all that a man shall be the better for the example of a quiet conversation; but an angry disposition is troublesome, because it has nothing else to work upon. We should therefore choose a sincere, easy, and temperate companion, that will neither provoke anger nor return it; nor give a man any occasion of exercising his distempers. Nor is it enough to be gentle, submissive, and humane, without integrity and plain-dealing; for flattery is as offensive on the other side. Some men would take a curse from you better than a compliment. Cælius, a passionate orator, had a friend of singular patience that supped with him, who had no way to avoid a quarrel but by saying *amen* to all that Cælius said. Cælius, taking this ill: "Say something against me," says he, "that you and I may be two;" and he was angry with him because he would not: but the dispute fell, as it needs must, for want of an opponent.

He that is naturally addicted to anger, let him use a moderate diet, and abstain from wine; for it is but adding fire to fire. Gentle exercises, recreations, and sports, temper and sweeten the mind. Let him have a care also of long and obstinate disputes; for it is easier not to begin them than to put an end to them. Severe studies are not good for him either, as *law*, *mathematics*; too much attention preys upon the spirits, and makes him eager: but *poetry*, *history* and those lighter entertainments, may serve him for diversion and relief. He that would be quiet, must not venture at things out of his reach, or beyond his strength; for he shall either stagger under the burden, or discharge it upon the next man he meets; which is the same case in civil and domestic

affairs. Business that is ready and practicable goes off with ease; but when it is too heavy for the bearer, they fall both together. Whatsoever we design, we should first take a measure of ourselves, and compare our force with the undertaking; for it vexes a man not to go through with his work: a repulse inflames a generous nature, as it makes one that is *phlegmatic, sad*. I have known some that have advised looking in a glass when a man is in the fit, and the very spectacle of his own deformity has cured him. Many that are troublesome in their drink, and know their own infirmity, give their servant order beforehand to take them away by force for fear of mischief, and not to obey their masters themselves when they are hot-headed. If the thing were duly considered we should need no other cure than the bare consideration of it. We are not angry at madmen, children, and fools, because they do not know what they do: and why should not imprudence have an equal privilege in other cases? If a horse kick, or a dog bite, shall a man kick or bite again? The one, it is true, is wholly void of reason, but it is also an equivalent darkness of mind that possesses the other. So long as we are among men, let us cherish humanity, and so live that no man may be either in fear or in danger of us. Losses, injuries, reproaches, calumnies, they are but short inconveniences, and we should bear them with resolution. Beside that, some people are above our anger, others below it. To contend with our superiors were a folly, and with our inferiors an indignity.

There is hardly a more effectual remedy against anger than patience and consideration. Let but the first fervor abate, and that mist which darkens the

mind will be either lessened or dispelled; a day, nay, an hour, does much in the most violent cases, and perchance totally suppresses it; time discovers the truth of things, and turns that into judgment which at first was anger. Plato was about to strike his servant, and while his hand was in the air, he checked himself, but still held it in that menacing posture. A friend of his took notice of it, and asked him what he meant? "I am now," says Plato, "punishing of an angry man;" so that he had left his servant to chastise himself. Another time his servant having committed a great fault: 'Speusippus,' says he, "do you beat that fellow, for I am angry," so that he forebore striking him for the very reason that would have made another man have done it. "I am angry," says he, "and shall go further than becomes me." Nor is it fit that a servant should be in his power that is not his own master. Why should any one venture now to trust an angry man with a revenge, when Plato durst not trust himself? Either he must govern that, or that will undo him. Let us do our best to overcome it, but let us, however, keep it close, without giving it any vent. An angry man, if he gives himself liberty at all times, will go too far. If it comes once to show itself in the eye or countenance, it has got the better of us. Nay, we should so oppose it as to put on the very contrary dispositions; calm looks, soft and slow speech, an easy and deliberate march, and by little and little, we may possibly bring our thoughts into sober conformity with our actions. When Socrates was angry, he would take himself in it, and *speak low*, in opposition to the motions of his displeasure. His friends would take notice of it; and it was not to his disadvantage neither, but rather to his credit, that so

many should *know* that he was angry, and nobody *feel* it; which could not have been, if he had not given his friends the same liberty of admonition which he himself took. And this course should we take; we should desire our friends not to flatter us in our follies, but to treat us with all liberties of reprehension, even when we are least willing to bear it, against so powerful and so insinuating an evil; we should call for help while we have our eyes in our head, and are yet masters of ourselves. Moderation is profitable for subjects, but more for princes, who have the means of executing all that their anger prompts them to. When that power comes once to be exercised to a common mischief, it can never long continue; a common fear joining in one cause all their divided complaints. In a word now, how we may prevent, moderate, or master this impotent passion in others.

It is not enough to be sound ourselves, unless we endeavor to make others so, wherein we must accommodate the remedy to the temper of the patient. Some are to be dealt with by artifice and address: as, for example, "Why will you gratify your enemies to show yourself so much concerned? It is not worth your anger: it is below you: I am as much troubled at it myself as you can be; but you had better say nothing, and take your time to be even with them." Anger in some people is to be openly opposed; in others, there must be a little yielding, according to the disposition of the person. Some are won by entreaties, others are gained by mere shame and conviction, and some by delay; a dull way of cure for a violent distemper, but this must be the last experiment. Other affections may be better dealt with at leisure; for they proceed gradually: but this com-

mences and perfects itself in the same moment. It does not, like other passions, solicit and mislead us, but it runs away with us by force, and hurries us on with an irresistible temerity, as well to our own as to another's ruin: not only flying in the face of him that provokes us, but like a torrent, bearing down all before it. There is no encountering the first heat and fury of it: for it is deaf and mad, the best way is (in the beginning) to give it time and rest, and let it spend itself: while the passion is too hot to handle, we may deceive it; but, however, let all instruments of revenge be put out of the way. It is not amiss sometimes to pretend to be angry too; and join with him, not only in the opinion of the injury, but in the seeming contrivance of a revenge. But this must be a person then that has some authority over him. This is a way to get time, and, by advising upon some greater punishment to delay the present. If the passion be outrageous, try what shame or fear can do. If weak, it is no hard matter to amuse it by strange stories, grateful news, or pleasant discourses. Deceit, in this case, is friendship; for men must be cozened to be cured.

The injuries that press hardest upon us are those which either we have not deserved, or not expected, or, at least, not in so high a degree. This arises from the love of ourselves: for every man takes upon him, like a prince, in this case, to practice all liberties, and to allow none, which proceeds either from ignorance or insolence. What news is it for people to do ill things? for an enemy to hurt us; nay, for a friend or a servant to transgress, and to prove treacherous, ungrateful, covetous, impious? What we find in one man we may in another, and

there is more security in fortune than in men. Our joys are mingled with fear, and a tempest **may** arise out of a calm; but a skilful pilot is always provided for it.

## CHAPTER X.

## AGAINST RASH JUDGMENT.

IT IS good for every man to fortify himself on his weak side: and if he loves his peace he must not be inquisitive, and hearken to tale-bearers; for the man that is over-curious to hear and see everything, multiplies troubles to himself: for a man does not feel what he does not know. He that is listening after private discourse, and what people say of him, shall never be at peace. How many things that are innocent in themselves are made injuries yet by misconstruction! Wherefore, some things we are to pause upon, others to laugh at, and others again to pardon. Or, if we cannot avoid the sense of indignities, let us however shun the open profession of it, which may easily be done, as appears by many examples of those that have suppressed their anger under the awe of a greater fear. It is a good caution not to believe any thing until we are very certain of it; for many probable things prove false, and a short time will make evidence of the undoubted truth. We are prone to believe many things which we are willing to hear, and so we conclude, and take up a prejudice before we can judge. Never condemn a friend unheard; or without letting him know his accuser, or his crime. It is a common thing to say, "Do not you tell

that you had it from me: for if you do, I will deny it, and never tell you any thing again:" by which means friends are set together by the ears, and the informer slips his neck out of the collar. Admit no stories upon these terms; for it is an unjust thing to believe in private and to be angry openly. He that delivers himself up to guess and conjecture runs a great hazard; for there can be no suspicion without some probable grounds; so that without much candor and simplicity, and making the best of every thing, there is no living in society with mankind. Some things that offend us we have by report; others we see or hear. In the first case, let us not be too credulous: some people frame stories that they may deceive us; others only tell what they hear, and are deceived themselves: some make it their sport to do ill offices, others do them only to pick a thank: there are some that would part the dearest friends in the world; others love to do mischief, and stand aloof off to see what comes of it. If it be a small matter, I would have witnesses; but if it be a greater, I would have it upon oath, and allow time to the accused, and counsel too, and hear over and over again.

In those cases where we ourselves are witnesses, we should take into consideration all the circumstances. If a *child*, it was *ignorance*: if a *woman*, a *mistake*: if done by *command* a *necessity*; if a *man* be injured, it is but *quod pro quo*: if a *judge*, he *knows* what he does: if a *prince*, I must *submit*; either if *guilty*, to *justice*, or if *innocent*, to *fortune*: if a *brute*, I make myself one by *imitating* it: if a *calamity* or *disease*, my best relief is *patience*: if *providence*, it is both *impious* and *vain* to be *angry* at it: if a *good man*, I will make the *best* of it: if a

bad, I will never wonder at it. Nor is it only by *tales* and *stories* that we are inflamed, but *suspicions, countenances, nay, a look or a smile*, is enough to blow us up. In these cases, let us suspend our displeasure, and plead the cause of the absent. “Perhaps he is innocent; or, if not, I have time to consider of it, and may take my revenge at leisure:” but when it is once *executed* it is not to be *recalled*. A jealous head is apt to take that to himself which was never meant him. Let us therefore trust to nothing but what we see, and chide ourselves where we are over-creduous. By this course we shall not be so easily imposed upon, nor put to trouble ourselves about things not worth the while: as the loitering of a servant upon an errand, and the tumbling of a bed, or the spilling of a glass of drink.

It is a madness to be disordered at these fooleries; we consider the thing done, and not the doer of it. “It may be he did it unwillingly, or by chance. It was a trick put upon him, or he was forced to it. He did it for reward perhaps, not hatred; nor of his own accord, but he was urged on to it.” Nay, some regard must be had to the age of the person, or to fortune; and we must consult humanity and candor in the case. One does me a *great mischief* at *unawares*; another does me a very *small one* by *design*, or peradventure none at all, but intended me one. The latter was more in fault, but I will be angry with neither. We must distinguish betwixt what a man cannot do and what he will not. “It is true he has once offended me; but how often has he pleased me! He has offended me often, and in other kinds; and why should not I bear it as well now as I have done?” Is he my friend? why then, “It was against his will.” Is he my enemy? It is “no more than I

looked for." Let us give way to wise men, and not squabble with fools; and say thus to ourselves, "We have all of us our errors." No man is so circumspect, so considerate, or so fearful of offending, but he has much to answer for.

A generous prisoner cannot immediately comply with all the sordid and laborious offices of a slave. A footman that is not breathed cannot keep pace with his master's horse. He that is over-watched may be allowed to be drowsy. All these things are to be weighed before we give any ear to the first impulse. If it be my duty to love my country, I must be kind also to my countrymen; if a veneration be due to the whole, so is a piety also to the parts: and it is the common interest to preserve them. We are all members of one body, and it is as natural to help one another as for the hands to help the feet, or the eyes the hands. Without the love and care of the parts, the whole can never be preserved, and we must spare one another because we are born for society, which cannot be maintained without a regard to particulars. Let this be a rule to us, never to deny a pardon, that does no hurt either to the giver or receiver. That may be well enough in one which is ill in another; and therefore we are not to condemn anything that is common to a nation; for custom defends it. But much more pardonable are those things which are common to mankind.

It is a kind of spiteful comfort, that whoever does me an injury may receive one; and that there is a power over him that is above me. A man should stand as firm against all indignities as a rock does against the waves. As it is some satisfaction to a man in a mean condition that there is no security in a more prosperous; and as the loss of a son in a cor-

ner is borne with more patience upon the sight of a funeral carried out of a palace; so are injuries and contempts the more tolerable from a meaner person, when we consider, that the greatest men and fortunes are not exempt. The wisest also of mortals have their failings, and no man living is without the same excuse. The difference is, that we do not all of us transgress the same way; but we are obliged in humanity to bear one with another.

We should, every one of us, bethink ourselves, how remiss we have been in our duties, how immodest in our discourses, how intemperate in our cups; and why not, as well, how extravagant we have been in our passions? Let us clear ourselves of this evil, purge our minds, and utterly root out all those vices, which upon leaving the least sting, will grow again and recover. We must think of everything, expect everything, that we may not be surprised. It is a shame, says Fabius, for a commander to excuse himself by saying, "I was not aware of it."

## CHAPTER XI.

TAKE NOTHING ILL FROM ANOTHER MAN, UNTIL YOU HAVE  
MADE IT YOUR OWN CASE.

It is not prudent to deny a pardon to any man, without first examining if we stand not in need of it ourselves; for it may be our lot to ask it, even at his feet to whom we refuse it. But we are willing enough to do what we are very unwilling to suffer. It is unreasonable to charge public vices upon particular persons; for we are all of us wicked, and that which we blame in others we find in ourselves. It is not a paleness in one, or a leanness in another, but a pestilence that has laid hold upon all.

It is a wicked world, and we make part of it; and the way to be quiet is to bear one with another. "Such a man," we cry, "has done me a shrewd turn, and I never did him any hurt." Well, but it may be I have mischieved other people, or at least, I may live to do as much to him as that comes to. "Such a one has spoken ill things of me;" but if I first speak ill of him, as I do of many others, this is not an injury, but a repayment. What if he did overshoot himself? He was loth to lose his conceit perhaps, but there was no malice in it; and if he had not done me a mischief, he must have done himself one. How many good offices are there that look

like injuries! Nay, how many have been reconciled and good friends after a professed hatred!

Before we lay anything to heart, let us ask ourselves if we have not done the same thing to others. But where shall we find an equal judge? He that loves another man's wife (only because she is another's) will not suffer his own to be so much looked upon. No man is so fierce against calumny as the evil speaker; none so strict exactors of modesty in a servant as those that are most prodigal of their own. We carry our neighbors' crimes in sight, and we throw our own over our shoulders. The intemperance of a bad son is chastised by a worse father; and the luxury that we punish in others, we allow to ourselves. The tyrant exclaims against homicide; and sacrilege against theft. We are angry with the persons, but not with the faults.

Some things there are that cannot hurt us, and others will not; as good magistrates, parents, tutors, judges; whose reproof or correction we are to take as we do abstinence, bleeding, and other uneasy things, which we are the better for, in which cases, we are not so much to reckon upon what we suffer as upon what we have done. "I take it ill," says one; and, "I have done nothing," says another: when, at the same time, we make it worse, by adding arrogance and contumacy to our first error. We cry out presently, "What law have we transgressed?" As if the letter of the law were the sum of our duty, and that piety, humanity, liberality, justice, and faith, were things beside our business. No, no; the rule of human duty is of a greater latitude; and we have many obligations upon us that are not to be found in the *statute-books*. And yet we fall short of the exactness even of that *legal*

*innocency.* We have intended one thing and done another; wherein only the want of success has kept us from being criminals. This very thing, methinks, should make us more favorable to delinquents, and to forgive not only ourselves, but the gods too; of whom we seem to have harder thoughts in taking that to be a particular evil directed to us, that befalls us only by the common law of mortality. In fine, no man living can absolve himself to his conscience, though to the world, perhaps, he may. It is true, that we are also condemned to pains and diseases, and to death too, which is no more than the quitting of the soul's house. But why should any man complain of bondage, that, wheresoever he looks, has his way open to liberty? That precipice, that sea, that river, that well, there is freedom in the bottom of it. It hangs upon every crooked bow; and not only a man's throat, or his heart, but every vein in his body, opens a passage to it.

To conclude, where my proper virtue fails me, I will have recourse to examples, and say to myself, Am I greater than Philip or Augustus, who both of them put up with greater reproaches? Many have pardoned their enemies, and shall not I forgive a neglect, a little freedom of the tongue? Nay, the patience but of a second thought does the business; for though the first shock be violent, take it in parts, and it is subdued. And, to wind up all in one word, the great lesson of mankind, as well in this as in all other cases, is, "to do as we would be done by."

## CHAPTER XII.

## OF CRUELTY.

THERE is so near an affinity betwixt *anger* and *cruelty*, that many people confound them; as if *cruelty* were only the *execution* of *anger* in the payment of a *revenge*: which holds in some cases, but not in others. There are a sort of men that take delight in the spilling of human blood, and in the death of those that never did them any injury, nor were ever so much suspected for it; as Apollodorus, Phalaris, Sinis, Procrustus, and others, that burnt men alive; whom we cannot so properly call *angry* as *brutal*, for *anger* does necessarily presuppose an injury, either *done*, or *conceived*, or *feared*, but the other takes *pleasure* in *t tormenting*, without so much as pretending any *provocation* to it, and *kills* merely for *killing sake*. The *original* of this *cruelty* perhaps was *anger*, which by frequent *exercise* and *custom*, has lost all sense of *humanity* and *mercy*, and they that are thus affected are so far from the countenance and appearance of men in *anger*, that they will *laugh*, *rejoice*, and *entertain themselves* with the most *horrid spectacles*, as *racks*, *jails*, *gibbets*, several sorts of *chains* and *punishments*, *dilaceration* of *members*, *stigmatizing*, and *wild beasts*, with other exquisite inventions of torture; and yet, at last the *cruelty* itself is more *horrid* and *odious* than

the means by which it works. It is a bestial madness to *love* mischief; beside, that it is *womanish* to *rage* and *tear*. A generous beast will scorn to do it when he has any thing at his mercy. It is a vice for wolves and tigers, and no less *abominable* to the *world* than *dangerous* to itself.

The Romans had their *morning* and their *meridian spectacles*, In the *former*, they had their combats of *men* with *wild beasts*; and in the *latter*, the *men* fought *one with another*. “I went,” says our author, “the other day to the *meridian spectacles*, in hope of meeting somewhat of mirth and diversion to sweeten the humors of those that had been entertained with blood in the *morning*; but it proved otherwise, for, compared with this inhumanity, the former was a mercy. The whole business was only murder upon murder: the combatants fought naked, and every blow was a wound. They do not contend for *victory*, but for *death*; and he that kills one man is to be killed by another. By wounds they are forced upon wounds which they take and give upon their bare *breasts*. *Burn that rogue, they cry What! Is he afraid of his flesh? Do but see how sneakingly that rascal dies.* Look to yourselves, my masters, and consider of it: who knows but this may come to be your own case?” Wicked examples seldom fail of coming home at last to the authors. To destroy a *single* man may be dangerous; but to murder whole nations is only a more *glorious wickedness*. *Private avarice* and *rigor* are condemned, but *oppression*, when it comes to be *authorized* by an act of state, and to be publicly *commanded*, though particularly forbidden, becomes a point of *dignity* and *honor*. What a shame is it for men to interworry one another, when yet the fiercest

even of beasts are at peace with those of their own kind? This brutal fury puts philosophy itself to a stand. The drunkard, the glutton, the covetous, may be reduced; nay, and the mischief of it is that no vice keeps itself within its proper bounds. Luxury runs into avarice, and when the reverence of virtue is extinguished, men will stick at nothing that carries profit along with it; man's blood is shed in wantonness—his death is a spectacle for entertainment, and his groans are music. When Alexander delivered up Lysimachus to a lion, how glad would he have been to have had nails and teeth to have devoured him himself: it would have too much derogated, he thought, from the dignity of his wrath, to have appointed a *man* for the execution of his friend. Private cruelties, it is true, cannot do much mischief, but in princes they are a war against mankind.

C. Cæsar would commonly, for *exercise* and *pleasure*, put *senators* and *Roman knights* to the *torture*; and *whip* several of them like *slaves*, or put them to *death* with the most acute *torments*, merely for the satisfaction of his *cruelty*. That Cæsar that “wished the people of Rome had but one neck, that he might cut it off at one blow;”—it was the employment, the study, and the joy of his life. He would not so much as give the expiring leave to groan, but caused their mouths to be stopped with sponges, or for want of them, with rags of their own clothes, that they might not breathe out so much as their last agonies at liberty; or, perhaps, lest the tormented should speak something which the tormentor had no mind to hear. Nay, he was so impatient of delay, that he would frequently rise from supper to have men killed by *torch-light*, as if his life and

death had depended upon their dispatch before the next morning; to say nothing how many *fathers* were put to death in the same night with their *sons* (which was a kind of mercy in the prevention of their mourning). And was not Sylla's cruelty prodigious too, which was only stopped for want of enemies? He caused seven thousand *citizens* of Rome to be slaughtered at once; and some of the senators being startled at their cries that were heard in the *senate-house*, "Let us mind our business," says Sylla; "this is nothing but a few mutineers that I have ordered to be sent out of the way." A *glorious spectacle!* says Hannibal, when he saw the trenches flowing with human blood; and if the rivers had run blood too, he would have liked it so much the better.

Among the famous and detestable speeches that are committed to memory, I know none worse than that impudent and *tyrannical maxim*, "Let them hate me, so they fear me;" not considering that those that are kept in obedience by fear, are both malicious and mercenary, and only wait for an opportunity to change their master. Beside that, whosoever is terrible to others is likewise afraid of himself. What is more ordinary than for a tyrant to be destroyed by his own guards? which is no more than the putting those crimes into practice which they learned of their masters. How many slaves have revenged themselves of their cruel oppressors, though they were sure to die for it! but when it comes once to a *popular tyranny*, whole nations conspire against it. For "whosoever threatens all, is in danger of all," over and above, that the cruelty of the prince increases the *number* of his enemies, by destroying some of them; for it

entails an hereditary hatred upon the friends and relations of those that are taken away. And then it has this misfortune, that a man must be wicked upon necessity; for there is no going back; so that he must betake himself to arms, and yet he lives in fear. He can neither trust to the faith of his friends, nor to the piety of his children; he both dreads death and wishes it; and becomes a greater terror to himself than he is to his people. Nay, if there were nothing else to make cruelty detestable, it were enough that it passes all bounds, both of custom and humanity; and is followed upon the heel with sword or poison. A private malice indeed does not move whole cities; but that which extends to all is every body's mark. One sick person gives no great disturbance in a family; but when it comes to a depopulating plague, all people fly from it. And why should a prince expect any man to be good whom he has taught to be wicked?

But what if it were *safe* to be *cruel*? were it not still a sad thing, the very state of such a *government*? A *government* that bears the image of a *taken city*, where there is nothing but *sorrow, trouble, and confusion*. Men dare not so much as trust themselves with their friends or with their pleasures. There is not any entertainment so innocent but it affords pretence of crime and danger. People are betrayed at their *tables* and in their *cups*, and drawn from the very *theatre* to the *prison*. How horrid a madness is it to be still *raging* and *killing*; to have the rattling of *chains* always in our *ears*; *bloody spectacles* before our *eyes*; and to carry *terror* and *dismay* wherever we go! If we had *lions* and *serpents*, to rule over us, this would be the manner of their *government*, saving that they agree bet-

ter among themselves. It passes for a mark of greatness to burn cities, and lay whole kingdoms waste; nor is it for the honor of a prince to appoint this or that single man to be killed, unless they have whole *troops*, or (sometimes) *legions*, to work upon. But it is not the spoils of *war* and *bloody trophies* that make a prince *glorious*, but the *divine power* of preserving *unity* and *peace*. *Ruin* without *distinction* is more properly the business of a general *deluge*, or a *conflagration*. Neither does a fierce and inexorable *anger* become the *supreme magistrate*; “Greatness of mind is always meek and humble; but cruelty is a note and an effect of weakness, and brings down a governor to the level of a competitor.”

## SENECA OF CLEMENCY.

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THE humanity and excellence of this virtue is confessed at all hands, as well by the men of *pleasure*, and those that think every man was made for himself, as by the Stoics, that make “man a sociable creature, and born for the common good of mankind;” for it is of all dispositions the most *peaceable* and *quiet*. But before we enter any farther upon the discourse, it should be first known what *clemency* is, that we may distinguish it from *pity*; which is a *weakness*, though many times mistaken for a *virtue*: and the next thing will be, to bring the mind to the *habit* and *exercise* of it.

“Clemency is a favorable disposition of the mind, in the matter of inflicting punishment; or, a moderation that remits somewhat of the penalty incurred; as *pardon* is the total remission of a deserved punishment.” We must be careful not to confound *clemency* with *pity*; for as *religion worships* God, and *superstition profanes* that worship; so should we distinguish betwixt *clemency* and *pity*; *practicing* the *one*, and *avoiding* the *other*. For *pity* proceeds from a *narrowness of mind*, that respects rather the *fortune* than the *cause*. It is a kind of moral sick-

ness, contracted from other people's misfortune: such another weakness as laughing or yawning for company, or as that of sick eyes that cannot look upon others that are bleared without dropping themselves. I will give a shipwrecked man a plank, a lodging to a stranger, or a piece of money to him that wants it: I will dry up the tears of my friend, yet I will not weep with him, but treat him with constancy and humanity, as *one man* ought to treat *another*.

It is objected by some, that *clemency* is an insignificant virtue; and that only the bad are the better for it, for the good have no need of it. But in the first place, as physic is in use only among the sick, and yet in honor with the sound, so the innocent have a reverence for clemency, though criminals are properly the objects of it. And then again, a man may be innocent, and yet have occasion for it too; for by the accidents of fortune, or the condition of times, virtue itself may come to be in danger. Consider the most populous city or nation; what a solitude would it be if none should be left there but those that could stand the test of a severe justice! We should have neither judges nor accusers; none either to grant a pardon or to ask it. More or less, we are all sinners; and he that has best purged his conscience, was brought by errors to repentance. And it is farther profitable to mankind; for many delinquents come to be converted. There is a tenderness to be used even toward our slaves, and those that we have bought with our money: how much more then to free and to honest men, that are rather under our protection than dominion! Not that I would have it so general neither as not to distinguish betwixt the good and the bad: for that would

introduce a confusion, and give a kind of encouragement to wickedness. It must therefore have a respect to the quality of the offender, and separate the curable from the desperate; for it is an equal cruelty to pardon all and to pardon none. Where the matter is in balance, let mercy turn the scale: if all wicked men should be punished, who should escape?

Though mercy and gentleness of nature keeps all in peace and tranquillity, even in a *cottage*; yet it is much more beneficial and conspicuous in a *palace*. *Private men* in their *condition* are likewise *private* in their *virtues* and in their *vices*; but the words and the actions of *princes* are the subject of *public rumor*; and therefore they had need have a care, what occasion they give people for discourse, of whom people will be always a talking. There is the *government* of a *prince* over his *people*, a *father* over his *children*, a *master* over his *scholars*, an *officer* over his *soldiers*. He is an unnatural father, that for every trifle beats his children. Who is the better master, he that rages over his scholars for but missing a word in a lesson, or he that tries, by admonition and fair words, to instruct and reform them? An outrageous officer makes his men run from their colors. A skilful rider brings his horse to obedience by mingling fair means with foul; whereas to be perpetually switching and spurring, makes him vicious and jadish: and shall we not have more care of *men* than of *beasts*? It breaks the hope of generous inclinations, when they are depressed by servility and terror. There is no creature so hard to be pleased with ill usage as man.

Clemency does *well* with *all*, but *best* with *princes*; for it makes their power comfortable and beneficial, which would otherwise be the pest of mankind. It

establishes their greatness, when they make the good of the public their particular care, and employ their power for the safety of the people. The prince, in effect, is but the soul of the community, as the community is only the body of the prince; so that being merciful to others, he is tender of himself: nor is any man so mean but his master feels the loss of him, as a part of his empire: and he takes care not only of the lives of his people, but also of their reputation. Now, giving for granted that all virtues are in themselves equal, it will not yet be denied, that they may be more beneficial to mankind in one person than in another. A beggar may be as magnanimous as a king: for what can be greater or braver than to baffle ill fortune? This does not hinder but that a man in authority and plenty has more matter for his generosity to work upon than a private person; and it is also more taken notice of upon the bench than upon the level.

When a gracious prince shows himself to his people, they do not fly from him as from a tiger that rouses himself out of his den, but they worship him as a benevolent influence; they secure him against all conspiracies, and interpose their bodies betwixt him and danger. They guard him while he sleeps, and defend him in the field against his enemies. Nor is it without reason, this unanimous agreement in love and loyalty, and this heroical zeal of abandoning themselves for the safety of their prince; but it is as well the interest of the people. In the breath of a prince there is life and death; and his sentence stands good, right or wrong. If he be angry, nobody dares advise him; and if he does amiss, who shall call him to account? Now, for him that has so much mischief in his power, and yet ap-

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plies that power to the common utility and comfort of his people, diffusing also clemency and goodness into their hearts too, what can be a greater blessing to mankind than such a prince? *Any man* may kill another *against* the law, but only a *prince* can save him so. Let him so deal with his own subjects as he desires God should deal with him. If Heaven should be inexorable to sinners, and destroy all without mercy, what flesh could be safe?

But as the faults of great men are not presently punished with thunder from above, let them have a like regard to their inferiors here upon earth. He that has revenge in his power, and does not use it, is the great man. Which is the more beautiful and agreeable state, that of a calm, a temperate, and a clear day; or that of lightning, thunder, and tempests? and this is the very difference betwixt a moderate and turbulent government. It is for low and vulgar spirits to brawl, storm, and transport themselves: but it is not for the majesty of a prince to lash out into intemperance of words. Some will think it rather slavery than empire to be debarred liberty of speech: and what if it be, when government itself is but a more illustrious servitude?

He that uses his power as he should, takes as much delight in making it comfortable to his people as glorious to himself. He is affable and easy of access; his very countenance makes him the joy of his people's eyes, and the delight of mankind. He is beloved, defended, and reverenced by all his subjects; and men speak as well of him in private as in public. He is safe without guards, and the sword is rather his ornament than his defence. In his duty, he is like that of a good father, that sometimes gently reproves a son, sometimes threatens him;

nay, and perhaps corrects him: but no father in his right wits will disinherit a son for the first fault: there must be many and great offences, and only desperate consequences, that should bring him to that decretory resolution. He will make many experiments to try if he can reclaim him first, and nothing but the utmost despair must put him upon extremities.

It is not flattery that calls a prince *the father of his country*; the titles of *great* and *august* are matter of compliment and of honor; but in calling him *father*, we mind him of that moderation and indulgence which he owes to his children. His subjects are his members; where, if there must be an amputation, let him come slowly to it; and when the part is cut off, let him wish it were on again: let him grieve in the doing of it. He that passes a sentence *hastily*, looks as if he did it *willingly*; and then there is an injustice in the excess.

It is a glorious contemplation for a prince, first to consider the vast multitudes of his people, whose seditious, divided, and impotent passions, would cast all in confusion, and destroy themselves, and public order too, if the band of government did not restrain them; and thence to pass the examination of his conscience, saying thus to himself, "It is by the choice of Providence that I am here made God's deputy upon earth, the arbitrator of life and death; and that upon my breath depends the fortune of my people. My lips are the oracles of their fate, and upon them hangs the destiny both of cities and of men. It is under my favor that people seek either for prosperity or protection: thousands of swords are drawn or sheathed at my pleasure. What towns shall be advanced or destroyed; who shall be

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slaves, or who free, depends upon my will; and yet, in this arbitrary power of acting without control, I was never transported to do any cruel thing, either by anger or hot blood in myself or by the contumacy, rashness, or provocations of other men; though sufficient to turn mercy itself into fury. I was never moved by the odious vanity of making myself terrible by my power, (that accursed, though common humor of ostentation and glory that haunts imperious natures.) My sword has not only been buried in the scabbard, but in a manner bound to the peace, and tender even of the cheapest blood: and where I find no other motive to compassion, humanity itself is sufficient. I have been always slow to severity, and prone to forgive; and under as strict a guard to observe the laws as if I were accountable for the breaking of them. Some I pardoned for their youth, others for their age. I spare one man for his dignity, another for his humility; and when I find no other matter to work upon, I spare myself. So that if God should at this instant call me to an account, the whole world agree to witness for me, that I have not by any force, either public or private, either by myself or by any other, defrauded the commonwealth; and the reputation that I have ever sought for has been that which few princes have obtained, the conscience of my proper innocence. And I have not lost my labor neither; for no man was ever so dear to another, as I have made myself to the whole body of my people." Under such a prince the subjects have nothing to wish for beyond what they enjoy; their fears are quieted, and their prayers heard, and there is nothing can make their felicity greater, unless to make

it perpetual; and there is no liberty denied to the people but that of destroying one another.

It is the interest of the people, by the consent of all nations, to run all hazards for the safety of their prince, and by a thousand deaths to redeem that one life, upon which so many millions depend. Does not the whole body serve the mind, though only the one is exposed to the eye and the other not, but thin and invisible, the very seat of it being uncertain? Yet the hands, feet, and eyes, observe the motions of it. We lie down, run about and ramble, as that commands us. If we be covetous, we fish the seas and ransack the earth for treasure: if ambitious, we burn our own flesh with Scævola; we cast ourselves into the gulf with Curtius: so would that vast multitude of people, which is animated but with one soul, governed by one spirit, and moved by one reason, destroy itself with its own strength, if it were not supported by wisdom and government. Wherefore, it is for their own security that the people expose their lives for their prince, as the very bond that ties the republic together; the vital spirit of so many thousands, which would be nothing else but a burden and prey without a governor.

When this union comes once to be dissolved, all falls to pieces; for empire and obedience must stand and fall together. It is no wonder then if a prince be dear to his people, when the community is wrapt up in him, and the good of both as inseparable as the body and the head; the one for strength, and the other for counsel; for what signifies the force of the body without the direction of the understanding? While the prince watches, his people sleep; his labor keeps them at ease, and his business keeps them quiet. The natural intent of monarchy appears even

from the very discipline of bees: they assign to their master the fairest lodgings, the safest place; and his office is only to see that the rest perform their duties. When their king is lost, the whole swarm dissolve: more than one they will not admit; and then they contend who shall have the best. They are of all creatures the fiercest for their bigness; and leave their stings behind them in their quarrels; only the king himself has none, intimating that kings should neither be vindictive nor cruel.

Is it not a shame, after such an example of moderation in these creatures, that men should be yet intemperate? It were well if they lost their stings too in their revenge, as well as the other, that they might hurt but once, and do no mischief by their proxies. It would tire them out, if either they were to execute all with their own hands, or to wound others at the peril of their own lives.

A prince should behave himself generously in the power which God has given him of life and death, especially towards those that have been at any time his equals; for the one has his revenge, and the other his punishment in it. He that stands indebted for his life has lost it; but he that receives his life at the foot of his enemy, lives to the honor of his preserver: he lives the lasting monument of his virtue; whereas, if he had been led in triumph, the spectacle would have been quickly over. Or what if he should restore him to his kingdom again? would it not be an ample accession to his honor to show that he found nothing about the conquered that was worthy of the conqueror? There is nothing more venerable than a prince that does not revenge an injury. He that is gracious is beloved and reverenced as a common father; but a tyrant stands in fear and in

danger even of his own guards. No prince can be safe himself of whom all others are afraid; for to spare none is to enrage all. It is an error to imagine that any man can be secure that suffers nobody else to be so too. How can any man endure to lead an uneasy, suspicious, anxious life, when he may be safe if he please, and enjoy all the blessings of power, together with the prayers of his people? Clemency protects a prince without a guard; there is no need of troops, castles, or fortifications: security on the one side is the condition of security on the other; and the affections of the subject are the most invincible fortress. What can be fairer, than for a prince to live the object of his people's love; to have the vows of their heart as well as of their lips, and his health and sickness their common hopes and fears? There will be no danger of plots; nay, on the contrary, who would not frankly venture his blood to save him, under whose government, justice, peace, modesty, and dignity flourish? under whose influence men grow rich and happy; and whom men look upon with such veneration, as they would do upon the immortal gods, if they were capable of seeing them? And as the true representative of the ALMIGHTY they consider him, when he is gracious and bountiful, and employs his power to the advantage of his subjects.

When a prince proceeds to punishment, it must be either to vindicate himself or others. It is a hard matter to govern himself in his own case. If a man should advise him not to be credulous, but to examine matters, and indulge the innocent, this is rather a point of justice than of clemency: but in case that he be manifestly injured, I would have him *forgive*, where he may *safely* do it: and be *ten-*

der even where he cannot *forgive*; but far more execrable in his own case, however, than in another's.

It is nothing to be free of another man's purse, and it is as little to be merciful in another man's cause. He is the great man that masters his passion where he is stung himself, and pardons when he might destroy. The end of punishment is either to comfort the party injured, or to secure him for the future. A prince's fortune is above the need of such a comfort, and his power is too eminent to seek an advance of reputation by doing a private man a mischief. This I speak in case of an affront from those that are below us; but he that of an equal has made any man his inferior, has his revenge in the bringing of him down. A *prince* has been *killed* by a *servant*, destroyed by a serpent: but whosoever preserves a man must be greater than the person that he preserves. With citizens, strangers, and people of low condition, a prince is not to contend, for they are beneath him: he may spare some out of good will, and others as he would do some little creatures that a man cannot touch without fouling his fingers: but for those that are to be pardoned or exposed to public punishment, he may use mercy as he sees occasion; and a generous mind can never want inducements and motives to it; and whether it be *age* or *sex*, *high* or *low*, nothing comes amiss.

To pass now to the vindication of others, there must be had a regard either to the amendment of the person punished, or the making others better for fear of punishment, or the taking the offender out of the way for the security of others. An amendment may be procured by a small punishment, for he lives more carefully that has something yet to lose—it is a kind of *impunity* to be incapable of a *farther*

*punishment.* The corruptions of a city are best cured by a few and sparing severities; for the multitude of offenders creates a custom of offending, and company authorizes a crime, and there is more good to be done upon a *dissolute age* by *patience* than by *rigor*; provided that it pass not for an *approbation* of *ill-manners*, but only as an *unwillingness* to proceed to *extremities*. Under a merciful prince, a man will be ashamed to offend, because a punishment that is inflicted by a gentle governor seems to fall heavier and with more reproach: and it is remarkable also, that “those sins are often committed which are very often punished.” Caligula, in five years, condemned more people to the *sack* than ever were before him: and there were “fewer parricides before the law against them than after;” for our ancestors did wisely presume that the crime would never be committed, until by law for punishing it, they found that it might be done. *Parricides* began with the *law* against them, and the punishment instructed men in the *crime*. Where there are few punishments, innocence is indulged as a public good, and it is a dangerous thing to show a city how strong it is in delinquents. There is a certain contumacy in the nature of man that makes him oppose difficulties. We are better to follow than to drive; as a generous horse rides best with an easy bit. People *obey willingly* where they are *commanded kindly*.

When Burrhus the prefect was to sentence two malefactors, he brought the warrant to Nero to sign; who, after a long reluctance came to it at last with this exclamation: “I would I could not write!” A speech that deserved the whole world for an auditory, but all princes especially; and that the hearts

of all the subjects would conform to the likeness of their masters. As the head is well or ill, so is the mind dull or merry. What is the difference betwixt a *king* and a *tyrant*, but a *diversity of will* under one and *the same power*. The one destroys for his pleasure, the other upon necessity; a distinction rather in fact than in name.

A gracious prince is armed as well as a tyrant; but it is for the defence of his people and not for the ruin of them. No king can ever have faithful servants that accustoms them to tortures and executions; the very guilty themselves do not lead so anxious a life as the persecutors: for they are not only afraid of justice, both divine and human, but it is dangerous for them to mend their manners; so that when they are once in, they must continue to be wicked upon necessity. An universal hatred unites in a popular rage. A temperate fear may be kept in order; but when it comes once to be continual and sharp, it provokes people to extremities, and transports them to desperate resolutions, as wild beasts when they are pressed upon the *toil*, turn back and assault the very pursuers. A turbulent government is a perpetual trouble both to prince and people; and he that is a terror to all others is not without terror also himself. Frequent punishments and revenges may suppress the hatred of a few, but then it stirs up the detestation of all, so that there is no destroying one enemy without making many. It is good to master the *will* of being *cruel*, even while there may be cause for it, and matter to work upon.

Augustus was a gracious prince when he had the power in his own hand; but in the *triumviracy* he made use of his sword, and had his friends ready

armed to set upon Antony during that dispute. But he behaved himself afterwards at another rate; for when he was betwixt forty and fifty years of age he was told that Cinna was in a plot to murder him, with the time, place and manner of the design; and this from one of the confederates. Upon this he resolved upon a revenge, and sent for several of his friends to advise upon it. The thought of it kept him waking, to consider, that there was the life of a young nobleman in the case, the nephew of Pompey, and a person otherwise innocent. He was off and on several times whether he should put him to death or not. “What!” says he, “shall I live in trouble and in danger myself, and the contriver of my death walk free and secure? Will nothing serve him but that life which Providence has preserved in so many civil wars—in so many battles both by sea and land; and now in the state of an universal peace too—and not a simple murder either, but a sacrifice; for I am to be assaulted at the very altar—and shall the contriver of all this villany escape unpunished?” Here Augustus made a little pause, and then recollecting himself: “No, no, Cæsar,” says he, “it is rather Cæsar than Cinna that I am to be angry with: why do I myself live any longer after that my death is become the interest of so many people? And if I go on, what end will there be of blood and of punishment? If it be against my life that the nobility arm itself, and level its weapons, my single life is not worth the while, if so many must be destroyed that I may be preserved.”

His wife Livia gave him here an interruption, and desired him that he would for once hear a woman’s counsel. “Do,” says she, “like a physician, that when common remedies fail, will try the contrary:

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you have got nothing hitherto by severity—after Salvidianus there followed Lepidus—after him Muræna—Cæpio followed him, and Egnatius followed Cæpio—try now what mercy will do—forgive Cinna. He is discovered, and can do no hurt to your person; and it will yet advantage you in your reputation.” Augustus was glad of the advice, and he gave thanks for it; and thereupon countermanded the meeting of his friends, and ordered Cinna to be brought to him alone; for whom he caused a chair to be set, and then discharged the rest of the company. “Cinna,” says Augustus, “*before I go any farther*, you must promise not to give me the interruption of one syllable until I have told you all I have to say, and you shall have liberty afterwards to say what you please. You cannot forget, that when I found you in arms against me, and not only made my *enemy*, but *born* so, I gave you your life and fortune. Upon your petition for the priesthood, I granted it, with a repulse to the sons of those that had been my fellow-soldiers; and you are at this day so happy and so rich, that even the conquerors envy him that is overcome; and yet after all this, you are in a plot, Cinna, to murder me.” At that word Cinna started, and interposed with exclamations, “that certainly he was far from being either so wicked or so mad.” “This is a breach of conditions, Cinna,” says Augustus, “it is not your time to speak yet: I tell you again, that you are in a plot to murder me;” and so he told him the time, the place, the confederates, the order and manner of the design, and who it was that was to do the deed. Cinna, upon this, fixed his eye upon the ground without any reply: not for his word’s sake, but as in a confusion of conscience: and so Augustus went on.

“What,” says he, “may your design be in all this? Is it that you would pretend to step into my place? The commonwealth were in an ill condition, if only Augustus were in the way betwixt you and the government. You were cast the other day in a cause by one of your own *freemen*, and do you expect to find a weaker adversary of Cæsar? But what if I were removed? There is Æmilius Paulus, Fabius Maximus, and twenty other families of great blood and interest, that would never bear it.” To cut off the story short; (for it was a discourse of above two hours; and Augustus lengthened the punishment in *words*, since he intended that should be all;) “Well, Cinna,” says he, “the life that I gave to you once as an enemy, I will now repeat it to a *traitor* and to a *parricide*, and this shall be the last reproach I will give you. For the time to come there shall be no other contention betwixt you and me, than which shall outdo the other in point of friendship.” After this Augustus made Cinna *consul*, (an honor which he confessed he durst not so much as desire) and Cinna was ever affectionately faithful to him: he made Cæsar his *sole heir*; and this was the *last conspiracy* that ever was formed against him.

This moderation of Augustus was the excellency of his mature age; for in his youth he was passionate and sudden; and he did many things which afterward he looked back upon with trouble: after the battle of Actium, so many navies broken in Sicily, both *Roman* and *strangers*: the *Perusian altars*, where 300 *lives* were sacrificed to the *ghost* of Julius;) his frequent *proscriptions*, and other sverities; his *temperance* at last seemed to be little more than a weary cruelty. If he had not *forgiven* those that he

*conquered*, whom should he have *governed*? He chose his very *life-guard* from among his *enemies*, and the *flower* of the Romans owed their *lives* to his *clemency*. Nay, he only punished Lepidus himself with *banishment*, and permitted him to wear the *ensigns* of his *dignity*, without taking the *pontificate* to himself so long as Lepidus was living; for he would not possess it as a *spoil*, but as an *honor*. This *clemency* it was that secured him in his greatness, and ingratiated him to the people, though he laid his hand upon the government before they had thoroughly submitted to the yoke; and this clemency it was that made his *name famous* to *posterity*. This is it that makes us reckon him *divine* without the authority of an *apotheosis*. He was so tender and patient, that though many a bitter jest was broken upon him, (and *contumelies* upon princes are the most *intolerable* of all *injuries*) yet he never punished any man upon that subject. *It is*, then, generous to be merciful, when we have it in our power to take revenge.

A son of Titus Arius, being examined and found guilty of *parricide*, was banished Rome, and confined to Marseilles, where his father allowed him the same annuity that he had before; which made all people conclude him guilty, when they saw that his father had yet *condemned* the son that he could not hate. Augustus was pleased to sit upon the fact in the house of Arius, only as a *single member* of the *council* that was to examine it: if it had been in Cæsar's palace, the judgment must have been Cæsar's and not the *father's*. Upon a full hearing of the matter, Cæsar directed that every man should write his opinion whether *guilty or-not*, and without declaring of his own, for fear of a partial vote.

Before the opening of the books, Cæsar passed an oath, that he would not be Arius's *heir*: and to show that he had no interest in his sentence, as appeared afterward; for he was not condemned to the ordinary punishments of *parricides*, nor to a prison, but, by the mediation of Cæsar, only banished Rome, and confined to the place which his father should name; Augustus insisting upon it, that the father should content himself with an easy punishment: and arguing that the young man was not moved to the attempt by *malice*, and that he was but half resolved upon the fact, for he wavered in it; and, therefore, to remove him from the city, and from his father's sight, would be sufficient. This is a glorious mercy, and worthy of a prince, to make all things gentler wherever he comes.

How miserable is that man in himself, who, when he has employed his power in rapines and cruelty upon others, is yet more unhappy in himself! He stands in fear both of his domestics and of strangers; the faith of his friends and the piety of his children, and flies to actual violence to secure him from the violence he fears. When he comes to look about him, and to consider what he *has* done, what he *must*, and what he is *about* to do; what with the *wickedness*, and with the *torments* of his *conscience*, many times he fears death, oftener he wishes for it; and lives more odious to himself than to his subjects; whereas on the contrary, he that takes a care of the public, though of one part more perhaps than of another, yet there is not any part of it but he looks upon as part of himself. His mind is tender and gentle; and even where punishment is necessary and profitable, he comes to it unwillingly, and without any rancor or enmity in his heart. Let the

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authority, in fine, be what it will, clemency becomes it; and the greater the power, the greater is the glory of it. “It is a truly royal virtue for a prince to deliver his people *from other men's anger*, and not to oppress them *with his own*.”